From the first day of the war, the mechanized corps were involved in fierce battles with German troops. They did not have to break through the defense of the enemy, to enter the breakthrough and act in the depths of the rear, as provided for by the prevailing plans. The main type of their combat activity was the application of confrudars on the opposite strikes of the enemy, which in itself was considered unlikely before the war.
In the first days of war combat activities Mechano Pooh was determined by order People's Commissar Defense of the USSR №3, given at 22.07 June 22, 1941 he said:
"1. The enemy, inflicting the main blows from the Svalk-Skogo protrusion on Olita and from the area of \u200b\u200bthe Zancy at the front of Vladimir-Volynsky, Radzekhov, auxiliary blows in the directions of Tilzit, Shauliai and Sidlitz, Volkovysk during June 22, Large Losses, achieved small successes in these directions ... 2. I order:
a) the aries of the Northern Front continue to continue the durable cover of the state border, the border on the left is the former;
b) Arms of the North-West Front, firmly holding the coast Baltic Sea, to apply powerful counterdard from the Kaunas district to the flank and rear of the Suvalkaya group of the enemy, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and to take place on June 24 to master the area of \u200b\u200bthe Suwalki, the border on the left is the former;
c) the armies of the Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction, to apply powerful counter-powered counterparts of at least two pieces and airborne aircraft to the flank and rear of the Suvalkskaya group of the enemy, destroy it together with the Northwestern Front and to exit June 24 to master the rider of Suwalki ...
d) the armies of the South-Western Front, which firmly holding the state border with Hungary, concentric blows in the general direction to Lublin forces 5 and 6 of the army, at least 5 pieces, and the whole of the front aircraft to surround and destroy the enemy grouping, coming on the front of Vladimir-Volynsky, The roonstol, to the outcome on June 24 to master the District of Lublin, firmly secure himself from Krakow direction;
e) the armies of the South Front prevent the invasion of the enemy to our territory; When attempting the enemy to strike in the Chernivtsiy direction or forcing the rivers Prut and Danube with powerful flanking strikes of ground troops in collaboration with aviation to destroy it with two carcups on the night of June 23 to focus in the district of Chisinau and forests of the North-west Chisinau. "
This directive of NGOs reflected the desired rather than the real position of things at the front. Head of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, who was at this time at the headquarters of the UZF, did not participate in its preparation and in telephone conversation With his deputy Vatutin, I noticed: "But we still don't know exactly where the enemy strikes his blows. It is not better to figure out what happens on the front, and then take the right solution"However, the question was already resolved by Stalin and Tymoshenko.
Of great success in these battles did not succeed, but to slow down the promotion of enemy troops in the directions of the main blows, they managed, albeit at the cost of huge losses. In the first weeks of the war, the carplowes lost almost all the tanks, most of the personnel - the result of this was the decision of the AGK rate of July 15, 1941, which provided for the abolition of the mechanical support. Tank divisions were transferred to the subordination of the commanders of the armies, the motorized was reorganized into small.
Tankists choose a place to cross. Commander of the Floating Tanks of Cove Art. Lieutenant Gunnikov and commander of the car Pokhalzin.
BT-7 sample 1937. 7th MK MVO on the exercises in October 1940
Northwest Front
The total troops of the Baltic Military District on the eve of the war included the 3rd and 12th mechorts. The nomination to the border of the 12th Mechkorpus began by order of the commander district Mr. F.I. Kuznetsova on June 18. After the start of hostilities, the Commands of the Mechkorpus received the order of the Commander of the front about the applied of the counterpart for the enemy's broken grouping: "12-MEHCORU-SU - eliminate the 23rd TD of the enemy's tanks in the attacks, the main forces of the body to deploy at the front of the Telta - Festus and the rear of the enemy, breaking through the Taurogens, the 3rd Mehkorpus, leaving the 5th TD at the disposal of the commander of the 11th Army, the 2nd TD and the 84th MD on the night of June 23 to go out in advance in the path of movement area Rosieni to strike Interaction of the 12th MK with the 9th Artbrigada PTO on the enemy. " The 12th Corps and Part of the 10th Rifle Corps from the Jarnya region, Ultrasound and the 2nd Tank Division of the 3rd MK together with the 48th rifle division from the Keidanyai district, I should consider the converging directions on the Scudville to defeat the Tilzite Grinding the Germans. But, as a result bad organization and collateral, Consturdar, June 23-24, was reduced to hasty, not agreed at the place and time actions.
The Commander of the ABTV SFF P.P. Polyuboyarova described these events so:
"The nomination of troops for the counterdard took place in conditions when the divisions of the first echelon of the 8th Army were leaving under the opponent's onslaught ... Division of the 12th mechancroud still, when nominated on the starting line, was subjected to strong exposure Aviation enemy. In the area of \u200b\u200bthe fried, an unexpected collision of parts of the 23rd occurred tank Division With an opponent. The enemy was able to cut off from the battle units of the rear of its 46th tank shelf. Nevertheless, the shelves of this division were still able to focus on the counterpart in the Laukuv region. As for the 28th tank division, its parts reached the planned areas late for three hours. Part of her forces turned out to be a reflection of the enemy's tank attacks in the Kelme district. Here, fierce battles with an opponent led and the 202nd MD Corps. The beginning of the counterdard had to shift sodium hours. The actions of the 12th Mechkorpus were practically poured into a counter battle without proper training. "
The 2nd Tank Division of the 3rd MK, together with the parts of the 48th and 125th rifle divisions, counterattacked the enemy in the morning of June 23rd, but also its actions of territorial success did not bring. On June 24, a fierce counter deployed in the direction of Construar tank Battle. At the front of about 60 km and to a depth of 25 km in battles on both sides, up to 1000 tanks participated at the same time. By evening, the 2nd tank division was surrounded by German troops and was crushed on June 26.
On the eve of the war: BT-7 Leno at the May Day parade of 1941. The May Blizzard was then perceived as a bad sign ...
BT-5 and BT-7 on the exercises before the war.
On June 27, the headquarters of the 12th mekorpus was defeated. Comkor N.M. Shestopalov captured (instead of it with 1.07 commander of the 12th building appointed P-K V.Y. Grinberg). On July 4, the hull is displayed in the front reserve.
But the view from the other side is the head of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Halder:
"Army Army Troops Almost all of the front (except for the 291st infantry DivisionComing to Liba-Wu, reflected the tank counterattacks of the enemy, which, presumably, led the 3rd Russian tank corps with the support of several motor-mechanized brigades. Despite this, the enhanced right wing of the Army Group managed to move to Wiilcomira (Ukmerge). In this section of the front, the Russians are also fighting hard and fiercely "(recording of June 24). June 25, Galder makes the next record: "It is clear only that only the 3rd tank corps of the enemy, from the very beginning, which was in the area, divided by the Tank Corps of the Reanardt and that the Tank Corps of Manstein advanced to the east, which forced the Russians to start a departure for the Western Dvina. The enemy is organized by moving, covering the waste with tank connections. " The results were insignificant, and the losses in tanks are great. Only the 12th Fur Corps by June 29 lost up to 80% of the match. Already from June 25, the mechanicalpus has been managorgard fights with separate parts, covering the waste of the 8th, 11th and 27th Army SFF.
As a result of a breakthrough of the 4th tank group, the SFF troops was opened in the divergent directions - the 8th Army in Riga, the 11th on Polotsk, and the road to Daugavpils and to crossroads through Western Dvina turned out to be open. In the morning on the morning of June 26, the 8th Tank Division of the 56th MK of Manstein approached Dow Gavpeilsu. To eliminate a breakthrough from MVO, the 21st Mr. Mr. D. L. Luheshenko, who received an order to cover the Daugav-Pilssian direction, and part of the forces to destroy the enemy's troops in the Rezekne region. In the morning of June 28, the compounds of the 21st MK, which had only 98 tons
cove, switched to the offensive. The result of three-day fights was the stop of a German offensive until July 2, right up to the approach of the main forces of the German 4th Tank Brigade. The commander of the 56th motorized housing of Manstein in his memoirs described these events as possible: "As it was possible to foresee, the enemy pulled out fresh strength and not only from Pskov, but also from Minsk and Moscow. Soon we had to defend themselves on the northern shore of the enemy, Supported by one tank division. In some areas, it took a serious turn ... Finally, on July 2, we were able to speak again after the third mechanized connection arrived in the building - the SS Division "Totenkopf", and the 41st Tank Corps range went to the left of us Dvina at Jacobstad-Ta (Ekabpils). "
Snapshots made by the German military correspondent Artur Grimm in the morning of June 22 at the village of Life. The armored personnel carriers SDKFZ 251/1 and the "Troika" from the 1st TD pass by the burning BT. SDKFZ 251/1 are equipped with fasteners to start jet shells.
In July, for the breakdown of the intentions of the Germans to break through to Novgorod, the 1st mehortow Mr. M.D. Chernyavsky was sent to the SFF, which was part of Leno. By this moment, one 3rd tank division remained in it, and she was without a single tank battalion, SMEs and an oad. Even before the war, on June 17, the 1st Tank Division was seized from its composition. On June 30, the corps became part of the SFF, and the next day the 163th MD was transferred to the 27th Army. 5.07 Parts of the 1st Mechorcouss after a hard battle took the city island, but by the evening they were forced to leave him. On July 14-15, the corps hit the 8th Tank Division of the 56th MK in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Soltsy, throwing it by 40 km. This counterdown had a consequence of the suspension of the German attack on Leningrad before the R. Lulga of the main forces of the 18th Army of Germans and full lead in order of the 4th TF. But the 1st Mechkorpus itself ceased to exist as a tank association, losing most of the tanks.
By the middle of July, all four companies acting in the NWP band, as a result of huge losses (from June 22 to July 9 - 2523 tanks) turned into weakened rifle parts, covered the waste of the front troops, and were shortly disbanded.
West Front
Here directive No. 3 of Tymoshenko in the evening of June 22 put a task in front of the Commanders to the commander - blows in the area of \u200b\u200bGrodno in the direction of the Suwalki, together with the SFF troops, to surround and destroy the rustling of the rustles on June 24 on June 24. For Construdar, the 6th Machorpus of the 10th Army, the 11th Corporation of the 3rd Army and the 6th Cavalry Corps were involved. The general leadership of the mechanized group was packed by the deputy commander of the front of General I.V. Boldin.
The 11th Machorpos General D.K.Mostovko has entered the battle on the right flank of the Western Front on June 22, the connection with it was lost. The 6th Machkorpus General M.G. Khazkylevich began a nomination from the Bialystok district in the direction of Grodno, the losses from the strikes of German aviation. The 4th and 7th tank divisions came out on the line of deployment by noon on June 23, where they were met with strong anti-tank fire and were attached to aviation strikes. As a result of a fierce battle, they managed to discard the southeastern southeastern part of the Wehrmacht and in the evening to go out in the defense band of the 27th Rifle Division of the 3rd Army. The next day, after capturing the Germans Grodno, the 6th Mechkorpus struck in the northern direction. Stripping into a powerful anti-tank defense, the body carried the big losses.
In the afternoon, on June 24, the tank divisions of the 6th Mechorts were overstateled on the south-east of Grodno, where in the evening they entered into battle with the connections of the 3rd tank group Gota, trying to stop her promotion on the Minsk direction. Entering the 8th and 20th Army Corps in the battle of the 8th and 20th Army, on June 25, the enemy was able to dismember the division of the 6th round, which were forced to conduct scattered, not related to the general intention of battles. General Boldin with his headquarters was surrounded and lost contact with the command of the 6th MK. The Commander of the Pavlov commander in the evening of June 25 gave the commissioner of the 6th Corps order: "I immediately interrupt the battle and forced march, following at night and in the afternoon, focus on Slonim" (which was captured by the 17th TD General Back Arima). The 6th and 11th mechorcroids acting against the two army corps of the 9th Army of the Germans suffered significant losses and due to the lack of proper material and technical supply in the midst of the battle were without fuel and ammunition. Under blows german troops Together with the parts of the 3rd army, they were forced to go to the side of Naliboka forest, which led to the formation of a large gap between the flanks of the SFF and ZF. At the end of June, divisions of the 6th and 11th mechorts came to the environment of the west of Minsk.
BT-7 on the march. The tank is equipped with a pair of martial light headlights on a gun mask to illuminate targets at night shooting.
T-26 sample 1939 with a conical tower and a subfestable box with inclined armor-tami. On the tank belonging to NIIBT, unusual Applied onboard number - it only on the tower, but also on the front sheet of the housing.
The 14th center of General S.I. Woborin, which was part of the 4th Army of General A.A. Corobkova, in the evening of June 22 he received a combat order of the commander of the 4th Army of Army No. 02, which reads: "14-MEH Corps (22 - I and the 30th TD, the 205th honey) in the morning on June 23 to strike from the turn of the fence, Pelisk, Khmelevo in the general direction of the high-Lithuanian with the task of destroying the day to destroy the enemy east of the river West Bug. " At six o'clock on June 23, part of the 14th Mehkorpus, the 28th SK, the 75th CD began a counterattack against the 47th, 24th MK and the 12th Army Corps. By the beginning of the attack, the 30th tank division had up to 130 tanks, the 22nd TD about 100. During the battle of the division, the large losses from artillery fire, aviation, tanks suffered. Once at risk of surroundings as a result of bypass from the North by the 17th Tank Division of the Germans, owls. The troops were forced to move away. The total losses of the 14th mechorcouss in the tanks amounted to 120 cars. Consturdar did not have success, and the 4th Army was dissected by the troops of Guderian and began a departure towards Slutsk. The 14th Mechkorpus covered her waste. By June 28, only 2 T-26 tank remained in it, the hull was displayed in the rear and disbanded. In the failure, General S.I. Woborin was accused (25.06 wounded, and the command of the 14th MK adopted Pcasto I.V.Tugarinov), he was arrested and then shot.
T-26 makes a way through the forest trap. Spare reference and supporting rollers are fixed on the tumor shelf.
The T-26 of the Captain Homyakov divisions move through the village of Salney. West Front, July 1941
Tankers are examined before leaving on the line.
T-34 under cover anti-tank artillery It goes into the attack. West Front, July 1941
The 13th, 17th and 20th mechortscouss by the beginning of the war were echo in the process of formation, so in the battles were used as rifle parts, left for July without tanks.
In early July, the 5th Malcarpus General I.P. Alexseenko, which was previously intended for the USF, and 724 and 715 of the MVO, who had 924 and 715 tanks, were among the troops of the Western Front. They were included in the 20th Army of General P.A. Korroshkin, who received the order of the commander of the CF: "The Western Dvina River Frontarily List, Dnipro, in the morning of July 6, 1941, go to a decisive offensive for the destruction of the leprenel enemy grouping." The depth of the blows was determined for the 5th mechorts of up to 140 km, for the 7th - up to 130 km. On the morning of July 6, 5, the 7th mechorts came into battle. Initially, their actions developed quite successfully: both corps, overcoming the resistance of the enemy, reached the region north and south of Senno. The enemy put forward the 17th and 18th tank divisions here. For two days, our corps reflected on the onslaught of these compounds, which detained the promotion of the entire 3rd tank group of the enemy to the Dnieper ... However, the countercourse of mechanized buildings did not receive development. The Nazis threw a large strength of aviation here, and our corps were in a difficult position, losing. They were forced to start a waste in difficult conditions under the blows of tanks and aviation opponents.
The T-26 column is put forward on the position for the counterattack.
Bonding in dirt and abandoned BA-20M.
The tank part covered on the road with a blow from the air. The high accuracy of the bombing of German pixers is noticeable: the dispersion of the bombs does not exceed a few meters, and most BT-7 and KB are destroyed by direct hits.
The retreating artillery part after the attack of German tank workers.
Shielded KV-1 "Bay Fascists."
Tractor "Komsomolets" who got Germans with ammunition.
Major General tank troops A.V. Bosikov in the report to the head of the GabTU RKKKA as evaluated their actions: "Corps (5th and 7th) fight well, it is not very bad that the headquarters are low-performance and vague, and it is also bad that many cars get to the enemy For malfunction of trivial. Organize repair, the evacuation is not able to do a division nor the carcupus, nor the army, nor the front. There was no batch from the air to cover the carcrocenes, because of the huge losses to fulfill this task could not. By virtue of the above reasons, the mechanicalcouss entered into Fight B. different time, As you approach the battlefield.
The main goal of Conrtedar was the defeat of the 1st Tank Group E. Kleist, who broke down at the junction of the 5th Army of General M.I. Potapov and the 6th Army of General I.N.Muzichenko. The oncoming tank battle turned around in the Lutsk area, Dubno, exactly from June 23.; On the part of Lutsk and Dubno on the left flank, the 1-yt was applied to the 9th Machorpos Rokossovsky and 19th Machorcupus General N.V. Ek-Lenko. From the south, from the area of \u200b\u200bBrody, the 15th Machorpos General I.I. Karpezo and the 8th Machorpos General D.I. Ryabyshev were coming to Radekhov and Be Restorko. On June 23, the German troops continued to attack on Lutsk, Berestechko, expanding the gap between the 5th and 6th armies. On the same day, the confrudar began. In the morning, in the area of \u200b\u200bRadechov, on the front, 70 km wide was transferred to the offensive of the 15th Mechkorpus, but there were big losses, was forced to move away. Mr. A.A.Vlasov, instead of participation in the 1st tank group, was aimed to eliminate the enemy's breakthrough at the stake of the 6th and 26th Army in the Mostiska area (except for the 32nd TD, which acted together with the 15th MK). The 22nd Mechkrucus from the turn of Voinnica - Boguslavskaya moved to the offensive on June 24 - Boguslavskaya advanced 7-10 km to Loche. But, acting independently, without aviation support, the corps lost more than 50% of tanks and departed to the initial position. The 41st Tank Division of the 22nd MK did not at all participate in the counterdad.
In the "Description of the fighting of the 22nd Machorpos UZF for the period from 22 to 29.06.1941" This is stated like this:
"On June 24, 1941, the 19th Tank Division at 13.30 counterattacked the coming part of the enemy in the region of the height of 228.6, Alexandrovka, Mar-Kovitsa. The T-26 tanks were brought into the attack. T-26 tanks, old - 45 pieces, BA-10 armored vehicles - 12 pieces. Most of these tanks were destroyed by the enemy and disabled. Upon reaching the Tanks of the Forest District, the south of the height of 228.6, north of Kanevich, the infant of the enemy began to retreat, and a strong artillery and Ru-Merrate Fire was opened from the forest, followed by medium and heavy tanks. Strong strong tank BoyLittle 2.5 hours. The remaining tanks after the fight began to go out of battle. The infantry began a random waste ... The 19th TD moved to R. SERZHA. In this battle, the commander of the 22nd MK Mr. Kondrushev was killed (Nethera Mr Torchi changed him) ...
In the morning, on June 25, he passed on the offensive from the North of the 9th and 19th Mechkruss, which threw part of the 3rd MK of the Germans to the south-west from Exactly. But it was not possible to develop success due to the fact that the blow from the south, due to the unpretentiousness of the troops, was transferred the next day. On June 26, the 1st TGR and the 6th Army were applied by Conitary 9th and 19th MK from the north, the 8th and 15th MK from the South, joining the oncoming tank battle with the 9th, 11th , 14th and 16th TD Germans. The 9th and 19th Mechkorpus during June 26-27 were fighting the battles with the divisions of the 3rd MK, but under the blows of aviation were forced to move to the area west of Rivne. The 8th Mechkorpus struck the 16th TD to strike, advanced by 12 km. On the night of July 27, he was bred from the battle and began focusing for the 37th SC. "
German soldiers pass by tanks undergoing bombing. Northwest Front, July 1941.
Abandoned on the street of the Lithuanian city of T-38.
The operational summary of the headquarters of UZF №09 dated June 26, 1941 reported:
"The 8th Mechkorpus at9.00 on June 26 he was indecidantly attacked by the mehchasts of the enemy from the Briestchko district in the direction of Berestechko and, without having enough support to aviation and from the side of the neighbor on the left - 15 MK, stopped by the enemy in the initial area. The 15th Mechkorpus also operates Indecisive, without performing an order for an attack. By 9.00 26.06 - the beginning of the attack - the MK was not yet concentrated in the original for the attack area. " UZF headquarters, seeing the low performance of the counterdovern, solved the front-line reserve (31st, 36th, 37th IC) to strengthen the defense at the turn of Lutsk, Kremenets, and the MK to derive from the battle to prepare a new powerful counterdard. The rate did not approve this decision, ordered from the morning on June 27 to continue the attacks. The divisions of the 8th MK were turned back, but their efforts were not supported by other MK, and the 8th Mechkorpus fell into the environment. The commander of the 8th MK Mr. D.I. Ryashev in the battle report of June 28, 1941 reported: "The position of parts is heavy, I ask to support aviation on June 28. Parts of the enemy are on the Werba Road, Dubno. Tanks, published Dubno is cut off from the 7th division, which position is unknown, the aviation is very bombed. The 7th division suffered large losses. "
Anti-aircraft SAU SD KFZ 10/4 with a 20-mm automatic Flak 30 gun leads fire soviet tanks. Malocaliberian rapid anti-aircraft gunners on the half-member and car chassis turned out to be a formidable opponent of easily organized BT and T-26.
Pz Tanks KPFW III AUSF E broke into the Soviet artillery battery.
The counterdresters of the mechanicalcouss YUZF for a week detained the offensive of the 1st tank group and raised the opponent's plans to break through to Kiev and surround the 6th, 12th and 26th Army of the UZF on the Lviv ledge, but it was not possible to achieve a fracture in hostilities.
One of the main reasons for unsuccessful actions of the Soviet carcaps in this battle was the lack of communication and interaction between them. Commander of the 9th Machorpus K.K. Rokossovsky:
"... with the information of troops about the position at the front, the case was out of the hands badly. The information had to be mined. And if the events in our direction were able to more or less recognize and guess, then about what happened or what was happening on the site of other south-western armies. The front we did not know anything. Apparently, the headquarters of the 5th Army also did not know anything, for he did not inform us. The connection of the corps with the headquarters of the 5th Army was missingly absent, and periodically stopped with neighbors.
Burned T-34 sample 1940. West Front, July 1941
Bottled and burnt trucks, BT-7 and KB tanks after a fight under great. KB early editions with F-32 gun and shielded tower. North-West Front, Pskov Direction, August 1941
T-28, failed after the explosion of the gun.
Commander of the intelligence battalion of the 43rd tank division of the 19th MK VS Archipov:
"... Communication was the weakest of our link. And not only the connection between the two groups of mechanical cameras, who caused a blow from the south (8th and 15th MK) and from the North (9th and 19th MK), but also Communication of the highest headquarters with these groups - the headquarters of the UZF ... and the headquarters of the 5th army. Weak, with long-term breaks of radio communication was the cause of desemination of information directed from the front line to the highest headquarters. Therefore, solutions that were taken in the headquarters and, in their own The queue was transferred to the front, often did not correspond to the changed combat situation. For example, in the evening of June 26, when, without changing the right flank of the 11th German TD and defeating one of her tank regiments, our division came out to Dubno, none of us knew What from the south, applying huge losses to other connections of the 48th German motorized building, successfully promotes us to meet the 8th Machorpus General D.I. Ryabysheva ... This situation was repeated the next day, when all three corps - the 36th rifle , 8th and 19th mechanized - again fell on the Dubnensky direction . Again, we and our neighbors, the arrows of the 36th Corps, went out to the approach to Dubno, did not know that the 34th tank division of P-Ka I.V.Vasilyeva from the 8th Mechkorpus was already broken into the city. Thus, on 26 and 27 June, the Soviet tank wedges twice and very deeply - up to 30 km - they crashed into both flank of the German 48th MK. However, the lack of communication between these wedges and mutual ignorance was not allowed to bring the case to a logical end - to the surroundings of the 48th MK between Brods and Dubno. "
The 34th Tank Division, who took Dubno, was surrounded by German troops and crushed - all tanks were destroyed, commander Pcast I.V.Vasiliev died.
Tank PZ KPFW II AUSF F, broken by artillery fire and half-coated in the river.
Red Army women at the captured light stack armored car SD KFZ 261. Western direction, August 1941
In general, the leadership of the combat actions of the mechkorpus left much to be desired. Orders Commanders of different levels Often contradicted one other. This is brightly visible on the example of the 8th mechorts. Here is an excerpt from summary actions of mechanized front-line compounds for the period from 22.06 to 1.08.1941:
"On June 22, 1941, not allowing the corpus to fulfill the order of the 26th Army, the front commander appoints a new area of \u200b\u200bconcentration and subordinates the building of the 6th Army. Commander of the 6th Army, without considering that the Corps makes a march by following the order of the US Commander, Gives a new area of \u200b\u200bconcentration. By virtue of this order, the commander had to turn the march part in the new direction. On June 24, the commander of the 6th Army moves the corps to the new district. On June 26, the order of the front commander №0015 is transferred to a new district. Thus, Without participating in hostilities, and making the "super-confined" marches on a closed circle, fulfilling the orders of the commander of the 26th, 6th armies and the front, the corps passed an average of 495 km, leaving on the roads for the time of the march 50% of the combat extension The material part, exhausting the remaining material part and the driver's composition. June 26, by performing the orders of the front №0015 and 0016, the MK commander, without concentrating all parts, introduces its body to battle About parts without intelligence enemy, without finding out its location and strength. As a result, the part is riveted on a strong PTO and swamps and carry considerable losses without fulfilling the task. The actions of the air housing were not covered, the interaction on the scale of the front was not organized. The nervousness of the highest headquarters in the management and formulation of tasks, the abundance of orders not related to one with another, non-compliance with the elementary statutory standards in the organization and conducting marches appeared the main reason loss of combat capability of the case and loss of material part. "
PZ KPFWLLLL AUSF G with 50mm kwk l / 42 with Soviet troops.
Kievans examine the trophy assault weapon Stug III AUSF C, captured at the village of Vita-post and towed to the city. On self-propeller in the center stands the Deputy Military Commission of the Kiev Streignon Battalion Commissioner M.V. Pankovsky. Kiev, August 10, 1941.
It was not better the case in the 15th mehorts.
"Frequent change in the challenges of the body and delivery of orders from the headquarters of the front and the 6th army with a large delay introduced an ambiguity, confusion and excessive cost of motor resources. For example, on June 24, an order was received by the headquarters of the front of the 15th service from the turn of Kolesnik - Holois in the area South-west Brody to apply a joint blow from 8 MK in the direction of Berestechko, Dubno. Parts of the hull began to fulfill this order and were in the following way, and some have already achieved the area of \u200b\u200btheir concentration. On June 25 followed the order for the return return of the corps parts for the previously involved Rubber in order to prepare the offensive in the direction of Radzhekhov, CO-Kohl together with the 4th MK. at 23.00 on June 26 received new order Front headquarters: defeat the MehGroup of the enemy, acting on Dubno, inflicting a blow to the direction of the shovel, Berestechko, Dubno. On June 27, a new order was received again, in the root changing the task of the case: to move away to the area of \u200b\u200bZloczo heights. The body began to perform an order, but was followed by a new order of the front: "Despite any difficulties and technical cutters of the match, on June 28 in the direction of Berestchka."
Comments here are superfluous.
Dressed PZ KPFW and AUSF S. July 1941
PZ KPFW 38 (T)-knitted by artillery, known from us as "Prague". July 1941
Starting Kontruddar, the 8th Mechkorpus was deeply wedged in front of the Germans, going into the rear of their 11th tank division and threatening the enemy's warehouses deployed in Dubno. The offensive of the Germans was detained for several days, but by July 1, the main forces of the corps were surrounded by remaining without fuel and ammunition. There was no more speech about the continuation of the counterdard. Tankists moved to defense, fighting from the oked tanks, the fate of the corps was a deplorable, as he noted in a couple of days Galder, "in the course of long-resistant fighting forces of the enemy turned out to be ground and most of its connections are broken." On June 30, the front troops received an order to move themselves on the line of fortifications along the old state border.
In early July, the troops of the Army Group "South" were able to break through Soviet defense. On July 7, the 11th German Tank Division reached Berdicheva, and the 3rd Motorized Corps of the 1st Tank Group and the 6th Army came to Zhytomyr. As a result of this breakthrough, there was a threat of seizure of Kiev and the surroundings of parts of the 6th and 12th armies of YUZF South-west of Kiev. Hitler demanded to destroy the larger forces of the enemy west of the Dnieper, to take away the possibility of conducting organized operations with large masses of troops east of the Dnieper.
The UNTF command was forced to take urgent measures to counter the German troops. In the area of \u200b\u200bBerdicheva, counterattacks were consolidated detachments of the divisions of the 4th and 15th mechorts. The 16th mechano came to the Western Front from the South was sent here. His divisions entered the battle directly from the echelons. From the parts of the 4th, 15th, the 16th MK, Berdichev-Skye Group was formed under the command of Komdiva A.D. Sokolov. As a result, counterattack managed to force the Germans to move to the defense, stopping their promotion to the White Church. At the same time, only the 11th TD of the Germans, according to German data, lost more than 2000 people in battles. The price of the bloody battle was able to delay the offensive of the Center for the Army Army to South for a whole week (07/18/1941 Galder fixed the challenge of the flank of the 1st Tank Group: "He still trample in the area of \u200b\u200bBerdichev and White Church."). The 8th and 10th tank divisions especially distinguished themselves in the battles of Berdichev, for the week, having worked the main forces of the tank stick. At this time, heavy battles were in the area of \u200b\u200bNovograd-Volynsky, where the troops of the 5th Army Army were applied to the North Flange of the German group, published to Kiev. The main shock force of the 5th Army was three companies: 9th Mr. A.G. Maslova (19.07 I changed K.K. Crosovsky), 19th Mr. N.V.Feklenko and the 22nd Mr. V.S.Tamruchi, who had 30-35 tanks (in the 19th MK - 75 tanks).
However, the forces of the mechorts were exhausted by counterattacks, and the group under Korosten was forced to go to the defense (as the Germans noted, "the tanks are no longer observed").
By this time, only the shadow of her relics remained from the carcroids. According to the headquarters of the headquarters of the south-western direction on the state of rifle and tank divisions of fronts of July 22, 1941, "tank divisions numbered: less than 1 thousand people - about 20% of all divisions, 1-2 thousand people - about 30%, 3-5 thousand people - about 40%, 10-16 thousand people - 10% of all divisions. Of the 12 tank divisions, only two has 118 and 87 tanks. Most of the rest has only a few tanks. " In the second half of August, the compounds of the 5th Army, including the mechorpus, moved over the Dnieper.
Cavalier attack with the support of T-26.
In general, the actions of the mechancroids in the first week of war against impact groups The enemy in order to change the course of events was not crowned with any of the strategic directions. German command, assessing actions soviet troops When applied by Kontrudarov, noted:
"Before the Army Group" South ", the enemy was at an altitude in matters of general guidelines and the maintenance of offensive actions of an operational scale. To groups of Army" Center "and North" in this respect, the enemy showed himself from a bad side. Management of troops in the tactical level and the level of combat Preparation of troops - mediocre. "
South Front
In the UF band, Soviet carcupus had a huge superiority over the enemy - 769 tanks of the 2nd and 18th rounds were opposed by 60 Romanian. The ratio was 12.8: 1. But the commander of the Talenev Front believed that he was opposed by 13 tank and motorized divisions of the Germans, although they really were not. Here in June-July, the 2nd Machorpus General Yu.V. Novoselsky was most actively operating. Together with the 48th Rifle Corps of General R. Yalinovsky, he applied counterdasters in German and Romanian troops at the turn of the river Prut. On July 8, a blow to the junction between the 4th Romanian and 11th German armies, the 2nd Mechkorpus stopped the opponent's offensive. On July 22, the 2nd Mechkorpus inflicted Consturis from the Christian Names area to the 11th and 16th Tank Divisions of the Germans, throwing them by 40 km, eliminating the threat of the surroundings of the 18th Army.
The 18th Mechkorpus on June 30 from Akkerman was brought to the embaling area for staffing and July 4, he was transferred to the staff of the UZF. On July 19, he became part of the 18th Army and inflicted Constridar on the right flank of the 52nd Army Corps of the 17th Army south of Vinnitsa, having 387 tanks. On July 25, the division of the 17th Army broke through the defense in the strip of the 18th MK and the 17th SK in the region of Gaysin - Trostyanets. Until July 30, the 18th Mehkorputs occupied the defense of the Gaivoron, and in August, he was moved to Pavlograd.
At the end of July, the Division of the 2nd Mechkorpus was trying to help the 6th and 12th armies of the South Africa, but could not break through the front of German troops. In addition, the tank parts of the UFA by this time suffered tangible losses, although their combat potential was still pretty great. According to an assistant to the Assistant Commander of the UFU for the ABTV Mr. Sdevneva dated July 31, 1941, in the Mekhor Pusa, the SFA was:
in the 2nd MK combing: 1 KB, 18 T-34, 68 BT, 26 T-26, 7 flamethdment, 27 T-37, 90 BA-10, 64 BA-20 (total tanks - 147, on 22.06. - 489);
18 MK: 15 BT and T-26, 5 T-28, 2 flamete, 1 BA-10, 4 BA-20 (total tanks - 22, on 22.06. - 280);
16 MK: 5 T-28, 11 BA-10, 1 BA-20 (on 22.06. - 608 tanks);
24 MK: 10 BT, 64 T-26, 2 flamete, 10 BA-10, 5 BA-20 (total tanks - 76, on 06.26. - 222).
It also said:
"As a result of consolidation material resources, accidents, breakdowns requires middle overhaul: 2 mK - up to 200, in the 18th MK - up to 200 units. "
"The 16th Machorputs with minimal residues: 240th MD, 15th and 44th TD, of which the infantry detachment was formed by the battalion, MCP, power to the battalion. The 16th Mehkorpus is absolutely not at all. real power. "
Repair T-26 forces of the crew and brigade workers. In the days of the retreat, remove the damaged car, only if it retained the progress - the failed tanks were nothing and no time.
Odessa Tank Tractors based on STZ-5 with bootiers made of ship steel. Front armored meter is armed with infantry machine guns of DP. Pay attention to the Figure of the Sailor-Foflot actively participated in the manufacture of these machines, and they often drove them-in the battle of sailor crews.
Repair BT-2 in the workshop of one of the plants of Leningrad.
KV-1 with a welded tower and a gun F-32.
The crew masks its T-34 in shelter.
Mechancups deployed in the inner districts, after the start of the war, were disbanded, and ten tank divisions were created on them. new organization. The main reason for re-forming german strike Mechorts became the "full exhaustion of the material part."
When considering the events of the first weeks of the war, the question arises, why, possessing a huge quantitative superiority in tanks (in the ZF band, the ratio was 2.7: 1, YUZF - 5.6: 1, SUF - 12.8: 1), having tanks not inferidating , and even superior in their combat qualities German, Soviet armored troops suffered such a crushing defeat? Explain its superiority of the enemy in military equipment and suddenness of the attack, as it was done earlier, will be very unconvincing. Therefore, we give here the considerations of commanders of tank troops, direct participants of the described events.
P. P. Poluboy Markov, Commander of ABTV SF:
"For the most part, the counterdasters were applied to our troops, often disparately, without focusing the major efforts in decisive directions, on unreserved and strong enemy groupings. The enemy acted well. aerial reconnaissance. Hitler's pilots quickly opened the regrouping and focusing our troops, especially they followed the movements of tank connections. "
K.K. Crosovsky, in June 1941. The commander of the 9th Machorpus UZF:
"The troops of this district (Coo) from the first day of the war were completely unprepared to the meeting of the enemy. Their dislocation did not fit the provision of a possible attack on our border. Many compounds did not have a laid ammunition and artillery set, the latter was taken to the polygons located The border itself, yes there was left. What happened on June 22 was not envisaged by any plans, so the troops were captured by surprise in the full sense of the word. The loss of communication of the district headquarters with the troops aggravated a difficult position. Died in unequal battle Good tankers, selflessly fulfilling the role of infantry in battles. Even when the directions of the main blows applied by German troops were performed quite clearly, as well as their grouping and strength, the command of the district was unable to take responsibility and take a cardinal decision to save the situation, to maintain most of the troops from complete defeat, pulling them into Old fortified area. "
Major Baranova's tank battalion goes to position in the Crimean Vala. Open hatcher in the upper tower hatch is designed for flag bond and start signal missiles. October 1941.
We will not concern the reasons for lesions wearing a strategic nature - many literature are devoted to them, especially in last years. The reasons for the failures of the operational tactical level were estimated back in 1941 in documents not intended for extensive use, they were set forth with an exhaustive fullness. As an example, we give the report of the assistant commander of the troops mr. Tank Troops of the Volsk Deputy NGO USSR mr. Fedorenko from August 5, 1941 in it this is speech On the actions of the mechanical terrorism of the UZF, but its conclusions are distributed on the buildings of other fronts. In this document, the main reasons for the rapid yield of tank units are called:
"1. From the very first day of the war, the fur circuit was incorrectly used, because everyone was granted to armies ...
2. All martialctions Meccurps took place without careful intelligence, some parts did not know at all what was happening in close proximity. Aviation intelligence in the interests of MK was completely failed. The management of fur-enclosures on the part of the general commander was delivered badly, the compounds were scattered (8 MK) and by the time the occurrence was torn apart from each other. The armies headquarters were absolutely not prepared for controlling such large mechanized compounds as a mechanicalpore ...
3. The headquarters of the armies completely forgot that the material part has certain motocats that it requires viewing, small repair, additional replenishment of flammable and ammunition, and the technical composition and the heads of ABTO armies did not suggest them, and instead after completing the task By giving them the time required for this purpose, the general commander demanded only let's go anything else. Mechkorpus completely did not have a cover both on the march and on the battlefield.
4. The information from top to bottom, as well as with the neighbors was made of hand out badly. War from the first day accepted a maneuverable character, the enemy turned out to be moving ...
This is all related to the general commander. But there were many shortcomings made directly and commanders of mechanized parts and connections. These include:
1. The headquarters of MK, TD and TP have not yet mastered the proper operational-tactical outlook. They could not do right conclusions And completely did not understand the idea of \u200b\u200bthe command of the army and the front.
2. There was no maneuverability - there was lethargy, slowness in solving problems.
3. Actions, as a rule, were the nature of the frontal blows, which led to an unnecessary loss of material part and personnel ...
4. Inability to organize the combat order of the corps in the directions, cover the way of movement of the enemy, and the last, mainly moved along the roads.
5. There was no desire to deprive the enemy the possibility of a fuel court, ammunition. The ambush on the main directions of his actions were not practiced.
6. NOT used large settlements To destroy the enemy and inability to act in them.
7. Office, ranging from the platoon commander to large commanders, was bad, the radio was used badly, the hidden control of the troops was delivered poorly ...
8. Extremely poorly delivered crews in the preservation of material part. There have been cases when the crews left the cars that have ammunition were individual casesWhen the crews left the cars and went out.
9. In all parts and compounds there were no evacuation funds, and the available could provide MK and TD only in offensive operations.
10. Personal composition new technique I did not master, especially KB and T-34, and is completely not taught by the production of repair in the field.
To these conclusions it is difficult to add anything, you can only confirm concrete facts. Here are just a few:
In the 8th TD of the 4th MK, 107 tanks were destroyed by YUZF crews, including 25 KB, 31 T-34. 18 T-34 was lost at an unknown reason.
In the 10th TD of the 15th MK, the UWF was thrown during the departure of 140 tanks, of which 34 KB and 9 T-34. 6 cars are missing.
The 7th TD of the 6th MK ZF only on June 22, 63 tank lost 63 tanks.
The 13th TD of the 5th MK ZF in the midst of Kontrudar got up due to the lack of fuel. In the same position were TD of the 6th, 11th, 12th and other MK.
The 5th and 7th MK ZF in July applied counterdriver on the ground, completely not adapted for the actions of tanks, which led to great losses.
22nd TD of the 14th MK ZF, stationed in Brest, in the morning of June 22, as a result of the art film, lost most of the tanks and artillery. Warehouses fuel and ammunition were destroyed.
The 23rd and the 28th TD of the 12th MK of the SFT, participating in the counterdar in the Tilzite grouping, entered into battle at different times, the coordination of actions was absent. The 28th tank division also turned out to be without fuels and was forced to be half a day inactive.
KB, destroyed by an explosion of ammunition.
T-34 after a fight with german tanks. Inboard - a lot of slopes, a fire trails are visible. The support roller is pulled, and the burst of ammunition is demolished by a tower hatch and a fan.
To be continued...
Ctrl ENTER
Noticed Osh BKU Highlight the text and click Ctrl + Enter.
With the help of the document to share HC. Maxim Kolomiets, managed to learn the factory number of the shielded tank of the KV-1 No. 20 and clarify the reason for its loss. Earlier, from other 21-th overthruss documents, one tank KV was divided and burned in the site of the bookmouth (Sovr. Name Etherinets).
Snapshots tank subscribed as Dagda and in famous selection Snapshots of the German from the 122nd Infantry Division, like Zilup, and the reception is just between these cities.
As it became known, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe bookmaker, on July 2, 1941, a tank KV-1 was left the head. № 4793. On the march, the tank ended fuel. As we see, the tank did not succeed in the pictures.
Below I will give a number of quotation from combat reports to illuminate the situation with combustible in the 21st Mechkorpus:
on 26.06. " ... ammunition and fuel extremely limited. I ask you to send
".
at 3.00 28.06. " in the parts of the fuel on average 1/4 refueling. Tanks used to be can't - no fuel
".
30.06. "... In the way of 20 pieces of kV, which for lack of gas oil did not put forward
".
Apparently, at least part of the tanks from the heavy battalion of the 42nd TD in early July reached the Dagda area and, judging by the presence of combat damage at Tank No. 20, participated in the battles.
Some ambiguity remains with the loss date. Probably tank left 3 or even on July 4, 1941. It is known that the tank with the head. No. 4793 Only at 15.30 on June 30, sent from LKZ to Art. Novosokolniki. July 2, battles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe receptionist have not yet been.
The situation as of 13.00 July 3 is set forth in combat order No. 9 of the 21st Machorpus commander. Exposure will give here:
"1. The opponent in the morning 2.7.41 was the offensive at the front of Somerset, Rageli and from the direction of Kraslav, broke through the front at the site of the flight brigade and the 185th motorized rifle division at the turn of the Esta, Somerset. Its advanced motor-mechanized parts at 7 o'clock 20 minutes have been seen from Androup and at 9.00 3.7.41 - in Chornaya.
2. 21-ME mechanized corps, holding back the enemy with arkergard parts, start waste consistently on turns, not allowing the defeat combat order in parts
".
Below in the order is a route for the 42nd Tank Division:
" 8. The commander of the 42nd Tank Division, following in the tail, organize strong tanks of the cover of infantry, tanks and artillery, holding down the enemy at the raising of waste. Left side detachment on the route Duga, Bommuja, Wetsloboda, Zilup ...".
The tank of tanks was led by the deputy commander of the 42nd TD on the construction part of the Colonel Bulah. Even below in the same order:
"12. Tanks "KV" under the command and responsibility of Colonel Bulax to bring to Seber, in the future - a number
".
Corrections and additions are welcome.
21st mechanized case.
Formed in March-June 1941 in the Moscow Military District from the personnel and match of the 24th Lögotankoy Brigade, the 1st special cavalry brigade, the 1st motorized rifle Moscow Red Banner Division, the 185th Rifle Division, the 452th Gobichic artillery regiment.
As of June 22, 1941, the corps totaling only 98 lung tanks (BT-7 and T-26) and 30 flameless tanks. However, starting from June 23, 1941, the combat power of the corps increased due to more than 100 guns and two tank battalions (both as part of the corps on June 24, 1941) armed with one hundred and five BT-7 and two T-34. And subsequently S. Kirov Plant Received a few heavy tanks kV-2.
IN acting Army From June 22, 1941 to September 5, 1941.
Bathroom and dislocation as of June 22, 1941:
- Corps control, 42th tank and 185th Motorized division - in the village of Idrice of Sebezhsky district at that time, Kalininskaya (now - Tverskaya), and now the modern Pskov region;
- The 46th Tank Division - in the district city of Owchka at that time of the Kalininskaya (now - Tverskaya), and now the modern Pskov region.
On June 23, 1941, the military townships of the corps became the object of the enemy air strike, as a result of which they were destroyed by some of the military warehouses plus - in the ranks of personnel were killed and wounded.
On June 25, 1941, the Corps received the task to navigate to Daugavpils, where to organize defense to take defense along the line Western Dvina North of Daugavpils - at the turn of Nicegale, Kraslav.
Marsh passed in conditions of powerful air attacks of the enemy.
For Daugavpils, the Corps arrived by June 27, 1941, but there was already the 56th motorized vessel of the Wehrmacht.
On June 28, 1941, the 21st Mechanized Corps began the assault on Daugavpils, while the 42nd Tank Division attacked the city from the southeast, and the 185th Motorized Division was right. Some parts and units managed to break into the city, but to the outcome of the day they were knocked out from here the 8th tank division and the 3rd motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht.
By the beginning of the day, on June 29, 1941, the 46th tank division was withdrawn from the corps with a consolidated group of Lieutenant General S.D. Akimova.
As of June 30, 1941, there were: in the 42nd tank division - 270 people with 14 guns and 7 tanks, the 46th tank division - 400 people with 7 guns, 185th Motorized division - 2259 people at 56 implements (in including 33 anti-tank).
From July 5, 1941 - in the area of \u200b\u200bHimself on vacation. But already on July 7, 1941, he received an order to navigate to the area of \u200b\u200bUsadishche, Barsuki, Selivanovo, where on the same day took part in the unsuccessful counterdard in the general direction on Rifleos, Marshavitsa, Rubino, and then moved on the line, which was 15-25 kilometers North-west of the city Novorzhev ...
As a combat unit, the corps ceased to exist from August 194, but de Jura - from September 5, 1941.
February 12, 1941 was presented in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the SCS of the USSR New mobilization plan "Mobplan-23" or otherwise called "MP-41".
According to this plan, 2 motorized rifle, 60 tank and 30 motorized divisions were assumed in the army of peacetime. This actually meant the creation of another 20 new mechanized buildings, which began in February - March 1941
According to MP-41, among the existing and formed 30 incapsions in February 1941, 19 first-queuing companies and 11 "second stage" mechanics were identified ("abbreviated composition").
Of the 11-turn "second stage", four companies were operational compounds from the cash tank fleet of military districts:
23rd MK (Orvo, 161 Tank),
25th MK (HVO, 163 Tank),
26th MK (Squa, 125 tanks),
27th MK (Savo, 308 tanks).
The rest of the seven were deployed in the rear areas of the border military districts (two in Coo - the 19th and 24th, three in the wrapping - the 13th, 17th, 20th, one in the ODO - 18th, one in MVO - 21st).
The supply of additional tank technology for 1941 was envisaged only for the 13th, 17th, 19th, 24th rounds (in the amount of about 500 cars, including the 13th MK Wrap 324 tank).
The reason is quite simple - for all 30 mechanical groups of the desired number of tanks, it was simply not. In the same "Mobplan number 23" it was noted that 13012 cars were required to deploy new companies, but during 1941 only about 3,650 tanks could be filed.
Therefore, it is quite logical that the main task of the formation of the "second stage, abbreviated composition" mechanical cameras was the creation of compounds "although not fully secured by the material part, but allowing to prepare frames ... and pin them as combat organisms." That is, these were educational units, which at the right moment was supposed to be equipped with tanks and techniques. But as the story reacted by the fate of 4 months was completely insufficient to "pinch them as combat organisms" - the necessary experience had happened directly in brutal and bloody battles.
On March 8, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) approved the appointment of commanders to newly formed mechorts, tank and motorized divisions.
Major General Nikolay Yakovlevich Kirichenko (until this point - the commander of the 10th Cavalry Division) was appointed commander of the 26th Mecorpus.
The team of the 52nd Tank Division was appointed Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Grigory Mikhailovich Mikhailov, who had just completed training at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Republic of Red Afs.
The 26th mechanized case (V / h 7476) began to be formed from March 18, 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District with the Department of Corps Management in Armavir.
The formation of the mechanical cameras regulated the decision of the USSR SCC dated July 6, 1940 No. 1193-464ss, which said:
"SCC of the USSR decides:
1. To approve the organization of the mechanized corps as part of two tank divisions, a motorized division, a motorcycle shelf, one aircraft driver, road battalion and body communication battalion.
The mechanized corpus is to give one airbject as part of a 2-bit bombing and one fighter airlifts.
2. To approve the organization of the tank division of the mechanized corps and a separate tank division in the composition:
a) 2 tank regiments on one battalion of heavy tanks (in each), 2 battalions of medium tanks and the battalion of flamethrower tanks in each shelf;
b) one motorized shelf in the composition of 3 rifle battalions and one 6-gun battery of regimental artillery;
c) of one artillery regiment in the composition of 2 divisions: one division of 122-mm of leads and one division of 152-mm haubs;
d) zenitian Division, reconnaissance battalion, bridge battalion and rear maintenance parts ...
4. Approve the full number:
a) control of the mechanized hull with a motorcycle regiment on peaceful time - 2 662 people, and on war time - 2,862 people;
b) a tank division for peacetime - 10,943 people, and for wartime - 11,343 people ... "
The composition of the 26th mechanical circuits included three divisions:
52th tank,
56th tank,
103th Motorized,
as well as the 28th motorcycle regiment, 548th separate battalion Communication, 88th Separate Motor Label Battalion and 126th Separate Cabinet Avia Squadrilla.
Loading...
