The most active representatives of Russian society, including military personnel, already in the second half of the 80s insisted on the consistent application of the principles of democracy in the sphere of ensuring the country's military security. It is worth recalling what guidelines for military reform were outlined at the very beginning of the construction of the new Russian army - in the April Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation of 1992 and in the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 30, 1992 No. 918 “On measures for the stage-by-stage transition to staffing the RF Armed Forces with military personnel on a voluntary basis - by contract":
The total number of Russian military personnel should not exceed 1 million (i.e., in the future it was planned to fight “not with numbers, but with skill”);
A compact army and navy must be equipped with effective weapons based on advanced technologies;
The expenditures, structure and size of a military organization must be open to the public.
Alas! The implementation of the decisions made in 1992 was, contrary to common sense, entrusted to the “siloviki” themselves. Should we be surprised at the disastrous results? However, without going into a detailed analysis of the events of the 90s, let us turn to the current situation. In 2003, realizing the need for quick and radical changes, the Russian President announced the upcoming modernization of the army. Here are the most important ideas expressed by the president in his message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2003 and, according to him, which have not lost their significance today: “In military reform, the key issues are significant rearmament, improvement of recruitment principles and improvement of the very structure of the Armed Forces... In accordance with approved plans, we will continue to form units in the ground forces, airborne forces, and marine corps constant readiness on a professional basis. This work should be completed in 2007. In addition, service in the internal and border troops will be based on professional principles... I would also like to note that the non-commissioned corps of our Armed Forces will be transferred to a professional basis at an accelerated pace. From 2008, the duration of conscription service should be reduced to one year. For the first six months, conscripts will master military specialties in training units. After this, they will have the opportunity to choose - either serve for six months in linear units, or switch to contract, professional service. Those who have served 3 years under a contract should receive a number of preferences, including the guaranteed right to higher education at state expense.”
These theses fully corresponded to the hopes and expectations of the overwhelming majority of citizens, especially since their substantiation was based on the conclusions of public organizations and independent experts. Only the military leaders thought differently. In the fall of 2003, the Ministry of Defense prepared and, with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation, held a meeting, after which the so-called “ White paper”, which stated that the military reform had already been completed and that nothing needed to be radically changed in the army. The problem of recruitment was considered here from the point of view of the military, the interests of society were mentioned only in passing. And although the White Paper does not have legal force, generals regularly refer to it, and their subordinates are forced to be guided by it.
Nevertheless, the modernization of the armed forces began. To judge its possible results, you need to answer two questions: 1) who is entrusted with carrying out the relevant activities; 2) what real actions have been taken to date. We will try to give answers to these questions in relation to the main directions of modernization.
Principles of army recruitment
The Ministry of Defense remained responsible for the reform of the recruitment system as a whole. And this is alarming. In fact, the federal target program (FTP) for the transfer of private and junior military personnel to contract, adopted by the Russian government on August 25, 2003, is formally interdepartmental. However, in reality this program is implemented only by the security forces. Representatives of society (in particular, employees of the non-governmental Institute of Economics transition period(IET), who took part in its justification) were removed from the implementation of the program under the pretext of secrecy. Control over the implementation of the Federal Target Program is also entrusted to the Ministry of Defense. Thus, this ministry plans events on its own, carries them out on its own, and controls itself.
The answer to the second of the questions raised is no less troubling. The initial steps to implement the Federal Target Program can hardly be called prudent: instead of the speedy and significant increase in pay for contract soldiers recommended by civilian experts (10–20% higher than the average salary in the country), the Minister of Defense in 2003 hastened to sign an order to increase pay for military personnel of the central government agencies Ministry of Defense.
Later we managed to “adjust” this policy, but we still cannot calm down. First of all, because the Federal Target Program for the transfer to contract of permanently ready military units of the Armed Forces of the Ministry of Defense, internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and border troops of the FSB, adopted in 2003, is implemented differently in these departments.
The FSB has already abandoned conscription and is moving to staffing the border service exclusively on a contract basis; it is ahead of the Federal Target Program. This is already the second of the “security” departments that was able to assess its own benefits from the transition to a contract (the first, as you know, was the Main Directorate for the Execution of Punishments, transferred some time ago from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice).
By the end of 2005, the Ministry of Internal Affairs intended to fully staff only the 46th separate brigade of internal troops stationed in Chechnya under the contract. However, the complete transfer of these troops to a contract form of recruitment, which the President of the Russian Federation spoke about in his 2003 message, is now rejected. On what basis? This department has not yet given any clear explanations.
The Ministry of Defense and the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff (GOMU), which is responsible for this area of work, are especially strongly opposed to the transfer of all regular troops to contract - even in the long term. Only certain units have been fully transferred to the contract in the RF Armed Forces, primarily the 76th Airborne Division (stationed in Pskov, participating in a number of operations in the North Caucasus) and the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (stationed in Chechnya). The rest of the reform, according to the Ministry of Defense, is being carried out in accordance with the Federal Target Program, but is encountering difficulties. But the “fast pace” of contract recruitment of all sergeant positions in all regular forces has been temporarily forgotten: they are going to start this event only after the completion of the Federal Target Program.
And yet, the appearance in the Russian army of not only military units, but also formations, fully staffed under contract, on a voluntary basis, should be regarded as a huge achievement.
As for the difficulties, it should be noted: until now, the salary of a contract soldier does not exceed the average salary in the country anywhere except Chechnya. Therefore, instead of an intensive influx of contract soldiers into the army, there is an outflow of previously recruited ones - mainly those who did not serve in permanent readiness units. But not only of them. Due to the extortions that contract soldiers serving in Chechnya are subjected to, a military career is losing its attractiveness for them too. According to published data, more than 1.3 thousand people left the 42nd division in 2005, and more than 400 more will be dismissed early because they did not return from vacation. As it turned out, during their service they did not receive the required allowances. And not all is well in the “elite” 76th, as evidenced by the chief of staff of this division. The allowance standards are such that contract workers are often forced to buy some items of clothing and equipment, including even skis, with their own money. And the Minister of Defense only at the end of 2005, after several additional “infusions” of funds into the ministry’s budget, discovered that the costs of the Federal Target Program were not indexed, that the program was financed without taking into account inflation.
The situation is even worse with the upcoming reduction in the duration of conscription service. Instead of a six-month period, which, as many experts have shown, is quite sufficient for learning the basics of a military specialty and preparing for service under a contract (or for enrollment in a mobilization resource), the government decree and the message of the President of the Russian Federation appeared the formula “up to 1 year”, by which the military means not six, but a full twelve months. This destroys the life plans of those who, for example, did not qualify for admission to a university and were then drafted into the army. In fact, such a conscript will lose not one, but two years, since he will not be able to take exams again next summer.
It was promised that all conscripts would spend the first half of the year in a military training unit. But even here there is no clarity. The number of such units and the total number of their contingent are clearly insufficient. This means that many young men will immediately be drafted into training units attached to other military units, where they will meet their “grandfathers.” And those servicemen who go through training military units will find themselves in the second half of their service not in permanent readiness units, but in some mysterious “linear” units. What these parts are is far from clear. Apparently, the military leaders who prepared proposals for the President of the Russian Federation on this issue forgot that the term “line troops” has long been outdated. Officially, there are no military units called “linear” in the Russian Federation at all. According to the works of our military theorists and practitioners, now there are such “categories of content” of formations and military units: permanent readiness, reduced strength (type A and B), personnel and newly formed ones. The formation of new military units is not planned (except for two mountain brigades, which are expected to be created by 2007). Type B cadre and reduced-strength military units are not ready to carry out their intended tasks. Reduced military units of type A perform tasks in a limited scope. What skills will conscripts acquire there in the second half of their service? Surely they will not be used “for their intended purpose.”
Probably because of this ambiguity, the Ministry of Defense has still not implemented clause 4 of the mentioned government decree of 08.25.03 (on the Federal Target Program) and has not submitted it on time - i.e. by the fourth quarter of 2003! - a bill to change the procedure for conscription for a short period and the very appointment of such service. Instead, we are excited by bills on the abolition of deferments, on the liquidation of military departments, etc. Recently it turned out that there are too many such departments. But let us remind you: according to our laws, not a single military department it cannot be created without the knowledge of the Ministry of Defense. So who created these unnecessary departments?
Meanwhile, delaying such a transition is fraught with extreme negative consequences, especially considering the coming demographic collapse. This is evidenced, in particular, by the results of mathematical modeling of recruitment processes and their military-economic characteristics. Detailed modeling materials have been published. They are presented in detail and regularly updated on the IET website [www.iet.ru] in the “Publications” section, under the “Military Reform” heading.
The graphs below show some of the simulation results.
Figure 1. Change in the pace (thousands of people per half-year) of replenishment of the conscript contingent, conscription, recruitment and replenishment of contract soldiers, as well as the total number of conscript contingent (thousands of people) - according to the option proposed by the Ministry of Defense
The great depth of forecasting - up to 2035 - is explained by the fact that this is the only way to take into account demographic fluctuations, the time discrepancy between the processes of conscription into the army, demobilization, the transition of citizens to the mobilization resource and stay in it, and from an economic point of view - all types of expenses, including pension provision for future retirees from among the RMKS currently recruited under contract. The number of people serving, in the reserve and retired depends significantly on the personnel policy being pursued; the same applies to the corresponding expenses.
As modeling has shown, after 2008, the rate of growth in the number of contract soldiers envisaged in the Federal Targeted Program, as well as the president’s decision to reduce the length of conscription service, do not fit in with the intention of the Ministry of Defense and its supporters in the security bloc to maintain the current size of the armed forces. They are also incompatible with the promise to preserve “student” deferments. Something will have to be given up, since even if all deferments are cancelled, the demographic collapse will lead to a sharp decrease in the influx of young citizens into the conscription contingent. As for the bill currently being initiated on conscription for one year after graduation, it is worth remembering Emperor Alexander II: according to his reform, persons with higher education were only supposed to serve for six months! Even in those years, calling on specialists for a longer period seemed impractical.
It is argued that GOMU's plans are driven by economic factors. But this aspect has also been comprehensively studied by non-governmental organizations and independent experts. Calculations show that with the implementation of the program of the Ministry of Defense (first - implementation of the Federal Targeted Program, then the transfer of all sergeants to contract), the costs of all types of allowance for the RMKS, including housing for those who will become professional military personnel, and then military pensioners, will increase to approximately 125 billion rubles per year (in 2005 prices). These calculations take into account all components of expenses, as well as the fact that, while increasing the pay of RMKS military personnel, it will simultaneously have to be increased for officers, warrant officers and midshipmen. And, of course, it is assumed that the personnel policy will be reasonable and not all military personnel who entered into the first contract will serve until retirement, as was stated earlier in the article by the head of the State Military Inspectorate V.V. Smirnov and is still understood by many. In most states with large armed forces (for example, the United States), after each contract period, approximately half of the military personnel remain in the ranks, the rest leave. This is precisely what the incentive system and legislation are aimed at. It is gratifying that V.V. Smirnov, at least now, at the end of 2005, recognized such a policy as effective for Russia.
Figure 2. Budgetary expenditures for the reform of the system of recruiting military personnel for the military organization of the RMKS (billion rubles per year) according to the option proposed by the Ministry of Defense
Taking into account this personnel policy, which is rational for Russia, additional costs were assessed to accelerate the reform of the recruitment system under various acceleration options (compared to GOMU plans). Are they big? The question is not idle, since the Minister of Defense, at the instigation of some of his subordinates, is trying to intimidate society precisely with “exorbitant expenses.” It is characteristic that the financial and economic service of the Ministry of Defense did not declare anything of the kind, especially since there were no official publications of the source data, methods and calculation results. Apparently, other people who use different arithmetic “count” for the minister.
Modeling has established that the statements of military leaders about the economic unsustainability for the country of a complete transfer of the military organization to the voluntary principle of recruitment do not correspond to reality.
Figure 3. Additional total costs for accelerating the transfer of a military organization to a voluntary recruitment principle (compared to the option proposed by the Ministry of Defense; billion rubles per year)
Forms of transition to a voluntary recruitment principle:
In 1–2 after the implementation of the Federal Target Program by 2008.
In 2–2 immediate transition (months of service in brackets).
Even if you do not reduce the number of RMKS and all military personnel in general, then if you speed up the federal target program, the excess costs that would be needed to implement the Ministry of Defense option will be only a few percent of the current ones total expenses on defense. The figure shows six options for accelerating the transition, their detailed descriptions can be found in IET publications. These calculations have not been refuted by anyone!
With the exception of two “forced” options that require a “surge” of expenses in the next few years, the rest generally lie in the range of 10–15 billion rubles. But also “bursts” that provide an immediate transition to financially quite tolerable. Let us remind you that in the adopted budget, the expenditures of the Ministry of Defense amount to 600 billion rubles. Only in 2005, in addition to the budget (!), the Ministry of Defense received much more funds than would be required to accelerate the transition to a contract acquisition system. And next year, 2006, this increase will be greater. However, additional funds are used for other purposes. Who has proven to society that they are more relevant and that money is spent efficiently? Judging by the materials of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office and the Accounts Chamber, huge sums are simply stolen.
But that's not the point. A fundamentally different approach to solving the acquisition problem is more rational. In terms of combat effectiveness, the number of military personnel in a group made up of contract soldiers is equivalent to one and a half times more military personnel serving under conscription for two years, as now. The difference in their combat effectiveness will be even more significant upon transition to one year of conscription service. This means that the size of a military organization in the process of switching to a contract can be reduced by more than one and a half times without any damage to the country’s defense capability. V.V. Smirnov also spoke about the foreign experience of a “sharp” reduction in personnel during the transition to a contract. It is not clear why these conclusions cannot be applied to Russia.
Note: the reduction will affect not only soldiers, sailors, sergeants and foremen, but also the more “expensive” officers. In other words, we are not talking about additional expenses, but about the possibility of using the freed-up funds to equip the combat-ready military units remaining after the reduction with modern weapons.
Equipment and maintenance of a military organization
This aspect of army modernization was mentioned by the President of the Russian Federation in his 2004 Address to the Federal Assembly: “To successfully modernize the entire military organization of the state, we need to clearly know how a lot of money is spent, including on providing housing for military personnel, on military medicine, and on education. In addition, the army and other security agencies have accumulated huge assets, and they also need to be assessed and effectively managed. A transparent military economy is a necessary condition for reform.” The natural question is: is there sufficient political will to implement the assigned tasks? After all, in 1992, as already mentioned, these tasks were formulated in approximately the same way.
Can we talk about successes in relation to the military-technical and socio-economic aspects of modernization? Without a doubt. First of all, this is the creation of unified systems of material, technical and other types of support for the entire military organization of the Russian Federation. Some successes are also obvious in providing military personnel with housing and in equipping the RF Armed Forces with the latest weapons systems. Society appreciated them, but now it is worried about something else. Still leaves something to be desired best quality weapons and the level of their use: the latter is due to both technical reasons and the human factor (insufficient training of personnel, whose combat training is not fully funded).
To solve this problem, a number of administrative (institutional) reforms were undertaken. The State Defense Procurement Service has been created, a “single customer” system is being formed in the Ministry of Defense, and the Russian Government Commission on Military-Industrial Issues has been created. The restructuring of the military-industrial complex (DIC) continues.
At the same time, however, the defense industry is still “fenced off” from the Russian economy, and the enterprises included in it are enlarging and turning into a group of monopolists, which does not fit well with market principles. Unfortunately, there is still a widespread opinion that the domestic defense industry is the locomotive of progress, and that in order to save the Russian economy it is necessary to invest in it. But this thesis was not entirely accurate before, and now it does not stand up to criticism, especially when it comes to investments not controlled by society.
The Ministry of Defense should promote the unification of the production of military equipment and products for national economic purposes, an integrated approach to innovation processes, since this ministry itself cannot now make large-scale, economically profitable orders. If innovation is based on the unity of materials, element base and structural components for military and civilian products, the possibility of inter-industry unification will immediately appear, which means that the factor of reducing production costs with increasing serial production will begin to work. Let us recall that doubling the output of modern engineering products usually reduces their cost by 15–20%, and even more in breakthrough areas.
Thus, with a competent innovation policy, it is even possible to reduce military spending while maintaining the level of the country’s defense capability, or, what is now more reasonable, to increase the level of military security without involving additional funds. A military-technical policy in which dual-use innovations will naturally be included in military development plans will be useful for the Russian military organization. But is Defense Minister S.B. Ivanov, who also became Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, ready to implement just such a policy? So far, unfortunately, we have not heard his statements indicating his readiness to accept a radical and completely necessary measure: do not approve in future either the State Armament Program or the State Defense Order if their projects are not supported not only by traditional military-technical, but also by unification justifications that guarantee the rational civilian use of military technologies.
Planning and control systems
At the end of 2005, one could note with satisfaction that order in the “security” departments had somewhat strengthened, and as a result, the level of military security in Russia had risen. This is evidenced by a number of facts, the most impressive of which seems to be the disruption of the plot of a major terrorist attack in Nalchik. However, we have not yet seen a noticeable decrease in the level of offenses in the military organization itself, especially economic ones. Here it is worth quoting again the message to the Federal Assembly in 2004, in which the president specifically recalled: “Please keep in mind the Ministry of Defense and the government as a whole: the volume of funds spent, the interests of the country’s defense capability, as well as important social parameters of the reform make it mandatory to have civilian control over the effectiveness of ongoing in the army of transformations." One can only regret that the president expressed his wish in the form of a request, and not a categorical demand, since the lack of civilian control is precisely the stumbling block for military reform.
It is not yet clear that the “security” departments are properly taking into account changes in methods government controlled. The point is that last years in many countries, the system known as “planning, programming and budget development” was further developed in two directions: firstly, it also covered the stage of control, not so much over the execution of the budget, but over the achievement of strategic goals; secondly, this naturally required a more rigorous formalization of the system of strategic goals, tactical tasks that must be solved to achieve these goals, and clear (measured or calculated) indicators indicating the degree of such achievement. A new term has emerged: “results-based budgeting.” International standards have been developed regarding the classification of financial assets.
Under these conditions, some Russian economists found it possible to take as the basis for the functional budget classification of the Russian Federation the international standard of Classification of Functions of Government Bodies, which was compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and adopted by the UN in 2000 as an element of the UN System of National Accounts, introduced in 1993. They were further encouraged to take this step by the fact that the use of this standard was supported by the International Monetary Fund, which included it in its Manual of Government Finance Statistics. The government adopted the concept of reforming the budget process in the Russian Federation, providing for “bringing the budget classification of the Russian Federation closer to the requirements of international standards” (Resolution No. 249 of May 22, 2004).
But at the same time, the most important circumstance was forgotten that military spending is a special concern of the world community, that a different international standard for it has long been adopted and is in force. It is worth recalling that it was introduced at the initiative of the USSR General Assembly UN as early as December 12, 1980 (resolution No. 35/142 B). And the decree of the Russian government regarding military spending must be carried out primarily on the basis of this standard. In part, one can also rely on NATO’s standardized reporting, since the Russian Federation is in a “partnership” relationship with this organization and conducts a corresponding exchange of military-economic information.
However, when developing and approving budgets for 2005 and then 2006, the requirements of the international standard regulating military spending were ignored. Supporters of their complete secrecy did not fail to take advantage of this. As a result, contrary to the above “request” of the President of the Russian Federation, the degree of secrecy of military spending in the Russian Federation did not decrease, but increased significantly! This fact was negatively assessed by almost all independent experts and even - in the official conclusion on the draft budget - by the Duma Defense Committee. But the head of the economics and finance service of the Ministry of Defense L. Kudelina, characterizing the budget in a recent newspaper publication, did not say a word about this shortcoming.
The role of Russian society in reforming the military organization
First of all: the modernization of the military organization of the Russian Federation must be declared a priority strategic goal of the entire society, and not of any one department or group of departments. The sad experience of the failure of military reform in the 90s and the difficulties it has encountered in recent years indicate that it cannot be entrusted only to the “siloviks”. The leadership of modernization can only be entrusted to those representatives of Russian society who truly recognize the principles of democracy and are strictly guided by them in their activities. Without a clear definition of the goals of modernization and the creation of a supra-departmental working body responsible for it, it can again degenerate into a fiction. At the same time, it is necessary to reinforce the powers of such a body with federal law - for example, by adjusting the law on the Security Council.
Its obligatory participants should be representatives of the presidential administration, the Security Council, the military-industrial commission under the government of the Russian Federation, and, most importantly, one of the commissions under the Public Chamber formed by this new institution. But the Public Chamber alone is not enough. It is necessary to ensure that all public organizations, all citizens have real opportunity to exert a beneficial effect on the military organization of Russia in the interests of society and the state.
The most important and urgent task that this body must solve is the creation of two interrelated systems: 1) strategic goals in the field of military security and 2) a detailed classification of budgetary expenditures allocated to achieve them. Only he, guided by the law on state secrets (and not departmental regulations) and international norms (standards), will have the right to decide which items and types of expenses should be secret.
We all would not want a conflict between society and the military leadership. But we are even more interested in ensuring that the new plan for modernizing the army is not ruined, that the President of the Russian Federation shows his will and does not retreat before the opposing forces. And here society must say a strong word.
Some military officials who remain “at the helm” explain their inaction by citing the experience of the Americans, who allegedly switched to a voluntary recruitment system for more than 10 years. Meanwhile, the Americans managed it in almost five years (taking into account preparations for the transition), and in fact (between the president’s decision to begin the transition and the demobilization of the last conscript) - even faster - in two years. See in particular: Shlykov V. How it was in America // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2002. No. 8 (9). pp. 246–459.Current tasks in the development of the Armed Forces Russian Federation. M.: Voeninform Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2003.
Severinov S. Choice of volunteers (conversation with V. Smirnov) // Red Star. No. 242 dated 12/29/05.
Shlykov V. Black bread of military business // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2003. No. 2 (11). pp. 459–472.
On the rationality of the classification of military expenditures used in it in relation to budget planning in the Russian Federation, see, for example, the monograph: The military budget of the state: Methods of justification and analysis. M.: Voenizdat, 2000.
Every year the modernization of the Russian Armed Forces is gaining momentum. New types of weapons are being approved, the infrastructure of the army is being improved, and the professional skills of military personnel are significantly increasing. So today's question is Rearmament reforms of the Russian Armed Forces 2018 still remains open.
In certain circles, doubts arise that the military reform program of 2008-2020 will be completed on time. In view of the economic crisis and rapidly changing conditions in the country, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the reform.
The problem of the need for such a reform was voiced shortly before 2008 and was presented only as one of the possible directions for future reformation. A set of measures, divided into several stages, is designed to change and improve the structure, strength and composition of a strategically important military organization for the country - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Stages of rearmament:
- Stage I – took place from 2008 to 2011 inclusive.
- Stage II - began in 2012 and ended in 2015.
- Stage III – planned for the period from 2016 to 2020 inclusive.
Organizational and staffing maneuvers
At the first stage, organizational and staffing measures were carried out aimed at improving management, optimizing numbers and carrying out military education reform.
One of the main directions of the first stage of the reformation was the transition from a system consisting of four links (that is, “military district - army - division - regiment”) to a system including only three links: “military district - operational command - brigade”.
The number of military districts was reduced, each of which established its own reserve command. During the rearmament reform, the number of military units was also reduced.
Reduction degree:
- Ground forces - 90%;
- Navy - by 49%;
- Air Force - by 48%;
- Strategic Missile Forces - by 33%;
- Airborne troops - by 17%;
- Space Forces - by 15%.
A significant part of the rearmament was the reduction in the number of military personnel. Officers were the most affected by the reformation: from approximately 300 thousand people, the number of officers was reduced by almost half.
It must be said that the optimization of numbers was determined to be unsuccessful. The actions of the military department led to complex problems: the professional part of the junior army command was completely destroyed. Experts, by the way, recognized the program to replace warrant officers with sergeants as a failure.
It is expected that the warrant officers will return to their units in the required composition. By the beginning of 2018, the military department plans to increase the size of the Russian army. So, the total number of officers will be 220 thousand people, warrant officers and midshipmen - approximately 50 thousand people, contract soldiers - 425 thousand people, conscripts - 300 thousand people. A significant number of conscripts testify to.
The reform of military education implies the reduction of some military institutes and universities, and instead of them, scientific centers were formed under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.
Optimization of social security for military personnel
The second stage of the reformation, which included addressing social issues, was aimed at the following activities: providing housing, increasing material allowances, improving skills and professional retraining.
At the moment, the number of military personnel without housing has decreased significantly compared to 2009. Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly. In the first years of the second stage, this issue was successfully resolved, but since 2012, the number of people who do not have their own apartment has grown inexorably.
The elimination of the queue for housing, according to the plan of the Ministry of Defense, was to be completed by 2013. However, this process was not implemented for a number of serious reasons. In such conditions, the department took the only the right decision instead of housing, give those on the waiting list a one-time cash payment.
The increase in material allowances for military personnel occurred in 2012. Salaries were increased almost 3 times, and military pensions also increased. All allowances and additional payments in force before the reformation were abolished, and completely new additional payments were introduced instead.
All contract servicemen, according to the professional retraining reform, were required to undergo special “survival courses” aimed at improving their skills. Retraining of officers is carried out when a serviceman is appointed to a position.
Rearmament reform at present
Currently, the third stage of the reform of the rearmament of the Russian Armed Forces is underway. As of 2016, the total share of new weapons in the Russian Military Forces was 47%, while, according to the plan, this figure should have been only 30%. For the army, this means receiving an additional number of modern tanks, small arms and other types of weapons.
The ultimate goal of the reform is to increase the number of modern weapons to 70% by 2020. Thus, the modernization of the army of the Russian Federation must be completed on time and in full.
In addition to technical improvements, the rearmament reform contributed to increasing the level of combat training of military personnel, conducting large-scale exercises, forming new military institutions and units, optimizing the structure of the Military Forces, etc.
The best assessment of the current state of affairs can be the opinion of our sworn “friends” from the West, who emphasize the ever-increasing military power of our country.
Over the last decade, the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Russia began to actively work in the interests of its own Armed Forces. The rearmament of many types of troops is proceeding at a fairly high pace, especially for the Strategic Missile Forces and the Aerospace Forces (VKS), and to a lesser extent for the Navy (with the exception of the submarine fleet). Many are in the final stages of development advanced systems weapons, the creation process of which began after the collapse of the USSR. However, in reality, so far the troops are mainly receiving equipment that is a deep modernization of Soviet developments. This became possible thanks to the excellent modernization potential of many types of weapons, as well as the opportunities that open up thanks to the “digitization” of Soviet equipment (digital equipment was rarely used then) using a modern element base. Nevertheless, it is impossible to imagine the Russian military-industrial complex without the legacy of the USSR - continuity in this area is of utmost importance. And most of the enterprises remained from Soviet times, in most cases retaining their names. This will be demonstrated using specific examples from key sectors of the military-industrial complex.
Military aircraft industry: Soviet Su-27 and Mi-8 platforms bring billions in profits to Russia
Since the start of the Russian military campaign in Syria in September 2015, footage of the use of Su-34 front-line bombers, as well as Su-30SM and Su-35S multirole fighters, has constantly appeared in the largest world and Russian media. At the moment, these aircraft are the most modern and efficient aircraft in the Russian Aerospace Forces, attracting the attention of many buyers on the global arms market. And all of them were created on the basis of the fourth generation heavy fighter Su-27, adopted by the USSR Air Force in 1985.
As for the creation of these deep modernizations of the Su-27, this was done largely at the expense of foreign customers on their own initiative, since until the 2010s there was practically no state defense order for new combat aircraft. This is especially true for the two-seat multirole fighter Su-30SM, which would hardly have appeared without the largest Indian order (currently 272 aircraft have been contracted, about 250 of them have been delivered). This aircraft will soon bring up to $8 billion more to the Russian military-industrial complex - this is what the contract for upgrading the entire Indian Su-30MKI fleet to the SuperSukhoi level will probably cost.
As a result, today, new combat aircraft, created on the basis of the Soviet platform, are the basis of the Russian Aerospace Forces, entering the troops in large numbers. Only the fifth generation fighter T-50 PAK FA, which first took flight on January 29, 2010, can be called a completely “independent” project, and the first work on its creation began in 2002. Although the aircraft was completely created in the Russian Federation, the work itself on creating fifth-generation fighters began in the early 1980s in the USSR. Were developed technical requirements to aircraft of this class, in addition, the traditionally competing experimental design bureaus (OKB) MiG and Sukhoi began work on the creation of their own aircraft. Strictly speaking, initially only the MiG Design Bureau was involved in the fifth-generation fighter with the MFI project (multifunctional front-line fighter), and Sukhoi received a project for a new carrier-based fighter S-32 with a forward-swept wing. Later (after the collapse of the USSR), the S-32 was renamed the S-37 or Su-47 Berkut and became an experimental aircraft for testing fifth-generation fighter technologies. The fate of the MFI turned out to be quite sad - the only flight prototype MiG 1.44 carried out only two flights - in February and April 2000, after which the project was closed, becoming a “victim” of disorganization and low government funding in the 1990s. The protracted development of the vehicle led to its significant technical lag behind the American F-22 Raptor, which was already actively flying and was adopted by the US Air Force in 2005.
As a result, it was decided to begin the development of a fifth-generation fighter “from scratch” - already by the Sukhoi Design Bureau, which remained operational thanks to large-scale export projects. Actually, we are already talking about the T-50 PAK FA, in the creation of which we used all the technical developments that accumulated during testing of the S-37 and MFI. At the moment, 9 T-50 prototypes have been built, 7 of which are flightable. By 2020, the first batch of 6 production vehicles is expected to be delivered.
A similar state of affairs continues in the helicopter industry - the Mi-8/Mi-17 military transport helicopters in modern modifications, for example the Mi-8AMTSh, are the best sold in the international and domestic markets. It is worth noting that the first Mi-8 entered service back in 1965, however, the machine is still relevant to this day. In total, more than 16,000 Mi-8s were produced, making it the most common twin-engine helicopter in the world. Other popular modern Russian military helicopters - the Mi-35M, Mi-28N and Ka-52 attack helicopters - are also direct descendants of Soviet machines. The first flight of the Mi-28 was made on November 10, 1982, and the Ka-52 is a two-seat modification of the Ka-50 helicopter, which made its first flight on June 17, 1982. The Mi-35M is a modernization of the mass-produced Soviet attack helicopter Mi-24, which was put into service in 1972. “Original” Russian projects, such as the Mi-38 and Ansat transport helicopters, do not yet inspire confidence that they will become as widespread as their Soviet predecessors, which are still in use today. in great demand in the world.
As for military transport aviation, in this area there is complete dependence on Soviet-made aircraft. New vehicles built by the Antonov State Enterprise, for obvious reasons, are no longer available to the Russian army, and in general, the affairs of the Ukrainian company are not going well. As a result, we have to maintain a huge fleet of aircraft such as An-124, An-26, An-22, etc. in flying condition. So far, it has been possible to master production in Russia only for Ilyushin machines (production was moved from Tashkent to Ulyanovsk). In recent years, small-scale production of the Il-76MD-90A, the most advanced modification of the Soviet military transport aircraft Il-76, has begun. The only Russian project of a light transport aircraft, the Il-112, created to replace the An-26, is only just preparing for its first flight. Replacements for the An-124 and Il-76 are not yet visible on the horizon.
Mass-produced Russian ground equipment- direct legacy of the USSR
At the moment, Russia is the undisputed leader in the number of new tanks supplied to the world market. Such success of Uralvagonzavod was brought about by the main battle tanks T-90S. The T-90 tank was put into service in 1992, and its development began in the late 1980s on the basis of the T-72, which is the most popular second-generation tank in the world (more than 30,000 units produced). In 2001, an export modification of the tank was created - the T-90S, which began to be in great demand due to its excellent price-quality ratio. This was largely due to the fact that there was practically no Russian, “market” money in the cost of developing the machine - the basic work was done in the USSR, the same applies to the creation production capacity. As a result, India contracted for more than 2,000 tanks, Algeria purchased more than 300 vehicles, and others.
As for innovations in the armored tank market, we should note the development of a promising new generation tank on the Armata universal heavy tracked platform. A number of T-14 tanks are already in trial operation in the Russian Armed Forces. Directly T-14 with Soviet developments not related, but work on a tank with an “uninhabited” turret, which is main feature“Almaty” was carried out even before the collapse of the USSR. The creation of a real vehicle with such a layout, where the crew is placed in an isolated armored capsule at the bottom of the tank, became possible only with the development of computer technology.
A similar situation exists with armored combat vehicles - infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs). While promising products based on the Kuragnets-25 medium tracked platform and the Boomerang medium wheeled platform are just beginning to undergo testing and have not entirely clear prospects, the Russian army is also armed with Soviet BMP-2, BMP-3, BTR-80, etc. P. These vehicles undergo various upgrades, for example, to the level of BTR-82A or BMP-3M, however, there is nothing fundamentally new about them. These same products replenish the budget of Russian enterprises during export deliveries.
Russia's powerful air defense system is a legacy Soviet Union
One of the most famous Russian systems weapons is the long-range anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) S-400, which entered service with the Russian Armed Forces in 2007. However, the development of this air defense system, originally called the S-300PM3, began in 1987, based on its predecessor, the S-300PM. Somewhat later, the air defense system was renamed the S-400 “Triumph”, and the development was completed in modern Russia, largely thanks to funds received from the export of the S-300 air defense system (most of the products were purchased by China - according to some sources, up to 36 divisions).
Other means air defense(air defense), which are actively entering service with the Russian Aerospace Forces, such as the Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft gun-missile system (ZPRK), air defense systems short range“Tor-M2”, medium-range air defense system “Buk-M3”, etc. are modernizations of Soviet systems, as can be seen from their names. All these highly effective air defense systems, considered one of the most effective in the world, are a legacy of the USSR. The use of new elemental base and technologies in the conditions of modern Russia has made it possible to significantly improve their characteristics - both in range and probability of destruction, and in the number of simultaneously tracked and fired targets.
Nuclear deterrence is ensured by weapons that are a development of Soviet products
Perhaps the most important component of the Russian army is the strategic nuclear forces(SNF), providing deterrence from global conflicts. They include the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), the strategic submarine fleet and strategic aviation.
As for the Strategic Missile Forces, represented by silos and mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ground-based, then all the models in service have a direct connection with the Soviet military-industrial complex. R-36M2 "Voevoda" heavy liquid-propellant missiles, capable of carrying 10 individually targetable heavy nuclear warheads (with a yield of 800 kilotons of TNT), were built between 1988 and 1992 at the Yuzhmash plant in Dnepropetrovsk. This important component of the strategic nuclear forces should be replaced by the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, which is actually a direct branch of the evolution of the Voevoda. True, the work is somewhat complicated by the fact that missile production was established at Yuzhmash, which remained in Ukraine, but the State Research Center named after. Makeev is quite capable of developing and mastering the production of a new ICBM. By the way, one more the most important project is the creation of a controlled hypersonic glider-warhead for the Sarmat (such a warhead is almost impossible to intercept using means missile defense). According to available data, it is called “product 4202”, and its predecessor, the Albatross project, was worked on in the late 1980s, but due to underfunding or other problems, the program was closed. There is another interesting strategic “reanimation” - the Mozyr ICBM silo defense system. According to some sources, work on its creation has been resumed since 2012. The capabilities of modern radar stations made it possible to complete the work and ensure the interception of enemy warheads with a volley of clouds of metal arrows and balls at high speed towards the target.
As for the light solid-fuel ICBMs "Topol-M" and the most modern, RS-24 "Yars", they are an evolution of the ICBMs "Topol", produced from 1980 to 1994. The same can be said about the ultra-light ICBM RS-26 Rubezh.
Now let's turn to the maritime component of Russia's nuclear triad. Here we will encounter a little more Russian “novelty” than in the Strategic Missile Forces. First of all, we are talking about the fourth generation submarines of Project 955 "Borey" and the ballistic missiles with which they are equipped - the R-30 "Bulava". If the development of the Borey in its current form began in 1989, then the missile for the submarine was already being developed in modern Russia - since 1998. And it turned out to be very unsuccessful - so far, out of 26 launches, 9 turned out to be emergency, which is as much as 34.6%. And this despite the fact that the Bulava does not have any outstanding characteristics: the same American TridentII missile, adopted for service back in 1990, throws twice as much weight, and its warheads are aimed at the target more accurately. This situation arose due to the fact that the R-39UTTH “Bark” project, developed by the traditional “marine” rocket-building design bureau named after. Makeev, was closed due to high cost, and in 1998, the creation of a solid-fuel rocket for the Borey was entrusted to "", who did not have any experience in creating sea-based missiles.
As a result, at the moment, the basis of the maritime component of Russia’s nuclear triad remains the nuclear submarines of Project 667BDRM “Dolphin” produced in Soviet times with the R-29RMU2 “Sineva” and R-29RMU2.1 “Lainer” liquid-propellant ballistic missiles modernized in Russia.
Russian strategic aviation is represented exclusively by Soviet-made bombers - Tu-95MS and Tu-160. In modern Russia, a program has been launched to modernize existing aircraft, and new strategic cruise missiles X-101/102 (traditional/nuclear warhead) have been created. In addition, in the early 2020s it is planned to restore the production of Tu-160 bombers in the version of the Tu-160M2 (on-board electronics have been radically updated), but the creation of a new aircraft called PAK DA (Advanced Aviation Complex long-range aviation), apparently postponed indefinitely.
Conclusion
Naturally, we did not talk about all sectors of the Russian and Soviet military-industrial complex. However, the examples given are quite sufficient to understand the current trends:
1. The basis of the Russian military-industrial complex remains Soviet enterprises and Soviet developments. Most of the new equipment that is being put into service is a modernization of models created in the USSR, or the development of projects laid down by Soviet designers to the level of serial products. In some cases, projects closed in the 1990s are being revived.
2. The equipment, fully developed in the conditions of modern Russia, is just beginning its journey - most of these products are at the testing stage and have not yet been adopted by the Russian army. Some of them have noticeably murkier prospects than deep modernizations of time-tested Soviet images.
3. Despite its effectiveness and popularity, the equipment created in the 1970-1980s in the USSR will still have to be replaced. The existing modernization potential of many products, although enormous, is still coming to an end. That is why the Russian military-industrial complex faces a serious challenge - it is necessary to create a new generation of equipment in almost all industries. Moreover, the weapons created should become the basis for the Russian Armed Forces for the next half century. Naturally, in the process of development vital role Soviet experience and school also play a role - without them, even creating a new tank is very difficult, and in such industries as rocketry they are absolutely vital.
4. A change of generations requires serious financial investments, which were included in the State Armaments Program (SAP) 2011-2020. However, the economic crisis, the depreciation of the ruble and the decline in oil and gas revenues led to a slight drop in the pace of work performed. Now the hasty adoption of new Russian weapons before 2020 has become unlikely - during this time the emphasis will be on modernized Soviet technology. The prospects will become clearer after the adoption of the GPV-2025, which is planned for 2017.
Russia is vigorously rearming its army. In 2011, the State Arms Development Program until 2020 worth 1.2 trillion was approved. dollars. Its goal is to increase the number of the latest models of military equipment in the troops to 70%. Moscow has seriously decided to undertake a radical modernization of the armed forces and the defense-industrial complex.
2020: new army
As of 2010, the share of new equipment in the Russian armed forces was less than 20%. By 2020, this figure should be 70%. This allows us to call the army modernization program unprecedented in the post-Soviet history of Russia. If in 2003 the total budget of the Ministry of Defense was 600 billion rubles, today it is 2.3 trillion. rubles
The priority of the program is the modernization of strategic nuclear forces (SNF). The share of strategic missile forces (RVSN) in the strategic nuclear forces should be reduced from 70 to 35%. This is due to the fact that Russia is armed with a large number of obsolete Soviet-made missiles. The Army is relying on the Navy's nuclear forces instead of land-based missiles. The Strategic Missile Forces fleet should be updated by 80%.
Main nuclear shield By 2020, the country should have ten underwater strategic missile carriers of Project 955. They are equipped with ballistic missiles with fissionable Bulava warheads. At the beginning of 2014, two submarine cruisers, Yuri Dolgoruky and Alexander Nevsky, were already in service, and the third ship, Vladimir Monomakh, was undergoing commissioning tests.
The development of the Navy is one of the priorities of the rearmament program. The emphasis is still on a powerful submarine fleet. The restoration of the surface fleet is proceeding from the construction of small ships to large ones. The new generation corvette-frigate-destroyer combination should become the basis of the Navy's surface forces in six years.
The modernization of military aviation is also large-scale in its plans. By 2020, it is planned to purchase more than 1,500 aircraft of the latest types and modernize more than 400 currently in service. By 2020, Russia will have a modern army capable of performing a wide range of tasks.
New security challenges
Moscow names four main military dangers that in the future could pose a threat to the country’s security: (1) NATO expansion to the east, (2) strengthening of foreign military contingents in neighboring states, (3) destabilization of the political and strategic situation on Russia’s borders, (4) international terrorism. According to estimates of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, wars for resources may be added to this list by 2030 Central Asia and the Arctic. Military policy Russia in the Arctic provides for the creation of Arctic brigades, new nuclear icebreakers for the development of the Northern Sea Route, the creation of Arctic military bases in the Kara Sea and the formation of a special military district.
Russia does not plan to participate in conflicts in the near future. This gives her time to bring the army into a modern state. The Russian military-industrial complex is creating the latest weapons systems: strategic missiles, bottom missile systems, combat lasers, robotics, precision weapons. High-precision missiles guided through GLONASS satellites should soon form the arsenals of Russian front-line aviation. The limitation is the poor development in Russia of modern information support. Western technologies and analogues in on-board equipment in the event of a military conflict can devalue the combat effectiveness of modern military equipment.
However, Russia produces unrivaled nuclear, air and missile defense capabilities. The S-400 missile systems have a range twice as long as the American MIM-104 Patriot. The S-400 radars can track up to 100 targets simultaneously, and the speed of their missiles is 12 times the speed of sound. Russian complexes The Pantsir S-1 air defense system is one of the most effective in its class. High-precision hypersonics have no analogues ballistic missiles"Iskander-M". The newest Project 885 Yasen submarines are recognized as one of the quietest and most inconspicuous in the ocean. Russian Su-35 fighters have great capabilities. Attack helicopters"Ka-52" are one of the most powerful complexes weapons of this class in the world.
Export items
In 2013, Rosoboronexport exported military equipment by 13 billion dollars. Main Buyers Russian weapons- India, China, Vietnam, Venezuela, Indonesia, Algeria. These states account for more than 75% of exported military products. In total, Rosoboronexport cooperates with 60 countries. Russian products are traditionally in high demand. weapon, helicopters, anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), fighter aircraft, as well as Russian-made frigates and submarines.
The arms market periodically undergoes serious tests - politics and economics collide here. With military spending cut, there is fierce competition in the world. Afghanistan has to abandon the usual Mi-17 helicopters in favor of the American concern Sikorsky. The arms embargo on Iran has deprived Russia of significant revenue. The regime change and civil war in Libya also affected exports, and contracts with Syria were reduced. Nevertheless, Russia holds second place in arms supplies in the world after the United States.
Renaissance
The state's need to create and improve the Armed Forces contributes to the success of the rearmament program. The Russian military-industrial complex has high potential and preserves its heritage war machine The USSR is developing promising developments. The results of the program in 2011-2013 indicate Moscow’s readiness to bring the army and navy to a modern look by 2020.
The end of the 20s and the first half of the 30s were characterized by increased aggressiveness of reactionary imperialist circles, a rapid quantitative and qualitative increase in the armaments of the bourgeois armies, and an increase in their technical equipment. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union had to strengthen its defense capability in every possible way. Continuing to actively fight for peace and collective security, the Communist Party and the Soviet government showed tireless concern for the Armed Forces - a reliable means of curbing aggressors, preserving and strengthening the base of the world liberation movement.
As a result of intense activity during the five years after the military reform of 1924 - 1925. Solid foundations for the organization of the Soviet Army were laid, and its combat effectiveness increased. However, the technical equipment of the army of that time, reflecting the level of development of the productive forces of the Soviet Union, lagged significantly behind the armies of large imperialist states. Further increase in the defense capability of the USSR and the power of the Armed Forces was possible only on the basis of the socialist industrialization of the country and the creation of modern heavy industry. The main role in solving this problem was to be played by the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, which required the accelerated development of “...industrial sectors that increase defense capability Soviet Union" (825).
The main goal and most important content of solving military problems for the coming five years was the creation of a modern military-technical base for defense and raising the technical and combat power of the Armed Forces of the Country of the Soviets “to the level of first-class European armies” (826).
The international situation did not allow the implementation of this task to be postponed or prolonged for a long time. The party took into account that the imperialists could attack the Land of Soviets at any moment, taking advantage of its technical and economic weakness. The question was this: either the Soviet people will create a heavy industry and at the same time a strong defense industry in the shortest possible time, or the Soviet state, which was in the position of a besieged fortress, will be crushed by a new intervention of the imperialist aggressors. Therefore, the party was forced, while pursuing a policy of accelerated development of heavy industry, including defense, to maintain tension in production plans, limit the production of consumer goods, and cut the supply of scarce materials and raw materials to many factories in secondary sectors of the national economy.
The work, unparalleled in difficulty and complexity, required high organization, iron discipline, creative initiative, enormous effort and dedication. It was these qualities that the working class, led by the Communist Party, displayed. With his exploits he inspired the millions of working peasants and intelligentsia.
The first five-year plan for the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces, approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government in 1928, was developed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the headquarters of the Red Army in such a way that “the defense capability of the state would in no case lag behind the overall economic growth of the country” (827 ) .
The time had come for the technical reconstruction of the Soviet Armed Forces, which included both their transfer to a new military-technical base and the training of all personnel for the effective use of new equipment.
The development of the country's economy in the first two years of the first five-year plan showed that, thanks to the enthusiasm of the people and the use of material reserves, the target figures of the plan were significantly exceeded. This allowed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government to revise and increase many of the tasks and targets of the five-year plan for the development of the armed forces.
The first specification was made in the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated July 15, 1929 “On the state of defense of the USSR,” which proposed “increasing the pace of work to improve the equipment of the Red Army; along with the modernization of existing weapons, to achieve prototypes within the next two years, and then their introduction into the army, modern types artillery, all modern types of tanks, armored vehicles, etc.” In the field of aviation, it was considered a priority to “bring its quality as quickly as possible to the level of advanced bourgeois countries” (828). A necessary condition was the creation of our own, Soviet scientific and design personnel, especially in engine building. In the field of organizational building, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposed to continue the course of further increasing the proportion of technical troops and reducing auxiliary and service units.
During the preparation for the 16th Party Congress, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government demanded that the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR again revise the military development plan on the following basis:
a) in numbers - not to be inferior to our potential opponents in the main theater of war;
b) in terms of technology - to be stronger than the enemy in three decisive types of weapons, namely: the air fleet, artillery and tanks (829).
In June 1930, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR approved a revised plan for the construction of the Red Army. As a priority and main task, it provided for the complete rearmament of the army and navy the latest designs military equipment; based on the requirements of modern warfare, create and improve new types of troops (aviation, armored forces), special troops (chemical, engineering and others), increasing their share in the system of the country's Armed Forces; modernize old equipment; motorize and organizationally restructure the infantry, artillery, and cavalry; carry out mass training of technical personnel and master the entire army personnel new technology. In January 1931, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR approved the calendar plan for the construction of the Red Army for 1931 - 1933. This completed the development of a scientifically based military construction plan, which formed the basis for all work on the technical reconstruction of the army.
All work to implement this plan took place under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, such prominent party figures as I.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, S.M. Kirov, S.V. Kosior, A. A. Zhdanov.
At the same time, the system of leadership of the Armed Forces was improved. On July 18, 1929, the position of chief of armaments of the Red Army was established. He was entrusted with direct management of issues of technical re-equipment of troops. Until 1931, this post was held by I.P. Uborevich, then by M.N. Tukhachevsky, who was also the Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. At the same time, the Department of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army was created, headed by I. A. Khalepsky. The events carried out largely helped ensure the success of the grandiose task of technical reconstruction of the army, aviation and navy in an unprecedentedly short time, contributed to more purposeful work of central institutions, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs in developing the correct views on the creation of modern types of weapons and tactics at that time -technical requirements for them.
The five-year plan provided for equipping troops with modern small arms, especially automatic ones. Thanks to the care of the Communist Party, by the beginning of the 30s, a wonderful school of Soviet gunsmiths had formed, headed by outstanding scientists V. G. Fedorov, A. A. Blagonravov, N. M. Filatov and designers V. A. Degtyarev, F. V. Tokarev, B. G. Shpitalny and others, who developed the design theory and samples of new small arms. During the years of the First Five-Year Plan, the troops received quadruple anti-aircraft machine gun installations based on the Maxim heavy machine gun, an improved light machine gun of the Degtyarev system and tank and aviation machine guns created on its basis, which were not inferior to foreign models. In 1930, a self-loading pistol of the Tokarev system - TT - was adopted for service. As a result of the modernization of the famous Russian three-line rifle by Captain S.I. Mosin, the army received an improved rifle of the 1891/30 model. The main design efforts were aimed at reducing weight, simplifying the device, increasing the rate of fire and automating small arms fire.
Based on the plan for artillery rearmament of the Red Army, designed for five years, adopted by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, it was almost created anew industrial base for the production of guns, large design bureaus were organized, where Soviet specialists S. N. Makhanov, L. A. Magdoseev, V. N. Sidorenko, A. G. Gavrilov and others developed new types of artillery weapons: 37-mm anti-tank gun model 1930, 76-mm anti-aircraft gun model 1931, 203-mm howitzer model 1931 and 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1932 (830) To increase the firing range, maneuverability, rate of fire and explosive force of projectiles, some artillery systems have undergone modernization.
Artillery scientists V.M. Trofimov, R.A. Durlyakhov, G.A. made a great contribution to the development of domestic artillery in these years. Zabudsky, I. P. Grave, D. A. Ventzel and others.
During the first five-year plan Soviet army began to receive quite modern artillery weapons. But these first successes did not yet solve the main thing - the creation of qualitatively new types of artillery, which in their tactical and technical data would be superior to the artillery systems of capitalist countries.
In the late 20s and early 30s, based on the scientific theory of rocketry developed by K. E. Tsiolkovsky, Soviet scientists achieved significant success in the design rocket engines, missiles and missiles.
Design scientists V.A. Artemyev and N.I. Tikhomirov created such rocket-projectiles using solid fuel and carried out the first tests in 1928 (831). In 1932 a group led by B. S. Petropavlovsky designed a jet anti-tank shell caliber 65 mm. The team under the leadership of F.A. Zander created the OR-1 thermal jet engine. The Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory and the Jet Propulsion Research Group (GIRD) designed the first two Soviet liquid-fuel rockets, which were launched in August and November 1933. During repeated launches, one of them rose 1.5 km. The testing of all these missiles was extremely important. They showed that Soviet scientists are on the right path.
With the active support of G.K. Ordzhonikidze and M.N. Tukhachevsky, the Jet Research Institute was created in October 1933, where for the first time, research on the creation of rockets for space exploration was carried out on a large scale.
In 1934 - 1937 New missiles were successfully launched in the Soviet Union. One of them reached a height of 3 km, which was slightly higher than the maximum rise of American and German missiles of that time. All this allowed the outstanding Soviet scientist, future designer of space rockets S.P. Korolev to declare even then: “We are confident that in the very near future rocket flight will develop and take its rightful place in the system of socialist technology” (832).
The beginning of the 30s was characterized by rapid growth of Soviet armored vehicles. The resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR on the tank and armored armament system of the Red Army, based on the increasing role of tanks in modern warfare, set the task of creating an armored tank fleet that would have wedges, light and medium tanks, self-propelled guns, and three types of armored vehicles (light, medium, heavy) (833) . In the shortest possible time, young Soviet design teams under the leadership and with the participation of N.V. Barykov, S.A. Ginzburg, N.N. Kozyrev, I.A. Lebedev, K.N. Toskin, A.O. Firsov and others created tanks, tactical and technical data were not inferior to the corresponding foreign models, and in some characteristics even surpassed them. During 1931 - 1932 The T-27 tankette and light tank T-26. Samples of the high-speed wheeled-tracked tank BT, medium tanks T-28 and T-24, and heavy tank T-35 with a maximum armor thickness of 30 mm were developed.
However, mass production of domestic tanks was not established immediately. In 1929, the tank production plan was fulfilled only by 20 percent, in the first quarter of 1930 by 65 percent, and in the second and third quarters by only 20 percent (834). The reasons for this are an acute shortage of qualified personnel, poor supply of tank production with high-grade steels, tools, ignition devices, delays in specialization and cooperation between the automotive and tractor industry and tank building. The year 1931 became a turning point in the work of the tank industry. During the years of the first five-year plan, the tank industry produced 3949 tanks and wedges, of which 3039 were produced in 1932 (835). Significant disadvantages of armor tank weapons were the diversity of combat vehicles, the large proportion of wedges and light tanks, relatively weak firepower and insufficient armor protection. The rapid development of tank technology in the main capitalist countries required the creation of new, more advanced types of tanks in the USSR.
The newly created aviation industry has already achieved significant success during the years of the first five-year plan. Considering the increased role of aviation in modern warfare, the Communist Party and the Soviet government paid exclusive attention to issues of aircraft and engine construction, training of design and engineering personnel. A major role in this was played by the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), the Central Institute of Aviation Engine Engineering (CIAM), and the Main Directorate of Aviation Industry, headed by P. I. Baranov. The founders of the advanced Soviet school of aircraft and engine building were students of H. E. Zhukovsky, talented scientists B. S. Stechkin, V. P. Vetchinkin, B. N. Yuryev and outstanding designers D. P. Grigorovich, S. B. Ilyushin, S. A. Kochergin, V. M. Petlyakov, N. N. Polikarpov, A. N. Tupolev, A. A. Mikulin, V. Ya. Klimov, S. K. Tumansky, A. D. Shvetsov and other.
In January 1930, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR approved a program for the creation various types airplanes, balloons and airships, with the main focus on bomber and fighter aircraft.
Carrying out tasks of the party and government, Soviet scientists and aircraft designers quickly developed various types of bomber, fighter, attack and reconnaissance aircraft. The heavy bomber TB-3 designed by A. N. Tupolev, the I-5 fighter and attack aircraft TSh-2 by D. P. Grigorovich, and the light bomber P-5 by H. N. Polikarpov were adopted for service. In 1933, Polikarpov created the I-15 fighter with greater maneuverability and high speed; in 1935 the aircraft received a prize at the Milan exhibition. The long-range reconnaissance aircraft MDR-2, flying boats MBR-2 and MTB-2 were built for the navy.
During the years of the first five-year plan, the number of fighters in the Air Force increased more than 3 times, and heavy bombers - almost 8 times. If in 1929 reconnaissance aircraft accounted for about 82 percent of combat vehicles, then in 1932 reconnaissance aircraft accounted for only 30 percent, but bombers and attack aircraft - 45, and fighters - 25 percent (836).
The Air Force was almost entirely provided with domestic equipment. By the end of 1932 96 percent of fighters and 97 percent of heavy bombers were built at domestic enterprises. This made it possible in subsequent years to abandon the import of aircraft equipment. By the beginning of the second Five-Year Plan, the Soviet defense industry had 6 large aircraft and 4 engine factories, the capacity of which could be doubled in wartime (837).
In general, during the years of the first five-year plan, the production of aircraft increased by 2.7 times, and engines by 6 times compared to 1928, and the technical level of Soviet aviation in a number of indicators came significantly closer to foreign ones. At the same time, a number of important tasks in the field of aviation required further solutions. The level of domestic aviation engine production did not allow in those years to achieve high flight-tactical characteristics (in terms of speed and altitude). There were no examples of attack aircraft needed to support ground troops on the battlefield. Hard work lay ahead to create all types of aviation and increase its speed, flight altitude and range (838).
The deployment of the defense industry made it possible to begin equipping the army with new engineering equipment, chemical protection equipment, radio equipment and linear communication devices. In 1934 engineer P.K. Oshchepkov created the first experimental installations for radio detection of aircraft in the air. This marked the beginning of the development of domestic radar technology.
An important result of the introduction of new technology was the increased level of mechanization and motorization of the Soviet troops. If in 1929 there was an average of 2.6 (mechanical) horsepower per Red Army soldier, then in 1932 it was 6.5.
Much work was done to strengthen the Navy. As a result of the successful implementation of the first shipbuilding program (1926 - 1928), the naval strength of the Navy was almost completely restored.
In February 1929, the second shipbuilding program was developed (1928 - 1933), clarified by decisions of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council of June 13 and December 23, 1930, which provided for: completion and repair of 3 battleships, 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers; build 2 destroyers, 6 submarines, 3 patrol ships and 36 torpedo boats; begin construction of 28 submarines, 6 destroyers, 18 patrol ships, 60 torpedo boats, 10 minesweepers. In the development of the Soviet Naval Forces, the task was set to correctly combine the surface and submarine fleet, coastal, mine-positional defense and naval aviation, based on the nature of future combat operations and the availability of naval theaters. In 1930, serial construction of patrol ships and torpedo boats began for the first time. The next year, the first domestically designed submarines of the “D” type appeared, and from 1933, submarines of the “L” and “Shch” types began to enter service. Outstanding scientists and shipbuilders A. N. Krylov, P. F. Papkovich, V. L. Pozdyunin, V. F. Popov, V. P. Kostenko, B. M. Malinin, Yu. A made a great contribution to the development of Soviet shipbuilding Shimansky, A. P. Shershov, N. V. Isachenkov, V. G. Vlasov and others.
The level of domestic shipbuilding did not yet allow the development of the fleet on such a scale and pace as required by the security interests of the USSR. The party and government took measures to create new centers of the shipbuilding industry - in the North, South and Far East. In 1932, the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur was founded, which was assigned a large role in the development of domestic shipbuilding.
In 1932, by decision of the party and government, the construction of the Pacific Military Fleet began to protect the maritime borders of the Far East. In 1933, the Northern Military Flotilla was created. The construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, an inland waterway that connected the two seas, played a huge role in this. The Dnieper, Caspian, and Amur military flotillas grew in number. Much work was carried out to expand and improve the fleet's coastal bases. To protect the sea coast, the construction of 14 maritime fortified areas was completed, 12 air defense divisions were formed, etc.
In connection with the increasing danger of an attack by imperialist states on the USSR in 1931 - 1932. The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government obliged the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR to strengthen the western and eastern borders. In a short time, a strip of border fortified areas was created from Lake Ladoga to the Black Sea, and extensive work was carried out to strengthen land and maritime boundaries in the Far East. In the most threatened areas, a system of platoon and company defense areas was created, where long-term firing points were combined with field engineering fortifications. “In 1932,” Pravda wrote, “when there was a threat of attack on the Far Eastern Territory (DVK) Ed.) became especially real, the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government were forced to rebuild industry and put it in the service of the country's defense. And in a short time a powerful support was created on the remote Far Eastern borders. The foresight and iron will of the Central Committee saved us from intervention” (839).
These are the main directions and results of the party’s activities in the technical re-equipment of the army, aviation and navy during the years of the first five-year plan. Despite the exceptional difficulties associated with the novelty, the enormous scale of the tasks, and the need for accelerated tempo, the plans outlined by the party and government were successfully implemented. This required a lot of resources from the state and strained the efforts of workers in socialist industry and the military apparatus. In 1932, expenses for technical equipment of the Red Army increased more than 10 times compared to 1927 - 1928. (840) .
The technical re-equipment of the army and the development of methods of conducting armed struggle led to a change in the organizational structure of the country's Armed Forces.
In light of the decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR pursued the creation of powerful ground, air and military forces equipped with modern military equipment. naval forces. The party warned military personnel against overestimating the old branches of the military, as well as against being carried away by the theories of small mechanized armies, which were preached by some bourgeois military theorists.
Changes in the organization of ground forces consisted mainly in increasing the proportion of artillery and armor tank troops. In order to increase the fire and technical power of the rifle troops, their ability to successfully conduct offensive and defensive actions, units of armored forces, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery were included in the combined arms formations; cavalry formations include separate mechanized divisions and regiments, anti-aircraft and chemical units.
A great achievement was the creation of battalion anti-tank artillery, as well as the growth of divisional and corps artillery. The number of reserve artillery units of the High Command (RGK) has almost tripled.
Until 1929 - 1930. Soviet armored vehicles were in their infancy; they were based on armored cars and armored trains. By the end of the first five-year plan in ground forces The process of registration of a new type of troops - armored and mechanized - was completed.
Soviet military thought promptly determined the significance and prospects of this type of troops in modern warfare. On July 17, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted a resolution on the creation of an experimental mechanized unit. It said: “Taking into account that the new type of weapon, which is armored forces, has not been sufficiently studied both in the sense of its tactical use (for independent use and in conjunction with infantry and cavalry), and in the sense of the most advantageous organizational forms, it is necessary to recognize the need to organize 1929 - 1930 a permanent experimental mechanized unit" (841). At the end of 1929, an experienced mechanized regiment was formed (consisting of a tank battalion, an artillery battery, an armored vehicle division and a motorized rifle battalion), and in 1930, on its basis, the first mechanized brigade was formed, the next year the second mechanized brigade was formed. In 1932, in addition to these brigades, for the first time in the world, two mechanized corps were created. These were independent operational units. Each corps included two mechanized and one rifle and machine-gun brigades (500 tanks and more than 200 armored vehicles).
In 1929 - 1933 In the Soviet Army, regulations and instructions appeared that set out the basics of the use and actions of armored and mechanized forces. Motorized troops were turning into serious fighting strength. Their organizational structure correctly took into account the possibilities combat use and the conditions of modern warfare. People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs K.E. Voroshilov at the plenum of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in October 1932, noting that the adopted structure of motorized and mechanized forces most fully meets the interests and tasks of defense, said: “Independent tank and motorized units, along with This means infantry and artillery, reinforced with tanks and engines, is truly the only correct organizational form of using a tank and engine in the interests of state defense” (842). In December 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR issued a decree on the deployment of airborne detachments, which marked the beginning of the creation of airborne troops.
Important measures were taken to improve the organization of the country's air defense. In 1932, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, all management of the country's air defense system was entrusted to the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, within which the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army was established. Air defense departments were created in military districts. Air defense divisions and regiments were reorganized, the number of separate anti-aircraft divisions and anti-aircraft batteries of coastal artillery, technical air defense systems have been strengthened.
The resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated March 23, 1932 “On the fundamentals of the organization of the Air Force of the Red Army” set out new strategic and operational-tactical views on the organizational development and combat use of the Air Force in the event of an attack on our country (843).
The Air Force began to transform from a branch of the military into a branch of the armed forces. Already in 1929, a transition was made to brigades of fighter, attack, light and heavy bomber aircraft. In 1933, heavy bomber air brigades were united into corps capable of independently solving operational problems.
The share of artillery, aviation, and armored forces as a whole during the first five-year plan rose from 20 to 35 percent (844). The proportion of infantry and cavalry decreased, but their firepower and combat capabilities increased.
During the technical reconstruction and organizational restructuring of the Soviet Army, the Central Committee of the Party and the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR had to overcome the conservatism that had taken place, the underestimation of the importance of new military equipment, in particular tanks, and the exaggeration of the role of cavalry in modern warfare, the fetishization of the experience of the civil war of 1918 - 1920.
Marshal of the Soviet Union M. N. Tukhachevsky wrote about this: “First of all, we had to face the theory of the “special” maneuverability of the Red Army - a theory based not on the study and accounting of new weapons both in the hands of our possible enemies and in the hands of the Soviet fighter, but on alone only the lessons of the civil war, in views more inspired by the heroism of the civil war than justified by the growth of the power of culture, the growth of large-scale industry of the socialist state, as well as the growth of armaments of the armies of our possible opponents from the capitalist camp” (845).
Taking into account the changes that were taking place in military affairs, armament and the organization of bourgeois armies, the Central Committee of the Party corrected mistakes and blunders in military development, and pursued a line towards a harmonious combination and development of the military branches and branches of the armed forces.
Equipping the army and navy with new military equipment, changes in their organization, the creation of new branches of the military, and the increasing complexity of command and control required improvements in the training of military personnel. The enormous work that unfolded in this area was carried out on the basis of party decisions, in particular the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of February 25, 1929 “On the command and political composition of the Red Army,” which stated that when training command personnel in organic unity, they should two tasks are to be solved: the continuous increase in military and military-technical knowledge and the improvement of skills in organizing party political work. The need to increase the worker and party layer among command cadres was emphasized, especially in the artillery, special technical troops, the navy and headquarters. The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 5, 1931 stated: “The Central Committee considers the main, decisive task now in further increasing the combat capability of the army to be a decisive increase in the military-technical knowledge of command personnel, their mastery of combat equipment and complex forms of modern combat. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Union, the entire command staff and party organization of the army should now focus their main attention and forces on the most rapid and successful resolution of this task. The military-technical improvement of the commander should become the most important link in the work of the entire command staff and all army organizations" (846). The same resolution noted that as a result of the implementation of the previous resolution by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, significant successes had been achieved in strengthening the cadres of the commanding staff: the party and worker stratum had grown, cohesion had strengthened, and the influence of the party on non-party people had increased.
The party's governing documents provided a solid organizational basis for the process of further personnel training and gave it the necessary logical consistency. Military educational institutions were to become the leading centers in combat and political training, mastery of technology, military scientific work and providing the army with highly qualified personnel.
The previously established and proven system of military training received greater clarity and scope. Senior commanding officers were trained in military academies, middle ones in military schools and colleges, junior ones in regimental schools attached to units and in special schools for technical specialists. Improvement and retraining courses were maintained.
With the active assistance of political agencies and party organizations, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR carried out a great deal of work to improve the quality of command personnel. Experienced, worthy communist commanders were nominated for positions as commanders of formations, units and subunits.
In 1932, by order of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, planned regular Marxist-Leninist training of command and control personnel was introduced in all military units. Works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, solutions Communist Party, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army began to be systematically studied by all commanders and political workers.
Military training of commanding officers and political personnel began to be systematically carried out, the main place in which was given to the development of weapons and military equipment with the passing of a mandatory technical minimum. Along with this, most of the command personnel underwent retraining at short-term courses.
The Central Committee of the Party carried out important measures aimed at improving the work of military educational institutions. In military schools and academies, the teaching staff was strengthened, military educational institutions were supplied with new military equipment, and the quality of cadets and students was improved. In 1931, evening and correspondence faculties were created at the academies, which played a large role in the retraining of command and control personnel in the troops. The number of military academies increased one and a half times (from 7 in 1928 to 10 in 1932), and the number of students increased five times (from 3,198 people in 1928 to 16,550 in 1932) (847). The network of tank, artillery, aviation, engineering and other military schools that trained average command, political and technical personnel expanded significantly. The total number of military schools increased from 48 to 73. In 1930 - 1932. there were 18 ten-month advanced training courses for command personnel; 73 percent of students in these courses were retrained from combined arms and cavalry commanders to commanders of technical troops (848). The level of military education of command personnel has increased sharply. By the beginning of 1934, 48.2 percent of senior and 78.9 percent of senior command personnel had graduated from academies and advanced training courses; 42.7 percent of senior and 81.4 percent of middle command personnel are normal military schools (849).
The importance of party political work in the army has increased. In connection with the task of mastering new technology, it was necessary to expand and improve the training of political personnel. In 1931 - 1932 part of the military-political courses was transformed into military-political schools with a two-year period of study. Improvement courses for political personnel were also created (850). Compared to 1928, the number of students at the Military-Political Academy has quadrupled. In the early 30s, the Party Central Committee sent political work There are several thousand experienced party workers in the army and navy.
Military equipment, no matter how perfect it is, becomes a formidable and effective weapon only in the hands of people who have mastered it. That is why the primary task of training and educating the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy became the mastery of new equipment and weapons.
The slogan put forward by the party in those years was “The Bolsheviks must master technology!” was the focus of attention of commanders, political agencies and party organizations. Socialist industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution that unfolded in the country changed the social appearance of the working class and peasantry. Millions of Soviet people, not only cities, but also villages, became conscious and active participants in the construction of socialism. Qualified personnel of workers and technicians, tractor drivers, combine operators, drivers and other specialists grew rapidly. The ranks of the Soviet intelligentsia multiplied. Has increased sharply and general culture Soviet people. Thanks to this, the army and navy received more and more technically competent replenishment every year.
The Communist Party called on all Soviet soldiers to master new technology more successfully. The greeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Soviet Army said:
“Through the efforts of the proletarians and workers of the Soviet Union, a powerful socialist industry was created in the USSR - the basis of the defense capability of the USSR. The proletarians are arming the Red Army with powerful new military equipment.
Your job, comrades, is to master this technology, to learn to perfectly control and operate those newest machines and tools that were created by the hands of the working people of the USSR (851).
Political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations The armies mobilized all their forces to carry out the instructions of the Communist Party. A struggle began among the troops for excellent mastery of new equipment and weapons.
A major role in the successful solution of this task was played by the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated May 14, 1932 “On the mastery of technology and technical propaganda.” The order stated that equipping troops with a large amount of new equipment and more advanced types of weapons obliges all personnel to master the new equipment to perfection, organize careful care for it, and eliminate accidents and malfunctions of mechanisms and machines. In this regard, the Revolutionary Military Council proposed developing a network of military-technical circles, courses for private and junior command personnel, seminars and courses for commanding officers (852).
An important means of mobilizing personnel to master new equipment was military-technical propaganda, which was widely spread on the pages of the army press, with the help of cinema, and radio. It complemented and deepened the knowledge acquired by personnel during combat training.
Already in 1933, there were 5 thousand military-technical circles in the army and navy, which became a mass form of increasing military-technical knowledge. In 1932, about 80 percent of the soldiers studied in clubs and courses in the Belarusian Military District. In the formations of the Baltic Fleet in the second half of 1932 alone, 900 lectures and reports were given, 250 “battles” and 75 competitions for the best knowledge of equipment and weapons were organized (853). In 1932, 182 thousand rationalization proposals and applications for technical inventions were received from soldiers, commanders, political workers and entire army teams, and in 1933 - 152 thousand; many of them were successfully implemented.
The Communist Party paid great attention development of mass defense and sports work in the country. On February 23, 1932, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on Osoaviakhim, demanding a decisive improvement in its activities. The governing bodies of Osoaviakhim were asked to concentrate their efforts on mass defense work among workers, especially young people, training them in the use of weapons and actions in air defense.
The growing political and labor activity of the broad masses had a beneficial effect on strengthening the country's defense and the combat power of the Armed Forces. Trade unions, factory and local committees took an active part in this matter, which systematically discussed issues of mass defense work at their meetings and brought them to general meetings of workers and employees. Trade unions provided great help organizations of Osoaviakhim in the training of “Voroshilov shooters”. Many plants, factories, and institutions competed for exemplary organization of mass defense work and the best patronage of army and navy units. Hundreds of aircraft, dozens of tanks and other technical equipment were built in those years with money raised by workers.
The Komsomol was an active assistant to the party in strengthening the country's defense. Patronizing the navy and air fleet, he sent his best students there. The IX Komsomol Congress (January 1931) instructed the Komsomol Central Committee to ensure broad participation of Komsomol members in strengthening the country's defense capability. “The Congress considers it impossible,” it was stated in its decisions, “for people who underestimate the military danger, who do not undergo military training, and who do not prepare themselves for the impending battles to remain in the ranks of the Komsomol” (854). Carrying out the decisions of the congress, the Komsomol put forward the task of training 150 thousand pilots (855) for the Soviet air fleet in the next two years.
The implementation of the first five-year plan for the construction of the Red Army outlined by the party and government was associated with overcoming considerable difficulties caused by the grandeur and tension of national economic plans, the simultaneity of the process of technical restructuring of industry and Agriculture with the task of technical reconstruction of the army and navy, the need to provide a new technical base for the country’s defense in an extremely short time. The Communist Party successfully coped with these tasks because its scientifically based policy and practical activities to strengthen the defense of the USSR and the power of the Armed Forces enjoyed the full support of the working class, all working people of the USSR.
Thanks to the dedication of the working masses of the USSR, workers in the defense industry, and the military apparatus led by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the first five-year plan for the construction of the Red Army was fulfilled. This meant that the technical reconstruction of the army unfolded on a broad front.
Of course, these grandiose tasks could not be solved in one five-year period. On June 8, 1932, People's Commissar of Military Affairs K.E. Voroshilov, in a report to the government “On the main points of the construction plan of the Red Army in the second five-year plan,” summing up the results of the first five-year plan, noted the insufficient mechanization of the army, the lack of mechanized traction in the artillery and the necessary reserve of equipment and ammunition, insufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles for the development of continuous and deep operations (856).
The increasingly aggravated international situation required further strengthening of the Armed Forces. The second five-year plan for the development of the national economy, approved by the XVII Congress, provided for the transformation of the USSR into an economically independent and technically advanced state in Europe, the further development of the defense industry and the completion of the technical reconstruction of the Armed Forces on this basis.
Taking into account the international situation and the expected changes in the country's economy, the military development plan for the next five-year period provided for, by the end of it, to have an army that, in the event of imperialist aggression, operating simultaneously on several fronts, would be able to inflict truly crushing blows on the armies of the imperialist states (857 ) . This goal determined the nature and content of the second five-year plan for the construction of the Red Army for 1933 - 1938, being developed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR.
In June 1933, the Council of Labor and Defense adopted a resolution “On the naval construction program for 1933 - 1938”; in August of the same year - “On the tank weapons system of the Red Army for the second five-year plan”; in March 1934 - “On the artillery armament system of the Red Army for the second five-year plan”; in April 1935, the development plan for the Air Force for 1935 - 1937 was approved.
The following tasks were planned for the further technical reconstruction of the Armed Forces for the second five-year plan:
The most widespread introduction of mechanization in the Red Army; achieving a rate of mechanization of the army that would allow armored and mechanized forces to become one of the main, decisive elements in combat operations; the creation of new large mechanized formations - corps and separate brigades, the saturation of rifle troops with tanks, the elimination of the diversity of combat vehicles, the design and introduction of new, more advanced types of tanks, increasing the proportion of medium and heavy vehicles;
An increase in aviation threefold, the accelerated development of heavy bomber aircraft and the re-equipment of fighter aircraft with more modern models, the introduction of qualitatively better types of aircraft and engines; transformation of the Air Force into a powerful branch of the armed forces, solving independent operational tasks and fully ensuring close interaction with the ground forces and navy;
Modernization of existing and creation of new, more advanced artillery systems, mainly anti-aircraft, anti-tank, high-power artillery and its transfer to mechanical traction, increasing the power of military artillery;
Motorization and reorganization of rifle troops in order to strengthen their operational-tactical mobility and flexibility on the basis of new equipment and establish the most correct ratio of manpower and technical means of armed warfare, increasing the combat value of rifle troops by strengthening them with artillery, introducing mechanized regiments and tank battalions;
Further development of communications, provision of radio stations for all types of troops up to a company, squadron, battery, aircraft, tank inclusive; increase in engineering facilities to ensure the rapid construction of bridges, roads, and defensive structures;
Creation of a powerful submarine fleet, construction on Pacific Ocean, Black, Baltic, Barents and White Seas series coastal batteries for the defense of major naval bases.
The completion of technical reconstruction and the re-equipment of all types and branches of troops with new military equipment was supposed to create the superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the capitalist armies in the decisive means of armed struggle - artillery, tanks, aviation (858).
General results of the hard work of the Communist Party and the entire Soviet people in 1929 - 1935. on the technical reconstruction of the Soviet Army and Navy are shown in Table 13.
Table 13 Growth of weapons and military equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1928 - 1935 (859)
|
Types of weapons and military equipment |
In service (pieces) |
||
|
Rifles (thousands) |
1596 8811 24230 6645 92 None 7 52 1050 301 1394 |
2292 22553 33118 10684 1053 348 213 46 5669 1387 3285 |
3050 83922 53492 13837 7633 2547 464 42 35303 5550 6672 |
|
Heavy machine guns |
|||
|
Guns (76 mm and above) |
|||
|
Tanks (mostly light) |
|||
|
Armored vehicles |
|||
|
Cars |
|||
|
Aircraft |
|||
During the second five-year plan, the proportion of personnel divisions grew steadily. In 1932, the Soviet Army had 44 percent territorial and 56 percent cadre rifle divisions. This ratio no longer met the requirements of the army's combat readiness due to the increased military danger. By the end of 1935, on the initiative of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, this ratio was changed. The Red Army now has 65 percent of personnel and 35 percent of territorial rifle divisions (860). The size of the army increased from 617 thousand people in 1928 to 930 thousand in 1935. The number of ships in the USSR Navy also increased. The number of battleships, cruisers and destroyers remained almost the same, but submarines became 103 instead of 14, and torpedo boats - 205 instead of 50.
Technical reconstruction naturally led to a serious change in the ratio of types of armed forces, as evidenced by the following table.
Table 14. Change in the ratio of types of armed forces (861)
|
Types of armed forces |
Specific gravity (percentage) |
||
|
Ground troops |
|||
|
Air Force |
|||
The differentiation and technical saturation of the army was even more clearly manifested within the branches of the armed forces.
The ratio of types of aviation in the ground forces changed in favor of bomber and attack aircraft. If in 1932 heavy, light bomber and attack aircraft made up 45 percent of all aviation, then already in 1935 this figure was 51 percent. The share of reconnaissance aircraft decreased to 19 percent (862). Long-range aviation, heavy and medium bomber aircraft, especially increased, which indicated an increase in the capabilities of the Soviet air forces in delivering a retaliatory strike against aggressors. In the ground forces, new types of troops appeared and took a significant place - armored, chemical, air defense, airborne, displacing the old ones - rifle troops, cavalry and others, which in turn themselves became technically better equipped, mechanized and motorized.
While continuing to improve the organizational structure of the troops, the Communist Party took measures to strengthen the central and district military command apparatus. On June 20, 1934, by resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Revolutionary Military Council was abolished, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR, headed by K. E. Voroshilov, and M. N. Tukhachevsky became his deputy.
On November 22, 1934, the Military Council was established as an advisory body under the People's Commissar of Defense. In 1935, the headquarters of the Red Army, due to a significant increase in its role, was transformed into the General Staff. A.I. Egorov became the first Chief of the General Staff. The structure of the central and district military apparatus was fixed by the Regulations on the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, which was established on November 22, 1934. approved by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. All these changes contributed to raising the level of leadership of the Armed Forces. A striking manifestation of the Communist Party's concern for strengthening the army and navy was the introduction in September 1935 of personal military ranks (from lieutenant to Marshal of the Soviet Union) (863).
The Soviet Army was strong not only in technology, but also in the high political consciousness of its personnel, and the selfless devotion of soldiers and commanders to the socialist Motherland.
The years of the Second Five-Year Plan are characterized by a particularly large scope of political and educational work.
In 1934 - 1935 In the army, only in the system of the grassroots party education network, there were 2,140 history circles of the CPSU (b), 2,800 current politics circles, 7,425 Komsomol and 2,144 candidate schools. Thousands of political, general education, technical, sports and other circles worked in military units. In the first half of 1935 alone, 74 thousand reports and lectures were given in Red Army clubs and Red Army Houses, attended by 2 million people. To improve the theoretical training of party and Komsomol activists, divisional party schools were organized, covering 20 thousand people. Political classes and political information sessions were held regularly. Evening colleges operated in large garrisons.
Every year the Soviet government increased allocations for cultural and educational work in the troops: if in 1929 - 1930. 8.3 million rubles were allocated for these needs, then in 1934 - 72 million rubles. Political agencies and party organizations were given the necessary material opportunities to organize the political and cultural education of their personnel. On January 1, 1934, the troops had over 15 thousand Lenin corners, 1336 clubs, 142 Red Army Houses.
The growth of technical means of party-political and cultural-educational work is also indicative. In 1930, the units had 240 radio centers, 800 radio mobiles, 534 cinema mobiles, 945 film installations, 8 sound film installations, and in 1933 - 1366 radio nodes, 4800 radio mobiles, 3425 cinema mobiles, 1540 cinema installations, 327 sound cinema installations and cinema mobiles (864).
Amateur artistic activities have reached great scale. If in 1934 the troops had 3,500 groups and amateur art groups (50 thousand people participated in them), then in 1935 there were more than 10 thousand (they included 200 thousand participants).
The Communist Party constantly took care of the military periodicals. In 1936, 17 military magazines were published: “Red Army Soldier and Red Navy Man”, “Red Army Communist”, “Red Army Propagandist”, “Red Army Cultural Worker”, “Red Army Print”, magazines of branches and branches of troops and others. The troops published 15 district newspapers, more than 2,100 large-circulation newspapers.
The increased danger of aggression against the Soviet state forced an increase in the size of the Armed Forces and a widespread deployment of their technical reconstruction, which required additional military appropriations. In 1934, the People's Commissariat of Defense spent 5.8 billion rubles. However, this amount amounted to only 11.9 percent of the national budget, while Japan's military budget was 46.5 (865).
By the mid-30s, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union fully corresponded to the level of economic development of our country and the tasks of its defense. Along with improving the Armed Forces, much attention was paid to strengthening both land and sea borders in the Far East, Baltic and Black Seas. By the beginning of 1935, the length of defensive structures on our borders had increased 240 times compared to 1928 (866). The technical equipment of the army continued to grow, and its organizational structure improved. By the end of 1935, the Soviet Army had quite significant forces for those times: 86 rifle and 19 cavalry divisions, 4 mechanized corps, 14 mechanized brigades, 22 artillery regiments of the RGK, 5 air corps directorates, 19 air brigades, 2 divisions and 4 air defense brigades (867 ) .
Much still had to be done, but by the mid-1930s the army of the socialist country had become generally capable of not only reliably ensuring the state interests of the Soviet Union, but also, if necessary, providing effective assistance the peoples and governments of other countries vitally interested in curbing the growing imperialist aggression. The Army of the Country of Soviets increasingly became an important international factor, the hope of all progressive humanity in its struggle to prevent a new world war.
Based on the successes of socialist construction and the strengthening of the country's defense capability, Soviet foreign policy fought more and more persistently and decisively to organize a real collective resistance to the insolent aggressors.
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