The evolution of "Bukovs" and "Tors": what makes the "military umbrella" of Russian air defense unique. Self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system "circle"

IN Russian army There are two types of short-range anti-aircraft missile systems: “Tor” and “Pantsir-S”. The complexes have the same purpose: the destruction of low-flying cruise missiles and UAVs.

ZRPK "Pantsir-S" armed with 12 anti-aircraft guided missiles and four automatic cannons (two twin 30-mm anti-aircraft guns). The complex is capable of detecting targets at ranges of up to 30 km. The missile's destruction range is 20 kilometers. The maximum height of damage is 15 km. The minimum height of damage is 0-5 meters. The complex ensures the destruction of targets by missiles at speeds of up to 1000 m/s. Anti-aircraft guns ensure the destruction of subsonic targets. The air defense missile system is capable of covering industrial facilities, combined arms formations, anti-aircraft missile systems long range, airfields and ports. Millimeter-wave air defense radar with an active phased array antenna (AFAR).

SAM "Thor"- short-range anti-aircraft missile system. The complex is designed to destroy targets flying at ultra-low altitudes. The complex effectively combats cruise missiles, drones and stealth aircraft. "Thor" is armed with 8 guided anti-aircraft missiles.

Short-range anti-aircraft missile systems are indispensable, as they intercept the most dangerous and difficult to shoot down targets - cruise missiles, anti-radar missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Pantsir-SM

Evaluation of the highest efficiency of short-range complexes

In modern warfare, precision weapons play a vital role. Short-range air defense systems should be structurally present in every battalion, regiment, brigade and division. MANPADS should be used at the platoon and company level. Structurally, a motorized rifle battalion must have at least one Pantsir-S or Tor. This will significantly increase safety during the mobile maneuver of the battalion. Missile brigades should have the largest number of short-range anti-aircraft systems.

"Pantsir-S" is capable of covering launchers tactical missiles being several kilometers away. This will allow you to run tactical missiles while at the same time being safe from return fire. Let's take for example the Iskander operational-tactical missile system. The maximum range of its ballistic missiles reaches 500 km. Without the cover of the Pantsir-S air defense missile system, the tactical missile system risks being destroyed by enemy aircraft. The radars of modern aircraft are capable of detecting a missile launch. In general, missile launches are clearly visible in the radar and infrared range. So the launch will probably be clearly visible from hundreds of kilometers away.

Having detected the missile launch, enemy aircraft will fly to the launch site. The cruising speed of a supersonic aircraft is 700-1000 km/h. The aircraft is also capable of turning on afterburner and accelerating to speeds of more than 1,500 km/h. It will not be difficult for an airplane to cover a distance of 50-300 km in a short time (a few minutes).

The operational-tactical complex will not have time to prepare for a traveling position and travel a distance of at least more than 5-10 km. The folding and deployment time of the Iskander OTRK is several minutes. Drive 10 km at maximum speed about 60 km will take about 8 minutes. Although it will be impossible to accelerate to 60 km on the battlefield, the average speed will be 10-30 km, taking into account the unevenness of the road, dirt, etc. As a result, the OTRK will have no chance of traveling far to avoid getting hit by an airstrike.

For this reason, the Pantsir-S air defense missile system could protect launchers from missile attacks from aircraft as well as their aerial bombs. By the way, a very small number of anti-aircraft missile systems are capable of intercepting aerial bombs. These include Pantsir-S.

AGM-65 "Meiverik"

AGM-65 “Meiverik” against short-range air defense systems

The range of the NATO tactical aircraft missile "Meiverik" is up to 30 km. The rocket speed is subsonic. The missile attacks the target while gliding towards it. Our anti-aircraft gun-missile system is capable of detecting a missile launch at ranges of up to 30 km (taking into account the millimeter range of the Pantsir-S radar and the lack of stealth protection of the Maverick missile) and will be able to attack it from 20 km (maximum launch range ZPRK missiles). At a distance of 3 to 20 km, an aircraft missile will be an excellent target for an anti-aircraft system.

From 3000 m, 2A38 automatic cannons will begin to fire at the rocket. Automatic cannons have a caliber of 30 mm and are designed to destroy subsonic targets, such as the Maverick missile. A high density of fire (several thousand rounds per mine) will make it possible to destroy the target with a high degree of probability.

SAM "Tor-M1"

If the Iskander OTRK had covered the Tor, the situation would have been somewhat different. Firstly, the complex’s radar has a centimeter range, which somewhat reduces its ability to detect targets. Secondly, the radar, unlike the Pantsir-S, does not have an active antenna array, which also impairs the detection of small targets. The air defense system would have noticed an aircraft missile at ranges of up to 8-20 km. From a range of 15 km to 0.5 km, the Thor could effectively fire at the Maverick missile (the effective firing range is approximate, based on the tactical and technical characteristics of the radar and its ability to fire at targets with a similar effective dispersion area).

According to the results of a comparison of the Pantsir-S air defense system and the Tor air defense system, the former is slightly superior to its competitor. The main advantages: the presence of an AFAR radar, a millimeter-wave radar, and missile and gun armament, which has certain advantages over missile weapons (missile and gun armament allows you to fire at significantly more targets due to the fact that the guns are additional weapons that can be used when the missiles run out).

If we compare the capabilities of the two systems to combat supersonic targets, they are approximately equal. Pantsir-S will not be able to use its cannons (they only intercept subsonic targets).

Pantsir-S1 fires

The advantage of Pantsir-S is automatic cannons

A significant advantage of the Pantsir-S air defense missile system is that its automatic cannons, if necessary, are capable of firing at ground targets. The guns can hit enemy personnel, lightly armored and unarmored targets. Also, taking into account the very high density of fire and a decent range (approximately the same as for air targets), the air defense missile system is capable of firing at the crew of an anti-tank missile system (man-portable anti-tank missile system), protecting itself and protected launchers of operational-tactical missiles.

Conventional large-caliber machine guns located on tanks and small-caliber automatic guns of infantry fighting vehicles do not have such a huge speed and density of fire, because of this they usually have little chance of firing at ATGM crews from ranges of more than 500 m and, as a result, are often destroyed in such “duels.” Also, “Pantsir-S” is capable of firing at an enemy tank, damaging its external instruments, the cannon and knocking down the track. Also, the air defense missile system is almost guaranteed to destroy in a confrontation any lightly armored vehicle that is not equipped with long-range anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM).

“Tor” cannot offer anything in terms of self-defense from ground equipment, with the exception of desperate attempts to launch a guided anti-aircraft missile at an attacking target (purely theoretically possible, in fact I heard only one case during the War in South Ossetia, the Russian small missile ship “Mirage” launched anti-aircraft missile of the Osa-M complex at the attacking Georgian boat, after which a fire started on it, in general, anyone interested can look it up on the Internet).

Pantsir-S1, automatic guns

Options for covering armored vehicles and providing fire support for them

The Pantsir-S air defense missile system can cover advancing tanks and infantry fighting vehicles at a safe distance (3-10 km) behind armored vehicles. Moreover, such a range will make it possible to intercept aircraft missiles, helicopters, and UAVs at a safe distance from advancing tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (5-10 km).

One Pantsir-S air defense missile system will be able to provide protection to a tank company (12 tanks) within a radius of 15-20 km. This, on the one hand, will allow the tanks to be dispersed over a large area (one air defense missile system will still provide protection from air attacks), on the other hand, for protection tank company a significant number of Pantsir-S air defense missile systems will not be needed. Also, the Pantsir-S radar with an active phased array antenna will make it possible to detect targets up to 30 km (10 km before the maximum destruction range) and inform armored vehicle crews about an upcoming or possible attack. Tankers will be able to put up a smoke screen of aerosols, making it difficult to target in the infrared, radar and optical ranges.

You can also try to hide the equipment behind any hill or shelter, or turn the tank with its frontal part (the most protected) towards the attacking air target. It is also possible to try to shoot down an enemy aircraft or low-speed aircraft yourself with a guided anti-tank missile or fire at them with a heavy machine gun. Also, the air defense missile system will be able to provide target designation to other anti-aircraft systems that have a greater range of destruction or are located closer to the target. The Pantsir-S air defense missile system is also capable of supporting tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with fire from automatic cannons. Probably in a “duel” between an infantry fighting vehicle and an air defense missile system, the latter will emerge victorious due to its much faster-firing barrels.

/Alexander Rastegin/

Self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system "CIRCLE"

The formation of requirements for the first air defense system of the Ground Forces "Krug" was characterized by those trends that determined the totality of the main characteristics of the first missile systems of the country's Air Defense Forces - S-25 and S-75 and the necessary requirements of the Ground Forces for cross-country capability, time of readiness for combat work from the march and absence of wired communication lines and electrical connection cables between the complex facilities. The main ones considered were high-speed and high-altitude targets, practically invulnerable to cannon anti-aircraft artillery and not always accessible to interception by front-line fighters.

Of course, the mobile version of the Krug air defense system did not allow such large area destruction, like that of the S-200 system of the Air Defense Forces, which began development in the summer of 1958. Nevertheless, in terms of the given maximum range, the Krug complex had to surpass not only the SA-75 Dvina air defense system, which had been adopted by that time, ensuring the destruction of targets , flying at altitudes of up to 22 km at a range of up to 29 km, but also its modernized version, the S-75M Volkhov, with a range of up to 40 km, is just slated for design.

Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated February 13, 1958 No. 2188-88 “On the creation prototype of the Krug anti-aircraft missile system, the main characteristics of the air defense system, the cooperation of the lead contractors using the complex's means and the timing of the work were determined, which determine the exit to joint (state) tests in the third quarter. 1961

The anti-aircraft missile system was intended to intercept targets flying at speeds up to 600 m/s at altitudes from 3000 m to 25000 m, at a distance of up to 45 km. The probability of hitting a target such as an Il-28 front-line bomber at altitudes up to 20 km with one missile was supposed to be 0 ,8, while providing for the possibility of maneuvering the target with an overload of up to 4 units. A target with an effective scattering surface (ESR) corresponding to the MiG-15 fighter was supposed to be detected at a distance of 1 15 km, ensuring deployment time from the march and collapse time of no more than 5 minutes.

The lead organization for the development of the Krug anti-aircraft missile system (2K11) was determined to be NII-20 GKOT (director P.M. Chudakov), the chief designer was V.P. Efremov. The 1S32 missile guidance station of the Krug complex was developed at the same NII-20 by chief designer I.M. Drize, then K.I. Popov.

The development of missile defense systems on a competitive basis was entrusted to two artillery design bureaus, which had quite a lot of experience in creating anti-aircraft guns. The KS-40 (3M8) rocket weighing 1.8 tons with a ramjet engine was to be created by the team of OKB-8 of the Sverdlovsk SNK headed by L.V. Lyulev. The famous V.T. was appointed as the developer of the 2-ton missile defense system with a solid propellant engine. Grabin, chief designer of the Central Research Institute-58 GKOT located in Kaliningrad near Moscow.

Grabin's work lasted relatively short. The S-134 rocket he designed was also equipped with a ramjet engine. Unlike the Sverdlovsk model, air access to the combustion chamber was carried out through four sector air intakes. The Grabinsk company independently developed a launcher under the symbol S-135. In general, all this work was carried out a little more than a year- July 4, 1959. By Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers No. 739–338, TsNII-58 was attached to the nearby OKB-1 S.P. Queen. Grabin himself turned out to be unlucky, that is, in a teaching job at the Moscow Higher Technical School. Most of his former employees, under the leadership of Korolev, began designing solid-fuel strategic ballistic missiles.

However, the competitive nature of the development remained. By the same Decree of July 4, 1959, OKB-2 of the State Committee for Aviation Technology (GKAT), chief designer P. D. Grushin, was involved in the creation of missiles for the Krug, who proposed the V-757Kr missile for the Krug complex - a version of its B missile defense system -757 (“product 17D”) with a ramjet solid fuel engine, developed in the same years for the country’s Air Defense Forces. The Krug complex with the V-757Kr (ZM10) missile was designated 2K11Mi and was to be submitted for joint testing at the end of 1960.

In addition to the “safety net” of the Sverdlovsk Design Bureau, the connection of OKB-2 also pursued another goal - the implementation of the ever-living, but not always fruitful idea of ​​unifying missile weapons. A number of complaints about the Grushin version of the rocket were made when considering its preliminary design in the summer of 1960. It was necessary to reduce the length and weight of the rocket. Ground Forces specialists were not satisfied with the temperature range of operation and the permissible transportation range of the starting engine, the operational characteristics of the radio fuse and the autopilot. It was necessary to abandon the heating of the ampoule battery and gas generator of the main engine.

As already noted, the main developer of the 3M8 missile defense system, OKB-8, was clearly tasked with using a ramjet engine (ramjet engine) on an anti-aircraft guided missile. The choice of this type of engine using non-aggressive liquid fuel seemed quite justified. Air oxygen was used as an oxidizer in the ramjet engine, so the rocket carried only fuel - kerosene. Ramjet engines were five times or more superior in specific thrust to rocket engines. For rocket flight speeds exceeding sound speed by 5 times, the ramjet engine was characterized by the lowest fuel consumption per unit of thrust, even in comparison with a turbojet engine. In comparison, the design of a ramjet engine seemed amazingly simple, and it was also much cheaper. Almost the only drawback of ramjet engines was considered to be the inability to create significant thrust at subsonic speeds in the absence of the necessary speed pressure at the entrance to the air intake, which did not allow limiting oneself to the use of only ramjet engines on rockets launched from the Earth.

In the mid-1950s. Many attempts have been made to introduce ramjet engines not only into rocketry, but even into manned aircraft. The French were “ahead of the rest” here. In addition to the clearly experimental aircraft of the Leduc company with a more than extravagant placement in the central body of the air intake of the pilot’s cockpit, piloting the aircraft in a piquant prone position, a real Griffon fighter was also developed with a combined turbo-ramjet engine .

In rocket science, in addition to many unrealized projects of ramjet-powered products, there were the actual flying Novaho projectile and serial anti-aircraft missiles Bomarck, Super Bomarck, Bloodhound, and Teilos.

In our country, the greatest experience in designing and testing ramjet engines was accumulated at SKB-670 GKAT by the team led by chief designer M.M. Bondaryuk, back in the early 1950s. who developed such an engine for a rocket coastal complex"Storm". Their most significant work was the creation of a supersonic ramjet for the S.A. intercontinental cruise missile. Lavochkin "Storm", successfully tested both on test benches and in flight tests. Engines were being worked on for a similar rocket by V.M. Myasishchev "Buran", as well as for other aircraft. True, the existing experience was somewhat one-sided - the engines were developed for low-maneuverable vehicles flying at a constant speed at almost the same altitude.

Taking into account the impossibility of ramjet operation at low speeds, the 3M8 rocket was designed using a two-stage design with four launch engines arranged in a “package” design. To ensure the conditions for launching a ramjet engine, solid fuel boosters accelerated the rocket to a speed 1.5–2 times higher than sound.

By the end of the 1950s. There was already information about the unstable nature of the operation of ramjet engines at high angles of attack. On the other hand, for an anti-aircraft missile designed to destroy highly maneuverable aircraft front-line aviation, it was necessary to implement transverse overloads of about 8 units. This largely determined the choice of the overall design of the rocket. For the second (propulsion) stage, a design with a rotating wing was adopted, which provided the ability to create large lifting forces at low angles of attack of the rocket body.

On the 3M8 rocket, the use of combined control was initially envisaged - a radio command system during the main flight phase and homing at the final part of the missile defense trajectory. The semi-active radar homing head was supposed to operate on the pulsed radiation signal of the target tracking channel of the missile guidance station reflected from the target.

The missiles were launched from the self-propelled launcher 2P24 (factory designation KS-40), created in the same OKB-8, placed on the “object 123” tracked chassis developed by the Sverdlovsk Transport Engineering Plant based on the “object 105” self-propelled chassis artillery installation SU-100P. The artillery part of the launcher included a support beam with a boom hinged in its tail section, raised by two hydraulic cylinders. On the sides of the boom, brackets with supports were attached - “zero length” guides - to accommodate two missiles. When the rocket was launched, the front support sharply folded down, clearing the way for the lower console of the rocket stabilizer to pass through. The missiles were launched at an angle from 10° to 55° to the horizon. Before that, during the march, the missiles were supported by additional underwater supports, also attached to the boom. One support of the truss structure was brought in from the front and ensured the fixation of both missiles at once. Another support was moved from the sides opposite to the arrow.

The height of the launcher with assembled missiles during the march exceeded 4 m, so if it was necessary to pass under overpasses, the upper stabilizer console was removed.

The technical appearance of the rocket and launcher did not take shape immediately. At an early stage of design, a variant of a rocket with a “+”-shaped wing arrangement and an “x”-shaped tail unit was considered, while the missiles were launched from the launcher’s beam guides. Even after the start of flight tests, the possibility of switching from the frontal annular air intake to the side sector ones was explored. During the development process, the span of the wing and tail surfaces decreased somewhat.

The experimental model of the SNR was placed on a self-propelled prototype of the Baikal anti-aircraft self-propelled gun, which was not adopted for service, on which the turret with anti-aircraft guns was replaced with an antenna post with a so-called “basket”, in which consoles and workplaces for three operators were placed. The “basket” was rotated in the azimuthal plane by ±90°. The antenna post, in turn, could rotate relative to the “basket” by another ±45° in azimuth and rise up to the vertical in elevation. However, this layout option turned out to be extremely cramped and inconvenient to use - some of the instruments were even located under the operator’s chairs. Counting and solving instruments and power supply facilities were placed outside the “basket”, in the housing. The test results did not allow us to accept this layout scheme, which was more suitable for a tank than for a radar, for further development - it was not possible to ensure normal working conditions for operators.

In its standard version, the missile guidance station was located on the “object 124” self-propelled vehicle, basically similar to the launcher chassis. At the same time, the personnel and almost all instruments and assemblies were located in a fixed wheelhouse in the middle of the hull, and the rotating antenna post was located in its stern.

Initially all tests anti-aircraft missiles The complex was supposed to be carried out at the Donguz test site in the Orenburg region, but it turned out to be too small taking into account the required missile launch ranges. Therefore, in 1960, the construction of a new testing ground near the Emba railway station began in Kazakhstan. The most necessary facilities of this test site were prepared in 1963, which made it possible to conduct joint tests there. The new facility was named the 11th State Test Site.

Initial plans included the delivery of telemetry missiles to the test site in the first quarter. 1959, missile guidance stations - by June, and target detection stations - in the third quarter. the same year.

In fact, only on November 26, 1959, the first of 10 throw tests of a mock-up rocket with full-scale launch engines took place, during which the first troubles were revealed - flutter, destruction of the rocket when the launchers were separated... Flight testing of the main engine with four launches of rockets without control equipment began in June 1960 Since August, having failed to achieve stable engine operation, they began to carry out program launches of rockets equipped with an autopilot, but without radio control equipment. Until June next year, 32 such launches were completed. Of these, the first 16 missiles were equipped with a simplified autopilot that did not provide roll control and a turbopump unit without a fuel consumption control device. Of the 26 launches carried out before the end of 1960, in six the rocket was destroyed in flight, in seven the propulsion engine did not turn on, and only 12 were relatively successful.

By the summer of 1960, the first tests of simplified versions of the Grushinsky B-757 for the S-75 complex were carried out. Since January 23, three launches of prototypes have been carried out, with a partially equipped gas generator, without rudders and destabilizers. During these tests, the operation and separation of the accelerator, the operation of the main engine with achievement of speeds from 560 to 690 m/s were checked. On April 22, autonomous tests of the rocket began, during which the B-757 developers encountered a number of difficulties.

Taking into account the delays in testing missiles, the decision of the Military-Industrial Commission (MIC) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated February 2, 1961 No. 17 proposed to launch the B-750VN missiles of the S-75 complex with on-board equipment similar to adopted for the Krug air defense missile system. Based on the 1SB7 on-board radio control and radio imaging unit from the 3M8 missile, 20 sets of KRB-9 equipment were manufactured, suitable for placement on B-750 family missiles.

However, in August it was not possible to proceed to joint testing of the complex with the standard 3M8 missile - by this time the first missile guidance station was still in the debugging stage, and the second model was in the state of delivery of individual units. Nevertheless, on September 24, the first launch of the modified B-750VN missile took place in the fixed beam SNR 1S32. Disappointing results showed the need to refine the SNR.

During the first flight tests, surging of the ramjet engine also appeared, which worked satisfactorily only at low angles of attack. Due to the insufficient vibration resistance of the equipment, the surge led to a disruption in the passage of commands and, as a result, to a loss of controllability of the missile defense system. At the 31st second, the transponder signal systematically disappeared. This mysterious phenomenon overcome by moving the antenna from the rocket body to the stabilizer. Difficulties with launching a missile into the SNR beam were eliminated by staggering the installation of the range strobe from the moment the boosters were released. On the recommendation of the commission, the open-loop control gain was reduced from 0.9 to 0.5, while the closed-loop gain was quadrupled. In 1961, the first 10 samples of 1SB7 were manufactured by the Tula Arsenal plant.

Taking into account the large number of failures in testing of 3M8 missiles, by decision of the State Committee on Aviation Technology dated August 25, 1961, a special expert commission was created to develop measures to refine the missile. Most of the accidents were associated with burnouts of the combustion chamber, failures in the operation of the on-board equipment of the control unit, and insufficient strength of a number of structural elements. A month later, based on the recommendations of the commission, it was decided to change the design of combustion stabilizers, eliminate flow separation zones and increase the heat resistance of the combustion chamber of the main engine. By the end of the year, it was planned to carry out additional fire tests of the engine at CIAM stands, as well as vibration tests of the KRB equipment and the PT-10 on-board current converter - first autonomously, and then as part of a rocket.

In addition to the inoperability of the equipment when exposed to vibrations and undeveloped engines, the flight tests also revealed a discrepancy between the flight performance characteristics of the rocket and the specified ones. None of those performed in 1960–1961. 55 launches failed to reach maximum range. According to calculated estimates, the specified level of maneuverability at high altitudes was not ensured. NII-648 delayed the development of a prototype homing head (GOS) for the missile. Testing of the on-board power supply was not completed.

By the end of 1961, the attitude of the military-industrial leadership towards the Grushin B-757Kr missile had changed significantly. The deadline for completing work on the B-757 for the country's Air Defense Forces has been repeatedly postponed. Accordingly, the planned start date for flight testing of the B-757Kr for the Ground Forces was moved to September 1962.

Before that, in the conditions of failures with the tests of the 3M8 missile defense system, Grushin’s much greater experience in creating anti-aircraft missiles, compared to Lyulev, contributed to the fact that the V-757Kr missile was already considered as the main version of the missile defense system for the Krug complex. The somewhat worse overall dimensions of this missile were to some extent compensated for by interspecific unification with the B-757 missile ("product 17D"), developed for the S-75M air defense system of the country's Air Defense Forces. However, the ramjet engine turned out to be a “tough nut to crack” for the OKB-2 team. The development of the ramjet rocket was delayed, and already in 1960, the conventional V-755 liquid-propellant rocket entered service as part of the S-75M air defense system - in fact, a thoroughly modified V-750VN rocket. Having not completed the development of the V-757 missile, the Grushin team began working on a new missile defense system with a ramjet - the V-758 ("product 22D"). Under these conditions, despite the failures with the 3M8, the version of the 2K11M complex with the Grushin V-757Kr missile began to be considered as secondary. In particular, by the decision of the military-industrial complex of December 28, 1961, it was instructed to consider the possibility of placing the V-757Kr missile on a standard 2P24 launcher instead of the previously manufactured 2P28 in one prototype, also designed on a chassis of the SU-100P type specifically for the Grushinsky missile. After the actual termination of testing of the B-757 missile, the decision of the military-industrial complex of October 17, 1962 raised the question of the advisability of further continuing work on the B-757Kr missile. Work on the B-757 and B-757Kr was finally closed by the Decree of the Party and the Government of June 15, 1963.

In the fall of 1961, an experimental missile guidance station was installed instead of the experimental one. For it, as for the 2P24 launcher, provision was made for hermetic sealing to protect against weapons of mass destruction.

However, the state of work on the Lyulev rocket was also unfavorable, although in May 1962 factory tests of rockets with radio control equipment began. By the end of 1962, they had not achieved reliable operation of the on-board equipment of the missile launcher, had not determined the ballistic capabilities of the missile, and did not have time to commission the second missile guidance station. On the other hand, there was an encouraging result - an analysis of the capabilities of the missile guidance station and the dynamic characteristics of the missile defense system showed the possibility of ensuring acceptable accuracy when using only a radio command control system.

In 1962, the 3M8 rocket with a radio command system began to fly largely without problems. The decision of the military-industrial complex of January 12, 1963 approved the proposal of the GRAU and industry to conduct joint flight tests (FLI) in two stages - first only with the radio command system, then with the seeker. Thus, the process of abandoning the use of a combined guidance system on a missile, including a semi-active seeker, actually began in favor of purely radio command systems already mastered in the S-25, S-75 and S-125 air defense systems.

During factory tests until April 1963, 26 launches were carried out. Most of them were carried out against so-called electronic targets, two - against parachute targets, four - against IL-28 converted into targets. During joint testing from the beginning of 1963 to May, eight launches were carried out, three of which ended in failure. There was not a single successful launch of missiles at an elevation angle of the guides of more than 46°, while it was required to ensure the ability to launch at angles up to 60°.

Of the 25 launches carried out from February to August 1963, only seven managed to shoot down targets - Il-28. “Organizational conclusions” were being prepared, but the main shortcomings had already been revealed, and before the end of the year it was possible to successfully carry out a couple more launches. And this despite the fact that the missiles arrived at the test site untimely - out of the required 40 missiles, only 21 were delivered, and the test results were processed slowly - within three weeks. The ground equipment of the complex was not brought to its full complement - the vehicles were not equipped with navigation, orientation and topographical equipment, or telecode communication systems. Gas turbine installations of the machines' power supply systems often failed. Only on the second launcher was the sound insulation system brought to a state that ensured the possibility of a safe launch while personnel were inside 2P24. During the tests, there was an incident, fortunately, which did not lead to tragic consequences, when the fighters accompanying the target fired instead at the target in order to eliminate it in the event of a miss by the missile defense system.

Launcher 2P24 with 3M8 missiles for the Krug air defense system

By the beginning of next year, two more launches were carried out, both successful. However, none of the firing has yet been carried out against relatively small targets such as the MiG-17 and against targets flying at altitudes of less than 3000 m. The SAM sustainer engine still operated unstable at low altitudes. Self-oscillations arose in the control loop, leading to unacceptable misses when flying near the target. The effectiveness of the radio fuse and warhead against real targets was questionable.

The difficulties associated with the creation of missiles of the Krug complex are characterized by the testimony of Igor Fedorovich Golubeev, deputy chief designer of Lyulev.

“We took on the 3M8 missile defense system without fully realizing the complexity and difficulty of this work. In a word, we were young and stupid. For comparison, I’ll say that with the current team of many thousands, we would have thought twice before taking on such work .

In 3M8, as is known, due to the lack of suitable solid fuel with a good unit impulse in the country, it was decided to use a ramjet engine using liquid fuel - kerosene. The ramjet engine was invented in 1903 by the Frenchman Legendre and since then has been one of the most energy-efficient rocket engine, which makes it possible not to carry oxidizer reserves on board.

But everything works well if the proportional flow rate of air to fuel is maintained - approximately 15:1. If this ratio changes, the engine begins to act up and may stall or surge. Therefore, one of the complex elements is the inlet diffuser and the fuel pump with injectors. Suffice it to say that about ten thousand injectors had to be “annealed” before the optimal shape was found. And this is only for this type of engine, and if its geometric dimensions were changed, everything would have to be repeated again. This is one of the reasons why ramjet engines are not widely used now - they are unique in their specific design. Each step during the development was difficult and was solved literally from scratch.

Since the beginning of controlled flights, the struggle against the attenuation of the on-board radio transponder signal in the engine exhaust plume began. It turned out that the combustion products of ordinary kerosene shield the transponder antenna very well. I had to take it out to the tail console. We had just dealt with this when the rocket began to sway approximately in the middle of the flight path and, with a frequency of 50:50, either passed through this section or lost control. The solution was simple - the phases of the power supply to the gyros of the SAM autopilot were mixed up. The gyroscopes, after pre-launch spin-up in the wrong direction, with the transition to on-board power, first began to slow down, stopped approximately in the middle of the trajectory, and then spun again in the opposite direction. If everything went well, then the further flight continued steadily."

In general, during joint tests from February 1963 to June 1964, 41 missile launches were carried out, including 24 missiles in combat configuration. Four cases of wing flutter required the introduction of anti-flutter balancers, three “poor” failures of the combustion process required modifications to the fuel supply regulator, six isopropyl nitrate explosions required improvements to the fuel system, two failures of the radio fuse required modifications to its circuitry.

But since the launches were mostly successful at the final stage of testing, the State Commission chaired by A.G. Burykina recommended the complex for adoption.

The corresponding Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated October 26, 1964 - “On the adoption of the Krug mobile anti-aircraft guided missile system with 3M8 missiles” determined the main characteristics of the complex. Most of the essential performance requirements set by the 1958 Decree have been met. The exception was the range of flight altitudes of targets hit - 3-23.5 km - it did not reach 1.5 km along the required maximum altitude reach. The engagement range range was 11–45 km, the maximum heading parameter (distance of the target path from the air defense missile system position in the lateral direction) was 18 km. In terms of the permissible maximum target speed - up to 800 m/s - the initial requirements were exceeded by 200 m/s. The detection range of an object with an EPR corresponding to the MiG-15 was 115 km. A typical target - an F-4C or F-105D fighter-bomber - was hit with a probability of 0.7. The reaction time of the complex was 60 s.

Layout of the 3M8 missile defense system "Krug"

1 - fairing: 2 - warhead: 3 - radio fuse: 4 - air pressure accumulator: 5 - fuel tanks: 6 - rotary wing; 7 - steering gear; 8 - radio control equipment: 9 - autopilot/ 10 - isopropyl nitrate tank: 11 - starting accelerator: 12 - turbopump unit; 13 - nozzle block: 14 - combustion stabilizer: 15 - stabilizer

Starting engines ZTs5 on the 3M8 missile of the Krug air defense system

The 3M8 rocket was made according to a two-stage design. The body of the rocket's sustainer stage was a supersonic ramjet engine ZTs4 - a tube with a pointed central body, sharp inlet edges of the frontal air intake, ring nozzles and combustion stabilizers. On previous missiles of similar designs, most of the systems and assemblies were placed in a ring pattern in the outer ramjet housing. However, for a number of elements, for example, the warhead, such a location was clearly contraindicated. In the central body of the air intake with a cylindrical part diameter of 450 mm, in addition to the ZN11 high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing about 150 kg, there was a ZE26 radio fuse and a ball cylinder of an air pressure accumulator. A homing head was supposed to be installed in the front part of the central body. The central body was slightly recessed into the internal volume of the rocket body. Next were openwork structures made of annular and radial elements - straightening grilles, nozzle blocks, combustion stabilizers. In the annular engine housing with an outer diameter of 850 mm, starting from its leading edge, there were tanks with kerosene, approximately in the middle of the length - steering gears, wing fastenings, and closer to the trailing edge - blocks of control system equipment (CS).

Rotary wings with a span of 2206 mm were placed in an “X”-shape and could be deflected by a hydropneumatic steering drive in the range of ±28°. The wing chord was 840 mm at the base, 500 mm at the tip. The sweep along the leading edge was 19°38; the trailing edge was 8°26’ (negative), the total area in one plane of the rotating parts of both consoles was 0.904 m².

Stabilizers with a span of 2702 mm were installed in a “+”-shaped pattern. Chord 860 mm at the base, 490 mm at the tip. The leading edge is swept 20°, the trailing edge is straight, the total area of ​​the two consoles in one plane is 1.22 m?. The length of the rocket was 8436 mm, diameter - 850 mm.

With a starting weight of 2455 kg, the initial weight of the second (flight) stage was about 1400 kg, of which approximately 270 kg was fuel - T-1 kerosene (or TS) and 27 kg was isopropyl nitrate.

The fuel supply was provided by a turbopump unit C5.15 (on the first samples - C2.727), running on monofuel - isopropyl nitrate. This unitary fuel, in comparison with hydrogen peroxide, which was previously widely used in rocket technology, had a slightly lower density (by about a quarter) and had greater energy and, more importantly, was more stable and safer in operation.

Each of the four ZTs5 starting engines was equipped with a charge of 11 RSI-12K solid baplite fuel weighing 173 kg in the form of a single-channel block 2635 mm long with an outer diameter of 248 mm and a channel diameter of 85 mm. To ensure separation of the starting engines from the sustainer stage, a pair of small aerodynamic surfaces were attached to each of them in the aft bow.

For radio command flight control of missile defense systems under the leadership of R.S. Tolmachev developed a missile guidance station (SNR) 1S32, which was a coherent-pulse radar in the centimeter range. The station's antenna post was a rather complex rotating structure with several dish antennas, the largest element of which was the target channel antenna. To the left of it was the antenna of the narrow beam of the missile channel, above which were located the antennas of the wide beam of the missile channel and, closer to the periphery, the transmitter of commands to the missile. Subsequently, a television-optical sighting camera was placed in the upper part of the antenna post. The station automatically processed target designation information received via telecode from the target detection station (SOTs) 1S12, and carried out a quick search for the target. The search had to be carried out only by elevation, since the resolution of the target detection station in the vertical plane was much worse than in the horizontal. After detecting the target, it was captured for automatic tracking using angular coordinates and range.

Next, the calculating device at the missile guidance station determined the boundaries of the launch and engagement zones, the installation angles of the acquisition and tracking antennas of the missile defense system (with wide and narrow scanning beams), as well as the data entered into the target and missile auto-rangefinder. Based on telecode commands from the missile guidance station, the launcher was turned in the launch direction. After the target entered the launch zone and the command transmitter was turned on, the launch was carried out by pressing a button on the missile guidance station. Based on signals from the onboard transponder, the missile launcher was captured for tracking by the angular (with a wide beam) and rangefinder channels of the missile guidance station and was first introduced into the narrow beam of the missile channel antenna, which was then aligned parallel to the target channel antenna. Flight control commands generated by the missile guidance station's computer, as well as a one-time command to disarm the radio fuse were transmitted to the missile.

SAM guidance was carried out using the “half straightening” method or the “three points” method. The radio fuse was triggered when the missile flew at a distance of less than 50 m from the target. Otherwise, the rocket would self-destruct.

The 1S32 station implemented the method of hidden monoconical scanning along angular coordinates and used an electronic target range finder. Resistance from passive, range-deflecting, reciprocal and non-synchronous interference was ensured by frequency tuning and channel lettering, high energy potential of the transmitter, signal amplitude selection, the ability to simultaneously operate one missile defense system at two frequencies, as well as coding of control commands.

Missile guidance radar 1S32 of the Krug air defense system and its diagram

1S32 missile guidance radar at a combat position

Target detection radar 1S12 SAM "Krug"

In accordance with the calculated characteristics, the pulse power of the missile guidance station was 750 kW, the sensitivity of the receiver was 10 -13 W, and the beam width was 1°. Target acquisition for auto tracking in a noise-free environment could be carried out at a range of up to 105 km. At a given level of interference (1.5–2 packs of dipoles per 100 m of target path), the auto-tracking range was reduced to 70 km.

Errors in target tracking in angular coordinates did not exceed 0.3 d.u., in range - 15 m. Subsequently, for protection against Shrike-type missiles, intermittent operating modes and auto-tracking using a television-optical sight were introduced.

It is known that the main thing in the S-75 air defense system is combat unit- anti-aircraft missile division - had the ability to independently conduct combat operations, having, along with missile guidance stations, also target reconnaissance means - usually radars of the P-12 family, often in combination with altimeters.

The anti-aircraft missile division, armed with the Krug air defense system, also included a target reconnaissance device, the role of which was performed by the 1S12 target detection station - a centimeter-range rangefinder radar. In combination with one or two PRV-9A radio altimeters, the same radar under the name P-40 (“Armor”) was also used in military air defense radar companies. The radar was developed by NII-208 (later NII IP of the Ministry of Radio Industry) under the leadership of chief designer V.V. Reisberg.

The 1S12 target detection station provided detection of a fighter at ranges of up to 180 km (at a flight altitude of 12000 m) and 70 km for a target flying at an altitude of 500 m. The pulsed radiation power of the station was 1.7–1.8 MW, the receiver sensitivity was 4. 3–7.7x10 -14 W. During a circular view, four beams were sequentially formed in the elevation plane: two lower ones with a width of 2° and 4°, as well as two upper ones with a width of 10° and 14°. The beam direction was switched electromechanically.

The “object 426” chassis, developed at the design bureau of the Kharkov Transport Engineering Plant named after. V.A. Malyshev on the basis of the AT-T heavy artillery tractor created there. In a number of indicators, including security, it was inferior to the chassis based on the SU-100P. The diversity of tracked vehicles in the anti-aircraft missile division did not bode well either. In this case, the choice of chassis was determined by the weight of the equipment and antenna post of the 1S12 station, twice as large as the missile guidance station.

The most important advantage of the combat assets of the anti-aircraft missile division was the autonomy of their power supply, provided by built-in gas turbine units with a power of 40 to 120 hp. Information exchange between the division's assets was ensured by radio telecode communication. For the first time, gyroscopic navigation aids and topo-tethering were installed in air defense systems. The presence of these means and the exclusion of cable connections made it possible to sharply reduce the time spent on their deployment and collapse at a combat position.

Target detection radar 1S123RK "Krug" (in stowed position) and its diagram

As already noted, the main unit of the Krug complex was an anti-aircraft missile division, which included a control platoon, three anti-aircraft missile batteries, each of which included one 1S32 missile guidance station and three 2P24 launchers with twin guides, as well as a technical battery. Thus, the division included three missile guidance stations and nine launchers with 18 combat-ready missiles.

The control platoon contained a 1S12 target detection station, as well as a target designation receiving cabin for the Krab (K-1) combat control complex.

The technical battery included 2V9 control and testing stations, 2T6 transport-loading vehicles, 9T25 transport vehicles, refueling vehicles, as well as technological equipment for assembling and refueling rockets.

In essence, the anti-aircraft missile division formed the anti-aircraft missile system as a minimum set of forces and means ensuring the detection and destruction of an air target.

Despite the possibility of conducting independent combat operations, the anti-aircraft missile division’s own means did not provide the most efficient use its combat potential. This was determined, first of all, by the limited search capabilities of the 1S12 station, taking into account its location on the real terrain with shading zones, as well as the extremely short flight time during enemy aircraft operations at extremely low altitudes.

To ensure more effective use of anti-aircraft missile divisions, they were included in anti-aircraft missile brigades with a unified control system.

The brigade, designed to solve the air defense tasks of the front (army), along with three anti-aircraft missile divisions, included a control battery. The brigade's control battery contained the combat control cabin of the "Crab" complex, as well as its own means of detecting air targets - detection radar P-40D, P-18, P-19, radio altimeter PRV-9A (or PRV-11).

The joint work of the command posts of the brigade and divisions was ensured by the K-1 (“Crab”) control complex. It was created in 1957–1960. by the OKB-563 GKRE team under the leadership of chief designer B.S. Semenikhin. Initially, the "Crab" complex, which later received the index 9S44, was intended for automated fire control of an anti-aircraft artillery regiment armed with S-60 automatic cannons, but was then developed to ensure the combat operation of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile regiment.

Besides command post brigade - combat control cabin located on the Ural-375 chassis, and division command posts - target designation receiving cabins (on ZIL-157) the complex included a narrow-band radar image transmission line "Setka-2K", a GAZ-69T topographic surveyor and equipment power supply in the form of separate diesel power plants.

The complex made it possible to visually display the air situation on the brigade commander’s console on the spot and on the move based on information from the P-10, P-12 (P-18), P-15 (P-19) and P-40 radars. When targets were found at a distance of 15 to 160 km, up to 10 targets were simultaneously processed, target designations were issued with forced pointing of the antennas of the battery missile guidance station in given directions, and the acceptance of these target designations was checked. The coordinates of 10 targets selected by the brigade commander were entered into the computer by two data acquisition operators, after which the information was transmitted directly to the battery missile guidance stations.

The operating time of the K-1 complex from detecting an enemy aircraft to issuing target designation to the division, taking into account the distribution of targets and the possible need to transfer fire, was 32 seconds. The reliability of target designation training reached more than 90% with an average target search time of the missile guidance station of 15–45 s.

In addition, the complex made it possible to receive at the brigade command post and relay information about two targets coming from the front (army) air defense command post.

Resolution No. 966–379 of October 26, 1964 also determined the cooperation of the main manufacturing enterprises of the complex elements. Serial production of detection stations 1S12 was carried out at the Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant MRP, missile guidance stations 1S32 - at the Mari Machine-Building Plant MRP. 2P24 launchers and missiles were produced at the Sverdlovsk Machine-Building Plant named after. M.I. Kalinina MAP. Nearby, at the Sverdlovsk Electrical Automation Plant, serial production of the K-1 “Crab” control complex was underway.

As usual in government decrees, along with the adoption of the complex into industry, work was assigned to further improve it, which was carried out in several stages.

First of all, improvements were made to reduce the lower limit of reach and reduce the “dead zone”.

To hit low-flying targets, they switched to overshooting, which eliminated the premature firing of the fuse. The SNR equipment was improved - two launch zones were displayed on the screen, corresponding to firing at maneuvering or low-maneuverable targets. To increase the probability of hitting maneuvering targets, a nonlinear corrector was added to the control loop, and the open-loop control loop gain was returned to the previous value of 0.9. To use air defense systems in conditions of the threat of the use of anti-radar missiles, a television-optical sight was used.

In 1967, the Krug-A air defense system was adopted, for which the lower limit of the affected area was reduced from 3 to 0.25 km, and the near limit was brought closer from 11 to 9 km.

After modifications were made to the missile as an aircraft in 1971, the Krug-M air defense system was adopted. The far border of the complex's affected area was removed from 45 to 50 km, the upper border was raised from 23.5 to 24.5 km.

In 1974, the Krug-M1 was put into service, for which the lower limit was reduced from 0.25 to 0.15 km, the near limit was reduced from 11 to 6–7 km. It became possible to hit targets on catch-up courses at a range of up to 20 km.

Further expansion of the capabilities of the Krug complex was associated with the improvement of its combat control means.

The "Crab" complex was originally developed mainly for the purpose of ensuring combat control of anti-aircraft artillery units and, when used as part of brigades of the "Krug" complex, had a number of disadvantages:

Mixed control mode (the most effective in a real combat situation) was not provided;

There were significant limitations on target designation capabilities (one target was given instead of the required 3–4);

Information from divisions about independently selected targets could not be transmitted to the brigade command post;

The brigade command post was technically interfaced with higher air defense units (air defense command posts of the front and army) only through radiotelephone channels and a tablet data exchange scheme, which led to a delay of an average of 40 s and the loss of up to 70% of targets;

The division command post, when receiving information from its own target detection station 1S12, delayed the passage of target designation to the batteries and lost up to 30% of targets;

The range of the radio links was insufficient, amounting to 15–20 km instead of the required 30–35 km;

The complex used only a telecode communication line between the command posts of the brigade and divisions with insufficient noise immunity.

As a result, the fire capabilities of the Krug brigade were used only by 60%, and the degree of participation of the brigade command post in organizing the repulsion of the raid was less than half of the targets fired at.

Scheme of the 2P24 launcher for the Krug air defense system

Transport vehicle 9T25 of the Krug complex

Transport-loading vehicle 2T6 of the Krug complex

In accordance with the Resolution of April 14, 1975, an automated control system (ACS) for combat operations of the Krug - Polyana D-1 (9S468M1) anti-aircraft missile brigade was developed. The development was carried out by the Scientific Research Institute of Automatic Equipment (NII AA) of the Ministry of Radio Industry, the chief designer was S.M. Chudinov.

The brigade combat control point (PBU-B) 9S478 included a 9S486 combat control cabin, a 9S487 interface cabin and two diesel power plants.

The division's combat control point (PBU-D) 9S479 consisted of a 9S489 combat control cabin and a diesel power station.

In addition, the automated control system included a 9С488 maintenance cabin.

All cabins and power stations PBU-B and PBU-D were placed on the chassis of Urap-375 vehicles with a unified K1-375 van body. The exception was the UAZ-452T-2 topographic surveyor as part of a brigade PBU (PBU-D topographic reference was provided by the appropriate means of the division). Communication between the front (army) air defense command post and PBU-B, and between PBU-B and PBU-D, was carried out via telecode and radiotelephone channels.

PBU-B was equipped with radars (P-40D, P-18, P-19, PRV-16, PRV-9A), operating in different frequency ranges and having cable connections with PBU-B.

PBU-B automatically ensured the distribution of targets between divisions, setting fire missions for them and coordinating their shelling of targets, as well as receiving commands and target designations from higher command posts and transmitting reports to them.

PBU-B technical means provided:

Reception of information from the radar and its display on scales of 150 km and 300 km, remote control equipment for determining the nationality of targets, as well as automated reception of information about the height of targets from radio altimeters PRV-16 (PRV-9A) with the issuance of target designations (TD) to these altimeters;

Semi-automatic acquisition of coordinates and processing of up to 10 target traces;

Reception from higher command posts and display of information on 20 targets, processing of target designations issued by them for 2 targets, as well as generation and transmission of information about the brigade’s combat operations to higher command posts;

Reception and display of information from PBU-D about the targets selected for shelling and for subsequent firing cycles (4 targets per division), as well as about the position, condition, combat readiness and results of combat operations of the division and its batteries;

Interface and communications cabin 9S487 (KSS-B) of the combat control point 9S478 (PBU-B) of the Krug anti-aircraft missile brigade - ACS 9S468M1

Combat control cabin 9S486 (KBU-B) of the combat control point 9S478 (PBU-B) of the anti-aircraft missile brigade "Krug" - ASU9S468M1 ("Polyana-D1")

Combat control cabin (right) 9S489 (KBU-D) and power station (left) combat control point 9S479 (PBU-D) of the anti-aircraft missile division "Krug" - ACS 9S468M1 ("Polyana-D 1")

DIVISIONAL SELF-PROPELLED ANTI-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM "KUB" Development of a self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system "Kub" (2K12), designed to protect troops, mainly - tank divisions, from air attack weapons flying at medium and low altitudes, was assigned