July 14, 1941 at one of the defense sectors 20 th army, in the forest to the east Orsha, flames shot up to the sky, accompanied by an unusual rumble, not at all similar to the shots of artillery guns. Clouds of black smoke rose above the trees, and faint arrows hissed toward the German positions in the sky.
Soon the entire area of the local station, captured by the Nazis, was engulfed in fierce fire. The Germans, stunned, fled in panic. It took the enemy a long time to gather their demoralized units. So for the first time in history they declared themselves Katyusha.
The first combat use by the Red Army of powder rockets of a new type refers to the battles on Khalkhin Gol. On May 28, 1939, Japanese troops occupying Manchuria, in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, launched an offensive against Mongolia, with which the USSR was bound by a treaty of mutual assistance. A local, but no less bloody war began. And here in August 1939 a group of fighters I-16 under the command of a test pilot Nikolay Zvonarev first used RS-82 missiles.
The Japanese initially decided that their planes were attacked by a well-camouflaged anti-aircraft gun... Only a few days later, one of the officers who took part in the air battle reported: "I saw bright flashes of flame under the wings of the Russian planes!"
"Katyusha" in combat position
Experts flew in from Tokyo, examined the wrecked planes and agreed that such destruction could only be caused by a shell with a diameter of at least 76 mm. But calculations showed that an aircraft capable of withstanding the recoil of a cannon of this caliber simply could not exist! Only on experimental fighters were 20 mm cannons tested. To find out the secret, a real hunt was announced for the planes of Captain Zvonarev and his comrades-in-arms pilots Pimenov, Fedorov, Mikhailenko and Tkachenko. But the Japanese failed to shoot down or land at least one car.
The results of the first use of missiles launched from aircraft surpassed all expectations. In less than a month of fighting (on September 15, an armistice was signed), the pilots of the Zvonarev group made 85 sorties and in 14 air battles shot down 13 enemy planes!
Rockets, which proved to be so successful on the battlefield, were developed from the beginning of the 1930s at the Reactive Research Institute (RNII), which, after the repressions of 1937-1938, was led by a chemist Boris Slonimer... He worked directly on rockets Yuri Pobedonostsev, who now has the honor to be called their author.
The success of the new weapon spurred work on the first version of the multiple-charge installation, which later turned into a Katyusha. In NII-3 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, as the RNII was called before the war, he supervised this work as a chief engineer Andrey Kostikov, Modern historians speak quite disrespectfully of Kostikov. And this is true, because the archives revealed his denunciations of colleagues (on the same Pobedonostsev).
The first version of the future "Katyusha" was charged 132 -mm shells similar to those used by Captain Zvonarev at Khalkhin Gol. The entire installation with 24 guides was mounted on a ZIS-5 truck. Here the authorship belongs to Ivan Gvay, who made before that "Flute" - an installation for rockets on the I-15 and I-16 fighters. The first field tests near Moscow, carried out at the beginning of 1939, revealed many flaws.
Military specialists who approached the assessment rocket artillery from the positions of cannon artillery, we saw a technical curiosity in these strange machines. But, despite the ridicule of the gunners, the staff of the institute continued to work hard on the second version of the launcher. It was installed on a more powerful ZIS-6 truck. However, 24 guides, mounted, as in the first version, across the vehicle, did not ensure the stability of the vehicle when firing.
Field tests of the second version were carried out in the presence of the marshal Klim Voroshilova... Thanks to his benevolent assessment, the development team received the support of the command staff. At the same time, the designer Galkovsky proposed a completely new option: leave 16 guides and mount them longitudinally on the machine. In August 1939, the pilot plant was manufactured.
By then, the group led Leonid Schwartz designed and tested samples of new 132-mm missiles. In the fall of 1939, another series of tests was carried out at the Leningrad artillery range. This time launchers and the shells for them were approved. From that moment on, the rocket launcher was officially called BM-13, which meant "combat vehicle", and 13 is an abbreviation of the caliber of a 132-mm rocket.
The BM-13 combat vehicle was a chassis of a three-axle ZIS-6 vehicle, on which a rotary truss was installed with a package of guides and a guidance mechanism. For aiming, a rotary and lifting mechanism and an artillery sight were provided. In the rear of the combat vehicle there were two jacks, which ensured its greater stability when firing. The launch of the rockets was carried out with a handle electric coil connected to the battery and contacts on the guides. When the handle was turned, the contacts closed in turn, and in the next of the shells the starting squib was triggered.
At the end of 1939, the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army ordered NII-3 for the manufacture of six BM-13. By November 1940, this order was completed. On June 17, 1941, the vehicles were demonstrated at a review of the Red Army's weapons, held near Moscow. BM-13 was examined by the Marshal Tymoshenko, People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov, commissar of ammunition Vannikov and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. On June 21, following the results of the review, the command decided to deploy missile production M-13 and installations BM-13.
On the morning of June 22, 1941, NII-3 employees gathered within the walls of their institute. It was clear: no new weapons military trials will no longer pass - now it is important to collect all the installations and send them into battle. Seven BM-13 vehicles formed the backbone of the first rocket artillery battery, the decision on the formation of which was made on June 28, 1941. And already on the night of July 2, she departed on her own to the Western Front.
The first battery consisted of a command platoon, a sighting platoon, three fire platoons, a combat supply platoon, an economic department, a fuel and lubricants department, and a medical unit. In addition to seven BM-13 launchers and a 122-mm howitzer of the 1930 model, which served for zeroing, the battery had 44 trucks for the transportation of 600 M-13 rockets, 100 howitzer shells, entrenching tools, three refueling stations for fuel and lubricants, seven daily food rations and other property.
Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov - the first commander of the Katyusha experimental battery
The command staff of the battery was staffed mainly by students of the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy, who had just finished the first course of the command faculty. Captain appointed as battery commander Ivana Flerova- an artillery officer with experience Soviet-Finnish war... Neither the officers nor the numbers of the combat crews of the first battery had any special training; during the period of formation, only three lessons were possible.
They were led by the developers of rocket weapons, design engineer Popov and military engineer of the 2nd rank Shitov. Just before the end of the class, Popov pointed to a large wooden box mounted on the step of the combat vehicle. “When sending you to the front,” he said, “we will fill this box with corpulent checkers and put a squib, so that at the slightest threat of capture jet weapons the enemy could undermine both the installation and the shells. " Two days after the performance from Moscow, the battery became part of the 20th Army of the Western Front, which was fighting for Smolensk.
On the night of July 12-13, she was alerted and sent to Orsha. Many German echelons with troops, equipment, ammunition and fuel have accumulated at the Orsha station. Flerov ordered to deploy the battery five kilometers from the station, behind a hill. The engines of the vehicles were not turned off, so that after a volley, they would immediately leave the position. At 15 hours 15 minutes on July 14, 1941, Captain Flerov gave the order to open fire.
Here is the text of the report to the German General Staff: “The Russians used a battery with an unprecedented number of guns. High-explosive incendiary shells, but of unusual action. The troops fired upon by the Russians testify that a fire raid is like a hurricane. The shells explode at the same time. The losses in people are significant ”. The morale effect of the use of rocket launchers was overwhelming. The enemy lost more infantry battalion at Orsha station and great amount military equipment and weapons.
On the same day, Flerov's battery fired at the crossing over the Orshitsa River, where a lot of Nazi manpower and equipment was also accumulated. In the following days, the battery was used in various areas of operations of the 20th Army as a fire reserve for the chief of artillery of the army. Several successful volleys were fired at the enemy in the areas of Rudnya, Smolensk, Yartsevo, Dukhovshina. The effect exceeded all expectations.
The German command was trying to get hold of samples of the Russian miracle weapons. The hunt began for Captain Flerov's battery, as once for Zvonarev's fighters. On October 7, 1941, near the village of Bogatyr, Vyazemsky District, Smolensk Region, the Germans succeeded in encircling the battery. The enemy attacked her suddenly, on the march, firing from different directions. The forces were unequal, but the calculations fought desperately, Flerov used up the last of his ammunition and then blew up the launchers.
Leading people to a breakthrough, he died heroically. 40 people out of 180 survived, and everyone who survived after the death of the battery in October 1941 was declared missing, although they fought until the victory. Only 50 years after the first salvo of BM-13, the field near the village of Bogatyr revealed its secret. There, at last, the remains of Captain Flerov and 17 other missilemen who died with him were found. In 1995, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Ivan Flerov was posthumously awarded the title Hero of Russia.
Flerov's battery died, but the weapon existed and continued to inflict damage on the advancing enemy. In the first days of the war, the manufacture of new installations began at the Moscow plant "Compressor". The designers also did not need to be customized. In a matter of days, they completed the development of a new combat vehicle for 82-mm shells - BM-8. It began to be produced in two versions: one on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle with 6 guides, the other on the chassis of an STZ tractor or T-40 and T-60 tanks with 24 guides.
Obvious successes at the front and in production allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in August 1941 to decide on the formation of eight regiments of rocket artillery, which, even before taking part in battles, were given the name of "Guards mortar regiments of artillery of the Supreme Command Reserve". This emphasized the special importance that was attached to the new type of weapons. The regiment consisted of three divisions, a division - of three batteries, four BM-8 or BM-13 in each.
Guides were developed and manufactured for a rocket caliber 82 mm, which were later installed on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle (36 guides) and on the chassis of light tanks T-40 and T-60 (24 guides). Special launchers for missiles of 82 mm and 132 mm caliber were made for their subsequent installation on warships- torpedo boats and armored boats.
The production of BM-8 and BM-13 grew continuously, and the designers developed a new 300-mm M-30 rocket, weighing 72 kg and with a firing range of 2.8 km. They were nicknamed "Andrew" among the people. They were launched from a launcher ("frame") made of wood. The launch was carried out with the help of an engineer blasting machine. For the first time, "Andrews" were used in Stalingrad. The new weapons were easy to manufacture, but setting them in position and aiming at the target took a long time. In addition, the short range of M-30 rockets made them dangerous for their own calculations. Subsequently, combat experience showed that the M-30 - powerful weapon offensive capable destroy bunkers, trenches with canopies, stone buildings and other fortifications... There was even an idea to create a mobile phone based on Katyushas. anti-aircraft missile system for the destruction of enemy aircraft, however, the experimental installation was never brought to a serial model.
On the effectiveness of the combat use of "Katyusha" in the course of an offensive against a fortified enemy unit can serve as an example of the defeat of the Tolkachev defense unit during our counteroffensive near Kursk in July 1943. Village Tolkachevo was turned by the Germans into a heavily fortified center of resistance with big amount dugouts and bunkers in 5-12 roll-offs, with a developed network of trenches and communication trenches. The approaches to the village were densely mined and covered with barbed wire. By volleys of rocket artillery, a significant part of the bunkers was destroyed, the trenches, along with the enemy infantry in them, were filled up, the fire system was completely suppressed. Of the entire garrison of the knot, which numbered 450-500 people, only 28 survived. The Tolkachev knot was taken by our units without any resistance.
By the beginning of 1945, 38 separate divisions, 114 regiments, 11 brigades and 7 divisions armed with rocket artillery were operating on the battlefields. But there were also problems. The mass production of launchers was set up quickly, however wide application The Katyusha was held back due to a lack of ammunition. Absent industrial base for the manufacture of high quality projectile engine propellants. In this case, ordinary gunpowder could not be used - special grades were required with the desired surface and configuration, time, nature and combustion temperature. The deficit was limited only by the beginning of 1942, when the factories relocated from west to east began to pick up the required production rates. For all the time of the Great Patriotic War Soviet industry produced more than ten thousand combat vehicles of rocket artillery.
Origin of the name Katyusha
It is known why BM-13 installations were at one time referred to as "guards mortars". The BM-13 installations were not actually mortars, but the command tried to keep their design secret for as long as possible. When at firing ranges the soldiers and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to give the "real" name of the combat mount, he advised: "Call the installation as usual artillery piece... This is important to maintain secrecy. "
There is no single version of why BM-13 began to be called "Katyushas". There are several assumptions:
1. According to the title of Blanter's song, which became popular before the war, to the words of Isakovsky “Katyusha”. The version is convincing, since for the first time the battery fired on July 14, 1941 (on the 23rd day of the war) at a congregation of fascists on the Market Square of the city of Rudnya, Smolensk Region. She was shooting from a high steep mountain - the fighters immediately had an association with a high steep bank in the song. Finally, Andrei Sapronov, a former sergeant of the headquarters company of the 217th separate communications battalion of the 144th rifle division of the 20th army, is alive, now a military historian, who gave her this name. Red Army soldier Kashirin, having arrived with him after the shelling of Rudnya at the battery, exclaimed in surprise: "This is a song!" “Katyusha,” Andrei Sapronov replied (from the memoirs of A. Sapronov in the Rossiya newspaper No. 23 dated June 21-27, 2001 and in the Parliamentary Gazette No. 80 dated May 5, 2005). Through the communications center of the headquarters company, the news about the miracle weapon named "Katyusha" within 24 hours became the property of the entire 20th Army, and through its command - the whole country. On July 13, 2011 the veteran and "godfather" of Katyusha turned 90 years old.
2. There is also a version that the name is associated with the index "K" on the body of the mortar - the installations were produced by the Kalinin plant (according to another source - the Comintern plant). And the front-line soldiers liked to give nicknames to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed "Mother", the ML-20 cannon-howitzer - "Emelka". Yes, and BM-13 at first sometimes called "Raisa Sergeevna", thus deciphering the abbreviation RS (rocket projectile).
3. The third version suggests that this is how the girls from the Moscow Compressor plant, who worked on the assembly, dubbed these cars.
Another, exotic version. The guides on which the shells were installed were called slopes. The forty-two-kilogram projectile was lifted by two fighters, harnessed to the straps, and the third usually helped them, pushing the projectile so that it would lie exactly on the guides, he also informed the holders that the projectile got up, rolled, rolled onto the guides. He was allegedly called "Katyusha" (the role of those who held the projectile and rolled it constantly changed, since the calculation of the BM-13, in contrast to the cannon artillery, was not explicitly divided into the loader, the directing, etc.)
4. It should also be noted that the installations were so secret that it was even forbidden to use the commands "pli", "fire", "volley", instead of them sounded "sing" or "play" (to start it was necessary to turn the handle of the electric coil very quickly) , which, perhaps, was also associated with the song "Katyusha". And for our infantry, the Katyusha salvo was the most pleasant music.
5. There is an assumption that initially the nickname "Katyusha" had front-line bomber equipped with rockets - an analogue of the M-13. And the nickname jumped from an airplane to a rocket launcher through shells.
In the German troops, these machines were called "Stalin's organs" because of the external similarity of the rocket launcher with the pipe system of this musical instrument and the powerful stunning roar that was produced when the missiles were launched.
During the battles for Poznan and Berlin, the M-30 and M-31 single launch units received the nickname "Russian faustpatron" from the Germans, although these shells were not used as an anti-tank weapon. With "dagger" (from a distance of 100-200 meters) launches of these shells, the guards broke through any walls.
If Hitler's oracles had taken a closer look at the signs of fate, then July 14, 1941 would surely have become a landmark day for them. It was then in the area of the Orsha railway junction and the Orshitsa river crossing Soviet troops For the first time, BM-13 combat vehicles were used, which received the affectionate name "Katyusha" in the army environment. The result of two volleys on the accumulation of enemy forces was overwhelming for the enemy. The losses of the Germans fell under the "unacceptable" column.
Here are excerpts from the directive to the troops of the Hitlerite high military command: "The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower cannon ... The shot is fired by electricity ... During the shot, smoke is formed ..." technical characteristics new Soviet weapons- jet mortar.
A striking example of the effectiveness of the guards mortar units, and their basis was made up of "Katyushas", can serve as lines from the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov: "The rockets by their actions produced continuous devastation. I looked at the areas in which the shelling was conducted, and saw the complete destruction of fortifications ... "
The Germans developed a special plan to capture new Soviet weapons and ammunition. Late autumn 1941, they managed to do it. The "captive" mortar was indeed "multi-barreled" and fired 16 rocket mines. His firepower several times superior in efficiency to the mortar in service fascist army... The Hitlerite command decided to create an equivalent weapon.
The Germans did not immediately understand that the Soviet mortar they had captured was truly unique phenomenon opening new page in the development of artillery, the era of jet systems salvo fire(MLRS).
We must pay tribute to its creators - scientists, engineers, technicians and workers of the Moscow Reactive Research Institute (RNII) and related enterprises: V. Aborenkov, V. Artemyev, V. Bessonov, V. Galkovsky, I. Gwai, I. Kleimenov, A. Kostikov, G. Langemak, V. Luzhin, A. Tikhomirov, L. Schwartz, D. Shitov.
The main difference between BM-13 and similar German weapons was an unusually bold and unexpected concept: mortarmen could reliably hit all targets in a given square with relatively inaccurate rocket mines. This was achieved precisely due to the salvo nature of the fire, since each point of the fired area necessarily fell into the engagement zone of one of the shells. German designers, realizing the brilliant "know-how" of Soviet engineers, decided to reproduce, if not in the form of a copy, then using the main technical ideas.
It was possible in principle to copy the Katyusha as a combat vehicle. Insurmountable difficulties began when trying to design, work out and establish mass production of similar missiles. It turned out that German gunpowder cannot burn in a rocket engine chamber as steadily and steadily as Soviet ones. The counterparts of Soviet ammunition designed by the Germans behaved unpredictably: they either sluggishly left the guides in order to immediately fall to the ground, or began to fly at a breakneck speed and exploded in the air from the excessive pressure increase inside the chamber. Only a few units flew to the target regularly.
It turned out that for effective nitroglycerin propellants, which were used in Katyusha shells, our chemists achieved a spread in the values of the so-called heat of explosive transformation no higher than 40 conventional units, and the smaller the spread, the more stable the powder burns. Similar German gunpowder had a spread of this parameter even in one batch above 100 units. This led to the unstable operation of the rocket engines.
The Germans did not know that the ammunition for the "Katyusha" was the fruit of more than ten years of activity of the RNII and several large Soviet research teams, which included the best Soviet powder factories, outstanding Soviet chemists A. Bakaev, D. Halperin, V. Kar'kina, G. Konovalova, B Pashkov, A. Sporius, B. Fomin, F. Khritinin and many others. They not only developed the most complex formulations of rocket powders, but also found simple and effective ways of their mass, continuous and cheap production.
At a time when at Soviet factories, according to ready-made drawings, the production of guards rocket launchers and shells for them was being developed at an unprecedented pace and literally every day, the Germans still had to conduct research and design work according to MLRS. But history did not let them have time for this.
The article was written based on the materials of the book Nepomnyashchy N.N. "100 Great Secrets of World War II", M., "Veche", 2010, p. 152-157.
"Katyusha"- the popular name for combat vehicles of rocket artillery BM-8 (with 82 mm shells), BM-13 (132 mm) and BM-31 (310 mm) during the Great Patriotic War. There are several versions of the origin of this name, the most probable of them is associated with the factory brand "K" of the manufacturer of the first combat vehicles BM-13 (Voronezh plant named after the Comintern), as well as with the song of the same name, popular at that time (music by Matvey Blanter, lyrics by Mikhail Isakovsky).
(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S. Ivanov. Military Publishing. Moscow. In 8 volumes -2004 ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)
The fate of the first separate experimental battery was cut short at the beginning of October 1941. After its baptism of fire near Orsha, the battery successfully operated in battles near Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk. For three months of hostilities, Flerov's battery not only inflicted considerable material damage on the Germans, it also contributed to raising the morale of our soldiers and officers, exhausted by continuous retreats.
The Nazis arranged for new weapons real hunt... But the battery did not stay in one place for a long time - having given a volley, it immediately changed its position. A tactical technique - a salvo - change of position - was widely used by Katyusha units during the war.
At the beginning of October 1941, as part of the grouping of forces of the Western Front, the battery was in the rear of the German fascist troops... While moving to the front line from the rear on the night of October 7, she was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr, Smolensk region. Most of the battery personnel and Ivan Flerov died, having shot all the ammunition and detonated combat vehicles. Only 46 soldiers managed to get out of the encirclement. The legendary battalion commander and the rest of the fighters, who fulfilled their duty to the end with honor, were considered "missing." And only when it was possible to find the documents of one of the army headquarters of the Wehrmacht, where it was reported about what actually happened on the night of October 6-7, 1941 near the Smolensk village of Bogatyr, Captain Flerov was excluded from the list of missing persons.
For heroism, Ivan Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree in 1963, and in 1995 he was awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation posthumously.
In honor of the deed of the battery, a monument was erected in the city of Orsha and an obelisk near the city of Rudnya.
"Katyusha"- the popular name for combat vehicles of rocket artillery BM-8 (with 82 mm shells), BM-13 (132 mm) and BM-31 (310 mm) during the Great Patriotic War. There are several versions of the origin of this name, the most probable of them is associated with the factory brand "K" of the manufacturer of the first combat vehicles BM-13 (Voronezh plant named after the Comintern), as well as with the song of the same name, popular at that time (music by Matvey Blanter, lyrics by Mikhail Isakovsky).
(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S. Ivanov. Military Publishing. Moscow. In 8 volumes -2004 ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)
The fate of the first separate experimental battery was cut short at the beginning of October 1941. After its baptism of fire near Orsha, the battery successfully operated in battles near Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk. For three months of hostilities, Flerov's battery not only inflicted considerable material damage on the Germans, it also contributed to raising the morale of our soldiers and officers, exhausted by continuous retreats.
The Nazis arranged a real hunt for new weapons. But the battery did not stay in one place for a long time - having given a volley, it immediately changed its position. A tactical technique - a salvo - change of position - was widely used by Katyusha units during the war.
At the beginning of October 1941, as part of the grouping of forces of the Western Front, the battery ended up in the rear of the German fascist troops. While moving to the front line from the rear on the night of October 7, she was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr, Smolensk region. Most of the battery personnel and Ivan Flerov died, shooting all the ammunition and blowing up combat vehicles. Only 46 soldiers managed to get out of the encirclement. The legendary battalion commander and the rest of the fighters, who fulfilled their duty to the end with honor, were considered "missing." And only when it was possible to find the documents of one of the army headquarters of the Wehrmacht, where it was reported about what actually happened on the night of October 6-7, 1941 near the Smolensk village of Bogatyr, Captain Flerov was excluded from the list of missing persons.
For heroism, Ivan Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree in 1963, and in 1995 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation posthumously.
In honor of the deed of the battery, a monument was erected in the city of Orsha and an obelisk near the city of Rudnya.
Katyushas were effective at any time of the year.
Painting by F. Usypenko "The response of the mortar guardsmen"
The fact that we still do not have a true and reliable history of the Great Patriotic War is an obvious fact. Moreover it comes not only about some "white spots" (of which there are more than enough now), but about events that have long been described in detail in various works.
WHEN IT WAS?
One of these events was the first combat use of BM-13 rocket artillery combat vehicles on July 14, 1941 near Orsha. It would seem that there can be no questions here - everything is already known, and in details. And yet...
Let's read the text that is accessible to everyone and, for sure, well-known to many (it makes no sense to refer to the source, since everything stated below wanders from edition to edition).
“For the first time rocket artillery took part in the battle in July 1941 near Orsha. In the area of the city, units of the 73rd Infantry Division fought a heavy defensive battle. On the night of July 14, the Nazis captured Orsha. In the morning, enemy echelons with troops, military equipment, fuel and ammunition began to arrive here one after another. To delay the enemy offensive, the deputy chief of artillery of the Western Front, General G.S. Kariofilli, on the morning of July 14, assigned the commander of the 1st separate rocket artillery battery, Captain I.A.Flerov (seven BM-13s and a 122-mm sighting howitzer) the task: to fire on the accumulation of enemy echelons at the Orsha railway junction.
At 15 hours 15 minutes, after three sighting shots from a 122-mm howitzer, a roar and rattle came from the hollow, black clouds of smoke burst upward, more than a hundred red-tail shells shot up into the air. The volley took place.
On the echelons of the enemy, which were at the railway junction, fell fire tornado... Rocket projectiles exploded in the thick of carriages with ammunition, fuel, equipment, people. Everything trembled like an earthquake. A few minutes after the volley, the railway junction turned into a sea of fire, over which thick smoke billowed. The distraught Hitlerites rushed about in the red-hot smoke. Many soldiers and officers of the enemy were destroyed. "
"And what is incomprehensible here?" - an inexperienced reader will ask. Almost everything. But let's start in order.
What exactly did you mean in this case? It is quite possible that the period of darkness of the day - starting from about sunset - about 22 hours - and until sunrise - about four in the morning. That is, the German units could take Orsha both at 22 o'clock and at 4 o'clock in the morning. However, in July 1941, the Germans did not fight at night (and this fact is widely known). Therefore, if Orsha was left “on the night” of July 14, we can only talk about daylight hours.
Now we are just trying to figure it out: getting up, having breakfast (the Germans were very strict with this in the first months of the war), setting combat missions, by vehicles, and only then - into battle. Consequently, the Wehrmacht units entered Orsha not earlier than six in the morning. In another way (if, let me remind you again, "on the night of July 14, the Nazis captured Orsha") it simply does not work.
By the way, under what circumstances the Soviet troops lost Orsha, official sources remain silent to this day. Captured - and that's it. However, we read on. "In the morning, enemy echelons with troops, military equipment, fuel and ammunition began to arrive here one after another."
Again, it is not entirely clear what it is - "in the morning". Morning begins at sunrise and formally continues until noon. That is, we can talk about a relatively long period of time - about eight hours. At what point in the morning did the enemy trains begin to arrive?
STUNNING NONSURRENCES
However, in this proposal something else is more interesting. If it was the enemy echelons that began to arrive, then, by that time, the domestic railway track had already been changed to the Western European track. That is, "in the night" they occupied, and by the morning the paths were already altered.
Good. Suppose the Germans did not alter the track at such a speed. They took advantage of our by rail... And our own rolling stock. And our own locomotives. It turns out that a lot of them were captured. After all, the speech in the text is about "the accumulation of echelons." But then it turns out somehow ugly. After all, the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions of June 29, 1941, unambiguously demanded: “In case of the forced withdrawal of the Red Army units, it is necessary to steal the rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single steam locomotive, not a single carriage” "
Meanwhile - albeit with a sudden withdrawal - to destroy the locomotives, to blow up the entrance arrows is not so difficult. Or how should one run so as not to have time to do even this? It turns out that Orsha was in the hands of the Germans intact? Did the enemy get the largest railway junction in Belarus in perfect working order?
True, according to the text, there is no logic in the actions of the enemy. Suppose he managed to capture a certain amount of domestic serviceable rolling stock. In the first months of 1941, this was not the case. But then this is what happens. In the place where the Western European track ends, the Germans organize a kind of transshipment base - they unload their military echelons (covered wagons, platforms, tanks), and then - without delay - reload ammunition, food, fuel, etc. on the captured Soviet rolling stock. An absolutely fantastic sight.
It is enough just to imagine pumping fuel from one tank to another. Buckets, or what, to do it in the front line? Such a course of action would greatly increase the time it takes to deliver materiel directly to the troops. And all this is being undertaken with one goal - to drive trains to the newly taken city. In fact, to the cutting edge. On the railway junction located in the fire impact zone Soviet artillery... Indeed, for something, but the Germans cannot be blamed for the stupidity.
Again after taking settlement- the first activities (carried out and are being carried out by any army) - combing and demining. And then - the arrival, and one after another - of military echelons. Absurd, and this is the mildest definition of what is happening.
And again, from our side, the picture looks very unattractive: not only was Orsha handed over to the Germans safe and sound, the largest railway junction was not even mined. This is already on the verge of a war crime ...
Inevitably, you get into a dead end and after a careful reading of this passage: “In order to delay the enemy offensive, the deputy chief of artillery of the Western Front, General G.S. Kariofilli, on the morning of July 14, set the commander of the 1st separate rocket artillery battery, Captain I.A.Flerov ... : fire a salvo at the concentration of enemy echelons at the Orsha railway junction. "
“In the night” the Germans seized Orsha in the morning. In the morning, "enemy echelons" began to arrive there. But Georgy Spiridonovich Kariofilli already knows for sure: in Orsha there will be "an accumulation of enemy echelons." Therefore, he sets tasks for their destruction - and also in the morning. All this looks absolutely incredible. Moreover, the general did not have his own intelligence equipment.
But Ivan Flerov's battery fired a volley and ... “Everything trembled, like an earthquake. A few minutes later ... the railway junction turned into a sea of fire, over which thick smoke billowed. The distraught Hitlerites rushed about in the red-hot smoke. Many soldiers and officers of the enemy were destroyed. "
Nothing to say, an impressive sight appears in the mind's eye of the reader. It's just curious that the text does not mention the number of destroyed railway cars (tanks, locomotives). Although they (in contrast to the many killed and wounded German soldiers and officers), it was not only possible to count them, but also should. Why not take aerial photography of the Orsha railway junction the day after the BM-13 battery volley? And if the station turned into a "sea of fire", then in this case it is not too late to send a reconnaissance plane even after two or three days. The case is still exceptional - the first example of the combat use of rocket artillery. And to show the pictures to the Supreme Command - here it is, a weapon of unprecedented efficiency. And there and then the decision - urgently in the series.
PROBABLE GOAL
However, it is by no means excluded that such aerial photography was carried out and there is clear evidence of the result of the first fire strike of the now legendary Katyushas. However, when examining these images, it will be easy to establish that there are no German echelons at the station and the Orsha railway junction is packed with Soviet military echelons (wagons, tanks and locomotives). Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that on some 14th route there was a train that, under no circumstances, should have got to the enemy.
It was then that the picture of July 14, 1941, with the precision of a sent cartridge into the chamber, takes on real and sharp, focused outlines. And this canvas looks like this.
First. The Germans suddenly captured Orsha.
Second. The railway junction turned out to be jammed with our military trains.
Third. Among them were especially important. It was impossible to allow these echelons to go to the enemy.
Fourth. General Kariofilli knew for sure that there was an accumulation of echelons at the Orsha station (it is usually not specified that these were our echelons).
Fifth. Combat use BM-13 made it possible to successfully solve the problem. The Germans had little to gain.
At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize: the effectiveness of the new weapon - rocket artillery - does not negate all of the above.
And the history of the Great Patriotic War really did not exist and does not exist, even if there are so many inconsistencies in the canonical texts about well-known events.
It is well known that on September 18, 1941, by order of the USSR People's Commissar for Defense No. 308, four infantry divisions Western Front (100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st) for the battles near Yelnya - "for combat feats, for organization, discipline and approximate order "- were awarded the honorary titles" Guards ". They were renamed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards, respectively. Subsequently, many units and formations of the Red Army that distinguished themselves and hardened during the war were transformed into guards.
But Moscow researchers Alexander Osokin and Alexander Kornyakov discovered documents from which it follows that the question of creating guards units was discussed in the circles of the USSR leadership back in August. And the first guards regiment was supposed to be a heavy mortar regiment, armed with rocket artillery combat vehicles.
When did the guard appear?
In the course of acquaintance with the documents on weapons of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, we found a letter from the People's Commissar of General Engineering of the USSR P.I. Parshin No. 7529ss dated August 4, 1941 addressed to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin with a request to allow the production of 72 M-13 vehicles (later called "Katyushas") with ammunition for the formation of one heavy guards mortar regiment in excess of the plan.
We decided that there was a typo, since it is known that the guards rank was first awarded by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 308 of September 18, 1941 to four rifle divisions.
The main points of the GKO decree, unknown to historians, read:
"1. Agree with the proposal of Comrade Parshin, People's Commissar of General Engineering of the USSR, to form one Guards mortar regiment armed with M-13 installations.
2. Assign the name of the People's Commissariat of General Machine Building to the newly formed Guards Regiment.
3. To take into account that NKOM manufactures equipment of the regiment with systems and ammunition in excess of the established task for M-13 for August. "
From the text of the decree it follows that not only was agreement given to manufacture superplanned M-13 installations, but it was also decided to form on their basis guards regiment.
The study of other documents confirmed our guess: on August 4, 1941, the concept of "guards" was first applied (and without any decision on this matter from the Politburo of the Central Committee, the Presidium The Supreme Council or Council of People's Commissars) in relation to one specific regiment with a new type of weapon - M-13 rocket launchers, encrypting them with the word "mortar" (entered personally by Stalin).
It is striking that the word "guard" for the first time during the years of Soviet power (except for the units of the Red Guard in 1917) was introduced into circulation by the People's Commissar Parshin - a man who was not too close to Stalin and had never even visited his Kremlin office during the war years.
Most likely, his letter, printed on August 2, on the same day was handed over to Stalin by the 1st rank military engineer V.V. Aborenkov - deputy chief of GAU for rocket launchers, who was in the leader's office together with the chief of GAU, Colonel-General of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev for 1 hour 15 minutes. The regiment, created by the decision taken that day, became the first regiment in the Red Army of the M-13 mobile rocket launchers (with the RS-132) - before that, only the batteries of these installations (from 3 to 9 vehicles) were formed.
It is noteworthy that on the same day, on the memorandum of the chief of artillery of the Red Army, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov, Stalin wrote about the work of 5 rocket artillery installations: “Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky. To promote this business with might and main. To raise the production of shells fourfold, fivefold, sixfold. "
What gave impetus to the decision to create the M-13 Guards Regiment? Let's state our hypothesis. In June-July 1941, by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the system of strategic leadership was rebuilt. armed forces... On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created under the chairmanship of Stalin, to whom all power in the country was transferred during the war. On July 10, the State Defense Committee transformed the Headquarters of the High Command into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. The Headquarters included I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov, marshals S.K. Timoshenko, S.M. Budyonny, K.E. Voroshilov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov.
July 19 Stalin becomes people's commissar defense, and on August 8, 1941 by the decision of the Politburo No. P. 34/319 - "the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all troops of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and Navy". On the same day, August 8, the states of "one guards mortar regiment" were approved.
We take the liberty of suggesting that initially it was, perhaps, about the formation of a unit designed to ensure the protection of the Supreme Command Headquarters. Indeed, in the state of the field Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief imperial army during the First World War, quite likely taken by Stalin and Shaposhnikov as a prototype, there were heavy weapons, in particular, the Stavka defense aviation division.
But in 1941, it did not come to the creation of such a field Headquarters - the Germans were too quickly approaching Moscow, and the management active army Stalin preferred to carry it out from Moscow. Therefore, the regiment of guards mortars M-13 did not receive the task to take over the protection of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
On July 19, 1941, Stalin, setting the task of Timoshenko to create shock groups for offensive operations in the Battle of Smolensk and the participation of rocket artillery in them, said: “I think it's time to move from petty fighting to action large groups- shelves ... ".
On August 8, 1941, the staffs of the regiments of the M-8 and M-13 installations were approved. They were supposed to consist of three or four divisions with three batteries in each division and four installations in each battery (from September 11, all regiments were transferred to a three-divisional composition). The formation of the first eight regiments began immediately. They were equipped with combat vehicles manufactured using the pre-war stock of units and parts created by the People's Commissariat of General Machine Building (from November 26, 1941, it was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Mortar Armament).
In full force - with Katyusha regiments - the Red Army first struck the enemy in late August - early September 1941.
As for the M-13 Guards Regiment, conceived for use in the defense of the Supreme Command Headquarters, its formation was completed only in September. Launchers for him were made in excess of the assigned task. It is known as the 9th Guards Regiment, operating near Mtsensk.
It was disbanded on December 12, 1941. There is information that all of its installations had to be blown up when there was a threat of encirclement by the Germans. The second formation of the regiment was completed on September 4, 1943, after which the 9th Guards Regiment fought successfully until the end of the war.
Captain Flerov's feat
The first salvo of a rocket launcher in World War II was fired on July 14, 1941 at 15.15 by a battery of seven (according to other sources, four) M-13 launchers in the congestion of echelons military equipment at the railway junction of the city of Orsha. The commander of this battery (called in different sources and messages in different ways: experimental, experimental, the first, or even all these names at the same time) indicates the captain-artilleryman I.A. Flerov, who died in 1941 (missing in action according to TsAMO documents). For courage and heroism, he was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree only in 1963, and in 1995 he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia.
According to the directive of the Moscow Military District of June 28, 1941, No. 10864, the first six batteries were formed. In the most reliable, in our opinion, source - the military memoirs of Lieutenant General A.I. Nesterenko (“Katyushas are firing. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975) it is written:“ On June 28, 1941, the formation of the first battery of field rocket artillery began. It was created in four days at the 1st Moscow Red Banner Artillery School named after L.B. Krasin. It was the now world famous battery of Captain I.A. Flerov, who fired the first salvo at the accumulation of fascist troops at the Orsha station ... Stalin personally approved the distribution of guards mortar units along the fronts, plans for the production of combat vehicles and ammunition ... ".
The names of the commanders of all six first batteries and the places where their first volleys were fired are known.
Battery No. 1: 7 units M-13. Battery commander Captain I.A. Flerov. The first salvo on July 14, 1941 at a freight railway station in the city of Orsha.
Battery No. 2: 9 M-13 units. Battery commander Lieutenant A.M. Kuhn. The first salvo on July 25, 1941 at the crossing near the village of Kapyrevshchina (north of Yartsevo).
Battery No. 3: 3 units M-13. Battery commander Lieutenant N.I. Denisenko. The first salvo on July 25, 1941, 4 km north of Yartsevo.
Battery No. 4: 6 units M-13. Battery commander Senior Lieutenant P. Degtyarev. The first salvo on August 3, 1941 near Leningrad.
Battery No. 5: 4 units M-13. Battery commander Senior Lieutenant A. Denisov. The place and date of the first salvo are unknown.
Battery No. 6: 4 units M-13. Battery commander Senior Lieutenant N.F. Dyatchenko. The first salvo on August 3, 1941 in the 12sp 53sd 43A zone.
Five of the first six batteries were sent to the troops of the Western direction, where main blow German troops were applied across Smolensk. It is also known that, in addition to the M-13, other types of rocket launchers were delivered to the Western direction.
In the book of A.I. Eremenko “At the beginning of the war” it says: “... A telephone message was received from the Headquarters with the following content:“ It is supposed to widely use “eres” in the fight against the Nazis and, in this connection, try them out in battle. You are allocated one M-8 division. Try it and report your opinion ...
We tested something new near Rudnya ... On July 15, 1941, in the afternoon, an unusual roar of jet mines shook the air. Like red-tailed comets, mines darted upward. Frequent and powerful explosions struck the ears and eyes with a strong roar and dazzling brilliance ... The effect of a simultaneous burst of 320 minutes within 10 seconds surpassed all expectations ... This was one of the first combat tests of the Eres.
In the report of marshals Timoshenko and Shaposhnikov for July 24, 1941, Stalin was informed about the defeat of the German 5th Infantry Division near Rudnya on July 15, 1941, in which three volleys of the M-8 division played a special role.
It is quite obvious that a sudden salvo of one M-13 battery (16 RS-132 launches in 5-8 seconds) with maximum range 8.5 km was capable of causing serious damage to the enemy. But the battery was not designed to hit a single target. This weapon is effective when working over areas with dispersed manpower and enemy equipment while simultaneously firing multiple batteries. A separate battery could fire a defensive salvo, stun the enemy, cause panic in his ranks and suspend his offensive for some time.
In our opinion, the purpose of sending the first multiple launch rocket launchers to the front by batteries was, most likely, the desire to cover the headquarters of the front and armies in the direction threatening Moscow.
This is not just a guess. A study of the routes of the first Katyusha batteries shows that, first of all, they ended up in the areas where the headquarters of the Western Front and the headquarters of its armies were based: the 20th, 16th, 19th and 22nd. It is no coincidence that in their memoirs, Marshals Eremenko, Rokossovsky, Kazakov, General Plaskov describe precisely the battery combat work of the first rocket launchers which they observed from their command posts.
They point to the increased secrecy of the use of new weapons. IN AND. Kazakov said: "Access to these" touchy "was allowed only to the commanders of the armies and members of the military councils. Even the chief of artillery of the army was not allowed to see them. "
However, the very first salvo of M-13 rocket launchers, fired on July 14, 1941 at 15 hours 15 minutes at the railway commodity hub of the city of Orsha, was carried out while performing a completely different combat mission - the destruction of several echelons with secret weapons, which under no circumstances should was to be at the disposal of the Germans.
A study of the route of the first separate experimental battery M-13 ("Flerov's batteries") shows that at first it was apparently intended to guard the headquarters of the 20th Army.
Then she was given a new task. The battery with security on the night of July 6 in the Orsha region moved west through the territory already actually abandoned by the Soviet troops. She moved along the Orsha-Borisov-Minsk railway line, loaded with trains traveling to the east. On July 9, the battery and its security were already in the area of the city of Borisov (135 km from Orsha).
On that day, GKO decree No. 67ss was issued "On the readdressing of vehicles with weapons and ammunition at the disposal of the newly formed divisions of the NKVD and reserve armies." It demanded, in particular, to urgently find some very important cargoes among the trains departing to the east, which in no case should get to the Germans.
On the night of July 13-14, Flerov's battery received an order to urgently move to Orsha and a missile strike on the station. On July 14, at 15 hours 15 minutes, Flerov's battery fired a volley at echelons with military equipment located at the Orsha railway junction.
What was in these trains is not known for certain. But there is information that after the volley no one approached the affected area for some time, and the Germans allegedly even left the station for seven days, which suggests that as a result missile strike some toxic substances.
On July 22, in an evening radio broadcast, Soviet announcer Levitan announced the defeat of the German 52nd Chemical Mortar Regiment on July 15. And on July 27, Pravda published information about German secret documents allegedly captured during the defeat of this regiment, from which it followed that the Germans were preparing a chemical attack on Turkey.
Raid of the battalion commander Kaduchenko
In the book of A.V. Glushko "Pioneers of rocketry" shows a photograph of the employees of the Research Institute-3, headed by the deputy director A.G. Kostikov after receiving awards in the Kremlin in August 1941. It is indicated that Lieutenant General is standing with them in the photo. tank troops V.A. Mishulin, who was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero that day.
We decided to find out why he was awarded the highest award of the country and what relation his awarding could have to the creation of M-13 rocket launchers at NII-3. It turned out that the commander of the 57th tank division Colonel V.A. Mishulin the title of Hero Soviet Union was awarded on July 24, 1941 "for the exemplary performance of the command's combat missions ... and for the courage and heroism shown at the same time." The most striking thing is that at the same time he was also awarded the rank of general - and not a major general, but immediately a lieutenant general.
He became the third lieutenant general of the tank forces in the Red Army. General Eremenko in his memoirs explains this by the error of the cipher clerk, who carried the title of the signer of the encryption code to the Headquarters of Eremenko with the idea of conferring the title of Hero and General on Mishulin.
It is quite possible that this was so: Stalin did not cancel the erroneously signed decree on awarding. But only why did he also appoint Mishulin as deputy head of the Main Armored Directorate. Isn't there too many rewards at once for one officer? It is known that after a while General Mishulin was sent to the Southern Front as a representative of the General Headquarters. Usually marshals and members of the Central Committee acted in this capacity.
Did not the courage and heroism shown by Mishulin have anything to do with the first salvo of the Katyusha on July 14, 1941, for which Kostikov and the employees of NII-3 were awarded on July 28?
The study of materials about Mishulin and his 57th Panzer Division showed that this division was transferred to the Western Front from the South-Western Front. Unloaded at the Orsha station on June 28 and became part of the 19th Army. The division's management with one motorized rifle guard regiment was concentrated in the area of the Gusino station, 50 kilometers from Orsha, where the headquarters of the 20th Army was located at that time.
In early July, a tank battalion of 15 tanks, including 7 T-34 tanks, and armored vehicles arrived from the Oryol Tank School to replenish Mishulin's division from the Oryol Tank School.
After the death of Commander Major S.I. Razdobudko battalion was headed by its deputy captain I.A. Kaduchenko. And it was Captain Kaduchenko who became the first Soviet tanker, who was awarded the title of Hero during the Patriotic War on July 22, 1941. He received this high title even two days earlier than his divisional commander Mishulin for “being the head of 2 tank companies who defeated the enemy's tank column ”. In addition, immediately after the award, he became another major.
It seems that the awarding of the division commander Mishulin and the battalion commander Kaduchenko could take place if they completed some very important task for Stalin. And most likely, this was the provision of the first salvo of "Katyushas" on echelons with weapons that should not have fallen into the hands of the Germans.
Mishulin skillfully organized the escort of the secret Katyusha battery behind enemy lines, including a group attached to it with T-34 tanks and armored vehicles under the command of Kaduchenko, and then its breakthrough from the encirclement.
On July 26, 1941, the newspaper Pravda published an article entitled "Lieutenant General Mishulin", which described Mishulin's feat. About how he, wounded and shell-shocked, made his way in an armored vehicle through the enemy's rear to his division, which at that time was conducting fierce battles in the Krasnoye area and the Gusino railway station. It follows from this that commander Mishulin, for some reason, a short time left his division (most likely, together with Kaduchenko's tank group) and returned wounded to the division only on July 17, 1941.
It is likely that they were carrying out Stalin's instructions to organize the support of the "first salvo of Flerov's battery" on July 14, 1941 at the Orsha station along echelons with military equipment.
On the day of the volley of Flerov's battery, July 14, GKO decree No. 140ss was issued on the appointment of L.M. Gaidukov, an ordinary employee of the Central Committee, who oversaw the manufacture of multiple launch rocket launchers, authorized by the State Defense Committee for the production of RS-132 missiles.
On July 28, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued two decrees on rewarding the creators of the Katyusha. The first - "for outstanding services in the invention and design of one of the types of weapons that raise the power of the Red Army" A.G. Kostikov was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.
The second - 12 engineers, designers and technicians were awarded orders and medals. The Order of Lenin was awarded to V. Aborenkov, a former military representative who became deputy chief of the Chief artillery control on rocketry, designers I. Gwai and V. Galkovsky. N. Davydov, A. Pavlenko and L. Schwartz received the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. The Order of the Red Star was awarded to the designers of NII-3 D. Shitov, A. Popov and workers of the plant No. 70 M. Malov and G. Glazko. Both of these decrees were published in Pravda on July 29, and on July 30, 1941, in an article published in Pravda, the new weapon was called formidable without specification.
Yes, it was a cheap, easy-to-manufacture and easy-to-use firearm. It could be quickly produced in many factories and quickly installed on everything that moves - on cars, tanks, tractors, even on sleds (as it was used in the cavalry corps of Dovator). And also "eres" were installed on airplanes, boats and railway platforms.
Launchers began to be called "guards mortars", and their combat crews were called the first guardsmen.
Pictured: Guards rocket mortar M-31-12 in Berlin in May 1945.
This is a modification of the "Katyusha" (by analogy it was called "andryusha").
Fired with 310 mm unguided rockets
(unlike the 132-mm Katyusha shells),
launched from 12 guides (2 tiers of 6 cells in each).
The installation is located on the chassis of the American "Studebaker" truck,
which was supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease.
Loading...
