Exactly 60 years ago-August 9, 1955-The Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the development of the first anti-aircraft missile system "Berkut" to protect Moscow from a potential threat from the air. This brainchild of the Cold War was a triumph of Soviet engineering and cost half a billion rubles. Disputes about the effectiveness of the System-25 "Berkut" do not subside even 30 years after the complex was removed from combat duty.
The relationship between the members of the anti-Hitler coalition has never been completely cloudless. But as the defeat of Germany became apparent, the future victors paid more and more attention to the post-war reconstruction of the world, and the conflict of interests, predictably, escalated. Immediately after the end of the war, it came to tough political confrontations - in particular, the well-known Iranian and Turkish crises - and the development of the first plans for a war between the USSR, the USA and England.
On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill's famous Fulton speech marked the beginning of what was later called the Cold War. The prospect of open military confrontation between the recent allies became more and more clear, and in the Korean War of 1950-1953, Soviet and American pilots were already firing at each other with might and main. The great powers were hastily preparing for a new world war and, of course, tried to imagine what it would look like and what, in fact, we should prepare for. Of course, in the first place, the experience of that war, which they just managed to end, was analyzed.
Fourth power
The experience of the war, among other things, postulated the enormous and ever-growing importance of air defense. Back in the middle of the war, in July 1943, the Council for Radar of the State Defense Committee of the USSR was formed, in 1947 it was transformed into the Committee for Radar, and in 1950, on the initiative of Lavrenty Beria, the Third Main Directorate was created under the Council of Ministers. The air defense forces were singled out as a separate, by that time, the fourth type of armed forces, along with the air force, navy and ground forces.
One of the primary tasks of air defense was the defense of cities from massive raids by a large number of bombers, examples of which were still fresh in memory. In the eternal struggle between armor and a projectile, the projectile temporarily won: bombers learned to fly at heights completely unattainable for anti-aircraft artillery, and for fighter aircraft of those times too. The widespread proliferation of missile delivery systems for nuclear weapons was then a matter for the near future, but the weapon itself was already there, so the passage of even one enemy aircraft to the target was extremely undesirable. Meanwhile, high-altitude British "Canberras" and American "Stratojets" from time to time invaded the airspace of the USSR, and calmly returned to the bases. It was necessary to find some new and reliable solution. They are guided anti-aircraft missiles.
The idea of guided anti-aircraft missiles was not fundamentally new: projects of this kind were tried to be carried out in different countries even before the start of World War II, but not a single project reached a working state. During the war, German engineers came closest to solving problems, but even in Germany it did not come to the introduction of air defense missiles into service.
In 1946, the United States began development of the Nike-Ajax missile system, successfully tested and put into production in 1951, and put into service two years later. Single-channel, that is, with the possibility of simultaneous tracking and shelling of just one air target, without interconnection between the batteries, the organization resembled rather barrel artillery of the war times. The Soviet Union approached the matter much more thoroughly.
American missile system Nike-Ajax
http://nikemissile.org
On August 9, 1950, after a series of discussions with Stalin's participation, it was decided to create a missile air defense system for large cities. First - for Moscow, then a similar system was supposed to be built at least for Leningrad. The development of the system with the code name "Berkut" was entrusted to KB-1, known today as NPO Almaz. Individual elements of the system were developed by the Radio Engineering Institute and OKB-301, the current NPO named after S. A. Lavochkina. KB-1 was supervised by Konstantin Mikhailovich Gerasimov. The chief designers were Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko and Sergo Lavrentievich Beria. Deputy Chief Designer - Alexander Andreevich Raspletin. The work was supervised directly by Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.
Already on July 25, 1951, less than a year after the decision was made, within the framework of the Azavod tests, the first launch of the rocket, "product 205", was carried out. The prototype of the B-200 radar station also began to be tested in the summer of 1951, and in the fall of 1952 it was already sent to the test site for missile launches. On April 26, 1953, a Tu-4 bomber, used as a target, was first shot down by two missiles at the Kapustin Yar training ground.
Vertical antenna of the station "B-200" - designed for viewing the airspace in the elevation plane
http://www.raketac25.narod.ru
In mid-1953, L.P. Beria was arrested, removed from all posts, relieved of all posts and soon shot. Sergo Beria, one of the chief designers of KB-1, was suspended from work, deprived of academic degrees, titles, awards, placed under house arrest, then in prison until the end of 1954, and later had nothing to do with the design of the system. P.N.Kuksenko was removed from the post of chief designer and appointed scientific secretary of the scientific council of the design bureau. The place of the chief designer was taken by A.A.Raspletin.
The birth of System-25
However, these personnel changes had little effect on the course of work. Organizational changes turned out to be much more sensitive: the Kapustin Yar test site was transferred to the Main Artillery Directorate, as well as the order for the system. The artillerymen were new to missile systems, and they approached the novelty with doubts and caution. State acceptance tests of the system, called "System-25", or abbreviated S-25, began in June 1954. The elements of the system presented for testing generally met the technical requirements specified in the decree of 1950, and in some parts they significantly exceeded them. Nevertheless, GAU was in no hurry to make a decision on the final acceptance of the system. There are conflicting opinions about who exactly slowed down the deployment of the system on alert. The military was intimidated by the complexity and novelty; it was proposed to put the system into operation without being put into service, there were statements about the need to refine it for the continuously changing characteristics of the weapons of a potential enemy. Finally, NS Khrushchev unequivocally spoke in favor of the system, and on May 7, 1955, the S-25 system was put into service.
The appearance of the missile and the characteristics of the S-25 complex. Air Defense Troops magazine
In parallel with the development, large-scale construction was carried out. Already in March 1951, the Council of Ministers issued a decree on the organization of the construction department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 565 with the tasks of building air defense facilities around Moscow. In June of the same year, the selection of sites for construction began, organizational and management structures were formed, forced labor camps were organized to provide construction with a workforce. The construction of the positions began in December 1951.
As a result, the S-25 consisted of several rings for various purposes, combined into a single system. At a distance of 200-250 kilometers from the capital, ten A-100D "Kama" radar positions were deployed with a detection range of up to six hundred kilometers, two radars per position. At a distance of about a hundred kilometers from Moscow, the outer ring of positions was located, connected by a ring road with a coating of concrete slabs: thirty-four missile regiments with starting positions for sixty missiles, the first models of which had a target destruction range of up to 22 kilometers, and radar guidance stations B- 200 with a target tracking range of up to 50 kilometers. Each regiment controlled a sector of 60 degrees, the sectors of fire of the regiments overlapped. A residential town was erected near the positions of the regiment for officers and their families.
View of the C-25 position from space. You can see the "Christmas tree" of the starting positions, the CPR and the residential town
Seven bases for refueling and storing missiles provided launching positions with fueled missiles. The transportation of missiles was carried out by vehicles ZIS-151, later ZIL-157, and at the very end partly ZIL-131, equipped with special trailers. Each base contained about a thousand missiles, including 20 fully fueled. The shelf life of the rocket in a fueled state initially did not exceed two and a half months, later than six months. After a number of upgrades and replacement of missiles with newer ones, the shelf life has increased further.
The second, inner ring of positions, also connected by a ring road, consisted of 22 regiments and was located approximately fifty kilometers from Moscow. The last ring represented four more positions of the Kama detection radar, the data on the exact model are contradictory. Probably, these were not the A-100D with a circular view, but the A-100B with a sector view and a detection range of up to 225 kilometers. All radar detection information was transmitted to the central command post. The entire system made it possible to simultaneously fire on up to 1,120 enemy aircraft, evenly flying up to Moscow from all directions. Each regiment simultaneously accompanied and fired at up to 20 targets, and three missiles could be launched at each. To combat large formations of enemy aircraft, it was supposed to either "break" them on approach by the actions of fighters, forcing them to spread out into the firing zones of several regiments, or to use a missile with a special, in other words, nuclear, warhead. The power of the nuclear charge was estimated at ten kilotons, the first test of such a rocket was carried out in 1957. And on November 7, 1960, the B-300 missiles were first shown at a military parade in Moscow.
V-300 rockets at the parade on Red Square
http://topwar.ru
The costs of building the system turned out to be so high that the construction of a modified system for Leningrad was canceled. The rapid development of means of attack and electronic warfare led to the partial obsolescence of the S-25 even before it was put on alert. In the process of service, the system underwent four major stages of modernization and several smaller ones: the speed and range of missiles, noise immunity, and the minimum height of target interception decreased. But by the end of the 1970s, the possibilities for improving the system were exhausted, and in 1982 the S-25 was removed from combat duty.
ZIS-151 tractor with V-300 missile
The effectiveness of the S-25 has always been quite controversial. The opponents of the system point first of all to its stationarity, and, consequently, vulnerability to attack. The cost of construction and operation also left much to be desired. On average, one object in the second half of the 50s cost half a billion a year, while the total cost was almost 13 billion rubles.
Information about the cost of the S-25 system in 1956-1957
The technical problems were proportional to the complexity of the system. We had to balance between the number of fueled missiles and the short shelf life of the fueled missile, after which the missile had to be written off.
The pride of the developers was the electronic, not the electromechanical, calculating devices, implemented on radio tubes. In addition to the obvious pluses and progressiveness, at the time of production there were also minuses. Only in the equipment of the central radar for the guidance of radio tubes, there were about thirteen thousand. In addition to the monstrous amount of electricity consumed by the incandescence, and the equally monstrous heat release, which required powerful ventilation systems, lamps have a very limited service life, usually amounting to thousands of hours. Further, the cathodes lose emission, and the lamp fails. In general, a station was considered combat-ready if it could provide at least eighteen channels out of twenty announced.
Command post of the firing complex
http://historykpvo.narod2.ru/
There were big problems with logistics. Three volleys of the regiment, sixty launches, could be fired within a couple of minutes. Recharging was theoretically possible in two hours - in practice, such an urgent reloading required sixty trucks, taking them by rocket onto a trailer at the storage base, carrying them up to several tens of kilometers along a very narrow concrete road, somehow driving off with returning empty vehicles - and so eight times. As one storage base provided eight regiments.
In defense of the system, we can say that at least it was, and in any case performed functions of intimidation regularly: after placing the S-25 on alert, reconnaissance flights within its reach instantly stopped. In addition, and this is often underestimated, the Soviet Union gained unique experience in the development, creation and operation of a complex, heterogeneous, geographically distributed weapons system operating in real time. Such experience by that time, perhaps, could not be obtained anywhere in the world.
To date, some of the S-25 sites are occupied by the more modern S-300 complexes, some with summer cottages, but most are simply abandoned and destroyed.
Rocket V-300 and radar B-200 in the Aviation Museum on Khodynskoe Pole in Moscow
http://pvo.guns.ru
V-300 missiles of various models are being converted and used as targets in air defense exercises.
The history of Sistema-25 is over.
References:
- General characteristics of the air defense complex "Berkut", technical design. Section 1.1951
- Air defense missile troops. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 1994
- Dmitry Leonov. The book is about 658 ZRP.
The director of SB-1, who is also the chief designer, Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko used to work in his office until late at night, looking through foreign scientific and technical journals, scientific and technical reports and other literature. Such a routine was dictated by the fact that in the office of Pavel Nikolayevich there was a Kremlin telephone, and if Stalin called, it was always in the middle of the night and precisely on the Kremlin "turntable". In such cases, the matter was not limited to a telephone conversation, and Pavel Nikolayevich had to travel to the Kremlin, where he had a permanent pass. With this pass, he could always go to Stalin's reception room, where Poskrebyshev sat as a loyal and permanent guard at the entrance to the Stalinist office.
But this time Pavel Nikolaevich, who arrived at Stalin's summons at two o'clock in the morning, was escorted to Stalin's apartment by a security officer. The landlord received his guest, sitting on the couch in his pajamas, looking through some papers. Pavel Nikolaevich's greeting was answered by
"Hello, comrade Kuksenko" - and with a motion of his hand with a clamped pipe, he pointed to an armchair that stood next to the sofa. Then, putting aside the papers, he said:
Do you know when a non-friendly plane last flew over Moscow? “The tenth of July, one thousand nine hundred and forty-two. It was a single reconnaissance aircraft. Now imagine that a single plane will also appear over Moscow, but with an atomic bomb. And if several single planes break through from a massive raid, as was the case on July 22, one thousand nine hundred and forty-one, but now with atomic bombs? After a pause in which he seemed to be pondering the answer to this question, Stalin continued:
"But even without atomic bombs - what is left of Dresden after the massive air strikes of our yesterday's allies? And now they have more planes, and there are enough atomic bombs, and they literally nest right next to us. And it turns out that we need a completely new air defense, capable of not allowing a single aircraft to reach the defended object even during a massive raid.What can you say about this crucial problem?
Sergo Lavrentievich Beria and I carefully studied the captured materials of the developments carried out by the Germans in Peenemünde on the Wasserfall, Reintocher, and Schmetterling anti-aircraft missiles. According to our assessments, carried out with the participation of German specialists working for us under contract, promising air defense systems should be built on the basis of a combination of radar and guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, - answered P.N. Kuksenko. After that, according to Pavel Nikolayevich, Stalin began to ask him "friendly" questions about such an unusual case for him, connected with radio electronics, which was at that time the technology of radio-controlled missiles. And Pavel Nikolayevich did not hide the fact that he himself did not understand much in the emerging new branch of defense technology, where rocket technology, and radar, and automation, precision instrumentation, electronics and much more, for which the name does not exist, should merge.
He emphasized that the scientific and technical complexity and scale of the problems here are not inferior to the problems of creating atomic weapons. After listening to all this, Stalin said:
“There is an opinion, comrade Kuksenko, that we need to immediately start creating a Moscow air defense system designed to repel a massive raid of enemy aircraft from any direction.
The new main administration under the Council of Ministers will have the right to involve any organization of any ministries and departments in the execution of work, providing this work with material funds and funding as needed without any restrictions. In this case, the head office will need to have a powerful scientific and design organization - the head one for the whole problem, and we propose to create this organization on the basis of SB-1, reorganizing it into the Design Bureau * 1. But in order to state all this in the decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, you, as the future Chief Designer of the Moscow air defense system, are instructed to clarify the structure of this system, the composition of its means and proposals for the developers of these means in accordance with the technical specifications of KB-1. Prepare a personal list of specialists for sixty people - wherever they are - for transfer to KB-1. In addition, the personnel officers of KB-1 will be given the right to select employees for transfer from any other organization to KB-1. All this work on the preparation of the draft resolution, as Pavel Nikolayevich later recalled, began to spin with incomprehensible speed.
During this period and even after the release of the decree, Stalin summoned P.N. Kuksenko, mainly trying to understand a number of "educational" questions of interest to him, but he especially meticulously inquired about the possibilities of the future system to repel a "star" (that is, simultaneously from different directions) massive raid and "ramming" massive raid.
However, the questions that Stalin asked Pavel Nikolaevich can only partly be called "educational". It seems that Stalin personally wanted to make sure that the future air defense system of Moscow would really be able to repel the massive raids of enemy aircraft, and having made sure of this, he no longer considered it necessary to call Pavel Nikolaevich for personal conversations, leaving the Berkut to the full care of L.P. Beria.
In the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers, the air defense system of Moscow received a code name - the Berkut system. Its chief designers were P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria.
The system was kept secret even from the Ministry of Defense. The draft resolution was endorsed by the Minister of Defense A.M. Vasilevsky, bypassing all the authorities subordinate to him. The newly created TSU (Third Main Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers) was identified as the customer of the system being created. For this, TSU created its own military acceptance, its own anti-aircraft missile range in the Kapustin Yar area, and as the system objects were created, military formations subordinate to TSU were created for the combat operation of these objects. In short, the Berkut system was supposed to be transferred to the Ministry of Defense ready for combat duty, with equipment, troops, and even with residential townships.
S-25 "Berkut". In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Soviet Union began implementing one of the most complex and costly programs in the early stages of the Cold War, second only to the nuclear weapons program. In the face of a threat from the strategic bombing forces of the United States and Great Britain, JV Stalin ordered the creation of an air defense missile system, guided by a radar network, to repel possible massive air attacks on Moscow. The Moscow system was followed in 1955 by a second program aimed at defending Leningrad.
SAM S-25 Berkut - video
After the end of World War II, the Soviet Union embarked on a program to use captured German military technology. Particular interest was shown in radar technology and anti-aircraft missiles. After a preliminary study of many types of German missiles, it was decided to stop at the Schmetterling and Wasserfall missiles. On their basis, the specialists of NII-88 developed the R-101 and R-105 missiles. the tests of which began in 1948, however, both types of missiles showed insufficient combat effectiveness, and the Soviet program suffered from the same problems as Germany: an excessive focus on missile design and insufficient attention to more critical technological problems associated with the radar system and system control (guidance). At the same time, other Soviet design bureaus, reinforced by German engineers, were researching key technologies. In particular, in NII-885 (Monino, Moscow region), a semi-active radar seeker for anti-aircraft missiles was developed, in which the SCR-584 radar obtained from the "lend-lease" was used to illuminate the target.
In August 1950, the task of developing a Moscow air defense system. based on anti-aircraft missiles, was assigned to the Moscow SB-1. The chief designers of the system were S. Beria (son of J1. Beria), a well-known radio specialist in the country, and P. Kuksenko, previously repressed. The system was named "Berkut" (after the initial letters of the names of the developers).
The strategic air defense system S-25 "Berkut" (SA-1 "Guild" according to the US / NATO classification) was intended to defend Moscow from air raids, in which up to 1000 bombers could participate. In accordance with the tactical and technical requirements, it was necessary to develop a control center that would ensure the targeting of missiles at 20 bombers flying at speeds up to 1200 km / h at ranges up to 35 km and at altitudes from 3 to 25 km. The work on the "Berkut" system was distributed among several special design bureaus. OKB-301, headed by S. Lavochkin, was entrusted with the development of the associated V-300 missile (factory index "205"). It widely used German technology, but it was different from the previous P-101 system.
The V-300 rocket was single-stage, made according to the aerodynamic "duck" scheme: air rudders were placed in the bow of the hull in two mutually perpendicular planes in front of the two wings, installed in the same planes on the middle part of the hull. The cylindrical body with a diameter of 650 mm was dismembered into 7 compartments. A four-chamber liquid-propellant engine Ш9-29 with a displacement feed system was installed in the tail, which developed a thrust of 9000 kg. Gas rudders were attached to a special truss in the rear of the hull. The launch mass of the rocket is 3500 kg. The missile was launched vertically from a special launch pad. The B-200 radar provided tracking of both the target and the missile, and issued control commands to the missile. The antenna systems of the B-200 radar scanned space in the azimuth and elevation planes. The radar measured three coordinates required to form missile control commands. The missile was equipped with a proximity fuse, which was triggered in the final phase of interception; the system did not have the ability to detonate on command. The E-600 high-explosive fragmentation warhead was supposed to hit the enemy aircraft from a distance of up to 75m.
Test launches of B-300 missiles began in June 1951, that is, less than a year after the start of the program. During the year, about 50 of these missiles were launched at the Kapustin Yar missile range. The initial launches were mainly related to aerodynamic and component tests, since the B-200 radar was not delivered to the Kapustin Yar test site until the end of 1952. Testing of the system in its entirety began in May 1953, when the Tu-4 bomber was shot down by a B missile. -300 at an altitude of 7 km. The choice of the target type was not accidental, the Tu-4 was a copy of the American B-29, which dropped atomic "bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Clarifying serial missile samples were tested in 1954, including the simultaneous interception of 20 targets. After the death of I.V. Stalin's leadership in the Berkut program underwent significant changes: SB-1 was removed from the KGB, Beria was arrested, S. Beria was removed from work, and SB-1 was renamed KB-1 of the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering. Chief Designer NI I-108 A. Raspletin was transferred to KB-1 and headed the Berkut program, which was renamed the C-25 program.
Under the name S-25 "Berkut", the system was put into service and its serial production and deployment began. The most expensive elements of the system were the launch positions and the necessary road network. It was decided to create two rings of missile regiments around Moscow: one ring at a distance of 85-90 km from the city center to deliver a decisive strike against bombers, and the other at a distance of 45-50 km to destroy the bombers that had broken through the first ring. In order to provide access to the launch sites, two ring roads were built. According to American intelligence estimates, the construction of these roads and launch sites in 1953-1955. the annual production of concrete was consumed.
Construction began in the summer of 1953 and ended in 1958. 22 anti-aircraft regiments were deployed on the inner ring, and 34, that is, a total of 56 regiments, on the outer ring. Each starting position consisted of four functional sections-zones: starting, radar, administrative, housing and technical and power transformer substation. On the territory of the launch zone with an area of more than 140 hectares, there was a developed network of access roads and 60 launchers. At a distance of about 1.5 km, a command post was located in the bunker, covering an area of about 20 hectares. On the territory of the point there was a V-200 radar, including an azimuth radar and an altimeter. The main BESM and 20 control posts were deployed in the bunker. Each regiment consisted of about 30 officers and 450 privates. Each facility contained three missiles with a nuclear warhead having a TNT equivalent of about 20 kt. Such a missile could destroy all targets within a radius of 1 km from the point of detonation and should have been used in the event of massive raids using nuclear weapons carriers.
The configuration of the position allowed the regiment to hit 20 targets simultaneously. Apparently, at the first stage, each regiment could fire 20 targets with 20 B-300 missiles. After improving the system, the shelling could be carried out with three missiles at one target, which significantly increased the likelihood of defeat. In addition to the launch positions of 56 regiments, six defense zones were built along the inner ring road. The positions of the C-25 system were supported by a large number of radars of the country's air defense system, which provided early warning and initial information on targets. Especially for these purposes, NII-224 developed the A-100 surveillance radar. but other early warning radars could also be used. The deployment of the S-25 system coincided with a significant increase in the air defense radar network, in particular, in the period 1950-1955. the production of radar equipment has quadrupled.
Two rings of the S-25 "Berkut" air defense missile system around Moscow with a radius of 50 and 90 km
Serial production of the S-25 "Berkut" system began in 1954. By 1959, only about 32 thousand V-300 missiles had been produced. This was 20 times the scale of ballistic missile construction in the same period. For the first time, the B-300 missile defense system was openly shown at the parade on November 7, 1960. The S-25 system in terms of the scale and construction time was approximately comparable to the American Nike-Ajax system. The USA produced 16 thousand missiles and deployed 40 divisions, in the USSR - 32 thousand and deployed 56 regiments. The first division of the Nike-Ajax system was deployed near Washington in December 1953, somewhat earlier than in the Moscow Air Defense District. The large scale of production and deployment of the S-25 system in the USSR is partly due to a simpler guidance system that intercepts one target with three missiles to achieve an acceptable level of destruction. The technical parameters of both systems were approximately the same, the actual destruction range was 40-45 km. However, the B-300 missile was three times heavier than the American missile, partly due to the greater mass of the warhead, but mainly due to the use of a less efficient single-stage design as opposed to the two-stage Nike-Ajax missile. In both cases, these systems were quickly replaced by more complex ones: the Nike-Hercules in the USA and the S-75 Dvina in the USSR.
Like many of the first missile weapon systems, the S-25 system, which N.S. Khrushchev called the "Moscow palisade", had obvious shortcomings even at the stage of deployment. The funds of the system were evenly distributed over the periphery of Moscow without strengthening the most probable directions of attack (North and West). Insufficient density of fire could not prevent the breakthrough of superior forces or the defense could be broken even before the approach of the main forces of bomber aviation. Although the system was never used in combat mode, there is no reason to believe that the S-25 was well protected from electronic warfare. While the aviation of the United States and Great Britain received significant combat experience in the use of electronic warfare equipment during the Second World War and in Korea, in the USSR they were in their infancy. This led to the weak protection of the C-25 system from electronic suppression and other electronic warfare methods. The choice of a fixed configuration of combat positions limited the development of the system and its improvement. Huge command bunkers, adapted to accommodate the RAS B-200 antenna system, limited the azimuth capabilities of the station.
The S-25 system could hit subsonic targets flying at speeds up to 1000 km / h, although at. armament appeared bombers with supersonic speed. And finally, in the mid-50s, the USA and the USSR developed missiles launched outside the air defense zone: the American AGM-28F "Hound Dog" and the Soviet X-20 (AS-3 "Kangaroo"). They posed a threat, since they had a significantly smaller reflective radar surface and could be launched outside the S-25 system's affected area. The disadvantages and high cost of the S-25 system became the reason for the refusal to deploy it around Leningrad. The S-25 system was in service for almost 30 years, although its effectiveness continued to decline. In the 80s, it was replaced by the S-300P system.
The performance characteristics of the C-25 air defense system Berkut
-
Years of operation: 1955 - 1982
- Adopted: 1955
- Constructor: Lead developer - KB-1
System characteristics of the 1955 model
Target speed: 1500 km / h
- The height of the defeat: 5.0-15 km
- Range: 35 km
- Number of missiles: 60
- The possibility of hitting a target in interference: no
- Rocket shelf life: on the launcher - 0.5 years; in stock - 2.5 years
Characteristics after modernization in 1966
Targets speed: 4200 km / h
- The height of the defeat: 1500-30000 m
- Range: 43 km
- Number of targets hit: 20
- Number of missiles: 60
- The possibility of hitting a target in interference: yes
- Rocket shelf life: on the launcher - 5 years; in stock - 15 years
Photo SAM S-25 Berkut
The vertical antenna of the B-200 station of the C-25 "Berkut" complex is designed to survey the airspace in the elevation plane.
Control room of the C-25 complex. In the center is the senior operator's console, on the sides are the workstations of the guidance and launch operators, in the background are the air situation tablets.
As I promised, I am posting a document on the creation of the Berkut air defense system (it is exactly 60 years old).
As you read the resolution, pay attention to the methodology for setting tasks, appointing responsible persons, deadlines, incentives, and so on.
From archival documents of the Almaz-Antey concern
Commentary on the document marked "Top secret" (from the material of the concern).
BY THE DECISION OF I. STALIN
60 years ago, under the heading "top secret", the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued on the creation of the country's first air defense system.
On August 9, 1950, the (only recently declassified) Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426 signed by JV Stalin on the creation of a supermodern effective air defense system of cities and strategic objects under the code "Berkut" was issued.
It was supposed to be built on the basis of a fundamentally new class of weapons -
anti-aircraft guided missiles. But the uniqueness of the project was not only that. The text of the Resolution testifies to the foresight of the political and military leadership of the USSR, its ability to predict the development of events, to anticipate them.
The Great Patriotic War ended just five years ago. Some cities are still in ruins, and a new "cold" war is already in full swing - the United States is blackmailing the Soviet Union with atomic bombings from the air. In these conditions, the country finds the strength and means to create air defense weapons based on new radar control systems.
Another challenge was finding an organization to lead this gigantic project. A new powerful developer was needed, which became Design Bureau No. 1 (now Almaz-Antey State Design Bureau named after Academician A. A. Raspletin). The management of the project was entrusted to a Special Committee created for this under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and personally to JI. P. Beria.
The Decree involved the best research and development organizations, enterprises of various ministries and departments to solve complex scientific and technical problems in radar, jet and aviation technology. Large material resources, bonus funds were laid for this.
More than a million rubles were allocated to the team of KB No. 1 alone for these purposes, and the main leaders of the development of the "Berkut" system were awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and laureates of the Stalin Prize. The deadlines for the implementation of this daring project are impressive, which even by today's standards seem simply incredible: 2 years and 4 months.
“To consider it necessary to have a complete set of radar installations, guided missile-projectiles, launching devices and carrier aircraft included in the Berkut system by November 1952 to provide air defense for Moscow,” said the 5th paragraph of the Resolution.
These deadlines were met. And over the next two years, the construction of two air defense rings around Moscow was completed for the S-25 "Berkut" system. Each of the 56 anti-aircraft missile systems was ready to simultaneously hit 20 targets with 20 missiles. The production of components has been established, soldiers and officers have been trained.
All this is evidence of the extraordinary systems thinking of the scientific leader - A.A. Raspletin, the highest professionalism of the development team, the managerial abilities of the project leaders, the ability to mobilize the best engineering forces to solve grandiose problems. The S-25 "Berkut" system together with the S-75 (1957), S-125 (1961), S-200 (1967) systems ultimately allowed the country to successfully solve geopolitical problems. And this cannot but arouse admiration in modern Russia, which is facing the need for a new technological breakthrough in the 21st century - the creation of a Russian aerospace defense system.
AND ANOTHER COMMENT OF A VETERAN OF THE CONCERN:
The speed of decision-making at the level of the Government of the USSR commands respect. Once on Stalin's desk on August 3, the draft document was sent to L. Beria with the note "For, with amendments." On August 8, the latter reported that the document was finalized, all amendments were made. The very next day, August 9, 1950, all members of the Council of Ministers put their signatures, incl. Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Industry and Communications G.V. Alekseenko. The document also bears the signatures of the developers who were entrusted with the creation of the "Berkut" system - the chief designers of the Design Bureau No. 1 P.N. Kuksenko and S. Beria.
It is noteworthy that KB-1 made proposals for the development of anti-aircraft missile projectiles and the latest radar control systems for the purpose of creating a modern air defense system. These proposals resulted in this epoch-making Decree of the 50th year of the last century.
THIS IS THE FIRST PAGE OF THE DOCUMENT WITH THE AUTOGRAPH OF STALIN AND THE ENTRY OF BERIA.
AND THIS IS HOW THE FIRST PAGE LOOKED BEFORE STALIN SCHEDULED ON IT
Dear Yuri Albertovich, I watched with great interest a series of programs with your participation on the topic “Defending the skies of the Motherland. History of Russian Air Defense "November 21-23 and again on November 26 this year on the TV channel" Zvezda ".
With the end of World War II and the aggressive desire of our former allies to defeat the USSR (W. Churchill, March 1946, Fulton USA), including with the help of captured German missile weapons, means of their production and bringing them to an intercontinental range, I. V. Stalin seriously considered the issue of creating an anti-missile defense for the country, especially since there was experience of British air defense against German missiles. However, the adoption of practical decisions was hampered by two circumstances: first, the existing missiles could not yet take on board an atomic bomb of the mass and dimensions that it had at that time; secondly, the range of these missiles was still insufficient to strike at most of the vital large objects on the territory of the USSR.
At the same time, the threat from the strategic aviation of the United States and Great Britain was very real. Their strategic bombers (B-36 and B-50), in terms of flight range, mass and payload dimensions, were quite capable of carrying atomic bombs, which was shown by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If earlier, during the Great Patriotic War, the breakthrough of one or two German bombers even to the capital did not represent an overwhelming danger, now the breakthrough of even one aircraft, but with an atomic bomb, was catastrophic. In this regard, by the decision of I.V. Stalin in 1948. Air Defense Forces are withdrawn from the subordination of the Chief of Artillery of the Soviet Army, and an independent branch of the armed forces is formed - the Air Defense Forces of the country, the commander of which, while holding the post of Deputy Minister of War of the USSR, was appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov. VNOS forward points were moved significantly to the west in the territory of the people's democracies, to the south - to the borders of the USSR and to the east - beyond the Urals.
I was sent to the Air Defense Forces in the same 1948 to the receiving radio center of the communications center of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces of the country for the post of shift chief. In 1949 I was appointed head of this radio center. The radio bureau (a nodal point of the receiving radio center, serving for receiving radio messages and controlling transmitters) was located at the command post of the Commander of the country's air defense in his personal room, which occupied the entire compartment with its own elevator (22 Frunzenskaya embankment, 3rd entrance) in the building of the Ministry of Defense USSR from the first to the last floor. The radio bureau itself was located directly next to the tablet room of the command post and served its tablet complex. This placement of the radio bureau in the immediate vicinity of the flatbed hall was due to the urgent need to minimize the delivery time of radiograms to the flatbed complex. Suffice it to say that the radiograms of the "Air" series about the dangerous crossing of the USSR borders by a foreign aircraft had to reach from the VNOS point to the tablet complex in no more than 2 minutes, in order to provide the Commander of the country's air defense with the necessary time to make a decision on response actions. In the course of our mass media there was this type of response to inquiries from foreign newspapers and radio about the fate of the plane that crossed the border of the USSR: “The plane has retired towards the sea”. In our country's air defense, this meant: the plane was spotted by VNOS points, the radio bureau received a radiogram, reported to the Commander, he discussed the measures with the country's leadership and the violator was shot down. In cases of an erroneous flight of foreign aircraft and their warnings, they changed course and went to themselves from the line of VNOS points.
In parallel with these transformations of the air defense forces and the improvement of the warning and communication system on the initiative of I.V. Stalin, the development of a new air defense system of the USSR with the use of anti-aircraft missile weapons began. For this purpose, I.V. Stalin summoned Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor P.N. Kuksenko (head of the department of radio receivers and radio intelligence of the Military Red Banner Academy of Communications named after S.M.Budyonny (VKAS named after S.M.Budyonny)) and as the future director of KB-1 and chief designer of the air defense system of the Moscow industrial region the structure of this system, the composition of its means, proposals for transforming SB-1 into the head research and development organization (KB-1), in terms of the composition of co-executors of the developers of these means and providing the created organizations with the necessary specialists. Technical decisions were supposed to be made on the basis of the diploma project of Sergo Lavrentyevich Beria on the topic: "Defeat the enemy's naval assets with the help of guided missiles launched from a carrier aircraft", performed at the VKAS named after S.M. Budyonny under the leadership of P.N. Kuksenko. The project was implemented in industry, its industrial prototype was tested at sea, where the role of the American aircraft carrier was played by the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, and was adopted by the aviation of the USSR Navy. S.L. Beria and P.N. Kuksenko were awarded the Stalin Prize. S.L. Beria (candidate of technical sciences in 1947, doctor of technical sciences in 1952) was appointed the second chief designer of the air defense system of the Ministry of Natural Resources in KB-1. Amo Sergeevich Elyan, the former director of the plant that produced the guns of V.G. Grabina brand "ZIS", where for the first time in world practice was developed and applied the technology of their continuous production. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, this plant produced more than 100,000 guns. A.S. himself Yelian was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.
As P.N. later recalled. Kuksenko, all the work on the implementation of the instructions of J.V. Stalin and the preparation of the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR spun with extraordinary speed.
"Berkut" - this is the code received by the first Soviet anti-aircraft missile system. Her birthday is August 9, 1950. (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426 SS / OP 09.08.1950). According to this decree, the Third Main Directorate of the USSR CM (3 TSU CM USSR) was formed, which acted as the customer of the system, created its own military acceptance, its own anti-aircraft missile range in the Kapustin Yar area and subsequently military formations for the combat operation of the circular air defense of Moscow. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, who at that time was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I.V. Stalin.
The Berkut air defense system was designed not only to protect the capital, but also to protect the larger Moscow industrial region from a single (one aircraft), mass (up to 1000 aircraft) and star (massive raid from all sides) raid, in which not a single aircraft could overcome it.
At the same time, the country's air defense command, I.V. Stalin, was instructed to prepare and conduct a retaliatory strike on the territory of the United States, on the cities of their eastern coast. In order to fulfill these instructions, I.V. Stalin and for training by the Commander of the country's Air Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov organized and conducted combined-arms exercises of air defense and long-range bomber aviation. The city of Stalingrad was chosen as an object for practicing a retaliatory strike on the east coast of the United States. A city that stretches along the banks of the Volga for more than 60 km. With this location, it perfectly imitated the North American east coast. The plan of the exercises included a real flight of a long-range bomber aviation squadron with the practice of striking Stalingrad (conditionally) with atomic bombs along its entire length with overlapping in its north and south. Air refueling was planned for the bombers, as well as the return of bombers and refuellers to their nearest airfields. All stages of the exercises: approach to bombing, dropping bombs, practicing refueling in the air - were successful. Communication with the squadron, control of hostilities was carried out by the country's air defense command by radio through the radio bureau mentioned above. The project of the radio bureau, its installation and installation were carried out according to the project, under the leadership and with the direct participation of the head of the decimeter radio center of the air defense communications center of the country, Captain Popov Viktor Yemelyanovich. I, as the future head of the change of radio operators of the radio bureau, was involved in the installation of workstations and switches. After the explosion of an experimental nuclear charge near Semipalatinsk, and especially after these combined-arms exercises "with a retaliatory strike on the cities of the eastern coast of the United States", the intensity of aggressive intentions fell sharply, that even we felt it on our watch. The number of reports of violations of our lines dropped sharply. The USA realized that it is better not to hurt the USSR!
The development of the Berkut system went on as usual. The whole system included: A-100. Stationary all-round radar "Kama" 10 cm range, based onwhich determined two rings of radar detection:near (25-30 km from Moscow) and far (200-250 km). Main constructurer L.V. Leonov. Research Institute - 244 (now YARTI);B-200.Radar for guiding anti-aircraft missiles from two rings: close (24 objects) andfar (32 objects). Leading designer V.E. Magdesiev. Razraboot of receiving, transmitting, feeder paths, antennas and receiving froma vet on an anti-aircraft missile cm range - author and leading designertor G.V. Kisunko. Development participant M. B. Zaxon. All from KB-1.B-300.Anti-aircraft guided missiles placed at launch positions inin the immediate vicinity of the guidance radar. General designtorus S.A. Lavochkin. OKB-301. Launch equipment for launching thesemissiles - Chief Designer V.P. Barmin. GSKB MMP.G-400.Interceptor aircraft Tu-4 with G-300 air-to-vehicle missilesspirit". Chief designer L.I. Innkeeper, OKB-301. Development of rethe grabber was terminated at an early stage due to a difficult linkage withground complexes and low efficiency.D-500... Long-range radar detection aircraft based on the Tu-4.However, they didn’t come to their actual use in the “Berkut” system.E-600.Modifications of various types of B-300 missiles with high-explosive fragmentationa combat unit with a radius of destruction of at least 75 meters. Constructry N.S. Zhidkikh, V.A. Sukhikh, K.I. Kozorezov. KB NII-6 MSKhM. Directortor NII-6 MSKhM Rastorguev.
The equipment of missile guidance stations for determining the coordinates of targets, missiles and giving a command to detonate a warhead was developed by a team of German specialists who were in the USSR as prisoners of war, under the leadership of Aizenberger.
The B-200 complex provided tracking of up to 200 targets along 200 firing channels with automatic (manual) target tracking and simultaneous guidance of 1 - 2 missiles to each target. In general, the "Berkut" system could protect the Moscow industrial region from the raid of more than 1000 bombers. By the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the "Berkut" system, named in 1953. as the S-25, was put into service on May 7, 1955. It is interesting to note that this day has already been celebrated in the USSR for 10 years as "Radio Day", and it was 60 years since the opening of radio by the Russian scientist A.S. Popov, when he for the first time in the world broadcast the telegram “ Heinrich Hertz "In honor of the German scientist who was the first to prove the validity of the electromagnetic theory of the English scientist James Clerk Maxwell ´ a about the possibility of independent existence and propagation of radio waves.
During operation, the S-25 air defense system was improved with the replacement of its elements with new ones. The upgraded S-25M system was decommissioned in 1982 and replaced by the S-300P medium-range anti-aircraft missile system. Chief designer V.D. Sinelnikov Deputy General Designer of the Almaz Central Design Bureau. The S-300 complexes were supplied in three versions: the S-300P for the country's air defense forces, the S-300V for the Ground Forces and the S-300F for the Navy.
Subsequently, the anti-missile defense (ABM) system grew from the air defense of the country, which retained its characteristics, the complexes of which were adopted in 1978. This is the A-35 system, General Designer Grigory Vasilievich Kisunko, KB-1.
I am attaching to my letter a photocopy of my article dedicated to this great man and the 40th anniversary of the world's first nuclear-free destruction of an anti-missile warhead of a ballistic missile, which took place on March 4, 1961, 23 years earlier than the United States!
Today, due to the very great scientific and technical complexity and enormous material costs, only two countries in the world are capable of and do possess missile defense systems. These are Russia and the United States.
Literature.
Missile defense systems. 44 Rocket Regiment, military unit 89503.http : // rocketpolk44. narod. ru / kosm- v / PRO. htm
Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Third edition, volume 5, p. 200. Air Defense Troops, 1971
G.V. Kisunko “Secret area. Confessions of the General Designer "- Moscow .:" Sovremennik ", 1996. - 510s., Ill.
Ganin S. “The first domestic anti-aircraft missile system of the air defense of Moscow S-25“ Berkut ”, Nevsky bastion, No. 2, 1997.
PS ... Yuri Albertovich, I hope that when writing the script for the next screenings of the series “Defending the Sky of the Motherland. History of domestic air defense ”You will take into account the factual data presented in my letter to you. Mainly about the people who created the country's air defense. In my opinion, this is not difficult to do without increasing the time of the series, since it is oversaturated with frequently repeated, almost identical data about the technique and its photographs.
Please accept my congratulations on the 70th anniversary of the counter-offensive of our troops near Moscow and the defeat of the Nazi troops.
Sincerely,
Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Troshin G.I.
December 2011.
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