7TP (siedmiotonowy polski - 7-ton Polish).
On September 1, 1939, that is, at the time of the German attack on Poland, the Polish tank fleet included 135 7TR tanks. The 7TR type tank was developed by Polish designers in 1933 on the basis of the English Vickers - 6 tons, the same one on the basis of which the Soviet T-26 was developed. The original design has been subject to significant changes. First of all, the power plant was replaced. Instead of an English carburetor engine, a Saurer diesel engine, mass-produced in Poland, was installed. The thickness of the armor was increased and the shape of the hull in the rear part was changed.
This caused an increase in weight and required strengthening of the chassis. After the production of several dozen combat vehicles in the English two-turret version, it was decided to produce tank with one turret, and the Swedish 37-mm Bofors anti-tank gun was chosen as the weapon. The same company also provided design documentation for the production of the tower. In addition to the cannon, the tank was also armed with a 7.92 mm Browning machine gun. A telescopic sight, a tank periscope for observing the battlefield and a radio station were installed. Overall, it was a good tank for its time, quite mobile and technically reliable.
In the early 30s, the Poles purchased about 50 Vickers 6-ton light tanks from Great Britain. As a result of a number of improvements, the 7TR light tank appeared, which was built from 1935 to 1939. The first model weighed 9 tons and had two turrets, each with a machine gun. The thickness of the hull was increased to 17 mm, and the turret to 15 mm. On March 18, 1935, the Ursus plant received an order for 22 double-turret tanks armed with 7.62 mm Browning machine guns. As power plant Instead of the English Armstrong-Siddley carburetor engine, a Saurer diesel engine with a power of 111 hp was used. With. In this regard, it was necessary to change the design of the hull above the power compartment.
A very interesting article about Poland and the beginning of the 2nd World War in the middle of the last century. Thanks to the authors
Poland at that time was a rather strange place. public education, quite roughly stitched together after the First World War from fragments of the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian empires with the addition of what she managed to grab during the Civil War and immediately after it (Vilna region - 1922), and even the Cieszyn region, grabbed for the occasion in 1938 during the partition of Czechoslovakia.
The population of Poland within the 1939 borders was 35.1 million people before the war. Of these, there were 23.4 million Poles, 7.1 million Belarusians and Ukrainians, 3.5 million Jews, 0.7 million Germans, 0.1 million Lithuanians, 0.12 million Czechs, well and approximately 80 thousand others.
Ethnic map of Poland
National minorities in pre-war Poland were treated, to put it mildly, not very well, considering Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Germans, Czechs as a fifth column of neighboring states, and I’m not even talking about the Poles’ love for Jews.
From an economic point of view, pre-war Poland was also by no means among the leaders.
But the leaders of the fifth largest and sixth most populous country in Europe sincerely considered their state to be one of the great powers, and they, of course, tried to pursue a policy accordingly - a great power one.
Polish poster from 1938
Polish Army at the pre-war parade
It seemed that geography itself suggested only two policy options - either to establish relations with at least one of the two strong neighbors, or try to create a coalition of small countries to resist these terrible monsters.
This is not to say that Polish rulers did not try this. But the trouble was that, upon its appearance, the newborn state pushed with its elbows so painfully that it managed to rob all, I repeat, all of its neighbors. The Soviet Union has “Eastern Kresy”, Lithuania has the Vilna region, Germany has Pomerania, Czechoslovakia has Zaolzie.
Polish Vickers E enters the Czechoslovakian Zaolzie, October 1938
There were also territorial disputes with Hungary. Even with Slovakia, which was formed only in March 1939, they managed to quarrel, trying to chop off a piece from it, which is why Slovakia turned out to be the only power other than Germany that declared war on Poland on September 1 and sent 2 divisions to the front. Maybe Romania didn’t get it, but the Polish-Romanian border was somewhere on the outskirts. Giving something away to improve relations is somehow not at all the Polish way.
And if your own strengths are not enough, naturally, you need to turn for support to those who, after the First World War, helped create this “ political news" - Polish Republic.
But the pre-war policy of both France and Great Britain showed that these countries did not want to get involved in a new war, and wanted the East of Europe to sort it out themselves, without interfering in any way. Attitude towards the Soviet state Western politicians was, to put it more precisely, very nervous, and many of them saw in their sweet dreams how someone would attack her. And here is a chance that the Germans will climb further to the east, or ours, without agreeing with the Fuhrer in advance, will rush to defend Western Belarus and Ukraine, which were then really dreaming of liberation from the Polish occupation. Well, as often happens in such cases, two armies moving towards each other will not be able to stop and will fight.
This means that Western Europe will be able to remain in peace for some time, watching how their restless eastern neighbors fight.
Although our future allies gave guarantees to Poland, and even confirmed that 15 days after the aggression of any power they would valiantly stand up to defend Poland. And what’s interesting is that they completely fulfilled their promise, actually standing on the German-French border, and standing there until May 10, 1940, until the Germans got tired of it and went on the offensive.
Rattling with solid armor of medals
The French went on a furious campaign.
Comrade Stalin waited for them for 17 days,
But the evil Frenchman does not go to Berlin.
But that's in the future. In the meantime, the task of the Polish leadership was to figure out how to protect the territory themselves from possible aggression from the west. It must be said that pre-war Polish intelligence was at a fairly high level; for example, it was she who revealed the secret of the famous German Enigma encryption machine. This secret, together with Polish codebreakers and mathematicians, then went to the British. Intelligence was able to timely reveal the grouping of the Germans and even determine their strategic plan with fairly high accuracy. Therefore, already on March 23, 1939, hidden mobilization began in Poland.
But that didn't help either. The length of the Polish-German border was then almost 1900 km, and the desire of Polish politicians to protect everything smeared the Polish Army, which was already almost twice as inferior to the German troops (on September 1, against 53 German divisions, the Poles managed to deploy 26 infantry divisions and 15 brigades - 3 mountain infantry , 11 cavalry and one armored motorized, or a total of 34 conventional divisions) along the entire future front.
The Germans, having concentrated 37 infantry, 4 light infantry, 1 mountain rifle, 6 tank and 5 motorized divisions and a cavalry brigade near the Polish border by September 1, on the contrary, created compact strike groups, achieving overwhelming superiority in the directions of the main attacks.
Yes and Combat vehicles that, as it was called then in our press, “landlord-bourgeois lordly” Poland, fully reflected the degree of development of the state. Some truly advanced developments for that time were in single copies, and the rest were fairly worn weapons left over from the First World War.
Of the 887 light tanks and wedges listed as of August (Poland had no others), approximately 200 were of some combat value - 34 “six-ton Vickers”, 118 (or 134, here in different sources in different ways) their Polish twin 7TP and 54 French Renaults with Hotchkisses of 1935. Everything else was very old and suitable only for police operations or display in museums.
Light tank 7TR produced in 1937
It is worth saying here that in the second half of the thirties a qualitative revolution took place in tank building. Due to the anti-tank guns that appeared in the infantry, which were inconspicuous, small and could be moved by crews across the battlefield on their wheels, all tanks built according to previous designs and having armor protection only from machine guns and infantry bullets suddenly turned out to be obsolete.
Designers and engineers from all leading countries got to work. As a result, slow, extremely inconvenient for their crews and clumsy, but well-armored French monsters appeared, although more convenient, but poorly armed and equally slow British Matildas and much more advanced Germans - Pz.Kpfw. III and Pz.Kpfw. IV. Well, our T-34 and KV.
The situation with aviation was no better for the Poles. 32 really new and very successful “Moose” (twin-engine bomber PZL P-37 “Los”, 1938) were lost against the background of outdated ones and about 120 “Karas” (light bomber PZL P-23 “Karas” 1934) that took the brunt of the attack With maximum speed 320 km/h, 112 aircraft were killed in battle) and 117 PZL P-11 - fighters developed in 1931-34 with a maximum speed of 375 km/h and two 7.7 mm machine guns - of which 100 aircraft were killed.
twin-engine bomber Panstwowe Zaklady Lotnicze PZL P-37 "Los"
Fighter Panstwowe Zaklady Lotnicze PZL P-11C
The speed of the then German "Dor" and "Emil" fighters - Messerschmitt Bf109D and Bf109E fighters - was 570 km/h, and each of them was armed with a pair of cannons and machine guns.
True, it is worth saying that the Wehrmacht in 1939 could not particularly boast of the latest developments. There were only 300 new tanks (T-3 and T-4), and T-1 and T-2, which formed the main strength of the German tank divisions, were pretty outdated by 1939. They were saved by the Czech “Pragues” (“Skoda” LT vz.35 and LT vz.38 “Praha”), of which the Germans got a lot.
But 54 not very successful “French” (in “Renault-35” and “Hotchkiss-35” there are only 2 crew members and the turret must simultaneously load and aim the cannon, shoot from it and the machine gun, observe the battlefield and command the tank) with anti-shell reservations against 300 German ones will still not be enough.
Light infantry escort tank Renault R 35
But the most important thing for any army is how it is led, and the troops were controlled in a typical Polish way, communication with the armies, corps and formations was constantly lost almost immediately after the start of the war, and the military and political elite were primarily concerned with their own salvation, and not with leadership troops. How the Poles managed to resist for a month under such conditions is a national mystery.
It is also a mystery how, in preparing for war, the Polish leadership did not worry about how it was actually going to lead. No, command posts Of course, they were equipped, and the furniture there was beautiful, but at the beginning of the war, the Polish General Staff had at its disposal only two radio stations and a few telephones for communication with the troops. Moreover, one radio station, which could hardly fit on ten trucks, was very large and very unreliable, and its transmitter was broken during an air raid on the second day of the war, while the second receiver was in the office of the Polish commander in chief, Marshal Rydz-Smigly, where it was not accepted to enter without a report
Marshal of Poland, Supreme Commander Polish army Edward Rydz-Śmigły (1886 - 1941)
But something had to be done, and the dashing plan “Zachud” (“West”, in Polish, was invented for the USSR; the plan “Wschud” (East) was being prepared for the USSR, the military in all countries was not very inventive) according to which the Polish Army had to, stubbornly defending the entire western and southern borders, carry out an offensive against East Prussia, for which deploy 39 infantry divisions and 26 border, cavalry, mountain infantry and armored mechanized brigades.
Polish infantry on the defensive. September 1939
It was possible to deploy, as mentioned above, 26 divisions and 15 brigades. To strike East Prussia, the operational groups “Narev”, “Wyszkow” and the “Modlin” army were assembled, a total of 4 divisions and 4 cavalry brigades, 2 more divisions were in the deployment stage. The “Pomože” army was concentrated in the “Polish corridor” - 5 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade. Part of the forces of this army was intended to capture Danzig, 95% of whose population was German. In the Berlin direction - the Poznan army - 4 divisions and 2 cavalry brigades, the borders with Silesia and Slovakia were covered by the Lodz army (5 divisions, 2 cavalry brigades), Krakow (5 divisions, cavalry, motorized armored and mountain infantry brigades and border guards) and "Karpaty" (2 mountain infantry brigades). In the rear, south of Warsaw, the Prussian army was deployed (before the start of the war, they managed to assemble 3 divisions and a cavalry brigade there).
The German plan, which they called “Weiss” (white), was simple and effective - preempting organized mobilization with a sudden invasion, concentric attacks from the north - from Pomerania and the south - from Silesia to general direction to Warsaw with two strike groups, simply called Army Groups “North” and “South”, to encircle and destroy Polish troops, located west of the Vistula-Narev line.
The advance of mobilization did not work out very well, but in the directions of the main attacks the Germans managed to achieve an overwhelming superiority in forces and means, which, of course, affected the overall result.
Dislocation of troops on 09/01/1939
With such a balance of forces, only mobility and coordination, which, for example, the Israelis showed in 1967, could save the Poles. But mobility, given the famous Polish impassability, the absence of vehicles and the dominance of German aviation in the skies, could only be achieved if the troops were not scattered along an endless 1,900-kilometer front, but were concentrated in advance in a compact group. There is no point in talking about any kind of coordination under the then Polish leadership, which valiantly rode closer to the neutral borders at the first shots.
The President, in his person saving the most important asset of Poland - its elite, left Warsaw on September 1. The government held out longer; it only left on the 5th.
The last order of the Commander-in-Chief came on September 10. After this, the heroic marshal did not make contact and soon showed up in Romania. On the night of September 7, he set off from Warsaw to Brest, where in the event of war with the USSR, according to the Vshud plan, the headquarters was supposed to be located. The headquarters turned out to be unequipped, it was not possible to properly establish contact with the troops, and the dashing Commander-in-Chief moved on. On the 10th, the headquarters was moved to Vladimir-Volynsky, on the 13th - to Mlynov, and on September 15th - closer to the Romanian border, to Kolomyia, where the government and the president were already located. In some ways, this jumping dragonfly reminds me of Winnie the Pooh saving his honey pots seven times during a flood.
Things were going badly at the front.
The first success was achieved by the German 19th Mechanized Corps, which struck from Pomerania to the east. 2 mechanized, tank and two infantry divisions attached to it, having overcome the resistance of the Polish 9th division and the Pomeranian cavalry brigade, by the evening of the first day they had covered 90 kilometers, cutting through the Pomože army. It was in this place, near Kroyants, that the most famous case clashes between Polish cavalrymen on horseback and German armored vehicles.
At 19.00, two squadrons (approximately 200 horsemen), led by the commander of the 18th regiment of Pomeranian lancers, attacked the German motorized infantry, who were resting with sabers. The German battalion, which did not take proper precautions, was taken by surprise and scattered across the field in panic. The cavalrymen, overtaking the fleeing ones, cut them down with sabers. But armored cars appeared, and these squadrons were almost completely destroyed by machine-gun fire (26 killed, more than 50 seriously wounded). Colonel Mastalezh also died.
Polish lancers attack
The well-known legends about dashing cavalry attacks with sabers drawn on tanks are the invention of the high-speed Heinz (Guderian), propagandists of the Goebbels department and post-war Polish romantics.
Polish lancers in a dashing attack on September 19 at Vulka Weglova chop noodles from inopportunely turned up but very scary German tanks
In 1939, the Polish cavalry actually carried out at least six mounted attacks, but only two of them were marked by the presence of German armored cars on the battlefield (September 1 at Krojanty) and tanks (September 19 at Wolka Weglowa), and in both episodes the direct the target of the attacking lancers was not armored vehicles enemy.
Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade near Bzura
On September 19, near Wólka Weglowa, Colonel E. Godlewski, commander of the 14th regiment of the Yazłowiec Uhlans, who was joined by a small unit of the 9th regiment of the Lesser Poland Uhlans of the same Podolsk brigade from the Poznan Army encircled to the west of the Vistula, hoping for the effect of surprise, made a decision use a cavalry attack to break through the positions of resting German infantry to Warsaw. But it turned out to be motorized infantry from a tank division, and artillery and tanks were nearby. The Poles managed to break through heavy enemy fire, losing 105 people killed and 100 wounded (20% of the regiment's personnel at that time). A large number of lancers were captured. The entire attack lasted 18 minutes. The Germans lost 52 killed and 70 wounded.
By the way, many laugh at the Polish passion for cavalry, but during this campaign the cavalry brigades, due to their mobility in the swampy-wooded Polish plain and better training and weapons than the infantry, turned out to be the most effective formations of the Polish Army. And they fought with the Germans mostly on foot, using a horse as a vehicle.
Polish cavalry
In general, the Poles fought bravely where they managed to get a hold, but they were poorly armed, and they were commanded in such a way that there are simply no words. There is no need to talk about any centralized supply given the German air supremacy and the chaos at the headquarters. And the lack of clear leadership of the troops quite quickly led to the fact that proactive commanders subjugated everything they could get their hands on and acted according to their own understanding, without knowing what their neighbor was doing, or the general situation, and without receiving orders. And if the order did arrive, then there was neither sense nor opportunity to carry it out due to the fact that the leadership, not receiving timely reports from the troops, had difficulty imagining the situation on the battlefield. This may be very Polish, but it does not contribute to success.
Already on September 2, the Pomože army, guarding the “corridor” that became the reason for the conflict, was cut into two parts by counter attacks from Pomerania and East Prussia, and the larger of them, the coastal one, found itself in a double ring of encirclement.
But the real disaster was brewing in the center, where on the second day of the war German tankers managed to find the junction of the Lodz and Krakow armies and the 1st Panzer Division rushed forward through the “Czestochowa gap” uncovered by troops, reaching the rear defensive line before those Polish units who were supposed to occupy it...
Not many people understand what a tank breakthrough is. Here is the best, from my point of view, description of what happens to the defending army:
“The enemy has realized one obvious truth and is using it. People take up little space in the vast expanses of the earth. To build a solid wall of soldiers would require a hundred million of them. This means that gaps between military units are inevitable. As a rule, they can be eliminated by the mobility of troops, but for enemy tanks, a weakly motorized army is as if motionless. This means that the gap becomes a real gap for them. Hence the simple tactical rule: “A tank division acts like water. It puts light pressure on the enemy’s defenses and advances only where it does not meet resistance.” And the tanks are pressing on the defense line. There are always gaps in it. Tanks always pass.
These tank raids, which we are powerless to prevent due to the lack of our own tanks, cause irreparable damage, although at first glance they cause only minor destruction (seizing local headquarters, cutting telephone lines, setting fire to villages). Tanks play a role chemical substances, which destroy not the body itself, but its nerves and lymph nodes. Where tanks flashed like lightning, sweeping away everything in their path, any army, even if it appeared to have suffered almost no losses, had already ceased to be an army. It turned into separate clots. Instead of a single organism, only organs that were not connected to each other remained. And between these clots - no matter how brave the soldiers are - the enemy advances unhindered. An army loses its fighting efficiency when it becomes a mass of soldiers.”
This was written in 1940 by the pilot of air group No. 2/33 long-range reconnaissance, French army captain Antoine de Saint-Exupéry.
German T-1 tanks (Light tank Pz.Kpfw. I) in Poland. 1939
And this is precisely what the Poles were to experience first in the 20th century. Having received a message that German tanks were already 40 km from Częstochowa, deep in the rear of his troops, on September 2, Commander-in-Chief Rydz-Śmigła ordered the troops of the Lodz Army defending in the central direction to be withdrawn to the main line of defense.
It was decided to withdraw the Krakow army to the east and southeast beyond the line of the Nida and Dunajec rivers (100 - 170 km). Its open northern flank was bypassed by the 16th Motorized Corps, the 22nd Motorized Corps, which broke through the covering troops on September 2, was moving from the south to Tarnow, and the 5th Panzer Division of the 14th Army captured Auschwitz (about 50 km from Krakow) and the army warehouses located there .
This made the defense of the central positions on the Wart pointless, but it was no longer possible to correct anything. It is easy to give an order, but it is very difficult to carry it out when troops are slowly moving on foot under the blows of German air power dominating the air along the famous Polish roads. The troops defending in the center simply could not retreat faster. The desire to protect everything played a bad joke - there were simply no reserves to plug all the holes, and those that were did not keep up with the rapidly changing situation and most of them were defeated on the march or during unloading, without having time to enter the battle.
It can be stated that by the evening of the second day of the war, the border battle was won by the Germans. In the north, the Pomože army located in the “Polish corridor” was cut and partially surrounded, and communication between Germany and East Prussia was established. In the south, the Krakow army, outflanked on two flanks, leaves Silesia, effectively eliminating the southern section of the Polish front and exposing the southern flank of the main defensive position, which the central group had yet to reach.
The 3rd Army advancing from East Prussia, having broken on the third day the resistance of the Modlin Army (two divisions and a cavalry brigade), which was literally crushed by the Germans in these battles and had lost its combat capability, created a thirty-kilometer gap in the Polish defense. The army commander, General Przedzimirski, decided to withdraw the defeated troops beyond the Vistula and try to put them in order there.
The pre-war Polish operational plan was thwarted.
The command and political leadership of Poland could not offer anything else, and one could only hope that the allies would feel ashamed and still help.
But they are allies - they won’t shed their blood for nothing for some Poles, they need to prove that you are not a freeloader, but a partner. And this doesn’t really reach the modern leaders of the “newly formed” states, let alone the politicians of the “Second Poland”. By that time, they were preparing to “go into exile” in order to heroically “lead” the Polish resistance from comfortable Parisian and then London mansions.
The Polish army and the Poles themselves were not yet going to surrender, and although the retreat that had begun almost along the entire front influenced the mood, the troops continued to fight.
The central group, tired of the marches, managed to retreat to Warta by September 4, without having time to gain a foothold, and was subjected to flank attacks. The Kresovaya Cavalry Brigade, which was covering the right flank, was knocked out of its position and retreated from the line. The 10th Division held out longer, but was also defeated. On the southern flank, the German 1st Panzer Division disorganized the improvised defenses and moved towards Piotkow, to the rear of the main position. Both flanks were open.
On September 5 at 18.15, the chief of staff of the Lodz army said: “The 10th Infantry Division has scattered, we are gathering it in Lutomirsk. Therefore, we leave the Warta - Vindavka line, which cannot be maintained... The situation is difficult. This is the end".
The army began to withdraw what was left to Lodz. The battle at the main position, practically without having begun, ended.
The main Polish reserve - the Prussian army (three divisions and a cavalry brigade), having discovered the Germans in Piotkow, in its rear, due to contradictory orders that sent its divisions piecemeal in different directions, and the panic that gripped the troops, simply disappeared into the thicket events without having almost any influence on their course.
With her disappearance, the last hope of the Polish command to seize the initiative also disappeared.
All Polish troops entered the battle. They were crushed by German tanks, aircraft and infantry. There were no more reserves. Hopes of gaining a permanent foothold on some lines were fading; the enemy's losses were not so great as to cause a crisis. The Allies, not intending to move anywhere, valiantly stood on the Maginot Line.
In the evening, the Polish Commander-in-Chief sent directives to the troops on a general retreat along the entire front in the general direction to the southeast, to the borders of allied Romania and Hungary, which was favorable to the Poles. The Polish president, government and deputies rushed there.
I have always been touched by the position of such politicians, who brought the country to defeat and rush to emigrate to “lead” the underground struggle, in the hope that they will be allowed to rule once more. And there are those who want to transfer power to them again.
Polish propaganda beat with fanfare: “Polish air raid on Berlin”, the Siegfried Line was broken in 7 places”...
But practically on September 5 the war was lost by the Poles. However, the Germans still had to complete it.
First, the surrounded part of the “Pomože” army was defeated. On September 5, Grudzenzh was taken, on the 6th - Bygdoszcz and Torun. 16 thousand Polish soldiers were captured and 100 guns were captured.
When the Germans entered Bygdoszcz (Bromberg) and Schulitz, it turned out that the Polish authorities carried out a massacre of Polish citizens of German nationality living in these cities. With this, the Poles opened another sad page of the Second World War, being the first to organize atrocities against civilians. Even on the eve of defeat, the Polish Nazis turned out to be incorrigible.
German residents of Bygdoszcza (Bromberg) - victims of the Polish genocide
There was no longer an organized Polish front before the 10th Army struck through the Czentkhov Gap. After reaching Tomausz Mazowiecki on September 6, she received orders to break through to the Vistula line. Having discovered a concentration of significant Polish forces south of Radom (these were retreating units of the Prussian and Lublin armies), the army, regrouping its forces, struck from its flanks two motorized corps that met east of Radom on September 9, encircled this group and destroyed it by September 12. 65 thousand people were captured, 145 guns were captured.The 16th motorized corps, advancing to the north, without encountering resistance, reached the southern outskirts of Warsaw by September 8.
In the south, having passed Krakow, which was surrendered to the Poles without a fight on September 5, the 14th Army reached Tarnow at the Dunajewiec River.
At the headquarters of Army Group South, the impression was that the Polish troops west of the Vistula were giving up the fight, and on September 7, all corps of the group received orders to pursue the Poles with maximum speed. On the 11th, the 14th Army of this group crossed the San River at Yaroslav and reached the upper reaches of the Dniester with its right flank.
Covering the northern flank of the 10th Army, the 8th Army occupied Lodz and reached the Bzura River.
German infantry crossing the Bzura River
The 3rd Army, advancing from East Prussia to the south, overcame the resistance of the Polish troops opposing it and crossed the Narew River. Guderian rushed to Brest, and the Kempf group covered Warsaw from the east, capturing Siedlice on September 11.
The 4th Army, based in Pomerania, reached Modlin, encircling Warsaw from the northeast.
It was a disaster...
Poland. September 1939
1.3.1. Polish campaign - tank warfare (Polish tanks)Poland - state and tactics of armored forces
By the time the Germans invaded Poland in 1939, the Polish army had 169 7TR tanks, 38 Vickers 6-ton tanks, 67 Renault FT-17 light tanks left over from the First World War, 53 Renault R- light tanks 35 (which were transferred to Romania without taking part in the battles), approximately 650 TK/TKS tankettes and about 100 various armored vehicles. It is clear that this modest force had no chance of defeating the Germans, armed with more than 3,000 tanks; As a result, most of the Polish armored vehicles were very quickly destroyed, and what survived fell into the hands of the Germans.
A significant role in the rapid defeat of the Polish armored forces was also played by the fact that in battles the Poles used their tanks according to the French model. They distributed all available armored forces among infantry and cavalry units, reducing their importance to exclusively tactical - that is, supporting infantry and cavalry on the battlefield. There was no talk of any tank units larger than a battalion in the Polish army (as well as in the French). Thus, in the use of tanks on the battlefield, the Poles could not match the Germans, who used powerful “armored fists,” however, the equipment that was in service with the Polish army could only be used for a similar purpose. So the Polish Army tried to use the available armored forces with the highest possible efficiency for their then state.
Polish armored vehicles
Like most troops of other countries, the Polish army used foreign tanks for a long time. The first tanks appeared among the Poles back in 1919 - these were the French Renault FT-17, which proved themselves to be excellent during the First World War. They formed the basis of the Polish tank forces until 1931, until the need arose to replace these outdated vehicles.
In 1930, the Polish delegation signed a contract with Great Britain for the supply of 50 Vickers Mk.E tanks ("Vickers 6-ton"). The tank made a positive impression on the Poles, but it had a number of shortcomings - thin armor, weak armament, consisting only of machine guns, and an unreliable engine. In addition, the tanks were very expensive: the cost of one Mk.E was 180,000 zlotys. In this regard, in 1931, the Polish government decided to develop its own tank based on it. This is how the most successful combat vehicle of the Polish army appeared - the 7TR light tank.
Light tank Renault FT-17
The French tank Renault FT-17 was the most mass tank 1st World War and, in addition, the most belligerent. He performed well in battles and was extremely popular. That is why this tank was widely used in the armies of the world - the military of both European and Asian countries willingly purchased it. Polish tanks Renault FT-17s appeared in service with Pilsudski's legionnaires in 1919 and were used in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. But by 1939, the famous “French” were hopelessly outdated: suffice it to say that the maximum possible speed of movement did not even reach 10 km/h! There was no need to talk about the combat effectiveness of such tanks in the new conditions, and the Poles did not even try to produce them.
The tank had a simple hull, assembled on a frame made of metal corners. The chassis consisted of four bogies - one with three and two with two small-diameter rollers on board. Suspension - on leaf springs. The drive wheel was located at the rear, and the guide wheel at the front. The tank was equipped with a Renault carburetor engine (35 hp). Speed - up to 7.7 km/h. The armament, housed in a rotating turret, consisted of a 37 mm cannon or machine gun. The crew consisted of only 2 people. The thickness of the vertically located armor parts is 18 millimeters, and the roof and bottom are 8 millimeters. Combat weight 6.5 tons. 
Vickers Mk.E
The Vickers Mk.E, also commonly known as the Vickers Six Ton, was a British light tank from the 1930s. Created by Vickers-Armstrong in 1930. It was offered to the British Army, but was rejected by the military, so almost all tanks produced were intended for export. In 1931-1939, 153 Vickers Mk.E tanks were produced. In many countries that purchased this tank, it served as the basis for their own developments, the production of which was sometimes many times greater than the production of the base vehicle. In particular, 38 Vickers Mk.E tanks were used in the Polish Army against the German army (according to the contract, the Poles were supposed to receive 50 of these vehicles, but 12 of them never arrived in Poland).
Combat weight, t 7
Layout: double-tower
Crew, people 3
Case length, mm 4560
Case width, mm 2284
Height, mm 2057
Ground clearance, mm 380
Booking
Body forehead, mm/deg. 5-13
Hull side, mm/deg. 5-13
Hull feed, mm/deg. 8
Armament
Machine guns 2 × 7.92 mm Browning
Engine power, l. With. 91.5
Highway speed, km/h 37
Cruising range on the highway, km 120
Light tank 7TR
7TR was built from 1935 to 1939. The first model had two turrets, each with a machine gun. The thickness of the hull was increased to 17 mm, and the turret to 15 mm. On March 18, 1935, the Ursus plant received an order for 22 double-turret tanks armed with 7.62 mm Browning machine guns. Instead of the English Armstrong-Siddley carburetor engine, a Saurer diesel engine with a power of 111 hp was used as a power plant. With. In this regard, it was necessary to change the design of the hull above the power compartment. The next model had one Swedish-made turret with a 37 mm Bofors cannon and a 7.92 mm machine gun. It was these single-turret 7TPs that became the most successful tanks of the Polish armed forces.
The crew of the 7TR tank consisted of 3 people. The driver was located in the front of the hull on the right, the commander was in the turret on the right, and the gunner was in the turret on the left. Observation devices were simple and few in number. The sides of the towers had two viewing slits protected by armored glass, and telescopic sights were installed next to the machine guns. The driver only had a front double-leaf hatch, in which an inspection slot was also cut out. Periscope devices were not installed on double-turret tanks.
The Swedish 37-mm Bofors cannon, mounted on the single-turret 7TR, had high combat qualities for its time and was capable of hitting almost any tank. At a distance of up to 300 meters, an armor-piercing projectile penetrated armor up to 60 mm thick, up to 500 meters - 48 mm, up to 1000 meters - 30 mm, up to 2000 meters - 20 mm. The armor-piercing projectile weighed 700 grams and developed an initial speed of 810 m/s. The practical range was 7100 meters, the rate of fire was 10 rounds per minute.
Combat weight, t 11
Crew, people 3
Length 4990
Width 2410
Height 2160
Armor, mm: up to 40
Speed (on highway), km/h 32
Cruising range (on highway), km/h 160
Wall height, m 0.61
Ditch width, m 1.82 
Wedge heel TKS
TK (TK-3) and TKS - Polish wedge (small reconnaissance turretless tank) from the Second World War. Developed on the basis of the British Carden Loyd wedge chassis. The TK was produced starting in 1931. In 1939, the tankette began to be re-equipped with a 20 mm cannon, but before the start of the war, only 24 units managed to be modernized. TKS have also been used as armored tires.
Weight, kg: 2.4/2.6 t
Armor: 4 – 10 mm
Speed, km/h: 46/40 km/h
Engine power, hp: 40/46 l/s
Cruising range, km: 180 km
Main armament: 7.92 mm wz.25 machine gun
Length, mm: 2.6 m
Width, mm: 1.8 m
Height, mm: 1.3 m
Crew: 2 (commander, driver)
Modifications
TK (TK-3) - about 280 produced since 1931.
TKF - TK wedge with 46 hp engine. (34 watt); About 18 were produced.
TKS - improved model of 1933; About 260 units were produced.
TKS with 20 mm gun - about 24 TKS were equipped with the 20 mm gun in 1939.
C2P - unarmed light artillery tractor, approximately 200 produced.
Combat use
By the beginning of the invasion of Poland in 1939, the Polish army managed to mobilize 650 tankettes. A German tank officer captured in the early days of the war appreciated the speed and agility of the Polish wedge, saying: “... it is very difficult to hit such a small cockroach with a cannon.”
In September 1939, Polish tanker Roman Edmund Orlik, using a TKS wedge with a 20-mm gun, together with his crew, knocked out 13 German tanks (including presumably one PzKpfw IV Ausf B). 
Armored car Wz.29
Samochód pancerny wz. 29 - “armored car model 1929” - Polish armored car of the 1930s. The first armored car of a completely Polish design, wz.29, was created by designer R. Gundlach on the chassis of the Ursus A truck in 1929. In 1931, the Ursus plant, which supplied the chassis, and the Warsaw Central Automobile Workshops, which supplied the armored hulls, assembled 13 armored vehicles of this type. The Wz.29 remained in Polish service until the outbreak of World War II. On September 1, 1939, the troops still had 8 units, which were actively used in the September battles, during which all were lost or destroyed by the crews in order to prevent capture by the enemy.
Combat weight, t 4.8
Crew, people 4
Number of issued, pcs 13
Dimensions
Case length, mm 5490
Case width, mm 1850
Height, mm 2475
Base, mm 3500
Track, mm 1510
Ground clearance, mm 350
Booking
Armor type: rolled steel
Body forehead, mm/deg. 6-9
Hull side, mm/deg. 6-9
Hull feed, mm/deg. 6-9
Armament
Caliber and brand of 37 mm SA 18 gun
Ammunition for gun 96
Machine guns 3 × 7.92 mm "Hotchkiss"
Ammunition for machine guns 4032
Engine type: in-line 4-cylinder carburetor liquid-cooled Ursus 2A
Engine power, hp 35
Wheel formula 4 × 2
Highway speed, km/h 35
Cruising range on the highway, km 380
Climbability, degrees. 10
Fordability, m 0.35
By the end of 1938, the company Dzial Silnikowy PZlzn presented its project. (DS PZlzn.). This project is significantly different from others in that the engineers of DS PZlzn. (lead engineer Eduard Habich) decided not to follow exactly the instructions of the Armament Committee regarding tactical and technical data, but created an original concept of a medium tank based on their own developments. The fact is that this company developed “high-speed tanks” for the Polish Army on a Christie-type suspension. In 1937, an experimental 10TP tank was created, similar in its characteristics to the Soviet BT-5 tanks, and in 1938, the development of a cruising tank with reinforced armor and armament 14TR began. Based on the developments under the 14TP project, the “сzołgu średniego” version was created, submitted to the armament committee.
Compared to the 14TR project, the “medium tank” had a slightly longer hull, significantly increased armor (frontal armor 50 mm for the first version and 60 mm for the last), and a powerful engine of 550 hp was supposed to be installed. or a pair of 300 hp engines, which was supposed to provide the tank with a speed of up to 45 km/h. As for weapons, instead of the initially planned installation of a 47mm anti-tank gun (as on the 14TR), it was decided to use a 75mm gun, created on the basis of the anti-aircraft Wz. 1922/1924 with a barrel length of 40 calibers, which also had a small recoil, which made it possible to place it in a compact turret. Such a weapon had very high armor penetration and was suitable both for fighting tanks and for destroying long-term fortifications. An expanded turret was designed for this gun, and the designers abandoned small turrets, replacing them with machine guns mounted on the front and coaxial with the gun.
If this project had been implemented before 1940, Poland would have received perhaps the most powerful medium tank in the world, with armor close to contemporary heavy tanks.
At the beginning of 1939, BBT. Br. Panc. presented a new project for its tank in two versions. While maintaining the general layout, the engineers changed the purpose of the tank - it became a high-speed, specialized tank for combating armored targets. The company refused to use a 75mm infantry gun; instead it was proposed to use a 40mm semi-automatic or 47mm anti-tank gun. Having offered an option with a 500-horsepower gasoline engine (or a twin 300-horsepower engine), the developers expected that their tank would reach a speed of 40 km/h on the highway. The armor was increased to 50 mm (frontal part of the hull). A new smaller turret for the 40mm gun and a different version of the chassis were also developed. The weight of the designed tank increased to the maximum allowed by the second edition of the Armaments Committee requirements of 25 tons.
Although the projects of the companies DS PZlzn. and BBT. Br. Panc. were not rejected by the Armament Committee (for the DS PZlzn. at the beginning of 1939, funds were even allocated to create a full-size wooden model), much more attention was paid to the revised project of the Committee specialists (KSUST). Based on an analysis of BBT companies' proposals. Br. Panc. and DS PZlzn., engineers working in the Armaments Committee, presented a new project at the end of 1938. Having retained the basic layout (including the three-turret design), as well as the 75mm gun mod. 1897 as the main armament, they redesigned the engine compartment and the rear part of the hull following the example of the BBT project. Br. Panc., and instead of a 320-horsepower diesel engine, they decided to use a pair of 300-horsepower gasoline engines, as suggested by specialists from DS PZlzn., which made it possible to achieve the same speed parameters as those of the competitor. It was also decided to bring the project in terms of armor to 50mm (front of the hull). All this was supposed to weigh 23 tons, but later the design weight was increased to 25 tons.
The Polish military expected to begin testing a prototype tank in 1940, but World War II prevented these plans from being realized. By the beginning of the war, work had progressed most successfully at the company DS PZlzn., which made a wooden model of the tank. According to some reports, this model was destroyed when the Germans approached, just like the unfinished experimental tank 14TR.
By the time the Germans captured Poland in 1939, the Polish army had 169 7TR tanks, 50 Vickers 6-ton tanks, 67 Renault light tanks. F.T.-17, remaining from the First World War, 53 Renault light tanksR-35 (which were transferred to Romania without taking part in the battles), approximately 700 TK tankettes/TKS, 100 different armored vehicles. Since they were opposed by more than 3,000 German tanks, most of the Polish armored vehicles were very quickly destroyed, and what remained fell into German hands.
Sources:
1. based on materials from the site wartanks.ru
2. based on materials from the site weu1918-1939.pl
3. based on materials from the site zielp.pl
4.
MagnuskiJ.Czołgśredni 20/25TP //NowaTechnikaWoiskova, 2006, No. 9.
5. Comp. Kholyavsky G. L. Complete encyclopedia of tanks of the world. 1915 – 2000 – Minsk, Harvest LLC, 2006. – 576 p., ill.
FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF POLISH BTV
At the end of the First World War, the Polish army was in third place in terms of the number of tanks it had. In the spring of 1919, the first Polish army was formed in France. tank regiment. When he arrived in Poland in June, he had 120 lungs French tanks"Renault" FT. Individual companies or even platoons of these tanks took part in the Soviet-Polish War of 1920. By the end of it, there were still 114 combat-ready tanks left. In October 1921, a combined tank company took part in the occupation of Upper Selesia.
Since 1926, the Technical Directorate of the Ministry of Military Affairs (MS Wojsk.) had an armored vehicles department that performed advisory functions. In January 1929, this department was turned into a “patronage”, to which all relevant departments of various departments were subordinated. And on November 23, 1930, the Command of the Armored Forces (Dowodztwo Broni Pancernich DBP) was organized with the rights to manage MS Wojsk. It was engaged, first of all, in training tank crews. In 1936, this Command was given equal rights with the directorates of the main branches of the ground forces. In particular, it created a department for technical support of armored forces, which, among other things, oversaw the issue of motorization of the army as a whole. And finally, in 1937, three territorial directorates of armored forces were created.
The command of the armored forces was initially subordinated to a tank regiment stationed in Zhuravitsa near Przemysl (three battalions of three companies each), five squadrons of armored vehicles and two divisions of armored trains. In 1930-1934. All armored units were combined into three mixed armored regiments. In 1934, they were disbanded and all armored units were consolidated into independent companies and squadrons.
In 1937, there were six battalions in the armored forces: in Warsaw, Zhurawica, Poznan, Brest nad Bug, Krakow and Lvov and two separate companies in Vilna and Bydgoszcz. A year later, these latter were also deployed to battalions in Lutsk and Sgierzha.
By this time, the regular strength of the armored forces was 415 officers, more than two thousand non-commissioned officers and 3,800 privates. In 1938, however, there was a shortage of 14% of non-commissioned officers.
The organization of the battalion was as follows: headquarters and control, command platoon; companies: training, tank, armored vehicles, motorized infantry and supply, communications platoon. The battalion's staff strength is 36 officers, 186 non-commissioned officers and 409 privates, as well as 12 officials. These battalions were more in the nature of training rather than combat units. In case of mobilization, they must be deployed into combat units.
However, this organization did not last long. And in 1939, shortly before the start of the war, four battalions: the 1st, 4th, 5th and 8th each had three companies of reconnaissance tanks (actually wedges) and a squadron of armored vehicles. Other battalions had a reinforced composition, and the 2nd could even be considered a regiment, since it consisted of 185 combat vehicles, i.e. tanks, wedges and armored vehicles.
The increase in the number of battalions led to a decrease in their combat strength. Third platoons were abolished in companies of tankettes and squadrons of armored vehicles, as a result of which the number of tankettes in companies decreased from 16 to 13, and B A in squadrons from ten to seven.
Only in 1939 did the Tenth Motorized Cavalry Brigade move from the Directorate of Cavalry to the Ministry of Military Affairs and was subordinated to the Command of the Armored Forces. The brigade consisted of the 10th regiment of mounted riflemen and the 24th regiment of lancers (from here it is clear that the brigade was far from motorized). In addition, the brigade included reconnaissance and anti-tank (AT) divisions, a communications squadron and a traffic control platoon. Only upon mobilization, the brigade was assigned a motorized artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a battery of anti-aircraft guns, and an aviation detachment. But, most importantly, the brigade received tank units created on the basis of the 2nd tank battalion in Zhuravitsa.
In the Polish Armed Forces, armored troops (BTV) belonged to the technical branch of the military. Their task was to support infantry and cavalry in joint actions with them. The only two motorized formations - the 10th Cavalry Brigade and the Warsaw Armored Motorized Brigade (as we translated the Polish - Warszawska Brygada Pancerno Motorowa W.B.P.-M.) were extremely poorly equipped with armored vehicles, but well equipped with artillery (including anti-tank) and especially with infantry weapons.
What was the organization of the 10th Cavalry Brigade (10. Brygada Kawalerii Zmotoryzowanej - 10 VK) according to wartime staff?
It included: a command and supply squadron, two motorized regiments (but four linear squadrons, a machine-gun squadron and reinforcement units), divisions: reconnaissance, artillery, anti-tank, engineer battalion and communications squadron; companies: light and reconnaissance tanks, air defense battery and rear services.
The combat vehicles were part of the 121st company of light tanks - from three platoons but five Vickers E tanks, plus the company commander's tank (a total of 16 tanks, 10 of them with a cannon, six with machine guns, 114 personnel); 101st company of reconnaissance tanks (two platoons and six TK-3 or TKS tankettes - a total of 13 tankettes and 53 personnel); squadron of reconnaissance tanks of the reconnaissance division (two platoons of six tankettes, a total of 13 and 53 personnel).
Thus, the 10th Cavalry Brigade had 16 Vickers E tanks and 26 tankettes, four 100 mm howitzers, four 75 mm guns, 27 - 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, four 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and more than four thousand personnel.
After the successful actions of the 10th Cavalry (Motorized) Brigade during the 1937 maneuvers, the High Command decided to create another motorized brigade. At that time, the 2nd Cavalry Division (CD) was reorganized, which included the 1st Cavalry Brigade, called the Warsaw Brigade. Its two regiments - mounted riflemen and shvolezhers, during the liquidation of the 2nd CD in February 1939, became part of the Mazowieckian Cavalry Brigade.
In June, it was decided to motorize one regiment, and soon another, and complete the creation of a motorized brigade by August 15, called the Warsaw Armored Motorized Brigade. Colonel Stefan Rowecki (died in 1944) was appointed its commander. The formation of other units of the brigade began: an artillery battalion, a battalion of sappers, a anti-tank battalion and others. And when the war began on September 1, the organization of the brigade was in full swing. The equipment of the units was still far from wartime levels. The brigade received orders to leave Warsaw. On the 2nd she surrendered her last horses. But the Vickers E slippers she was given have not yet arrived. On September 3, an order was received to take up defensive positions at the Vistula crossings, which was carried out the next day. The 12th company of light tanks (16 Vickers E tanks) (instead of the battalion required) joined the brigade only on September 13th.
The transfer of parts of the Polish army to wartime organization (mobilization) began immediately after the occupation of the Czech Republic by German troops (March 15, 1939), in which, in particular, Poland participated by occupying the Cieszyn region.
The mobilization of armored weapons took place in four stages:
I - March 23 - the 91st Tank Division (T d-n) was formed for the Novogrudek Cavalry Brigade.
II - August 13 - 21st tank division (for the Volyn cavalry brigade), 101st and 121st reconnaissance tank companies for the 10th motorized cavalry brigade.
III - August 23 - 1st battalion of light tanks, seven tank divisions, 11th and 12th companies and a squadron of tanks for W.B.P.-M., twelve companies of reconnaissance tanks and armored trains.
IV - August 27 - 2nd tank battalion, two tank divisions and three companies of reconnaissance tanks.
On September 1, 1939, the 21st battalion of light tanks, three companies of low-speed tanks and two armored trains did not have time to fully mobilize.
Below is the structure of armored units by wartime states:
Organization of the Warsaw Armored Motorized Brigade (Warszawska Brygada Pancerno-Motorowa WB.P. M)
Headquarters and headquarters company: two cavalry regiments, each with four linear squadrons, reconnaissance and heavy weapons squadrons. The reconnaissance squadron has a platoon of tankettes (six vehicles).
Divisions: reconnaissance (13 tankettes as part of the reconnaissance squadron), artillery (four - 75 mm guns, four - 100 mm howitzers), anti-tank (24 - 37 mm guns).
Sapper battalion.
12th company of light tanks (3 platoons of 5 tanks each). Total: 4 officers, 87 privates, 16 Vickers Yo tanks
11th company of reconnaissance tanks - 13 TKS (of which four with a 20-mm cannon), 91 people. personnel.
Communications squadron.
Air defense battery - four 40 mm cannons.
Rear units.
In total, the brigade has 5,026 personnel in wartime personnel, including 216 officers, 16 light tanks, 25 tankettes, eight field guns, 36 - 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, four 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, 713 vehicles.
The organization of peacetime brigades did not at all resemble the structure of a combat unit. Their mobilization was difficult, because the units that came to their composition upon mobilization came from five different districts and, in addition, were subordinate to various departments and commands.
Light tank battalion
(Batalion CzotgowLekkich – BCL)
Headquarters and headquarters company with a communications platoon and an anti-aircraft machine gun squad (four machine guns) - 105 people. One tank.
Three tank companies, three tank platoons of five tanks each, a company commander’s tank. Personnel – 83 people. (four officers). 16 tanks.
Company Maintenance– 108 people
In total there are 462 people in the battalion. personnel, including 22 officers. 49 7TR tanks.
Battalions No. 1 and No. 2.
The structure of the 21st light tank battalion, armed with R35 tanks, was somewhat different.
Headquarters and headquarters company – 100 people.
Three tank companies with four tank platoons (three tanks each) and a company commander’s tank. In total, the company has 13 R35 tanks and 57 people. personnel, including five officers.
Maintenance Company
– 123 people personnel and six reserve R35 tanks.
There are 394 people in the battalion. personnel, 45 R35 tanks.
Armor division
(Dyvizjon Pancerny) The divisions were part of the cavalry brigades and consisted of: headquarters squadron - 50 people; a squadron of reconnaissance tanks consisting of two platoons and six tankettes. Total – 53 people. personnel, 13 tankettes;
squadron of armored vehicles (two platoons) - 45 people. personnel, seven BA;
maintenance squadron - 43 people. personnel.
There are 191 people in the division in total. personnel, including 10 officers, 13 tankettes and seven BA.
Division numbers: 11th, 21st, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 51st, 61st, 62nd, 71st, 81st and 91st.
Separate company of reconnaissance tanks
(Samodzielna Kompania Czotgow
Rozpoznawczych SKCR) Control board – 29 people, one wedge.
Two platoons of six tankettes, 15 people each. personnel. Technical platoon – 32 people. Total: 91 people. personnel (four officers), 13 tankettes.
Numbers of individual companies of reconnaissance tanks: 31st, 32nd, 41st, 42nd, 51st, 52nd, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 71st, 72nd, 81st, 82nd, 91st and 92nd. There are 15 companies in total.
At the end of August 1939, the 12th and 121st companies of Vickers E light tanks were formed, with 16 vehicles each, and after the start of the war the 111th, 112th and 113th light tank companies were formed (Kompania Czo1 "^<>w Lekkich – KCL) 15 Renault FT tanks each.
The company of Renault FT tanks had a control platoon - 13 people, three tank platoons and five tanks (13 people) and a technical platoon. Total 91 people. personnel, including officers.
On September 4 and 5, 1939, the 1st and 2nd light tank companies of the Warsaw Defense Command were formed with 11 7TR tanks (apparently just from the factory floors).
Distribution of armored vehicles according to the mobilization plan
Wartime combat units were to consist of 130 light tanks (7TR and Vickers), 45 light tanks "Renault" R35, 45 so-called low-speed "Renault" FT, 390 tankettes TK-3 and TKS, as well as 88 armored vehicles mod. . 1929 and arr. 1934, i.e. a total of 698 armored units. To this should be added 56 (16 Renault FT and 40 TK-3) as part of armored trains. If you look at the distribution by types of troops, only 195 tankettes were provided for operations in infantry formations (i.e. 28% of the total), in cavalry - 231 units (33%), 188 (27%) in reserve units and only eighty-four or 12% in motorized formations. The total number of armored forces upon mobilization was to be 1,516 officers, 8,949 non-commissioned officers and 18,620 privates, i.e. a total of 29,085 people. Of these, the crews of combat vehicles numbered about 2,000 people. We see that the percentage of tank crews compared to the total number of armored units was very low (about 6%). Also, a small percentage were combat vehicles from the total number of cars and motorcycles in these units.
Since mobilization was not completed at the beginning of the war, wartime staffing levels were not reached. Many reservists remained in reserve units, and reserve No. 1 was supposed to replenish battalions and companies of light tanks, reserve No. 2 served to replenish tank divisions, and reserve No. 3 was to replenish companies of reconnaissance tanks - i.e., tankettes.
It is noteworthy that according to the plan, all these small units - battalions, divisions, companies - were scattered across army operational formations. This is what it was supposed to look like according to plan.
The separate operational group "Narev" received armored divisions (BD) No. 31 and No. 32.
The Modlin Army, which covered Warsaw from the north from East Prussia, received the 11th and 91st armored divisions, the 62nd and 63rd separate companies of reconnaissance tanks (ORRT).
The Pomoże Army (which was supposed to prevent the unification of German units from East and West Prussia in the so-called “Polish Corridor”) received the 81st armored division and the 81st separate company of reconnaissance tanks.
Army "Poznan" - 62nd and 71st armored divisions, 31st, 71st, 72nd and 82nd separate companies of reconnaissance tanks.
Army "Lodz" - 21st and 61st armored divisions, 32nd, 41st, 42nd, 91st and 92nd separate companies of reconnaissance tanks.
Army "Krakow" - 10th armored cavalry brigade (with 101st and 121st separate companies of reconnaissance tanks and a tank squadron), 51st armored division, 51st, 52nd and 61st separate companies of reconnaissance tanks.
At the junction of the Lodz and Krakow armies, a reserve army was stationed with the 1st and 2nd battalions of light tanks and the 33rd armored division.
In the reserve of the Supreme High Command were the Warsaw Armored Motorized Brigade (with the 11th and 12th separate companies of reconnaissance tanks and a tank squadron), the 21st battalion of light tanks and the 111th, 112th, 113th companies of "low-speed" tanks (" Renault" FT).
In reality, this plan was not fully implemented. During the war, several improvised units were created, formed from surplus equipment. Training tanks of the 3rd battalion and the training center of the armored forces entered the company of the tank detachment of the Warsaw Defense Command. This detachment also included new 7TR tanks arriving from the factory, as well as tankettes from the training center. In total, the detachment consisted of 33 armored units.
From the remnants of the peacetime 12th Tank Battalion, a half-company of six Renault R3.5 tanks was created. From the personnel of the same 12th battalion, the 21st battalion of light tanks was formed, consisting of 45 Rono R35 tanks that had just arrived from France. From the 2nd training battalion, two platoons with four tanks each were created.
It is possible that obsolete vehicles such as the NC-I (24 units were purchased at one time), M26/27 (five units) and the Italian FIAT 3000, as well as prototypes of Polish tanks were also used in some military clashes . It is known that the TKS-L self-propelled gun took part in the defense of Warsaw). Several captured armored units were also used. So, on September 21, near Laszczowka, the Poles used two captured German tanks. Let's talk about a few more improvisations, i.e. about armored heavy trucks. Two such "Polish FIAT 621" trucks received guns and machine guns from the sunken destroyer "Mazur" -
Thus, during the September battles, Polish troops had: 152 light tanks 7TR and Vickers, 51 light tanks Renault R35, three H35, 45 Renault FT, 403 TK-3 and TKS and 88 armored vehicles mod. 1929 and arr. 1934. Total 742 armored units. To these you can add another 14 armored trains. Everything was sent into battle. There were no reserves left. And there was nothing to replace combat and technical losses with.
Only light tanks 7TP, Vickers and R35, which made up less than a quarter of all armored vehicles, could be considered more or less full-fledged. Wedges could only be used where they did not encounter enemy anti-tank defenses or armored vehicles. The combat value of the VA and Renault FT tanks was practically zero. The technical condition of Polish armored units left much to be desired. This is, apparently, why losses of armored units due to technical reasons exceeded combat losses.
ARMORED VEHICLES
Questions technical equipment The Polish army was dealt with by the Komitet do Spraw Uzbrojenia i Sprzetu - KSUS (Committee on Armament and Equipment), which was part of the Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych MS Wojsk. (Ministry of Military Affairs).
The Dowodztwo Broni Pancernich DBP (Command of the Armored Forces) has always expressed its views regarding armored vehicles.
R&D was carried out by Biuro Konstrukcyjne Broni Pancernich Wojskowego Instytutu Badan Inzynierii V K Br. Rape. WIBI (Design Bureau of Armored Vehicles of the Military Institute of Technical Research).
WIBI was reorganized in 1934 and tank building issues were taken over by Biuro Badan Technicznych Broni Pancernich - BBT Br. Rape. (Bureau of Technical Research of the Armored Forces).
The production of combat vehicles, their modernization, and the production of prototypes were carried out by:
Panstwowe Zaklady Inzynierii PZInz. State engineering plants in Czechowice - (Czechowice), with experimental workshops in "Ursus" - at the automobile plant in Warsaw, and Centralne Warsztaty Samochodowe - CWS (Central Automotive Workshops in Warsaw).
Tests of armored vehicles were carried out by:
Biuro Studiow PZInz. (BS PZInz.) – PZInz Research Office.
Centrum Wyszkolenia Broni Pancernich CW Br. Pane. – Armored Forces Training Center.
FOREIGN MANUFACTURED TANKS
Modernized Polish Renault
Light tank "Renault" FT
As we have already mentioned, the first tanks in the Polish army were the French Renault FT light tanks. There is no need to describe them. These machines are well known. Let's just say that in 1918, the army of General G. Haller received 120 of these tanks. Haller's army returned to Poland at the end of the First World War with all its tanks.
In May-June 1919, at the request of the Polish government, the main personnel of the 505th French tank regiment under the command of Major J. Marais arrived in Poland. In the city of Lodz it was re-equipped as the 1st Tank Regiment. It consisted of 120 (72 cannon, 48 machine gun) tanks. His second company first took part in the battle near Bobruisk in August 1919, losing two tanks in the process. The company returned to Warsaw, and the French tank crews left for their homeland, leaving only the so-called advisers or instructors. When the Polish army retreated from Ukraine in 1920, most tanks returned to Poland.
During the August counter-offensive of the Poles in 1920, three Renault companies (i.e., about 50 vehicles), united in a special detachment of Major Novitsky, took part. The detachment entered the battle on August 17 near Minsk-Mazowiecki. On August 20, at Mława, Polish tanks and their supporting infantry units cut off the retreat routes for Guy's cavalry corps. Unable to break through to the east, the corps was forced to move to the territory of East Prussia (Germany) and was interned there. During all the battles, the Poles lost 12 tanks, of which seven were captured by Red Army soldiers.
At the end of the war, the French replaced the Poles' losses in tanks. 30 vehicles were received, including six tanks with radio stations, as well as so-called Renault BS with a 75-mm gun. In 1925-1926 Another 27 Renaults were assembled at the Central Automobile Workshop.
Complaints were caused by the low speed and power reserve. The Poles tried to improve the driving characteristics of Renault. In 1923, Lieutenant Kardashevich proposed a new type of caterpillar - steel wires with welded tracks. Did not help.
In 1925-1926 The central workshops in Warsaw assembled 25 Renault training tanks using parts and assemblies from failed vehicles. They were covered not with armor, but with steel sheets.
In 1928, large-capacity fuel tanks were installed on one of the tanks, lengthening the hull for this purpose. Another tank with a removed turret was converted into a smoke curtain. There were attempts to strengthen the weapons. In 1929-1930 a new octagonal turret was designed, in which a non-coaxial cannon and machine gun were installed. And here, too, we limited ourselves to one copy. In 1935-1936 The Katowice plant supplied six towers similar to the Renault-Vickers towers. They were installed on the tank in 1937.
On June 1, 1936, the army had 119 Renault FT tanks. In 1936-1938 some of them were sold abroad: to Spain and 16 tanks to Uruguay. On July 15, 1939, there were another 102 units, of which 70 vehicles (combat and training) were part of the 2nd tank battalion in Zhuravitsa. During mobilization, the battalion allocated three separate companies of “low-speed” tanks. The rest were part of armored trains. In 1940, Polish units in France received Renault FT tanks as training tanks.
Light tank "Renault" M26/27
In France, they began modernizing their famous tank in order, first of all, to increase its speed and range. At the suggestion of the co-owner of the Citroen automobile company, engineer A. Kegress, about a hundred tanks were equipped with rubber tracks, and the elasticity of the suspension was increased with a large stroke of the road wheels. Drums were installed on consoles in front and behind the hull, which rotated freely on an axis, which was supposed to increase the ability to overcome ditches and trenches. The tank's ground clearance has increased, fuel consumption has decreased, and, consequently, the cruising range has increased. The speed also increased to 12 km/h. The tank received the designation "Renault" M24/25 (according to the years of modernization). These vehicles fought in 1925-1926. in Morocco against the State of Riffs.
In 1926, the following modernization followed: a rubber track with metal tracks was used. The drums were abandoned. New 45 hp engine. With. provided speeds of up to 16 km/h. The power reserve has increased to 160 km. Now the tank was called Renault M26/27. It was purchased by Yugoslavia and China. In 1927, Poland acquired 19 units. Basically, further modernization options were tested on them: for example, new turrets with machine gun and cannon armament were tested. These cars were called "Renault" arr. 1929. The weight of the M26/27 tank is 6.4 tons, the armament remains the same as that of the Renault FT.
English tank "Vickers - 6 tons", version "B"
"Vickers 6 tons", option "A"
"Vickers 6 tons", option "B"
Light tank "Renault-Vickers" ("Renault" model 1932)
With the receipt of Vickers - 6 tons tanks from England and a license for its production, the question was raised about modernizing Renault tanks using units English tank. Its chassis was changed in order to unify some components with chassis"Vickers". In 1935, a new turret with a twin 37 mm gun and a machine gun was installed on the tank. The new model did not live up to expectations: its speed did not exceed 13 km/h. The engine overheated and fuel consumption was high. Weight of the Renault tank mod. 1932 - 7.2 tons.
Light tank "Renault" NC-1 (NC-27)
With the next modernization of Renault, French engineers managed, first of all, to increase the thickness of the armor to 30 mm (forehead) and 20 mm on the side of the hull. The cast turret had armor 20 mm thick. The NC-27 tank was not adopted by the French army, since despite a more powerful engine (60 hp) and an increase in speed to 20 km/h, the range remained small due to high fuel consumption - 100 km.
However, the tank was purchased in small quantities by Sweden, Yugoslavia, Japan and even the USSR (for testing only). Poland bought 10 of these vehicles in 1927 and used them to train tank crews.
Tank weight – 8.5 tons, armament – one 37-mm cannon, crew – 2 people.
Light tank "Vickers E" ("Vickers - 6 tons")
In 1929, the English company Vickers, on its own initiative, created a light tank called “Vickers - 6 tons”. In the 1930s, this vehicle had perhaps no less influence on world tank construction than the famous Renault FT. New tank turned out to be simple and reliable, its fine-linked manganese steel tracks could withstand a range of up to 4,800 km - an unprecedented figure at that time. The tank was cheap, but for some reason the British army did not accept it - the military was not satisfied with its chassis. But it was purchased and produced under license (for example, in the USSR under the T-26 brand) by many countries.
The tank was presented in two versions: “A” weighing 7 tons with two machine-gun turrets and “B” weighing 8 tons with a 47-mm cannon and a machine gun in the turret. Armor 13 mm thick protected the forehead, sides of the hull and turret. Speed – 35 km/h, range – 160 km. The crew consisted of 3 people.
The Poles became interested in Vickers tanks back in 1925. In 1930, KSUS purchased one example for testing. One of its designers, Vivien Loyd, also came to the country with him. Tests in 1931 revealed the following (according to the Poles) shortcomings of the tank: cramped conditions in the fighting compartment, overheating of the air-cooled engine, the need for frequent supervision, etc. The company agreed with the Poles' proposals to eliminate the noted shortcomings.
On September 14, 1931, an agreement was concluded on the purchase of 1" tanks, of which 16 were in the "B" version. Tanks arrived in 1932. The Poles made some other corrections, however, at the expense of the company. Thus, the tanks of the Polish order were noticeably different from the original ones even in appearance, in particular, in the air intakes. “Horns” appeared above the machine guns in the towers - otherwise it would have been impossible to place magazines on the model machine guns. 1925, charged from above.
Wedge heel "Carden-Loyd" being tested
"Carden-Loyd" Mk. VI
Without significant changes, Vickers tanks survived until 1939, although some measures were still taken. In 1935, a project was presented to bring them to the standards of the 7TR tank that entered mass production. There was a variety in the brands of weapons for model “A”: two 7.92-mm machine guns, or mod. 1925, or arr. 1930; one – 13.2- and one – 7.92-mm sample. 1930. Option “B” received a 37-mm Puteaux M1918 cannon (as on the Renault), coaxial with a machine gun mod. 1925, or a 47-mm Vickers-Armstrong cannon mod. E, coaxial with a machine gun mod. 1925. Combat weight - 7.35 tons (option "A") or 7.2 tons (option "B"). The reservation remained "English". Engine "Armstrong-Sidley Puma" with a power of 92 hp. With. Speed – 35 (32) km/h, range – 160 km, average specific pressure – 0.48 kg/cm 2 . The tank overcame a climb of 37°, a ditch of -1.8 m, a wall of 0.75 m and a ford of 0.9 m.
On September 1, 1939, the troops had 34 Vickers - 6 tons tanks as part of the 12th and 121st light tank companies.
Wedge heel "Carden-Loyd" Mk.VI
Among the British military of the early 20s, the idea of equipping almost every infantryman with his own armored vehicle was seriously considered. As part of this idea, engineers J. Carden and V. Loyd produced agricultural tractors on their own in their small factory in 1925-1928. created a number of small tracked armored vehicles, then called wedges, i.e. “minitanks”. They were designed for a crew of two or even one person, and were armed with a machine gun mounted in an open top hull. The most successful example was the Carden-Loyd Mk.VI wedge (1928). This machine was of interest to both the Vickers company and the British military, but even more to the leaders of the armed forces of many countries. The inventors went to work for Vickers, where in subsequent years they created many samples of tanks for English army.
The Carden-Loyd Mk.VI wedge served as the ancestor and example of similar vehicles built in Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, Japan and the USSR (our T-27 wedge) under license. In England itself, however, it was not received so enthusiastically, considering it just a kind of machine gun carrier, and not so many were ordered for the army (348 units), although they were very cheap, simple to construct, etc. Another thing is for export... They were purchased by 16 countries!
The wedge weighing 1.5 tons was served by two crew members and was armed with one machine gun. Its height was only 122 cm. It was protected by armor 6-9 mm thick. Engine 22.5 liters. With. allowed her to reach a speed of 45-48 km/h, with a power reserve of 160 km.
They also showed interest in the wedge heel in Poland. The resulting wedge was tested in July 1929, and was successful. It was decided to purchase them for service in the cavalry. There is no exact data on how many of them were purchased. However, in 1936 there were 10 units in the army. They were armed with a Polish 7.92-mm Browning machine gun (ammunition capacity - 1000 rounds). The Poles have made some improvements to the chassis to reduce shaking. They were called small reconnaissance tanks.
Light tank "Renault" R35
Constructed in 1933-1935. This French tank was intended to support infantry. For this purpose, it was well armored (32-45 mm), and had sufficient speed (19 km/h). The armament was weak - an old 37 mm cannon and a machine gun. Combat weight - 9.8 tons, crew - 2 people.
The Polish military leadership, however, wanted to purchase SOMUA S35 medium “cavalry tanks” from France, but the French refused and offered their outdated Renault D medium tank, which the Poles refused. In 1938, the Poles bought a pair of R35s and put them to the test. And, although they were not very delighted, in April 1939 they purchased 100 R35. In July, the first 49 tanks arrived by sea. In early September, the 21st battalion of light tanks, consisting of 40 vehicles, went to the front. Pressed against the Romanian border, 34 tanks crossed it and were interned. Six tanks joined the 10th Cavalry Brigade. Three of them made their way to the Hungarian border and crossed it.
Four R35s from the remnants of the 21st Battalion, as well as three Hotchkiss H35 tanks, formed the so-called separate company of R35 tanks. The company lost all its vehicles in battles with the Red Army (September 19 near Krasnoye) and German troops.
The second batch of R35 was supposed to arrive in Poland via Romania. She remained in Romania.
Light tank "Hotchkiss" H35
These French tanks were intended to operate alongside cavalry and had a speed of 28 km/h (combat weight - 11.4 tons, crew - 2 people). Its armament was the same as that of the R35 and its armor was approximately the same. Three H35s arrived along with the R35. On September 14, they formed the above-mentioned half-company together with R35 and were all lost in battle.
DOMESTIC TANKS AND WEDS
Wedge heel TK-3
Wedge heel TK-3
Although Poland acquired a license to produce the Carden-Loyd Mk.VI wedge, they did not build it on the English model. Based on thorough tests of the English machine, it was decided to construct an improved model. The design bureau of the armored forces of the Military Institute of Technical Research (WIBI) was entrusted with the design. The design work was carried out by Major Engineer T. Trzeciak with the participation of E. Karkoz and E. Gabiha. Based on their project, two prototypes were made in 1930, differing in the way they placed the 40 hp Ford A engine. With. and a three-speed gearbox. Compared to the Carden-Loyd wedge, experimental vehicles called TK-1 and TK-2 or wedges arr. 1930, they received an improved suspension, electric starter, etc. Tracks made of manganese steel made it possible to reduce their wear and increase the reliability of the chassis. They were armed with a 7.92-mm Browning machine gun, which could be removed from its place in the frontal shield and mounted on an outer pin, which made it possible to fire at aircraft. The wedges had a mass of 1.75 tons, armor thickness of 6-8 mm, speed 45 km/h, cruising range 150 km, crew – 2 people.
Speaking of the name. TK was considered the first letters of the designers' last names. But, most likely, this is a simple abbreviation of the word “Wedge Heel”. In their first burrows they were classified as “small, turretless tanks.” Later, production vehicles were called “reconnaissance tanks.”
In 1931, the Ursus plant in Warsaw produced a sample of the TK-3, which now had full armor. On July 14, 1931, under the designation "TK mod. 1931" it was put into service. Even before testing the prototype on February 24, 40 wedges were ordered, production of which began in the summer of 1931 at PZInz. Until 1934, about 280 units were built (in 1931 - 40, in 1932 - 90, in 1933 - 120 and in 1934 - 30).
Weight of TK-3 (or simply TK) is 2.43 tons, armament is one 7.92 mm Browning machine gun or mod. 1925 (ammunition - 1500 and 1200 rounds, respectively). Reservation on rivets made of rolled sheets 6-8 mm thick (forehead, sides). Roof – 3-4 mm, bottom – 4-7 mm. Engine – “Ford A” with a power of 40 hp. With. provided the wedge with a speed of 45 km/h, with a range of 150 km (fuel reserve - 60 l). The average specific pressure is 0.56 kg/cm2. Obstacles to be overcome: rise – 37°, ditch – 1.2 m, ford – 0.5 m.
As soon as the production of the Fiat 122 engine (Polish Fiat 122BC) with a power of 46 hp was launched in Poland. With. it was decided to install it on TK-3. In 1933, two TKF prototypes were made, and then a small series of 16 TKFs was produced, which differed in nothing but the engine from the TK-3.
The big drawback of the wedges was the small angle of fire of the machine gun mounted in the front shield. The conclusion suggested itself - install a circular rotation tower on the car. This was done by the WIBI Armored Forces Design Bureau. In 1933, the TKW prototype (W - from the word wieza - tower) was tested. The height of the TK-3 hull was reduced and the fighting compartment was redesigned. For the driver it was necessary to install an armored cap with a hatch in his roof. It was equipped with a periscope designed by R. Gundlyakh (later in the British army it received the designation Mk.IV). The turret of the new design housed a 7.92-mm machine gun mod. 1930. Tests showed poor visibility from the wedge and poor ventilation. During prolonged shooting, the shooter literally suffocated from the powder gases.
The new prototype received an improved turret design with a special ventilation duct protected by an armored cap. The installation of the 7.92 mm Hotchkiss machine gun was designed in a new way.
In total in 1933-1934. built six TKW of both variants. Preference was given to the PZInz light tank. 140.
TKW combat weight - 2.8 tons. Engine - "Polish Fiat" 122VS.
Experienced TKW wedge
First TKW prototype (top) and upgraded TKW
As an experiment, a 20-mm Oerlikon automatic cannon was installed on one TK-3 wedge instead of a machine gun. The experiment was unsuccessful.
The TK-3 base also served for the production of the self-propelled gun "GKO" (D - from dzialo - gun).
Wedge heel TKS
The shortcomings of the TK-3 wedge were obvious from the very beginning. There were quite a few of them: unsuccessful installation of a machine gun, cramped conditions inside, poor security, hard suspension, etc. And in January 1933, BS PZInz. Started design estimates for a new wedge. The work was carried out with the participation and control of VK Vg. Rape. WIBI. Project PZInz. provided for serious alterations, which would have required both time and expense. It was rejected, but they still considered it necessary to preserve at least the successful design solutions of the TK-3.
According to the new project, on June 15, 1933, experimental workshops PZInz. They made a prototype tankette, first called STK, then “light high-speed tank model 1933” and, finally, TKS. What was the difference between TKS and TK-3? First of all, the thickness of the armor has increased. It amounted to 8-10 mm in the frontal, side and rear parts of the hull and 3-5 mm on the roof and bottom. The shape of the front part of the hull was changed: the shooter received a kind of cabin, where a 7.92-mm machine gun mod. 1925 (in the first production vehicle model 1930) with a horizontal firing angle of 48° and a vertical angle of 35°. The design of the upper part of the hull became more multifaceted - the armor plates were installed at an angle that increased bullet resistance. The suspension elements were strengthened, the track was expanded and, although the weight of the first series vehicles increased to 2.57, and later ones to 2.65 tons, the average specific pressure decreased to 0.43 kg/cm 2 . Engine "Polish Fiat" AC 122 with a power of 42 hp. With. provided a highway speed of 40 km/h. The fuel supply (60 l) was enough for 180 km on the highway and 110 km on the ground.
The first batch of 20 TKS entered service with the troops in September 1933. On February 22, 1934, the TKS was officially put into mass production. In total, about 280 units were produced, distributed by year: 1934 - 70, 1935 - 120, 1936 - 90. Even in the Polish sources themselves there is no single result regarding the release of TKS (and TK-3) wedges. Let's give data from two sources: according to one, 300 TK, 280 TKS including TKF were produced, according to another - 275 TK, 18 TKF, 4 TKD, 263 TKS. The total amount of 574 units of TK, TKS, TKF was also given.
Just before the start of the war, an attempt was made to strengthen the armament of the TKS, as well as the TK-3. One vehicle of each type received a 20-mm automatic cannon of Polish design. After tests completed in January 1939, the new model was put into service and an order was issued for the production of 100 (or even 150) units by January 1940. Before the start of the war, the PZInz plant. In Ursus, he managed to produce only 10 copies, which were sent to a separate reconnaissance company of the 10th Cavalry Brigade. Wedge weight – 2.8 tons.
Let us note some more attempts to modernize the TKS wedge. In 1938, one sample was produced, called TKS-B with side clutches. The sloth was lowered to the ground to increase the length of the supporting surface. On the basis of TKS, an experimental self-propelled gun TKS-D was created and artillery tractors were produced.
Prototype TKS wedges
TKS wedge design
Armor plates 8-10 mm thick were attached to the frame with rivets (bottom - 5, roof - 3 mm). There was no division into departments inside. The engine and main clutch were located along the longitudinal axis of the housing. There were seats on both sides of the unprotected engine: on the left for the driver, on the right - the gunner-commander. A car-type power transmission was placed in front: a clutch, a gearbox (three forward gears and one reverse), a differential turning mechanism with band brakes, the axle shafts of which were connected to the drive wheels. In front of the driver were the control pedals and the steering wheel of the turning mechanism. In front, behind and on the side of the shooter are boxes of ammunition. It was possible to get inside the wedge through two hatches in the roof with double-leaf covers.
TKS prototype with machine gun mod. 30 g.
Serial TKS with machine gun mod. 25
TK prototype with 20 mm cannon
TKS prototype with 20 mm cannon mod. '38
TKS-B wedge prototype
Wedge heel TKS
The commander conducted observation through three viewing slits and a periscope of the Gundlyakh system. Behind him was a 60 liter fuel tank (road range - 180 km) and a battery.
Engine (Polish Fiat 122AC) six-cylinder four-stroke with a power of 42 hp. With. developed a speed of 40 km/h.
The chassis consists of four rubber-coated support rollers on board, interlocked in twos with flat springs on a supporting beam. The guide wheel with the caterpillar tension mechanism is attached to the end of the supporting beam. Drive wheel with ring gear. Four supporting rollers are mounted on a common beam. The body was attached to the chassis using springs and longitudinal beams. Track width 170 mm. Wedge weight - 2.65 tons. Dimensions: 256 x 176 x 133 cm. Average specific pressure - 0.425 kg/cm 2.
Obstacles to be overcome: rise – 35°-38°, ditch – 1.1 m, ford – 0.5 m.
Light tank 7TR
Although Poland acquired a license to produce the English Vickers E tank, they did not build it. From the very beginning, the Poles (as well as the British military) were not satisfied with the chassis. The engine was also not satisfactory.
Back in 1931, design work was underway on a tank with the main elements of the Vickers E, but with a 100 hp Saurer engine. With. At first it was called the “battle tank model 1931”, and then VAU-33 (Vickers Armstrong Ursus). At the same time, a tracked artillery tractor was being developed at the same base. The work was carried out by V K Br. Rape. WIBI, and then V VT Vg. Rape.
The design of the Vickers hull was changed with an increase in the thickness of the armor, and most importantly, the Polish tank received a diesel engine - for the first time in the world tank building serial tank. This licensed diesel engine from the Swiss company Saurer was already produced in Poland under the VBLD or VBLDb brand.
In August 1934 PZInz. launched the first copy of the tank, called 7TP (7 tonowy Polski), for testing. The tests were carried out jointly with the Vickers tank. In March 1935, an order followed for 22, then another 18 7TR tanks with delivery until January 1937. These were also two-turreted tanks.
1936 brought some changes to the armor over the power section. The design of the towers has also undergone changes. The armament consisted of either two 7.92-mm machine guns mod. 1930, or one 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun and another 7.92 mm mod. 1930.
7TR, double-turret version and isometry of its hull
Differences in the layout of the power compartments of the Vickers 6 tons tanks (above) and 7TR (below)
Options for new weapons in one turret were considered: a 47-mm Potsisk cannon, or a 55-mm cannon from the Starachowice plant, or a 47-mm cannon designed by engineer Rogl, as well as 40-mm cannons from Vickers and the Starachowice plant. But preference was given to the 37-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1936 in a tank version of the Swedish company Bofors. The company also undertook to construct a new turret for its gun.
A prototype of a single-turret tank was tested in February 1937. The new turret had a mechanical rotation mechanism and a manual mechanism for vertical aiming of the cannon, coaxial with a machine gun. A Zeiss TWZ-1 periscope sight, produced in Poland, was installed. The installation of a new turret also entailed some alterations in the turret section of the hull. The battery was moved from the fighting compartment to the power compartment, and racks and mounts for ammunition were installed on the walls of the fighting compartment. Several double-turret tanks were converted to this model.
The lessons of the Spanish Civil War showed that tanks such as the 7TR are outdated. However, orders for the construction of 7TP were not canceled, but attempts were made to improve its characteristics. In 1938, tank turrets with a rear niche for a receiving and non-transmitting radio station were produced, and the tank itself was equipped with a TPU. A semi-gyrocompass was also installed for movement in low visibility conditions. “Spurs” were developed for the tracks, an emergency starter in case of failure of the electric starter (however, this was not installed before the start of the war). Work was carried out on sealing the hull in cases of operations in conditions of the use of chemical agents and on the creation of fire-fighting equipment.
Attachment systems were developed for the 7TR tank: a bulldozer blade, plows for digging ditches, etc. A bridge version of the tank was developed, as well as a self-propelled gun with two 20-mm automatic guns.
The desire to improve security led to the new project 9TR (or tank model 1939).
The hull frame of the 7TR tank consisted of three parts assembled at the corners and bolted together. Armor plates made of cemented steel were bolted onto it. Their thickness in the frontal and vertical side parts reached 17 mm, and the inclined side and stern parts reached 13 mm. Bottom and roof – 10 mm. The thickness of the turret armor (for double-turret tanks) is 13 mm, and for single-turret tanks of the latest series - 15 mm (turret roof - 10 mm).
Inside, the body was divided into three compartments: the front (control) with a gearbox, a turning mechanism and fuel tanks (main 110 l and spare 20 l), side clutches with brakes. The driver sat on the right side of the compartment to the right of the fuel tank.
The fighting compartment was separated in the middle by a thin partition with three hatches from the power plant compartment. On the first vehicles, 7.92-mm Maxim machine guns mod. 1908, "Browning" arr. 1930, "Hotchkiss" arr. 1925 or 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun. Ammunition - 3000 rounds (for a 13.2 mm machine gun - 720).
The turret (in single-turret tanks) is shifted to the left. It is equipped with a 37 mm cannon (ammunition capacity - 80 rounds) and a coaxial machine gun "Browning" mod. 1930 (ammunition - 3960 rounds), the barrel of which is protected by an armored pipe. It was equipped with a telescopic sight. The loader worked to the right of the gun and had at his disposal a Gundlyakh periscope observation device. The commander-gunner used a periscope sight mod. 1937. The tower had three viewing slots with glass blocks. The 2N/C radio station and part of the ammunition were placed in the aft niche.
The undercarriage consisted (on board) of four bogies of two rubber-coated rollers with quarter-elliptic leaf springs, four support rollers, a drive wheel (in front) and a guide wheel with a track tensioning mechanism (in the rear). There are 110 tracks in the caterpillar.
Double-turreted version of the 7TR tank
Single-turret tank 7TR
Single-turret tank 7TR with radio station
9TR tank project
Light tank 7TR
Combat weight - 9.4 tons (double turret) and 9.9 tons (single turret with radio station). Dimensions: 488 x 243 x 219 (double turret) – 230 (single turret) cm.
Average specific pressure – 0.6 kg/cm 2 . Speed (single turret) – 32 km/h. Cruising range – 150 km (on the highway) and 130 km (country roads). Obstacles to be overcome: rise – 35°, ditch – 1.8 m, ford – 1.0 m.
A total of 135 7TR tanks were built before September 1939. Here are their release data:
01.1933 – 01.1934 – two prototypes;
03.1935 - 03.1936 - 22 double-turret tanks of the 1st series;
02.1936 - 02.1937 - 18 double-tower, although they were planned as single-tower (later some were rebuilt into single-tower) II series; Some tanks were converted from Vickers.
By September, 16 double-turret tanks remained; everyone was in the Training Center.
1937 - 16 single-turret tanks of the III series;
1938 - 50 single-turret tanks of the IV series;
1939 - 16 tanks of the V series and 11 tanks of the VI series.
Of the 48 tanks planned for 1939, 21 were started, but not completed (maybe some were completed by the Germans).
Another 150 tanks were ordered in June 1939, but construction did not even begin.
There are other data. On July 1, 1939, there were supposedly 139 7TR tanks. Several tanks could arrive in July-August, and 11 more in September.
EXPERIMENTAL MACHINES AND PROTOTYPES 1926-1939
In total, about 20 prototypes of armored vehicles were developed in Poland before 1939.
Tank XVВ
Light tank 4TR
Medium tank WB
In May 1926, a competition was announced for a tank for the Polish army based on a very high technical specification. With a mass of 12 g, it had to have armor that, from a distance of 500 m, would not be penetrated by anti-tank gun shells (of that period) with a caliber of up to 47 mm. Armament: 47 mm cannon, 13.2 and 7.92 mm machine guns. An engine with an electric starter and a heating device in winter had to provide a speed of at least 25 km/h. It was planned to equip the tank with a radio station and smoke exhaust equipment.
Two companies undertook to implement the project - the Department of the Warsaw Locomotive Works and PZInz (plant in Czechowice). The first company won the competition, and then it was decided to develop two versions of the project: the WB-3 tracked tank and the WB-10 wheeled-tracked tank.
Production of both prototypes began in 1927. The following year, the wheeled-tracked WB was completed (tested in May). The test results were negative. With the tracked version it was even worse and work stopped.
WB-10 combat weight – 13 tons, crew – 4 people; armament: 37 mm or 47 mm cannon in the turret and two machine guns (one in the turret, the other in the hull).
Road wheels - two per side, moving in a vertical plane using a special mechanism, were lowered onto the road and raised the tank body, leaving the tracks above the road. For this operation, the crew did not need to exit the tank.
Light tank 4TR (PZInz.140)
The big disadvantage of wedges was the placement of the machine gun in the body with a small angle of fire. These, as we already know, were the TKS wedges. To correct this shortcoming, it was decided to create a turret version of the wedge. The tactical and technical specifications were formulated by the military and military equipment BR.Panc. and transferred for development to KB PZfiiz. The future tank, which received the factory designation PZInz.-140 (military designation 4TR), was designed under the direction of engineer E. Gabikh. Based on his project, a prototype was ordered in 1936, testing of which began in August 1937. Of greatest interest was the chassis, the design of which took into account foreign experience, in particular Swedish, for which a special commission visited the Landsverk company.
The chassis consisted of four pairs of interlocked rollers with hydraulic shock absorbers located horizontally. The driving wheels were in front, the sloth wheels were in the back. Engine 95 HP With. was specially developed at the same plant and received the designation PZInz.-425. It was located on the right side of the body. With a combat weight of 4.35 tons, the tank had a high specific power - 22 hp/t, which provided it with a speed of 55 km/" h. Cruising range on the highway - 450 km. Specific pressure - 0.34 kg/cm 2 .
The armament located in the turret consisted of a 20-mm cannon with 200 rounds of ammunition, and a 7.92-mm machine gun (with 2,500 rounds of ammunition). Reservation - on rivets made of rolled sheets with a thickness of 8-17 mm (front), 13 mm (side) and 13 mm (turret). The tank was supposed to be equipped with a transceiver radio station. The crew consisted of two people.
In accordance with the wishes of the Directorate of Armored Forces (DBP), E. Gabih in July 1937 developed a project for an improved version with a 37-mm cannon in the turret. The combat weight reached 4.5 tons. Speed – 50 km/h, range – 250 km. However, it was recognized that one person in the turret could not cope with the duties of commander, gunner, etc.
In the fall of 1937, the 4TR, like other new tank models, underwent extensive testing. It was decided to continue the work and eliminate the noted shortcomings. In particular, due to the shaking it was impossible to shoot on the move. Eliminating this drawback would require serious modifications to the chassis, especially the suspension. This would have taken a lot of time and expense, and 4 TP did not enter service.
Light tank PZInz.130 (Lekki czotg rozpoznawczy (plywajacy)
In imitation of the British amphibious tanks designed by Carden and Loyd, PZInz engineers. led by the same Gabikh, they built an amphibious tank, named PZInz.-130. In its design, many units from the 4TR tank were used, in particular, the engine, transmission, and chassis. The turret, equipped with one machine gun, was taken from the TKW wedge version. It was planned to replace the machine gun with a 20-mm cannon. Buoyancy was ensured by the sufficient volume of the hull and its tightness. On the sides above the tracks there were floats filled with cork. The propeller, placed in a rotating hydrodynamic casing, ensured a water speed of 7-8 km/h and turns. Since, when taking power to the propeller, the transmission of torque to the drive wheels of the caterpillar drive was not switched off, entry into and exit from the water was facilitated, as was movement in shallow water.
Light tank PZInz.130
With a tank combat weight of 3.92 tons, the engine produces 95 hp. With. provided it with a very high specific power - 24.2 hp / t, from which - excellent speed on the highway - 60 km/h (power reserve - 360 km). 8 mm riveted armor protected the forehead, sides of the hull and turret. Tests carried out in 1936 on land and water gave excellent results. But due to financial difficulties, work on the amphibious tank was not continued. Both PZInz prototypes. 130 and 140 made it to the USSR and were tested in Kubinka. The ratings were quite high.
Light tank 9TR
In an effort to improve the tactical and technical characteristics of the 7TR tank, the Armored Forces Command at the beginning of 1939 decided to implement all the proposals developed by the VVT Vg. Rapeseed, and BS PZInz. for a promising tank. It was decided to install a new diesel engine with a capacity of 116 hp. Armor protection should also be strengthened. Joint research of VVT Vg.Rapeseed. and the Institute of Metallurgy and Metal Science identified the possibility of obtaining homogeneous armor plates up to 50 mm thick and cemented up to 20 mm. Thanks to this, the project of the so-called “reinforced light tank 7TR of the 1939 model” or 9TR was created.
In addition to the VVT Vg option. Rape. PZInz offered its version. with a piston engine of our own design with a capacity of 100 hp. e., but smaller in size than diesel. The production of the prototype was entrusted to PZInz. At the end of June 1939, 50 9TR tanks were ordered for delivery in May 1940, although it was not decided which variant would be chosen for mass production. September 1, 1939 in the experimental workshop of PZInz. There were three prototypes in the assembly process (two of them were our own version).
According to the project, the mass of the first and second options should have been 9.9 tons and 10.9 tons, respectively. Armor made of welded rolled sheets with a thickness of 40 mm in the frontal and 15 mm in the side and rear parts of the hull and 30 mm in the front of the turret. Speed – 35 km/h. The remaining tactical and technical characteristics are close to the performance characteristics of the 7TR gank.
Light wheeled-tracked tank 10TR
In the 1920s, tank builders faced the acute issue of increasing the operational mobility of tanks, which, as is known, had a short range. When transporting even short distances, tanks were loaded onto railway platforms or special trailers. Tanks with dual propulsion, i.e. tracked and wheeled, were developed. We have already talked about a similar Polish machine – the WB gank. Such vehicles were complex in their propulsion design, unreliable in operation and vulnerable in combat.
W.J. Christie solved the problem of the double mover in a completely different way and, at first glance, very simply. This designer, not recognized in his homeland, began designing combat vehicles in 1915, when he was the owner of a small tractor manufacturing company. The following year, he offered the American army a sample of a three-inch self-propelled anti-aircraft gun. The first tank was designed by W.J. Christie in 1919. The vehicle, known under the brand name M.1919, was wheeled and tracked with a rear-mounted engine and a front steered pair of wheels on wheels. The tracks were put on the front and rear wheels.
When KSUS announced a competition for a tank design for Poland in April 1926, Christie took part in it. He offered his tanks of the M.1919 and M.1921 models. The Poles rejected them. However, later, when the successes of Christie’s tanks became widely known, Captain M. Rucinski went to the USA in 1929, who became acquainted with both the last Christie tank, M. 1928, and the M. 1931 tank, which was still in the design stage. It was decided to even buy the last two samples. The deal, however, did not take place and these two tanks were purchased american army. There were rumors that the reason for the refusal of the Polish side was the fact that it had become aware of the purchase of two such tanks Soviet Union.
However, the Poles decided to secretly start designing a wheeled-tracked tank based on the information and advertising brochures received by Rucinski. In 1931, sketches of the project appeared. Then the matter stalled, and the materials were even lost. However, at the beginning of 1935 they returned to this project. March 10, a group of designers - Yu. Lanushevsky ( chief designer), S. Oldakovsky, M. Stashevsky and others began designing a new tank, called the pursuit tank (czotg poscigowy) 10TR. The general management of the project was carried out by Major R. Gundlyakh.
The design work was completed quite quickly, and at the end of 1936 the construction of the machine began. The matter was hampered by the lack of a suitable engine. I had to purchase a 240-horsepower Dmeriken La France engine from the USA. It was very capricious and did not provide the advertised power. However, in June 1937 the tank was ready. It had four pairs of rollers, a Christie system suspension (independent on coil springs). The fourth pair is the leading one; the torque was transmitted to it using a guitar, just like the VT. The front pair is steerable; the second pair, when moving on wheels, was suspended using a hydraulic device to improve agility.
Wheeled-tracked tank 10TP
The tank body is welded. The turret with weapons is the same as on the Polish 7TR light tanks. In addition, a machine gun was installed in the frontal part of the hull. The tank was equipped with two sights (periscope and telescopic) and a Mk.IV periscope. Had three viewing slits.
Tests that lasted until the beginning of 1939 revealed many shortcomings, which were partially eliminated. It was decided to stop further work on the 10TP and begin development of the improved 14TP model. The war that began on September 1, 1939 put an end to this work.
Combat weight – 12.8 tons. Dimensions: 540 x 255 x 220 cm. Crew – 4 people. Armament: 37 mm cannon mod. 1937, coaxial with a 7.92 mm machine gun mod. 1930 in the tower; one 7.92 mm machine gun mod. 1930 in the building. Ammunition - 80 shells, 4500 rounds. Armor made of welded plates 20 mm thick (front, side and rear of the hull), turret - 16 mm (on stickers), roof and bottom 8 mm. Engine - "American La France", 12 cylinders, power 210 hp. With. Speed on tracks – 56 km/h, on wheels – 75 km/h. Range (estimated) – 210 km. Fuel capacity – 130 l. Average specific pressure – 0.47 kg/cm 2 .
Obstacles to be overcome: rise – 37°, ditch – 2.2 m, ford – 1.0 m.
Medium tank 20/25TP
Poland also attempted to create its own medium tank. The first estimates were made even in the early 20s. They started doing this more seriously in the 1930s. Then KB PZInz. developed three versions of a medium tank, which received the unofficial name 20/25TR. In general, they resembled in layout the English medium tank of 1928 "Vickers - 16 tons" (otherwise A6E1). Armament - a 40-, 47- or even 75-mm gun was supposed to be installed in the turret, and two machine guns - in small turrets in front of it. The armor thickness reached 50-60 mm for different options, and the speed was 45 km/h.
Medium tank 25 TP
Medium pursuit tank 14TR
Due to failures with the 10TR wheeled-tracked tanks, it was decided to develop another cruising tank (purely tracked) 14TR. The weight savings resulting from the abandonment of the double propulsion system were used to enhance protection (up to 50 mm in thickness). Project 14TR was completed at the end of 1938. However, for a tank weighing 14 tons there was no engine - for such a vehicle with a design speed of 50 km/h, an engine with a power of 300-400 hp was required. With. In KB PZInz. Such an engine was being prepared, but it was still very far from completion. It was even supposed to install German engine Maybach HL108.
The prototype, 60% complete, was destroyed before the Germans entered Warsaw. The armament of the 14TR tank was to consist of a 37- or 47-mm cannon and two machine guns, and the crew was to consist of four people.
EXPERIMENTAL SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY UNITS (SAU)
Light self-propelled gun PZInz.-160
The General Staff did not attach much importance to the creation of self-propelled guns, not seeing the need for mechanization of artillery. However, in the 30s, as is known, several models of light self-propelled guns were created on the basis of TKS wedges - TKS, TKS-D.
By order of the PZInz Armor Forces Directorate. it was proposed to develop a “tracked armored chassis for a 37 mm anti-tank gun.” E. Gabikh got down to business, and in November 1936 presented his self-propelled gun project called PZInz.-160 based on the PZInz.-152 tracked tractor of his own design. Instead of an anti-tank gun, he proposed a 37-mm tank gun mod. 1937, which has not yet entered production. Apparently, this decided the fate of this self-propelled gun.
In August 1937, Gabikh presented another project of the self-propelled gun PZInz.-160 weighing 4.3 thousand with a new engine. However, VVT Vg. Raps, gave preference to its version of the wedge in the role of self-propelled guns - TKS-D. In addition, this last one, but the estimate could cost 40 thousand versus 75 thousand zlotys PZInz.- 160. Thus, the matter was resolved by the financial issue.
Let's give tactical and technical characteristics PZInz.-160: weight – 4.2 tons, crew – 4 people. Armament: in addition to the 37mm cannon mod. 1937 two 7.92 mm machine guns mod. 1925 - one in the front part of the hull, the other - on a pin for firing at aircraft (ammunition - 120 rounds and 2000 rounds). Welded armor plates 6-10 mm thick. Engine PZInz.-425 – 95 l. With. Speed – 50 km/h, range – 250 km.
Light self-propelled gun TKD
It is known that the British tried to arm the Carden-Loyd Mk.VI wedge with a 47-mm cannon, i.e., create a model of a light self-propelled gun. While working on the design of the TK-1, the Poles envisioned an English solution for it with the installation of a 37-mm gun. But then there was no suitable artillery system of this caliber. In April 1932, engineer J. Zapushsvsky from VK Vg. Rape. WIBI has completed a self-propelled gun project with a 47-mm Potsisk cannon based on the TK-1 with reinforced suspension and widened tracks due to the increased weight to 3 tons.
In May 1932, the prototype was tested, which was joined in June by three new TKD vehicles. A platoon was formed from them. He was included in the cavalry brigade as an anti-tank unit. Military trials lasted until 1935.
A TKD self-propelled gun with a 37-mm gun was also tested - a kind of conversion of the Puteaux gun from the Renault FT tank. The tests were not successful.
The idea of arming troops with two types of TK-3 wedges with a machine gun and a gun as an anti-tank weapon did not find support, in particular, in connection with the entry into service of a new type of TKS wedge.
Self-propelled guns TKD
The TKD self-propelled gun was armed with a 47 mm gun mod. 1925, protected by 4-10 mm armor, reached speeds of up to 44 km/h and had a range of about 200 km. The crew was supposed to consist of three people.
Light self-propelled gun TKS-D
With the advent of the TKS wedge, naturally, an attempt was made to use its base for a light self-propelled gun armed with a 37-mm Bofors cannon. The project was prepared by engineers E. Lapushevsky and G. Liike under the leadership of R. Gundlyakh. In April 1937, a prototype was made based on the S2P tractor, which had a TKS wedge chassis. In 1937-1938 two more TKS-D were manufactured, which more or less successfully passed the tests. But it was decided to install the Polish Fiat 122V engine with a power of 55 hp on the future self-propelled gun. With. and arm her with a machine gun.
The TKS-D again did not reach serial production, although the more successful self-propelled gun PZInz.-160, but also more expensive, was abandoned in its favor.
The TKS-D weighed 3.1 tons, the crew, or rather the gun's servants, was 5 people, of which two were located in the self-propelled gun itself, and three in the trailer. The 37-mm cannon had a horizontal firing angle of 24° and a vertical firing angle of -9° +13° (68 rounds of ammunition). Armor plates 4-6 mm thick were attached welded seams. Speed – 42 km/h, range – 220 km, fuel reserve – 70 liters.
Tractor S2R
Self-propelled gun TKS-D
ZSU 7TR
In 1937, VVT Vg. Raps, began developing, based on the 7TR tank, a twin 20-mm anti-aircraft gun FK model "A" of Polish design. The spark gun was installed in a turret open at the top, but due to the decision in 1938 to equip the TK and TKS tankettes with such a gun, work on the ZSU was stopped.
ARMORED CARS
From the very first days of the emergence of the Polish state (November 1918), many single copies of armored vehicles of various origins fell into the hands of the Poles. Among them: “Erhard”, “Austin”, “Garford”, “White”, “Poplavko-Jeffrey”, “Pirles”, “Ford”, “Fiat”. In addition, existing trucks, as well as road rollers and steam locomotives were armored . They had little combat value due to damage and understaffing. Among them we would like to mention the so-called “Pilsudski tank”. It was a truck armored in the Lvov railway workshops. The first "armored unit" - the so-called "Union of Armored Vehicles" - took part in the battles for Lviv. It included the BA "Pilsudski tank", "Bukovsky", "Lviv guy" and an armored road roller. At the end of December 1918, the then Ministry of Military Affairs ordered the creation of automobile troops armed with captured BA. This is how two separate platoons of armored vehicles arose.
In 1920, there were already two separate columns and three divisions of armored vehicles that took part in the battles with the Red Army. They included 3-4 or 9-10 BA.
At the end of the Soviet-Polish war, all 43 available armored vehicles (12 BA Fords, 18 Peugeots purchased in France, six captured Austins and others) were included in two separate platoons and three divisions of armored vehicles.
All this equipment was already outdated and of little combat value.
In 1925, armored vehicles were assigned squadron by squadron to the lancer regiments of the 1st-5th cavalry divisions. The 6th squadron, consisting of only one platoon, was in reserve.
Since 1928, new Polish-made vehicles began to arrive - armored vehicles mod. 1928.
At the same time, negotiations were underway with Italian companies, which, however, did not lead to positive results.
At the beginning of the 30s, parts of armored vehicles received a new organization. This was due to the appearance in February 1929 of the Directorate of Armored Forces (“patronage”). In May 1930, the then units of tanks, armored cars and armored trains were united into an independent branch of the military. Two divisions of armored vehicles were formed.
In 1931, the organization of three armored regiments, which included divisions of armored vehicles, was approved. And in 1934, six battalions of tanks and armored vehicles were formed, a year later renamed armored battalions.
At the same time, work was underway on the creation of new models of armored vehicles. This is how BA arr. appeared in small quantities. 1929 and arr. 1931
In the second half of the 30s, the Command of the Armored Forces showed no interest in armored vehicles. Their development in the country has ceased. Only in the plans for the development of armored forces for 1937-1940. it was planned to design light BAs based on the Soviet D-8 and D-13. But they refused this too.
As of July 15, 1939, 71 armored vehicles were in the army, 16 in reserve, and 13 in schools. The latter were worn out and were not suitable for combat use. For armored vehicles mod. The 1934 model accounted for 86, and the 1929 model accounted for 14 cars.
All armored vehicles fit for service upon mobilization became part of 11 cavalry brigades. Seven or eight BAs were in service with BA squadrons (45 personnel) of armored brigade divisions. Only the 11th division had a BA mod. 1929, the rest are armored cars mod. 1934. In addition to armored vehicles, the armored divisions of cavalry brigades had 13 TKS or TK-3 tankettes.
Armored car model 1928
The successes of the half-track vehicles of the French designer A. Kegresse aroused the interest of the Polish command. In 1924-1929 More than a hundred chassis of Citroen-Kegress B-10 vehicles were purchased, of which 90 were decided to be armored and armed, thereby turning them into armored vehicles. The project of such a machine was developed by engineers - the Frenchman R. Gabo and the Pole J. Chacinsky. They were covered with 8 mm armor and equipped with a turret with a 37 mm gun or a 7.92 mm machine gun mod. 1925. I had to somewhat strengthen the tracked undercarriage. They received the name BA model 1928. Since 1934, they began to be converted into VA mod. 1934.
Armored car mod. 1928 had a mass of 2 tons, a crew of 2 people. Engine "Citroen" V-14 with a power of 14 hp. e., speed – 22-24 km/h, range – 275 km.
In 1926, the Ursus mechanical plant near Warsaw acquired a license to produce 2.5-ton trucks from the Italian company SPA. Production in Poland began in 1929. It was also decided to use them as a base for armored vehicles. The project was ready in 1929. In total, about 20 armored vehicles mod. 1929 or "Ursus".
They had a mass of 4.8 tons, a crew of 4-5 people. Armament - 37 mm gun and two 7.92 mm machine guns or three 7.92 mm machine guns mod. 1925. Reservations - forehead, side, rear - 9 mm with rivets. Engine "Ursus" power - 35 hp. e., speed – 35 km/h, range – 250 km.
The armored car turned out to be heavy and had poor maneuverability, because it had only one pair of driving wheels. They were used mainly for educational purposes. Upon mobilization they became part of the 14th armored division of the Mazowieckian Cavalry Brigade.
BTT ISSUE IN POLAND BY YEAR (rounded to the nearest ten)
| 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | ||
| TK-Z | 40 | 90 | 120 | 30 | - | - | - | 280 | |
| TKF | - | - | - | 20 | - | - | - | 20 | |
| TKS | - | - | - | 70 | 120 | 90 | - | - | 280 |
| 7TP | - | - | - | - | _ | 30 50 | 40 | 10 | 130 |
| Total | 40 | 90 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 110 50 | 40 | 10 | 710 |
ARMAMENT OF POLISH TANKS AND BARS Cannons
| Model | Caliber, mm Barrel length in calibers | Projectile (bullet) mass, g | Initial speed, m/s | Firing range, m | Rate of fire, rds/min | Thickness of pierced armor, mm with height, m | Note |
| FR "A" wz.38 | 20/75 | 135 | 870-920 | * | 750 | 25/200 | Magazine 5-10 rounds, belt - 200 Old, French |
| Bofors SA1918 | 37/21 | 500 540 | 365 388 | 2400 | * | 12/500 | |
| Vickers | 47 | 1500 | 230-488 | 3000 | * | 25/500 | |
| Machine guns | |||||||
| 7.92 wz.08 | 7,92 | 14,7 | 645 | 500 | Tape for 250 cartridges. | ||
| 7.92 wz.25 "Hotchkiss" | 7,92 | 12,8 | 700 | 4200 | 400 | 4/400 | Shop 24-30, tape 250 pato |
| 7.92 wz.30 | 7,92 | 12,8- 14,7 | 700 | 4500 | 700 | 8/200 | 250 or 330 round belt |
| Reibel wz.31 | 7,5 | 10 | 850 | 3600 | * | * | On tanks R35, H35 |
| "Gochkicc" wz.35 | 13,2 | 51,2 | 800 | * | 450 | 20/400 | Shop 15 patr. Vickers tanks |
Armored vehicles arr. 1928 turned out to be slow-moving and had low cross-country ability. It was decided to convert them from half-tracks to wheeled ones. The remodeling project was drawn up in 1934. One armored car was converted and tested in March, which were more or less successful, and in September 1934, 11 armored cars mod. 1934. During alterations and further modernization, components of the Polish Fiat car were used. There were three modernizations in the machines mod. 34-1. The tracked undercarriage was replaced by a wheeled undercarriage with an axle for the Polish Fiat 614. A new engine "Polish Fiat 108" was installed..On the armored car mod. 34-11 was supplied with a Polish Fiat 108-III engine, as well as a rear axle of a new reinforced design, hydraulic brakes, etc.
Armored vehicles arr. 1934 were armed with either a 37 mm cannon or a 7.92 mm machine gun mod. 1925. Combat weight is 2.2 tons and 2.1 tons, respectively. For BA mod. 34-II – 2.2 tons. Crew – 2 people. Reservation - 6 mm horizontal and inclined and 8 mm vertical sheets.
BA arr. 34-P had a 25 hp engine. That is, it developed a speed of 50 km/h (for sample 34-1 - 55 km/h). The range is 180 and 200 km, respectively. The armored car could climb 18°.
By the beginning of the war, armored vehicles mod. 1934 were outdated and badly worn.
BA arr. 34
POLISH TANKS IN BATTLES
PzA supports German infantry on the streets of Warsaw
On September 1, German troops attacked Poland from the north, west and south. These included seven tank divisions and four light divisions. There were two tank battalions with 144 tanks in reserve.
Each tank division (TD) had from 308 to 375 tanks. Only in the 10th TD and the Kempf tank group there were 154 and 150 of them, respectively. Light divisions had from 74 to 156 tanks. Thus, total There were 2586 tanks, but not all of them were combat tanks; there were up to 200 so-called command tanks.
There are other data: G. Guderian spoke about 2800 tanks. Of course, not all Wehrmacht tanks were thrown into battle - approximately 75% of their total number, which amounted to 3195 units on September 1, 1939. They were distributed by type as follows: light tanks - Pz.I - 1145, Pz.II - 1223, Pz 35(0 - 219, Pz 38(0 - 76; medium - Pz.III - 98 and Pz.IV -211, commander - 215, three flamethrowers and five self-propelled guns. Light tanks therefore accounted for almost 90%.
The German light machine-gun tanks Pz.IA and Pz.IB (combat weight - 5.4-5.8 tons, armor - 13 mm) were incomparably weaker than the Polish 7TP. Pz.IIA (combat weight - 8.9 tons, armor - 14 mm, speed - 40 km/h) are armed with a 20 mm cannon. And 7TP could fight with them with hope of success.
Czech tanks in German army Pz.35(t) and Pz.38(t), armed with a 37 mm cannon, can be considered more or less equivalent to the Polish ones.
The Pz.III medium tanks with their 37 mm gun were superior to the 7TR in terms of armor and speed.
Thus, Polish cannon tanks, for the most part, could safely take on German light tanks. The TK-3 and TKS wedges were not suitable for combat, but only for reconnaissance and security.
But the Germans operated in large numbers of tanks (even a tank battalion had more than 70 tanks). And only reconnaissance patrols on light tanks and VA were desirable prey for Polish tanks, although the latter most often operated as part of a platoon and rarely a company.
From September 1 to 3, there were battles on the border, in which ten cavalry brigades, eight tank divisions, 11 separate tank companies (OTP), and eight armored trains took part. These were actions of reconnaissance groups and even attempts at counterattacks with forces up to a company and a squadron. Such clashes can be counted up to thirty, but Polish tank crews avoided encounters with enemy tanks. Losses amounted to about 60 tanks and armored vehicles, or 10% of the number participating in these actions. It is possible to take revenge on the actions of the 81st SKCR, which participated in the destruction of a German detachment pressed against Lake Melno. Tanks, VA and two armored trains provided support to the Volyn cavalry brigade near Mokra.
On September 4-6, battles broke out on the main line of defense. By this time, the armored forces had almost reached the stipulated strength, i.e. 580 combat vehicles and nine armored trains. In twenty battles, up to 100 armored units were lost, of which 50 were lost to the Lodz army. At the same time, the first took place not only in the Polish company, but in the entire Second World War tank battle(it would be better to say a battle of armored vehicles, i.e. tanks and armored personnel carriers). Here is how it was.
On September 4, on the left flank of the Piotrkow Task Force (Lodz Army), the German 1st Panzer Division attacked the positions of the 146th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Reserve Infantry Division along the Prudka River. The task force commander ordered the 2nd Tank Battalion to assist the infantry. The battalion has not yet participated in battles.
At about 15:00, two platoons of the 1st company, with the support of their infantry, drove away a German patrol with an armored vehicle, which tried to cross to the left bank of the Prudki River. At 8 o'clock, German light tanks and armored cars crossed the river and lost three vehicles, being attacked by tanks of the 1st company. The Poles lost one tank burned out and two damaged, the 146th regiment withdrew without interference.
To the left of the 1st company the 2nd company operated. She had a skirmish with a German detachment, detained him, but had two damaged tanks, however, towed to the rear.
On September 5, the advancing Germans were attacked by the 1st and 3rd companies, which were ordered to cut the highway to Piotrkow. Polish tanks met with light tanks of the 1st Panzer Division. The Germans were initially taken by surprise and lost four BA. Then the German tanks, bypassing the flanks, forced the Polish tankers to retreat to the north with the loss of eight tanks.
The 2nd Horn also attempted to stop the German column by destroying two armored vehicles, but the forces were unequal and the company withdrew. Losses amounted to five burned and five damaged tanks.
By evening, having left the battle, 24 tanks had gathered in the forest, six of them damaged in tow. The 3rd company, consisting of 12 tanks, ended up in a different place. There was not enough fuel and ammunition. Some of the cars had to be abandoned. The battalion only briefly held back the German advance, destroying up to 15 combat vehicles. The remnants of the battalion on the 6th gathered in the forest near Andresnol, then they began to retreat to the northeast, losing vehicles as a result of breakdowns and air attacks. Only 20 tanks reached Brest-nad-Bug, where, after repairs, a separate tank company was formed. On the 15th and 16th the company fought with the Germans at Wlodawa and on September 17th received orders to march to the Romanian border. But the border, even the Hungarian one, was crossed only by people - damaged tanks that had no fuel were destroyed and abandoned. The battle at Petroków is considered to be the largest tank battle of the Polish armored forces.
On September 7-9, Polish troops retreated to the Vistula and beyond the Vistula. Both acted at the front motorized rifle brigades and other parts: a total of 480 armored units. Losses during these days in twenty battles exceeded 100 units.
Pz.II, shot down on the streets of Warsaw
Destroyed Pz.I from the 5th Panzer Division
The 1st Tank Battalion entered the battle in the Inowroclaw area on September 7, and on the 8th on the Dzhevichka River. The battalion practically ceased to exist as a tactical unit. Only 20 tanks, mostly from the 3rd company, went beyond the Vistula. On September 15, the remnants of the battalion became part of the W.B.P.-M. and on September 17 they repulsed German attacks in the Yuzefov area.
On September 8, the defense of Warsaw began. At 21.00 that day, the platoon of 7 "GR unexpectedly collided with a platoon of German tanks near the cemetery in Wrzyszew. The Germans did not expect the attack and lost three of the four tanks. Already in the dark, another battle took place with German tanks, and the Poles suffered some losses.
On September 12, a combined detachment of 7TR tanks attacked the Germans in the Okęcie area. At the same time, one German medium tank was captured. The tanks broke away from the infantry and were attacked by the Germans. Having lost seven of 21 tanks, the Poles withdrew.
On September 10-13, the Poles tried to advance on the Bzura River. By this time, the formation of all armored units had finished, but many that previously existed were no longer there. Combined units of no more than a company strength appeared. Both motorized brigades and nine armored trains operated at the front. There are about 430 armored units in total. Of which, 150 were lost in thirty battles.
At first, the Poles had some success in the battles on the Bzura River, but on September 14-17, almost all operational formations of the Polish army were defeated. On September 17, the ring of German encirclement closed in Brest-nad-Bug. Here, during the defense of the Brest Fortress, the old Renault FT “distinguished themselves”, who simply blocked the gates of the fortress with their corps and delayed Guderian’s tanks for a day. On the 17th, units of the Red Army entered Polish territory from the east.
The armored units defeated at Bzura retreated to Warsaw. Both brigades continued to fight, reduced essentially to battalions of light tanks: eight divisions and ten companies of tanks, numbering only about 300 armored units. Many vehicles had to be destroyed due to the impossibility of repairing them or lack of fuel. During this period, about 170 tanks and armored vehicles were lost, mainly on the Bzura River.
The 10th Cavalry Brigade ended its combat journey with a two-day battle, which opened the way for it to Lvov.
From September 18 to 29, only a few small armored detachments continued to fight in isolated pockets of resistance.
On September 18, a motorized brigade, two companies of light tanks and five other units were in action. In total there were about 150 armored units. Between September 18 and 20, about 160 combat vehicles took part in the battles near Tomaszow Lubelski. At first they were successful, capturing part of the city, destroying a lot of enemy manpower and equipment.
On September 22-23, the 91st armored division broke through the German positions and moved along with the Novogrodsk cavalry brigade to the Hungarian border, and on September 27 in the Sambir area, having lost all vehicles in battles with Soviet troops, finished his journey.
On September 28, 1939, General Demb-Bernadski announced the surrender of the armed forces of the Second Republic of Poland.
In short, all the tanks, wedges and armored vehicles were destroyed and captured by the enemy. And only about 50 armored units, having crossed the border, were interned in Romania and Hungary. And here’s what it all looked like in percentage terms: 45% were combat losses, 30% were technical losses, 10% were abandoned and destroyed equipment due to lack of fuel, and 10% surrendered during capitulation.
What are the losses of the enemy, i.e. the German Wehrmacht? It is known that in September 1939, the total number of Wehrmacht armored units was reduced by 674 tanks and 318 armored vehicles. According to German data, 198 tanks were irretrievably lost and 361 were damaged, including command tanks. In Polish sources we're talking about about 250 ticks, broken down by type: 89 – Pz.I (together with commander ones), 83 – Pz.II, 26 – Pz.III, 19 – Pz.IV, 26 – Pz.35(t), and seven Pz. 38(t). Basically, the Germans suffered losses from the fire of Polish anti-tank guns, anti-tank rifles and hand grenades. Polish aviation also caused some losses. Polish tanks, armored cars and armored trains destroyed 50 and possibly another 45 enemy armored units. In direct collisions of combat vehicles, both sides lost approximately 100 units. The greatest losses were suffered by the German 4th Light Division (about 25 units) in battles with 10 VK and W.B.P.-M. and the 4th Panzer Division (about 20).
German soldiers inspecting an abandoned Polish TKS wedge
What was the participation of Polish armored units in the battles with the Red Army advancing from the east? First of all, there were very few of them on this front. And these were the remnants of several companies and divisions. There can be two or three military clashes with Soviet units.
On September 14, a “half company” was formed from recently received French R35 tanks (two vehicles not included in the 21st Tank Battalion) and three H35 tanks. On September 19, two of its tanks carried out reconnaissance together with a squadron of lancers in the village of Krasne near the city of Buek. They drove out a detachment of “Ukrainian nationalists” (apparently, rebels) from the village. On September 20, the “half company” met with the advance detachment of the 23rd Tank Brigade of the Red Army. One tank was destroyed by anti-tank gun fire, the other, damaged, had to be burned. Now the “half company” was leaving the Soviet troops and in the Kamenka-Strumilov area they met a reconnaissance detachment of the 44th German Infantry Division. The Germans lost one tank destroyed and two damaged. September 25 again meeting with Soviet troops, withdrawal. The last tank had an engine failure; the tank was blown up. In total, the “half company” covered about 500 km.
Polish authors believe that the Red Army, in its liberation campaign, lost about 200 armored units - tanks and armored vehicles - from Polish artillery fire and infantry hand grenades. Our sources report combat losses of 42 tanks (and, apparently, BA): 26 units. falls on the Belorussian and 16 on the Ukrainian fronts. 52 tankers were killed and 81 were wounded.
Did the Polish armored forces fulfill their purpose in September 1939? If we take into account what these forces were, the number of combat units, their characteristics and technical condition, as well as their role assigned to Polish war plans, the results were not so bad. First of all, these small units of tanks and armored vehicles provided headquarters with valuable information about the enemy. And often they were practically the only such means. They helped cavalry detachments for these purposes and, in addition, more than once successfully fought with enemy armored units. Let's also add a great moral impact on both our troops and the enemy.
But in general, the Polish armored forces did not have much influence on the course of hostilities. IN unequal battle they were defeated. They lost their combat effectiveness not only from enemy actions, but also for technical reasons during the multi-hundred-kilometer retreat. Maybe it wouldn’t be so sad if the Polish armored vehicles inflicted noticeable damage on the enemy. In fact, not a single battle between Polish combat vehicles in which even small groups of tanks took part was won. But perhaps the first battle of the 10th motorized cavalry brigade can be called an exception.
800 Polish tanks and wedges did not change the course of a single battle. And although, of course, the Polish armed forces had no chance of winning the campaign, nevertheless, the command could use its armored forces much more effectively. At least twice the opportunity presented itself to gather a fairly large group of tanks and throw them into an attack on the enemy. For the first time, such an opportunity presented itself in the defensive battle near Petrkov and Borovaya Gora, when the introduction of two battalions of light tanks into the battle with the support of other armored forces could at least hold back the advance of the German 16th Corps. Another time, when attempting an offensive by Army Groups "Poznan" and "Pomoże", by decisively introducing all available armor into the battle, more noticeable results could be achieved and create a threat to the left wing of the 8th German Army in the initial stage of the battle over Bzura.
The use of armored units corresponded to the concept of the operational plan of the war and assumed the creation of a kind of curtain (cordon guard). This was more or less, given the number and composition of the armor (mainly wedges), reasonable. But all armored units were used in this “scattered” manner and no reserve of mechanized units was provided. True, even before the war, such a reserve of armor was provided for in the reserve army in the form of a support corps, which should have included up to half of all light tanks, however, this was not done. And the battalions of light tanks were immediately transferred to the field armies at the start of the war. The mistake of the High Command was that it did not concentrate the appropriate forces in the Piotrków area under a single command, which did not allow the armored forces to be used effectively.
In hindsight, we can say that there was a real opportunity to carry out an attack on all the armored units of the Lodz army. Such a strike could eliminate the breakthrough of the German 1st Panzer Division. And although the Germans had more tanks on their side, these were light tanks - Pz.l and Pz.II, which were significantly weaker in armament than the Polish 7TR.
The Poles could launch up to 150 tanks and wedges into a counterattack. It is very possible that this attack by Polish tanks on September 4 was able to at least temporarily stabilize the defense on the Prudka line and save the Polish 19th from defeat infantry division.
Several more examples can be given, but this will suffice. In a word, the Polish armored forces did what they could and as best they could. In any case, the Polish tank crews fought selflessly and without hesitation entered into hopeless battles with superior enemy forces.
Light tank R35 of the Polish army
Light tank7TR (double turret)
Armored car model 1934
Wedge heel TK-3
TKS wedge with 20mm cannon
Armored car model 1929
German command tank Pz Bef Wg I
Light tank "Vickers-6T" (Polish order)
German tank Pz IV
Polish light tank 7TR
German light tank Pz II
Polish light tank 7 TP
Captured tank 7 TP
Polish experimental amphibious tank PZ Inz 130
German medium tank Pz III
Soviet light tank T-26
Rostislav ANGELSKY
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