Rocket impotence. why no one really needs the INF Treaty. On the US violation of the INF Treaty

Ground-based medium (from 1000 to 5500 km) and short (from 500 to 1000 km) range.

It should be noted, however, that this classification was finally introduced only by the 1987 treaty. Before it was signed in the United States, ballistic missiles were divided into intercontinental (over 5,000 km), medium (from 5,000 to 500 km) and shorter (from 150 to 500 km) range. In the USSR, until the mid-1980s, operational-tactical missiles (from 1 to 500 km) were also distinguished. In the USA, tactical (operational-tactical) missiles had a flight range from 1 to 150 km. In 1987, a new classification was finally established. Therefore, in relation to the period until the mid-1980s. V historical works It is legitimate to use both classifications.

In accordance with the agreement, the parties within three years should have destroyed everything launchers and rockets ground-based with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, including missiles on both European and Asian territory of the USSR. This was the first case in history of an agreement on a real reduction in existing weapons. The treaty also provided for verification procedures for inspectors who were to monitor the destruction of missiles. opposite side.

According to Art. 3 Agreements subject to destruction:

• rockets medium range
  • USSR - “RSD-10”, “R-12”, “R-14” (according to NATO classification, “SS-20”, “SS-4” and “SS-5”, respectively) and ground-based cruise missiles of the Republic of Kazakhstan- 55 (NATO classification - SSC-X-4 “Slingshot”);
  • USA - Pershing 2 and BGM-109G (land-based Tomahawk cruise missile);
• rockets short range
  • USSR - “OTR-22” and “OTR-23” (“SS-12” and “SS-23”);
  • USA - "Pershing-1A".

Background

In the mid-1970s. first in the USA and then in the USSR, systems for laser, infrared and television guidance of missiles at targets were created. This made it possible to achieve great accuracy in hitting targets (according to various estimates - up to 30 meters). Experts are talking about the possibility of applying a new type nuclear strike- decapitating or blinding, which would make it possible to destroy the elite of the opposite side before a decision is made to activate the retaliatory strike mechanism. This revived ideas about the possibility of victory in a “limited nuclear war” based on gains in flight time. On August 17, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced the concept of a decapitation (aka counter-elite) strike as the new basis of US nuclear policy. For this purpose, it was assumed that a gain in flight time would be achieved. The emphasis in deterrence has shifted from the strategic triad to medium- and shorter-range weapons. This approach was enshrined in key documents on US nuclear strategy.

In order to implement the doctrine, the United States began to modify the located in Western Europe Forward Based System. As part of this project, US-British cooperation on modification increased ballistic missiles on submarines and medium-range missiles. In Britain and France signed the Ottawa Declaration, according to which they pledged to develop common system defense, including the nuclear sphere. In the USSR, these actions were perceived as France’s rejection of the concept of “independent defense” and a partial revision of the Gaullian policy.

These actions caused alarm in the USSR. In the city, D. F. Ustinov became the Minister of Defense of the USSR, who was inclined towards a tough response to the actions of the United States. The basis of the modified nuclear strategy of the USSR was the build-up of the fleet of heavy ICBMs with MIRVs and, at the same time, the cover of the Eurostrategic direction. In 1977, the USSR, under the pretext of modifying the outdated RSD-4 and RSD-5 (SS-4 and SS-5) complexes, began deployment on western borders medium-range missiles RSD-10 "Pioneer" (SS-20). In total, about 300 missiles of this class were deployed, each of which was equipped with three warheads for individual targeting. This allowed the USSR to destroy NATO military infrastructure in Western Europe in a matter of minutes - control centers, command posts and, especially, ports (the latter, in case of war, made it impossible for American troops to land in Western Europe). Against the background of the total superiority of the USSR in conventional weapons, this gave Warsaw Pact complete military superiority in the European theater of operations

Prospects

Is Russia violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty? The Obama administration believes it is in violation, according to reports, and senior Republican lawmakers are calling for decisive action. "We believe it is imperative that Russian leaders not be allowed to believe that they stand to gain from violating this or any other treaty," wrote House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon, R-Calif. foreign affairs House of Representatives Ed Royce, also a Republican from California, and the head of the House Intelligence Committee, Republican Mike Rogers from Michigan.

Such statements create an extremely difficult situation. They are likely to further worsen Russian-American relations, which have already sunk to an extremely low point, and weaken the prospects for additional cuts nuclear weapons and could thwart President Obama's attempts to win congressional support for his Iran policy and achieve key achievements in the field of arms control.

The allegations of wrongdoing are twofold. The first concerns the new intercontinental ballistic missile "Yars" (RS-26) (RS-26 is called "Rubezh", the designation "Yars" is RS-24 - trans.), which, apparently, has been launched more than once at a distance less the upper limit under the INF Treaty (this treaty bans all American and Soviet/Russian missiles with a launch range from 500 to 5500 km). Although these tests may be concerning, they are not a violation. The RS-26 is, without a doubt, strategic missile(its range exceeds 5500 km), and there are no provisions in existing treaties prohibiting testing at ranges less than the maximum. Flight tests of the missile are apparently carried out to evaluate its ability to penetrate enemy defenses, and therefore the Russians use the Sary-Shagan test site, which specializes in missile defense issues, for launches. The second claim, which only recently became known, concerns an unidentified ground-launched cruise missile.

The American government, according to available information, repeatedly raised the question of conducting these tests with the Russians, but they replied that this was not a problem and refused further answers. On January 17, 2014, the United States informed NATO allies of its concerns. However, an official representative of the State Department explained that this issue is still being analyzed, and no one is classifying the actions of the Russians as violations.

The topic of compliance with the INF Treaty covers three different but closely interrelated aspects. One of them is of a technical nature: the nature of the allegations of violations, the characteristics of the missiles involved, and the issue of verification. The second relates to arms control and strategic issues - how the provisions of the INF Treaty fit (or do not fit) into Russian national security strategy. The third concerns politics, raising questions about why allegations of wrongdoing continue to surface in public debate, creating potential implications for American foreign policy.

Technical aspects: nature of concern

Technical issues are a complex maze of engineering, military and legal details. As noted above, Russian tests of the RS-26 ICBM are not a violation of the treaty: there is no ban on conducting tests at a reduced range in existing arms control treaties. No lower limit for flight tests strategic weapons- This is a legacy of Cold War approaches. At that time, the parties were mainly concerned about the maximum capabilities of weapons systems, be it range or the number of warheads mounted on a launch vehicle. There is also a technical reason: it is impossible to prevent unsuccessful launches, which can be classified as violations if it is established minimum distance for flight tests.

The situation with allegations of testing new ground-launched medium-range cruise missiles (the INF Treaty prohibits ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km) is more difficult to analyze because no specific information in this regard has been disclosed. Ballistic missiles, which often use the same propulsion systems as space rockets, fly along a steep trajectory, rising due to fuel and descending due to the force of gravity. Cruise missiles are guided, and they consume fuel throughout the flight, like aircraft torpedoes. One of the candidates for the role of a suspicious cruise missile could be the R-500 missile, created for the Iskander complex, which was originally designed for a ballistic missile.

"Iskander" was supposed to replace the operational-tactical missile system"Oka" (SS-23 according to NATO classification), which was eliminated as part of the INF Treaty. The decision to eliminate the Oka caused outrage among Soviet military leaders, who argued that its range was less than 500 km (450-470 km), and that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev made such a serious concession to the United States without their support. The Iskander has the same range as the Oka, that is, less than 500 km, and it does not violate the INF Treaty. However, there are strong suspicions that this range can be increased if necessary. According to the report National University defense of Finland, at the optimal range trajectory, the ballistic version of the Iskander can have a range of 600 and even 700 km. It is believed that the R-500 cruise missile, which was tested at 360 km, may have a flight radius “several times larger.” If, as many believe, the R-500 is a modified version of the Granat surface-to-surface cruise missile (SS-N-21 according to NATO classification), then theoretically it could actually have a longer range.

If we're talking about about the P-500, then allegations of possible violations may indicate several options:

The United States may have detected one or more tests conducted at ranges greater than 500 km;

The United States may have made a measurement error. Such measurements should be carried out by national technical means, and therefore they may not be accurate enough;

The American measurements could be based on calculations of the optimal range trajectory, and the Russian data could be taken from an actual flight path that includes two-dimensional maneuvers to avoid detection and interception by systems missile defense(in this case, the practical range may be less than 500 km, and the optimal range trajectory is greater).

In any of these cases, the excess range (over 500 km) is small, and it actually does not create any strategic difference. If this is so, then the dispute over the P-500 will end in the same way as dozens of unresolved problems with the implementation of treaties that are inevitable in the process of arms control and reductions end. In fact, Russia also has complaints against the United States regarding the implementation of agreements.

But there are also less likely possibilities. For example, this could be tests of the Granat missile. Available information suggests that these sea-launched cruise missiles have been removed from submarines and are now stored ashore. At the same time, the Russian military regularly tests old Soviet weapons systems to ensure they meet specifications. By various reasons Sometimes it is more convenient to launch rockets from the ground rather than from an offshore platform. There is also a joint Russian-Indian project to create the BrahMos II cruise missile, which is designed to be launched from different platforms, including from the ground. But this project is still in the early stages of implementation.

Or Russia could test a new ground-launched cruise missile with a range well beyond the 500 km limit. Without even basic information, it will be difficult to make a comprehensive assessment of the implications of such a system for strategy and the arms control regime. However, the fact that the State Department stopped short of calling the case a violation and instead said it was a matter of concern and required further assessment and consultation suggests that the Russians are unlikely to develop a new long-range (over 500 km) ground-launched cruise missile. Meanwhile, an analysis of Russia's behavior in the field of arms control and strategy indicates that it is unlikely to cheat on the treaty in order to increase the missile's range by some hundred kilometers.

Aspects of arms control: attitude towards the INF Treaty in Russia

It is well known that many influential figures from among the leadership Russian elite oppose the INF Treaty. In 2005, Vladimir Putin’s close ally Sergei Ivanov, who was then the Minister of Defense, spoke about Russia’s possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty during a conversation with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

Subsequent debates in Moscow led to a decision not to withdraw from the treaty, but the issue still surfaces from time to time. The main justification is that medium-range missiles are created by countries located to the south of Russia - China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and others. It can be said that the fate of the INF Treaty in Russia hangs by a very thin thread.

Some say that Russia's cool attitude towards the INF Treaty can be explained by an attempt to circumvent or even violate it. But most likely, something completely different is true: if Moscow decides that the INF Treaty interferes with its critical R&D programs, then it will not hesitate to withdraw from it.

At the core Russian strategy security lies in preventing the possible use of precision-guided conventional weapons (such as Navy Tomahawk missiles) by the United States and NATO, as they did during the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, and in other countries over the past 15 years. Russian military doctrine 2000 provides for the limited use of nuclear weapons against air bases and command centers in order to counter a perceived threat. However, the use of nuclear weapons was from the very beginning considered a temporary measure, valid until the country gained modern means non-nuclear deterrence and deterrence. Iskanders filled one of these niches of non-nuclear potential (there is currently no evidence that Russia is testing these missiles for use with nuclear warheads, although this is theoretically possible), and in this sense they play important role, being aimed at whole line potential targets without the threat of a nuclear strike.

If Iskanders are deployed in the Kaliningrad region, located as an enclave between Poland and Lithuania, these missiles with a range of 500 km will be able to hit targets throughout almost the entire territory of Poland and the Baltic countries, which is a possible springboard for NATO strikes. If the range of these missiles increases by 100 or even 200 kilometers, the situation will not change radically.

Therefore, it seems quite logical that if Russia decided to deploy medium-range ground-based missiles, it would aim for some kind of quantum leap, say, to obtain systems with a range of 1000-1500 km. Such missiles would allow Russia to endanger not only a large part of the European theater of operations, but also other countries to the south of Russia.

Withdrawal from the INF Treaty is unlikely to be a serious problem if this agreement interferes with the development of weapons that the Russian leadership considers important for further development non-nuclear deterrence potential. Quitting the treaty will certainly support most of elite. If Putin introduces such a bill to parliament, it will be adopted without debate and without meeting serious opposition.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2003 will be a necessary pretext. Like the George W. Bush administration, Moscow could argue that the INF Treaty is a relic of the Cold War, that maintaining it is detrimental to the country's security (citing the missile programs of Russia's southern neighbors), and that it has no intention of developing intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Moreover, the state of Russian-American relations today is such that, in the opinion of Russian leadership, the cancellation of some old contract is unlikely to worsen it even more.

Thus, the case that Russia is in serious violation of the INF Treaty appears weak. As noted above, testing the RS-26 is not a violation. At worst, it is exploiting a legal loophole for one's own advantage. The story of the cruise missile test is uncertain, but the fact is that American government did not want to call it a violation, speaks of his uncertainty. In the history of Soviet-American and Russian-American arms control, there were dozens of similar cases when the parties expressed concern about each other's actions. In most cases, these concerns were not resolved until they were no longer relevant.

As a rule, these were technical issues discussed by technical experts over closed doors. Why then did these allegations about a possible violation of the INF Treaty appear at all? Most likely, the reasons should be sought not in the essence of the arms control process, but in alliances and the peculiarities of domestic politics.

Political aspects: Russian-American relations and domestic politics USA

The most consistent and persistent questions about the deployment of Iskanders are asked Baltic states, in particular Lithuania. Referring to these missiles, she speaks of the need to preserve American nuclear bombs free fall in Europe, although many old members of the North Atlantic Alliance are in favor of their withdrawal. News of the suspicious tests emerged after a January NATO meeting.

And domestically, a group of Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee wrote a letter that suggests the Grand Old Party saw the information as an opportunity to stall the administration's initiatives in a number of areas, such as further reductions in US and Russian nuclear weapons. and the Iranian nuclear program.

The news comes shortly after the interim nuclear deal with Iran went into effect and President Obama threatened to veto any attempts by Congress to impose new sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Republicans on the Armed Services Committee argue that the new agreement will allow Iran to deceive the United States without suffering serious punitive sanctions, and say the administration's actions toward Russia prove them right.

Similarly, Republicans were extremely skeptical of Obama's 2013 proposal to cut deployed strategic weapons by another third. nuclear charges The USA and Russia within the framework of the START-3 treaty concluded in 2010 - from 1550 to 1000 units. Their main concern is that Obama may try to implement these cuts by bypassing the Senate, whose approval of treaties is mandatory.

Paradoxically, here they found common ground with Russian opponents of compromise. Moscow is demonstrating a clear reluctance to engage in cuts beyond those provided for in START III. Any action that weakens the prospects for such cuts will be supported by Russian government(of course, it will publicly state otherwise). Moreover, if the initiative comes from the United States, it will be beneficial for Moscow, since the blame for the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament she will be able to lay it on the opposite side.

Moreover, these leaks come at a time when the Senate is considering the nomination of Rose Gottemoeller. Gottemoeller, who served as America's top diplomat in New START negotiations, has been serving as undersecretary of state for arms control and international policy for several years. She is expected to be appointed to this position on a permanent basis. But the price of its approval may be the resolution of the INF Treaty dispute on terms favorable to opponents of the new cuts. Specifically, this means forcing Russia to admit to violating the treaty in a way that further disrupts the administration's arms control plans.

Nikolay Sokov is a senior researcher at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation. Miles Pomper - Senior Fellow at the Monterey Institute international studies(Monterey Institute of International Studies) and former editor of Arms Control Today.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

The parties to the treaty pledged not to produce, test or deploy medium-range (1,000 to 5,500 km) and short-range (500 to 1,000 km) land-based ballistic and cruise missiles.

It should be noted, however, that this classification was finally introduced only by the 1987 treaty. Before it was signed in the United States, ballistic missiles were divided into intercontinental (over 5,000 km), medium (from 5,000 to 500 km) and shorter (from 150 to 500 km) range. In the USSR, until the mid-1980s, operational-tactical missiles (from 1 to 500 km) were also distinguished. In the USA, tactical (operational-tactical) missiles had a flight range from 1 to 150 km. In 1987, a new classification was finally established. Therefore, in relation to the period until the mid-1980s. in historical works it is legitimate to use both classifications.

In accordance with the agreement, the parties were required to destroy, within three years, all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, including missiles on both European and Asian territory of the USSR. This was the first case in history of an agreement on a real reduction in existing weapons. The treaty also provided for verification procedures for inspectors who were supposed to monitor the destruction of the opposing side's missiles.

According to Art. 3 Agreements subject to destruction:

• medium range missiles
  • USSR - “RSD-10”, “R-12”, “R-14” (according to NATO classification, “SS-20”, “SS-4” and “SS-5”, respectively) and ground-based cruise missiles of the Republic of Kazakhstan- 55 (NATO classification - SSC-X-4 “Slingshot”);
  • USA - Pershing 2 and BGM-109G (land-based Tomahawk cruise missile);
• short range missiles
  • USSR - “OTR-22” and “OTR-23” (“SS-12” and “SS-23”);
  • USA - "Pershing-1A".

Background

In the mid-1970s. first in the USA and then in the USSR, systems for laser, infrared and television guidance of missiles at targets were created. This made it possible to achieve great accuracy in hitting targets (according to various estimates - up to 30 meters). Experts have started talking about the possibility of delivering a new type of nuclear strike - a decapitating or blinding strike, which would make it possible to destroy the elite of the opposite side before a decision is made to activate the retaliatory strike mechanism. This revived ideas about the possibility of victory in a “limited nuclear war” based on gains in flight time. On August 17, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced the concept of a decapitation (aka counter-elite) strike as the new basis of US nuclear policy. For this purpose, it was assumed that a gain in flight time would be achieved. The emphasis in deterrence has shifted from the strategic triad to medium- and shorter-range weapons. This approach was enshrined in key documents on US nuclear strategy.

In order to implement the doctrine, the United States began to modify the Forwad Based System located in Western Europe. The project increased US-British cooperation on the modification of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intermediate-range missiles. In the city, Britain and France signed the Ottawa Declaration, according to which they pledged to develop a common defense system, including the nuclear sphere. In the USSR, these actions were perceived as France’s rejection of the concept of “independent defense” and a partial revision of the Gaullian policy.

These actions caused alarm in the USSR. In the city, D. F. Ustinov became the Minister of Defense of the USSR, who was inclined towards a tough response to the actions of the United States. The basis of the modified nuclear strategy of the USSR was the build-up of the fleet of heavy ICBMs with MIRVs and, at the same time, the cover of the Eurostrategic direction. In 1977, the USSR, under the pretext of modifying the outdated RSD-4 and RSD-5 (SS-4 and SS-5) complexes, began deployment on the western borders of medium-range missiles RSD-10 "Pioneer" (SS-20). In total, about 300 missiles of this class were deployed, each of which was equipped with three warheads of individual targeting. This allowed the USSR to destroy military infrastructure in a matter of minutes NATO in Western Europe - control centers, command posts and, especially, ports (the latter, in the event of war, made it impossible for American troops to land in Western Europe). Against the backdrop of the total superiority of the USSR in conventional weapons, this gave the Warsaw Pact complete military superiority in the European theater of operations

Prospects

A similar statement about Russia’s possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty was made earlier (in June) by Russian President Vladimir Putin in response to the US announcement of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems.

In February 2007, the commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General

USSR stamp, Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987

(INF Treaty, INF Treaty) - an agreement between the USSR and the USA, signed by M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan on December 8, 1987 during the Soviet-American meeting at top level in Washington.

The agreement entered into force on June 1, 1988. For the first time in history, the treaty made it possible to eliminate an entire class of weapons: the parties pledged to destroy all systems of ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles of medium (1000-5500 km) and shorter (from 500 to 1000 km) range, and also not to produce, test or deploy such rockets in the future. In accordance with the Treaty, the parties were required to destroy, within three years, all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, including missiles on both European and Asian territory of the USSR. The treaty provided for verification procedures by inspectors who were to monitor the destruction of the opposing side's missiles.

Before the Treaty was signed in the United States, ballistic missiles were divided into [ ] for intercontinental (over 5000 km), medium (from 500 to 5000 km) and short (from 150 to 500 km) ranges. In the USSR until the mid-1980s [ ] operational-tactical missiles (from 1 to 500 kilometers) also stood out. In the USA, tactical (operational-tactical) missiles had [ ] flight range from 1 to 150 kilometers. In 1987, with the signing of the Treaty, a new classification was finally established. In relation to the period until the mid-1980s, it is legitimate to use both classifications in historical works.

According to Art. 3 Agreements subject to destruction:

By June 1991, the Treaty was implemented: the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems (about half of them were manufactured missiles that were not on combat duty); USA - 846 complexes.

After several mutual accusations of violating the INF Treaty, the parties in February 2019 announced the suspension of compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

Background [ | ]

In the mid-1970s, first in the USA and then in the USSR, laser, infrared and television missile guidance systems were created. This made it possible to achieve great accuracy in hitting targets (according to various estimates - up to 30 meters). Experts have started talking about the possibility of delivering a new type of nuclear strike - a decapitating or blinding strike, which would make it possible to destroy the leadership of the opposite side before a decision is made to activate the retaliatory strike mechanism. This revived ideas about the possibility of victory in a “limited nuclear war” due to the gain in flight time. On August 17, 1973, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger unveiled the concept of the decapitation strike as a new basis for US nuclear policy. To implement it, it was assumed that a gain in flight time would be achieved. The priority in the development of nuclear deterrents shifted from the strategic triad to medium- and shorter-range weapons. In 1974, this approach was enshrined in the fundamental documents on US nuclear strategy.

In order to implement the doctrine, the United States began to modify the Forward Based System located in Western Europe. The project increased US-British cooperation on the modification of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intermediate-range missiles. In 1974, Great Britain and France signed the Ottawa Declaration, according to which they pledged to develop a common defense system, including the nuclear sphere. In the USSR, these actions were perceived as France's abandonment of the concept of "independent defense" and a partial revision of the Gaullism policy.

These actions caused alarm in the USSR. In 1976, D. F. Ustinov became the Minister of Defense of the USSR, who was inclined towards a tough response to US actions. The basis of the modified nuclear strategy of the USSR was the expansion of the fleet of heavy ICBMs with MIRVs and, at the same time, covering the European strategic direction. In 1977, the USSR, under the pretext of modifying the outdated RSD-4 and RSD-5 (SS-4 and SS-5) systems, began deploying RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) medium-range missiles on its western borders. In total, about 300 missiles of this class were deployed, each of which was equipped with three warheads for individual targeting. This allowed the USSR to destroy NATO's military infrastructure in Western Europe in a matter of minutes - control centers, command posts and, especially, ports (the latter, in the event of war, made it impossible for American troops to land in Western Europe). Against the background of the total superiority of the USSR in conventional weapons, this gave the Warsaw Pact Organization complete military superiority in the European theater of operations.

In response, on December 12, 1979, the NATO Council adopted a “dual decision” that provided for the deployment of 572 Pershing-2 missiles in Europe by 1983. The short flight time of the Pershing-2 missiles (6-8 minutes) gave the United States the opportunity to launch a first strike on command posts and launchers of Soviet ICBMs (at the same time, the deployed nuclear missiles were not taken into account in the Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons). At the same time, NATO countries agreed to begin negotiations with the USSR in order to solve the problem of Soviet Euro-missiles by 1983.

Negotiation [ | ]

But the United States refused to conduct “package negotiations.” In September 1983, the Americans began deploying their missiles in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. On November 22, 1983, the Bundestag voted for the deployment of Pershing 2 missiles on German territory. These actions caused a sharply negative reaction in the USSR. On November 24, 1983, Yu. V. Andropov made a special statement, which spoke about the growing danger of nuclear war in Europe, the USSR's withdrawal from the Geneva negotiations on Euromissiles and the adoption of retaliatory measures - the deployment of OTR-23 "Oka" ("SS-23" ) on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Having a range of up to 450 km, they could theoretically sweep through the entire territory of Germany, that is, deliver a preventive disarming strike on the Pershing locations. At the same time, the USSR put forward its atomic submarines closer to the US coast.

An attempt to resume contacts between the parties began immediately after the death of Yu. V. Andropov, which occurred on February 9, 1984. His funeral on 14 February was attended by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US Vice President George H. W. Bush. They proposed resuming negotiations on Euromissiles on the condition that the USSR “unblocks the package.” However, there was no unity in the Soviet leadership. New general secretary CPSU Central Committee K. U. Chernenko advocated negotiations with NATO countries, but Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov (who became in fact the second person in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee) categorically refused to unblock the package. On June 29, 1984, the USSR proposed resuming negotiations on “Euromissiles” on package terms. However, the United States (as expected) did not agree with this position. Since the USSR continued the deployment of the OTR-23 Oka in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which began under Yu. V. Andropov, the United States announced in the summer of 1984 that it intended to deploy Lance operational-tactical missiles with neutron warheads in Europe.

In December 1984, a Soviet delegation led by M. S. Gorbachev visited the UK. But, despite the warm welcome, M. Thatcher categorically refused to conduct “package” negotiations. The situation changed after the death of D.F. Ustinov on December 20, 1984 - a compromise line prevailed in the Soviet leadership. On February 7, 1985, at a meeting with US Secretary of State J. Shultz in Geneva, USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko agreed to conduct negotiations on Euromissiles separately from negotiations on space weapons. After Gorbachev's election general secretary The CPSU Central Committee resumed negotiations on March 10, 1985.

The USSR's position in the negotiations became softer. In the summer of 1985, Gorbachev introduced a moratorium on the deployment of the OTR-23 Oka in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Gorbachev and Reagan made an attempt to reach an agreement on in November 1985. It ended in failure: the United States refused to withdraw medium-range missiles from Europe, and the USSR was close to blocking the package again. But in January 1986, Gorbachev announced a program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world and made a number of serious concessions. At the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik, the USSR agreed to “unblock the package” - to negotiate on the INF separately from SDI.

In the fall of 1986, the USSR proposed an option for the removal of medium-range missiles: the USSR would withdraw the RSD-10 beyond the Urals, and the United States would remove the Pershing-2 and ground-based cruise missiles to North America. Reagan agreed to accept this option. However, on December 24, 1986, Japan categorically opposed it: Tokyo feared that the USSR would redirect the RSD-10 at them. On January 1, 1987, China also opposed this option, where they also feared that they could become a target for the RSD-10. As a result, when the USSR proposed the “double zero” project in February 1987, the United States, taking into account the interests of Japan, refused to accept it.

Result of negotiations[ | ]

A compromise was reached during negotiations between USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze in Washington in September 1987.

The USSR agreed to develop a unified classification for the INF Treaty and include the OTR-23 Oka (SS-23) in the future treaty, although they did not fall under the INF Treaty definition. The United States, in turn, promised to destroy the Tomahawk ground-based cruise missiles and abandon deployment in Central Europe OTR "Lance-2" with neutron warheads.

On December 8, 1987, the Washington Treaty was signed, under the terms of which the parties agreed to destroy all INF missiles as a class.

Execution of the Agreement[ | ]

By June 1991, the Treaty was implemented: the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems (about half of them were manufactured missiles that were not on combat duty); USA - 846 complexes.

Execution of the Agreement[ | ]

Termination of the Agreement[ | ]

Russian claims against the United States for violations of the Treaty[ | ]

On February 15, 2007, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Yuri Baluevsky, said that Russia could begin to review the entire treaty-legal system of nuclear deterrence in response to the deployment of elements of the American missile defense system in Eastern Europe. In particular, he said, Russia can unilaterally withdraw from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: “The Treaty... is of an open-ended nature, but the possibility of withdrawing from it exists if one of the parties provides convincing evidence of the need for withdrawal. Today they exist: many countries are developing and improving medium-range missiles, and Russia, having fulfilled the INF Treaty, has lost many of these weapon systems.”

A similar statement about Russia’s possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty was made earlier (in June 2000) by Russian President Vladimir Putin in response to the US announcement of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

In February 2007, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, said at a press conference that Russia was ready to restore the production of medium-range ballistic missiles: “As a class of MRBMs, they were destroyed, but all the documentation remained, all the technology remained. IN shortest time, if necessary, production of these complexes will be restored. But with new technologies, on a new element base, with new system management, with new opportunities." This statement was made in response to reports that Poland and the Czech Republic intend to accept the US proposal to deploy missile defense elements (surveillance radars and interceptor missiles) on their territory.

This approach is also reflected in official documents- Thus, in the Review of Russian Foreign Policy (2007) it was noted: “The situation emerging around the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) is of concern. Missiles of these two classes were destroyed in accordance with the Treaty back in 1991, but since then this international legal act has not been given a universal character. Moreover, everything larger number States, including those located near our borders, are developing and putting such missiles into service. In these conditions, it is necessary to think about ensuring our own security.”

From Russia's perspective, the United States has violated the INF Treaty by deploying interceptor missile launchers in Europe that could hypothetically be used to deploy cruise missiles, using target missiles similar in characteristics to ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, and increasing production and use attack unmanned aerial vehicles.

Vertical launcher modules mk.41, already located in the missile defense system in Poland and Romania, make it possible to launch not only Standard 2 and Standard 3 anti-missile missiles, but also Tomahawk missiles (Tomahawk is a medium-range cruise missile (1000-2200 km), capable of carrying and nuclear warheads).

In 2013, the United States began test launches from the ground of the AGM-158B aircraft cruise missile with a range of a thousand kilometers. And in December 2017, President Trump signed a defense bill, which, among other things, provided for the allocation of $25 million for the development of a new cruise missile of this type. From the Russian point of view, this is a violation of the INF Treaty.

In June 2013, Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex, called the USSR’s decision to abandon medium-range missiles “at least controversial,” and the head of the presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov, announced the possibility of withdrawal Russian Federation from the Treaty.

Withdrawal from the Treaty[ | ]

In July 2014, US President Barack Obama, in a letter to Vladimir Putin, for the first time at the level of heads of state, accused Russia of testing medium-range cruise missiles that violate the Treaty. The USA claims that in 2008-2011. Russia, in violation of the Treaty, tested a ground-based cruise missile with a range of more than 500 km (we are talking about the 9M729 missile, developed by the Yekaterinburg Novator Design Bureau named after Lyulev); According to Russian officials, the range of this missile is obviously less than 500 km).

In November 2016, in Geneva for the first time since 2003, at the initiative of the United States, a meeting of a special control commission within the framework of the INF Treaty was convened, but the concerns of the parties could not be addressed.

On October 31, in an article in Foreign Policy, John Wolfsthal (director of the Nuclear Crisis Group, former special assistant to President Barack Obama and senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council) criticized Trump's decision. In particular, John Wolfsthal argues that: “Reversing this treaty would make the United States and its allies (which Trump clearly doesn’t care about) less secure and undermine global foundations non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".

On November 26, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that Moscow considers the US deployment of launchers for guided missiles MK41 as part of the Aegis Ashore complexes in Europe, which, contrary to the Treaty, “allow the combat use of Tomahawk medium-range cruise missiles and other strike weapons from the ground.”

On December 5, Vladimir Putin commented on Pompeo’s statement, recalling that the United States first announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty and only after that began to provide reasons for its decision, shifting responsibility to Russia: “No evidence of violations on our part is provided,” the Russian President noted.

On December 17, in an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, commander Rocket Forces strategic purpose Colonel General Sergei Karakaev said that “the impact of the consequences of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the subsequent deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe and the associated new threats to our security are undoubtedly taken into account.” Karakaev said that by the end of the year it is planned to supply about 100 new types of weapons to the troops, including stationary and mobile-based Yars missile systems. This will be one of the Russian responses to the deployment of the US missile defense system in countries of Eastern Europe. According to Karakaev, a number of military-technical measures will sufficiently reduce the effectiveness promising system US missile defense in Europe.

Russian-American negotiations on the treaty that took place on January 15, 2019 in Geneva ended in failure, primarily due to disagreements between the parties regarding claims to the Russian 9M729 missile.

On January 23, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation invited foreign military attaches and journalists to a briefing, where some performance characteristics ground-based cruise missile 9M729, a launcher and a transport-launch container were demonstrated. Representatives of the United States and the military of a number of other NATO member countries, as well as the EU, including Great Britain, Germany and France, ignored the invitation. The demonstration of the Russian 9M729 missile, however, did not dissuade the United States that Russia is violating the INF Treaty. The official representative of the US Embassy in the Russian Federation, Andrea Kalan, told Interfax: “The United States and most of our NATO allies refused to attend this briefing, in which we all saw only another attempt hide the violation and create the appearance of transparency."

On February 1, 2019, US President Donald Trump announced the start of the withdrawal procedure from the Treaty. “Russia has been violating the INF Treaty with impunity for too long, secretly developing and deploying prohibited missile system, which poses a direct threat to our allies and troops abroad. Tomorrow, the United States will terminate its obligations under the INF Treaty and begin the process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which will be completed in 6 months unless Russia returns to compliance by destroying all of its missiles, installations and associated equipment that violate the treaty,” Trump said.

On February 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia, in response to US actions, was also suspending participation in the Treaty: “American partners ... announced that they are engaged in research, development and development work, and we will do the same.” At the same time, Putin demanded that we no longer initiate negotiations with the United States on disarmament: “We will wait until our partners are mature enough to conduct an equal, meaningful dialogue with us on this most important topic - both for us, and for our partners, and for the whole world.” ".

On February 2, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the United States began preparing for the production of missiles prohibited by the Treaty two years before it announced its withdrawal from the INF Treaty: “According to irrefutable data available to the Russian Ministry of Defense, since June 2017 at the military-industrial enterprise Raytheon Corporation in Tucson, Arizona, has launched an expansion and modernization program production capacity in order to create medium- and shorter-range missiles prohibited by the INF Treaty.” Over the past two years, the area of ​​this largest manufacturing plant in the United States missile weapons increased by 44%, and the number of personnel increased by 2 thousand people.

On February 5, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu conference call The ministry said that in 2019-2020, in response to the US decision to suspend implementation of the INF Treaty, a ground-based version of the sea-based Kalibr complex with a long-range cruise missile will be developed. At the same time, it is necessary to create a ground-based missile system with hypersonic missile long range.

On February 7, the Russian Ministry of Defense, having familiarized itself with the contents of the US State Department’s note on the suspension of the American side’s participation in the INF Treaty and the beginning of the procedure for withdrawing from it, rejected “unfounded allegations about Russia’s violation of its obligations under this treaty” and, in turn, accused the United States of that they did not take the necessary actions to eliminate their violation of their own obligations under the Treaty. In this regard, the Russian Ministry of Defense proposed that the American side, in the period before the termination of the Treaty, return to its implementation and “accept necessary measures to return to strict compliance with the Treaty by destroying” several types of missiles and military equipment:

The corresponding note was presented to the military attaché at the US Embassy in Moscow.

On February 8, the US mission to NATO stated that the Aegis Ashore missile defense system is “fully compliant with US obligations under the INF Treaty” and is capable of launching “only defensive interceptor missiles”, which in turn are not subject to the Treaty. According to the American side, American attack UAVs do not violate the Treaty either: “The INF Treaty does not place any restrictions on the development, testing and use of reusable armed drones. According to the United States, the term “missile”, which is used in the Treaty, is applicable only to disposable items.”

see also [ | ]

Notes [ | ]

1. History of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles // Kommersant, 12/07/2017
2. The US has targeted sanctions against the Russian missile. Negotiations in Geneva on the INF Treaty are under threat of failure // Kommersant, 12/11/2017
3. Putin announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the missile treaty (undefined) . Lenta.ru (February 2, 2019). Retrieved February 2, 2019.
4. Russia “may withdraw” from the US missile treaty (undefined) . BBC(February 15, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
5. Vladimir Solovyov. Intelligence in words // The United States asked Russia to hold back its missiles (undefined) . Kommersant(February 17, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
6. Denis Zhukov; Olga Sokolik. Russia gave an “asymmetrical” response (undefined) . RBC daily(February 20, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
7. Russian Foreign Ministry | 03/27/2007 | Review of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation
8. Obituary on the arms control regime. The price of the issue // "Kommersant", 08.12.17
9. “Saving the treaty requires a more responsible approach on the part of the United States.” Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov on threats to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty // Kommersant, 12/8/2017
10. INF Treaty: On Russian claims against the United States (undefined) . Journalistic Truth (December 7, 2018). Retrieved December 10, 2018.

Ballistic missiles were divided [ ] for intercontinental (over 5000 kilometers), medium (from 500 to 5000 kilometers) and shorter (from 150 to 500 kilometers) ranges. In the USSR until the mid-1980s [ ] operational-tactical missiles (from 1 to 500 kilometers) also stood out. In the USA, tactical (operational-tactical) missiles had [ ] flight range from 1 to 150 kilometers. In 1987, a new classification was finally established. Therefore, in relation to the period until the mid-1980s, it is legitimate to use both classifications in historical works.

In accordance with the agreement, the parties were required to destroy, within three years, all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, including missiles on both European and Asian territory of the USSR. This was the first case in history of an agreement on a real reduction in existing weapons. The treaty also provided for verification procedures by inspectors who were to ensure the destruction of the opposing side's missiles.

According to Art. 3 Agreements subject to destruction:

• medium range missiles
  • USSR - RSD-10 “Pioneer”, “R-12”, “R-14” (according to NATO classification, “SS-20”, “SS-4” and “SS-5”, respectively) and ground-based cruise missiles of the Republic of Kazakhstan -55 (NATO classification - SSC-X-4 “Slingshot”);
  • USA - Pershing 2 and BGM-109G (land-based Tomahawk cruise missile);
• short range missiles
  • USSR - OTR-22 Temp-S and OTR-23 Oka (SS-12 and SS-23);
  • USA - "Pershing-1A".

These actions caused alarm in the USSR. In 1976, D. F. Ustinov became the Minister of Defense of the USSR, who was inclined towards a tough response to the actions of the United States. The basis of the modified nuclear strategy of the USSR was the expansion of the fleet of heavy ICBMs with MIRVs and, at the same time, covering the “Eurostrategic” direction. In 1977, the USSR, under the pretext of modifying the outdated RSD-4 and RSD-5 (SS-4 and SS-5) complexes, began deploying medium-range RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) missiles on its western borders. In total, about 300 missiles of this class were deployed, each of which was equipped with three warheads for individual targeting. This allowed the USSR to destroy NATO's military infrastructure in Western Europe in a matter of minutes - control centers, command posts and, especially, ports (the latter, in the event of war, made it impossible for American troops to land in Western Europe). Against the background of the total superiority of the USSR in conventional weapons, this gave the Warsaw Pact complete military superiority in the European theater of operations.

On December 8, 1987, the Washington Treaty was signed, under which the parties agreed to destroy the INF as a class of missiles under the control of inspectors.

Entry into force of the agreement

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