In the second half of the 1940s, the Soviet nuclear program developed at breathtaking speed. Enormous resources were spent on it. The main impetus was the presence of a potential enemy - the United States - of a nuclear bomb. The country's leadership realized that it was necessary to catch up with America, which not only has such a weapon, but has already successfully used it in combat operations (inflicting nuclear strikes for Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
The first Soviet atomic charge was tested in 1949. And here the question arose of how to deliver an atomic charge to US territory. Several dozen bombs made by the Soviet military, to which the developers gave the name “Tatyana” (probably due to the fact that the product index began with “T”), only Tupolev Tu-4 bombers were capable of entering the United States. But in 1952, these slow-moving, piston-engined bombers were easy prey for American F-86 jet fighters. In addition, the Tu-4 could fly to American territories only with an intermediate landing at an ice airfield on one of the northern islands or on an ice floe near the North Pole. At the same time, the bomber crew had a one-way ticket. Their only option after the operation was completed was to try to fly to the Mexican border and parachute out.
Naturally, this state of affairs did not satisfy either the country's leaders or the military. Therefore, work began on the issue of using atomic bombs in the interests of various branches of the USSR Armed Forces. The country's leadership gave preference rocketry and bomber aircraft. However Navy wanted to get his hands on nuclear weapons.
At that time, the most numerous class of ships in the Soviet fleet were submarines. Even before the war, the USSR Navy was the leader among world states in the number of submarines. During the Great Patriotic War their effectiveness on enemy communications was confirmed. Submarines located under water in conditions nuclear war had a clear advantage over surface ships. They could get close enough to the enemy’s shores and strike. Therefore, the Navy command first of all wanted to have atomic weapons specifically on submarines. However, other technical difficulties and problems immediately arose here: the maximum diameter of the torpedo tubes of Soviet submarines was 533 mm, and the diameter of the “portable” atomic bomb, tested in 1951, – 1500 mm. What to do in this situation? The sailors proposed to reduce the charge to the required dimensions, and the nuclear scientists demanded to increase the dimensions of the torpedo. That is why two projects appeared torpedo weapons with nuclear weapons.
T-15 – “Tsar Torpedo”
The initiator of the T-15 project was Alferov V.I., whose activities were related to different time with the Navy, the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry and the Ministry of Medium Engineering. Captain of the first rank Alferov V.I. in KB-11 he took an active part in the creation of the atomic bomb, developed the circuit and instruments of the system for detonating a nuclear charge. Alferov V.I., taking advantage of his authority in industry, immediately after testing the first Soviet hydrogen bomb organized the development of an ultra-large torpedo for a hydrogen charge, designated T-15.
The author of the idea of creating a super-powerful nuclear torpedo Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov is considered to be the one who proposed using the developed nuclear weapons as a “means of delivery” (100 megatons!) nuclear submarine project 627. This is confirmed by his own memories. These torpedoes were supposed to be used against US naval bases, as well as to strike cities located on the coast (although the latter option was opposed by many, including military sailors). As a result of the explosion of such a bomb, giant wave- a tsunami destroying everything on the coast and even far from the coastline.
For reasons of secrecy, as well as taking into account personal relationships (in the Navy, Alferov was treated extremely negatively, since his letter to Beria and Bulganin, about the allegedly illegal transfer of documentation for the 45-36AV-A air torpedo to the Americans during the war, became the reason for the unfair trial of the admirals Kuznetsov, Galler, Alafuzov and Stepanov) the development of the T-15 torpedo was started without the involvement of the Navy. The 6th Department of the Navy learned about this torpedo only through the project of the first nuclear submarine - “Project 627” - the chief designer of which was V.N. Peregudov
The supposed armament of the nuclear boat became known to the fleet only in December 1953, after approval tactical and technical characteristics preliminary design 627. The sailors were greatly surprised by it. The first compartment of the submarine housed one huge torpedo tube, which almost completely replaced traditional torpedo weapons. The length of the torpedo tube was 23.5 meters (22 percent of the total length of the submarine). On the submarine, in addition to a one and a half meter torpedo, it was planned to install two bow 533-mm torpedo tubes with torpedoes for self-defense. No spare torpedoes were provided.
This unusual layout of the submarine is explained by the dimensions of the submarine developed at NII-400 under the leadership of chief designer N.N. Shamarin. T-15 torpedoes. The length of the torpedo was about 23 meters, the mass of the torpedo was 40 tons, the mass of the warhead was 3.5-4 thousand kg. The main weight load fell on the battery, which provided the torpedo with a speed of 29 knots, while the cruising range was 30 kilometers. Presumably, it was proposed to use a thermonuclear charge in the T-15 torpedo. The warhead of the torpedo was developed at KB-11 of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building, under the leadership of chief designer Yu.B. Khariton. The thermonuclear charge was to be detonated by an impact or remote (time) fuse. The firing control of the T-15 torpedo was provided by the Tantalum torpedo firing control station.
The tactical and technical elements of the submarine were approved on December 21, 1953. In July of the following year, SKB-143 completed the technical design of a nuclear submarine. On October 18, 1954, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building Submitted a technical project to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. After this, the Ministry of Defense was asked to review the project and send its conclusion to the Council of Ministers. Head of the Ministry of Defense N.A. Bulganin instructed Admiral P.G. Kotov, Assistant Minister for Naval Affairs, to deal with this issue. At the same time, the issue of admitting specialists and naval leaders to the project was decided. In 1954, an expert commission was formed headed by Vice Admiral A.E. Orel, head of the Directorate of the General Staff of the Navy. The Navy mainly objected to the composition of the nuclear submarine's armament. According to naval experts, the fleet does not need a submarine with such weapons. In addition, serious doubts arose that the submarine would be able to come within the launch range of the T-15 torpedo (40 kilometers), and that the torpedo itself would work as expected.
Against this background, based on the results of the Navy’s examination, it was decided to adjust the technical design of the 627 nuclear submarine. By Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 588-364 of March 26, 1955, the technical design of the submarine was approved only with 533-mm torpedo tubes, and work on the T-15 was stopped.
However, the Soviet nuclear torpedoes do not end there.
T-5 nuclear torpedo
As already noted, the sailors opposed increasing the size of torpedoes and wanted to obtain a nuclear charge of acceptable dimensions (533 mm caliber). It is for this reason that at the end of 1953 the 6th Department of the Navy issued, through the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Industry, a tactical and technical assignment for the nuclear BZO (combat charging compartment) of a ship's 533-mm torpedo.
The development of this product, which received the designation T-5 during the creation process, was carried out by NII-400 (TsNII Gidropribor). The development team was headed by A.M. Borushko. Nuclear charge for the torpedo - RDS-9 - was developed at the design bureau of the USSR Ministry of Medium Engineering under the leadership of Academician Yu.B. Khariton. For the whole combat unit, including automation, answered Lieutenant General N.L. Dukhov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, chief designer Moscow branch of KB-11. The design of the torpedo did not have any “revolutionary” innovations - a conventional 533-mm steam-gas straight torpedo with a range of 10 kilometers at a speed of 40 knots. The torpedo had an inertial control system and a thermal oxygen-alcohol-water steam-gas piston engine.
The developers almost immediately encountered technical difficulties. For example, for a long time they could not achieve stability of the torpedo in terms of depth. During sea trials of the T-5 torpedo in inert ammunition, out of fifteen fired shots, during four, after passing approximately halfway through the path, it made a “bag” and the hydrostatic contactor was prematurely activated, which is equivalent to issuing a command to detonate the warhead, since by this time all stages of its protection. Another problem was the provision thermal regime nuclear warhead, since its normal functioning required a temperature of +5...+25 C, which was difficult to ensure in an unheated torpedo tube of a submarine, especially if it was based in the North.
While the designers were solving these and other problems, on September 21, 1955, in accordance with the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of April 13, 1955, at the training ground New land tests were carried out on the atomic BZO (combat charging compartment) of the T-5 torpedo. The BZO was lowered from a Project 253L minesweeper and detonated at a depth of 12 meters, the average power was 3 kilotons.
In 1957, state tests of the T-5 torpedo were carried out. According to the program, the tests were to carry out two sighting shots of torpedoes without a special warhead, one in a control configuration (with a special warhead, without fissile materials in it), and one combat shot. Initially it was planned to detonate the charge at a depth of 25 meters, but later this parameter was changed to 35 meters. One of the shots from the initial stages state tests ended in failure. In this regard, Admiral A.G. Golovko, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, considered that the tests should be stopped. The chairman of the commission, Admiral Basisty N.E., after a meeting with specialists and a report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, decided to conduct live shooting with an atomic combat charging compartment. The test conditions were as follows: Project 613 submarine S-144 (73rd separate division of submarines of the Northern Fleet) under the command of captain first rank Lazarev G.V. was “at periscope depth, the speed of the torpedo was 40 knots, the depth of the explosion was 35 meters...”. The shooting took place on October 10, 1957 at 10 o’clock at an air temperature of -6 degrees and visibility of 20 km. The deflection of the torpedo during the course (10 km) was 130 meters.
In 1958, the Navy adopted the T-5 torpedo for service. These torpedoes were produced in small series for the Northern and Pacific fleets at the Kirov plant (Alma-Ata). Torpedo production ceased at the end of 1960. In June 1960 at Pacific Ocean Their control tests were carried out in inert equipment. There were several reasons for the cessation of production of T-5 torpedoes. Firstly, the short development time had a significant impact on the performance and reliability of the torpedo, so in many respects it was inferior to torpedoes already in service. Secondly, and this is probably the most important thing, at the end of 1960, 533-mm ASBZO (autonomous special combat weapons) began to enter service. charging compartments) For serial models torpedoes The development of ASBZO with a capacity of 20 kilotons began according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 13, 1957 in KB-25 of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machinery and NII-400 of the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. It was the adoption of the ASBZO that marked the end for special nuclear torpedoes.
Main characteristics of T-15 / T-5 torpedoes:
Caliber – 1550 mm / 533 mm;
Torpedo mass – 40000 kg / 2200 kg;
Torpedo length – 2355 cm / 792 cm;
Type of energy – electric / steam-gas;
Nuclear charge – thermonuclear / atomic;
The torpedo carrier is the nuclear submarine of project 627 / submarines of all projects;
Prepared based on materials:
http://raigap.livejournal.com/181946.html
http://www.iss-atom.ru
http://vpk-news.ru
http://militaryrussia.ru
http://www.atrinaflot.narod.ru
Pentagon sources have confirmed that Russia is testing a new type of weapon - a giant torpedo with a terrifyingly powerful thermonuclear warhead, known as Status-6, writes Popular Mechanics. "This is very bad news," the US military said.
According to US intelligence, the tests took place on November 27. The torpedo was fired from the submarine special purpose B-90 "Sarov", details unknown. The author of a material published in The Washington Free Beacon on this topic calls the Russian underwater vehicle revolutionary: a torpedo with a nuclear power plant capable of moving at a speed of 90 knots at a depth of up to a kilometer. The range of the "Status" is 10 thousand kilometers, the size of the warhead is 6.5 meters. According to the Americans, a thermonuclear charge with a power of up to 100 megatons can be placed there. Detonated off the coast of the United States, it would cause a giant tsunami that would wipe out coastal states along with naval bases, airfields and military factories.
According to experts, Status-6 is Russia's new asymmetric response to the US deployment global system missile defense. The creation of a giant torpedo was first discussed a year ago, when at a government meeting on military issues a tablet with a description of the new weapon was caught on television cameras. The Kremlin called the “exposure” of secret information an “accident.” However, a number of political scientists consider it a deliberate “leak” and disinformation: according to the deadlines indicated in the tablet, the “Tsar Torpedo” was planned to be created in 2019.
Special-purpose submarines will be used as a carrier of the “Status” - in addition to the Sarov, these are the Belgorod project 09852 Antey and the Khabarovsk project 09851, which are currently being modernized. Officially, the submarines are called carriers of deep-sea vehicles and have a docking unit in the bottom, which makes them the burden cannot be detected either from land or from satellite.
The description of the system says that it is intended, among other things, to cause guaranteed unacceptable damage to the enemy by creating zones of extensive radioactive contamination on the coast, unsuitable for human life for a long time. A cobalt bomb, a thermonuclear weapon described by one of the creators of American atomic weapons, Leo Szilard, fits this description. The outer shell of such ammunition consists of cobalt-59, and its explosion guarantees the destruction of all living things.
Tests of a cobalt bomb have never been carried out due to the unsuitability of the affected areas for development and the risk of destroying the entire biosphere of the Earth - according to calculations, this would require only 510 tons of cobalt. However, such a bomb and a giant torpedo as a means of delivering it can be used as a deterrent weapon - together with a system on alert that guarantees a retaliatory strike with all its might nuclear forces Russia even when destroyed command posts and personnel of the Strategic Missile Forces.
According to the latest Review nuclear potential(Nuclear Posture Review), Russia is developing a new nuclear torpedo/drone dubbed "Status-6". Although the torpedo has some alarming capabilities (I already wrote about this in my article), this is not the first such weapon that the Russians are working on. More importantly, Status-6 appears to have fatal flaws that limit its practical effectiveness in combat scenarios.
Background
Nuclear torpedoes have been actively developed over the years cold war. The earliest development is the Project 627 November nuclear attack submarines, which were considered to carry the T-15 nuclear torpedo, designed to attack NATO port facilities. These torpedoes provided the Soviet Union with the ability to limit NATO's naval dominance and were also seen as an alternative means of attacking the United States.
However, the range of the T-15 torpedo was only about 40 kilometers (25 mi), and its speed did not exceed 25 knots, and therefore it was difficult to imagine a situation in which a submarine could successfully carry out this type of attack. The project was closed, and the Novembers themselves were rebuilt and became normal nuclear attack submarines. Later the United States and Soviet Union nuclear torpedoes optimized for tactical missions will be adopted.
Possibilities
Judging by the currently available information, it can be assumed that “Status-6”, after separation from the carrier submarine, begins to move towards the intended target under its own power and under its own control. The speed of the underwater drone reaches 56 knots, it is capable of diving to depths of up to 1,000 meters, and its range of action is 10 thousand kilometers (6,200 miles). Its diving speed and depth pose a challenge to the Navy's existing capabilities, as it is superior in depth and speed to most existing torpedoes.
If this unmanned underwater vehicle is ever put into service, the United States will likely respond with its own underwater drone. Given its range, this drone could be launched from shore installations, although its launch data may indicate that fighting will soon begin, whereas in a critical situation they will serve as a casus belli, that is, a reason for war.
Context
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Sina.com 05.12.2017It is not yet clear what kind of communication the Russians will be able to maintain with the underwater drone once it is launched, although its characteristics indicate that it will be controlled by surface ships. This is by no means a trivial question. When starting from maximum distance the Status-6 drone will apparently take up to four days to reach its intended target. This is extremely dangerous in a crisis, since the political dynamics at the time of launch may differ from what will happen at the time of striking the target. Moreover, the prospect of having a weapon that moves independently to its target within four days is alarming, to say the least.
Status-6 could likely be used as a strategic deterrent, designed to provide another capability for a strike against the United States that could not be prevented by countermeasures. ballistic missiles. Despite its vast nuclear arsenal, Russia has long expressed concerns about the security of its second-strike capability, given the possibility of a combined strike by the United States and improved missile defenses. But, as Brian Clark notes (quoted in his article by Dave Majumdar), Status-6 cannot be called a practical means of deterrence.
For first strike weapons, the drone's usefulness will depend on extreme secrecy and high reliability; if the Americans are able to detect its launch, or for some reason it is late in reaching the target, then the element of surprise will be lost. As a last-ditch deterrent, this underwater drone may have the dual disadvantage of being able to approach its target after the main events of the conflict, and it may also lack a "shutdown" system that Russian political leaders could use as a bargaining chip. at negotiations.
It can be assumed that Status-6 is also capable of attacking a concentration of warships, including American carrier strike groups. However, this will require a more advanced command and control system, or it will be necessary to make the device autonomous enough to make decisions regarding the choice of target and the time of detonation.
conclusions
As some analysts have noted, the idea of using a long-range, nuclear-armed underwater drone is alarming, but it does not seem entirely realistic. It is uncertain and difficult to imagine the conditions under which the Russian political leadership will decide to use weapons that can hit the intended target only a few days later.
In fact, such an underwater drone could serve more as a test model for the development of other technologies. It may also be used by some design bureaus to maintain their funding, but it can hardly be called a ready-to-use combat system.
However, one lesson is that against a determined opponent anti-missile system will never work, and in most cases it will be very expensive. Powerful nations like China or Russia at least have the means to develop weapons that can destroy or penetrate missile defenses, thereby destroying the security umbrella to which the United States has conditioned itself. Status-6 may not be exactly such a weapon, but it is clear that Russia is exploring any means that might work.
The second lesson is that the old ideas seem to be truly dead now. The nuclear torpedo, almost literally, was the first idea the Soviet Union came up with, hoping (at the time) to overcome that significant superiority, which the United States possessed in the field of delivery vehicles. After 60 years, it appears someone has revived the idea for a new Cold War cycle.
InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.
In the second half of the 1940s, the Soviet nuclear program developed at breathtaking speed. Enormous resources were spent on it. The main impetus was the presence of a potential enemy - the United States - of a nuclear bomb. The country's leadership realized that it was necessary to catch up with America, which not only has such weapons, but has already successfully used them in military operations (nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
The first Soviet atomic charge was tested in 1949. And here the question arose of how to deliver an atomic charge to US territory. Several dozen bombs made by the Soviet military, to which the developers gave the name “Tatyana” (probably due to the fact that the product index began with “T”), only Tupolev Tu-4 bombers were capable of entering the United States. But in 1952, these slow-moving, piston-engined bombers were easy prey for American F-86 jet fighters. In addition, the Tu-4 could fly to American territories only with an intermediate landing at an ice airfield on one of the northern islands or on an ice floe near the North Pole. At the same time, the bomber crew had a one-way ticket. Their only option after the operation was completed was to try to fly to the Mexican border and parachute out.
Naturally, this state of affairs did not satisfy either the country's leaders or the military. Therefore, work began on the issue of using atomic bombs in the interests of various branches of the USSR Armed Forces. The country's leadership gave preference to missile technology and bomber aircraft. However, the Navy also wanted to get its hands on nuclear weapons.
At that time, the most numerous class of ships in the Soviet fleet were submarines. Even before the war, the USSR Navy was the leader among world states in terms of the number of submarines. During the Great Patriotic War, their effectiveness in operating on enemy communications was confirmed. Submarines located under water in a nuclear war had a clear advantage over surface vessels. They could get close enough to the enemy’s shores and strike. Therefore, the Navy command first of all wanted to have atomic weapons on submarines. However, other technical difficulties and problems immediately arose here: the maximum diameter of the torpedo tubes of Soviet submarines was 533 mm, and the diameter of the “portable” atomic bomb tested in 1951 was 1500 mm. What to do in this situation? The sailors proposed to reduce the charge to the required dimensions, and the nuclear scientists demanded to increase the dimensions of the torpedo. That is why two projects of torpedo weapons with nuclear weapons appeared.
T-15 - "Tsar Torpedo"
The initiator of the T-15 project was Alferov V.I., whose activities were associated at different times with the Navy, the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Captain of the first rank Alferov V.I. in KB-11 he took an active part in the creation of the atomic bomb, developed the circuit and instruments of the system for detonating a nuclear charge. Alferov V.I., taking advantage of his authority in industry, immediately after testing the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, organized the development of an extra-large torpedo for a hydrogen charge, designated T-15.
The author of the idea of creating a super-powerful nuclear torpedo is Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, who proposed using the Project 627 nuclear submarines being developed as a “vehicle for delivery” of a powerful nuclear charge (100 megatons!). This is confirmed by his own memories. These torpedoes were supposed to be used against US naval bases, as well as to strike cities located on the coast (although the latter option was opposed by many, including military sailors). As a result of the explosion of such a bomb, a giant wave was formed - a tsunami, destroying everything on the coast and even far from the coastline.
For reasons of secrecy, as well as taking into account personal relationships (in the Navy, Alferov was treated extremely negatively, since his letter to Beria and Bulganin, about the allegedly illegal transfer of documentation for the 45-36AV-A air torpedo to the Americans during the war, became the reason for the unfair trial of the admirals Kuznetsov, Galler, Alafuzov and Stepanov) the development of the T-15 torpedo was started without the involvement of the Navy. The 6th Department of the Navy learned about this torpedo only through the project of the first nuclear submarine - “Project 627” - the chief designer of which was V.N. Peregudov
The supposed armament of the nuclear boat became known to the fleet only in December 1953, after the approval of the tactical and technical characteristics of preliminary design 627. The sailors were greatly surprised by it. The first compartment of the submarine housed one huge torpedo tube, which almost completely replaced traditional torpedo weapons. The length of the torpedo tube was 23.5 meters (22 percent of the total length of the submarine). On the submarine, in addition to a one and a half meter torpedo, it was planned to install two bow 533-mm torpedo tubes with torpedoes for self-defense. No spare torpedoes were provided.
This unusual layout of the submarine is explained by the dimensions of the submarine developed at NII-400 under the leadership of chief designer N.N. Shamarin. T-15 torpedoes. The length of the torpedo was about 23 meters, the mass of the torpedo was 40 tons, the mass of the warhead was 3.5-4 thousand kg. The main weight load fell on the battery, which provided the torpedo with a speed of 29 knots, while the cruising range was 30 kilometers. Presumably, it was proposed to use a thermonuclear charge in the T-15 torpedo. The warhead of the torpedo was developed at KB-11 of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building, under the leadership of chief designer Yu.B. Khariton. The thermonuclear charge was to be detonated by an impact or remote (time) fuse. The firing control of the T-15 torpedo was provided by the Tantalum torpedo firing control station.
The tactical and technical elements of the submarine were approved on December 21, 1953. In July of the following year, SKB-143 completed the technical design of a nuclear submarine. On October 18, 1954, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building Submitted a technical project to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. After this, the Ministry of Defense was asked to review the project and send its conclusion to the Council of Ministers. Head of the Ministry of Defense N.A. Bulganin instructed Admiral P.G. Kotov, Assistant Minister for Naval Affairs, to deal with this issue. At the same time, the issue of admitting specialists and naval leaders to the project was decided. In 1954, an expert commission was formed headed by Vice Admiral A.E. Orel, head of the Directorate of the General Staff of the Navy. The Navy mainly objected to the composition of the nuclear submarine's armament. According to naval experts, the fleet does not need a submarine with such weapons. In addition, serious doubts arose that the submarine would be able to come within the launch range of the T-15 torpedo (40 kilometers), and that the torpedo itself would work as expected.
Against this background, based on the results of the Navy’s examination, it was decided to adjust the technical design of the 627 nuclear submarine. By Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 588-364 of March 26, 1955, the technical design of the submarine was approved only with 533-mm torpedo tubes, and work on the T-15 was stopped.
However, the story of Soviet nuclear torpedoes does not end there.
T-5 nuclear torpedo
As already noted, the sailors opposed increasing the size of torpedoes and wanted to obtain a nuclear charge of acceptable dimensions (533 mm caliber). It is for this reason that at the end of 1953 the 6th Department of the Navy issued, through the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Industry, a tactical and technical assignment for the nuclear BZO (combat charging compartment) of a ship's 533-mm torpedo.
The development of this product, which received the designation T-5 during the creation process, was carried out by NII-400 (TsNII Gidropribor). The development team was headed by A.M. Borushko. The nuclear charge for the torpedo - RDS-9 - was developed at the design bureau of the USSR Ministry of Medium Engineering under the leadership of Academician Yu.B. Khariton. Lieutenant General N.L. Dukhov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, chief designer of the Moscow branch of KB-11, was responsible for the entire combat unit, including automation. The design of the torpedo did not have any “revolutionary” innovations - a conventional 533-mm steam-gas straight torpedo with a range of 10 kilometers at a speed of 40 knots. The torpedo had an inertial control system and a thermal oxygen-alcohol-water steam-gas piston engine.
The developers almost immediately encountered technical difficulties. For example, for a long time they could not achieve stability of the torpedo in terms of depth. During sea trials of the T-5 torpedo in inert ammunition, out of fifteen fired shots, during four, after passing approximately halfway through the path, it made a “bag” and the hydrostatic contactor was prematurely activated, which is equivalent to issuing a command to detonate the warhead, since by this time all stages of its protection. Another problem was ensuring the thermal conditions of the nuclear warhead, since its normal functioning required a temperature of +5...+25 C, which was difficult to ensure in an unheated torpedo tube of a submarine, especially if it was based in the North.
While the designers were solving these and other problems, on September 21, 1955, in accordance with the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of April 13, 1955, tests of the nuclear BZO (combat charging compartment) of the T-5 torpedo were carried out at the Novaya Zemlya test site. The BZO was lowered from a Project 253L minesweeper and detonated at a depth of 12 meters, the average power was 3 kilotons.
In 1957, state tests of the T-5 torpedo were carried out. According to the program, the tests were to conduct two sighting shots of torpedoes without a special warhead, one in a control configuration (with a special warhead, without fissile materials in it), and one combat shot. Initially it was planned to detonate the charge at a depth of 25 meters, but later this parameter was changed to 35 meters. One of the shots in the initial stages of state testing ended in failure. In this regard, Admiral A.G. Golovko, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, considered that the tests should be stopped. The chairman of the commission, Admiral Basisty N.E., after a meeting with specialists and a report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, decided to conduct live firing with a nuclear combat charging compartment. The test conditions were as follows: Project 613 submarine S-144 (73rd separate division of submarines of the Northern Fleet) under the command of captain first rank Lazarev G.V. was “at periscope depth, the torpedo speed was 40 knots, the explosion depth was 35 meters...”. The shooting took place on October 10, 1957 at 10 o’clock at an air temperature of -6 degrees and visibility of 20 km. The deflection of the torpedo during the course (10 km) was 130 meters.
In 1958, the Navy adopted the T-5 torpedo for service. These torpedoes were produced in small series for the Northern and Pacific fleets at the Kirov plant (Alma-Ata). Torpedo production ceased at the end of 1960. In June 1960, their control tests of torpedoes in inert ammunition were carried out in the Pacific Ocean. There were several T-5 torpedoes to stop production. Firstly, the short development time had a significant impact on the performance and reliability of the torpedo, so in many respects it was inferior to torpedoes already in service. Secondly, and this is probably the most important thing, at the end of 1960, 533-mm ASBZO (autonomous special combat charging compartments) for production torpedo models began to enter service. The development of ASBZO with a capacity of 20 kilotons began according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 13, 1957 in KB-25 of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machinery and NII-400 of the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. It was the adoption of the ASBZO that marked the end for special nuclear torpedoes.
Main characteristics of T-15 / T-5 torpedoes:
Caliber - 1550 mm / 533 mm;
Torpedo mass - 40000 kg / 2200 kg;
Torpedo length - 2355 cm / 792 cm;
Type of energy - electric / steam-gas;
Nuclear charge - thermonuclear / atomic;
The torpedo carrier is the Project 627 nuclear submarine / submarine of all projects;
According to the US Nuclear Posture Review, the Russian intercontinental autonomous nuclear torpedo "Status-6" is real weapons, which represents real threat. At the same time, analysts assess the reality of this threat differently.
“This is clearly a threat to America that needs to be taken into account,” says former U.S. submarine officer Brian Clark, now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Provided that the torpedo is created, the main danger for Washington lies in its ability to bypass American system missile defense.
“The US military will begin to fear that Status 6 could fool the ballistic missile defense system,” Clark notes. “However, the new torpedo will be comparable in noise level to submarines or will be even more noticeable in this regard. Like a submarine, the torpedo is powered by a nuclear propulsion system consisting of a small reactor and turbine, but there is not enough room for noise-reducing design features like floating decks and sound insulation. US Navy must monitor these unmanned submarines using anti-submarine defense systems, including SOSUS.”
American sonars can easily detect a torpedo, but the United States does not have effective way protection from weapons like “Status-6”.
“The problem is finding a way to destroy the torpedo,” Clark says. – Submarine may abandon its plans after an unsuccessful torpedo attack or as a result of detection by sonar. But Status-6 has no crew, and will continue to move towards the target until it is physically stopped. Today, America does not have the weapons or technology to stop an underwater drone.”
"Status-6", despite all its innovation, is unlikely to become an effective weapon.
“In general, Status-6 is not considered an effective weapon,” Clark says. - Bomber with nuclear bombs or cruise missiles controlled by a pilot who, in the event of escalation or de-escalation of the conflict, may receive an order to abandon the operation or adjust his actions. In theory, the torpedo can also be recalled, but due to technical problems or communication problems, the activation or deactivation of the projectile may fail.”
“Status-6” is unlikely to be used in connection with balancing on the brink of nuclear war. “A torpedo is not as effective in terms of escalating a conflict, while bombers and ballistic missiles can signal to the enemy that a conflict is escalating, but without irreversible consequences,” Clark reports. “Status-6 does not give the enemy any signals other than an explosion or appearance in enemy waters, which makes it vulnerable.”
If American intelligence reports about the existence of weapons are correct, perhaps greatest danger is that the Status-6 warhead may be lost or stolen.
“Equipping Status 6 with a nuclear warhead could expose this type of Russian nuclear weapon to loss or theft,” Clarke said. – Even if tamper-proof Russian government unlikely to want to lose control nuclear weapons, especially given its emphasis on conflict escalation and self-control.”
Former Soviet and Russian arms control negotiator Nikolai Sokov, who is now senior research fellow The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies called the concept an echo of the USSR era.
“The concept is very old and dates back to a time when intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-based ballistic missiles were few and considered unreliable and vulnerable,” Sokov told the publication. The National Interest. – Today it is difficult to understand why to create a slow projectile with a power of 100 megatons. When a presentation slide was shown on Russian television a few years ago, I thought it was a ploy to alarm American intelligence. The authenticity of intelligence information about recent tests raises questions. Russia is actively working on the creation of small submarines. I readily believe that a carrier submarine is being developed with small submarines on board capable of diving to significant depths. But why equip them with 100 megaton warheads?”
Director of the Nonproliferation Program in East Asia James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Geoffrey Lewis suggested that the slow torpedo would be used to attack coastal targets such as naval bases. “It could explode in a port, destroy ships, or simply threaten coastal cities like New York,” Lewis said. “In my opinion, America can create a defense against such attacks, although I am not sure whether it will be effective.” In my opinion, this will be easier than intercepting a missile.”
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