Electronic warfare

Electronic warfare (EW)- a set of measures and actions of troops (forces) agreed in terms of goals, tasks, place and time to identify radio-electronic means (RES) and control systems of troops (forces) and enemy weapons, their destruction by all types of weapons or capture (incapacitation) and radio-electronic suppression (REP), as well as electronic protection (REZ) of their electronic objects and systems of command and control of troops and weapons, as well as electronic information support and counteraction to technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy; type of combat support.

The purpose of electronic warfare is to disorganize the control of forces (troops), reduce the effectiveness of reconnaissance, the use of weapons and military equipment by the enemy, as well as ensure the stability of the operation of systems and means of command and control of own forces (troops) and weapons.

Electronic warfare is divided into actions to temporarily disrupt the operation of the enemy's electronic equipment (jamming) and actions associated with long-term (or permanent) incapacitation of this equipment (force defeat).

Electronic warfare components

Electronic jamming

Maintenance of airborne radio jamming station AN / ALQ-184

Electronic suppression is a set of measures and actions to disrupt (disrupt) the work or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's combat use of electronic systems and means by influencing their receivers with electronic interference. Includes radio, radio, optoelectronic and hydroacoustic suppression. Electronic jamming is provided by the creation of active and passive interference, the use of decoys, traps and other methods.

Electronic protection

Electronic protection is a set of measures and actions of troops (forces) for electronic destruction of enemy radio-electronic objects, electronic protection of their radio-electronic objects, as well as electronic information support.

Electronic intelligence

Electronic intelligence - the collection of intelligence information based on the reception and analysis of electromagnetic radiation. Electronic intelligence uses both intercepted signals from communication channels between people and technical equipment, and signals from operating radars, communication stations, radio jamming stations and other radio-electronic equipment.

Comprehensive technical control

Electromagnetic damage

Electromagnetic impact (impulse), disabling electronic, communication and power equipment of the enemy. The striking effect is achieved by inducing induction currents. First noted during nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

Currently, magnetrons are used to create a destructive pulse. Electromagnetic destruction systems are in service in the United States and other NATO countries.

History

For the first time electronic warfare was used by the forces of the Russian Navy during the Russo-Japanese War. On April 15, 1904, during an artillery bombardment that the Japanese squadron conducted along the inner roadstead of Port Arthur, the radio station of the Russian battleship Pobeda and the coastal post " Golden mountain"By creating deliberate interference, seriously hampered the transmission of telegrams from enemy spotter ships.

Nevertheless, radio equipment at that time was mainly used to provide communication, identify enemy communication channels and intercept information transmitted through them. The preference was given to intercepting radio transmissions rather than suppressing them. However, during the First World War, radio interference began to be used sporadically to disrupt radio communications between the headquarters of armies, corps and divisions and between warships. At the same time, special radio interference stations appeared in the German army even then.

In the period between the world wars, radio communication was actively developing, radio direction finding, radio control and radar equipment appeared. As a result, the concept of command and control and interaction of the ground forces, the air force and the navy is radically changing. All this led to the further development of methods and techniques for countering enemy radio-electronic means.

During the Second World War, the participating countries actively used electronic and hydroacoustic suppression. Special units and subunits of radio interference were formed and widely used to support combat operations. A great deal of experience has been accumulated in conducting reconnaissance and creating radio interference, as well as electronic protection.

In the post-war period, the development of electronic warfare equipment continues. New ship- and air-based radio jammers are emerging.

In modern wars and military conflicts, the role of electronic warfare continues to grow. The development and adoption by many states of high-precision and high-tech weapons leads to the emergence of new objects of radio-electronic influence. The use of anti-radar missiles significantly reduces the survivability of modern radio-electronic equipment (radar, air defense systems), built on the basis of active radar equipment. Wide application satellite systems intelligence, communications and navigation necessitates their neutralization, including through electronic suppression. Portable means of electronic reconnaissance and interference are being developed to combat new means of communication and navigation, search and neutralize radio explosives and other remote detonation devices. Electronic warfare means were given the possibility of system-software impact on the automated control system and on other computer systems.

XXI Century

Electronic warfare in Russia

Development of electronic warfare equipment

  • Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
  • Research Center for Operational and Strategic Justification 24 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
  • Scientific Research Center of Electronic Weapons 14 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
  • Research Center of Communications 34 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
  • Federal State Research Center for Electronic Warfare and Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Reducing the Significance of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Training of EW specialists

Military Space Academy. A.F. Mozhaisky

Training of specialists for electronic warfare of the Navy

  • Higher special officer classes
  • Naval Institute of Radio Electronics. A.S. Popova
  • Tambov Interspecies Training Center for Electronic Warfare Specialists

Training of civilian specialists for electronic warfare

  • Baltic State Technical University "Voenmech"
  • Ryazan State Radio Engineering University
  • Voronezh State Technical University (until 2009)
  • Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service
  • Saint Petersburg State University of Telecommunications named after prof. M. A. Bonch-Bruevich

see also

Notes (edit)

Literature

  • Dobykin V.D., Kupriyanov A.I., Ponomarev V.G., Shustov L.N. Electronic warfare. Forceful defeat of electronic systems. - M .: Vuzovskaya kniga, 2007 .-- 468 p. - ISBN 978-5-9502-0244-5
  • Paliy A.I. Essays on the history of electronic warfare. - M .: University book, 2006 .-- 284 p. - ISBN 5-95020-108-6
  • Modern electronic warfare. Methodological issues. - M .: Radiotekhnika, 2006 .-- 424 p. - 700 copies. - ISBN 5-88070-082-8
  • Electronic warfare. Radio camouflage and jamming protection. - M .: MAI, 1999 .-- T. 1. - 240 p. - 1000 copies. - ISBN 5-7035-2253-6
  • Tsvetnov V.V., Demin V.P., Kupriyanov A.I. Electronic warfare. Radio intelligence and radio countermeasures. - M .: MAI, 1998 .-- T. 2. - 248 p. - 1000 copies. - ISBN 5-7035-2186-6
  • Ch. ed. V. N. Chernavin Naval Dictionary. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1990 .-- S. 357 .-- ISBN 5-203-00174-x

Russia is actively developing and producing electronic security equipment (EW) designed to combat combat control systems. Electronic warfare systems suppress and disable electronic means of command and control of troops and weapons. In our country, the creation of electronic warfare is engaged in 18 enterprises that are part of the Concern "Radioelectronic Technologies" (KRET).

Electronic warfare systems are the technical basis for information warfare. They neutralize control systems by suppressing, disabling and destroying radio-electronic means. Electronic warfare systems are used in the sky, on earth and in space.

KRET was established in early 2009 for the development and production of aviation, ground and sea radio-electronic complexes, as well as military and civilian systems. It is part of the Rostec State Corporation, which owns 100% of the concern's shares.

TYPES OF RADIO ELECTRONIC FIGHTING SYSTEMS

Electronic warfare systems can be divided into several groups. These are means of suppression (REP), means of protection (REZ) and reconnaissance means (RER).

The means of electronic warfare create active and passive interference, use false targets and traps to disrupt the operation of electronic systems and equipment.

The means of REZ eliminate or weaken the impact on their radio-electronic objects of means of radio-electronic destruction, and also protect radio-electronic reconnaissance from unintentional mutual radio interference.

RER means are designed to collect intelligence information by receiving and analyzing electromagnetic radiation.

The use of all means of electronic warfare increases efficiency and increases survivability military equipment... The main buyer and customer of electronic warfare systems produced by the KRET concern is the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

EW SYSTEMS PRODUCED BY KRET CONCERN

In accordance with the decree of the President of the country, by 2020 in Russian army there must be at least 70% of new generation equipment. In 2013, the Ministry of Defense adopted seven unique electronic warfare systems manufactured at KRET enterprises.

The MOSCOW-1 electronic reconnaissance and control station is designed to scan the airspace. Having found equipment equipped with radio elements, the station transmits the received data to electronic warfare, air defense and air forces to neutralize targets. Unlike conventional radars, "Moscow-1" operates in passive radar mode - it catches the target's own radiation, while remaining invisible to the enemy.

Within the framework of the state order for 2013, 10 multifunctional jamming systems "Krasukha-4" were delivered to the Ministry of Defense. The system is produced by the Bryansk Electromechanical Plant (BEMZ). This complex is capable of completely covering areas of land several hundred kilometers from radar detection, suppressing the action of enemy aviation radars and communications equipment.

KRET also supplied the RF Armed Forces with more than 10 multifunctional jamming stations “RTUT-BM”. They are designed to protect personnel and equipment from being hit by artillery shells and missiles equipped with radio fuses. "Mercury-BM" was developed by the All-Russian Research Institute "Gradient".

In addition, several unique aviation complexes"PRESIDENT-S" and active jamming station SP-14 / SAP-518. These systems interfere with aircraft homing missile systems, causing the fired missiles to deviate from their intended target. "President-S" was developed and released by the Scientific Research Institute "Ekran". The complex is designed to protect helicopters, military transport aircraft.

The means of electronic protection called "AVTOBAZA" was developed by the VNII "Gradient" and produced by the Novgorod NPO "Kvant". The complex is designed for passive detection of emitting radar systems and transmission to an automated control center of the coordinates of operating radars, their class and frequency range numbers. Several such complexes in the given time are in service with the Russian army.

PLANS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

The SAP-14 / SAP-518 stations provide protection for the Su-34 generation 4+ fighter-bomber, the Su-35S generation 4 ++ super-maneuverable multi-role fighter, and the Su-27SM fourth-generation multi-purpose highly maneuverable all-weather fighter. Universal devices are manufactured by the Kaluga Radio Engineering Research Institute (KNIRTI).

A means of electronic protection called "AVTOBAZA" was developed by the VNII "Gradient" and released by the Novgorod NPO Kvant. The complex is designed for passive detection of emitting radar systems and transmission to an automated control point of the coordinates of operating radars, their class and frequency range numbers. Several such complexes are currently in service with the Russian army.

PLANS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

KRET enterprises are constantly working on new electronic warfare systems. 12 aircraft and ground systems are under development. In particular, by order of the Ministry of Defense, development work is being carried out to create a unique complex "KHIBINY-U".

Analysis of armed conflicts in the late XX - early XXI centuries. shows that electronic warfare(Electronic warfare, or in Western terminology, electronic warfare) becomes one of the key elements modern wars. Organizationally, electronic warfare is one of the components of information operations.

The essence of electronic warfare is to temporarily or permanently reduce the effectiveness of the use of reconnaissance means, weapons, military equipment of the enemy by means of electronic or fire suppression (destruction) of its electronic equipment, control systems, reconnaissance, communications. Thus, electronic warfare can include both the temporary disruption of the operation of the enemy's electronic systems by jamming, and the complete destruction of these systems (fire damage or capture). Electronic warfare also includes measures for electronic protection (REZ) of its information systems and electronic intelligence.

Saturation of the modern battlefield information systems defines the extremely important role of electronic warfare in modern and future wars. The experience of recent military exercises has shown that even if one of the opposing sides has an overwhelming superiority in precision weapons, it cannot guarantee victory if its governing structures are suppressed by electronic warfare.

The objects of the main impact in the course of electronic warfare operations are:

  • elements of command and control systems for troops and weapons;
  • intelligence equipment;
  • information storage, processing and distribution systems;
  • radio electronic means;
  • automated systems, databases and computer networks;
  • personnel involved in decision-making and management processes.

The increasing role of electronic warfare in modern wars is determined by two factors.

First, the increase in the scale and depth of operations, the saturation of troops with modern means of automation, command and control and intelligence led to a sharp increase in the share of support forces in operations. According to Western experts, in modern combat operations, about 2/3 of all forces solve the tasks of reconnaissance, command and control, electronic warfare, support, etc.

Secondly, an increase in the capabilities of EW forces and assets to influence the enemy's combat control systems. Modern systems Electronic warfare is very versatile: they can be applied to the depth of both a single combat operation and the entire theater of war, at any time of the day, use lethal and non-lethal weapons, operate as part of various multipurpose integrated systems (command and control, communications, computer support for reconnaissance, fire defeat, fight against enemy combat control systems), provide comprehensive protection of their control systems and even use the enemy's computer networks in their own interests.

Nowadays, the further improvement of technical means and methods of electronic warfare is taking place very quickly. First of all, this applies to the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. The armed forces of these countries and the NATO Joint Armed Forces have worked out well the technique of simultaneous or phased strikes against the enemy using fire weapons, electronic warfare, strategic and tactical disguise, disinformation and psychological warfare.

DEVELOPMENT OF EW IN THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES

In the mid 80s. of the last century, the US Armed Forces and the NATO Joint Armed Forces developed the concept of "combat counteraction to communication and control systems" (Command, Control, Communications Countermeasure, CCCCM). In the early 90s. on its basis, the concept of combating combat control systems was developed. At the same time, the creation of an integrated system of combat control, reconnaissance, communications, computer support and electronic warfare began. With the development of forces and means, electronic warfare stood out the new kind operations information war- "network war" or "cyber war", that is, disorganization of enemy combat control systems through the impact on his computers, local and global computer networks.

The development of electronic warfare in the US Armed Forces and the NATO Allied Forces can be divided into three stages.

First step- until 1980, when electronic warfare played a small role in hostilities. Electronic warfare operations were of a supporting nature and consisted of interfering with enemy reconnaissance and communications equipment, as well as imitating the operation of various radio-electronic means in order to mislead the enemy about the real combat situation.

Second phase- 1980-1993 Creation of a concept for the integrated use of electronic warfare forces and means to influence the enemy's combat control and communications systems. It implied the coordinated use of electronic suppression, reconnaissance, disinformation and fire destruction to combat enemy electronic systems. However, the imperfection of automation equipment, the low throughput of communication channels and the absence of an integrated command and control system did not allow the use of the entire potential of electronic warfare in combat operations.

Nevertheless, already during the electronic warfare, she played one of the key roles. Here, electronic warfare was used within the framework of a single concept worked out by the American troops during the Green Flag exercise.

In particular, a day before the start of the air offensive operation of the anti-Iraqi coalition, the ground-based electronic warfare systems of the allies began jamming Iraqi communication channels. The operation itself began with an attack by American helicopters of two Iraqi air defense early warning stations. This created a breach in Iraqi air defense, into which aircraft immediately rushed to strike targets in Iraq. In the early days of the air operation, they were actively used to suppress the Iraqi air defense american planes F-4G with high-precision anti-radar HARM missiles, as well as EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft, which "blinded" Iraqi radar stations with interference. At the same time, American reconnaissance aircraft RC-135, TR-1 and E-8 took tight control of Iraqi airspace. Having lost the "eyes" in the form of radars, the Iraqi ground air defense systems and fighter aircraft were completely blinded and disorganized, and within a few days they ceased to represent a real combat force.

During the ground offensive, the electronic warfare means of the US ground formations ensured the suppression of Iraqi radio networks to the depth of the division.

Stage Three development of electronic warfare began in 1993 and continues to this day. The operational-strategic theory of "information war" was created. Electronic warfare equipment has significantly improved: their automation has been completed; integrated complexes of communications, intelligence, control and electronic warfare were created; creation of perspective views non-lethal weapons EW using electromagnetic (for example, the American U-bomb, tested in 1999 during the war against Yugoslavia; when this bomb explodes, a powerful electromagnetic pulse is generated that affects radio-electronic control devices, reconnaissance and communications in a large radius), and other types of energy; providing users with access at the tactical level to global databases, issuing target designations to weapons and electronic warfare equipment in a time mode close to real.

Thus, if at the first stage electronic warfare was one of the types of support for strike forces, at the second stage it was an integral part of the combat operations of each type of armed forces, then at the third stage it was a component of information warfare and one of the components of military potential.

DEVELOPMENT OF EW IN THE ARMED FORCES OF RUSSIA

In Russia, electronic warfare has a long history. For the first time, the suppression of enemy radio networks by interference to disrupt the coordination of artillery fire was successfully used by Russian signalmen back in 1904. Also during the First World War, Russian radio communications were used to interfere with the work of German radio networks.

During the Great Patriotic War, electronic warfare was conducted on a permanent basis. On December 16, 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR issued a decree "On the organization in the Red Army of a special service for jamming German radio stations operating on the battlefield." In pursuance of this resolution, the head of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR A.M. Vasilevsky the next day issued a directive "On the formation of a special group and special divisions of radio interference." A special term is introduced - "RPD" (electronic suppression).

After the war, there was a rapid improvement in radio communications, radar and airborne radars of aircraft and ships, the creation of missiles with radar homing heads. At the same time, it became necessary to both reduce the effectiveness of the use of weapons and electronic systems of the enemy, and to protect their radio networks and electronic systems from suppression. For this, the 1950s. developed and supplied to the troops special means Electronic warfare: radio interference transmitters, dipole and corner reflectors. For the purpose of the qualified use of electronic warfare equipment in the Soviet army, a special electronic warfare service was created during the same period.

In the future, to equip parts of electronic warfare, to protect aircraft, helicopters, ships, tanks and other military equipment, automated electronic warfare systems began to be created, including reconnaissance means, jamming in various wavelengths and equipment for analysis, information processing and control.

In 1962, the term "BRESP" (struggle radio electronic means suppression), and the electronic warfare service began to be designated by the same term. Among the tasks of the BRESP service were nuclear and fire destruction, electronic suppression and capture of enemy radio-electronic objects (command posts, communication centers, radars, etc.). At the same time, there was a certain discrepancy between the tasks and capabilities of the BRESP units: they had only means of jamming, but not fire damage and capture of enemy targets. These tasks were under the jurisdiction of the operational divisions of the headquarters.

Since the early 1960s. new powerful means of fire destruction of radio-electronic objects appeared - missiles aimed at radio emission. In 1963, the US Armed Forces entered the "air" class aircraft missile - "Shrike" radar. In the USSR, similar models of weapons are created: in 1965, the Soviet Long-range aviation the KSR-11 missile was received, in 1968 - the Kh-22P, and in 1972 the front-line aviation received the Kh-28P missile. The adoption of these missiles was very relevant for the reason that Soviet aircraft jamming stations were significantly inferior to American ones in power, frequency range and speed, and fire damage to enemy radars could compensate for this shortcoming.

In 1969, the term "electronic warfare" was introduced, which is still used in the Russian Armed Forces. Accordingly, the BRESP bodies were transformed into an electronic warfare service, which, in addition to the functions of electronic warfare, was also entrusted with the tasks of ensuring electromagnetic compatibility of electronic systems in order to ensure sustainable command and control of troops and weapons. True, in 1976, instead of electronic warfare, the term EPD ("electronic suppression") was introduced, but it did not take root, and in 1977 it was again replaced by electronic warfare.

In order to conduct research and train qualified personnel in the field of electronic warfare in the USSR, an extensive network of research centers and educational institutions was created. In 1960, the head institute for electronic warfare was created - 21 NIITs (now 5 TsNII). Specialized departments and laboratories were created in research institutes, at training ranges and in centers for the combat use of weapons and military equipment of the branches of the Armed Forces. In the interests of electronic warfare, specialists from such institutions as 30 TsNII MO, GNIKI VVS, 4 PPI and PLC worked front-line aviation, 43 PPI Long-Range Aviation, Air Force Engineering Academy. N.E. Zhukovsky.

In 1980, the Voronezh Higher Military Engineering School of Radio Electronics was created (later - the Voronezh Military Institute of Radio Electronics - VRE), which trains qualified technicians in the field of electronic warfare. Also was created whole line military universities that graduated specialists in the field of electronic warfare in Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk, Riga, etc., but after the collapse of the USSR, their potential was lost for Russia. In fact, VIRE remained the only specialized Russian military university that graduates EW specialists for the army. However, in 2006, for incomprehensible reasons, this educational institution was attached as an electronic warfare faculty to the Voronezh Military Aviation University.

Preparation junior professionals Electronic warfare for all types and branches of troops, reserve officers, as well as foreign cadets is produced at the Tambov Interspecies Training Center (TMTC), established in 1962.

Practical experience Soviet electronic warfare specialists received during the wars in Korea, the Middle East and Afghanistan.

During the first Chechen campaign, battles in Dagestan and the subsequent counter-terrorist operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic, Russian EW units took an active part in the hostilities.

The illegal armed groups on the territory of Chechnya created an extensive control and communication system, which included cellular, trunk, radio relay, short-wave and ultra-short-wave, cable and satellite communications. The tasks of Russian electronic warfare units the opening and suppression of illegal armed groups' communication systems, as well as the collection of information through radio intelligence about the number, location of militant detachments, plans of the Chechen command, etc.

The actions of the electronic warfare forces gave good results. Often, during radio communications, the militants themselves indicated the location of their bases, accumulations of manpower, etc. These data were immediately implemented by the Russian troops in the form of artillery and air strikes on the indicated places. Here is just one episode.

03/20/1995. From the radio interception of the communications of the Chechen commanders:

"- Where are you?

We are going to you.

Tell the guys to go through the Mesker-Yurt intersection and come to us. "

Artillery strikes were delivered at the accumulation of militants and equipment in the area of ​​the specified intersection, as a result of which 2 armored personnel carriers and two vehicles with militants were destroyed.

During the assault on Grozny from December 10 to December 20, 1999, electronic warfare units only by means of radio reconnaissance completely revealed the defense system and the number of enemy forces defending the southeast of the city. With such actions, the EW specialists greatly facilitated the conduct of operations by shock units and helped save many lives of Russian soldiers. Being under constant pressure from the electronic warfare, the detachments of Chechen fighters gradually lost control and coordination of actions, which played an important role in the outcome of hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

During the "five-day war" with Georgia, Russian electronic warfare forces also acted quite successfully. According to the Latvian military expert brigadier general reserve Karlis Krustinles: “Georgia has problems with both air defense and the interconnection of units. There were situations when combat units communicated with each other with the help of messengers, because any communication ceased to operate. The Russian army prepared in advance to suppress not only electronic communications and radars, but also ordinary telephone communications. "

Countermeasures were also conducted against electronic reconnaissance conducted from NATO ships in the Black Sea.

In the "five-day war" it became obvious that the issue of superiority in an air war is largely a matter of electronic warfare. As it turned out, in the early days of the war, electronic warfare in the Russian group was not very well established. The radio and electronic intelligence forces of the Russian Air Force were transferred to the subordination of the GRU General Staff. However, the latter provided little assistance to the air force, as a result of which they did not have reliable information about the whereabouts. The aircraft participating in the hostilities did not fully meet the requirements of electronic protection against air defense systems. All this led to losses in aviation from anti-aircraft fire, including the most painful one - the Tu-22M3 long-range bomber.

After the shock of the first losses, representatives of the Air Force High Command intervened, who developed recommendations for the crews of aircraft and helicopters participating in combat missions. A significant place in them was assigned to measures of electronic protection. In particular, do not use aircraft that did not have individual electronic warfare equipment in combat, exit from the attack by Su-25 aircraft by massively shooting heat traps, use attack aircraft only under the cover of group defense equipment by aircraft and helicopters of electronic warfare. After that, aviation losses ceased. However, according to experts, the Russian Air Force has serious gaps in the field of electronic warfare, both in terms of personnel training and technical equipment, and in a collision with a really strong air defense, losses would be many times higher.

In 2009, electronic warfare units and subunits were transformed into a separate type of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including formations, units and subunits of electronic warfare as part of operational-strategic commands.

According to the former commander of the electronic warfare troops O. Ivanov, today the effect of the influence of electronic warfare means is becoming comparable to the use of modern high-precision weapons, even surpassing it in some respects. Wherein Russian systems Electronic warfare is not inferior to foreign counterparts. In addition to modernizing existing ones, new multifunctional complexes are being created, some of which can be attributed to technological breakthroughs. According to O. Ivanov, great opportunities are now opening up for electronic warfare. True, he himself, which is strange, in July 2011 voluntarily resigned from the post of commander of the electronic warfare forces at the age of 45, when, it would seem, great prospects for successful career and professional growth were opening up. According to some experts, among the reasons for the resignation is disagreement with the provisions of the military reform being carried out in Russia, in particular, with the introduction of a new electronic automated command and control system for the ESU TK troops, which the military criticizes for numerous shortcomings laid down at the level of the terms of reference.

GOALS, TASKS AND EW MEANS

The goals for electronic warfare in modern war are not only the disorganization of the enemy's combat control systems, but also depriving him of the opportunity to use information about the combat situation, ensuring that the enemy is preempted in making combat decisions, and reducing his losses during combat operations.

In accordance with the views of the American command, the main element of electronic warfare is an electronic attack using ground and air-based electronic warfare systems, as well as portable and dropped behind enemy lines.

Means of electronic attack are conventionally divided into two types: non-destructive and destructive effects.

Non-destructive means of electronic jamming, electronic disinformation, infrared countermeasures (false thermal targets and stationary generators of pulsating infrared interference designed to combat air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles equipped with infrared homing heads). The tasks of these means: suppression or disablement of electronic or optoelectronic systems, intelligence, communications, navigation; imitation of the operation of electronic systems in order to mislead the enemy; overloading enemy communication systems; the impact on its personnel serving electronic systems or participating in the processes of command and control.

Destructive means are means of directed energy (electromagnetic weapons), precision weapons and ammunition with homing heads for radio-electronic radiation.

It is worth dwelling on directed energy weapons in a little more detail. These systems are also called magnetrons, and in Western terminology - active electronically scanned array (AESA). This weapon affects the electronic systems of enemy equipment with microwave waves, disabling them. With its help, you can completely turn off the on-board electronics of the aircraft, stop the engine of a car or ship, etc. When exposed to a large area, this weapon can act as non-destructive.

Directed energy weapons entered service with the US Armed Forces relatively recently. It is equipped with the latest American aircraft: the F-35 (although its electromagnetic armament is defensive in nature and is designed to disable enemy missiles) and the Boeing EA-18G Growler carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft. The latter can carry five overhead containers with electronic warfare weapons, including AESA equipment. EA-18G was successfully used in the suppression of the Libyan air defense in 2011. There are plans to install directed energy emitters on ships and ground combat vehicles. Also, prototypes of non-lethal directed energy weapons designed to influence a person (disperse a crowd, etc.) have been created.

Speaking of directed energy weapons, mention should also be made of US testing of laser weapons to combat ballistic missiles, but at the end of 2011 this program was closed.

The tasks of destructive means of electronic attack are: suppression, defeat, destruction of enemy reconnaissance, navigation, control, electronic systems of military equipment and weapons; defeat of enemy personnel involved in the maintenance of these systems.

An important element of electronic warfare is the electronic protection of its troops. It includes three areas:

  • direct protection of radio electronic systems (protection against enemy interference, atmospheric interference, weapons, directed to radio emission, directed energy, electronic disinformation);
  • ensuring electromagnetic compatibility at command posts and in combat formations of troops (protection of the electronic systems of their troops from mutual interference, including from electronic attack means used against the enemy's electronic systems);
  • electronic protection during information operations (protection of information circulating in combat control systems, information protection of reconnaissance equipment, electronic attack and electronic protection).

In the interests of electronic protection, a comprehensive technical control... Its task is to control the ability of the enemy to collect intelligence information from electronic systems.

Comprehensive technical control includes:

  • radio control - control over information circulating in their radio networks;
  • radio-technical control - control of the enemy's ability to collect information about the technical parameters of their radio electronic devices;
  • radar control - control to ensure that the power, nature, direction and types of radiation of their RES does not exceed strictly established standards in order to complicate the collection of information about them by the enemy (electronic camouflage);
  • electronic optical control - control over the possibility of receiving information by the enemy using television cameras, receiving thermal radiation;
  • acoustic and hydroacoustic control - control of the possibility of obtaining information by the enemy by receiving sound signals propagating in the air and water.

Although the programming and reprogramming of electronic warfare equipment during a combat operation is not a component of electronic warfare, it directly affects its effectiveness. Their tasks are: ensuring the timely targeting of electronic warfare funds to priority objects; restructuring of electronic warfare equipment in connection with the requirements of the situation; achieving the highest efficiency of their use in terms of power, direction, type of electronic attack (protection) when the object of attack (protection) changes the parameters of electromagnetic radiation and makes a maneuver; reservation and timely replacement of electronic warfare equipment in the event of their failure.

EW DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Based on the experience of military operations at the beginning of the XXI century. the main trends in the field of electronic warfare for the near future can be identified:

  • the use of electronic warfare forces together with combat control systems in information operations;
  • the transition from the solution of individual tasks to the integrated management of electronic warfare in the interests of the entire group of forces;
  • adoption of new universal electronic warfare equipment with a significantly expanded frequency range and functionality;
  • an increase in the number of targets simultaneously controlled, hit, suppressed by one electronic warfare complex;
  • expanding the list of EW targets in connection with the development of directed energy weapons;
  • creation of electronic warfare systems with an open architecture, the functionality of which can be changed by adding additional modules.

Protecting aircraft from radio frequency and infrared threats remains a top priority for air forces in many countries, as evidenced by the increased activity in this area over the past two years.

Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region are traditionally reticent when it comes to their military purchases, let alone airborne electronic self-defense systems as such. An exception to this rule is the statement by Leonardo that the Indonesian Air Force is increasing the level of self-defense of its Hawk Mk.209 fighters by installing a SEER radar warning system receiver. According to Dave Appleby of Leonardo, the product "will be operational soon" on these aircraft. According to the company, the system is available in two versions: one covers the frequency range from 0.5 GHz to 18 GHz, and the second - the range from 2 to 10 GHz.

Europe

Meanwhile, in November 2016, Leonardo confirmed that the British Air Force had received BriteCloud radio frequency decoys in order to develop a theory of the combat use of these targets on board the Panavia Tornado-GR4 fighter. Appleby noted that the decoy “is a digital RF jammer in a fully self-contained unit, reduced to the size of a beverage can. That is, this unit is so small that it can be dropped from a fighter in the same way as a heat trap, allowing the most advanced radar-guided missiles and fire control radars to be diverted from the aircraft. "

Although Leonardo does not provide information on when the BriteCloud system could enter service with the Tornado-GR4 fighters. this is expected to happen as early as next year. Leonardo said the arrival of BriteCloud marks an important milestone for British aviation, which Appleby said will “be the first in the world’s air force to use this technology.” He further noted that the Miysis DIRCM (Directional Infrared Countermeasure) system was sold to the first customer in 2016.

According to the company, the system can be installed on helicopters and wide-body aircraft, providing comprehensive coverage against infrared-guided missiles, using lasers to neutralize them. “Miysis is ready for export and the first buyer was an overseas customer, but we have nothing more to say about this,” added Appleby.

The British Air Force may soon begin operating new BriteCloud radio frequency decoys aboard its Tomado-GR4 aircraft

European projects for air vehicles EW also focused on kinetic capabilities. At the end of 2016, Orbital ATK was awarded a $ 14.7 million contract under the US Foreign Trade Act to rework existing Raytheon AGM-38B High Speed ​​Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM ) to the AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) configuration. The reports indicate that the delivery of 19 converted missiles will be completed by September 2018, they will be installed on the Tornado-ECR electronic warfare aircraft of the Italian Air Force. Orbital noted that according to the signed agreement, the 500th rocket was transferred US Navy last May.

In addition, the program to create a new version of the rocket under the designation AGM-88E AARGM-ER (Extended Range) began in 2016, and as the company said, the project is aimed at “developing hardware and software modifications in order to improve the characteristics of the AARGM, including increased range, survivability and effectiveness against new complex threats. " They also added that current activities in this direction will focus on the design of a new engine for the rocket, software updates, additional design improvements and tests. The technology development and risk reduction phase began last year, and prototype missiles will be delivered to the US Navy in 2019.

American companies are also active in Europe. Last year, Northrop Grumman was a success and was selected to supply LAIRCM (Large Aircraf Infra-Red Countermeasure) systems for the German Air Force's Bombardier Global Express-5000 turbofan transport aircraft used to transport VIPs. Information about the completion of the installation of these systems has not yet been reported.

The German Air Force has also undertaken to increase the level of protection of its Tornado-ECR / IDS fighters, intending to install containers with electronic warfare equipment Saab BOZ-101 on them. A total of 39 containers will be installed from 2017 to 2020. The BOZ-101 system includes an attacking missile warning system and an automatic suppression system with the ability to launch false thermal targets to combat IR-guided missiles attacking from below and from the side.

Northrop Grumman's LAIRCM infrared countermeasures system will be installed on german aircraft Global Express-5000 used to transport VIPs

The Dutch Air Force reportedly intends to upgrade its Terma PIDSU missile launchers installed on F-16A / B Fighting Falcon fighters. These containers will be upgraded to the PIDS + configuration with the addition of the Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) and a false thermal target dropper that can launch them diagonally. After modernization, the aircraft is guaranteed to be able to deal with surface-to-air missiles with infrared guidance. At the heart of this upgrade is the addition of the Airbus / Hensoldt AN / AAR-60 (V) 2 MILDS-F MAWS ultraviolet missile launch detection system.

The installation of an automatic dropper will expand the functions of the PIDSU container, which previously could only drop dipole reflectors to combat surface-to-air and air-to-air radar missiles; it can now also distract IR-guided missiles.

In December 2016, Dutch F-16A / B aircraft also received upgraded Northrop Grumman AN / ALQ-131 Block-II REP containers. The emphasis in the modernization was placed on improving the architecture of the digital receiver and irradiator, which are part of the container. They received a library of radio bands of a potential enemy to identify and locate threats and then generate deliberate interference to neutralize them. Based on open sources, the AN / ALQ-131 system covers the radio frequency range from 2 to 20 GHz and is capable of simultaneous jamming using 48 different waveforms. On the F-16A / B fighters of the Dutch Air Force, the original AN / ALQ-131 REP system was installed back in 1996. Each new AN / ALQ-131 Block-II system costs over a million dollars, and the Air Force has acquired 105 of these containers.

Electronic warfare container systems are also being developed by the Ukrainian company Radionix. which announced in November 2016 the start of flight tests of its Omut-KM onboard electronic protection system. Tests on board the aircraft should confirm the capabilities of the Omut system, which has already passed ground and laboratory tests. For testing, the system was installed on the Su-25 attack aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force. The Omut system can be offered both in a container configuration and for installation inside an aircraft. The company notes that the architecture of the Omut system allows it to be installed on the Su-27 fighter. It is not reported about the beginning and timing of deliveries of this system and, in general, about its installation on the aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force. In addition, the company also does not provide information on the characteristics of its system.

Leonardo celebrated the first shipment of its Miysis Controlled IR Countermeasures System to an unnamed customer. The system uses lasers to neutralize attacking IR-guided missiles

Russia

In May 2016, the Concern Radioelectronic Technologies (KRET) company announced the start of deliveries of a new electronic protection complex (KRZ) for attack helicopters of the Russian Air Force. The press release of KRET says that the KRZ includes:
- system for determining laser irradiation,
- a missile attack warning device in the ultraviolet range,
- automatic dropping of false thermal targets and dipole reflectors,
- laser missile defense system with IR guidance.

The press release does not say about the name of the new system, how many will be delivered, and when the deliveries and installation on the Mi-28N helicopters will begin. The decision to install a new KRZ could be a response to the shortcomings identified during the Syrian conflict in the equipment of this helicopter. For example, on April 12, 2016, a Mi-28N helicopter was shot down by a missile from a MANPADS in the vicinity of the city of Homs, and both crew members were killed.

Surprisingly, the Vitebsk L370-57 (President-S) electronic countermeasures complex was installed on Mi-28N helicopters. According to open sources, this complex contains exactly the same equipment as new complex, the installation of which on Mi-2N helicopters was announced by KRET. The question arises whether the President-S / L370-5 complex was installed on all Mi-28N helicopters and was the helicopter shot down on April 12 equipped with this complex?

In addition, is the KRET statement a consequence of the requirement Russian ministry defense for the installation of the President-S / L370-5 complex (see first photo) for the entire fleet of Mi-28N helicopters? Further confusing the case are some reports claiming that the helicopter was not shot down by MANPADS. but crashed as a result of a technical malfunction. Later, in August 2016, KRET announced that it was offering the Lever-AB electronic warfare and electronic reconnaissance system installed on the export version of the Mi-8MTPR-1 multipurpose transport helicopter. Little is known about the characteristics of the Lever-AB system, for example, it can jam radio frequency threats within a radius of approximately 100 km.

Near East

At the end of last year, the American company Harris announced that it had received a $ 90 million contract for the supply of its AN / ALQ-211 (V) 4 AIDEWS (Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suite) integrated electronic warfare suite to the Moroccan Air Force. The announcement says that these AN / ALQ-211 (V) 4 systems will be installed on F-16C / D Block-62 + fighters, of which the Moroccans have 15 and 8, respectively.

The AN / ALQ-211 (V) 4 protection kit is installed inside the aircraft. It includes a broadband digital receiver that detects the transmission of radio signals in a complex electromagnetic environment and which can drop dipole reflectors to neutralize such threats. According to Harris, deliveries of these systems will begin in mid-2018.

Meanwhile, in February 2017, it was announced that Terma would supply MASE Modular Aircraf Self-Protection Equipment EW containers for Trush S-2RT660 turboprop aircraft supplied by the United Arab Emirates Air Force to combat terrorist groups. Each aircraft will carry two MASE containers connected to an electronic warfare control system also developed by Terma AN / ALQ-213. The Emirates Air Force will receive a total of 24 S-2RT660 aircraft.

Light SPEAR from Elbit Systems, combining RTR and EW subsystems, demonstrates the trend of developing systems for UAVs that are capable of collecting reconnaissance data and protecting the carrier platform

Also in this region, we see the emergence of new electronic warfare products, for example, the SPREOS (Self-Protection Radar Electro-Optic System), an Israeli company Bird Aerosystems. The system presented at the Paris exhibition Eurosatory 2016 is designed to protect air platforms from IR-guided missiles, in particular from those that are fired from MANPADS. According to the company, the product is in the last stages of development and may have already begun its tests on board the aircraft.

SPREOS (Self-Protection Radar Electro-Optic System) developed by the Israeli company Bird Aerosystems

Another Israeli company, Elbit Systems, has unveiled its new Light SPEAR electronic protection system designed for installation on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The company is reported to have developed a system not only to ensure the safety of drones, but also to collect intelligence information in areas that could be dangerous to manned aircraft. According to some reports, Light SPEAR is based on the Elisra development system, which is already installed on a number of aircraft and helicopters of the Israeli Air Force, but has a lower weight, size and power consumption in order to optimize operation on UAVs.

At the heart of the Light SPEAR architecture is a combination of an electronic reconnaissance system, mainly designed to identify, localize and categorize radar threats, and an electronic jamming system, whose task is to interfere with detected threats. The company claims to use the so-called DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Memory) approach, whereby several jamming channels can be used simultaneously to neutralize threats in a wide frequency range.

The company does not disclose whether the Light SPEAR system was put into operation, on which UAVs it is installed or can be installed. Elbit said in a statement that it also developed the Micro SPEAR jammer, which "is an extremely compact electronic warfare system designed to self-protect drones and electronic attacks." These two systems are joined by the new Air Keeper electronic reconnaissance / electronic warfare system, which “collects intelligence information and has the ability to interfere with enemy radio frequency equipment, which allows, when installed on any existing cargo, transport or passenger aircraft, to perform tasks such as , collection of intelligence and electronic warfare. Reducing the effectiveness of enemy radars and radio systems. Air Keeper is also capable of determining the coordinates of communications equipment, radar and other similar systems. "

The emergence of the Light SPEAR system indicates an increasing trend in equipping drones with electronic protection systems. For example, in April 2017, the American company General Atomics demonstrated its MQ-9 Reaper drone (photo below), which took off with a Raytheon AN / ALR-69A radar warning system receiver installed in one of the underwing nacelles. At the same time, it is unclear whether the American Air Force (the main operator of this UAV) will install the ANIALR-69A system on all devices or purchase only a few systems that will be installed on the MQ-9 UAV when operating in areas with the possibility of external influence. While drones have always been viewed as the ideal vehicle for so-called "dumb, dangerous and dirty" missions, at a cost of $ 6.8 million for a single MQ-9 UAV, it is not surprising that work is underway to protect these platforms, as well as their use for data collection. RTR over the battlefield.

In December 2016, at the International UAV exhibition in the Canadian city of Toronto, Cognitive Systems presented its electronic warfare system designed for installation on UAVs. The system, which is a chip weighing 80 grams, can conduct real-time reconnaissance of radio frequency signals, identify them and determine their location.

Over the past two years, the countries of the Middle East have become noticeably more active in purchasing self-defense systems for aircraft... For example, at the end of 2016, Egypt acquired the AIM / AAR-47 Common Missile Warning System developed by BAE Systems for installation on board its Boeing AN-64D Apache attack helicopters, CH-47D Chinook multipurpose transport helicopters and UH- multipurpose helicopters. 60A / M Black Hawk. The $ 81.4 million deal includes training, technical assistance and equipment testing.

Electronic protection systems were also sold to the Egyptian Air Force through the sale of weapons and military equipment to foreign states (Foreign Military Sale). These are automatic dipole reflectors and false thermal targets AN / AAR-60 and AN / ALE-47 manufactured by Airbus / Hensoldt, designed for two light attack aircraft Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan, purchased from the American company Orbital ATK at the end of 2016.

To be continued…

Electronic warfare equipment.

Since I do not know very well the electronic warfare equipment, or rather, I have only a general idea about it, I give the floor to Major General Igor Burakov, since 2001 - the head of the Electronic Warfare Service of the Ground Forces. And although it is not directly related to the Strategic Missile Forces, the equipment used in electronic warfare of both the Ground Forces and the Strategic Missile Forces is often the same:

"- You have already said about the structure of your troops. And what can you say about the means that are in service with electronic warfare units?"


Each level has its own means, which differ in the range of action, the power of the emitter, the radio frequency at which they work. For some time, for example, our Spetsnaz radio battalions were armed with communication radio stations of the PAT and SCR-399 type with the R-328r and R-328s control devices. As well as jamming stations R-330. In the 60s, new means appeared (jamming station R-325, R-325M, R-330, R-330A and radio stations R-100, R-110 and R-102 with a control device).

The radio engineering battalions were armed with SPB-1 radar jamming stations and R-814 VHF radio communication jamming stations with the Arfa-3 prefixes. In the future, new radar jamming stations of the SPB-5, SPB-7, SPO-8 and SPO-10 types, as well as the R-824, R-834 and R-834 aviation radio stations with the "Arfa-3" attachments were received.

1976 - 1977 kits of electronic warfare units of the front, army and army corps were developed. They were engaged in the suppression of short-wave communications in the operational and operational-tactical level, covering the front's facilities and troops.

As for the 1980s, the formation of new EW units was significantly constrained by the limited supply of jamming stations to airborne radars from the industry (SPN-30, SPN-40, and in subsequent years - SPN-2, SPN-3 and SPN-4). In the second half of the 90s, the development was completed and fundamentally new models of radio interference technology for space radio communications were adopted. But the end of the century was, perhaps, the most difficult in terms of the arrival of new technology. And only from about 2000 the situation gradually began to improve. "[5]

Colonel V.S. Kuznetsova [6]:

“...... The heads of the electronic warfare of the Military Districts (Belorussian, Leningrad, Baltic, Moscow Air Defense Districts, Baranovichi Air Defense Corps), meeting me at their headquarters, said:“ A rich owner has arrived! ”. Sometimes I even had, of course, with the permission of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces and the commander of the army, to transfer, according to the relevant documents, some samples of this equipment (for example, reconnaissance equipment) to the districts as mutual assistance ... "

Colonel V.S. Kuznetsov :

“... In the late 70s and all 80s, the personnel of our missile army knew how to practically work to overcome the US missile defense (ABM), defend against high-precision weapons (WTO) of the enemy, countered foreign technical intelligence (ITR), knew how work in conditions of radio interference with our communication facilities, i.e. in the entire spectrum of frequencies of "white noise" ... "

The following is a description of some of the electronic warfare equipment that were in service with the 23rd separate battalion Electronic warfare. Only open data found on the Internet are given. I would be grateful for clarifications and additions ...

* * *

Radar stations P-15 (1RL13) and P-19 (1RL134)


Radar P-15

The P-15 UHF radar was developed by VNIIRT (Moscow) and is designed to detect low-flying targets. Development began in 1952 and entered service in 1955. It is used as part of radar posts of radio engineering formations, control batteries of anti-aircraft artillery and missile formations of the air defense operational link and at tactical air defense command posts.

The P-15 station is mounted on one vehicle together with the antenna system and is deployed into a combat position in 10 minutes. The power unit is transported in a trailer.


Radar P-19

Stations P-15 and P-19 were manufactured at the Murom plant of radio measuring instruments (MZ RIP), and the introduction of the P-15 into production (the plant's design bureau began processing technical documentation) took place back in 1956. Later, the P-15 was repeatedly modernized: P-15M , P15M2, P-15MN, P-15N, P-15U. In fact, one of the modernizations of the P-15 can be considered the P-19 with its modifications: P-19-2, P-19-5, P-19Sh, P - 19Sh3, P-19Sh3-1. Currently, both stations are out of production, but can be upgraded.

According to some sources, station 1RL13 also has the name "Tropa" (although I came across the name "NEBO-SV" in one source), and 1RL134 - "Danube-15".

The station has three operating modes:

Amplitude;

Amplitude with accumulation;

Coherent impulse.

The station has protection from active, frequency-targeted interference - by fast tuning to one of four frequencies, and from passive interference - a compensation scheme against dipole interference and local objects.


Radar P-15

In 1970, tests of the P-15MN radar were carried out, on which flickering equipment and equipment for a ground-based radar interrogator (NRZ) were additionally introduced. At the beginning of the 70s, the P-15MN radar was largely transferred to a new element base and equipped with a new NRZ.As a result of this modernization, the station received the name P-19 (1RL134) and was put into service in 1974.

The P-19 radar is designed for reconnaissance of air targets at low and medium altitudes, target detection, determination of their current coordinates in azimuth and identification range, as well as for transmitting radar information to command posts and to interfaced systems. It is a mobile two-coordinate radar station located on two vehicles.

The first car is equipped with transmitting and receiving equipment, anti-jamming equipment, indicator equipment, equipment for transmitting radar information, simulating, communicating and interfacing with consumers of radar information, functional control and equipment for a ground-based radar interrogator.



Radar P-19

The second car is equipped with an antenna-rotary radar device and power supply units.

Difficult climatic conditions and the duration of operation of the P-15 and P-19 radars have led to the fact that by now most of the radars require resource restoration.

The only way out of this situation is considered to be the modernization of the old radar fleet based on the Kakta-2E1 radar.

The modernization proposals took into account the following:

Maintaining intact the main radar systems (antenna system, antenna rotation drive, microwave path, power supply system, vehicles);

Possibility of modernization in operating conditions with minimal financial costs;

The possibility of using the released P-19 radar equipment for the restoration of products that have not been modernized.

As a result of the modernization, the mobile solid-state low-altitude radar P-19 will be able to perform the tasks of monitoring the airspace, determining the range and azimuth of air objects - aircraft, helicopters, remotely piloted aircraft and cruise missiles, including those operating at low and extremely low altitudes, against the background of intense reflections from the underlying surface, local objects and hydrometeorological formations.

The radar is easily adaptable to use in various military and civilian systems. It can be used for information support of air defense systems, air forces, coastal defense systems, rapid reaction forces, civil aviation aircraft traffic control systems. In addition to the traditional use as a means of detecting low-flying targets in the interests of the armed forces, the modernized radar can be used to control airspace in order to prevent the transportation of weapons and drugs by low-altitude, low-speed and small-sized aircraft in the interest of special services and police units dealing with drug trafficking and arms smuggling.

The upgraded radar is all-weather and can be operated in various climatic zones.

Main characteristics:

P-15 P-19
View area in azimuth, deg. 360 360
Instrumental range, km 10-160 160
Viewing area in height, m up to 6000 up to 6000
View rate, s 6, 12 6, 12
power, kWt 310 310
Receiver sensitivity, W 2 x 10-14 2 x 10-14
BOTTOM azimuth width, deg. 4,5 4,5
Frequency range (waves) decimeter decimeter

SPN-30 reconnaissance and radar countermeasures station (1RL237)


SPN-30

SYMBOLS

Brief: SPN-30(Jamming Station - 30)

Customer index: 1RL237

NATO: Paint box

PURPOSE

Designed for electronic suppression (EW) in the extended operating frequency range of existing, including modernized airborne radars to protect ground and air objects. Suppression along the main beam and side lobes of the radiation pattern of the following classes of airborne radars is provided:

Side view;

Reconnaissance and shock complexes;

Weapon control;

Support for flights at low altitudes;

Multifunctional.

The following types of interference are generated in the station:

Quasi-continuous;

Multiple-pulse or time-based response;

Noise sighting in frequency and conjugate in the spectrum.


SPN-30

As a result of the modernization, the SPN-30 station acquires a modern look, improves performance, reliability, maintainability, improves weight and size characteristics, and reduces energy consumption.

The modernized station includes:

Antenna machine;

Control machine;

Power station;

Set of cables and harnesses;

Operational documentation.

SPN-40 active jamming station (1RL238)


SPN-40

SYMBOLS

Brief: SPN-40(Jamming Station - 40)

Customer index: 1RL238