In this part I will tell you about the anti-tank small arms of the Third Reich and their allies.
It should be noted that the means of anti-tank defense of the infantry were very necessary throughout the war.
Considering that the most massive and bloody battles took place precisely on the Eastern Front, and also taking into account the number of anti-tank weapons fired by opponents, it was this theater that became the key place for the use of anti-tank weapons.
Nazi Germany
Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany did not have the right to develop weapons like the PTR. Therefore, the first samples of anti-tank portable large-caliber rifles of the Nazis were developed from the beginning of the 30s to subsidiary in Switzerland, but about them a little later.
In Nazi Germany itself, a new anti-tank rifle was developed at Gustloff Werke by designer B. Bauer. The production was established by the Rheinmetall-Borsig concern. It was put into service under the designation Panzerbüchse model 38 (PzB 38) in 1938. The Germans leaned towards the Polish version and replaced the 13mm bullet with a 7.92mm bullet in almost the same 94mm long sleeve - getting the Patrone 318 (7.92x94mm). At the same time, the Germans also achieved a high initial speed (over 1200 m / s) and a flat trajectory, which made aiming easier.
The range of ammunition has expanded - cartridges of increased penetration, tracer cartridges and even chemical cartridges (the bullet carried a capsule with an irritating gas, which, according to the idea, was supposed to force the crew to leave combat vehicle). The last is true turned out to be ineffective.
The rifle itself was still bulky and very complex and expensive to manufacture, so a year later it was replaced by a new simplified and lightweight model PzB 39. The main differences between these models were locking. In model 38, the unlocking and extraction of the spent cartridge case occurred automatically when the barrel and the bolt coupled to it rolled back.
In Model 39, unlocking and locking was carried out manually, by moving the pistol grip forward and down, the barrel of the Model 39 remained stationary. To mitigate recoil, an active muzzle brake was installed on the barrel. On both sides of the body of the gun, special cases for cartridges were attached - 10 on each side.
In total, the military industry of Nazi Germany produced more than 40,000 PzB 39 rifles and only about 2,000 PzB 38. The weapon was widely used on all fronts, although by the end of 42, the effectiveness of 7.92x94 cartridges against medium and heavy tanks of the Red Army and the Allies was practically zero. Even penetrating a tank, such a small bullet did not give a tangible effect and did not cause serious damage to the tank.
As a result, the release was stopped, and some of the guns were adapted for firing over-caliber cumulative grenades attached to the "mortar" of the barrel. The barrels were significantly shortened, the new model of the grenade launcher received the GrB-39 index. Before the advent of anti-tank grenade launchers, it was this weapon that became a means of protecting the Wehrmacht infantry from Allied tanks in close combat. After the PzB 39 was removed from service, German designers made a number of attempts to create a new anti-tank rifle in a more powerful caliber, but not a single sample was adopted.
The SS troops used another very curious M.SS.41 anti-tank gun. It was developed by Czechoslovak gunsmiths (in fact, they continued their pre-occupation developments) together with SS-Waffenakademie in occupied Czechoslovakia at the Zbrojovka plant in Brno. PTR used the same cartridge 318.
The design of the weapon itself was curious; in fact, this is the first weapon in the Bull-Pup layout, which entered service, although not in large quantities. The box-type 5/10-round magazine of the weapon was located behind the fire control handle. In addition, the Czechs designed a very curious locking system - there was no movable bolt in this weapon.
The static bolt on the butt plate was mated to the barrel with a coupling. The barrel was unlocked by moving the handle forward and upward, when the handle moved back, a new cartridge was fed into the chamber and by turning the handle it was locked in the chamber.
PzB M.SS. 41 had a number of significant advantages - these are record-breaking small dimensions, modest weight, high rate of fire and extremely comfortable recoil. Nevertheless total number of these MFIs was only a couple of thousand samples. Affected by the complexity and high cost of the design and the weak cartridge 318 (7.92x94). Later, based on M.SS. 41 created a single-shot PTR PzB 42 in caliber 15x104 Brno. However, this weapon did not become widespread either.
Switzerland
The allies of the Germans were armed with another no less curious example. And this seemingly very formidable weapon was produced in neutral Switzerland. Solothurn Waffenfabrik AG is the Swiss branch of the German concern Rheinmetall-Borsig, which arose due to the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty. Unlike its German counterparts, the Swiss branch decided to play for high stakes back in the early 30s.
Namely, to use the developments from the field of designing air cannons to create the MTP. Heinrich Erhard, director of the Düsseldorf branch of Rheinmetall-Borsig, has been developing air cannons since the end of WWII. The engineers Rheinmetal - Gerlach and Rakula took the Erhard system with a barrel recoil and a short stroke as a basis, modified the introduction of the Shtange locking system and created a family of universal automatic cannons.
Among this family already in 1932. the PTR Solothurn S18-100 also appeared. In fact, this weapon is somewhat beyond the scope of the classic PTR as it was created not on the basis of a rifle, and not even on the basis of a heavy machine gun, but on the basis of an air cannon. Hence we have large caliber 20x105mm and a large weight for portable weapons - more than 40kg.
The cartridge (or rather even the projectile) 20x105B was soon (1934) replaced with a more powerful 20x138B, the barrel was lengthened and the total weight without ammunition exceeded 50kg. The new model received the designation Solothurn S18-1000, and later S18-1100. The newer models also had the ability to fire automatically. Despite its high penetration and formidable caliber, this weapon did not become any serious tank destroyer.
Mostly Hungarian, Italian, Bulgarian and Finnish units used the Swiss semi-cannon. The Wehrmacht was used rather limitedly under the designation PzB.41 (s) and showed low efficiency against medium tanks T-34 and heavy KV.
Finland
They did not lag behind their comrades in the shop and in Finland. The legendary Finnish designer Aimo Lahti designed the L-39 PTR, the production of which was set up by the VKT plant (Valtion Kivaaritehdas). The Lahti L-39 PTR was again based on an aircraft gun of its own design.
The weapon of Aimo Lahti has a special specificity, as it was created for use in extreme climatic conditions... Lahti's caliber was borrowed from Swiss colleagues - the same 20x138mm. The automatics are gas-operated, there is a gas piston and a four-position regulator. Locking with a wedge occurs in the vertical plane.
A unique feature of this weapon can be considered the presence of two trigger mechanisms - rear and front. The rear one holds the mobile system on the combat platoon, and the front drummer. The weapon has two triggers that need to be squeezed alternately. Such a system reliably protected against accidental shots and allowed the barrel to be cooled during intense firing. The magazine for 9 rounds was mounted on top.
Despite, again, good armor penetration rates, the weapon was very bulky, heavy and oversized. In total, less than 2,000 units were produced. Automatic versions were used as portable anti-aircraft guns against planes. The Finns also actively used the L-39 in the fight against the snipers of the Red Army.
In service with the infantry at the beginning of World War II, there were high-explosive hand grenades and anti-tank guns, that is, means that originated in the last years of the First World War. "Anti-tank rifle" (ATR) is not an entirely accurate term - it would be more correct to call this weapon " anti-tank rifle". However, it happened so historically (apparently, as a translation of the German word "panzerbuhse") and firmly entered our vocabulary. The armor-piercing action of anti-tank rifles is based on kinetic energy the bullet used, and, therefore, depends on the speed of the bullet at the moment it meets the obstacle, the angle of the meeting, the mass (or rather, the ratio of mass to caliber), the design and shape of the bullet, mechanical properties bullet material (core) and armor. The bullet, breaking through the armor, inflicts damage due to incendiary and fragmentation action. It should be noted that the lack of an armored action was the main reason for the low efficiency of the first anti-tank rifle - the single-shot 13.37-mm Mauser developed in 1918. A bullet fired from this PTR was capable of penetrating 20 mm armor at a distance of 500 meters. In the interwar period, the PTR was tested in different countries, but for a long time they were treated more like a surrogate, especially since the German Reichswehr adopted the Mauser anti-tank gun as a temporary replacement for the TuF machine gun of the corresponding caliber.
In the 20-30s, a light small-caliber cannon or a large-caliber machine gun seemed to most specialists the most successful and versatile solution to two problems - air defense at low altitudes and anti-tank at short and medium ranges. It would seem that this view was confirmed by the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 (although during those battles both sides, in addition to the 20-mm automatic cannon, used the surviving 13.37-mm Mauser anti-tank guns). However, by the end of the 30s it became clear that the "universal" or "anti-tank" machine gun (12.7 mm Browning, DShK, Vickers, 13 mm Hotchkiss, 20 mm Oerlikon, Solothurn "," Madsen ", 25-millimeter" Vickers "), due to the combination of its weight and size indicators and efficiency, cannot be used on the front line by small infantry units. During World War II, large-caliber machine guns, as a rule, were used for the needs of air defense or for firing at fortified firing points (a characteristic example is the peculiarities of the use of the Soviet 12.7-mm DShK). True, they were armed with light armored vehicles, along with anti-aircraft guns, they were attracted to anti-tank defense, even included in anti-tank reserves. But the large-caliber machine gun did not actually become an anti-tank weapon. Note that the 14.5-mm Vladimirov KPV machine gun, which appeared in 1944, although it was created under the cartridge of an anti-tank rifle, by the time of its appearance could not play the role of "anti-tank". After the war, it was used as a means of fighting manpower at significant ranges, air targets and light armored vehicles.
Anti-tank guns used during World War II differed in caliber (from 7.92 to 20 millimeters), type (self-loading, magazine, single-shot), size, weight, layout. However, their design had a number of common features:
- high muzzle velocity was achieved by using a powerful cartridge and a long barrel (90 - 150 calibers);
Used cartridges with armor-piercing tracer and armor-piercing incendiary bullets, which had armor-piercing and sufficient armor-piercing effect. Note that attempts to create anti-tank guns for the mastered cartridges of large-caliber machine guns did not give satisfactory results, and the cartridges were developed on purpose, and converted cartridges for aircraft guns were used in 20-mm anti-tank rifles. 20-mm anti-tank missile systems became a separate branch of "anti-tank machine guns" of the 20-30s of the last century;
To reduce recoil, muzzle brakes, spring shock absorbers, soft butt pads were installed;
To increase maneuverability, the dimensions of the mass and MTP were reduced, carrying handles were introduced, and the heavy guns were quick-disassembled;
In order to quickly transfer the fire, the bipod was attached closer to the middle, for the uniformity of aiming and convenience, many samples were supplied with a "cheek", a shoulder pad, a pistol grip was used for control in most samples;
Maximum reliability of mechanisms was achieved;
Great importance was attached to the ease of mastering and manufacturing.
The rate of fire problem was solved in combination with the requirement for simplicity of design and maneuverability. Single-shot anti-tank guns had a rate of fire of 6-8 rounds per minute, magazine guns - 10-12, and self-loading - 20-30.
12.7-mm single-shot "PTR Sholokhov" chambered for DShK, manufactured in 1941
In the USSR, a government decree on the development of an anti-tank rifle appeared on March 13, 1936. S.A. Korovin M.N. Blum and S.V. Vladimirov. Until 1938, 15 samples were tested, but none of them met the requirements. So, in 1936, at the Kovrovsky plant number 2 named. Kirkizha made two prototypes of the INZ-10 20-mm "company anti-tank rifle" of the M.N. Blum and S.V. Vladimirova - on a wheeled carriage and on a bipod. In August 1938, eight systems were tested at the Small Arms Research Range in Shchurovo. anti-tank weapons for the company link:
INZ-10 20mm anti-tank rifle;
- 12.7-mm anti-tank rifle, converted by NIPSVO from the German "Mauser";
- 12.7 mm Vladimirov anti-tank rifle;
- 12.7 mm anti-tank rifle TsKB-2;
- 14.5-mm anti-tank rifle of the Vladimirov and NIPSVO systems (14.5-mm cartridge was developed by NIPSVO);
- MTs 25-mm self-loading cannon (43-K system of Tsyrulnikov and Mikhno);
- 37-mm recoilless gun DR.
The INZ-10 light self-loading cannon showed unsatisfactory penetration and accuracy. The mass of the weapon in the firing position was also large (41.9 - 83.3 kg). The rest of the systems were also either found to be unsatisfactory, or needed serious improvements. At the beginning of 1937, NIPSVO conducted tests of an experimental Tula self-loading 20-mm anti-tank rifle (gun) TsKBSV-51 developed by S.A. Korovin. This gun had a tripod and optical sight... However, it was also rejected due to insufficient armor penetration. large mass(47.2 kg) and an unsuccessful muzzle brake design. In 1938, his lightweight 37 mm anti-tank gun suggested by B.G. Shpitalny, chief of OKB-15, but she was rejected even before the start of tests. An attempt to convert the automatic 20-millimeter gun of Shpitalny and Vladimirov (ShVAK) into a "universal" anti-aircraft anti-tank weapon also failed. In the end, the very requirements for anti-tank guns were recognized as inappropriate. On November 9, 1938, new requirements were formulated by the Artillery Directorate. Modified a powerful 14.5-mm cartridge, which has an armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 with a hardened steel core and a pyrotechnic incendiary composition (similar to the B-32 rifle bullet). Incendiary composition was placed between the shell and the core. Serial production of the cartridge began in 1940. The mass of the cartridge was 198 grams, the bullets were 51 grams, the length of the cartridge was 155.5 millimeters, the liner was 114.2 millimeters. A bullet at a distance of 0.5 km at a meeting angle of 20 degrees was capable of penetrating 20 mm cemented armor.
14.5-mm PTR Degtyarev mod. 1941 g.
N.V. Rukavishnikov developed a very successful self-loading rifle for this cartridge, the rate of fire of which reached 15 rounds per minute (the self-loading 14.5-mm anti-tank rifle, developed by Shpitalny, again failed). In August 1939, it successfully passed the test. In October of the same year, it was put into service under the designation PTR-39. However, in the spring of 1940, Marshal G.I. Kulik, the head of the GAU, raised the issue of the ineffectiveness of existing anti-tank weapons against the "newest tanks in Germany", about which intelligence appeared. In July 1940, the PTR-39 was put into production by the Kovrov plant named after V.I. Kirkiz was suspended. Erroneous views that the armor protection and firepower of tanks would increase significantly in the near future had a number of consequences: anti-tank guns were excluded from the armament system (order of August 26, 1940), production of 45-mm anti-tank guns was stopped, and an urgent design task was issued for 107- millimeter tank and anti-tank guns. As a result, the Soviet infantry lost an effective melee anti-tank weapon.
In the first weeks of the war, the tragic consequences of this mistake became visible. However, on June 23, tests of Rukavishnikov's anti-tank rifles showed a still high percentage of delays. Launching and putting this gun into production would take a significant amount of time. True, individual anti-tank rifles of Rukavishnikov were used in parts of the Western Front during the defense of Moscow. In July 1941, as a temporary measure, in the workshops of many Moscow universities, they set up the assembly of a single-shot anti-tank rifle for a 12.7-mm DShK cartridge (this gun was proposed by V.N.Sholokhov, and it was considered back in 1938). The simple design was copied from an old German Mauser 13.37mm anti-tank gun. However, a muzzle brake, a shock absorber at the back of the butt and installed lightweight folding bipods were added to the design. Despite this, the design did not provide the required parameters, especially since the armor penetration of the 12.7 mm cartridge was insufficient to combat tanks. Especially for these anti-tank rifles, a cartridge with an armor-piercing BS-41 bullet was produced in small batches.
Finally, in July, the 14.5-mm cartridge with an armor-piercing incendiary bullet was officially adopted. To speed up work on a technologically advanced and effective 14.5-mm anti-tank rifle, Stalin at the GKO meeting suggested entrusting the development to "one more, and for reliability - two designers" (according to the memoirs of DF Ustinov). The assignment was given in July to S.G. Simonov and V.A. Degtyarev. A month later, the designs were presented, ready for testing - only 22 days passed from the moment of receiving the assignment to the test shots.
V.A. Degtyarev and employees of KB-2 of the plant. Kirkizha (INZ-2 or Plant No. 2 of the People's Commissariat of Armaments) on July 4 began the development of a 14.5 mm anti-tank rifle. At the same time, two store versions were developed. On July 14, the working drawings were transferred to production. On July 28, the Degtyarev anti-tank rifle project was considered at a meeting at the Red Army's Small Arms Directorate. Degtyarev on July 30 was offered to simplify one sample by converting it into a single-shot one. This was necessary to speed up the organization of mass production of anti-tank rifles. A few days later, the sample was already presented.
At the same time, work was underway to fine-tune the cartridge. On August 15, a version of a 14.5-mm cartridge with a BS-41 bullet having a sintered powder core was adopted (bullet weight was 63.6 g). The bullet was developed by the Moscow Plant of Hard Alloys. 14.5 mm cartridges differed in color: the nose of the B-32 bullet was painted black, there was a red belt, the BS-41 bullet was painted red and had a black nose. The cartridge capsule was covered with black paint. This color allowed the armor-piercer to quickly distinguish between cartridges. A cartridge with a BZ-39 bullet was produced. On the basis of the BS-41, an "armor-piercing incendiary-chemical" bullet was developed with a capsule with a gas-forming composition of the KhAF in the rear (the German "armor-piercing chemical" cartridge for Pz.B 39 served as a sample). However, this cartridge was not accepted. Acceleration of work on anti-tank rifles was necessary, since the problems of anti-tank equipment rifle units escalated - in August, due to a lack of anti-tank artillery, 45-mm guns were withdrawn from the divisional and battalion level to form anti-tank artillery brigades and regiments, the 57-mm anti-tank gun was removed from production due to technological problems.
August 29, 1941, after a demonstration to members State Committee defense, the self-loading Simonov model and the single-shot Degtyarev were adopted under the designations of the PTRS and PTRD. Due to the haste of the issue, the guns were adopted before the end of the tests - tests of anti-tank rifles for survivability were carried out on September 12-13, the final tests of the modified anti-tank rifles were carried out on September 24. The new anti-tank guns were supposed to fight light and medium tanks, as well as armored vehicles at a distance of up to 500 meters.
14.5-mm ATR Simonov mod. 1941 g.
The production of the PTRD was started at the plant number 2 named after. Kirkizha - in early October, the first batch of 50 guns was put on assembly. In the Department of the Chief Designer on October 10, they created a special. a group for the development of documentation. A conveyor was urgently organized. Out of turn equipment and tools were being prepared. On October 28, a specialized production of anti-tank rifles was created under the leadership of Goryachiy - at that time the task of anti-tank weapons was a priority. Later, Izhmash, the production of the Tula Arms Plant, evacuated to Saratov and others, joined the production of anti-tank rifles.
Degtyarev's single-shot anti-tank rifle consisted of a barrel with a cylindrical receiver, a longitudinally rotary sliding bolt, a butt with a trigger box, trigger and percussion mechanisms, bipods and sighting devices. There were 8 rifling grooves in the bore with a stroke length of 420 millimeters. The active box muzzle brake was capable of absorbing up to 60% of the recoil energy. The cylindrical bolt had a straight handle in the rear and two lugs in the front, it was installed impact mechanism, reflector and ejector. The percussion mechanism included a mainspring and a striker with a striker; the tail of the striker looked like a hook and went out. The bevel of its frame, when unlocking the bolt, took the drummer back.
The receiver and trigger boxes were connected rigidly to the inner tube of the butt. The inner tube, which has a spring shock absorber, was inserted into the butt tube. The movable system (bolt, receiver and barrel) retreated after the shot, the bolt handle "ran" onto the copier profile attached to the butt, and when turned, unlocked the bolt. After stopping the barrel by inertia, the bolt retreated, getting up on the bolt delay ( left-hand side receiver), while the sleeve was pushed by the reflector into the lower window in the receiver. The shock absorber spring returned the moving system to the forward position. The insertion of a new cartridge into the upper window of the receiver, its ramming, as well as the locking of the bolt were done manually. The trigger included a trigger, a trigger and a sear with springs. Sights were carried out to the left on the brackets. They included a front sight and a reversible rear sight at a distance of up to and over 600 meters (in the anti-tank rifles of the first releases, the rear sight moved in a vertical slot).
On the butt there was a soft cushion, a wooden stop designed to hold the gun with the left hand, a wooden pistol grip, a "cheek". Folding stamped bipods on the barrel were attached with a lamb clamp. A handle was also attached to the barrel with which the weapon was carried. The accessory included a pair of canvas bags, each for 20 rounds. The total weight of Degtyarev's anti-tank rifle with ammunition was approximately 26 kilograms. In battle, the gun was carried by the first or both numbers of the calculation.
A minimum of parts, the use of a butt pipe instead of a frame greatly simplified the production of an anti-tank rifle, and the automatic opening of the bolt increased the rate of fire. Degtyarev's anti-tank rifle successfully combined simplicity, efficiency and reliability. The speed of production was great importance in those conditions. The first batch of 300 PTRD units was completed in October and in early November it was sent to the 16th Army of Rokossovsky. On November 16, they were first used in battle. By December 30, 1941, 17,688 Degtyarev anti-tank rifles had been released, and during 1942 - 184,800 units.
The Simonov self-loading anti-tank rifle was created on the basis of an experimental Simonov self-loading rifle of the 1938 model, which worked according to a scheme with a powder gas discharge. The gun consisted of a barrel with a muzzle brake and a gas chamber, a receiver with a butt, a trigger guard, a bolt, a reloading mechanism, a firing mechanism, sighting devices, a bipod and a store. The bore was the same as that of the PTRD. The open-type gas chamber was attached with pins at a distance of 1/3 of the barrel length from the muzzle. The receiver and the barrel are connected by a wedge.
The barrel bore was locked by tilting the bolt skeleton downward. Locking and unlocking was controlled by the bolt stem, which has a handle. The reloading mechanism included a gas regulator for three positions, a rod, a piston, a tube and a pusher with a spring. A pusher acted on the stem of the bolt. The return spring of the bolt was in the stem channel. A striker with a spring was placed in the breechblock channel. The shutter, having received a movement impulse from the pusher after the shot, moved back. At the same time, the pusher was returning forward. At the same time, the firing sleeve was removed by the bolt ejector and reflected upward by the protrusion of the receiver. After the cartridges ran out, the bolt stood up to stop in the receiver.
A trigger mechanism was mounted on the trigger guard. The hammer percussion mechanism had a helical mainspring. The design of the trigger included: the trigger sear, the trigger and the hook, while the trigger axis was located at the bottom. The store and the lever feeder were hinged to the receiver, its latch was located on the trigger guard. The cartridges were staggered. The store was loaded with a pack (clip) with five cartridges with the lid folded down. The rifle included 6 clips. The front sight had a fence, and the sector sight was notched from 100 to 1500 meters in increments of 50. The anti-tank rifle had a wooden stock with a shoulder pad and a soft pad, a pistol grip. The narrow neck of the butt was used to hold the gun with the left hand. A folding bipod was attached to the barrel using a clip (swivel). There was a handle for carrying. In battle, the anti-tank rifle was carried by one or both of the crew numbers. The disassembled gun on the campaign - the receiver with the butt and the barrel - was carried in two canvas covers.
The manufacture of Simonov's self-loading anti-tank rifle was simpler than the Rukavishnikov rifle (the number of parts is one third less, machine-hours less by 60%, the time by 30%), but much more complicated than Degtyarev's anti-tank rifle. In 1941, 77 Simonov anti-tank rifles were produced, in 1942 the number was already 63,308 units. Since anti-tank rifles were accepted urgently, all the shortcomings of the new systems, such as tight extraction of the cartridge case from Degtyarev's PTR or twin shots from Simonov's PTR, were corrected during production or "brought" in the military workshops. With all the manufacturability of anti-tank rifles, the deployment of their mass production in war time required a certain time - the needs of the troops began to be satisfied only from November 1942. The establishment of mass production made it possible to reduce the cost of weapons - for example, the cost of Simonov's anti-tank rifle from the first half of 1942 to the second half of 1943 almost halved.
Anti-tank guns bridged the gap between the "anti-tank" capabilities of artillery and infantry.
Since December 1941, companies armed with anti-tank guns (27, and later 54 guns) have been introduced into the rifle regiments. Since the fall of 1942, platoons (18 rifles) of PTR were introduced into the battalions. In January 1943, the PTR company was included in the motorized rifle and machine gun battalion (later - the submachine gun battalion) of the tank brigade. Only in March 1944, when the role of anti-tank rifles declined, the companies were disbanded, and the "armor-piercing" were retrained into tankers (since they were rearmed on the T-34-85, whose crew consisted not of four, but of five people). Companies were deployed in anti-tank battalions, and battalions - in anti-tank destroyer brigades. Thus, attempts were made to ensure close interaction of the PTR units with infantry, artillery and tank units.
The first anti-tank rifles were received by the troops of the Western Front, engaged in the defense of Moscow. Directive of General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, commander of the front forces, on October 26, 1941, speaking of sending 3-4 platoons of anti-tank rifles to the 5th, 16th and 33rd armies, demanded “to take measures for the immediate use of this weapon of exceptional efficiency and power ... their battalions and regiments ”. Zhukov's order of December 29 also pointed out the disadvantages of using anti-tank rifles - the use of crews as riflemen, lack of interaction with anti-tank artillery and groups of tank destroyers, cases of leaving anti-tank rifles on the battlefield. As you can see, the effectiveness of the new weapon was not immediately appreciated, the command staff simply had a poor idea of the possibilities of using it. It is also necessary to take into account the shortcomings of the first batches of anti-tank rifles.
Degtyarev's first anti-tank rifles combat use received in the 16th Army of Rokossovsky. The most famous battle was the clash on November 16, 1941 at the Dubosekovo junction during the defense of Moscow, a group of tank destroyers of the 2nd battalion of the 1075th regiment of the 316th Panfilov rifle division and 30 German tanks. 18 tanks that participated in the attacks were destroyed, but less than a fifth of the entire company survived. This battle showed the effectiveness of anti-tank grenades and anti-tank rifles in the hands of "tank destroyers". However, he also revealed the need to cover the "fighters" with riflemen and support with light regimental artillery.
To understand the role of anti-tank rifle units, it is necessary to remember the tactics. The commander of a rifle battalion or regiment could leave a company of anti-tank rifles in battle entirely at his disposal or transfer them to rifle companies, leaving at least a platoon of anti-tank rifles in the anti-tank area of the regiment in defense as a reserve. A platoon of anti-tank rifles could operate in full force or split into half-platoons and squads of 2-4 rifles. A detachment of anti-tank rifles, acting independently or as part of a platoon, in battle had to “select a firing position, equip it and camouflage it; quickly prepare for shooting, as well as accurately hit enemy armored vehicles and tanks; in the course of the battle, covertly and quickly change the firing position. " The firing positions were chosen behind artificial or natural obstacles, although quite often the calculations were simply hiding in the bushes or grass. The positions were chosen in such a way as to provide circular fire at ranges of up to 500 meters, and occupied a flanking position to the direction of movement of enemy tanks. Interaction was also organized with other anti-tank formations and rifle subunits. Depending on the availability of time at the position, a full-profile trench with a platform was prepared, a trench for circular firing without or with a platform, a small trench for firing in a wide sector - in this case, the shooting was carried out with the bipod removed or bent over. Fire on tanks from anti-tank rifles opened, depending on the situation, from a distance of 250 to 400 meters, preferably, of course, in the stern or side, however, in infantry positions, armor-piercers quite often had to "hit in the forehead." The crews of anti-tank rifles were dismembered in depth and along the front at distances and intervals from 25 to 40 meters with an angle backward or forward, during flanking fire - in one line. The front of the squad of anti-tank rifles is 50-80 meters, the platoon is 250-700 meters.
During the defense, "snipers-armor-piercing" were deployed in echelon, preparing the main position and up to three spare ones. The gunner-observer on duty remained at the position of the squad until the start of the offensive of the enemy armored vehicles. If the tank was moving, it was recommended to focus the fire of several anti-tank rifles on it: when the tank approached, fire was fired at its turret; if the tank is removed - in the stern. Taking into account the strengthening of the armor of tanks, fire from anti-tank rifles was usually opened from a distance of 150-100 meters. When they approached the positions directly or when breaking through into the depths of the defense, armor-piercing and "tank destroyers" used anti-tank grenades and Molotov cocktails.
The platoon commander of anti-tank rifles could allocate a squad participating in the defense to destroy enemy aircraft. This task was familiar. So, for example, in the defense zone of the 148th SD (Central Front) near Kursk, 93 heavy and light machine guns and 65 anti-tank rifles were prepared for the destruction of air targets. Often, anti-tank guns were put on improvised anti-aircraft guns... A tripod machine created for this purpose at the plant No. 2 named after Kirkizha was not accepted into production, and this is perhaps fair.
In 1944, a staggered arrangement of anti-tank rifles was practiced in depth and along the front at a distance of 50 to 100 meters from each other. At the same time, mutual shooting of approaches was ensured, dagger fire was widely used. In winter, anti-tank guns were installed in calculations for sledges or sleds. In closed areas with impenetrable spaces for the positions of anti-tank rifles, groups of fighters with incendiary bottles and grenades were located in front of them. In the mountains, the crews of anti-tank rifles were located, as a rule, at the turns of the roads, the entrances to valleys and gorges, in the defense of heights - on the tank-accessible and most gentle slopes.
In the offensive, a platoon of anti-tank rifles moved in rolls in a combat formation of a rifle battalion (company) in readiness to meet enemy armored vehicles with fire from at least two squads. The crews of anti-tank rifles took up positions in front of the rifle platoons. During an offensive with an open flank, armor-piercing units are usually kept on this flank. The squad of anti-tank rifles usually attacked on the flanks or in between rifle company, a platoon of anti-tank rifles - battalion or company. Between the positions, the crews moved under the cover of mortar and infantry fire along or hidden approaches.
During the attack, anti-tank guns were located at the line of the attack. Their main task was to defeat enemy fire (primarily anti-tank) weapons. In the event of the appearance of tanks, the fire was immediately transferred to them. During the battle in the depths of enemy defenses, platoons and squads of anti-tank rifles supported the advance of rifle subunits with fire, providing protection from "sudden raids of enemy armored vehicles and tanks from ambushes", destroying counterattacking or entrenched tanks, as well as firing points. The calculations were recommended to hit armored vehicles and tanks with flank and crossfire.
During battles in the forest or in settlements, because battle formations were dismembered, anti-tank rifle squads were often attached to rifle platoons. Moreover, in the hands of the commander of a regiment or battalion, a reserve of anti-tank rifles remained mandatory. During the offensive, anti-tank rifle subunits covered the rear and flanks of rifle regiments, battalions or companies, firing through vacant lots or squares, as well as along the streets. When taking up defense in the city limits, positions were placed at the crossroads of streets, in squares, in basements and buildings, in order to keep lanes and streets, breaches and arches under fire. During the defense of the forest, the positions of anti-tank rifles were placed in the depths, so that roads, glades, paths and glades were fired upon. On the march, a platoon of anti-tank rifles were attached to a marching outpost or followed in constant readiness to meet the enemy with fire in a column of the main forces. Anti-tank rifle units operated as part of forward and reconnaissance detachments, especially in rough terrain, making it difficult to carry heavier weapons. In the forward detachments, armor-piercing detachments were perfectly complemented by tank brigades - for example, on July 13, 1943, the advance detachment of the 55th Guards Tank Regiment successfully repelled a counterattack of 14 German tanks in the Rzhavets area with anti-tank guns and tanks, knocking out 7 of them. Former Lieutenant General of the Wehrmacht E. Schneider, an expert in the field of weapons, wrote: "The Russians in 1941 had a 14.5 mm anti-tank rifle, which caused a lot of trouble for our tanks and light armored personnel carriers that appeared later." In general, in some German works about the Second World War and the memoirs of the Wehrmacht tankmen, Soviet anti-tank guns were referred to as weapons "worthy of respect", but they also paid tribute to the courage of their calculations. With high ballistic data, the 14.5-mm anti-tank rifle was distinguished by its manufacturability and maneuverability. The Simonov anti-tank rifle is considered the best weapon of this class of the Second World War in terms of the combination of operational and combat qualities.
Having played a significant role in anti-tank defense in 1941-1942, anti-tank guns by the summer of 43 - with an increase in the armor protection of assault guns and tanks over 40 millimeters - lost their positions. True, there were cases of successful combat of anti-tank infantry formations with heavy enemy tanks in pre-prepared defensive positions. For example - the duel of the armor-piercer Ganzha (151st Infantry Regiment) with the "Tiger". The first shot in the forehead gave no result, the armor-piercer removed the anti-tank rifle into the trench and, letting the tank pass over him, fired at the stern, immediately changing position. During the turn of the tank in order to move to the trench, Ganzha made a third shot at the side and set it on fire. However, this is the exception rather than the rule. If in January 1942, the number of anti-tank rifles in the troops was 8,116 units, in January 43rd - 118,563 units, in 1944 - 142,861 units, that is, in two years it increased 17.6 times, then already in 1944 it began to decline. By the end of the war, the Active Army had only 40 thousand anti-tank rifles (their common resource on May 9, 1945 was 257,500 units). The largest number of anti-tank rifles were supplied to the ranks of the army in 1942 - 249,000 pieces, but already in the first half of 1945, only 800 pieces. The same picture was observed with 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm cartridges: in 1942, their output was 6 times higher than the pre-war level, but by 1944 it had significantly decreased. Despite this, the production of 14.5 mm anti-tank rifles continued until January 1945. In total, 471,500 units were produced during the war. The anti-tank rifle was a weapon of the front line, which explains the significant losses - during the war, 214 thousand anti-tank rifles of all models were lost, that is, 45.4%. The highest percentage of losses was observed in 41 and 42 years - 49.7 and 33.7%, respectively. The losses of the material part corresponded to the level of losses among the personnel.
The following figures indicate the intensity of the use of anti-tank rifles in the middle of the war. During the defense on Kursk Bulge on the Central Front, 387 thousand cartridges for anti-tank rifles were used up (48 370 per day), and on the Voronezh front - 754 thousand (68 250 per day). During the Battle of Kursk, more than 3.5 million rounds of anti-tank rifle cartridges were used up. In addition to tanks, anti-tank rifles fired at firing points and embrasures of bunkers and bunkers at ranges of up to 800 meters, and at planes up to 500 meters.
In the third period of the war, the anti-tank rifles of Degtyarev and Simonov were used against light armored vehicles and lightly armored self-propelled guns, which were widely used by the enemy, as well as to combat firing points, especially in battles within the city, up to the storming of Berlin. Often, rifles were used by snipers to hit targets at a considerable distance or enemy shooters who were behind armor shields. In August 1945, Degtyarev and Simonov's anti-tank rifles were used in battles with the Japanese. Here, this type of weapon could be in place, especially given the relatively weak armor of Japanese tanks. However, the Japanese used tanks very little against the Soviet troops.
Anti-tank rifles were in service with not only rifle, but also cavalry units. Here, to transport Degtyarev's rifle, packs for cavalry saddles and pack saddles of the 1937 model were used. The gun was attached over the horse's rump on a pack on metal block having two brackets. The rear bracket was also used as a swivel support for shooting from a horse at ground and air targets. At the same time, the shooter stood behind the horse, which was being held by the groom. An elongated UPD-MM parachute bag with a shock absorber and a parachute chamber was used to drop anti-tank rifles to partisans and airborne assault forces. Cartridges were quite often dropped from low-level flight without a parachute in burlap-wrapped closures. Soviet anti-tank guns were transferred to foreign units that were formed in the USSR: for example, 6,786 guns were transferred to the Polish Army, Czechoslovak units- 1283 units During Korean war 50-53 years, soldiers of the North Korean army and Chinese volunteers used Soviet 14.5-mm anti-tank guns against light armored vehicles and hitting point targets at a significant distance (this experience was adopted from Soviet snipers).
The improvement of anti-tank rifles and the development of new schemes for them went on continuously. An example of an attempt to create a lighter anti-tank rifle can be considered the Rukavishnikov single-shot 12.7-mm anti-tank rifle tested in February 1942. Its mass was equal to 10.8 kg. The shutter system made it possible to shoot at a speed of up to 12-15 rounds per minute. There was a possibility of replacing the barrel with a 14.5 mm one. The lightness and simplicity prompted the landfill specialists to recommend the new Rukavishnikov rifle for mass production. But the growth of the armor protection of assault guns and enemy tanks required a different approach.
The search for anti-tank weapons that would be able to operate in infantry units and fight the latest tanks went in two directions - "enlargement" of anti-tank guns and "lightening" of anti-tank guns. In both cases, ingenious solutions were found and rather interesting designs were created. Experienced single-shot anti-tank rifles of Blum and rifles "PEC" (Rashkov, Ermolaev, Slukhodkiy) aroused great interest in GBTU and GAU. Blum's anti-tank rifle was designed for a 14.5 mm cartridge (14.5x147) in which the muzzle velocity of the bullet was increased to 1500 meters per second. The cartridge was created on the basis of a 23 mm round case aircraft cannon (at the same time, a 23 mm shot was being developed on the basis of a standard 14.5 mm cartridge to facilitate an air cannon). The shotgun had a longitudinally sliding breechblock with two lugs and a spring-loaded reflector, which ensured reliable removal of the sleeve at any speed of movement of the shutter. The barrel of the gun was supplied with a muzzle brake. On the butt there was a leather pillow on the back of the head. Foldable bipods were used for installation. The RES anti-tank rifles were developed for a 20-mm round with a projectile having an armor-piercing core (no explosive). The RES barrel was locked by a horizontally moving wedge gate, which was opened manually and closed by a return spring. There was a safety catch on the trigger. A folding stock with a buffer resembled Degtyarev's anti-tank rifle. The gun was equipped with a muzzle brake-flash suppressor and a wheeled machine with a shield. In April 1943, a captured Pz.VI "Tiger" was fired at the GBTU training ground, which showed that Blum's anti-tank gun was capable of penetrating 82-mm tank armor at a distance of up to 100 meters. On August 10, 1943, both anti-tank guns were fired at the Shot course: this time they recorded the penetration of 55-mm armor by a bullet from Blum's anti-tank rifle at a distance of 100 meters, and 70-mm armor was pierced from the RES (at a distance of 300 meters) RES pierced 60 mm armor). From the conclusion of the commission: "in terms of armor-piercing action and power, both tested models of anti-tank guns are significantly superior to the anti-tank guns of Degtyarev and Simonov, which are in service. The tested guns are a reliable means of fighting medium tanks of the T-IV type and even more powerful armored vehicles." Blum's anti-tank rifle was more compact, so the question of its adoption was raised. However, this did not happen. Small-scale production of 20-mm RES was carried out in Kovrov - in 42, at plant No. 2, produced 28 units, and in 43, 43 units. This was the end of the production. In addition, at factory # 2, Degtyarev's anti-tank rifle was converted into a "two-caliber" rifle with an increased muzzle velocity chambered for a 23-mm VYa cannon (the development of the production of a gun at the plant began in February 1942). In another version of the Degtyarev anti-tank rifle with an increased initial speed, the principle of sequential firing of charges along the length of the barrel was used, according to the scheme of a multi-chamber gun, theoretically calculated in 1878 by Perrault. Above, approximately in the middle of the barrel of the anti-tank rifle, a box with a chamber was attached, which was connected by a transverse hole with the barrel bore. A blank 14.5 mm cartridge, locked with a conventional bolt, was put into this box. Powder gases set fire to the charge when fired blank cartridge, and he, in turn, increased the speed of the bullet, maintaining the pressure in the bore. True, the recoil of the weapon increased, and the survivability of the system and reliability turned out to be low.
The growth in armor penetration of anti-tank rifles did not keep pace with the increase in armor protection. In a magazine dated October 27, 1943, the GAU artillery committee noted: “The anti-tank rifles of Degtyarev and Simonov often cannot penetrate the armor of a German medium tank. Therefore, it is necessary to create an anti-tank rifle capable of penetrating armor of the order of 75-80 millimeters at 100 meters, and nailing armor of 50-55 millimeters at an angle of 20-25 °. " Even Degtyarev's "two-caliber" anti-tank rifles and heavy "RES" could hardly meet these requirements. Work on anti-tank rifles was actually curtailed.
Attempts to "lighten" artillery systems to parameters infantry weapons responded to the 1942 Infantry Combat Regulations, which included anti-tank guns in the number of infantry fire weapons. An example of such an anti-tank gun can be an experienced 25-mm LPP-25, developed by Zhukov, Samusenko and Sidorenko in 1942 at the Artillery Academy named after V.I. Dzerzhinsky. Weight in firing position - 154 kg. The crew of the gun - 3 people. Armor penetration at a distance of 100 meters - 100 millimeters (subcaliber projectile). In 1944, the airborne 37-mm ChK-M1 cannon of Charnko and Komaritsky was adopted. The original recoil damping system made it possible to reduce the combat weight to 217 kilograms (for comparison, the mass of a 37-mm cannon of the 1930 model was 313 kilograms). The height of the line of fire was equal to 280 millimeters. With a rate of fire of 15 to 25 rounds per minute, the cannon sabot projectile penetrated 86-mm armor at a distance of 500 meters and 97-mm armor at 300 meters. However, only 472 guns were made - they, as well as in "reinforced" anti-tank guns, were simply not needed.
Sourse of information:
Magazine "Equipment and weapons" Semyon Fedoseev "Infantry against tanks"
The first month of the war showed that the Soviet infantry, apart from grenades and Molotov cocktails, no longer had any other light and effective means necessary for her to fight the enemy's armored vehicles.
The reason for this situation was that our grief analysts before the war mistakenly believed that the Wehrmacht had only thick-armored tanks against which not only rifles, but even the "magpie" would be powerless.
That is why in the pre-war years in the USSR the main emphasis was placed on the development and production of such guns as the 76 mm F-22 and 57 mm ZIS-2, and suddenly, with the beginning of the war, it became clear that for these guns in 1941. there were simply no worthy targets on the battlefield, since the bulk of German tanks did not have thick enough armor and could be hit even with 12.7 mm armor-piercing bullets DShK machine gun.
True, it is necessary to pay tribute, the anti-tank problems of the Soviet infantry very quickly reached the very top and already at the very beginning of July 1941. the country's leadership set the gunsmiths the task of creating a mass lightweight means of fighting tanks.
According to the memoirs of D.F. Ustinov, Stalin at one of the GKO meetings proposed to entrust the development "to one more, and for reliability - to two designers."
The assignment for the design of the PTR was issued in July to the designers of gunsmiths V.A. Degtyarev and S.G. Simonov. It was impossible to hesitate, German tanks were rapidly advancing towards Leningrad and Moscow.
Soon on August 29, 1941, after a demonstration to the members of the State Defense Committee, the single-shot sample of Degtyarev and the self-loading Simonov were put into service under the designations, respectively, PTRD and PTRS. Due to the haste of the issue, this was done before the end of the tests - tests of the PTR for survivability took place on September 12-13, and the final tests of the modified PTR on September 24. The new PTR were supposed to fight medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at ranges up to 500 m.
A minimum of parts, the use of a butt tube instead of a frame simplified the production of PTR, and the automatic opening of the bolt increased the rate of fire. PTRD successfully combined simplicity, reliability and efficiency.
The speed of setting up production was of great importance in those conditions. The first batch of 300 ATRDs was completed in October and at the beginning of November sent to Rokossovsky's 16th Army. They were first used in battle on November 16. By December 30, 1941. released 17 688 ATGMs, and in 1942. - 184 800.
Another sample, the self-loading PTRS, was created on the basis of an experimental Simonov 1938 self-loading rifle. according to the scheme with the removal of powder gases. It consisted of a barrel with a muzzle brake and a gas chamber, a receiver with a butt, a bolt, a trigger guard, reloading mechanisms and a trigger, sights, a magazine and a bipod. The bore was similar to the PTRD.
Both guns had their pros and cons, so the PTRD was lighter than the PTRS by almost 3 kg, but this gun was single-shot. But the PTRS had a store for as many as 5 rounds, so that where the newsreel footage shows the fighters that they carry the gun together, this PTRS, and one person carried mainly the PTRD.
Since December 1941. In the rifle regiments were introduced PTR companies (27, then 54 guns), and from the fall of 1942. in battalions - ATR platoons (18 guns each).
In January 1943. the PTR company was included in the motorized rifle and machine gun battalion (later - the submachine gun battalion) of the tank brigade - only in March 1944, when the role of the PTR decreased, these companies were disbanded, and the "armor-piercing" was retrained into tankers. PTR companies were introduced into anti-tank fighter battalions, and PTR battalions - into anti-tank fighter brigades.
Thus, they sought to ensure close interaction of PTR not only with infantry, but also with tank and artillery units.
With the advent of anti-tank missile units, special tactics for their use were developed, as a result, the so-called gap between the "anti-tank" capabilities of the infantry and anti-tank artillery was eliminated.
In battle, the PTR company commander infantry regiment or the battalion could be left entirely at its disposal or given to rifle companies, in defense, leaving as its reserve at least an anti-tank rifle platoon in the anti-tank area of the regiment.
An ATR platoon could operate in full force, split into squads of 2-4 guns or half-platoons. An anti-tank missile division, acting as part of a platoon or independently, had to “choose a firing position, equip and camouflage it in battle; quickly prepare for shooting and accurately hit enemy tanks (armored vehicles); quickly and secretly change the firing position during the battle. "
The firing positions were chosen behind natural or artificial obstacles, although often the calculations had to take cover simply in the grass or bushes. The positions were supposed to provide all-round fire at a distance of up to 500 m and occupy a flank position to the direction of the likely movement of enemy tanks. Interaction with rifle units and other PTSs was organized. At the position, depending on the availability of time, a full-profile trench was prepared with a firing platform, a circular firing trench with or without a platform, or a small trench for shooting in a wide sector without a platform - in this case, shooting was conducted with a bipod bent or removed.
Fire on PTR tanks was opened, depending on the situation, from 250-400 m, preferably, of course, in the side or stern, but in infantry positions, armor-piercing personnel often had to "hit in the forehead." PTR calculations were dismembered along the front and in depth at intervals and distances of 25-40 m with an angle forward or backward, with flanking fire - in line. Front of the PTR squad - 50-80 m, platoon from 250 to 700 m.
It was recommended to focus the fire of several anti-tank missiles on a moving tank, when the tank approaches - on its tower, when the tank overcomes a barrier, escarp, embankment - along the bottom, when the tank moves to a neighbor - along the side and engine part, external tanks, when the tank is removed - to the stern ...
Taking into account the strengthening of the armor of medium tanks of the enemy, fire from anti-tank rifles was usually opened from 150-100 m. When tanks approached directly to the positions or penetrated into the depth of defense, the armor-piercers fought against them together with "tank destroyers" with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles.
In the offensive, the PTR platoon moved in rolls in the battle formation of a rifle company (battalion) in readiness to meet enemy tanks with fire from at least two squads. PTR crews took up positions in front in the intervals between rifle platoons. When attacking with an open flank, they tried to keep the armor-piercers on this flank. An anti-tank rifle squad usually attacked in gaps or on the flanks of a rifle company, an anti-tank rifle platoon - a ryut or battalion. From position to position, the crews moved along hidden approaches or under cover of infantry and mortar fire. http://www.plam.ru/transportavi/tehnika_i_vooruzhenie_2002_02/p4.php
Many people ask the question, what was the real effectiveness of the combat work of the PTR crews? Simply put, what could have been knocked out or what kind of military or other equipment could have been destroyed from the then Soviet anti-tank missile systems with their real armor penetration from 35 to 40 mm of armor?
The effectiveness of this weapon is assessed in different ways; in the Russian literature of recent years, it is customary to emphasize their shortcomings and assume that they had only "psychological significance" in the face of an obvious shortage of anti-tank artillery.
However, our opponents assess the role of the ATR somewhat differently, as former Lieutenant General of the Wehrmacht E. Schneider wrote: "In 1941, the Russians had a 14.5-mm ATR ... which caused a lot of trouble for our tanks and light armored personnel carriers that appeared later."
Former Major General F. von Mellenthin noted: “It seemed that every infantryman had an anti-tank rifle or anti-tank gun. The Russians were very clever at disposing of these funds and, it seems, there was no place where they would not be. "
In general, in a number of German works about the Second World War and the memoirs of German tank crews, Soviet anti-tank missile systems are referred to as a "worthy of respect" weapon, but the courage of their calculations is also given due. As early as 1942, Soviet commanders noted the new features of the Germans conducting attacks with tanks and assault guns - they sometimes stopped 300-400 m from the forward trenches, supported their infantry with fire from a place. And these are the ranges from which Soviet anti-tank systems opened fire. As you can see, the fire of anti-tank rifles had more than only "psychological significance." http://nnm.me/blogs/Dmitry68/protivotankovye_ruzhya/
It is known from Soviet sources that PTR units operated as part of reconnaissance and forward detachments, especially in rough terrain, where it was difficult to carry heavier weapons. In the forward detachments, the armor-piercers successfully supplemented the tanks - so on July 13, 1943, in the Rzhavets area, the forward detachment of the 55th Guards. tank regiment with tanks and anti-tank rifle fire successfully repelled a counterattack of 14 enemy tanks, knocking out half of them.
On October 30, 1944, the chief of staff of the 1st Baltic Front, Colonel-General V. V. Kurasov, reported: “The experience of using anti-tank systems during the Patriotic War shows that they had the greatest effect until July 1943, when the enemy used light and medium tanks. , and the battle formations of our troops were comparatively less saturated with anti-tank artillery.
Starting in the second half of 1943, when the enemy began to use heavy tanks and self-propelled guns having powerful armor protection, the effectiveness of the anti-tank missile system has significantly decreased. The main role in the fight against tanks is currently performed entirely by artillery. PTR, with good accuracy of fire, are now used mainly against firing points, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers of the enemy. "
The unit commanders successfully used the main advantages of the PTR - maneuverability, the ability to constantly be in the combat formations of small units, the simplicity of camouflage - both in 1944 and in 1945. For example, when fighting in encirclement, in settlements, when capturing and securing bridgeheads, when it was not possible to use artillery. http://nnm.me/blogs/Dmitry68/protivotankovye_ruzhya/
Having played a large role in anti-tank defense in 1941-1942, the anti-tank missile system by the summer of 1943 - with the growth of armor protection of tanks and assault guns over 40 mm - lost their positions
There were, however, cases of successful combat of infantry PTSs even with heavy tanks in pre-prepared defensive positions.
An example of this is the duel of the 151st Infantry Regiment Ganzha's armored rifleman with the Tiger tank. The first shot in the forehead did not work, the armor-piercer removed the PTR into the trench and, letting the tank go over him, fired at the stern and immediately changed its position, and when the tank turned around and moved into the trench, Ganzha set it on fire with a third shot into the side.
However, this was more the exception than the rule. If in January 1942. the number of anti-tank missiles in the troops was 8,116, in January 1943 - 118,563, in 1944 - 142,861, it grew 17.6 times over two years, then in 1944 it increased by 17.6 times. it began to decline, and by the end of the war the active army had only about 40,000 ATRs (their total resource was 257,500 as of May 9, 1945). The largest number of PTR was submitted to the Red Army in 1942. - 249,000 pieces, but for the first half of 1945. submitted only 800 PTR. The same picture is observed in relation to 12.7- and 14.5-mm cartridges: in 1942, their output was six times higher than the pre-war, but noticeably decreased by 1944. Nevertheless, the production of 14.5-mm PTR continued until January 1945, and in total, about 471,500 units were produced during the war. The PTR was a front-line weapon, which explains the high losses - during the entire war, about 214,000 PTR of all models were lost, that is, 45.4% of the total resource. The largest percentage of losses was in 1941 and 1942 - respectively 49.7 and 33.7%. Losses in the material part also reflect the level of losses in personnel.
The following figures testify to the intensity of the use of PTR in the middle of the war. During the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge on the Central Front, 387,000 rounds of ammunition were used up for the PTR (or 48,370 on the day of the battle), and on Voronezh, 754,000 (68,250 on the day of the battle) And 3.6 million rounds of ammunition were used up for the entire Kursk battle to ATR Except tanks - main goal- PTR could fire at firing points and embrasures of bunkers and bunkers at ranges of up to 800 m. On aircraft - up to 500 m.
In the third period of the war, ATGM and ATGM were used to combat light armored vehicles and lightly armored self-propelled guns. widely used by the enemy, as well as - with firing points, especially in urban battles, up to the storming of Berlin. They were often used by snipers to hit distant targets or enemy shooters behind armor shields. PTRD and PTRD were also used in battles with the Japanese in August 1945, and here they could have been in place given the relatively weak armor of Japanese tanks, but the Japanese used tanks against the Soviet troops a little. ru / transportavi / tehnika_i_vooruzhenie_2002_02 / p4.php
The most productive Soviet armor-piercers in the Second World War:
The crew of Yablonko and Serdyukov together destroyed 22 tanks;
Armored rifleman Private Startsev F.G. (2 br. 58 fur. Br.) In a battle near the farm Dyadin (Rostov region) in January 1943 in 40 minutes of battle knocked out 11 German tanks. In just 10 days at the front, Startsev's crew knocked out 17 enemy tanks. F.G.Startsev himself died in battle on January 18, 1943. http://poltora-bobra.livejournal.com/53079.html
Sergeant Ivan Derevyanko - 10 tanks;
Private Ilya Makarovich Kaplunov (4th Guards rifle regiment) - 9 tanks. Killed December 21, 1942;
Private Semyon Antipkin - 8 tanks and 1 aircraft;
Armor-gunner Ivan Knyazev (310 Guards rifle regiment) - 67 armored targets, machine guns, guns and mortars;
Ml. Sergeant Pyotr Osipovich Boloto (84th Guards rifle regiment) - 8 tanks;
Sergeant Pavel Illarionovich Bannov (19 tanks) - 8 tanks;
Armor-piercer Roman Semenovich Smishchuk - 6 tanks;
Sergeant Major Kadi Abakarovich Abakarov (1054 rifle regiment) - 6 tanks;
Private Blinov (98th Guards rifle division) - 6 tanks;
Armor-piercer Malenkov (95th rifle division) - 6 tanks;
Armor-piercer Pavel Ivanovich Ershov (24th Guards Air Force Regiment) - 6 tanks. He died in January 1944.
Sergeant Oboldin Savely Savelyevich (32 infantry brigade) - 4 tanks and 4 tanks captured in good order, destroyed several. dozens of soldiers;
Junior Sergeant Ivan Petrovich Kondratyev (4th Guards Air Force Brigade) - 4 tanks, 2 armored vehicles, 3 trucks;
Private Sabir Akhtyamovich Akhtyamov (4 Gv.m-s.br.) - 4 tanks, 2 armored personnel carriers, 2 trucks;
Private Kovtun Vasily Semenovich (902 rifle regiment) - 4 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, more than 20 machine guns, several soldiers;
Private Alexander Nikitich Logunov (490 rifle regiment) - 5 tanks and a large number of infantrymen.
Armored gunner A. Denisov on July 14 and 15, 1943, near Orel, shot down two Nazi bombers. http://www.militarists.ru/?p=5193
Thus, the use of anti-tank rifles in the Red Army gave our soldiers a powerful new weapon of fire, thereby significantly improving the morale of the defending infantrymen.
With this weapon, one armor-piercing fighter was relatively easy to control, but the calculation of the anti-tank rifle consisted of two soldiers, this is the gunner and the assistant gunner. The assistant gave the gunner cartridges, helped to carry the gun and ammunition to him, to tear off the trenches, to monitor the enemy, and, if necessary, he himself fired from the PTR.
In a difficult battle situation, when the enemy armored vehicles clanking and conducting intense fire, it was necessary to have great courage in order not to panic, carefully aim, wait for the tank to approach the most advantageous distance, and make striking shot.
Fighting at short distances, the lack of time for the production of several aimed shots during the time during which the tank travels 100-200 meters required to defeat, led in some cases to the frequent death of tank destroyers. Therefore, along with weapons, the soldier of the armor-piercing operator needed great personal courage, and only if these two factors were present was it possible efficient use anti-tank rifles.
The main commandment of the Soviet armor-piercers was: “Patience, endurance, and the eye are the keys to success. Let the enemy tank get closer and hit it with an accurate shot. " Most of the armor-piercing soldiers acted in this way, but many of them, unfortunately, did not always manage to outwit death.
It is known that those who served in armor-piercing were very rare to meet alive after the war, like all those fighters who bore the proud title of an anti-tank gunner.
(abbreviated from him. Panzerbüchse 39) is a German anti-tank rifle developed in the late 1930s by B. Brauer, a design engineer at Gustloff Werke. Designed to combat lightly armored targets at ranges up to 300-400 m.
| TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS ANTI-TANK GUN PZ.B.39 | |
|---|---|
| Manufacturer: | Gustloff-werke |
| Cartridge: | |
| Caliber: | 7.92 mm |
| Empty weight: | 12.1 kg |
| Weight with cartridges: | 14.5 kg |
| Length: | 1620 mm |
| Barrel length: | 1085 mm |
| Number of grooves in the barrel: | 4 right-handed |
| Firing mechanism (USM): | Kurkovy |
| Operating principle: | Manual reload, wedge bolt |
| Fuse: | Flag, on the back of the receiver |
| Aim: | Front sight with front sight and constant sight |
| Effective range: | 300 m |
| Sighting range: | 400 m |
| Bullet muzzle velocity: | 1175-1210 m / s |
| Armor penetration at an angle of meeting 90 °: | for 300 m - 20 mm, for 100 m - 30 mm |
| Ammunition type: | Single-shot, boxes with 10 spare cartridges in each can be attached to each side of the receiver |
| Number of cartridges: | 1+(20) |
| Production years: | 1939–1941 |
History of creation and production
Germany's preparation for a new war led in the 1930s. to intensive development in the field anti-tank weapons... The constant improvement of the designs of tanks required weapons to fight them, which had not only good maneuverability, but also high efficiency in the fight against them, and in conditions when the armor was invariably strengthened. The development of anti-tank weapons in the Reich went in several ways: an increase in its power was achieved by increasing the initial velocity of the bullet while maintaining a normal rifle caliber (no more than 9 mm): the creation of a large-caliber PTR, as well as improving the armor-piercing action of the bullet itself, using new materials in its manufacture, including number of cermet alloys.
Concern engineer Gustloff werke Brower, developed his single-shot anti-tank rifle based on a special 7.92 mm "rifle" cartridge increased power with an oversized liner known as the Patrone 318. In 1938, the gun was put into service under the designation Pz.B.38.
The Pz.B.38, despite being single-charged, had a rather complex design: a vertically sliding wedge-shaped breechblock and a kind of monitor arrangement, in which the barrel, receiver and bolt group after a shot rolled back, opening the bolt and ejecting the sleeve.
The very first combat use of the Pz.B.38 PTR in Polish campaign 1939 revealed its many shortcomings: first of all big sizes and weight. In addition, numerous complaints were caused by the unreliability of the weapon.
After annoying reclamations from the troops, Brower was forced to almost completely redo his weapons, simplifying its design and at the same time significantly reducing the cost of production. The new anti-tank rifle was adopted by the German army at the end of 1939, under the name.
The new Pz.B.39 anti-tank rifle, also using the Patrone 318 cartridge, intended to combat enemy light tanks and armored personnel carriers at distances of up to 300-400 m, differed from its predecessor in lighter weight and dimensions, which made it almost equal in maneuverability to light machine guns ...
German armored gunner with a Pz.B.39 anti-tank gun in position The high fighting qualities of the anti-tank rifle, which it showed at the initial stage of the war, forced the German military industry to expand its wide production, before the end of production in November 1941, 39,232 pieces were produced. Production was halted due to the low efficiency of the Pz.B.39 against Soviet tanks. T-34 and KV-1, and some of the guns were later converted into grenade launchers Gr.B.39 for firing at heavily armored targets with a cumulative grenade. When creating the grenade launcher, the barrel of the Pz.B.39 gun was shortened, and a mortar was screwed onto its muzzle. For firing from a grenade launcher, over-caliber cumulative anti-tank grenades were used Gewehrpanzergranate 46 and Gewehrpanzergranate 61, whose armor penetration was 80–120 mm at distances of 75–150 m, respectively.
Variants and modifications
Design and principle of operation
The gun has the following main parts: a barrel with a receiver, a folding stock, a trigger frame with a loading handle, a bolt, a bipod and two magazines (firing boosters).
The barrel bore is locked with a wedge bolt, which moves vertically in the grooves of the receiver. From above, the shutter is closed by a flap, which is automatically thrown back when the shutter is opened.
The hammer-type hammer mechanism consists of a hammer with a mainspring and a striker with a striker. The firing mechanism is located in the bolt, and the mainspring is located in the trigger. The trigger is mounted at the top of the trigger frame. It consists of a trigger and a spring-loaded trigger.
When you turn the fire control handle (it is also the loading handle) down, the bolt is lowered, and together with the bolt, the trigger is also lowered. In this case, the combat platoon of the trigger comes behind the sear of the trigger lever. When the fire control handle is turned back, the bolt rises up, the trigger remains on the cocked, the mainspring is compressed.
The extraction and reflection of the spent cartridge case is carried out by an ejector. The liner is first pushed back by the ejector and then thrown out by the ejector spring.
The accidental firing safety is located at the back, on top of the receiver. When the fuse is turned on, it locks the trigger. To turn on the fuse, you need to turn its flag to the left, and the letter "S" opens. To turn off the fuse, the box turns to reverse side(to the right), thus the letter "F" opens. Protection against a premature shot is carried out by the handle latch, the tail of which locks the trigger when the barrel is not completely closed.
The shotgun has a powerful muzzle brake that absorbs about 60% of the recoil energy.
The bipod is located in the middle of the gun, in the stowed position it is folded and held by a rod, on which there is an annular groove.
The butt is metal, folding, hinged to the receiver and held by a latch. In the middle part, the butt has a window into which the spent cartridges fall after they are reflected. In the stowed position, the butt pivots forward and is held in the same way as the bipod. The length of the gun with the stock folded is 1255 mm.
The sight is rack-mountable, permanent, designed for shooting up to 400 m.
To increase the rate of fire, the gun is equipped with two magazines, which are attached to the receiver on the right and left sides (the magazines act as firing accelerators).
Combat use
According to the 1940 states, the Pz.B.39 was the main anti-tank defense weapon of the German infantry. Each infantry platoon had 1 anti-tank rifle, 3 in a company, 9 in a battalion, and 27 in a regiment. Total 8 infantry division consisted of guns. There were 83 of them in the motorized division, and 57 in the tank division. In 1941, in the infantry, motorized. mountain infantry and engineer-sapper companies each had one squad with three Pz.B.39 anti-tank rifles. One PTR was in motorcycle platoons and 11 in the reconnaissance company of the motorized division. In general, however, the Pz.B.38 and Pz.B.39 anti-tank rifles were used on a rather limited scale both in the French campaign of 1940 and slightly more in 1941-1942. on the Eastern Front, where they were used quite successfully, mainly against lightly armored targets. Already in the summer of 1941, the German infantry had to face Soviet tanks T-34 and Kv against which this weapon was ineffective. Heavy battles that the German infantrymen had to fight during the Soviet offensive near Moscow in the winter of 1941-1942. the entire anti-tank defense system turned out to be practically inactive. The anti-tank rifles that were in service with the Wehrmacht no longer met the requirements of the time.
Soviet soldiers examine captured trophies In this part, we will focus on the most massive and successful manufacturer of PTR in the entire Second World War.
the USSR
The development of the PTR in the USSR has been engaged since 1936. several large KB at once. As with the likely opponents, the development was carried out in parallel in several directions, namely:
Development of light PTR for powerful rifle caliber cartridges (7.62x122 and 7.62x155).
And the development of light PTR in more powerful calibers 12.7mm and 14.5mm
In the second half of the 30s, the Soviet command greatly overestimated the armor of the tanks of a potential enemy and immediately decided to design portable large-caliber anti-tank rifles of 20-25mm caliber. At the same time, severely limiting the developers in the mass of weapons - up to 35 kg. As a result, out of 15 samples reviewed before 1938. none were adopted. In November 1938. the requirements of the Chief Artillery Office, now a cartridge was ready for the new weapon, which had been developed since 1934.
The powerful 14.5x114 mm B-32 cartridge had excellent characteristics at that time. An armor-piercing incendiary bullet with a hot core and a pyrotechnic composition left the barrel at a speed of 1100 m / s and pierced 20mm of armor, at an angle of 70 degrees, at a distance of 300m.
In addition to the B-32, a BS-41 bullet appeared a little later with even more impressive results. The metal-ceramic core allowed the BS-41 bullet to penetrate 30mm armor at a distance of 350m, and from a distance of 100m the bullet pierced 40mm armor. Also, for the purpose of the experiment, a capsule with an irritating substance, chloroacetophenone, was placed in the bottom of the BS-41 bullet. But also the idea didn't really catch on.
The first rifle adopted for service under the new cartridge was the development of N.V. Rukavishnikov. Its PTR-39 was capable of firing about 15 rounds per minute and was successfully tested. However, the PTR-39 did not go into mass production. Head of GAU - Marshal G.I. Kulik, based on erroneous information about new German tanks with reinforced armor, concluded that the PTR and even 45mm cannons were unsuitable for dealing with new German tanks.
This decision (1940) actually left the Soviet infantryman without quite effective anti-tank weapons for June 1941. Let me remind you that on June 22, 1941. the main tank of the Wehrmacht was PzKpfw III different modifications- the frontal armor of the most modern of them was a maximum of 50mm, taking into account the overhead armor plates. The maximum armor of the turret and sides of the newest modification for 1941 was 30mm. That is, most of the tanks with a high degree of probability were hit by the 14.5mm cartridge from the PTR in almost any projection at distances of 300m or more.
This is not to mention the defeat of the tracks, optical devices, tanks and other vulnerable areas of the tank. At the same time, a huge number of German armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers were quite tough for the Soviet PTR, especially the "forty".
The PTR-39 of Rukavishnikov's design was not devoid of flaws - it was rather complicated and expensive to manufacture and sensitive to use. But nevertheless, given that with the beginning of the war, our army was left without any PTR and given that the ersatz rifle of Sholokhov (cal.12.7mm DShK) was used - a copy of the same one, only with a muzzle brake and shock absorber, this mistake cost Red Army.
In 1941. at a meeting of the State Defense Committee, I.V. Stalin ordered to urgently develop a new anti-tank gun for the Red Army. For reliability, the leader recommended to entrust the work to "one more, and preferably two" designers. In their own way, both coped with the task brilliantly - S.G. Simonov and V.A. Degtyarev, moreover, from the moment of receiving the assignment to the test firing, only 22 days passed.
PTRD
July 4, 1941 Degtyarev began the development of his PTR and already on July 14 transferred the project to production, 2 store versions of the PTR Degtyarev were considered on July 28 at the RKKA Small Arms Directorate. In order to speed up and simplify production, one of the options was proposed to be single-shot. Already in August 1941, the cartridge I mentioned with a BS-41 bullet from the Moscow Hard Alloys Plant arrived in time. And in October 1941. in the ranks of the Red Army, a new combat specialty appeared - an armor-piercer.
PTRD - Single-shot rifle with a longitudinally sliding rotary bolt. The rifled barrel was equipped with an active box muzzle brake. The bolt had two lugs, a simple percussion mechanism, a reflector and an ejector. In the butt there was a spring for damping recoil, which also plays the role of a returnable one. After the shot was fired, the bolt in the hitch with the barrel rolled back, the bolt handle turned against the copier profile attached to the butt, and when turned, unlocked the bolt. After stopping the barrel by inertia, the shutter retreated, and stood on the shutter delay, the sleeve was pushed by the reflector into the lower window.
The new cartridge was sent into the chamber and the bolt was locked by hand. Sights were carried out to the left and worked in two modes up to 400m and more than 400m. The calculation of the gun consisted of two people. The total mass of the PTR and ammunition was about 26 kg (the Degtyarev gun itself weighed 17 kg). For maneuverability, a carrying handle was placed on the gun. They carried the gun either both, or one soldier from the calculation. Only during 1942. Soviet defense industry gave the front nearly 185,000 anti-tank guns.
PTRS
Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov took a slightly different path. Based on his own developments (for example, AVS-36), he created an anti-tank rifle with gas-operated automatics. This made it possible to achieve an excellent practical rate of fire of 16 or more rounds per minute. At the same time, this increased the total weight of the weapon to 22kg.
Simonov's design looks, of course, much more complicated against the background of Degtyarev's design, nevertheless, it was simpler designs Rukavishnikov. As a result, both models were adopted.
So PTRS - Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 Simonov systems A weapon designed to combat enemy light and medium tanks at a distance of up to 500m. In practice, it was also used to destroy firing points, mortar and machine-gun crews, pillboxes, bunkers, low-flying aircraft and enemy manpower behind shelters at distances of up to 800m.
Semi-automatic weapons used to operate the automation by removing part of the powder gases from the barrel. The weapon is equipped with a three-position gas regulator... Food was carried out from an integral store with clips of 5 rounds. USM allowed only single fire. Locking - by tilting the bolt in the vertical plane, recoil compensation by means of a muzzle brake, softening nozzle on the butt. In this model, a special shock absorber was not needed, since the muzzle brake paired with the semi-automatic system itself was enough to reduce recoil, although the recoil of the ATRM is less noticeable.
In 1941. due to a rather complicated and laborious production process, only 77 ATGMs entered the troops, but already in 1942 production was established and 63,000 ATGMs were sent to the front. The production of anti-tank guns and anti-tank systems continued until 1945. During the war years in the USSR, about 400,000 PTR were produced.
The combat use of PTR also took place in the most different corners planets and after the end of WWII. Soviet anti-tank missiles successfully penetrated the armor of American tanks in Korea, as well as the armor of the M113 armored personnel carrier in Vietnam.
Some samples of Soviet anti-tank systems were seized from Palestinian militants in Lebanon. The author witnessed with his own eyes the Soviet PTR in a gun at the training base of the Givati infantry brigade in the Negev desert in Israel. The Israelis called this weapon "Russian Barrett".
The 14.5x114 cartridge is still alive and in service in many countries of the world.
During the Second World War, there were aces-armor-piercers who had on their account more than a dozen destroyed enemy tanks and even Luftwaffe aircraft. The weapon played a very significant role in the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany. Despite. that by 1943 it became extremely difficult to knock out a tank from an ATR, the weapon remained in service until 1945. until it was replaced by anti-tank rocket launchers.
Work was also underway to create a new PTR chambered for a more powerful cartridge, for example, 14.5x147mm with high penetration. To hit already medium tanks of the Wehrmacht of later series. But such weapons did not get into service, since by 1943 the Red Army infantry was fully equipped with anti-tank artillery. The production of anti-tank rifles was on the decline; by the end of the war, only 40,000 anti-tank weapons remained in service with the red army.
In terms of the aggregate of the main qualities - maneuverability, ease of production and operation, firepower and low cost, the Soviet anti-tank missile systems significantly surpassed the enemy's anti-tank weapons. It is worth noting that early series PTR were not devoid of operational problems. With the onset of the spring of 1942, both design flaws and urgently established production appeared, as well as the lack of proper knowledge regarding operation in the troops themselves.
But through the efforts of the designers and workers, the shortcomings were corrected in as soon as possible, and the troops began to receive detailed, but quite intelligible and simple instructions on the operation of the PTR. The designers Degtyarev and Simonov personally inspected the front-line units and observed the operation, collecting feedback from the armor-piercing soldiers. By the summer of the 42nd, the guns were finally finalized and became a very reliable weapon that works in any climatic conditions.
In conclusion of this part, I will quote the chief of staff of the 1st Baltic Front, Colonel-General V.V. Kurasova:
“In the course of the Great Patriotic War,” he wrote on October 30, 1944, “anti-tank guns were used in all types of combat to cover tank-hazardous areas both with whole subunits and in groups of 3-4 guns. In an offensive battle, PTRs were used in the likely directions of enemy counterattacks, being directly in the battle formations of the advancing infantry. In defense, the anti-tank missile systems were used in the most tank-hazardous areas as part of a platoon-company, echeloned in depth. The firing positions were selected taking into account the conduct of flanking fire, and in addition to the main ones, there were 2-3 reserve positions, taking into account the conduct of group fire with an all-round fire.
The experience of using anti-tank systems during the Patriotic War shows that they had the greatest effect in the period up to July 1943, when the enemy used light and medium tanks, and the battle formations of our troops were relatively poorly saturated with anti-tank artillery. Starting in the second half of 1943, when the enemy began to use heavy tanks and self-propelled guns with powerful armor protection, the effectiveness of the anti-tank missile system significantly decreased. From this time on, the main role in the fight against tanks was played by artillery. PTR, possessing good accuracy of fire, are now used mainly against firing points, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers of the enemy "
At the end of the Second World PTR, they smoothly turned into large-caliber sniper rifles... Although in some local conflicts, both the PTR of the Second World War and modern home-made ones, handicraft samples are used to combat lightly armored and other equipment, as well as enemy manpower.
In this article, not all samples are mentioned that belong to the PTR. Conventionally, the PTR can be divided into three categories - light (rifle calibers), medium (heavy machine gun caliber) and heavy (bordering on air cannons and anti-tank artillery). I practically did not touch on the latter because, in my understanding, they no longer resemble a "gun".
Separately, it is necessary to consider the class of "recoilless", the development of which began in the USSR at the very beginning of the 30s ...
But that's a completely different story.
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