In December 1994, the Russian army invaded the Chechen Republic and attempted to capture the capital of Chechnya, Grozny, outright. After the failure of the first attempt, the Russian army spent two months liberating the city house by house. Lost in morale, Russian conscripts suffered heavy losses from the Chechen armed forces, and the war continues to this day. During the first month of the armed conflict, the Russian armed forces wrote off 225 armored vehicles as irrecoverable combat losses. This amounted to 10.23% armored vehicles participating in the campaign. Some of these armored vehicles were taken to the Kubinka training ground for study. Lieutenant General A. Galkin, head of the armored department, held a conference on the results of the research on February 20, 1995. The Minister of Defense was also present at the conference. The result of the conference was the refusal of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation from further purchases tanks with gas turbine engines. The following article describes the Chechen anti-tank tactics and the vulnerability of Russian armored vehicles in urban battles.
Chechen tactics of fighting armored vehicles
Chechen militants are armed with Soviet and Russian production, and most of them served in the Soviet armed forces. The Chechen combat group consists of 15-20 people, divided into firing cells of 3-4 people. Each cell includes a grenade launcher (armed with an RPG-7 or RPG-18), a machine gunner and a sniper. The rest of the cell's fighters are engaged in carrying ammunition (helping grenade launchers and machine gunners). Battle Groups deploy their cells into teams of “tank hunters”. The sniper and machine gunner cut off the infantry, and the grenade launcher hits the armored vehicle. Teams are located on the first, second, third floors of buildings and in basements. Usually one tank attacks 5-6 teams at the same time. Shooting is carried out at the roof, sides or rear of the car. Bottles of gasoline or napalm are thrown onto the roof of the car. Chechen "tank hunters" try to trap columns on city streets by blowing up the front and rear vehicles, and then methodically destroy the entire column.
The vertical firing angles of Russian tank guns do not allow them to fight “tank hunters” when they are located in basements or on the second or third floors, and the simultaneous attack of 5-6 teams makes machine guns useless. To combat “tank hunters,” self-propelled guns were included in armored columns. anti-aircraft installations ZSU-23-4 and 2S6.
First losses Russian technology are explained by inappropriate tactics, underestimation of the enemy and insufficient combat readiness. The Russians entered Grozny without surrounding it or cutting it off from reinforcements. They planned to capture the city on the move, without even dismounting. Due to a lack of personnel, the columns were mixed and most armored personnel carriers moved with minimal or no foot cover. These first columns were completely destroyed.
After the regrouping, the number of infantry was increased and the systematic liberation of the city began, house by house, block by block. Losses in armored vehicles were significantly reduced due to changes in tactics. Russian infantry moved level with the combat vehicle to support and cover it. Some of the machines were equipped with a wire mesh mounted 25-30 cm from the body to reflect cumulative and anti-tank grenades, Molotov cocktails and bundles of explosives. In order to destroy the “tank hunters,” ambushes were set up along their routes of approach.
Vulnerability of the Russian BTT
The bulk of the armored vehicles were destroyed using anti-tank grenades and grenade launchers. For each destroyed armored vehicle there were an average of 3-6 damaging hits. Favorite targets of Chechen grenade launchers were fuel tanks and engines. In the pictures gray areas of armored vehicles that accounted for 90% of damaging hits were identified.
BMD-1 is used to transport personnel of airborne units. Therefore, it has weak armor. The BMD-1 is vulnerable to attack from the front, side, rear and above. The front part of the turret has reinforced armor and is therefore less vulnerable, but the rear part is not.
The BMP-2 is better armored. However, the roof is poorly armored and the fuel tanks are located in the rear doors, leaving the driver easily vulnerable.
The wheeled BTR-70 is vulnerable in the same places as BMD and BMP.
62 tanks were destroyed during the first month of fighting in Chechnya. Over 98% (that is, 61 tanks) were destroyed by hits in areas not covered by dynamic protection. T-72 and T-80 tanks were used in Chechnya. They were invulnerable to frontal hits, since the frontal projection was well armored and covered with dynamic protection. Tanks were destroyed by hits on the sides, back and the roof, into the driver's hatch. In the initial stage of the conflict, most tanks participating in the battles did not have dynamic protection. They were especially vulnerable, including to frontal hits.
Conclusion
Chechen militants managed to develop effective techniques destruction of Russian armored vehicles on the streets of a big city. Many of these techniques can be used by other militaries to combat Russian-made armored vehicles in urban combat. Let's list these methods:
1. The created teams of “tank hunters” must include a machine gunner and a sniper to protect the grenade launcher from infantry.
2. Zones for anti-tank ambushes should be selected in areas of the city that limit the movement of armored vehicles to narrow “channels”.
3. The location of the ambush should ensure that escape routes are cut off and vehicles are locked in the destruction area.
4. It is necessary to use several commands, placing them on different levels- in basements, on the first and third floors of buildings. Difficulties with the use of RPG-7 and RPG-18 were caused by their jet stream, flashes of shots and low rate of fire. To reliably destroy an armored vehicle, 5-6 launches were carried out simultaneously by different teams. It's obvious that anti-tank weapon future urban battles should be multi-shot, with minimal unmasking signs, recoil and weight, the ability to fire from closed premises. The AT-4 anti-tank grenade launcher and the Javelin portable anti-tank missile system do not meet these requirements.
5. Armored targets must be fired from above, from the flanks and from the rear. Shots at the frontal armor are ineffective and can only unmask the grenade launcher.
6. First of all, attached anti-aircraft artillery installations must be destroyed.
Lester W. Grau, trans. from English Yuri Goldaev
(Red Thrust Star, January 1997. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS)
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Comments on the article
1 Quite a sensible article for analysts from far abroad (although, considering that it was made on the basis Russian sources... :)
2 “Many of these techniques can be used by other armed forces to combat Russian-made armored vehicles in urban combat.”- Incorrect conclusion. This conclusion is valid for almost all BTT of any production.
How it all began for me
I’ll start from the beginning, I’ll omit all the details of how I got to the Chechen Republic, I’ll only write that I was sent on a business trip from the 239th Guards. tank regiment 15th Guards tank division(Chebarkul), in which he held the position of commander of a tank platoon, respectively, for a similar position in the tank battalion of the 276th motorized rifle regiment. This was at the beginning of 1996. We went to Stary New Year, in my opinion, on the train Chelyabinsk-Mineralnye Vody. Well, of course, we drank all the way... From the Mineralnye Vody by train to Mozdok, we spent 3 days in Mozdok (there was no weather) - here for the first time I felt what a tent without insulation and a potbelly stove were like. Finally, either on the 18th or 19th of January, a Mi-26 transport helicopter with a group of fighters, apparently on their way to replenish the 205th MSBr (I don’t remember exactly), flew to Khankala. The fighters were dropped off in Severny. Our group of officers and warrant officers consisted of about twenty people, including the political officer of the 239th Guards. tank regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov, who was on his way to a similar position in the 276th SME, but not everyone went to the 276th, some went to the 324th SME, also from the Urals.
In Khankala they said that the helicopter would not arrive until the morning, and that I would have to spend the night here. It’s good that the “director” (the person who is responsible for replenishment, meeting replacement officers, who is assigned to the group’s headquarters) turned out to be my classmate, or rather, he was actually I have ZKV at my school. Oleg Kaskov (later Hero of Russia) sheltered me and took me to the group headquarters, to the room of the “directors”. At the school (Chelyabinsk Higher Technical School) we had a good relationship with him, we often vacationed together during our 3rd and 4th years.
On the spot
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A tank with a mask net, on it I am unloaded (made from a floating vest) with a machine gun. Tank No. 434, sometimes used in convoys, good tank(the soul lay with him, as well as with No. 431). The tank's driver is Smertin, an excellent driver, it's a pity that he's not in the photo. The "Luna" spotlight didn't have a cover on it, but actually had a "Ghostbusters" sign on it. |
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On the stern of the tank with the inscription “Barnaul S”, there is a checkpoint on the road “Avtury-Novaya Zhizn”. I rode in a convoy on this tank, and since the crew was from Barnaul (however, the entire company was from Barnaul), and I was acting as a company commander, Kostya Deryugin (regular commander of tank No. 431) wrote “Barnaul S” (C probably means commander). Kostya is to my left, in the foreground is the commander of the tank battalion (squatting in a light cap) Lieutenant Colonel Menshikov. Approximately mid-May 1996 |
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Officers' tent of the 2nd tank company. Let's drink! To my right is the commander of the 2nd TR Sanya Aleksandrov (Alex), the same year of graduation as me (1995), but just studied in a different company of the ChVTKU (in the 6th). Even further to the right is the commander of a tank platoon of the 166th MSBr, born in 1994. CHVTKU, unfortunately I don’t remember his last name. Location of SME 276, Kurchaloy, approximately July 1996. |
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Against the background of a tank of the 2nd company with the inscriptions “Jolly Roger” and “ Southern Urals" “Southern Urals” - because many were from the Chebarkul division (most of the officers and warrant officers), and “Roger” ... in general, part of the tanks of the 3rd (my) company carried the “Jolly Roger” flag. They took black insulation from tents and sewed a skull and crossbones cut from a sheet onto it. Location of the 276th SME, approximately the end of June 1996. |
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In a hat on a tank turret. The soldiers had just been replaced, which later had an impact in Grozny. Location of 276th SME, July 1996 |
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In the Ural cockpit wearing dark glasses. Checkpoint near Kurchaloy, I came to check on my own. May 1996 |
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IN dugout, surrounded by his subordinates, the photo was taken after the fighters were replaced. Location of the 276th SME, end of July 1996. |
In the morning by helicopterMi-8I arrived at the location of the 276th SME, which was then stationed in the area of the village. Avtury and Kurchaloy, approximately between them. He was assigned to the 3rd tank company as commander of the 1st tank platoon. The commander of the TR was Captain Valery Chernov, who arrived from the Chelyabinsk VTKU from the position of commander of a cadet platoon, I commanded the 1st platoon, Lieutenant Oleg Kaskov (on a business trip to Khankala) – second. Lieutenant Vlad [......], also a graduate of our school, but a year older, commanded the 3rd tank platoon. By the time of my arrival, Vlad, Oleg and company commander Valera Chernov had been in Chechnya for about 1-1.5 months and had not yet fought. Vlad served as an aircraft controller with the regiment's supply column (later I replaced him in this role). We were the first to officially come for 6 months; previously the rotation was every 3 months, but sometimes we stayed for 4, 5 or even more.
I replaced Seryoga Bityukov, he was also the commander of a platoon of cadets at the ChVTKU, senior lieutenant. I remember he gave me the unloading and additional magazines for the AK and asked: “Can you start a tank with a hook?” I say: “I can” (they showed it to me during an internship in Elani). “So,” he says, “he’s smart.” And he also gave me a key for the OFS fuse, and then a personal cartridge extractor for the PKT. He is generally a competent guy, he showed me everything, explained everything, he and I rode in a tank to all the checkpoints of the regiment (within the location) and I quickly found my way around the regiment. By the way, on one of the magazines of his AK it was written: “To my beloved Dzhokharka from Seryoga Bityukov”.
Materiel
The tanks in the battalion are T-72B1. About half of them were quite old cars from the first Grozny. In the 1st tank company many without side screens, company commander Oleg (unfortunately, I don’t remember his last name). In the 2nd TR, where Alexander Samoilenko was the commander, there are about half of old and new tanks. The third TR was fully equipped with fresh vehicles from the storage base manufactured in 1985. About a month before I arrived, they were brought into the regiment; there were no special problems with spare parts - in general, I was lucky. I don’t remember the exact number of vehicles in the battalion, something like 25. The regiment was incomplete, there were 2 SMEs (BMP-1), TB (T-72B1), ADN (2C1), ZDN (several"Shilok"), and the companies.
About two weeks later, the operation began, which later became known as “Novogroznenskaya”. Our company required 2 officers to join the combined detachment of the 276th MRR - a company commander and a platoon commander. Valery Chernov and I went, as well as 4 tanks, including the tank of the company commander, the 2nd platoon (mine), and the tank of the 3rd platoon with a mine trawl. I was assigned to the GPZ (head marching outpost), ahead was a tank with a trawl (aka a sentinel), then 2 more tanks and an infantry fighting vehicle, then the main forces of the raid detachment (I don’t remember the exact composition, about 20 infantry fighting vehicles and 10 tanks, IMR- 2, BTS, fuel tankers based on KRAZ, vehicles with ammunition).
They moved during the day, at night they took up a perimeter defense and set up guards. Approximate route: Kurchaloy – Mairtup – Bachiyurt. When approaching the village Mairtup was blown up by a landmine of an infantry fighting vehicle of the 166th MSBr. Their column was moving towards our column, I did not reach the explosion site by about 200 meters. He saw the top of the explosion and ordered the patrol tank to stop, then he saw armored vehicles on the outskirts of the green area, reported and gave a green rocket, which meant “friends”, having received the same in response, he continued moving. I saw a blown up car, it was lying on its torn off turret, there was a hole in the bottom of about 3 square meters, almost from side to side. There were soldiers lying around, they were being helped. The guys were seriously injured, one had his eyes knocked out (they had already bandaged him) and a machine gun was tied to his leg as a splint, he was shaking violently, the area around was a mixture of dirt, oil, blood, cartridges and some kind of debris.
This picture was clearly imprinted in my brain, because these were the first combat losses I saw, probably from that moment I realized that war is tough...
First fight
The first fire contact occurred near the village. Bachiyurt, a little above the village. We entrenched ourselves in an MTS or some farm and dug trenches. Thanks to the sappers - they helped: during the entire raid I never threw away the shovel. We had an IMR (engineering vehicle) and a BTS with us; they dug trenches for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, however, some of the trenches were there, apparently from previous battles. They were checked by sappers for the presence of mines.
In general, we had just gotten up and engineering work was still going on, when a smoke shell or a 120-mm mortar shell exploded 100-150 meters from the strong point. I remember that the battalion commander asked the artillery spotter if he called the fire, he said no. The command “to fight!” followed, and everyone took their places. As it turned out, on time - two gaps immediately followed in the disposition of the combined detachment. There were no losses, and everyone shot somewhere together, including my tank. I don’t know... I didn’t see the target, I don’t remember who gave the target designation, but they said that they saw flashes behind the hill. I decided where, and hit the tree crown twice with OFS from a distance of about 1200 meters. Both shells exploded in the treetops, I chose the thickest ones... in short, they didn’t shoot at us anymore. The next day, the mullah and someone from the Bachiyurt administration came and asked not to shoot at the village and something else. As far as I understand, it was not possible to reach an agreement, because a crowd of mostly women came out onto the Bachiyurt-Novogroznenskoye road, which was located 300 meters (maybe a little more) from the strong point (my tank and the tank of my platoon were facing the road) and chanted something type of "troop withdrawal".
I don’t know if it makes sense to describe all these psychological events, it’s just that, in my opinion, they delayed us, or maybe there was simply no order. Although the road was shot at night, naturally, no one fired at the crowd. In the evening they disappeared, during the day we set up a checkpoint on the road. To be honest, I don’t remember when we were fired at for the second time - before or after the mullah arrived, but, in my opinion, it happened the next day. A group of officers - me, Valera Chernov, the battalion commander of the SME, someone else - stood behind the parapet (along the perimeter, all-round defense), suddenly I realized that we were under fire.
We were fired upon by a group of militants numbering approximately 15-20 people. Fire from small arms They opened from the side of the road a little to the left of the area under fire, from a small height that dominated the strong point. We reacted quite quickly, I remember that I ran to my tank. While I was running, I was wondering if the “mass” was on and what place to take. There was no shell in the barrel, and I would not have been able to open fire from the cannon quickly, so I decided to take my regular place, dived into the hatch, unlocked the launcher, and turned it around. The machine gun was cocked. I took aim (I saw flashes of gunfire) and pulled the trigger. No shots were fired. I cocked it again, again silence. It seemed to me then that I was doing everything unforgivably slowly... I grabbed the machine gun that was lying on the armor, opened fire, fired a spark. I tried to deal with the "Cliff" again, I remember inserting one cartridge and it fired single, then inserted the tape and it worked. I still don’t know what happened with the NSVT... Then I checked it several times, it no longer refused, maybe it doesn’t need to be cocked in advance?
In short, while I was poking around, the gunner and driver arrived (they were busy arranging the dugout), launched the tank, and opened fire from the cannon and coaxial machine gun. In my opinion, as soon as the tanks opened fire, the militants immediately retreated, and I am not sure whether we got anyone or not. We shot from bottom to top along the crest of the hill, however, immediately behind the hill (on the reverse slope) there was a “green patch”, and its top was visible. I advised the gunner to hit the greenery, he placed several shells quite successfully (Sanya Ebel). In general, then there was reconnaissance (MSB reconnaissance platoon), they said that 15-20 people were leaving, and someone or something was being dragged, as far as I understand, they identified them from the tracks.
The second tank of my platoon opened fire at the same time as mine, it was to the right. The main mistake was that they did not assign fire weapons on duty, everyone was busy setting things up... There were no losses on our side, the battle lasted about 20 minutes, I didn’t record the time, and you can’t get your bearings in such a situation using your internal clock.
About 3 days later we received an order to move further in the direction of the village. Alera and Tsentoroy (however, later I found out that Tsentoroy is not called that at all, I don’t remember another name, so I’ll call it Tsentoroy). These two settlements were practically a single whole. We crossed the Bachiyurt-Novogroznenskoye road, leaving a checkpoint on a farm, so Bachiyurt was on the right flank, and Novogroznenskoye somewhere on the left (there was no direct visibility). Was heavy fog, the first information about the enemy appeared on the air, someone reported that several people ran across the road along which we were moving. Thus began truly the longest day of my life...
I acted in the GPZ, and the fog and my lack of experience (6-7 months after college and less than a month in the combat area) must have played a role. I made a mistake and stood at a height from which Tsentoroi was visible, but Aleroy was not visible. The SME battalion commander called me, by the way, they themselves did not immediately realize that they had made a mistake.
In short, we found out that we were in the wrong place, we had to move to the next height, about 1300 meters away. To do this, we had to go down into the ravine between the heights, and the place where we stood had previously been occupied by some kind of explosives unit, as I understand it, back in the summer of 1995. There were trenches for armored vehicles, the BTS dug a few more, and the infantry also began to dig in. I walked from the KShMka to the tank and stared at the map, at that moment fire was opened on us, as it seemed to me then, from all sides. There were about 50 meters to the tank, and I rushed... I remember that I was running practically on all fours, I remember sprays of bullets in my face, but I don’t remember how I ended up in the tank. I couldn’t immediately understand where the fire was coming from in the fog; apparently, the place had been targeted. I ordered the gunner to shoot at the adjacent height (exactly the one that we were supposed to occupy). Almost immediately the commander of another tank reported: “I see a spirit.” I say: “Urine! Don't report! He was on the other side of the all-round defense, I couldn’t give him target designation, and there was a company commander there.
Their tanks were located about 70 meters from each other and turned their stern towards me, and higher up the slope stood the tank of the 1st company almost parallel to my tank, only slightly moved forward. Below there was a tank with a trawl perpendicular to my tank and 9 moreBMP-1, KShM, BTS, and a couple MT-LBmortarmen and medics, 131 l/s personnel along with crews: all this along the perimeter.
They fired at us from small arms, grenade launchers, and mortars. I didn’t see any ATGM launches on the first day; apparently they weren’t allowed due to poor visibility. Almost immediately the “300th” appeared (I heard it over the phone), then I heard that the BMP was on fire. Immediately behind the stern of my tank there was an infantry fighting vehicle, 10-15 meters away, they didn’t have time to dig a trench for it. I turned the commander’s cupola around and saw that the BMP was on fire, with flames rising from the rear doors. My driver (Sergei Buza) says to me: “commander, can we protect the bekha from fire?” I say: “Come on, but it’s not clear how to cover the enemy from fire - the fire was coming from three sides.” In general, they covered it up, it would take a long time to explain...
As soon as we got into the trench, the ammunition of the infantry fighting vehicle detonated. The explosion was so strong that one of the doors hit the barrels of the company commander’s tank (they were empty), the turret along with the top plate of the hull was twisted and thrown several meters, the sides parted slightly. And the gunner and I got it too – we were sick all day. The hatches were slightly open (dangling on torsion bars) and locked into place. Then it caught fireMT-LBmortarmen with mines, he was pushed by a BTS from a height, in that place there was a rather steep descent of about 200 meters, he rolled to the very bottom, burned, smoked and went out.
Around mid-afternoon, the fog began to clear and a couple of helicopters arrivedMi-24, passed over us, and as soon as we were above the positions of the spirits, they opened quite strong fire from small arms and grenade launchers (the helicopters were flying at a low altitude). They immediately soared up, retreated, turned around and fired a salvo of NURS in height. As far as I remember, they made one pass and left altogether. The weather was not conducive to the use of aviation, thanks to them for working in such conditions. The artillery support was also not very good, the fact is that our 2S1 regimental artillery only reached the village. The center, even at its limit, did not reach the positions of the militants at the height at all. Then I learned that the artillery division had to be moved 3 km from the regiment’s location, covering it with roadblocks. The enemy's main positions were gradually revealed. They surrounded us in a semicircle: the main positions ran along the height at which we had to stand. This height with its near edge approached us at 500 meters, with its far edge at 1300 meters (the main network of trenches on the reverse slope) is the right flank and front (from the direction of movement of our detachment). In addition, there is a mortar behind the school in Tsentoroi, also on the right, a little behind. On the left flank there is an embankment road and a forest behind it, about 400-500 meters, in the same place, a little behind, a concrete fence and 2 large tanks behind it. It seemed to me then that this day would never end...
We reloaded the shells from the non-mechanized stowage into the automatic loader. I replaced gunner Sanya Ebel - he dislocated shoulder joint, I just don’t remember at what moment. In short, I tried to straighten it right in the tank, putting my hand on the pallet ejection frame, but it didn’t work. He got out and lay down on the stern, fortunately the fire had weakened a little. About 10 minutes later (all this is conditional, I didn’t feel the time) - he sits down in the commander’s place. I told him - so what? He says - she got into place herself. I was very lucky with the personnel, and I am grateful to God that I, a young lieutenant, had the opportunity to command and fight with such people. Thank them very much for their courage and bravery, for understanding me as a commander, thanks to those people who prepared them for combat operations in Chechnya (Siberian Military District). They shot and drove perfectly, there was almost complete interchangeability in the crews, even the driver drivers could shoot and knew how to turn on the fire control system, they were all of the same call, so there were no disagreements. I think this is one of the reasons for the lack of losses in these battles, if not the main one... But I digress...
We are at war...
I don’t remember all the circumstances of the first day. The battle flared up with new strength, then calmed down, and so on until the evening. It was starting to get dark, ammunition was delivered on twoMT-LBwith military guards, replenished the ammunition and laid shells on the parapet of the trench. I remember that I unloaded shells (not all, of course) from a tank with a trawl that came with a supply column, my friend (we lived in the dorm together) Edik Kolesnikov (ChVTKU born in 1994) was there - platoon commander of the 1st TR. Edik gave a few sips of mash from his flask, and before it got completely dark, they went back to Bachiyurt.
The fire intensified again, apparently they detected movement. It continued until it was completely dark. I changed the gunner, turned on the TPN 1-49 night light, visibility was not very good during the day, and at night it was a maximum of 200-300 meters. So, we shot with PKT for prevention, and so did the spirits. I remember that I had a dream in green color (I fell asleep right behind the gun sight), I woke up because someone was hammering on the hatch. The crew of the burnt BMP settled on our transmission and asked us not to sleep. The gunner replaced me. They knocked several times and asked to start the tank: it was cold... We swapped with the 438th tank (commander Pavel Zakharov) - either he was watching, then we were. This is how the first day ended. I described it in such detail because it was essentially my first serious fight.
The next four days simply merged into a series of events for me. The mortar fire intensified, the first ATGM launches began, fire was fired from the AGS, the gunner cut off the spirit from the PKT. I hit two of them with OFS: they “clicked” themselves - in the morning there was fog, then, suddenly, visibility improved to about 1500 m. They were standing, looking down somewhere at their feet, so I jumped away.
ATGMs were launched against the tank of the first company, but inaccurately. I don’t know the reason, there were several launches, the missiles either hit the parapet or flew over the tower - this was on the second day. The losses were, in my opinion, “three hundred”. The third day brought the greatest losses. Our mortar crew was destroyed - a direct hit by a 120-mm mortar shell on the caponier. Result: five “Gruz-200” together with the platoon commander, several more people were injured, one died on the way to Khankala. An ensign, a signalman with a KShMki, was sitting on the armor (why?), two VOG-17 grenades (from AGS) exploded on a ribbed MTO sheet, a fragment hit him in the eye. Before the evacuation I managed to talk to him. He asked what was wrong with his eye (the doctor warned me not to say anything), I told him that he couldn’t see it, it was a bandage. He asked for revenge. He and I traveled to Chechnya together on a train in the same compartment, drinking. Seryoga's name, unfortunately I don't remember his last name. I think I took revenge...
In addition, on the same day a mortar was working very hard on my tank. The explosions lay nearby, we had to maneuver. Thanks to the company commander (Valera Chernov), he suggested where it was better to stand. In addition, there were again several ATGM launches, again at the tank of the 1st company and again past (I think he had to change his position). The militants must be given credit, especially their mortar men - they shot accurately, which, however, cannot be said about the ATGM operator.
True, I was never able to spot him. I determined the approximate direction using the wires. Of course, if it was a 9M113, then at a range of 3500-4000 it could only be detected at the moment of launch. I think it was on the third day that the turning point occurred, we managed to push the spirits out to distant positions - 1300 meters, to squeeze out the ends of the horseshoe with which they covered us. However, the left flank was cleared by the end of the first day, only on the first day they tried to approach in white camouflage.
On the fourth day (or towards the end of the third) three 2S3 (Akatsia) units were brought up from Khankala, and they opened fire quite accurately. I immediately felt the difference between the 122 and 152 mm calibers - the efficiency is many times higher (in my opinion), I even think that’s why the perfume went away. I discovered three militants at a distance of 3600 meters, they were going down the slope (going into the mountains) from the side of Novogroznensky, I took the lead, rather intuitively. It seemed that I had covered it, it was quite difficult to evaluate the results from such a range using the 1A40 scope, they looked like dashes. On the same day there were several more launches (3-4) of ATGMs and finally hit the tank of the 1st company in left side towers directly into the guides of the “Tucha” system. The result is that the guides are bent, the head of the night sight is broken, the gunner and commander are shell-shocked, but nothing more. There are not even traces of a cumulative jet! It turns out that the ATGM hit, but the jet did not? When they say that anything can happen in war, they are not lying...
On the fifth day, nothing special happened: we shot, they shot, there were no more ATGM launches, although the tank remained in the same place. Several mines arrived, the AGS seemed to be working, there seemed to be no more losses. In the evening, an MSR arrived from near Novogroznensky with a tank platoon - 10BMP-2and three T-72B1 with reinforcements: two Vasilkas, something else from the 131st (Maikop) brigade. They started hammering: with artillery, Cornflowers, 120-mm mortars, and 2A42 cannons (we were pleased against the background of the Thunder). They spent the entire sixth day hammering, in the morning they were still snarling with rifle fire, then they probably left. The height was occupied by the MSR of the 131st brigade.
On the seventh day, the explosives arrived in two BTR-80 armored personnel carriers - clean and equipped. Valera Chernov says to me: “Come!” – I approach, he’s talking to the Airborne Lieutenant Colonel on an armored personnel carrier. The lieutenant colonel tells me: “My men are going to Tsentoroi now, cover from above, just yourself.” Your company commander told me about you.” I think: “What did Valera spout there?” I say: “Why in Tsentoroi?” He says, seriously: “We need to comb, see if there are any militants. Do not let me down". And there our infantry has probably been rubbing around for days, tearing at mattresses and blankets.
It became funny, I drove up the tank, sat down behind the gunner, turned on the system, and got into contact. They rushed there with one armored personnel carrier with a landing party, and my sight fogged up, so much so that I couldn’t see anything at all. The lieutenant colonel asks me, but I can’t answer, I’m having a fit of laughter, I don’t even know why. Somehow I pulled myself together, switched to our frequency, and said to Kostya Deryugin (tank number 431): “Put the tank next to mine.”
In short, they, without dismounting, drove through the village, along the main street, and came back. They thanked us and left. In the evening we listen to the interwave through a radio station, tune the receiver to its frequency, the transceiver to the interwave frequency (by the way, observation: if you tune the receiver, it picks up worse than the transceiver; later, when I worked as an aircraft controller as part of a regiment’s supply column, I noticed that if you work with turntables from the transceiver, and with the column from the receiver, then as soon as the column stretches out, the lead vehicles are no longer heard). So: the news says - today internal troops after heavy fighting occupied the village of Tsentoroi. I have nothing against VV and I understand that now they are carrying the main burden in the North Caucasus, but then... maybe someone else received awards for this? But that's on their conscience.
As for the sight - I think what happened? I unscrewed the drying cartridge, told the gunner to let the silica gel dry, looked at the sight head, it turns out that a fragment or bullet hit the very bottom and broke the glass, however, it looked pretty good through it, it just apparently lost its seal.
In addition, the windshield of the KT was cut by shrapnel and there was a dent from a bullet in one of the guides of the “Tucha” system. There was no other damage to the tank, only after the detonation of the ammunitionBMP-1(as I wrote about above) the whole tank was somehow “smoked”, covered in small debris (pieces of plates from batteries, bullets flying out of cartridges, something else). In addition, on the second or third day of fighting, I lost my AK-74S: it fell off the armor, and we drove over it. I had to throw it into the spare parts and give the bolt to the infantry - one of them had a broken ledge on the bolt.
The operation ended after about 2-3 weeks, we stood in this place for several more days, then we moved to Bachiyurt, where we stood for several days at a commanding height. It seems that they scammed Bachiyurt, although, more likely, they agreed with the administration or the elders: they handed over several machine guns. Then the same thing happened in Mairtup, then in Kurchaloi. Sometime in early April the raiding party returned to base camp shelf.
conclusions
Since we lived in tanks for about 2 months, let me give some recommendations.
1) If this is a cold season, and the fighting compartment heater, to put it mildly, “does not correspond,” at least on T-72 tanks, you can make a “gut” out of tarpaulin. Just cut a long strip (about 3 m long) and sew it with wire so that you get a “pipe” with a diameter of about 60-70 cm. Fasten one end to the blinds, and point the other end into the commander’s hatch and secure it with wire, but so that could be quickly thrown back. Warms up very efficiently fighting compartment and even a management department. You can use it both on the march and in place (you warm it up and close the hatches), and for some time it is quite comfortable.
2) It’s most comfortable to sleep in the driver’s seat, although I was quite comfortable in the commander’s seat. To do this, you need to remove the gun guard (I removed it and never installed it again) and all the fastenings for the non-mechanized stowage, and the commander’s seat. Place a standard army mattress on the floor, bend the edges of the mattress along the edges (right, left) - of course there is not enough space, but I managed to lie down in full height on the stomach, legs to the PCT. My dimensions: height 170 cm, weight 65 kg.
3) By combat use. Sometimes it is necessary to have in ammunition both fragmentation shells, and high-explosive, you can switch the part to high-explosive in advance and write it down as BKS (cumulative). You just need to remember that after loading you need to switch the ballistics back to OFS if there are no BKSs. However, we didn’t take them, we carried one BOPS in AZ and one in spare parts all the time, just in case, there were rumors that the spirits had a tank, but no one saw it.
4) According to observation devices. There was not enough visibility all the time; I wanted to get out and have a look. While this is more or less tolerable when operating in the mountains, when on the move and in the city it becomes almost critical. If you have the skills, you can, of course, observe, but I think that the commander needs a panoramic sight with an adequate night channel.
Based on T-72B1 night lights. They do not stand up to any criticism; we can only state that they exist. It was the presence of night sights, in my opinion, that stopped the enemy from active operations at night. This also applies to the gunner's sight and the commander's observation device. The driver's night light can be assessed satisfactorily, at least the tank can be driven. During the entire time I did not detect a single target at night, although I observed it quite often and for a long time.
5) In terms of armament. The PKT machine gun is reliable, you just need to clean it on time. There were no refusals or delays during the entire stay in Chechen Republic. There were shell casings and failures of electric triggers at the school, but this, it seems to me, was due to the condition of the machine guns themselves. In my opinion, the PKT is effective up to a range of 600 m, maximum up to 800 m, then it is better to work from a cannon (this is in combat conditions). By the way, all the militants destroyed from the PKT were at ranges of up to 500 m.
The gun is quite accurate, reliable, the OFS power is sufficient, but the high initial speed and flatness of the trajectory often made it impossible to destroy a target located behind the parapet. Militants very often (and this is not just my observation) brought the parapet ten meters forward, that is, you either end up in the parapet or higher. A remote projectile detonation system would solve the problem (on the T-90 this is implemented in the form of the Ainet system, but I don’t know how effective it is). Otherwise, you had to shoot either at the crown of a tree (if there is one close to the militants’ positions) or at a power line support (but you have to hit it).
The NSVT machine gun is quite reliable, although there was one failure (described above), it is accurate when firing in short bursts. You need a bulletproof shield, like the one on latest modifications American"Abrams". It seems to me that this is more effective than a remotely controlled ZPU, as on the T-80U and T-90, but this is my personal opinion.
P.S. In general, war is bad, but for any officer, sergeant, or soldier, this is an invaluable experience, all the more depressing is the fact that in connection with the creation of a “new look”, most officers with combat experience leave the army. Who will teach people?
During the first assault on Grozny, when our tank guys were driven into the narrow streets and burned (why - this is a separate discussion), many vehicles were lost. Some burned out completely, some were captured by the Czechs, some went missing along with their crews.
Soon, rumors began to circulate among various units that some special secret tank unit had begun to participate in the battles, which was armed with only one serviceable vehicle, the T-80, with a white stripe on the turret and without a tactical number. This tank appeared in different places - in the mountains, on passes, in the greenery, on the outskirts of villages, but never in the populated areas, even completely destroyed.
How he got there, where from, in what way, by whose order - no one knew. But as soon as a unit of our guys, especially conscripts, got into trouble - in an ambush, under flanking fire, etc., suddenly a T-80 tank appeared from somewhere, with a white smoky stripe on the turret, burnt paint and knocked down blocks of active armor .
The tankers never made contact and never opened the hatches. At the most critical moment of the battle, this tank appeared out of nowhere, opened surprisingly accurate and effective fire, and either attacked or covered, giving its own the opportunity to retreat and carry out the wounded. Moreover, many saw how cumulative grenade launchers, shells, and ATGMs hit the tank without causing any visible harm.
Then the tank disappeared just as incomprehensibly, as if it had dissolved into thin air. The fact that there were “eighties” in Chechnya is quite widely known. But what is less known is that soon after the start of the campaign they were withdrawn from there, since the gas turbine engines in these parts are exactly the same engine that corresponded to the theater of operations and the conditions of combat operations.
Personally, two people whom I trust unconditionally told me about their meeting with the “Eternal Tank” and if they tell something and vouch for their story, it means that they themselves consider it the TRUTH. This is Stepan Igorevich Beletsky, the story about the “Eternal” from which we squeezed out almost by force (the man is a realist to the core and telling something for which he himself could not find a rationalistic explanation is almost a feat for him) and one of the now former officers of the Novocherkassk SOBR, a direct witness to the battle of the “Eternal Tank” with the Czechs.
Their group, already at the very end of the First Campaign, ensured the withdrawal of the remaining medical personnel from the District Hospital of the North Caucasus Military District. We waited an extra day for the promised air cover - the weather permitted - but the helicopters never came. Either they skimped on fuel or forgot about it - ultimately they decided to go out on their own. We went out in the Urals with the 300th and medics and two armored personnel carriers.
We set out beyond zero, after midnight, in the dark, and seemed to get through cleanly, but a little less than two dozen miles before the “demarcation” line we ran into an ambush - Czechs with small arms, supported by a T-72. They turned into a fan and began to cover the Ural's retreat. But what is a batter versus a tank? They immediately burned one, the second died and stalled.
This is what I have written down from the words of my friend - this is almost a verbatim recording.
“The T-72s hit us with high explosives. It’s rocky there, when a rupture occurs, the wave and fragments go low, stone chips again. The spirit is literate, it doesn’t come close, you can’t get it from the border. At this moment, “Eternal” appears from the dust at the site of the next rupture, right in the middle of the road, as if it had been standing there all the time - it was just not there, the Urals had just passed by! And he stands there as if invisible, no one except us seems to see him. And he stands, all burnt, ugly, his antennas are knocked down, he’s all torn up, he’s just moving his turret a little and shaking his trunk, like an elephant’s trunk in a zoo.
Here - bam! - gives a shot. The “Czech” has a turret sideways and to the side. Bam! - the second one gives. Spirit - into the fire! And the “Eternal” barrel blew out, stands in a white cloud, spinning on its tracks and only the crackling sound of a machine gun. After the gun, it sounds like seed husks. The spirits are in the green, we are going to the bater. They opened it, the mechanic dragged away the dead man, let’s start it up. The turret jammed, but it didn’t matter, we who were still alive jumped inside and turned around. And “Eternal” suddenly fired from his cannon, like from a machine gun, quickly and quickly like this: Bam!-Bam!-Bam!
We're on gas. Here Seryoga Dmitriev shouts - “Eternal” is gone!” I couldn’t see myself anymore, I felt bad, I started vomiting out of nervousness on myself and around me. Well, as soon as they got to their own people, they went up in smoke, you understand. Then they started a quarrel with the local cops in a rage and over booze, almost shooting the assholes.
And they didn’t tell anyone about “Eternal” then - who would believe it..."
IN THE FIRE OF BATTLES
Since the adoption of the BMP-3 into service, many military conflicts have occurred, both in our country and abroad. And if the BMP-2 became the most warlike of all infantry fighting vehicles in the world, then the BMP-3 was not affected by the war on such a large scale. The one and only motorized rifle regiment on the BMP-3, which was formed in the Siberian district, stood far from the fire of the battles. These vehicles did not have time to be sent to Afghanistan - in 1989 Soviet troops left this country. In Transnistria, Tajikistan and Karabakh there were no such vehicles; battle-tested equipment fought there, with the exception of tanks of the T-64 type. However, with the outbreak of the first Chechen war in December 1994, one BMP-3 battalion was sent to this war.
What was posted on the Internet (nowadays you can also find a lot of similar things, I’ll go into more below) about the war and about weapons in that war, unfortunately, often did not correspond to reality. There were completely opposite opinions, including about the BMP-3. One could come across reviews like “who came up with such a machine that no one needs, nothing works in it,” etc.
As you know, during that war there were a lot of problems with equipment. There was a case when a train with armored personnel carriers arrived and out of 35 vehicles, only five left the platforms under their own power; the weapons complex on 28 vehicles was faulty. This is on an armored personnel carrier, there is a primitive weapon system, there is nothing to break there, but, nevertheless, this happened, this is information from official documents, not from the Internet.
The BMP-3 is a complex vehicle, and in order for it to realize its capabilities, you need to know it well. And there were only a few people, officers, who at that time knew this car well in Russia. There is no need to talk about soldiers and sergeants. When the BMP-3 is prepared, meaning that the entire range of work on servicing and preparing weapons has been carried out on it, then all operations to conduct very effective fire in the vehicle are reduced to pressing three buttons. But only after careful preparation! But only a few of our troops knew how to prepare the BMP-3 weapon system; the bulk of those “in the know” were sent abroad to earn foreign currency for the state. Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of one of the soldiers who served on the BMP-3, taken from one forum (http://forums.airbase.ru/2005/03/t32515--Moya-sluzhba-na-BMP-3. html).
“I served in the OUMSR 85th Vladimir-Pavlovsk Division in the period 1998-1999, which trained BMP-3 driver mechanics and gunner operators. My specialty is gunner operator. Due to the fact that the commanders of the vehicle, as a rule, were gunners, they were trained in approximately twice as many numbers as mechanics, and were subject to more stringent educational requirements.
Armament: three machine guns 7.62 mm, 100 mm and 30 mm cannon. PKT machine guns, 30 mm cannon with BMP-2, only a new 100 mm gun. Directional machine guns have mobility and the ability to aim fire, but were almost never used (hereinafter emphasized by the author). They are controlled by a driver, but for this he must be an ace, and we didn’t have time to grow up to that level, and there was little fuel for driving training, so there’s as much ammunition and shells as you want. The third machine gun, both guns are located on the same carriage, and they have common sights. There is a stabilizer in both planes. Our cars had two sights - a night sight with good optics and sighting range up to 4000 m and the ordinary PPB-2 with an aiming range of 2000 m. It is fair to say that the night sight is quite complex in design and it is unrealistic to repair it in parts. PPB-2 rarely broke down and was easily repaired, which is why it was the main one. Shooting at 4 km was an infrequent activity at competition shooting. The main emphasis was on shooting with 30mm and PKT, which was quite simple, especially with a 30mm gun.”
After reading, it becomes clear why someone in the war might not like the BMP-3. It turns out that in our training unit, gunners-operators were not taught to use the main sight (1K13-2 or “SOZH”), because it is complicated and God forbid it breaks. This means that they were taught to fire from the BMP-3 only in emergency mode without using an automated control system, which practically negates all the advantages of the vehicle.”
BMP-3 UAE Army in Kosovo consisting of international forces KFOR (photo by Yu. Obraztsov).
And here's another wonderful example information from the Internet, this just means that not everything on the Internet is true about the war; there is much more fiction. This is taken from one of the forums (http://medved-magazine.ru/ modules. php?name.Forums&file=viewtopic&t =171&highlight=), in which one of the participants poses as a very secret guy from a top-secret “office” who had to fulfill secret missions in almost all military conflicts on the planet that have occurred over the past 15-20 years, including in Iraq during this and this war (the author’s style and spelling have been preserved):
“And here is an earlier “secret” photograph, which is now being sculpted wherever it goes - in all conflicts. This is the first Chechen. City Grozniy, combat tests complex "Arena". A BMP-3 with an arena was ambushed in the suburbs, at a speed of more than 60 km rushed through the private sector, through vegetable gardens and houses, while shooting - just imagine - 18 damaging containers, almost in a circle, in 3 minutes, after which, receiving getting into frontal armor-the grenade stream was unable to penetrate the fuel tank, but the mechanic was concussed. The vehicle was abandoned by the crew and the landing party (who were strictly ordered to sit inside so that the “Arena” would not tear their heads off), the special forces took a circular position, but while they were finishing their shooting, a tank approached and took out the people, and the second one with the landing party fired back while the then secret infantry fighting vehicle was evacuated with Arena. While they were transporting it, there was still a hit in the landing compartment. According to the reports, it was clear that the crew and landing force all these 18 times (when a rocket or grenade was fired at the car, plus a hit in the forehead - that is, 19 times), said goodbye to life. I think the attackers also couldn’t understand anything, it’s a pity they didn’t conduct radio interception, probably the enemy simply couldn’t believe that everything was missing. The Arena itself is not visible in the picture, but believe me, this is that picture. And now it is lying around on different sites under completely different comments. I'm telling you how it really happened. By the way, evaluate the thickness of the landing party’s armor.”
Everything would be fine, but in the picture the BMP-3 is really without the Arena. That author apparently does not know that in addition to the antenna tower Radar complex"Arena", there are many other devices in the complex that are on the tower and hull and which are not in that picture. And the hole is from RPG grenades on board the BMP-3 in the picture, not in the troop compartment, but in the battery compartment. But these are minor things.
An officer (unfortunately, I don’t remember his name and surname) with whom we worked together in the UAE told me about how the BMP-3 showed itself in the first Chechen war, only he was not in my group, but in the battalion stationed in the United Arab Emirates. El Jaime. In Chechnya, he was the chief of staff of that same motorized rifle battalion on the BMP-3. According to him, out of the 31 vehicles they had at the time of their arrival in Chechnya in December 1994, during the six months of fighting, which included the storming of Grozny, seven vehicles were irretrievably lost. Two more cars with minor damage were taken away by order of the then head of the GBTU, Colonel General A.A. Galkina at NIMI TBVT in Kubinka for demonstration classes. On one of the vehicles, after a 120-mm mortar mine exploded a meter behind the rear of the vehicle, a shrapnel pierced the hatch cover for access to the main fire pit and broke the gas fire tube. The car lost control
Another BMP-3 of those taken to Kubinka had its starboard side pierced by a grenade from an anti-tank grenade launcher. It is unknown whether there were any casualties among the crew, but the vehicle remained repairable and practically combat-ready.
As that officer said, many BMP-3 crews were able to master the vehicle’s weapon system and successfully solve problems. During battles in the city, BMP-3s were successfully used to combat snipers, machine gunners and grenade launchers holed up on the upper floors of buildings. They were smoked out with a 100mm high-explosive fragmentation shells from ranges of 500-700 m. It was not difficult for an experienced gunner to “throw” such a projectile through the window, while the snipers and others in the premises had no chance to survive. They hit the windows and fired high-explosive incendiary and fragmentation tracer shells from a 30-mm automatic cannon. Large pointing and aiming angles from the BMP-3 weapons made it possible to successfully solve this problem,
Later, the officer’s words about the high combat qualities of the BMP-3, which the vehicle showed in that war, were confirmed to me by Colonel General S.A. Mayev, who was in that war too. He noted that BMP-3s saved more than one life of our soldiers.
The enemy also appreciated the high combat qualities of the BMP-3, especially the ability to effectively fight snipers on the upper floors of buildings. In this regard, the gangs began real hunt for BMP-3. For every BMP-3 shot down or destroyed, a substantial monetary reward was promised. In this regard, in the spring of 1995 motorized rifle battalion was withdrawn to a place of permanent deployment, however, some of the vehicles were transferred to units providing security command posts. Information about future fate those infantry fighting vehicles are unknown to the author.
BMP-3 also took part in another conflict - on the territory of Kosovo. There they participated as part of a UAE Armed Forces battalion as part of KFOR forces. This battalion carried out its mission in former Yugoslavia from 1999 to 2000. There has been no information about military clashes between Arab tank crews from the UAE and the enemy.
But the presence of the BMP-3 battalion from the UAE marked one interesting case. Yuri Obraztsov, who was serving there at that time as part of the French contingent, told me about him. The UAE battalion arrived in Kosovo in the summer of 1999. As long as it was warm, everything was fine, there were no problems. But then the cold weather came, problems began - they couldn’t start the engines. The reason is simple - there were no heaters on the cars, and Arab driver mechanics do not know how to start cold engines in principle. We had to call our specialists again and ask for help from the Russian military from our contingent of KFOR forces.
Now the BMP-3 has begun to enter service again Russian army, which cannot but rejoice. In 2008, the BMP-3 crew solemnly walked along Red Square at the parade, dedicated to the Day Victory. The design of this vehicle, created more than 20 years ago, but continues to remain the best infantry fighting vehicle in the world, is constantly being improved.
The author expresses gratitude to everyone who assisted in the selection of materials and photographs, the designers of the Kurgan SKBM, and personally Alexander Ivanovich Nikonov, Colonel General Sergei Aleksandrovich Mayev, photographers Arkady Chiryatnikov and Alexey Mikheev, my friends and colleagues Viktor Korablin, Alexander Maksyutin, Alexey Tinyakov, Yuri Obraztsov, Stefan Liess, Sergei Beketov, Tatyana Russ. And, of course, Maxim Kolomiets and Nina Sobolkova.
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