North Korea, or more precisely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is perhaps the most closed and unexplored country in the world. This ignorance breeds great amount rumors and scary stories. For example, there is information about brutal murders ordinary population from the government for rather strange offenses: having the wrong hairstyle, listening to prohibited music, shooting the president’s mistress for supporting Christianity, and so on. In fact, most of these stories are 99% nonsense and every fact told by the Western media needs to be double-checked.

North Korea is a unique country that has retained a pro-Soviet development course in its structure. It is a country known for its belligerent attitude towards most Western countries, especially the United States. In view of this, the leadership allocates a huge amount of manpower and funds for the defense of the state and the protection of its borders. The North Korean fleet plays an important role in this. In order to understand what the DPRK Navy is today, it is necessary to look at the history of the formation of the state and its relations with other countries.

Korean crisis

After the end of World War II, the territory of Korea was divided between America and the Soviet Union. However, the Koreans wanted to gain sovereignty and for this they organized self-government bodies in different places on the peninsula. So, in August 1948 South part declared itself a separate state, in response to this, the DPRK was formed on September 9 of the same year. However, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was not ready to accept the division of the peninsula into 2 countries, so he began intensively preparing his troops to capture South Korea. UN forces led by the United States were opposed to this idea and opposed Kim Il Sung's troops, while China sided with North Korea. The hostilities lasted until 1953, until a clear dividing line for the peninsula was formed. An absolute dictatorship was established in the DPRK, the ideas of Marxism-Leninism were replaced by Juche (“Self-reliance”).

Over the next three years, the industry of the destroyed country was restored to pre-war levels, but the new ideology implied strict restrictions on international trade, which subsequently had a negative impact on the country's economy. What about South Korea? After the hostilities of 1950-1953. The United States of America has stationed its military forces in this part of the peninsula to counter aggression from the north. Thus, the Republic of Korea became a US-controlled state. To this day, North Korea does not maintain diplomatic relations with either South Korea or the United States. NATO troops led by the United States and the leadership of the DPRK have a serious political conflict that could escalate into military action with the use of nuclear weapons.

History of the DPRK Navy

During the formation of the state, in the 40s of the twentieth century, in North Korea with the support Soviet Union a naval guard force was formed. Initially, they were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DPRK, but after torpedo boats appeared in their arsenal and a division was formed, they were transformed into separate species troops. During the war with South Korea and the United States, the fleet lost most of its ships and was forced to use fishing schooners. The superiority of the US fleet was undeniable, so the North Korean fleet was faced with the only task - landing troops on the enemy’s shore and placing mine barriers. During the war, 2,741 mines were laid, such actions helped prevent a serious offensive by US troops from the sea. Remaining forces of warships and equipment Marine Corps were thrown at coastal defense and by the end of the war, artillery and machine-gun brigades were even formed.

In 1968, the DPRK navy won a symbolic victory - it captured the US Navy reconnaissance ship Pueblo. This ship penetrated the enemy’s territorial waters to study the activities of the DPRK naval forces and identify their reaction and the reaction of the USSR to the appearance of an enemy ship. The reaction was not long in coming. The entire crew was arrested and the ship was towed to the port. Almost a year later, the ship's crew was released (and this in terrible North Korea, where, according to media logic, they should have been shot on the very first day), and the Pueblo is located on the shores of the capital and acts as a trophy or museum exhibit.

The North Korean fleet was also equipped with submarines. But the failures associated with them constantly brought bad news for the country's leadership. So, in 1985, the Project 633 submarine was sunk in the waters of the Yellow Sea with all the officers inside. In 1996, the submarine ran aground in the Sea of ​​Japan, the crew tried to swim to get out of the ship, but almost the entire crew was shot by South Korean troops. In 1998, the submarine became entangled in the fishing nets of South Korea - then all the people on board committed suicide. At the end of the same year, the DPRK boat was scuttled. Over the next year, another 28 ships entered South Korean territorial waters - one of them was also sunk.

The current state of the DPRK fleet

It is not possible to find reliable information about the modern North Korean fleet in open sources. These are strictly classified facilities; NATO, led by the United States, is at a loss as to what weapons are available to the army and, in particular, the DPRK Navy. However, according to incoming information from coastal areas, based on photographs from space, analyzing ongoing exercises and their combat maneuvers in the seas, one can get closer to understanding their composition, deployment bases and level of equipment.

So, the DPRK is armed with 9 large corvettes and frigates. According to available data, these are the following types:

  • The ship "Soho" (1 unit), was built in the 80s, has a displacement of 1845 tons, and a length of almost 74 meters. Includes the following weapons: 4 P-21/22 missiles, one 100 mm gun, 6 guns from 25 to 37 mm, 4 RBU-1200 installations. The ship is equipped with a helipad. Travel speed up to 27 knots.
  • Frigate “Najin” (2 units), length is 102 meters, displacement is 1.5 thousand tons. It is armed with 2 P-21/22 missiles, 2 100mm guns, 6 guns from 25 to 57 mm, and depth charges. Accelerates to a speed of 24 knots.
  • Artillery corvette “Sarivon” (4 units), built in the 60s of the 20th century, length 62 m, displacement of about 500 tons, equipped with six types of weapons from 37 to 85 mm, when moving reaches 18 knots;
  • Artillery corvette "Tral" (2 ships), vessel length 62 m, displacement 500 tons, equipped with 7 types of weapons ranging in size from 37 to 85 mm, speed of movement is 18 knots.

Also, the North Korean Navy has missile boats purchased from the USSR and China, as well as boats own production special purpose. It is curious that the latter are even exported to the navies of other countries; for example, they are in service with Iran and Syria. Let's look at them in more detail:

  • Type-A - a boat that looks like a fishing boat, transports military reconnaissance officers. Developed in the 90s of the last century. The length is 11 meters. Accelerates to a speed of 50 knots.
  • Type-B is a semi-submersible speedboat for transporting paratroopers, accommodating a crew of 2 people and three paratroopers. Length 9 meters, speed up to 40 knots. Almost invisible externally and poorly visible using radar.
  • Type-C is an analogue of type-B with an increased number of seats - a total capacity of 6 people.
  • Type-D is a gliding (planing) submarine with a length of 13 meters and a displacement of 10.5 tons. Immerses up to 20 m under water, speed on the surface is 50 knots, at a depth of no more than 6.

Regarding submarines, based on information from military experts, the DPRK has about 100 submarines of various configurations, produced in the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Iran and directly in North Korea.

In March 2016, in the Yellow Sea near the maritime border with the DPRK, the Cheonan corvette belonging to the Republic of Korea Navy was blown up. Of the 104 people, only 58 crew members managed to escape. The corvette was broken in half. After a lengthy investigation of what happened (experts from the UK, Sweden, Australia and the USA were invited for research), preliminary conclusions were made that the cause was the explosion of a North Korean fleet torpedo at a depth of 6-9 meters. According to other sources, the explosion occurred due to the detonation of a mine that had been in the sea since the war.

North Korean nuclear developments

Now about the latest developments. North Korea is the youngest nuclear power, is aggressive towards most Western countries and has the fourth largest army in the world. There is reason to believe that Korea has 15-20 nuclear weapons and will probably soon create a small-sized and heavy-duty weapon for assembling a ballistic missile. Considering the fact that the entire territory of Korea is surrounded by NATO missile submarines and is able to prevent the launch of a ballistic missile at the stage of gaining speed, the North Koreans decided to create missile-carrying submarines. In 2014, satellite images of the port of Sinpo were obtained, in which a new, previously unknown submarine was discovered. Upon detailed study, it was determined that the 65 m long submarine is significantly superior to all previous North Korean submarines. The military of NATO, Russia and other countries were most interested in the dimensions of the cabin - it was unusually large in appearance, it was covered with a tarpaulin and hid some elements. According to assumptions, it was the unit for the ballistic missile that was closed.

It is curious that the vertical installation is typical for a number of Soviet submarines, while in the 90s, North Korea, with the help of a whole chain of intermediaries, acquired several decommissioned Soviet nuclear submarines of this class as scrap metal. This means that North Korean developers had the opportunity to thoroughly study the structure of all combat installations. Subsequently, images from 2014-2015 recognized these assumptions. According to unconfirmed data, the vessel's displacement is 2-2.5 thousand tons, the speed reaches no more than 16 knots, the ability to dive no more than 150-200 m, including the ability to lie on the bottom, the maximum distance it can travel is 5000-6000 km. But the main interest lies in the definition of missile weapons. The ballistic missile is somewhat similar to the Soviet R-27, which was created in the 60s. We can speak with confidence only about the external similarity, since there is no information about its component anywhere. It is reliably known that at least 2 similar submarines are in service with the DPRK; in 2015, one of them was involved in a missile launch; on May 2, 2017, a second copy was discovered. It can be assumed that several more similar or even improved vessels are under construction.

Between 2014 and 2017, North Korea conducted 13 missile test launches, most of which were launched from a submarine. From the data obtained it is clear that the submarines currently designed are small in size. They do not allow you to hold multiple missiles, nor do they allow you to use modern views fuels that allow missiles to be launched over long distances. However, tests of vertical launches still showed a flight range of 500 km. We can conclude that the maximum range when changing the angle will be about 2500 km. Thus, this type The submarine is more likely not a patrol vessel, but on duty near the shore, being on the bottom not far from the shore and not giving itself away from the operation of the mechanisms. This weapon may represent serious danger for islands owned by the United States and its allies and located in the territory Sea of ​​Japan and the Pacific Ocean.

Deployment of the DPRK Navy

The total strength of the DPRK Navy as of 2016 is about 60 thousand people, the headquarters is located in Pyongyang. The Navy is divided into two divisions: eastern (Sea of ​​Japan region) and western (Yellow Sea, Korean Gulf). The placement is accordingly determined on both sides of the peninsula. Anti-ship weapons are in service missile systems(the quantity is unknown) and military artillery, represented by the SM-4-1, M-1992, M-46, ML-20 guns. Total There are about 650 ships, including the large submarine fleet of the DPRK.

Based on all of the above, we can conclude that the North Korean fleet is quite outdated in general, but is very effective for short-range battles. In the absence of diplomatic relations with bordering countries, the movement of ships between fleets is impossible. Therefore, there are 2 independent shipbuilding bases in the country. It is worth noting that the Navy is also equipped with a large number of mines of various types and configurations. In the event of a naval offensive by the enemy, it is possible to install minefields, the overcoming of which will require large military and time expenditures.

Thus, having enough difficult relationships with neighboring countries, as well as a serious conflict with such a military monster as the DPRK, the DPRK is forced to pay great attention to defense, in particular to the naval forces of the state. At the same time, given the state’s closedness from outside world, its opponents also have a responsibility to closely monitor North Korea's actions and, if necessary, make effective military decisions. The situation in the area of ​​the Korean Peninsula in Lately remains very tense and official statements, threats and actions from both sides of the conflict (DPRK and the USA) do not bode well at the moment.

Due to the current aggravation of international relations around the DPRK, I decided to post this unscheduled material.

It is widely known that the DPRK is the “youngest” among the members of the “nuclear club”. Since 2006 (when it first became known that the nuclear weapons program was a success), the DPRK has carried out - contrary to demands international community, including China and Russia - five nuclear tests, equivalent from 1 kt to 45 kt. According to the latest assumptions, the DPRK has an arsenal of 15-20 nuclear warheads, and is probably approaching the creation of a compact and sufficiently “survivable” weapon, adapted for installation in combat unit ballistic missile.

Until recently, it was assumed that the DPRK's main efforts in the field of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles were concentrated on intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, little progress in this area (judging by the problematic launches of satellites, the reliability of North Korean multi-stage missiles leaves much to be desired) and growing concerns about the vulnerability of both the missiles themselves - for missile defense systems, and their launch complexes - for a preemptive strike, apparently forced the military leadership of the DPRK to reconsider its strategy. The territory of North Korea is relatively compact: it is difficult to hide large launch complexes from detection. In addition, the entire territory of the Korean Peninsula is covered by American sea-based anti-missile systems (SM-3 anti-missile systems on American, Japanese, and - in the future - South Korean destroyers), which allows them to effectively intercept launching ballistic missiles in the acceleration area, when they are extremely vulnerable.

In solving the problem, the North Koreans appear to have followed the path of other nuclear powers and turned their attention to the sea.

So, what is known about the submarine missile carriers of a brilliant comrade, a new star, a genius among geniuses in military strategy, the highest leader of the party, army and people (all official titles) and simply the humble first secretary of the Central Committee of the TP of the DPRK?

For the first time on the new direction in North Korean nuclear strategy general public became known in 2014, when a Google Earth satellite took a photo of the North Korean port of Sinpo and a new submarine at the outfitting wall. Those interested in naval affairs immediately noted that the new submarine measures 65 meters in length and approximately 7 meters in width, significantly surpassing all previous North Korean-built submarines. For example, the most numerous boats of the Sang-O II type in the KNF (Korean People's Navy) (one of which was captured by the southerners in 1996 during an attempt to get into a South Korean port) are only 40 meters long and no more than 4 meters wide . Thus, the new submarine obviously represented a significant step forward.

The design of the submarine's conning tower attracted the greatest interest. In addition to its unusually large size, part of the wheelhouse was covered with a blue tarpaulin, hiding some structural element. One of the versions - what exactly is hidden under the blue tire - was a shaft for a ballistic missile. At the same time, it was indicated that a similar solution (placing missile silos vertically in the submarine's wheelhouse) was used on Soviet submarines of Project 611AB and Project 629. Such similarities are hardly accidental: in the 1990s, the DPRK, through front companies and a number of foreign intermediaries, entered into an agreement on the purchase for scrap of a number of decommissioned Soviet submarines, including Project 629A missile-carrying submarines. Thus, KNF engineers could familiarize themselves in detail with the main design solutions.

Further series of images, in 2014-2015, confirmed the initial assumptions:

This pair of pictures shows two interesting objects. Firstly, the massive conning tower of the submarine is clearly visible with a clearly visible large hole in it (the size of the hole initially led experts - erroneously - to believe the submarine was carrying two missiles). Secondly, a large raft with a cylindrical structure in the center was noticed next to the boat - very reminiscent of the submersible stands used for test launches of SLBMs in the Soviet fleet!

Submersible stand PSD-4, Black Sea Fleet. 1961.

It is easy to notice that the designs of the North Korean and Soviet stands are almost identical: four “pylons” with masts at the corners, and a massive cylinder of the launch shaft in the center. Most likely, KNF engineers managed to gain access to the drawings of Soviet stands (possibly through China) and relied on them when developing their own version. The tendency of North Korean engineers to develop and improve existing models instead of creating new ones is quite well known.

Subsequently, the new North Korean submarine repeatedly appeared in photographs until it finally appeared in official material from the CNF naval exercises:

KNF missile-carrying submarine during exercises. The impressive dimensions of the cabin are visible.

The new class of submarines was assigned symbol"Sinpo" (English: "Sinpo"), named after the construction port, but, according to more precise data, the official name of the class is "Gorae" (English: "Gorae"). According to available data, at least one submarine of this class - likely a technology demonstrator - has been in KNF service since at least 2015, and has taken part in experiments with underwater missile launching. Several more boats of this (or improved) type are presumably being built, or may already be completing trials.

What is known about these boats?

In design, the Shinpo class boats are a conceptual development of the previous series of small submarines of the KNF, such as the Sang-O, Yono and Yugo types. Which, in turn, are the development of the Yugoslav series of “Adriatic” submarines. Although the KNF has a number of large Type 033 submarines (the Chinese version of Project 633, assembled in the DPRK from Chinese-made components) and even at least one Project 613 submarine, Soviet-built (this venerable old lady appeared in exercises back in 2013, which I did not I can only describe it as a mockery of a valuable museum exhibit!), the construction of large submarines turned out to be unaffordable for the KNF. In addition, large submarines of the KNF would a priori be very vulnerable to modern systems PLOs available to the navies of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

The hull of the Shinpo-class submarine is very similar to the hull of the Yono-class submarine, and is apparently a direct development of it. Based on these similarities, it can be assumed that the missile-carrying submarine is single-hulled, has at least three decks and is equipped with a sonar system (probably quite primitive) in the bow. Horizontal rudders are located in the front part of the hull, vertical ones are in the stern. It is assumed (it is not clear from the available photographs) that the submarine carries from 2 to 4 torpedo tubes in the bow.

The submarine's power plant appears to be standard diesel-electric. The boat is probably equipped with a device for operating diesel engines under water (a snorkel), but there is no evidence of any air-independent installation on it. The propulsion is a standard screw. The crew, according to estimates, is 70-80 people.

The technical data of the submarine, of course, are only an object of extrapolation, but we can still assume the following performance characteristics:

* Displacement - from 2000 to 2500 tons.
* Length - 65 m
* Width - 7 m
* Underwater/surface speed - extrapolating data from the captured Sang-O, we can assume that it does not exceed 10/16 knots. Probably the real one is lower.
* Dive depth - again, extrapolating the data from Sang-O, the dive depth is 150-200 meters. There is an opportunity to go to the bottom.
* Surface range - most likely does not exceed 5000-6000 km.

The main interest, of course, is the submarine's missile armament. It is represented by a single missile, the Pukkusong-1 (also known as the KN-11). It is somewhat ironic that the name of the missile translated from Korean means “polar star” - that is, identical to the name of the first American SLBM, Polaris!

This ballistic missile has certain similarities with the Soviet R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile, created in the mid-1960s. Although the similarity is probably purely external, it cannot be ruled out that KNF engineers were able to obtain some (possibly indirect) information about the design of the retired R-27, or its Chinese counterpart, the JL-1.

The rocket is single-stage, has a length of about 9.3 meters, a diameter of about 1.5 meters and a launch weight - presumably - in the region of 15 tons. It is likely capable of carrying some of North Korea's existing nuclear warheads. However, it is not known for sure whether the KNF has thermal protection systems at its disposal that can ensure the safe entry of a warhead into the atmosphere.

An interesting detail is that the rocket probably exists in liquid and solid fuel versions:

Left: Photo of a rocket launch in 2014. Right: Photo of a rocket launch in 2016. The exhaust jets of the rockets are clearly different.

This could be explained either by the independent development of liquid-propellant and solid-propellant SLBMs, or by the decision to switch to solid propellant due to the problems of storing a liquid-propellant missile on a very small submarine. Since North Korea most likely does not have access to modern technologies solid rocket fuel, the efficiency of the rocket engines is likely to be low. The rocket is single-engine, with a single fixed nozzle. The missile is controlled in flight, like other North Korean ballistic missiles, using lattice rudders at the stern.

The rocket is adapted for launch from a submerged position, from a depth of 2-5 meters. Initially, the tests were carried out with a "hot" start, i.e. turning on the rocket engines directly in the silo with its further exit from the silo under its own power. However, later, the DPRK apparently switched to “cold” launch technology: the missile is pushed out of the silo by compressed air, with the engines starting over water. This may be due to the transition to solid fuel, which ignites more easily.

From October 2014 to February 2017, the KNF conducted 12 test launches of the rocket, with the following results:

During the launches, a flight range of about 500 km was demonstrated. However, it should be noted that the actual range of the missile is likely higher, ranging from 1200 to 1500 km. This is due to the fact that in the last two (successful) launches, the rocket was launched along a very high, almost vertical trajectory, rising to an altitude of up to 550 km. With a more optimal trajectory - at an angle closer to 45 degrees - the flight range could be more than 1000 km. It is unclear whether the missile has a detachable warhead, which could help determine the range. An analysis carried out by specialists from the Republic of Korea suggests a range of up to 2500 km when using a detachable warhead.


Estimated range of North Korean submarines (orange) and their missiles (blue).

So, the main question is what do Sinpo-class submarines give to the DPRK fleet?

It is obvious that these boats - despite all the efforts of the designers - are still not genuine missile submarines. Their range of action is limited, they are not capable of operating underwater for a long time, except under a snorkel - which, taking into account the modern development of anti-submarine defense systems, makes them extremely vulnerable. It is noteworthy that North Korean designers tried (as best they could) to mitigate the problem by developing a system underwater launch missiles: By comparison, early Soviet missile submarines could only launch their missiles from the surface.

A major drawback is the presence of only one ballistic missile on board. Even without taking into account the unreliability of North Korean missiles - taking into account all the difficulties of an underwater launch, I would suggest that the probability of a successful launch of Pukkusong-1 under realistic (not demonstration) conditions is no more than 50%, without taking into account possible failures already in flight - low accuracy and weakness of the warhead make it unlikely to successfully defeat anything except very large, area objects. This de facto reduces the capabilities of CNF submarines to deterrence by the potential threat of an attack: their actual combat capabilities are very limited.

In general, Sinpo-class submarines are, rather, not so much underwater missile carriers as underwater mobile launchers. Probably, their main task is not patrolling in the open ocean (the DPRK Navy does not have any means to cover the combat deployment areas of missile carriers), but duty in a stationary position - perhaps lying on the bottom - in coastal waters ah North Korea and operations in the waters of the Japanese and Yellow Seas.

What is the advantage of this - more expensive - method of deployment over conventional stationary/mobile installations?

1) Such “coastal missile carriers” are less vulnerable to surprise attacks. Being diesel-electric submarines, they can travel short distances almost silently, and lie on the bottom for a long time without revealing themselves to the operation of mechanisms. It is extremely difficult to identify such missile platforms in advance and destroy them with a first strike: you need to comb square kilometers of water area with magnetometers (and even the DPRK air defense, with all its obsolescence, can cause a severe headache for anti-submarine aircraft!)

2) They can launch missiles from unpredictable directions. The territory of the DPRK is very small, and is completely “visible” by American and South Korean radars - and is also “fired” by American and Japanese SM-3 (sea-based) and THAAD (ground-based) anti-missiles. Due to the limited flight time, launching North Korean missiles can be hit by anti-missile missiles while still accelerating - at a time when they are especially vulnerable. Even “coastal” submarines can significantly expand the range of possible launch positions, making it difficult to intercept during acceleration and forcing one to resort to less effective destruction of warheads upon re-entry.

3) Potentially - although this probability is very small - North Korean missile-carrying submarines pose a threat to US island territories in the Pacific Ocean, to US allies outside the Sea of ​​​​Japan, and even to the US "home territory" in Alaska. This forces the Americans to at least devote significant efforts to anti-submarine defense. It should be noted, however, that the Americans and their allies (as well as China, which is increasingly negatively disposed towards the DPRK) control all the “bottlenecks” of the Sea of ​​Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea, and the output of relatively noisy submarines that are unable to move under water for a long time time without a snorkel, on ocean communications is unlikely.

October 20th, 2017

Included naval forces Many countries have rare ships. They will never go to sea again, but to exclude them from the lists of the fleet would mean tearing out the heroic pages of the past from memory and forever losing the continuity of traditions for future generations.

That’s why the cruiser Aurora stands eternally laid up near the Petrogradskaya embankment in St. Petersburg, and the masts of the 104-gun battleship Victory rise in the docks of Portsmouth. The country’s naval flag flies over each veteran, a reduced crew of military sailors is on duty on board, and a special column is allocated in the Navy budget for their maintenance (note: Aurora was expelled from the Navy in 2010 and transferred to the category of ships -museums).

Even the pragmatic United States has its own rare ship - USS Pueblo (AGER-2). Perhaps the most unusual of all warships in the world.

To remove the Pueblo from the US Navy list would be to raise the white flag and capitulate in the face of the enemy. The little scout is still listed on all Pentagon lists as active combat unit. And it doesn’t matter that the Pueblo itself has been de facto moored at the embankment in North Korean Pyongyang for almost half a century, and its secret radio engineering “stuffing” was stolen piece by piece in the interests of the secret research institutes of the Soviet Union.

...The muzzles of uncovered 50-caliber Brownings stick out helplessly. On the walls of the Pueblo's superstructures there are black lacerations from shrapnel, and brown stains of the blood of American sailors are visible on the decks. But how did a Yankee warship end up in such a humiliating position?

Capture of Pueblo

The radio intelligence ship Pueblo passed through official documents US Navy as a Banner-class hydrographic ship (Auxiliary General Environmental Research - AGER). Former cargo and passenger ship FP-344, launched in 1944, and subsequently converted for special operations. Total displacement - 895 tons. The crew is about 80 people. Full speed - 12.5 knots. Armament - 2 machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber.

Typical scout of the times cold war, disguised as a harmless scientific vessel. But behind the modest appearance hid a wolfish grin. The interiors of the Pueblo's interior resembled a giant supercomputer - long rows of racks with radios, oscilloscopes, tape recorders, encryption machines and other specific equipment. The task is to monitor the USSR Navy, measure the electromagnetic fields of Soviet ships, intercept signals at all frequencies in the interests of the Agency national security(NSA) and Fleet Naval Intelligence.

On January 11, 1968, USS Pueblo (AGER-2) left the port of Sasebo and, having passed the Tsushima Strait, entered the Sea of ​​Japan with the task of monitoring the ships of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy. After hovering around Vladivostok for several days, the Pueblo moved south along the coast of the Korean Peninsula, simultaneously collecting information about sources of radio emission on the territory of the DPRK. The situation was alarming: on January 20, when the scout was 15 miles from the naval base on the island. Mayan-do watchmen discovered a warship on the horizon. Poor visibility prevented us from accurately establishing its nationality - the object, which turned out to be a small anti-submarine ship of the DPRK Navy, disappeared without a trace in the evening twilight.

On January 22, two North Korean trawlers appeared near the Pueblo, accompanying the American throughout the day. On the same day, a group of North Korean special forces attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee, but were killed in a shootout with the police.

The bad signs were ignored: the Pueblo calmly continued its journey along the coast of the DPRK.

On January 23, 1968, the hour struck - at 11:40 a small anti-submarine ship SC-35 of the DPRK Navy approached the Pueblo. Using a flag semaphore, the Koreans demanded to indicate the nationality of the ship. The Americans immediately raised the Stars and Stripes flag from the Pueblo's mast. This was supposed to cool down hotheads and exclude any provocation on the part of the enemy.

Soviet-made small anti-submarine ship

However, an order immediately followed from the SC-35 to immediately stop the move, otherwise the Koreans threatened to open fire. The Yankees were playing for time. At this time, three more torpedo boats appeared next to the Pueblo. The situation was taking a threatening turn. The US flag somehow did not particularly cool down the Korean fervor.

The commander of the Pueblo, Lloyd Butcher, once again checked the map and personally checked the navigation radar - everything is correct, the Pueblo is located 15 miles from the coast, outside the territorial waters of the DPRK. However, the Koreans did not even think of falling behind - the air was filled with the roar of jet fighters. North Korean aircraft and navy surrounded the lone American reconnaissance aircraft on all sides.

Now Commander Butcher understood what the enemy was planning - to encircle the unarmed Pueblo and force it to follow to one of the North Korean ports. When they left Sasebo, he was present at a meeting with officers from the crew of the Banner reconnaissance ship. Colleagues confirmed that the Soviet and Chinese navies regularly use similar tactics in an attempt to drive American reconnaissance ships into a trap. However, unlike the USSR Navy, the North Korean fleet acted more boldly and decisively. After 2 hours of fruitless pursuit, the first shell flew into the superstructure of the Pueblo, tearing off the leg of one of the American sailors. Following this, the sound of machine gun shots thundered across the reconnaissance aircraft's skin.

The Yankees screamed about the attack on all frequencies and rushed to destroy the secret equipment.

Tens of tons of radio electronics and encryption machines, mountains of secret documentation, reports, orders, magnetic tapes with recordings of negotiations between the North Korean and Soviet military - too much work for three fire axes and two electric paper shredders. Parts, documents and magnetic tapes should be dumped into bags for subsequent dumping overboard - having given the necessary orders, Butcher rushed headlong into the radio room. How does the command of the 7th Fleet promise to help him?

The signal about the attack on the US Navy ship was received by the ships of the carrier strike group, which was located 500 miles south of the Pueblo. The commander of Task Force 71, Rear Admiral Epes, ordered the duty group of Phantoms to be immediately scrambled into the air and the hell destroyed all North Korean cannons trying to approach the American reconnaissance ship. To which the commander of the super-aircraft carrier Enterprise simply shrugged his shoulders - he is unlikely to be able to help in this situation. The Enterprise's air wing has not yet recovered from a long transoceanic passage, half of the aircraft were damaged by a brutal typhoon, and the four combat-ready Phantoms on deck do not carry any weapons other than air-to-air missiles. It will take his guys at least an hour and a half to change weapons and form a full-fledged strike group - but, alas, by then it will probably be too late...

The destroyers USS Higbee, USS Collet and USS O'Bannon, stationed in Japanese ports, were too far away to provide any assistance to the attacked scout. The promised F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers also did not arrive...

At this time, the Koreans continued to methodically shoot the bridge and superstructure of the Pueblo with a 57 mm gun, hoping to kill the commander and senior officers of the ship. The “beheaded” ship must quickly raise the “white flag” and accept the terms of the Korean sailors.

Finally, Commander Butcher realized that help would not come to them, and the Koreans would shoot them all if the Yankees did not fulfill their conditions. The Pueblo stopped its progress and prepared to take on board the capture group. The Yankees did not even try to take the fight - the Brownings on the upper deck remained uncovered. Later, the commander justified that only one of the Pueblo’s crew knew how to use these weapons.

From an approaching torpedo boat, 8 Korean sailors, none of whom spoke English, landed on the deck of the Pueblo. Commander Butcher tried to explain that he was the senior man on the ship. The Korean officer, with signs, ordered the crew to line up along the side and fired a Kalashnikov burst over their heads, apparently showing the frightened Yankees that he was now in charge here. And he doesn't intend to joke with them.

Having gone down with the Koreans to the workrooms of the radio technicians and cryptographers, Commander Butcher was dumbfounded: the entire deck was littered with bags of documents, parts of secret equipment and scraps of magnetic years. They were collected in bags, but no one ever bothered to throw them overboard! No less surprise awaited them in the radio room: according to Butcher himself, the narrow eyes of the Koreans widened at the sight of how teletypes continued to knock out secret radiograms - the Yankees not only did not destroy the equipment, but did not even try to turn it off!

Consequences

The captured Pueblo was escorted to Wonsan. In total, in a skirmish with the DPRK Navy, the reconnaissance crew lost one person killed, the remaining 82 sailors were captured. 10 Americans were injured of varying severity.

The next day, negotiations between representatives of the United States and the DPRK began at the Panmunjeong checkpoint of the Korean militarized zone. Rear Admiral John Victor Smith read the American appeal: the Yankees demanded the immediate release of the hostages, the return of the confiscated hydrographic vessel and an apology. It was emphasized that the capture occurred at a distance of 15.6 miles from the coast of the Korean Peninsula, outside the territorial waters of the DPRK (according to international rules - 12 miles from the coast).

North Korean General Park Chung Guk simply laughed in the face of the Americans and stated that the border of territorial waters runs wherever Comrade Kim indicates. Currently, this distance is 50 miles from the coast of North Korea. He, on behalf of his country, expresses a strong protest against the grossly aggressive invasion of the DPRK's terrorist waters by an armed ship with spy equipment on board, and any conversation about the release of the Pueblo crew members can be held only after an official apology from the United States.

Negotiations have reached a dead end.

On January 28, with the help of the A-12 high-altitude supersonic reconnaissance aircraft (the predecessor of the SR-71), reliable confirmation was received that the Pueblo had been captured by the North Korean armed forces. The photographs clearly showed that the ship was located at the Wonsan naval base, surrounded by ships of the DPRK Navy.

i>"Pueblo" from a height of 20 km

At the same time, a letter of gratitude from Commander Butcher came from North Korea, in which he confessed to espionage and other sins. The text was compiled in accordance with the Juche ideology and could not possibly have been written by an American. But the signature was real. As it became known later, the Koreans beat the commander of the Pueblo, and when this did not help, they threatened that he would witness the execution of the entire crew and then die himself. Realizing who he was dealing with, Butcher wisely signed the confession.

At home, the sailors were greeted as real heroes. However, already in January 1969 it was opened trial- 200 hours of meetings, 140 witnesses. Pentagon officials were outraged that for the first time in 160 years, an American ship was surrendered to the enemy. With a full set of secret equipment!

Why did the commander, when threatened with the capture of the Pueblo, not decide to sink his ship? Or at least destroy the most valuable equipment? Encryption machines fell into the hands of the North Koreans - a direct threat to US national security, plus, the captured ship will probably be displayed somewhere in a prominent place, which will damage the image of America.

Lloyd Butcher justified himself by saying that a couple of months before the campaign he asked the naval command to install explosive devices to quickly detonate and destroy secret equipment. However, his request remained unsatisfied.

Finally, why didn’t the great and invincible American aviation come to the aid of Pueblo? Where was the super-aircraft carrier Enterprise clicking its beak at this time?

During the trial, more and more facts about the chaos in the US Navy were revealed. Finally, the Yankees decided to stop the tragicomedy and begin to constructively solve the identified problems. By decision of Navy Commander John Chaffee, the case was closed. Commander Butcher was completely acquitted.

The main mistake in the Pueblo incident was an incorrect calculation of the adequacy of the DPRK. The Yankees were confident that they were acting against an ally of the USSR, which meant there was no one to fear: Soviet sailors always complied with international maritime law and would never touch an American ship outside the 12-mile zone of territorial waters. Even on the open ocean Soviet intelligence officers(communication vessels - SSV) and their American “colleagues” (GER/AGER) - the same pathetic unarmed “pelvises”, boldly approached the squadrons of the “probable enemy”, rightly believing that their security was ensured by the military and political power of their countries, interpreted in the form of a flag flying above them.

American fears about the seizure of secret equipment were not in vain: Soviet specialists immediately dismantled and transported to the USSR a number of secret equipment, incl. KW-7 class encryption machines. Using this equipment, coupled with tables, codes and descriptions of cryptographic schemes obtained by the KGB with the help of Warrant Officer Johnnie Walker, Soviet cryptographers were able to decipher about a million intercepted US Navy messages.

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” This ancient aphorism is becoming increasingly relevant to the situation surrounding North Korea.

Horror stories about North Korean submarines launching nuclear ballistic missiles, as recent events have shown, are not so fantastic. Threat of attack by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which in the near future will threaten Japan, South Korea and US military installations in the area Pacific Ocean– one of the most realistic scenarios.

IN last years Pyongyang has made impressive progress in developing submarine-launched missile technology and has demonstrated intentions to use its achievements to solve strategic problems. North Korea does not hide its military ambitions even in the face of American military-strategic superiority in the region and hasty deployment to the Korean Peninsula strike groups The US Navy consists of aircraft carriers, ships and submarines that carry Tomahawk cruise missiles. The danger posed by Korean submarines only increases the growing tension in the region, since the military-political leadership of the DPRK shows no signs of abandoning the implementation of nuclear missile programs.

It should be especially noted that, taking into account the national military strategy, in April 2012, at the initiative of the leadership of the DPRK, amendments were made to the Constitution of the country establishing it nuclear status. At the same time, with Kim Jong-un coming to power in the DPRK, special attention began to be paid to the country’s submarine forces.

First of all, this concerns the construction of submarines that carry ballistic missiles and the creation of a naval component of the DPRK's strategic nuclear forces.

WHAT ARE THE DPRK SUBMARINE FORCES

Design, construction and operational use of submarines (submarines) different types in the DPRK began in the mid-1960s. According to foreign sources, since the 2000s, the DPRK Navy began to implement a number of programs to modernize the submarine fleet.

Currently, North Korean submarine forces are among the largest in the world. In terms of the number of non-nuclear submarines, the DPRK is in the top five along with Russia, China, Iran and India. The DPRK's submarine force includes more than 75 submarines.

The basis of the DPRK submarine fleet are diesel submarines of the 033 type, of which there are 20 units in the DPRK Navy. The 033 type submarine was produced by the DPRK under license from the USSR in the 60s of the 20th century. The Soviet submarine Project 633 (Romeo type according to NATO classification) was taken as the basis. Her greatest length– 76.6 m; maximum beam - 6.7 m, draft - 5.2 m, surface (underwater) displacement - 1475 (1830) tons, full speed in surface (underwater) position - 15 (13) knots, diving depth - 300 m. Armament The submarine is represented by eight 533-mm torpedo tubes (TA). Crew – 54 people.

In addition, the DPRK Navy includes more than 50 small and ultra-small submarines of various types.


Small submarines of the DPRK Navy (from top to bottom) Yogo type, P-4 type, Sang-O type

The small submarine “Sang-O” was developed in 1980–1990. In total, 40 of these boats were built in the DPRK, and their construction is still ongoing.

Its length is 34 m, width is 3.8 m, displacement when submerged is 370 tons, surface (underwater) speed is 7.2 (8.8) knots, range is 1500 miles, armament is two 533 mm TA (ammunition - 4 torpedoes).

The submarine "Sang-O" is designed for special operations, mine laying and actions against ships and vessels. The lightweight hull and fencing of the submarine's cabin are made of fiberglass. Construction of the Sang-O series of small submarines began in 1991. In the series, in addition to the main, torpedo version of the submarine (with Soviet torpedoes of type 53-56), two submarines were built for special operations, each carrying 16 mines on an external sling. In addition to laying mines, these submarines can also transport underwater carriers for light divers. The submarine's armament includes a 12.7 mm machine gun and a portable air defense system.

According to various sources, the DPRK has up to 10 ultra-small submarines (mini-submarines) of the Yugo type. The Yugo-class mini-submarine, developed in the DPRK, was originally built for export. Several Yugo-class boats were sold to Iran and Vietnam. Its length is 20 m, width – 2 m, displacement when submerged – 90 tons, surface (underwater) speed – 10 (4) knots, armament – ​​two 533-mm TA (ammunition – 2 torpedoes).

The most advanced submarine of the DPRK is a small submarine of the P-4 type. The DPRK Navy has about 10 of these boats. Its length is 29 m, displacement is 190 tons, armament is two 533 mm TA (ammunition - 2 torpedoes). It is noteworthy that the command of the South Korean Navy adopted the North Korean submarine “P-4”, captured in 1998, into service with the South Korean fleet.

Despite the successes in the construction of the submarine fleet, technical condition The DPRK submarine still leaves much to be desired. Over the past 10 years, North Korea has lost at least three submarines as a result of navigation accidents and incidents. Thus, on September 18, 1996, near the city of Gangneung near the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan, a navigation accident occurred and the subsequent capture of a North Korean Sang-O submarine by the South Korean military. The events of her capture developed as follows. On September 15, 1996, the boat landed several special forces groups on the South Korean coast to collect data on military installations in South Korea. There were 26 crew members and DPRK special forces soldiers on the boat. On September 18, while trying to pick up special forces groups, the boat ran aground, after which the crew decided to destroy all valuable equipment and make their way through enemy territory towards the DPRK. However, the North Korean sailors were discovered by South Korean military personnel. During the operation of South Korean units to seize the boat, one North Korean was captured, the rest were killed in a firefight or liquidated by colleagues.

Another submarine of the Sang-O type became entangled in fishing nets on June 8, 1998 near the South Korean city of Sakcho. The crew of the boat committed self-destruction.

On March 12, 2016, a North Korean small submarine was lost under unclear circumstances in the coastal waters of the Korean Peninsula.

At the same time, North Korean submarines have proven their high efficiency. Thus, according to information from a number of foreign sources, in 2010, as a result of an attack by a North Korean submarine, the South Korean corvette Cheonan was destroyed, killing 46 sailors. Some experts dismiss the threat of Pyongyang's submarines, arguing that they are "old and noisy vessels." However, in 2015, South Korean military experts reported the sudden departure of about 50 DPRK submarines from their bases and the loss of control over them by South Korean anti-submarine forces.

As emphasized in foreign sources, the North Korean authorities have been actively modernizing their submarine fleet in recent years, designing submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles. Against the backdrop of successes in testing nuclear and space technology, Pyongyang can create a full-fledged triad of nuclear forces.

According to American military experts, the decision of the DPRK leadership to create the basis for the naval component of the nuclear triad is based on the fact that, firstly, it is difficult to ensure the effective search and destruction of low-noise diesel submarines in the ocean and, secondly, there is the possibility of a guaranteed nuclear response regardless of the size of the already affected territory of the DPRK. This is a key component of the theory of nuclear deterrence.

According to foreign data, in July 2014, an experimental ballistic missile submarine was launched at the North Korean naval base of Sinpo (South Hamgyong Province), located on the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan of the DPRK. This is the first North Korean large diesel submarine of a new type capable of carrying ballistic missiles, which in the West is given the designation "Sinpo" (Sinp "o). The construction of the boat has been carried out since 2010 in the city of Sinpo at the South Shipyard, the main enterprise for the construction of submarines in North Korea .

A HORROR CALLED "SINPO"

The new submarine has a length of 67 m, a width of 6.7 m and a displacement of about 2500–3000 tons. The cabin of the Sinpo submarine is located in the middle between the bow and stern of the hull, the central part of the cabin is a rectangular section measuring 4.25 x 2.25 m , in which 1–2 launchers (shafts) of ballistic missiles are installed. The surface speed of the submarine is 16 knots, and the underwater speed is about 10 knots. Its cruising range is 1,500 miles.

The silhouette of the North Korean submarine, according to foreign sources, has some resemblance in appearance to the Project 629 submarine (Golf - according to NATO classification). At one time, in the period 1989–1990, the USSR transferred three submarines of this project to China. These submarines were used by the Chinese Navy for trial operation. In 1986, based on the technical solutions used in the construction of Soviet submarines of this type, China built its own submarine of this type with the aim of testing missile technologies and subsequent serial construction of Chinese submarines armed with nuclear ballistic missiles. Considering the level of relations between the PRC and the DPRK in the military sphere, taking into account the second article of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between China and North Korea of ​​1961, China can provide technological assistance in the implementation of the DPRK’s military programs, including the construction of the North Korean submarine fleet.

After completing a four-year construction phase in 2014, the new experimental North Korean submarine Sinpo began intensive sea trials.

The first launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from an experimental Sinpo-class submarine took place on November 28, 2015. According to foreign experts, the test launch was unsuccessful, since the South Korean military later found debris of the SLBM on the surface of the sea.

Less than a month later, North Korea conducted a second SLBM test. According to experts, it was produced not from a submarine, but from a barge test bench submerged in water. North Korean television released footage of the missile test in early January 2016, showing the country's leader Kim Jong-un, smiling, watching the missile take off from under the water and go beyond the clouds.

In August 2016, North Korean media showed a video of a KN-11 Pukkyuksong-1 (Polar Star) submarine ballistic missile launched from the coastal waters of North Korea. The missile, fired from a submarine, flew about 310 miles towards Japan, establishing new record firing ranges for Pyongyang's submarine-launched ballistic missile program. However, according to experts, the KN-11 Pukkykson-1 SLBM is capable of covering a distance of more than 600 miles. The KN-11 Pukkykson-1 SLBM is equipped with a two-stage solid propellant engine. Solid fuel has significant advantages over heptyl and kerosene, since it has higher energy levels and improves missile performance, which makes SLBMs more compact, hidden and allows them to be prepared for launch much faster.

According to foreign sources, the KN-11 Pukkykson-1 SLBM may have the following characteristics: number of stages - 2, diameter - up to 1.4 m, flight range - 900-1200 km.

It was reported that special testing grounds and stands have been created in the DPRK to test ballistic missiles launched from submarines.

According to the South Korean news agency YONHAP, even before the completion of the construction of the new Sinpo-class submarine, the North Korean Navy command carried out a number of tests simulating the launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine.

Currently, according to open sources, the DPRK has carried out at least five launches of the KN-11 Pukkyukson-1 SLBM. Of these, at least two launches carried out from the Sinpo submarine were successful. In general, to accept the new KN-11 missile into service with the Sinpo submarine, several dozen test launches will be required. In the 60s of the 20th century, in order to adopt the Project 629 submarine of the R-21 ballistic missile of the USSR Navy, it was necessary to carry out up to 30 launches, of which about 90% were successful.

SEOUL IS CONCERNED

The military-political leadership of South Korea is very concerned about the growth in the combat capabilities of the submarine forces of the DPRK Navy in general and the combat characteristics of the KN-11 SLBM in particular. The DPRK's submarine fleet in its development is ahead of the South Korean in terms of quantitative composition and is comparable to it in the qualitative aspect. The South Korean submarine fleet includes 9 Project 209 submarines (displacement 1200 tons) and 7 Project 214 submarines (1800 tons). The total number of South Korean submarines is four times less than the DPRK submarines! If North Korea has already created submarines with ballistic missiles, then South Korea is able to do this only in 10 years, by 2027-2030, having built up to six submarines with a displacement of up to 3000 tons.

Experts note that if the DPRK continues to build submarines with nuclear-capable SLBMs, South Korea, Japan and the United States will find themselves much more vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks, not being able to effectively intercept missiles launched from under water. In this regard, in April 2017, the United States hastily deployed anti-missile system THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) – anti-missile system mobile ground-based for high-altitude transatmospheric interception of medium-range missiles.

At the rate American experts, the THAAD missile defense system deployed by the United States in South Korea is aimed at neutralizing missile threats, mainly from the northern direction of the peninsula. But if a North Korean ballistic missile is launched from underwater from the east, south or west, it is unlikely to be detected by radar THAAD systems, and she will be able to successfully overcome defensive lines American system Missile defense on the territory of the Republic of Korea. Seoul notes that their missile defense systems are unlikely to be able to intercept a North Korean missile launched from international waters. Similarly, missiles fired by North Korean submarines off the east coast of Japan can successfully penetrate the Patriot missile defense system deployed there. Therefore, at joint naval exercises between the United States and South Korea, special attention is paid to training for the simulated destruction of DPRK submarines.

A South Korean government source estimates that it will take North Korea no more than two years to actually commission the completed Sinpo-class submarine and put it on combat duty. However, the main question now is how quickly the DPRK will be able to create nuclear warheads for missiles. To nuclear powers Types of the USSR, USA, China, Great Britain and France at one time took from two to seven years for this after carrying out conventional nuclear explosions.

In general, the intensification of practical measures to develop the submarine forces of North Korea gives reason to believe that the military-political leadership of the DPRK will take further steps to create its nuclear triad, assigning a special role to submarines armed with nuclear-armed SLBMs, as the most hidden, formidable and effective weapons.

I present to your attention an overview of the MODERN fleet of the DPRK.

It is unique in many ways. See for yourself what engineers from a poor country that does not have access, even general access, to any technical innovations can develop. Unfortunately, due to the absolute closedness of the country, there are virtually no photographs of this unique phenomenon, so you have to be content with rare pictures.
Let's start with the "large" surface ships.
North Korea has 9 ships, which they proudly call corvettes and frigates.
The newest and most technologically advanced frigate of the Soho class. 1 piece.

Built in 1983
Length 73.8m; width 15.5m; displacement 1845t
Weapons:
4 P-21/22 missiles (export version of "Termite") Don't be surprised that this is hello from the 50s, things will be even more interesting later.
1 x 100mm gun. Not sure if it's automatic.
2x30mm AK-230
2x37mm
2x25mm
4 RBU-1200 bombs
As we can see, the ship has a helipad, but the hangar is missing or removed below deck.
Speed ​​according to various sources is from 23 to 27 knots.
Frigate "Najin" 2 units.

In the 70s, when the ships turned into platforms studded with missile launchers, the DPRK received from the USSR drawings of the long-outdated Project 42 patrol ship "Falcon". Having installed rocket launchers in addition to the provided artillery armament, we got a strange ship. A hybrid of a World War II destroyer and a missile boat.
Length 102m; width 10m; Displacement 1500t
Weapons:
2 P-21/22 missiles
2x100mm guns with manual reloading
2x57mm
2x30mm
2x25mm
Depth charges. (Rails at the stern)
Speed ​​24 knots
Then there are 6 ships, for some reason called artillery corvettes. The purpose of these ships is not even guessable, because the speed is not enough even to catch up with a poacher or smuggler, and the weapons will not allow them to fight with anyone else. Unless you shell the undefended shore.
Sarivon class artillery corvette 4 units.

Built in the 60s, small ships that look like aliens from the 20s and 30s.
Length 62m; Width 7.3m; Displacement about 500t
Weapons:
1x85mm
1x57mm
4x37mm (according to other sources 4x14.5mm)
Speed: 18 knots (according to other sources 16)
Tral class artillery corvette 2 units

Who do you think this is? That's right, this is a pre-war Soviet minesweeper of the Tral type. The old man is still working diligently for the glory of the Juche ideas, and apparently has no intention of retiring yet.
Length 62m, width 7.3m, displacement 500t
Weapons:
1x85mm
2x57mm
4x37mm
Speed ​​18 knots.
We're done with the big ships. Let's move on to the mosquito fleet.
The DPRK has a number of ancient missile boats, purchased a long time ago in the USSR and China, of which a dozen or two are on the move, but it is not interesting to consider them, these are the well-known large-scale projects 183R “Komar”, 205 “Moskit”, 206 “Storm” and others.
Much more interesting are their special-purpose boats. The most interesting thing is that they even export them. North Korean boats are in service with the navies of Iran and Syria.
So, welcome!
Type-A A boat disguised as a fishing boat for transporting scouts and saboteurs, developed in the 90s.

Length 11m; Width 3m
Speed ​​up to 50 knots.
Length 9.3m, Width 2.54m.
Type-B Semi-submersible high-speed landing craft.

Immerses to the add-on in stealth mode. It becomes almost invisible visually and barely noticeable on radar.
Length 9.3m; Width 2.54; displacement 5t
Crew 2 people + 3 paratroopers.
Speed ​​30-40 knots on the surface and up to 12 knots semi-submerged.
Type-C

An improved version of model B, for 4 paratroopers.
Type-D

The same one, but sold to Iran:

A full-fledged planing submarine.
Length 12.8m; width 2.95m, displacement 10.5t
Capable of diving up to 3 meters under a snorkel and up to 20m under electric motors (?)
On the surface the speed is up to 50 knots, while underwater up to 6.
Naturally, the autonomy of these boats is not high, so North Korean engineers found a solution - dock landing ships converted from fishing trawlers. Pay attention to the gate at the stern.

Of course, in the event of war, these carrier vessels will be useless, but otherwise, for example, for landing scouts or saboteurs on the territory of South Korea or Russia, such a trawler with a submarine boat is ideal.
North Korea also has a fleet of real submarines. But about them next time.

PS Designers in the DPRK are what they need, but God forbid any other country gets to the point of commissioning ships from the early 20th century, much less considers, as the North Koreans believe, that their fleet is one of the strongest in the world.