Russia is vigorously rearming its army. In 2011, the State Arms Development Program until 2020 worth 1.2 trillion was approved. dollars. Its goal is to increase the number of new samples military equipment in the troops up to 70%. Moscow has seriously decided to undertake a radical modernization of the armed forces and the defense-industrial complex.
2020: new army
For 2010 share new technology in the Russian armed forces was less than 20%. By 2020, this figure should be 70%. This allows us to call the army modernization program unprecedented in the post-Soviet history of Russia. If in 2003 the total budget of the Ministry of Defense was 600 billion rubles, today it is 2.3 trillion. rubles
The priority of the program is the modernization of strategic nuclear forces(SNF). Share of missile forces strategic purpose(Strategic Missile Forces) in the strategic nuclear forces should be reduced from 70 to 35%. This is due to the fact that Russia is armed with a large number of obsolete Soviet-made missiles. The Army is relying on the Navy's nuclear forces instead of land-based missiles. The Strategic Missile Forces fleet should be updated by 80%.
Main nuclear shield By 2020, the country should have ten underwater strategic missile carriers of Project 955. They are equipped with ballistic missiles with fissionable Bulava warheads. At the beginning of 2014, two submarine cruisers, Yuri Dolgoruky and Alexander Nevsky, were already in service, and the third ship, Vladimir Monomakh, was undergoing commissioning tests.
The development of the Navy is one of the priorities of the rearmament program. The emphasis is still on a powerful submarine fleet. The restoration of the surface fleet is proceeding from the construction of small ships to large ones. The new generation corvette-frigate-destroyer combination should become the basis of the Navy's surface forces in six years.
Modernization is also large-scale in its plans military aviation. It is planned to purchase more than 1,500 aircraft by 2020 the latest types and modernize more than 400 currently in service. By 2020 Russia will have modern army, capable of performing wide range tasks.
New security challenges
Moscow names four main military dangers that in the future could pose a threat to the country’s security: (1) NATO expansion to the east, (2) strengthening of foreign military contingents in neighboring states, (3) destabilization of the political and strategic situation on Russia’s borders, (4) international terrorism. According to estimates of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, by 2030 wars for resources in Central Asia and the Arctic may be added to this list. Military policy Russia in the Arctic provides for the creation of Arctic brigades, new nuclear icebreakers for the development of the Northern Sea Route, the creation of Arctic military bases in the Kara Sea and the formation of a special military district.
Russia does not plan to participate in conflicts in the near future. This gives her time to bring the army to current state. The Russian military-industrial complex is creating the latest weapons systems: strategic missiles, bottom missile systems, combat lasers, robotics, precision weapons. High-precision missiles guided through GLONASS satellites should soon form part of the Russian arsenal front-line aviation. The limitation is the poor development in Russia of modern information support. Western technologies and analogues in on-board equipment in the event of a military conflict can devalue the combat effectiveness of modern military equipment.
However, Russia produces unrivaled nuclear, air defense and missile defense. The S-400 missile systems have a range twice as long as the American MIM-104 Patriot. The S-400 radars can track up to 100 targets simultaneously, and the speed of their missiles is 12 times the speed of sound. Russian Pantsir S-1 air defense systems are among the most effective in their class. The Iskander-M hypersonic high-precision ballistic missiles have no analogues. The newest Project 885 Yasen submarines are recognized as one of the quietest and most inconspicuous in the ocean. Great opportunities for Russian fighters Su-35. The Ka-52 attack helicopters are one of the most powerful weapons systems of this class in the world.
Export items
In 2013, Rosoboronexport exported military equipment worth $13 billion. Main Buyers Russian weapons- India, China, Vietnam, Venezuela, Indonesia, Algeria. These states account for more than 75% of exported military products. In total, Rosoboronexport cooperates with 60 countries. Traditionally, Russian small arms, helicopters, anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), fighter aircraft, as well as Russian-made frigates and submarines are in high demand.
The arms market periodically undergoes serious tests - politics and economics collide here. With military spending cut, there is fierce competition in the world. Afghanistan has to abandon the usual Mi-17 helicopters in favor of the American concern Sikorsky. The arms embargo on Iran has deprived Russia of significant revenue. The regime change also affected exports and Civil War in Libya, contracts with Syria have been reduced. Nevertheless, Russia holds second place in arms supplies in the world after the United States.
Renaissance
The state's need to create and improve the Armed Forces contributes to the success of the rearmament program. The Russian military-industrial complex has high potential, preserves the legacy of the USSR military machine and develops promising developments. The results of the program in 2011-2013 indicate Moscow’s readiness to bring the army and navy to modern look by 2020.
Questions:
- Main priorities for modernization of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
- Prospects for equipping the Armed Forces with weapons and equipment.
At present, forces and factors objectively exist in the world and in the foreseeable future there will be forces and factors whose action can lead to military clashes. In this situation, Russia, in order to acquire and consolidate the status of one of the leading world powers, must take several priority steps. Firstly, to use all possible peaceful means to prevent military conflicts, and secondly, to maintain constant readiness to be used to deter and repel possible aggression against the country and its allies, to protect its own political and economic interests, the military organization of the state, the basis of which is the Armed Forces. The use of military force by the Russian Federation is considered a forced last resort, advisable only if all other options have been exhausted. Interaction with various international institutions significantly facilitates the implementation of Russia’s external political goals, but does not provide a complete and unconditional guarantee of security. This can only be achieved by having a highly effective army and navy.
The country's leadership has a clear program for the development and increase in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces, based on a realistic understanding of the state's capabilities, as well as the tasks that Russia faces in the process of its integration into the modern system of international relations.
The leading countries of the world are on the threshold of a new post-industrial stage of development, which, according to some experts, can be overcome at the turn of the 2020s. Russia’s rivalry with other countries for a leading role and a worthy place in the new geo-economic division of labor, the possibility of using the most significant values and resources of both the post-industrial world space - technology, information, educated personnel, fresh water, environmentally friendly territories, and other resources of the Earth and its neighbors and deep space - requires powerful modern Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
1
The development of the current international situation and the persistence of threats to the security of the Russian Federation, including around our borders, require a comprehensive modernization of the Armed Forces within the framework of the designated priorities for their development. In this regard, the President of the Russian Federation in September 2008 set the task of forming a new look for the Russian army.
As part of the creation of a new image, the Armed Forces acquired a new structure, a new system of military planning, as well as updated systems for training and supporting troops. A new combat structure of the Armed Forces was created with an established strength of one million military personnel, six military districts were reorganized into four. The created military districts represent powerful inter-service groupings of troops in strategic directions: south, west, center and east. The combat readiness systems for troop command and control, logistics support and troop training have been fundamentally updated. The Ministry of Defense system clearly separates operational and support functions. Two areas of responsibility have been formed: the first is the planning, use and construction of the Armed Forces; the second is to ensure the activities of the army and navy.
Among the most significant structural transformations is the creation on December 1, 2011 of a new branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - the Aerospace Defense Forces. They combine the capabilities of air and missile defense forces, missile attack warning and space controlspace. Such integration of systems will make it possible to intercept any targets at speeds up to hypersonic both in the air and in space. In addition, in 2010, a unified system of logistics for troops with weapons, military equipment, ammunition, fuel, food, clothing and other equipment was formed, and the system for storing material reserves was optimized. In military districts and fleets, complex bases and logistics support brigades have been formed, compactly located in the areas where formations and units are deployed.
At the same time, there is still a lot to be done to ensure that the structure, weapons, and combat capabilities of the army and navy meet modern requirements. The main priorities for the modernization of the Russian Armed Forces are: equipping troops with new types of weapons and mastering them by army and navy personnel, giving the process of command and control a new quality and consolidating a new status for officers in society.
The formation of the Aerospace Defense Forces marked the beginning of the creation of a unified aerospace defense system for the country. Its structure and composition should take into account the state and nature of the agreement with the United States and NATO on issues of strategic offensive and defensive weapons, in particular, Russia’s participation or non-participation in the creation of a European missile defense system.
As part of improving the structure of the Armed Forces in 2012 the military should start functioning police. It will take on the tasks of maintaining discipline and order in the garrisons, protecting cargo and objects, conducting inquiries, etc. Number military police may be about 20 thousand people.
Military police today operate in more than 40 armies around the world, including the USA, Germany, France, Great Britain, and China. In the post-Soviet space, this institution exists in the armed forces of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, as well as in the armies of the Baltic states.
In the interests of improving the quality of troop control, the development and implementation of promising automated control systems for troops and weapons at various command levels, common to all types and branches of troops, will continue. Management tasks are planned to be practiced during exercises, including with the involvement of management bodies, units and subdivisions of Russia’s partners in the Treaty Organization collective security. By 2015, a new control system “close to artificial intelligence” will be created in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. She will manage not only the army, but also all law enforcement agencies using the Russian global satellite system GLONASS navigation, as well as satellite and unmanned surveillance equipment.
It is planned to further improve the infrastructure of the Armed Forces in various components. A new troop basing system is being formed. In the interests of its creation, the system of military camps, the airfield network, and the network of naval bases and fleet bases are being optimized. Taking into account the deployment of units, several large air bases will be formed; at each air base, the number of aircraft will increase by 2.5-3 times. This will increase the mobility of aviation groups and will make it possible to create a military infrastructure echeloned along the main strategic directions. In order to optimally accommodate military personnel, it is planned to sharply reduce the number of military camps. In each of them, the number of equipment will increase up to seven times, military personnel - up to ten. The comprehensive development of typical base military camps includes the construction of social facilities: food factories, outpatient clinics, physical education and sports facilities, shops, leisure centers, online libraries, mini-cinemas, post offices, pharmacies, bank branches, etc. Base towns will be located close to major cities. This will provide military personnel and members of their families with access to educational and cultural centers.
Particular attention is paid to remote military towns. It is planned in the future to provide them with a package of modern information and telecommunication services: high-speed Internet, digital television and telephony.
The storage system for missiles and ammunition will be optimized. As a result of aging, it is necessary to destroy about 74 thousand wagons of these explosive objects. By 2015, more than 35 thousand wagons of missiles, ammunition and explosives will be removed from arsenals located in cities.
By the end of 2012, the information and telecommunications infrastructure of the Armed Forces will be modernized, replacing outdated analog equipment with digital equipment.
A line of sixth generation radio stations is being developed. In 2011, deliveries of new portable radio stations to the troops began. The deployment of a promising constellation of military communications satellites has begun, the creation of which is planned to be completed by 2018.
To ensure full combat training, troops are freed from functions unusual for them. All economic tasks in the army and navy since January 1, 2012 are carried out by third-party organizations through outsourcing. The following functions are transferred to civil sector enterprises: maintenance and repair of equipment; providing personnel with food and bath and laundry services; cargo transportation, ship bunkering; comprehensive airfield operational maintenance of aircraft; operation of communal infrastructure. In 2012, it is planned to completely abandon the involvement of personnel in performing economic work and other non-core activities. Repair of military equipment will also be carried out by third parties.
In 2012, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are switching to a new system of contract service for sergeants and enlisted personnel. It provides for other approaches to stimulating military personnel, their multi-level selection and training.
The formation of a new image of the Armed Forces will require a reorganization of the military education system in the interests of staffing the RF Armed Forces with comprehensively trained officers who are capable of independently using modern weapons, modern equipment, and also who are able to teach this to soldiers who are currently serving in conscription for only one year. In order to solve this problem, the following measures will be implemented:
1) A new quality of military education will be ensured through the use of unified approaches to training in military and civilian schools. To do this, it is necessary to change the selection system for military universities, in particular, additional types of testing of applicants will be introduced.
Primary-level officers are expected to be trained under specialist training programs. For this purpose, military educational institutions, together with the best civilian universities and enterprises of the military-industrial complex, will develop new federal state educational standards. Training of senior officers will be carried out in the system of additional professional education. It is planned to create a system of continuous professional education for officers, providing for the preparation of military personnel for each new position. Much attention is paid to the training of professional sergeants. Their training will be carried out in 19 universities and branches, as well as at the Sergeant Training Center in the city of Ryazan.
2) The network and capacity of military educational institutions will be brought into line with the existing parameters of the personnel order. As part of this task, the process of consolidation of universities will continue.
One of the important areas of reforming the Armed Forces is improving the troop recruitment system. As attractive conditions are created military service it is planned to increase the share of contract military personnel. In the near future, the positions of soldiers and sergeants will be filled on a mixed basis.
As part of the increase social status officers, on January 1, 2012, a law came into force that significantly increased the level of pay for military personnel and the level of pensions, and measures were implemented to provide these categories of citizens with permanent housing. It is planned to further improve the system of incentives for military personnel through the introduction of new incentive bonuses.
In the near future, it is planned to provide military personnel with permanent housing, as well as to create a service housing fund for military personnel.
The Ministry of Defense will continue to implement the departmental target program “Implementation of social guarantees for military personnel discharged from military service.” Currently, 15 military personnel are participating in it educational institutions and 34 branches, where it is possible to master 250 civilian specialties.
The Ministry of Defense will also continue to assist discharged military personnel in their employment after transfer to the reserve.
To consolidate the high social status of military personnel, it is planned to continue work to improve legislation on military service, which would be aimed at increasing the motivation of military personnel to conscientiously perform their duties, observing the principles of equality during military service, and providing social guarantees to military personnel. For these purposes, work is currently underway on a draft federal law on military service in the Russian Federation.
2
The priority among others remains the task of equipping troops with modern weapons and military equipment. This means that the latest achievements of science, advanced technical solutions, materials and technologies will be applied; they will match or exceed the best foreign samples in all major tactical and technical characteristics. Behind last years There have been positive changes in solving this problem. The volume of supplies of modern weapons to the troops has increased; in 2010, their share increased by 15%. To unconditionally and completely fulfill this task, it is necessary to implement the new State Armament Program (SAP) for the period 2011-2020 as efficiently as possible. Almost 20 trillion rubles will be allocated to ensure this, which will allow the Armed Forces to be supplied with weapons and military equipment to 100% by 2016, and with modern models to 30%. By 2020, the share of modern weapons and modern equipment in the troops should be increased to a level of at least 70%, including in general purpose forces - up to 60-70 percent, in strategic nuclear forces - up to 70-80 percent. Measures for the development of the military-industrial complex of Russia, which are being carried out within the framework of the new federal target program for its development, are also aimed at implementing the GPV.
One of the most important areas of modernization of weapons and equipment is the modernization of strategic offensive and defensive systems. Within ten years, the Strategic Missile Forces will be completely modernized by replacing outdated Stiletto and Topol missiles with the latest Yara and Topol-M. To solve the problem of breaking through the existing and future missile defense systems available to the United States and its allies, the creators of the new complexes have provided such characteristics that allow us to speak of the invulnerability of our new missiles in all areas of their flight. New ICBMs have means and properties that make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to destroy missiles and warheads during flight.
New ICBMs have a maximally shortened acceleration phase of flight, significantly shorter in duration than older types of missiles. During flight, missiles and warheads (each new missile has several of them), made with the most reduced intrinsic radiation in all wave ranges, are accompanied by decoys and stations active interference, vigorously maneuver in altitude and heading, which makes it impossible to identify them and predict the meeting point for interception.
IN soon Work will begin on the creation of the latest hundred-ton silo-based ICBM. The new missile will replace the world-famous heavy ballistic missile R-36M2 Voevoda, known in the West under the name Satan.
Similar solutions have been applied to the new sea-based ICBM Bulava. It is expected that in the near future it will become the basis of Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces; new ones are already being built for this missile. submarines. The lead missile cruiser Yuri Dolgoruky will have 12 silos with Bulava missiles. In addition, by 2020, several new Yasen-class multi-purpose nuclear submarines will be introduced into service with the Navy.
As part of the State Armed Forces until 2020, all long-range detection radars of the missile attack warning system that are part of the Russian attack warning system will be replaced with new generation stations. The Voronezh station, which entered experimental combat duty near Kaliningrad at the end of 2011, became part of the Aerospace Defense Forces, has a range of 6 thousand kilometers and can simultaneously control 500 objects.
The Armed Forces will continue to be equipped with new modern missile and aviation systems. In 2012, the Aerospace Defense Forces will put into operation the next divisional complex of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, the naval aviation fleet will be replenished with 28 ship-based fighters MiG-29K and MiG-29 KUB, and supplies of Yak-130 combat training aircraft will continue for the Air Force . By 2020, 65 such aircraft will be delivered, which will meet the priority needs for training combat aviation pilots. The delivery of new Yak-130s creates conditions for pilots to master the new generation of combat aircraft, which are ordered by the Russian Air Force. Due to the fairly high combat capabilities of the Yak-130, it can be used to test the real use of many types aviation weapons, and not only uncontrollable, but also high-precision, as well as reprogram the control system in order to accurately simulate a specific type of combat aircraft.
The first among the new generation combat aircraft entering the Air Force will be the Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters, then they will be joined by aircraft created under the program of the Advanced Aviation Complex of Frontline Aviation (PAK FA). Serial purchase of PAK FA (T-50) for the Russian Air Force will begin in 2016. The T-50 aircraft is distinguished by highly intelligent on-board equipment, super maneuverability, will be able to take off and land on runways 300-400 meters long, and is capable of performing combat missions in any weather and time of day.
The missiles of the S-400 Triumph and S-300V-4 anti-aircraft missile systems supplied to the troops are capable of hitting targets at a distance of 400 km and an altitude of 35 km, and the complexes themselves are distinguished by high mobility and combat readiness: from the march they are brought into combat position just in five minutes.
The State Armaments Program, designed for the period until 2020, provides for the development of new grenade launcher and flamethrower weapons for the Ground Forces. It is planned to create a single multi-caliber grenade launcher system for all branches of the military, which should replace the RShG-1, RShG-2, RPG-7, RPG-29 and others grenade launchers.
In the period until 2020, research and development work will be completed, as a result of which a large number of different systems, complexes and types of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as equipment for military personnel will be supplied to the army and navy. So, in particular, the equipment of the soldier of the future will include about 10 different subsystems, including: small arms, armor protection, communications, ammunition, data exchange devices and others.
A single unified new generation vehicle platform will be developed for military vehicles. Its technical appearance will differ significantly from modern models. The frame-panel cabin will be equipped with bulletproof and mine protection. An armored functional module, a container body, and a loading platform should be installed on the new generation chassis.
Some of the most high-tech weapons supplied to the Russian Armed Forces will be purchased abroad. Thus, 4 helicopter-carrying landing dock ships “Mistral” will enter service with the Russian Navy. The first ship of this type will be built in France at the end of 2013 - beginning of 2014, the second - at the end of 2014 - beginning of 2015. The remaining two Mistrals will be built under license in Russia. The Mistral can transport 16 heavy or 35 light helicopters, ground equipment, landing boats and from 450 to 900 military personnel. The ship can also be used as a command center and a floating hospital.
Thus, the successful modernization of the army and navy by 2020 will allow the Russian Federation to have modern and effective Armed Forces capable of ensuring the military security of the country in the context of the transition to the post-industrial stage of development.
Guidelines
In the introductory part of the lesson, when justifying the relevance of the topic, the leader of the lesson should emphasize the need to have powerful Armed Forces in Russia in the modern international situation.
When presenting the material on the first educational issue, the leader must pay special attention to explaining the procedure for solving the main tasks of modernizing the Russian Armed Forces.
When presenting the material on the second educational question, it is necessary to disclose and justify priority task equipping troops with modern weapons and military equipment.
In the final part of the lesson, it is advisable to emphasize the complexity of solving the problems of modernizing the Armed Forces and give recommendations for independent study of the recommended literature.
Recommended reading:
1. Speech by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian Federation, at an extended meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2011. // Independent Military Review from 03/25/2011, http:// nvo.ng.ru/realty/2011-03-25.
2. Report of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation at an extended meeting of the board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2011. // Independent Military Review dated March 25, 2011., http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2011 -03-25.
3. Speech by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation on November 17, 2011.
4. Speech by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation at a meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on November 22, 2011.
5. Russia was forced to respond to the build-up of missile defense. Interview with the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces S. Karakaev to the newspaper “Vzglyad” December 16, 2011 http://www. vz.ru/news/2011/12/16.
6. The reform gives the desired results. Report of the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces at a military-scientific conference at the Academy of Military Sciences // Independent Military Review from 02.17.2012, http;// nvo.ng. ru/rearty/2012-02-l7/1_reform. html.
Reserve Colonel
Alexander LEBEDEV
Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor
Landmark 07 2012
The share of new equipment in the Russian army is 58%, and this year it will increase to 62. He spoke about this. President dedicated military themes. Representatives of the army and defense enterprises were invited today. The main goal is to sum up the interim results of the state rearmament program and decide what weapons the military will need in the future.
Today in St. Petersburg the new generation communications vessel “Ivan Khurs” was launched. This ship contains characteristics for a number of ship life support systems. Most processes for managing standard technical equipment and on-board weapons are automated.
The fulfillment of state defense orders almost in full over the past year suggests that the modernization of the Russian armed forces is proceeding strictly according to plan. This means that by the end of 2020, as planned by the president, the composition of weapons and military equipment will be updated by 70%.
“More than 5 thousand 600 units of the main types of the latest weapons, as well as about 3 thousand repaired and modernized models of military and special equipment were delivered to the troops,” the president reports. “This made it possible to increase the fleet of modern equipment in permanent readiness units to 58%. Overall ", the successful implementation of the state defense order last year made it possible to ensure the comprehensive development of weapons systems. Strengthen the combat potential of force groups formed in strategic directions."
Only the troops of the Central and Eastern Military Districts have several dozen new Iskander-M and Pantsir-S1 complexes, Su-35S and Su-34 aircraft, Bastion coastal missile systems, Tor anti-aircraft missile systems, unmanned aerial vehicles aircrafts various modifications.
Crimea was reinforced with the S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile system and Pantsir-S complexes, Navy replenished with 24 ships. "In 2017 level modern weapons and technology is planned to be increased to 62%, the president notes. “I ask the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and representatives of the defense industry to focus on this indicator. I would also note that the combat experience gained during the operation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the need to strengthen Arctic territories and borders in the west and southwest required clarification of approaches to re-equipping troops. Therefore, during the meeting we will also consider the main parameters of the new state armament program. As you know, its development has already begun."
By the way, the latest military equipment in a special northern livery could be seen at the Victory Parade. The Tor-M2DT and Pantsir-SA air defense systems were manufactured specifically for the Far North. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief keeps everything related to rearmament under personal control and holds such meetings twice a year.
“This is an absolutely unique format,” notes Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov. “The main goal is to increase the efficiency of military construction, the implementation of state defense orders, and the activity of our Armed Forces in general.”
After a detailed analysis, manufacturers will receive recommendations from the military on how to improve the most important parameters.
This is the ninth meeting on the implementation of state defense orders since 2013. The work lasts for a whole week. This will allow us to discuss in detail each of the projects in a variety of areas.
Rearmament Russian army scheduled to take place before 2020. Will the Russian government cope with this? On this moment the pace of reformation remains impressive. Although it was not possible to reach the heights planned back in 2008, the reformation continues and is gaining momentum. The Russian Federation is making every effort to carry out rearmament on time, even despite the economic recession.
General government plans
Back in 2008, a program for rearmament and general reform of the army was approved. It was planned to be carried out in three stages, and the army would not be rearmed immediately. The first step is changing personnel. Mostly officers retired. The second stage is improving the social security of army personnel. The first and second stages were completed successfully. However, the third stage, direct re-equipment, turned out to be the most difficult and financially costly, so the original plan to carry out 75% of the work by 2015 was postponed.
Despite the failure to meet intermediate deadlines, the government did not abandon the initially set tasks. The country will rearm until 2020 according to the following plans:
- Updating military equipment. This item includes the modernization of nuclear weapons, the performance characteristics of which are significantly superior to Western ones, and the updating of general army and naval equipment. The estimated renewal volume is 70% percent. Will be used Russian complex developments.
- Bringing the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation to a modern form (by 45% percent);
- Updating of aerospace defense assets (by 60% percent);
- Re-equipment ground forces(only 20% percent).
Will be transformed: edged weapons, nuclear forces, aircraft, armored ground vehicles. The total volume of changes will affect 75% of the equipment of all army units. At the moment, about half of the planned actions have already been completed.
The end of the rearmament program is scheduled for 2020. Moreover, by 2019 most of the updated equipment should be put into operation, and the army personnel should be completely transformed by this time. The list of updates has currently been approved, but may be adjusted at the initiative of the government.
Changes in plans
Due to the large-scale economic crisis of previous years, funding for the reform program decreased. The use of some monetary assets has become impossible. However, the government says that this will not affect the timing of the program or its volume.
They decided to achieve savings by reducing costs for foreign weapons Russian army. They decided to replace foreign-made models with modernized Russian equipment.
Deputy Defense Minister Borisov announced this, emphasizing: “The best is the enemy of the good.” Experts who have a pessimistic view of Russia’s development predict the failure of the campaign due to decreased funding, but government analysts promise the implementation of reforms by 2020.
Measures implemented so far
The rearmament program began to operate back in 2008, but the active stage of modernization actually started only in 2015, and during this year and subsequent time Russia managed to achieve significant results in the field of updating military equipment (97% of the annual program was completed):
- in the field of strategic weapons, Russia has acquired new Yars installations, which have intercontinental range(almost worldwide coverage);
- 5 missile regiments have already been rearmed;
- the military space forces received five sets of S-400 Triumph installations, which have an increased range;
- The Aerospace Forces also received at their disposal the latest “4++” fighter Su-35S, which in terms of characteristics almost reaches the level of the 5th generation; The Su-35S has been successfully tested in the military battles currently engulfing Syria;
- the ground forces received a new Russian service pistol and some other basic equipment;
- Tu class bombers were modernized and air force generally;
- The Navy has improved mainly in the Black Sea direction: the water area received two new submarines with rocket launchers Extended range "Caliber" technician.
At the same time, parts of the South were most significantly affected (their appearance will change by 80%). Active rearmament of units located near the eastern archipelagos of Russia began. The government is focusing on the defense of critical borders. The time of reformation is constantly increasing, but the pace of renewal is not slowing down. The last one, 2016, is the most promising: after a long economic stagnation, the program was practically completed.
The documentary catalog of the reform includes several more new weapons positions that were not disclosed as of 2016. They will be discussed in more detail online in 2018-2020.
Plans for the near future
In 2017, the Russian Federation plans not to slow down the pace of renewal. This is reported by Wikipedia and official statements by representatives of the country's Ministry of Defense. We need to exceed the indicators of 2015 and 2016 (97 percent of the plan). To achieve this goal, the pace of reforms was slightly increased. In this case, by the end of this year it is necessary:
- equip three more rifle units with Yars complexes, which can withstand comparison even with Western and European RK complexes;
- supplement three air defense divisions with Tor-M2 missile launchers;
- supply 950 armored vehicles, including tanks and other large military equipment;
- supplement the weapons of the Russian Armed Forces and Aerospace Forces with 170 new aircraft;
- commission water craft for the Navy: 8 ships for surface use and 9 boats for combat purposes;
- commission the Iskander installations;
- install 4 “Bal” RK installations;
- increase the number of S-400 complexes.
Some of the assigned tasks have already been completed. The remainder is being urgently completed before the New Year, after which the interim results of the reform will be summed up. How complete is the rearmament of the Russian the army will pass in 2017, it will be possible to judge only in January-February 2018. To rearm such a number of units - difficult task, which the reformers had previously dealt with surprisingly successfully.
The list of weapons of the Russian army until 2020 will be replenished with several new names that have not yet been announced. Latest news V military sphere- these are the Bal missile launchers and new tank models.
Russia's updated army and new weapons are primarily aimed at increasing the country's status in the eyes of other states. The updated RK are not afraid of US anti-missile installations, thanks to which they can provide both a decent defensive response and a strong attack. The complete rearmament of the Russian army will occur before 2020. The Minister of Defense and his Deputy, as well as other prominent figures from the Ministry of Defense, presented short report, where they say that after the reform is completed, the country’s armament level will increase many times over.
The most active representatives of Russian society, including military personnel, already in the second half of the 80s insisted on the consistent application of the principles of democracy in the sphere of ensuring the country's military security. It would be useful to remind you what landmarks military reform were outlined at the very beginning of the construction of the new Russian army - in the April Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation of 1992 and in the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 30, 1992 No. 918 “On measures for the phased transition to manning the RF Armed Forces with military personnel on a voluntary basis - under a contract”:
The total number of Russian military personnel should not exceed 1 million (i.e., in the future it was planned to fight “not with numbers, but with skill”);
A compact army and navy must be equipped with effective weapons based on advanced technologies;
The expenditures, structure and size of a military organization must be open to the public.
Alas! The implementation of the decisions made in 1992 was, contrary to common sense, entrusted to the “siloviki” themselves. Should we be surprised at the disastrous results? However, without going into a detailed analysis of the events of the 90s, let us turn to the current situation. In 2003, realizing the need for quick and radical changes, the Russian President announced the upcoming modernization of the army. Here are the most important ideas expressed by the president in his message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2003 and, according to him, which have not lost their significance today: “In military reform, the key issues are significant rearmament, improvement of recruitment principles and improvement of the very structure of the Armed Forces... In accordance with approved plans, we will continue to form permanently ready units in the ground forces, airborne forces, and marines on a professional basis. This work should be completed in 2007. In addition, service in the internal and border troops will be based on professional principles... I would also like to note that the non-commissioned corps of our Armed Forces will be transferred to a professional basis at an accelerated pace. From 2008, the duration of conscription service should be reduced to one year. For the first six months, conscripts will master military specialties in training units. After this, they will have the opportunity to choose - either serve for six months in linear units, or switch to contract, professional service. Those who have served 3 years under a contract should receive a number of preferences, including the guaranteed right to higher education at state expense.”
These theses fully corresponded to the hopes and expectations of the overwhelming majority of citizens, especially since their substantiation was based on the conclusions of public organizations and independent experts. Only the military leaders thought differently. In the fall of 2003, the Ministry of Defense prepared and, with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation, held a meeting, after which the so-called “ White paper”, which stated that the military reform had already been completed and that nothing needed to be radically changed in the army. The problem of recruitment was considered here from the point of view of the military, the interests of society were mentioned only in passing. And although the White Paper does not have legal force, generals regularly refer to it, and their subordinates are forced to be guided by it.
Nevertheless, the modernization of the armed forces began. To judge her possible results, two questions need to be answered: 1) who is entrusted with carrying out the relevant activities; 2) what real actions have been taken to date. We will try to give answers to these questions in relation to the main directions of modernization.
Principles of army recruitment
The Ministry of Defense remained responsible for the reform of the recruitment system as a whole. And this is alarming. In fact, the federal target program (FTP) for the transfer of private and junior military personnel to contract, adopted by the Russian government on August 25, 2003, is formally interdepartmental. However, in reality this program is implemented only by the security forces. Representatives of society (in particular, employees of the non-governmental Institute of Economics transition period(IET), who took part in its justification) were removed from the implementation of the program under the pretext of secrecy. Control over the implementation of the Federal Target Program is also entrusted to the Ministry of Defense. Thus, this ministry plans events on its own, carries them out on its own, and controls itself.
The answer to the second of the questions raised is no less troubling. The initial steps to implement the Federal Target Program can hardly be called prudent: instead of the speedy and significant increase in pay for contract soldiers recommended by civilian experts (10–20% higher than the average salary in the country), the Minister of Defense in 2003 hastened to sign an order to increase pay for military personnel of the central government agencies Ministry of Defense.
Later we managed to “adjust” this policy, but we still cannot calm down. First of all, because the Federal Target Program for transfer to contract adopted in 2003 military units constant readiness of the Armed Forces of the Ministry of Defense, internal troops The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB border troops are implemented in these departments in different ways.
The FSB has already abandoned conscription and is moving to staffing the border service exclusively on a contract basis; it is ahead of the Federal Target Program. This is already the second of the “security” departments that was able to assess its own benefits from the transition to a contract (the first, as you know, was the Main Directorate for the Execution of Punishments, transferred some time ago from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice).
By the end of 2005, the Ministry of Internal Affairs intended to fully staff only the 46th separate brigade of internal troops stationed in Chechnya under the contract. However, the complete transfer of these troops to a contract form of recruitment, which the President of the Russian Federation spoke about in his 2003 message, is now rejected. On what basis? This department has not yet given any clear explanations.
The Ministry of Defense and the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff (GOMU), which is responsible for this area of work, are especially strongly opposed to the transfer of all regular troops to contract - even in the long term. Only certain units have been completely transferred to the contract in the RF Armed Forces, primarily the 76th Airborne Division (stationed in Pskov, participates in a number of operations in the North Caucasus) and the 42nd motorized rifle division(stationed in Chechnya). The rest of the reform, according to the Ministry of Defense, is being carried out in accordance with the Federal Target Program, but is encountering difficulties. But the “fast pace” of contract recruitment of all sergeant positions in all regular forces has been temporarily forgotten: they are going to start this event only after the completion of the Federal Target Program.
And yet, the appearance in the Russian army of not only military units, but also formations, fully staffed under contract, on a voluntary basis, should be regarded as a huge achievement.
As for the difficulties, it should be noted: until now, the salary of a contract soldier does not exceed the average salary in the country anywhere except Chechnya. Therefore, instead of an intensive influx of contract soldiers into the army, there is an outflow of previously recruited ones - mainly those who did not serve in permanent readiness units. But not only of them. Due to the extortions that contract soldiers serving in Chechnya are subjected to, a military career is losing its attractiveness for them too. According to published data, more than 1.3 thousand people left the 42nd division in 2005, and more than 400 more will be dismissed early because they did not return from vacation. As it turned out, during their service they did not receive the required allowances. And not all is well in the “elite” 76th, as evidenced by the chief of staff of this division. The allowance standards are such that contract workers are often forced to buy some items of clothing and equipment, including even skis, with their own money. And the Minister of Defense only at the end of 2005, after several additional “infusions” of funds into the ministry’s budget, discovered that the costs of the Federal Target Program were not indexed, that the program was financed without taking into account inflation.
The situation is even worse with the upcoming reduction in the duration of conscription service. Instead of a six-month period, which, as many experts have shown, is quite sufficient for learning the basics of a military specialty and preparing for service under a contract (or for enrollment in a mobilization resource), the government decree and the message of the President of the Russian Federation appeared the formula “up to 1 year”, by which the military means not six, but a full twelve months. This destroys the life plans of those who, for example, did not qualify for admission to a university and were then drafted into the army. In fact, such a conscript will lose not one, but two years, since he will not be able to take exams again next summer.
It was promised that all conscripts would spend the first half of the year in a military training unit. But even here there is no clarity. The number of such units and the total number of their contingent are clearly insufficient. This means that many young men will immediately be drafted into training units attached to other military units, where they will meet their “grandfathers.” And those servicemen who go through training military units will find themselves in the second half of their service not in permanent readiness units, but in some mysterious “linear” units. What these parts are is far from clear. Apparently, the military leaders who prepared proposals for the President of the Russian Federation on this issue forgot that the term “line troops” has long been outdated. Officially, there are no military units called “linear” in the Russian Federation at all. According to the works of our military theorists and practitioners, now there are such “categories of content” of formations and military units: permanent readiness, reduced strength (type A and B), personnel and newly formed ones. The formation of new military units is not planned (except for two mountain brigades, which are expected to be created by 2007). Type B cadre and reduced-strength military units are not ready to carry out their intended tasks. Reduced military units of type A perform tasks in a limited scope. What skills will conscripts acquire there in the second half of their service? Surely they will not be used “for their intended purpose.”
Probably because of this ambiguity, the Ministry of Defense has still not implemented clause 4 of the mentioned government decree of 08.25.03 (on the Federal Target Program) and has not submitted it on time - i.e. by the fourth quarter of 2003! - a bill to change the procedure for conscription for a short period and the very appointment of such service. Instead, we are excited by bills on the abolition of deferments, on the liquidation of military departments, etc. Recently it turned out that there are too many such departments. But let us remind you: according to our laws, not a single military department can be created without the knowledge of the Ministry of Defense. So who created these unnecessary departments?
Meanwhile, delaying such a transition is fraught with extreme negative consequences, especially considering the coming demographic collapse. This is evidenced, in particular, by the results of mathematical modeling of recruitment processes and their military-economic characteristics. Detailed modeling materials have been published. They are presented in detail and regularly updated on the IET website [www.iet.ru] in the “Publications” section, under the “Military Reform” heading.
The graphs below show some of the simulation results.
Figure 1. Change in the pace (thousands of people per half-year) of replenishment of the conscript contingent, conscription, recruitment and replenishment of contract soldiers, as well as the total number of conscript contingent (thousands of people) - according to the option proposed by the Ministry of Defense
The great depth of forecasting - up to 2035 - is explained by the fact that this is the only way to take into account demographic fluctuations, the time discrepancy between the processes of conscription into the army, demobilization, the transition of citizens to the mobilization resource and stay in it, and from an economic point of view - all types of expenses, including pension provision for future retirees from among the RMKS currently recruited under contract. The number of people serving, in the reserve and retired depends significantly on the personnel policy being pursued; the same applies to the corresponding expenses.
As modeling has shown, after 2008, the rate of growth in the number of contract soldiers envisaged in the Federal Targeted Program, as well as the president’s decision to reduce the length of conscription service, do not fit in with the intention of the Ministry of Defense and its supporters in the security bloc to maintain the current size of the armed forces. They are also incompatible with the promise to preserve “student” deferments. Something will have to be given up, since even if all deferments are cancelled, the demographic collapse will lead to a sharp decrease in the influx of young citizens into the conscription contingent. As for the bill currently being initiated on conscription for one year after graduation, it is worth recalling Emperor Alexander II: according to his reform, persons with higher education were supposed to serve only six months! Even in those years, calling on specialists for a longer period seemed impractical.
It is argued that GOMU's plans are driven by economic factors. But this aspect has also been comprehensively studied by non-governmental organizations and independent experts. Calculations show that with the implementation of the program of the Ministry of Defense (first - implementation of the Federal Targeted Program, then the transfer of all sergeants to contract), the costs of all types of allowance for the RMKS, including housing for those who will become professional military personnel, and then military pensioners, will increase to approximately 125 billion rubles per year (in 2005 prices). These calculations take into account all components of expenses, as well as the fact that, while increasing the pay of RMKS military personnel, it will simultaneously have to be increased for officers, warrant officers and midshipmen. And, of course, it is assumed that the personnel policy will be reasonable and not all military personnel who entered into the first contract will serve until retirement, as was stated earlier in the article by the head of the State Military Inspectorate V.V. Smirnov and is still understood by many. In most states with large armed forces (for example, the United States), after each contract period, approximately half of the military personnel remain in the ranks, the rest leave. This is precisely what the incentive system and legislation are aimed at. It is gratifying that V.V. Smirnov, at least now, at the end of 2005, recognized such a policy as effective for Russia.
Figure 2. Budgetary expenditures for the reform of the system of recruiting military personnel for the military organization of the RMKS (billion rubles per year) according to the option proposed by the Ministry of Defense
Taking into account this personnel policy, which is rational for Russia, additional costs were assessed to accelerate the reform of the recruitment system under various acceleration options (compared to GOMU plans). Are they big? The question is not idle, since the Minister of Defense, at the instigation of some of his subordinates, is trying to intimidate society precisely with “exorbitant expenses.” It is characteristic that the financial and economic service of the Ministry of Defense did not declare anything of the kind, especially since there were no official publications of the source data, methods and calculation results. Apparently, other people who use different arithmetic “count” for the minister.
Modeling has established that the statements of military leaders about the economic unsustainability for the country of a complete transfer of the military organization to the voluntary principle of recruitment do not correspond to reality.
Figure 3. Additional total costs for accelerating the transfer of a military organization to a voluntary recruitment principle (compared to the option proposed by the Ministry of Defense; billion rubles per year)
Forms of transition to a voluntary recruitment principle:
In 1–2 after the implementation of the Federal Target Program by 2008.
In 2–2 immediate transition (months of service in brackets).
Even if you do not reduce the number of RMKS and all military personnel in general, then if you speed up the federal target program, the excess costs that would be needed to implement the Ministry of Defense option will be only a few percent of the current ones total expenses on defense. The figure shows six options for accelerating the transition, their detailed descriptions can be found in IET publications. These calculations have not been refuted by anyone!
With the exception of two “forced” options that require a “surge” of expenses in the next few years, the rest generally lie in the range of 10–15 billion rubles. But also “bursts” that provide an immediate transition to financially quite tolerable. Let us remind you that in the adopted budget, the expenditures of the Ministry of Defense amount to 600 billion rubles. Only in 2005, in addition to the budget (!), the Ministry of Defense received much more funds than would be required to accelerate the transition to a contract acquisition system. And next year, 2006, this increase will be greater. However, additional funds are used for other purposes. Who has proven to society that they are more relevant and that money is spent efficiently? Judging by the materials of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office and the Accounts Chamber, huge sums are simply stolen.
But that's not the point. A fundamentally different approach to solving the acquisition problem is more rational. In terms of combat effectiveness, the number of military personnel in a group made up of contract soldiers is equivalent to one and a half times the number of military personnel serving under conscription for two years, as is the case now. The difference in their combat effectiveness will be even more significant upon transition to one year of conscription service. This means that the size of a military organization in the process of switching to a contract can be reduced by more than one and a half times without any damage to the country’s defense capability. ABOUT foreign experience V.V. Smirnov also spoke about a “sharp” reduction in numbers during the transition to a contract in the above-mentioned article. It is not clear why these conclusions cannot be applied to Russia.
Note: the reduction will affect not only soldiers, sailors, sergeants and foremen, but also the more “expensive” officers. In other words, we're talking about not about additional expenses, but about the possibility of using the freed-up funds to equip the combat-ready military units remaining after the reduction with modern weapons.
Equipment and maintenance of a military organization
This aspect of army modernization was mentioned by the President of the Russian Federation in his 2004 Address to the Federal Assembly: “To successfully modernize the entire military organization of the state, we need to clearly know how a lot of money is spent, including on providing housing for military personnel, on military medicine, and on education. In addition, the army and other law enforcement agencies have accumulated huge property, and it also needs to be assessed and effective management. A transparent military economy is a necessary condition for reform.” The natural question is: is there sufficient political will to implement the assigned tasks? After all, in 1992, as already mentioned, these tasks were formulated in approximately the same way.
Can we talk about successes in relation to the military-technical and socio-economic aspects of modernization? Without a doubt. First of all, this is the creation of unified systems of material, technical and other types of support for the entire military organization of the Russian Federation. Some successes are also obvious in providing military personnel with housing and in equipping the RF Armed Forces with the latest weapons systems. Society appreciated them, but now it is worried about something else. Still leaves something to be desired best quality weapons and the level of their use: the latter is due to both technical reasons and human factor(insufficient training of personnel, whose combat training is not fully funded).
To solve this problem, a number of administrative (institutional) reforms were undertaken. The State Defense Procurement Service has been created, a “single customer” system is being formed in the Ministry of Defense, and the Russian Government Commission on Military-Industrial Issues has been created. The restructuring of the military-industrial complex (DIC) continues.
At the same time, however, the defense industry continues to “fence itself off” from Russian economy, and the enterprises included in it are enlarged, turning into a group of monopolists, which does not fit well with market principles. Unfortunately, there is still a widespread opinion that the domestic defense industry is the locomotive of progress, and that in order to save the Russian economy it is necessary to invest in it. But this thesis was not entirely accurate before, and now it does not stand up to criticism, especially when it comes to investments not controlled by society.
The Ministry of Defense should promote the unification of the production of military equipment and products for national economic purposes, an integrated approach to innovation processes, since this ministry itself cannot now make large-scale, economically profitable orders. If innovation is based on the unity of materials, element base and structural components for military and civilian products, the possibility of inter-industry unification will immediately appear, which means that the factor of reducing production costs with increasing serial production will begin to work. Let us recall that doubling the output of modern engineering products usually reduces their cost by 15–20%, and even more in breakthrough areas.
Thus, with a competent innovation policy, it is even possible to reduce military spending while maintaining the level of the country’s defense capability, or, what is now more reasonable, to increase the level of military security without attracting additional funds. A military-technical policy in which dual-use innovations will naturally be included in military development plans will be useful for the Russian military organization. But is Defense Minister S.B. Ivanov, who also became Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, ready to implement just such a policy? So far, unfortunately, we have not heard his statements indicating his readiness to take a radical and absolutely necessary measure: not to approve in the future either the State Armament Program or the State Defense Order if their projects are not supported not only by traditional military-technical, but also by unification justifications, guaranteeing rational civilian use of military technologies.
Planning and control systems
At the end of 2005, one could note with satisfaction that order in the “security” departments had somewhat strengthened, and as a result, the level of military security in Russia had risen. This is evidenced by a number of facts, the most impressive of which seems to be the disruption of the plot of a major terrorist attack in Nalchik. However, we have not yet seen a noticeable decrease in the level of offenses in the military organization itself, especially economic ones. Here it is worth quoting again the message to the Federal Assembly in 2004, in which the president specifically recalled: “Please keep in mind the Ministry of Defense and the government as a whole: the volume of funds spent, the interests of the country’s defense capability, as well as important social parameters of the reform make it mandatory to have civilian control over the effectiveness of ongoing in the army of transformations." One can only regret that the president expressed his wish in the form of a request, and not a categorical demand, since the lack of civilian control is precisely the stumbling block for military reform.
It is not yet clear that the “security” departments are properly taking into account changes in methods of public administration. The fact is that in recent years in many states the system known as “planning, programming and budgeting” has received further development in two directions: firstly, it also covered the stage of control, not so much over the execution of the budget, but over the achievement of strategic goals; secondly, this naturally required a more rigorous formalization of the system of strategic goals, tactical tasks that must be solved to achieve these goals, and clear (measured or calculated) indicators indicating the degree of such achievement. A new term has emerged: “results-based budgeting.” International standards have been developed regarding the classification of financial assets.
Under these conditions, some Russian economists considered it possible to take as the basis for the functional budget classification of the Russian Federation the international standard of the Classification of Functions of Government Bodies, which was compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and adopted by the UN in 2000 as an element of the UN System of National Accounts, introduced in 1993. They were further encouraged to take this step by the fact that the use of this standard was supported by the International monetary fund, who included it in their Manual of Government Finance Statistics. The government adopted the concept of reforming the budget process in the Russian Federation, providing for “bringing the budget classification of the Russian Federation closer to the requirements of international standards” (Resolution No. 249 of May 22, 2004).
But at the same time, the most important circumstance was forgotten that military spending is a special concern of the world community, that a different international standard for it has long been adopted and is in force. It is worth recalling that it was introduced at the initiative of the USSR General Assembly UN as early as December 12, 1980 (resolution No. 35/142 B). And the decree of the Russian government regarding military spending must be carried out primarily on the basis of this standard. In part, one can also rely on NATO’s standardized reporting, since the Russian Federation is in a “partnership” relationship with this organization and conducts a corresponding exchange of military-economic information.
However, when developing and approving budgets for 2005, and then for 2006, the requirements international standard regulating military spending were ignored. Supporters of their complete secrecy did not fail to take advantage of this. As a result, contrary to the above “request” of the President of the Russian Federation, the degree of secrecy of military spending in the Russian Federation did not decrease, but increased significantly! This fact was negatively assessed by almost all independent experts and even - in the official conclusion on the draft budget - by the Duma Defense Committee. But the head of the economics and finance service of the Ministry of Defense L. Kudelina, characterizing the budget in a recent newspaper publication, did not say a word about this shortcoming.
The role of Russian society in reforming the military organization
First of all: the modernization of the military organization of the Russian Federation must be declared a priority strategic goal of the entire society, and not of any one department or group of departments. The sad experience of the failure of military reform in the 90s and the difficulties it has encountered in recent years indicate that it cannot be entrusted only to the “siloviks”. The leadership of modernization can only be entrusted to those representatives of Russian society who truly recognize the principles of democracy and are strictly guided by them in their activities. Without a clear definition of the goals of modernization and the creation of a supra-departmental working body responsible for it, it can again degenerate into a fiction. At the same time, it is necessary to reinforce the powers of such a body with federal law - for example, by adjusting the law on the Security Council.
Its obligatory participants should be representatives of the presidential administration, the Security Council, the military-industrial commission under the government of the Russian Federation, and, most importantly, one of the commissions under the Public Chamber formed by this new institution. But alone Public Chamber not enough at all. We need to make sure that everything public organizations, all citizens had a real opportunity to exert a beneficial influence on the military organization of Russia in the interests of society and the state.
The most important and urgent task that this body must solve is the creation of two interrelated systems: 1) strategic goals in the field of military security and 2) a detailed classification of budgetary expenditures allocated to achieve them. Only he, guided by the law on state secrets (and not departmental regulations) and international norms (standards), will have the right to decide which items and types of expenses should be secret.
We all would not want a conflict between society and the military leadership. But we are even more interested in ensuring that the new plan for modernizing the army is not ruined, that the President of the Russian Federation shows his will and does not retreat before the opposing forces. And here society must say a strong word.
Some military officials who remain “at the helm” explain their inaction by citing the experience of the Americans, who allegedly switched to a voluntary recruitment system for more than 10 years. Meanwhile, the Americans managed it in almost five years (taking into account preparations for the transition), and in fact (between the president’s decision to begin the transition and the demobilization of the last conscript) - even faster - in two years. See in particular: Shlykov V. How it was in America // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2002. No. 8 (9). pp. 246–459.Current tasks for the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. M.: Voeninform Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2003.
Severinov S. Choice of volunteers (conversation with V. Smirnov) // Red Star. No. 242 dated 12/29/05.
Shlykov V. Black bread of military business // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2003. No. 2 (11). pp. 459–472.
On the rationality of the classification of military expenditures used in it in relation to budget planning in the Russian Federation, see, for example, the monograph: The military budget of the state: Methods of justification and analysis. M.: Voenizdat, 2000.
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