Then blondes - mass destruction, and ticks are biological?

Depends on the degree of guilt and aggression of the alleged enemy. Conducting military operations with a frying pan is already obvious aggression, which is more of a tactical weapon, and having a frying pan with you, which before committing an act of aggression is a diplomatic solution to the problem (simply the husband knows that there is a frying pan, so there’s no point in drinking), is rather strategic combat unit

Oxy!!! No need for nuclear!!! It’s better to build a wall around it and vomit to death from the wall.

Well... if I understand correctly, then the question is, there seems to be a return, but does this affect the characteristics? Answer: If a bullet hits, it destroys the same amount of HP, only it’s harder to hit

catenaccio
1-4-4-1

Bear Grylls said - this is irreplaceable!!!

To be honest, I don’t know, but I can suggest a website where you can find something of interest)) www.y8.com

As for multiplayer shooters, Battlefield 2 is already a little outdated, but in terms of graphics and gameplay it is still at its best. And when playing on the Internet, you can feel the spirit of war. I highly recommend it if you want to shoot, ride, fly. You can do all this in the game. There are tanks and planes and helicopters. :) (and yes, if you set the graphics settings to maximum, then turn off the shadows, they are pixelated and spoil all the graphics). You can also play Battlefield Bad Company 2, but personally I didn’t like it...

From single-player shooters - Crysis, Crysis Warhead or FarCry 2. The freedom of action is very pleasing. You can complete the same mission as a completely undetected ninja, or as a butcher who sweeps away everything in his path.

The undisputed leader among flying machines is Microsoft Flight Simulator Deluxe X. You can fly both small single-engine Cesnas and the AN-225 Mria. The graphics are not so hot, but it wins not because of the graphics, but because of the gameplay. You can set the difficulty level. Use autopilot and much more. Very cool.

Well, as for racing, I can recommend the meat Split Second Velocity. Amazing graphics, lots of special effects. Destruction. Dynamic game. But it can get boring quickly.

da
varenja
ogurci nasolili
kljukva
muzhskoe varenje
baklazhanovaja ikra
2 types of adzhiki
i gribi - solenie, marinovanie, zamorozhennie
med
cidoniju, saharom peresipali
jagodi zamorozili-vishnju, malinu, cherniku i klubniku

PartI. Land component

The aggravation of the political confrontation between Russia and the United States, which coincided with the active phase of renewal of the domestic nuclear triad, intensified public interest in the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the leading powers. IN soon it will only warm up as the American triad enters the renewal phase.

Nine countries possess nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons): the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China legally, and India, Israel, Pakistan and the DPRK – illegally: the first three have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear weapons(NPT), and North Korea withdrew from it. The arsenals of Russia and the United States, despite significant reductions, are overwhelmingly superior to the rest. When discussing the current and future nuclear arsenals of these countries, it is impossible not to briefly consider the terms of the START III treaty, since it largely determines their type.

The START-3 Treaty was signed in April 2010 and entered into force in February 2011. The current treaty is limited to February 2021, but it can be extended, by mutual agreement, for another five years. A cautious discussion of the prospects for treaties in the field of reduction of offensive weapons is underway, but it will be complicated by reasons of both a subjective (deterioration of relations) and objective nature - for example, further reductions increase the role of tactical nuclear weapons, on which there are no clear agreements, other countries nuclear club who will have to be involved in the negotiation process; The role of missile defense and promising non-nuclear high-precision weapons is increasing. A positive development is that discussions on extending the current START-3 treaty have begun.

The goal of START-3 is to reach the following levels by February 2018:

• 700 deployed carriers, that is, the total deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles land-based ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​and strategic bombers;
• 800 carriers, including non-deployed ones, that is, those in storage or intended for testing;
• 1,550 warheads, including warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and bombers. The latter are counted not only as one carrier, but also as one charge.

On this moment, according to data published as of March 1, 2016, the parties are close to the required indicators, and in some places have already achieved them. Thus, the number of deployed carriers in Russia is 521, and the number of warheads in the United States is 1,481. Paradoxically, since September 2013, the number of warheads in the Russian arsenal has been growing almost continuously - this fact is explained by the fact that the entry into service of new missile systems that are equipped shared warhead with individual guidance units (MIRV IN), ahead of the decommissioning of old monoblock ones. To reach the restrictions laid down in START-3, the domestic military will have to, in a year and a half, if not completely complete the renewal of the arsenal (this process in our tradition is almost continuous), then carry out active work to remove outdated systems from service, while providing them with a worthy replacement .

Traditionally, the basis of domestic strategic nuclear forces is the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), the ground component of the nuclear triad. The importance of the Strategic Missile Forces is emphasized by the fact that it is a separate branch of the military, subordinate directly to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In addition, they are the first and most successful to undergo modernization.

Sword that brings peace

Precise data on the composition of the Strategic Missile Forces in Russia are not published, but the area is relatively widely covered in the media, and general conclusions can be drawn based on open domestic and foreign publications.

The Strategic Missile Forces are armed with land-based ICBMs installed in silo launchers (SPUs) and on mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK) - a little more of the latter. Both options are different answers to the question of maximum survivability during an attack and, as a consequence, ensuring a retaliatory strike, the imminent threat of which is the basis of the entire concept of nuclear deterrence. Modern silos have the highest security, and, given their location at a distance from each other, the enemy will have to spend a warhead on each, and possibly several to guarantee (technical failure of the attacking ICBM or a significant miss). Operating a missile silo is relatively simple and cheap. The disadvantage is that the coordinates of all silos are probably known to the enemy and they are potentially vulnerable to high-precision non-nuclear weapons. However, this problem is still relevant for the relatively distant future, since modern strategic cruise missiles have subsonic speed and it is almost impossible to suddenly hit all silos with them.

PGRK, on ​​the contrary, are supposed to survive not on stability, but on mobility - being dispersed during a threatening period, they become less vulnerable to targeted strikes, and they can be effectively dealt with by massive strikes on the basing areas, preferably with high-power charges. Resistance of the mobile platform to damaging factors nuclear explosion much lower than that of the mine, but even in this case, to reliably defeat them, the enemy will have to spend a large number of their warheads.

Above we considered the worst option. The optimal thing is not a retaliatory strike, but a counter strike, in which the missiles of the attacked side will have time to take off before the enemy warheads fall on the base areas. Ensuring this is a matter of missile attack warning systems, strategic nuclear forces control systems and the efficiency of using their means, which is a separate big topic.

From 1987 to 2005, a small number of combat railway missile systems (BZHRK) “Molodets” were in limited operation in Russia (12 trains were produced, three launchers in each) - the only BZHRKs brought to mass production and combat duty. From a tactical point of view, the BZHRK can be considered a special case of the PGRK: the main difference is the use of an extensive railway network for dispersal during a threatening period. On the one hand, this ensures high mobility; on the other, the use of civilian infrastructure complicates security issues and, to a certain extent, “exposes” large transport hubs to the first strike, i.e. cities. The issue of visibility for reconnaissance means is also painful, since, once detected, it is not easy for a train to hide again - for obvious reasons.

The new Barguzin BZHRK is at the design stage. The use of smaller missiles will reduce weight, which will increase stealth - unlike Molodets, it will not need three diesel locomotives at once. However, the prospects for the Barguzin are still unclear, as criticism, including from the customer, comes from difficulties in operation and high costs in the context of budget cuts, with disputed advantages compared to the widely used wheeled PGRK.

The basis of the Strategic Missile Forces is now made up of them, namely the extensive Topol family of ICBMs: RS-12M Topol, RS-12M2 Topol-M and RS-24 Yars. The original Topols began entering combat duty in 1985 and are now being withdrawn from service. This process is planned to be completed at the beginning of the next decade. Rocket launches are carried out regularly, both to confirm the serviceability of the fleet and to test new technical solutions (considering that they are planned to be destroyed anyway, the flying laboratory in this situation is “for free”). According to various estimates, from 54 to 72 of these PGRKs remain in service: given the continuous process of the Topols becoming “non-deployed” and subsequent disposal, it is difficult to accurately determine their number at a particular point in time.

The RS-12M2 Topol-M complexes (beginning of deployment in 2006) and RS-24 Yars (beginning of deployment in 2010) are a development of the Topol with an improved missile. Due to the slightly increased mass, the number of axles increased from seven to eight. Topol-M and Yars are close to each other - the most important difference is the difference in combat equipment. If the Topol-M, like the original Topol, is equipped with one warhead with a capacity of 550 kT, then the Yars has a MIRV with three or four blocks of 150–300 kT each (according to various estimates). The use of one warhead on the Topol-M is due to the fact that it was created taking into account the requirements of START-2, which prohibited complexes with MIRVs. After the failure of START-2, it was rapidly modernized using the technical groundwork laid down.

Before the transition to Yarsy, only 18 units of the Topol-M PGRK were deployed. However, its missile has been widely used (60 units delivered) since 1998 to replace the UR-100N UTTH (RS-18A) ICBM, with its service life exhausted, in silos. There are at least 63 Yars deployed in a mobile version. In addition, they are used for the ongoing replacement of UR-100N silos - there are at least 10 of them.

The RS-26 Rubezh PGRK is being created with a small-sized missile and a six-axle chassis. Smaller dimensions will radically increase the maneuverability of the complex, since the Yars are still too big for ordinary roads. According to statements, Rubezh is already ready for deployment, but it may be limited political issues, since, according to the United States, it can be used against targets at a range of significantly less than 5,500 km, and this violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

In addition to Topol-M and Yars, there are exclusively silo-based ICBMs in service. The UR-100N UTTH, which went on duty in 1979, is almost out of service - no more than 20-30 units remain, and this process will be completed in the next two to three years. The R-36M2 “Voevoda” (RS-20V, better known by its sonorous American name SS-18 “Satan”) - the largest ICBM in the world, along with powerful complex to overcome missile defense, carrying either a warhead with a capacity of 8.3 MT, or ten light warheads of 800 kT each. The R-36M2 entered combat duty in 1988. At the moment, 46 missiles of this type remain in service. At the beginning of the next decade, they should be replaced by the promising heavy RS-28 Sarmat, also capable of carrying at least eight warheads, including promising maneuvering ones.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu:
“Strategic nuclear forces were maintained at a level that made it possible to reliably solve the problems of nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Missile Forces, more than 95% of launchers are contained in constant readiness for combat use"
(about the results of the Strategic Missile Forces service in 2015)

IN Russian Strategic Missile Forces are the most important part of the strategic nuclear forces. PGRKs with high stability are increasingly becoming a priority in equipment, but silo launchers are also retained - as an economical option and as a means of deploying particularly high-power missiles. The Strategic Missile Forces not only contains large quantity carriers than in the fleet, but they also carry a larger number of warheads. At the same time, the Strategic Missile Forces are successfully becoming saturated with new equipment and, as far as one can judge, they are successfully mastering it in numerous exercises.

In the navy, the development of new SLBMs and SSBNs seems to be accompanied by problems and delays. The submarine fleet continues to be plagued by a traditional disease of the USSR Navy - a low sailing ratio (percentage of time spent at sea). Combined with reduction numerical strength this leads to the fact that one or two SSBNs are on patrol at a time, which is incomparable with the many dozens of PGRK and silo launchers that are in readiness.

ugly ducklings

In the USA, the land part of the triad is, in contrast to ours, the weakest component. This is also manifested in the fact that silo-based land ICBMs are located in the structure of the Air Force - the Global Strike Command contains the so-called 20th Air Force, which includes, respectively, the “Missile Squadron” (literally Missile Squadron), united in "Rocket Wings"

The only type of ICBM in service with the US Armed Forces is the LGM-30G “Minuteman III”. The first Minuteman IIIs went on duty back in 1970 and became a revolutionary breakthrough for their time - they were the first to use MIRVs. Of course, since then it has passed whole line modernization programs, primarily aimed at increasing reliability and operational safety. One of the most serious “modifications” deprived the Minuteman III of the MIRV – instead of three warheads with a yield of 350 kT, one with a yield of 300 kT was installed. Officially, with this action, the United States demonstrated the defensive nature of its nuclear weapons - first of all, MIRVs are useful when delivering a first strike, when one carrier can destroy several enemy ones. However, the real reason was probably primarily to optimize the distribution of the “pool” available in START III: without these measures, the “sacred” would have to be cut – SSBNs and Trident II missiles.

The “new” warheads were removed from the LGM-118 “Peacekeeper” - a much newer (beginning of deployment in 1986) and advanced ICBMs. Each Peacemaker could deliver not three, but ten warheads with greater accuracy and over a slightly longer range. He was deservedly considered the American analogue of the Soviet “Satan”. However, difficulties in creating and finishing cold war led to the fact that Peacekeepers were released in a rather small series - only 50 were put on duty. For the same reasons, they were not implemented American programs creation of PGRK and BRZhK. At the end of the 1980s, largely under the influence of Soviet developments, the BRZhK with Peacekeeper missiles and the PGRK with the new small-sized MGM-134 “Midgetman” missile were in the active development phase. Both programs were closed in 1991–1992, at the prototype testing stage. The Peacekeepers themselves were withdrawn from service in 2005 as part of measures to fulfill the conditions of START-2.

By 2018, the United States plans to have 400 Minuteman IIIs in service. To fulfill this condition, 50 units will be transferred to “non-deployed” - the missiles will be sent to the warehouse, and the silos will be filled up. Thus, land-based ICBMs occupy a significant share (more than half) of the carrier pool, while no one plans to increase the number of SSBNs and bombers. However, the naval component accounts for more than twice as many warheads.

The United States sees the main task of the ground component in the new conditions as “creating a threat” - to reliably destroy the silos, the enemy will be forced to spend even more warheads than are stored in them in total. With this approach, the requirements for missiles are small - the main thing is that the enemy believes that they are capable of taking off. However, even this may sooner or later become too difficult for Minuteman III. The program to replace them is called Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). The possibility of creating a PGRK or BRZhK was assessed, but in the end they settled on the cheapest and simplest placement in a silo. Active funding for the creation of GBSD began in 2016. The cost of creating, manufacturing and modernizing ground infrastructure is estimated at $62.3 billion, spread over three decades. According to plans, the first “squadron” of GBSD will be on duty in 2029, and the Minuteman III will be completely replaced by 2036, but most defense programs are characterized by delays.

However, it is unlikely that GBSD will be implemented in full - when further agreements are concluded in the field of nuclear weapons reduction, the American ground component will be the first in line for reductions. And now, with the relatively comfortable format of START-3, there are proposals to reduce the share of the land component or even completely abandon it in favor of more stable SSBNs and multi-mission bombers.

SNF - strategic nuclear forces
Nuclear weapons - nuclear weapons
NPT - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile
SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile
MIRV IN - separable warhead with individual guidance units
Strategic Missile Forces - Strategic Missile Forces
ShPU - silo launchers
PGRK - mobile ground missile systems
BZHRK - combat railway missile system

The Trump administration is moving away from military security policy.

At the end of 2017, a new “Strategy” appeared in the United States national security”, and last week the American media published a “leaked” paper from the Trump administration called “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR).

Both of these documents differ from similar documents from the period of President Barack Obama in that they do not contain sections on arms control, strategic stability and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or negotiations to extend existing agreements in this area. The documents produced by the Trump administration are a defiant demonstration of the "America First" message. Magazine The National Interest responded to NPR's appearance with a hard-hitting article by two reputable experts, Richard Burton and John Wolfsthal, who warn of the disastrous consequences of this cowboy attack on the system of strategic stability.

Washington's new installations expand the list of conditions under which the United States can use nuclear weapons. In addition, the NPR adds two new types of nuclear weapons to the American arsenal and significantly lowers the threshold for their use. The main message of the document is to intimidate Moscow and convey to it the idea that “any decision to use nuclear weapons will result in the most severe consequences for the aggressor.” This is presented as sound policy and is welcomed by both major US political parties.

The document claims that Moscow is violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) by “producing thousands cruise missiles ground-based" This refers to the Russian operational-tactical complexes “Iskander” and “Iskander-M” with a range of 500 km (with the possibility of increasing the range to 1 thousand km), which are not subject to the INF Treaty (from 1 thousand km to 5 thousand km) and were produced in only a few divisions. It is not said that these weapons are a response to the deployment of NATO missile defense launch sites in Romania and Poland, although the concerns of the Russian leadership about the possibility of using these sites for missile launches are well known.

NPR calls for the deployment of new sea-launched cruise missiles "to bring Russia back into compliance with the INF Treaty." That is, in response to the operational-tactical Iskanders, the United States is proposed to deploy “Eurostrategic” class missiles. However, the document does not say anything about the verifiability conditions to ensure that NATO missile defense systems in Europe are not adapted to accommodate offensive weapons prohibited by the INF Treaty.

However, plans to undermine the INF Treaty are just the tip of the iceberg. The Pentagon is very concerned about the process of modernization by Russia of a large part of nuclear arsenal The USSR, which does not violate the current START III Treaty (START), which limits the number of warheads of strategic offensive weapons to 1,550. The United States, according to the authors of the document, lags behind the Russian Federation, although it is implementing projects worth trillions of dollars. These projects include new submarines and land-based missiles, as well as bombers armed with stealth missiles. The document requires an increase in spending in order to build additional submarines with nuclear cruise missiles. Even before this document appeared, the US Congressional Budget Office published a report, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026,” which stated that the US nuclear forces modernization program would require about $400 billion .in the next 10 years. In particular, we are talking about the development of a long-range cruise missile, the cost of this program is $8.3 billion.

According to experts, new policy Trump is fraught with the emergence of two strategic threats at once.

The first threat is that the US and Russia will soon be drawn into the trap of new instability in the arms race. Both sides will deploy more and more new systems and at the same time, as in ancient times, focus on the worst intentions of the other side. This will give rise to a mania for achieving superiority over a potential enemy and acting on the “action-reaction” principle.

The first example could be the emergence of new Iskander systems as a reason for the deployment of sea-based missiles. IN created atmosphere psychosis, the main parameters of weapons (the range and number of Iskanders and American cruise missiles) fade into the background. Approximately the same thing was observed in the period from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, before the conclusion of the INF Treaty. This resulted in the placement of tens of thousands nuclear warheads and turned the world into a life-threatening place, when the likelihood of a global catastrophe from an accidental or unauthorized missile launch has increased to an unacceptable level.

The second danger concerns the stability of strategic equilibrium in periods of acute international crises.

At one time, the INF Treaty was signed because neither Ronald Reagan nor Mikhail Gorbachev felt able to take on the responsibility of deciding the fate of the world within 5-10 minutes, which limited the flight time of missiles in the European theater of operations. The agreement they signed made it possible to breathe easy, now the situation of those years is returning. D. Trump’s intention to respond to the Iskanders with new cruise missiles without first clarifying the situation will return Europe to the state of military psychosis in which it was already after hosting the American Pershings. Only now the missiles will be based on US ships.

NPR makes no mention of any initiatives aimed at addressing dangerous trends in the field. strategic weapons. This document does not call for an extension of the New START treaty, which expires in 2021. It is not conceptually intended to establish control over the arms race. Its authors rely on the implementation of policy in the field nuclear weapons from the standpoint of achieving strategic superiority over Russia.

The American Nuclear Weapons Review, which brackets the issues of control, negotiations, and strategic stability, is a serious departure from the previous foundations of American military security policy.

According to the authors of the article in The National Interest, the American administration is choosing a dangerous path to destabilize the strategic balance. Instead, it should seek opportunities to resume negotiations on the INF Treaty and consolidate the parameters of this treaty with the full commitment of both sides.

Achieving this goal will make it possible to extend New START and begin a discussion about other forms of strategic weapons reduction. Next up are negotiations on non-nuclear strike weapons and advanced space and cyber military technologies.

In the field of strategic weapons, the slogan “America First” does not work.

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STRATEGIC WEAPONS

STRATEGIC WEAPONS

(strategic weapons) In military terminology, the word "strategic" refers to the general plan of battle, "tactical" to the smaller issues of combat. During the Cold War, the expression "strategic weapon" in the language of America and NATO (NATO) meant intercontinental nuclear weapons capable of bridging the distance between the United States and the USSR. It was opposed to tactical nuclear weapons (or theater weapons), average range whose actions were limited to the territory of Europe, as well as short-range nuclear weapons. These differences reflected mainly the position of the Americans, who wanted to know which weapons were capable of hitting the United States and which were effective within Europe. Outside of this context, the distinction between “strategic” and “tactical” becomes meaningless, which even led to problems in arms control negotiations when the USSR considered medium-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and capable of reaching its territory as “strategic” ".

Policy. Dictionary. - M.: "INFRA-M", Publishing House "Ves Mir". D. Underhill, S. Barrett, P. Burnell, P. Burnham, etc. General editor: Doctor of Economics. Osadchaya I.M.. 2001 .

Political science. Dictionary. - RSU. V.N. Konovalov. 2010.

See what "STRATEGIC WEAPONS" is in other dictionaries:

USSTRATCOM Emblem of Strategic Command Years of existence ... Wikipedia

A type of weapon in which nuclear weapons are the means of destruction and missiles are the means of delivery. Divided into strategic, operational tactical and tactical; ground, air and sea based. Strategic. O.r.i.. how...

Weapon- automatic: 1 self-loading sniper rifle of the Dragunov system model 1963 (SVD); 2 single Kalashnikov machine gun model 1961 (PKM); 3 self-loading pistol of the Makarov system model 1951 (PM); 4 Kalashnikov assault rifle model... ... Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary

Weapons (military), common name devices and means used in armed struggle to destroy enemy personnel, equipment and structures. O.'s development depends on the method of production and especially on the level of development of the productive forces.... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

Weapons of mass destruction By type... Wikipedia

WEAPON. There are weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, bacteriological) and conventional weapons; strategic, operational tactical and tactical weapon. In most countries, legislation regulates the wearing, storage,... ... Modern encyclopedia

The general name for devices and means used to destroy enemy personnel, equipment and structures. There are weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, bacteriological) and conventional weapons; strategic, operational... Big encyclopedic Dictionary

- (obsolete atomic weapons) a type of explosive weapon of mass destruction based on the use of intranuclear energy released during chain reactions of heavy nuclei of certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium or during the fusion reaction of light ... Dictionary of emergency situations

I; Wed 1. A weapon for attack or defense. Own a weapon. Threaten someone with a weapon. Store, clean o. Apply o. Supply o. Take hold of Fr. Get something with a weapon. Defend with weapons in hands or something. Personal, personal o. Ancient o. Fold o... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NW)- the main type of explosive weapon of mass destruction; is based on the use of intranuclear energy released as a result of a chain reaction of fission of heavy uranium nuclei (plutonium) or the synthesis of light nuclei of hydrogen isotopes (deuterium and... War and peace in terms and definitions

Books

• Strategic weapons of the future, Kardashev Mikhail Arutyunovich. The book provides detailed information about air-to-surface missiles (ASBMs). For the first time, systematized data on the development of ASBMs in the USSR, USA and other countries have been reviewed. Including…

In 1949. Now, after more than 60 years of existence, Russia's strategic nuclear forces number 611 strategic delivery vehicles that are capable of carrying 2,679 nuclear warheads (as of December 2010). Today, Russia's strategic nuclear forces are represented by a nuclear triad: rocket troops strategic purpose, maritime strategic forces and strategic long-range aviation. In accordance with accepted military doctrine Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction against itself or its allies, as well as as a countermeasure in the event of large-scale aggression using common species weapons, which would become a threat to the country's national security.

Strategic Missile Forces

The main component nuclear shield Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). They account for 375 missile systems and 1,259 nuclear warheads. These forces are distributed among 11 divisions. The Strategic Missile Forces are armed with missile systems the following types: R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 (SS-18) – 58 pieces, carrying 10 nuclear charges each, UR-100NUTTKH (SS-19) – 70 pieces, carrying 6 nuclear charges each, Topol, mobile (SS-25) – 171 pieces, 1 nuclear charge each, Topol-M mine (SS-27) - 52 pieces, Topol-M, mobile (SS-27) - 18 pieces, RS-24 mobile (Yars) - 6 pieces, carrying 3 each nuclear charge. More than 90% of all ground-based nuclear weapons are ready for launch within minutes.

Missile systems

The production of the R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 missiles was carried out by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine). R-36MUTTH missiles were put on combat duty in 1979-1983, R-36M2 missiles in 1988-1992. These two-stage liquid-propellant missiles are capable of carrying up to 10 nuclear warheads and are the most powerful means of Russia's nuclear shield. The development plans of the Strategic Missile Forces assume that the R-36M2 missiles will remain on combat duty, provided that their service life will be extended to 25-30 years. They will be able to remain on combat duty until 2016-2020.

The UR-100NUTTKH (SS-19) missile was created by NPO Mashinostroeniya (Reutov, Moscow region). These complexes entered combat duty in 1979-1984. These two-stage liquid-propellant rockets are capable of carrying up to 6 nuclear warheads. Currently, some have already been withdrawn from service. But a number of missiles, based on the test results, will continue to remain in service for several more years; their service life has been extended to more than 30 years.

Topol (SS-25) is a ground-based missile system developed at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering. These mobile systems entered service from 1985 to 1992. The missile of the complex is a three-stage solid fuel, carrying 1 nuclear warhead. The missiles were produced by the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant; currently the complexes are beginning to be decommissioned due to the expiration of the missiles' service life. On the basis of this complex, Topol M (SS-27) and its further development RS-24 (SS-X-29) were created. Topol-M was created in two versions: silo-based and mobile-based. Mine complexes began to enter service in 1997, the mobile complex entered service with the troops in 2006, and already at the beginning of 2010 the first RS-24 complexes in a mobile version were transferred to the armed forces, which received multiple weapons. head part with three warheads.

Russian Strategic Fleet

As of December 2010, the Russian Navy included 12 strategic missile carriers belonging to 4 various types. All data is strategic submarines carry 160 missiles with 576 nuclear warheads. Of these, the Northern Fleet includes 6 submarines of Project 667 BDRM “Dolphin” (located at the base in Gadzhievo), armed with RSM-54 missiles carrying 4 nuclear warheads. The Russian Pacific Fleet has 4 older Project 667 BDR Kalmar submarines (Vilyuchinsk village, Kamchatka) with RSM-50 missiles carrying 3 nuclear warheads. One Project 667 BDRM nuclear submarine is undergoing repairs and is expected to return to service this year.

Additionally, the Navy has a Project 941 Akula submarine, which was converted to test the new RSM-56 Bulava missiles; the remaining boats of this type were withdrawn from the fleet due to the end of the missiles’ service life. The fleet also includes one new Project 955 Borei nuclear submarine, which should be armed with the new Bulava ballistic missile, which cannot pass the program state tests. Two more submarines have been laid down under this project; it is the Project 955 Borei submarines that should become the backbone of the modern strategic nuclear forces of the Russian fleet.

According to experts, about 20% of strategic submarines are constantly on combat duty, i.e. at least 2 nuclear submarines carrying about 100 nuclear warheads. Also, in addition, some submarines at their bases are on duty with the ability to launch missiles “from the wall”, i.e. straight from the piers. Although, it is quite obvious that in this situation, submarines are extremely vulnerable not only to nuclear, but also to conventional weapons. In this case, the very point of creating such ships, which are very expensive for the fleet, the main feature of which is high survivability due to covert placement in missile launching positions, is lost.

Russian Strategic Aviation

Russian strategic aviation is concentrated in 37 air army and has 76 strategic bombers two types: Tu-160 (13 pieces) and Tu-95MS (63 pieces), capable of carrying up to 844 long-range cruise missiles. All these aircraft are armed with long-range cruise missiles Kh-55 and Kh-55SM (2500 and 3000 km, respectively). These missiles entered service in 1983, and are currently produced at the VMP AVITEK OJSC plant in Kirov. The missile flies at subsonic speed at an extremely low altitude, skirting the terrain. Designed to destroy strategically important ground objects, the coordinates of which are in advance known.

The basis of strategic aviation is the Tu-95 MS turboprop bombers, developed at the Tupolev Design Bureau and mass-produced from 1984 to 1991. There are two types of similar vehicles Tu-95 MS6 and Tu-95 MS16, the first carries 6 cruise missiles in the bomb bay, the second is capable of additionally carrying 10 missiles on pylons under the wings, which greatly affects the flight range of the missile carrier

The Tu-160 supersonic strategic missile carrier was also created at the Tupolev Design Bureau and was mass-produced from 1984 to 1992; since 1999, production has been resumed in Kazan. There are currently 16 bombers in service, 13 as part of the strategic nuclear forces. The bomber's armament includes 12 X-55 long-range cruise missiles located in the bomb bay.

Russian strategic aviation is concentrated at two airfields. The 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Air Division in Engels (Saratov region) has 13 Tu-160 and 23 Tu-95MS. The unit also includes a regiment of Il-78 tanker aircraft stationed in Ryazan. The 326th Heavy Bomber Division is located in the Khabarovsk Territory in Ukrainka. The division is armed with 40 Tu-95MS bombers

Tactical nuclear weapons

We should not forget that in addition to strategic nuclear forces, there are non-strategic ones, which in our country are hidden in a veil of secrecy even greater than the American ones. According to experts, there are about 2,000 such carriers in Russia. The difference between tactical nuclear weapons is that, unlike strategic ones, they are not placed on carriers, but are in warehouses in storage mode, and the carriers are not specialized, but ordinary basic weapons. Foreign experts estimate the Russian arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads at 8,000.

Status and prospects

Factors reducing the combat effectiveness of strategic nuclear forces:
Expiration of service life of 80% of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Strategic Missile Forces.
Removal from service and destruction of most nuclear railway missile systems.
Strategic aviation is concentrated at two airfields, with warheads stored separately.
The delayed commissioning of the Bulava missile, which should become the main weapon of strategic nuclear submarines.
Partial lack of cash coverage For the most part Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean, which increases the requirements for the mobility of the nuclear triad.

Positive points:

Start of operation of new generation missile attack warning system stations in Krasnodar region and Leningrad region.

From 2006 to 2008, 4 satellites of the Cosmos series of the Oko early warning system were launched into orbit.

All strategic nuclear submarine projects 667 BDRM and part of 667 BDR have recently undergone medium repairs with partial modernization and replacement of missiles

Resumption of Tu-160 production and strategic aviation flights in remote patrol areas around the world.

Commissioning of new mobile complex, equipped with RS-24 Yars missiles.