4th Guards tank army formed March 18, 1945 by transforming the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Upper Silesian Operation. It consisted of a directorate, the 6th Guards Lvov Mechanized Corps, the 10th Guards Volunteer Tank Corps, the 68th Guards Tank Brigade and a number of individual formations and units.

During Upper Silesian operation The army participated in the encirclement and liquidation of the Oppeln group of German troops, which was liquidated by March 22. On March 24, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps was included in the army, which, in addition to artillery and motorized rifles, had 150 tanks.

March 24, 1945 year, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps went on the attack in the direction of Leobschütz - Troppau, however great success I didn’t succeed and was able to advance only 3-4 km. In connection with this, the army commander brought the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps into battle in the direction of Steuberwitz. This maneuver yielded results; the corps advanced 10 km deep into the enemy’s defenses and created an immediate threat of encirclement of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which until that time had been holding back the advance of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. Over the next 3 days, the army completed the encirclement of German troops in the Biskau area and, in cooperation with the 60th Army, destroyed them.

Control
5th Guards Mechanized Corps
- 10th mechanized brigade
- 11th mechanized brigade
- 12th mechanized brigade
- 24th Guards tank brigade
6th Guards Mechanized Corps
- 16th Guards Mechanized Brigade
- 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade
- 49th mechanized brigade
- 29th separate tank regiment (from 03/17/1945 - 117th Guards Tank Regiment)
- 56th separate tank regiment (from 03/17/1945 - 118th Guards Tank Regiment)
10th Guards Volunteer Tank Corps
- 61st Guards Tank Brigade
- 62nd Guards Tank Brigade
- 63rd Guards Tank Brigade
- 68th Guards Tank Brigade
- 6th Guards Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division
- 200th Light Artillery Brigade

During Berlin strategic operation(April 16 - May 8) formations and units of the 4th Guards Tank Army, advancing on Berlin from the south, participated in the encirclement and defeat of the enemy group. On April 16, army units went on the offensive and, successfully advancing, captured the cities of Spremberg, Kalau, Luckau, Babelsberg, and on April 21 they reached the approaches to the southwestern outskirts of Berlin.

63rd Guards Tank Brigade under the command of Colonel M.G. Fomicheva, acting as a vanguard of the army, defeated the German garrison in Babelsberg (south of the outskirts of Berlin) and liberated concentration camps 7 thousand prisoners. Among them was the Prime Minister of France Edouard Herriot and his wife. On April 22, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps captured the cities of Beelitz, Treyenbritzen and Jüterbog, where the airfield and about 300 enemy aircraft were captured. Having reached the Treyenbritzen, Beelitz line, the corps began a battle with the advanced units of the 12th German army General Wenck, who tried to break into Berlin. All enemy attacks were repulsed, and his units were thrown back initial position. On April 23, the 10th Guards Tank Corps crossed the Teltow Canal.

Having entered the German capital from the south, units and units of the army quickly moved to join forces with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, closing the encirclement ring around Berlin from the west. On the night of April 25, the 35th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps captured the city of Ketzin, 22 km west of Berlin, where it linked up with the 328th rifle division 77th Rifle Corps and with the 65th Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Belorussian Front, closing the encirclement ring in this area.
After which the 4th Guards Tank Army continued to carry out tasks to close the enemy’s exit route from Berlin to the southwest; prevent the remnants of the 9th German Army, which were breaking through the rear of our army in the Luckenwalde area, from leaving to the west, into American zone. On the morning of May 2, German troops, breaking through the encirclement, reached the army headquarters. The repulsion of the attack was personally led by Army Commander D.D. Lelyushenko, and by noon the enemy was destroyed.

1st of May The decisive blow of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps to the west and the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps to the east and southeast, in cooperation with units of the 13th Army of General Pukhov, completely defeated the formations of the 12th and the remnants of the 9th enemy armies. Belov's 10th Guards Tank Corps, together with other army formations, continued to storm the southwestern part of Berlin, pressing the enemy to the Brandenburg Gate. On May 2, the Berlin garrison capitulated.

During the Berlin operation, the troops of the 4th Guards Tank Army destroyed 42,850 enemy soldiers and officers, 31,350 were captured, 556 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 1,178 guns and mortars were burned and captured.

The army completed its combat path by participating in Prague strategic operation(April 16 - May 8) - last offensive operation Soviet troops in Europe. On May 3, the army surrendered its combat sector to the 69th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and began to concentrate in the forests 35-50 km south of Berlin to prepare a strike on Prague. The army received orders to advance in the 13th Army zone along the western banks of the Elbe and Vltava rivers in general direction Teplice - Šanov - Prague.

5 May Army units crossed the Elbe in the Torgau area. On May 6, the army went on the offensive, a day earlier than planned, due to the outbreak of the Prague Uprising. By the evening of May 6, the army troops, having marched 50 km, reached the Waldheim, Siebelen line, and advanced detachments advanced up to 65 km and captured an important railway junction - the city of Freiberg. On May 7, we advanced another 50-60 km, to the Frauenstein-Zayda line. Soon all the passes through the Ore Mountains were occupied by Soviet units. The 10th Guards Tank Corps occupied Teplice and Shanov, and the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Dukhtsev.

On the night of May 8 The 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, acting as a vanguard of the army, in the area of ​​the city of Zatec, destroyed the headquarters of Army Group Center, thereby completely paralyzing the control of German troops.

Operating in difficult conditions mountainous area, guardsmen of the 16th mechanized brigade G.M. Shcherbak on the morning of May 8 broke into the city of Most, which is of great military-industrial importance. A large synthetic gasoline production plant was located there. The brigade destroyed more than 20 enemy guns, defeated the Nazi garrison and liberated the city.

On the night of 9th May The 63rd Guards Tank Brigade broke into Prague. At 4.00 in the morning, the entire 10th Guards Tank Corps entered the Czech capital and reached its northeastern outskirts, eastern and southeastern outskirts. 6th Guards Mechanized Corps - to the southern and southwestern outskirts of the city. 5th Guards Mechanized Corps - to the western outskirts. Together with these units, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, 3rd Guards and 13th Armies also entered the city.

The 4th Guards Tank Army, by order of the front command after the liberation of Prague, advanced in the eastern and southeastern directions and cut off the routes of retreat for the defeated German troops to the west. The 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, operating in the direction of Pilsen, at 11 o'clock on May 9th met with the 2nd Infantry Division of the 5th Corps of the 3rd American army in the Rzicany area (20 km east of Pilsen).

During Prague operation from May 6 to May 10, 1945, the 4th Guards Tank Army, having fought about 200 km, destroyed and captured about 200 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 246 guns and mortars, 6290 vehicles, and captured 48 thousand German soldiers and officers, including 9 generals.

For courage, bravery and heroism in battle, tens of thousands of army soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 119 were awarded the title; Twice this title was awarded to D.D. Lelyushenko and M.G. Fomichev.

Commanders:
Lieutenant General D.D. Lelyushenko (18.3.1945 –9.5.1945)
Member of the Military Council:
Major General T/V V.G. Gulyaev (18.3.1945 –9.5.1945)
Chief of staff:
Major General T/V K.I. Upman (18.3.1945 –9.5.1945)
After the end of the war, the 4th Guards Tank Army was included in the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. In 1946, the army was renamed the 4th Guards Mechanized Army. Its corps were transformed into divisions.

Composition of the army in 1946

Control
25th Tank Corps
5th Guards Mechanized Division
6th Guards Mechanized Division
7th Guards Mechanized Division
10th Guards Tank Division

In November 1946 due to personnel reduction Armed Forces USSR 4th Guards Mechanized Army was transformed into the 4th Guards Separate Personnel Tank Division. Accordingly, its divisions were transformed into separate personnel regiments, regiments into separate personnel battalions or divisions, separate battalions into separate personnel companies or batteries.

During 1949 From separate personnel units, the full-blooded 4th Guards Mechanized Army was re-formed as part of the 6th and 7th Guards Mechanized and 10th Guards Tank Divisions.

Army composition for 1958

Control
6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division
11th Guards Motorized Rifle Division
10th Guards Tank Division.

In 1958 year again reorganized into the 4th Guards Tank Army. In 1960 it was transformed into the 20th Guards Army.

January 17, 1974 by Decree of the Presidium Supreme Council USSR for services in battles against Nazi invaders and success in combat training, the 20th Guards Army was awarded.

Tank forces of the USSR ["Cavalry" of World War II] Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Fourth Guards Tank Army

The 4th Guards Tank Army was scheduled to be formed at the end of February 1943. In accordance with this, the formation of the field command of this army began. However, on March 1, I.V. Stalin gave instructions to General N.I. Biryukov to delay the formation of this army. On March 31, Stalin signed directive No. 46097 of the Supreme Command Headquarters to the commander of the Moscow Military District and the deputy people's commissars of defense on the formation of the 3rd reserve army in the Kaluga region by April 15. Its composition included: field control of the 4th Guards Tank Army with support units, service institutions and army rear services; 51, 62, 63, 70, 76, 95 and 119th rifle divisions, formed in the Kaluga region according to Headquarters directive No. 46081 of March 20. By April 5, the field command of the 4th Guards Tank Army was to be concentrated in the Kaluga region, where it was renamed the field command of the 3rd Reserve Army.

Stalin returned to the question of the formation of the 4th Guards Tank Army in the course of preparations for the battle on Kursk Bulge. On June 26, Order No. 46194 of the Supreme High Command Headquarters was issued on the completion of the formation of this army in the Moscow region by July 1, but under the name of the 4th Tank Army with direct subordination to its Headquarters. Lieutenant General was appointed commander of the army tank troops V.M. Badanov, relieved of his post as commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, became deputy army commander - deputy commander of the 57th Army, Major General of Tank Forces E.E. Belov, chief of staff - chief of staff of the 12th Army, Colonel P.I. Drugov. The 4th Tank Army included: the army command, deployed on the basis of the command of the 19th Cavalry Corps; 6th Guards Red Banner Mechanized, 11th Tank and 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps; motorcycle regiment; separate reconnaissance armored battalion; separate engineer battalion; 118th Signal Regiment; two delivery truck battalions; warehouses for armored vehicles, automobile equipment, fuels and lubricants, food, artillery, military-technical equipment, clothing, sanitary; army repair and restoration tank and automobile battalions, three evacuation stations, two collection points for emergency vehicles, an autosanitary platoon, an army artillery workshop; army workshops for the repair of communications equipment and clothing; field mobile hospital; two field laundry detachments; Army Field Base Management; separate army base maintenance company; field automobile bakery.

From 12 o'clock on July 18, 1943, in accordance with Directive No. 39641 of the General Staff, the 4th Tank Army was included in the Western Front. She was to take part in the Oryol strategic offensive operation.

Oryol strategic offensive operation (July 12 – August 18, 1943)

As already mentioned in the chapter devoted to the 2nd Guards Tank Army, on July 12, 1943, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front, Bryansk and Central Fronts went on the offensive, marking the beginning of the Oryol strategic offensive operation (code name “Kutuzov”).

By the end of July 19, units of the 1st and 5th Tank Corps of the Western Front bypassed Bolkhov from the west and southwest and, wedged deep into the enemy’s position, created a threat to his main communications connecting Orel and Bryansk. By this time, the 20th Tank Corps, introduced into the battle in the Bryansk Front, in close cooperation with formations of the 61st Army, completed a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, advanced to a depth of 20 km and created a threat to bypass Bolkhov from the southeast. The enemy, trying to avoid encirclement, gradually began to withdraw his units from Bolkhov. Now the most vulnerable direction for the entire Oryol enemy group was Khotynets. If the troops of the Western Front managed to capture Khotynets, then it would be possible to cut off this entire group from its communications. But the front did not have enough forces to solve this problem. Therefore, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to bring its reserves into the battle - the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies. Formations of the 4th Tank Army (652 tanks and self-propelled guns) arrived on the left wing of the Western Front on July 24. Commander of the Western Front, Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky decided on the morning of July 26 to lead the army into a breakthrough in the zone of the 11th Guards Army in order to strike in a southwestern direction, intercept the Orel-Bryansk railway and highway, and also isolate and destroy part of the forces in cooperation with the 61st Army Bolkhov enemy group. No more than ten hours were allotted for preparation for the offensive.

The troops of the 4th Tank Army had to break through the heavily fortified enemy defenses and by the end of the day on July 26, advance to a depth of 60 km. Marshal Soviet Union THEIR. Bagramyan, at that time commander of the 11th Guards Army, noted in his memoirs: “But we already had considerable experience of gnawing through strong, deeply echeloned defenses in sharply rugged terrain, and I doubted whether it was wise to introduce such a mass of tanks into battle without the appropriate preparing and ensuring a breakthrough. Tanks can, as they say, get bogged down in enemy defenses and suffer unjustified losses. Isn’t it better to send an army in the Khotynets direction: there are better conditions for tanks to operate, and this direction itself becomes decisive. But General V.D. Sokolovsky stood his ground: the tanks would go to Bolkhov. Then I asked to be given a few days to prepare the entry of a tank army into the zone of action of the 8th Guards Corps. V.M. Badanov began to ardently prove that the tank army itself would be able to break through the defenses and defeat the enemy. Since his opinion corresponded to the plan of the front commander, it was decided to introduce a tank army in the Bolkhov direction on the move.”

Subsequent events showed the error of the decision of the front commander and the rightness of General Bagramyan. The troops of the 4th Tank Army, together with the 11th Guards Army, had to break through the previously prepared four lines of enemy defense, densely saturated with firepower, manpower and obstacles. On the very first day, the 11th Tank and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps suffered heavy losses in combat vehicles, mainly from the fire of buried and camouflaged enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. And only the introduction of the 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps into the battle made it possible to change the situation. Formations of the 4th Tank Army reached the Orel-Bryansk railway, creating favorable conditions for the offensive of the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, which liberated Bolkhov on July 28.

The enemy was forced to begin the withdrawal of his troops from the Oryol bridgehead. The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front, advancing in the Oryol direction from the east, immediately began pursuing them. To strengthen the front, according to Directive No. 30154 of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, from 24 hours on July 29, the 11th, 11th Guards Armies, 4th Tank Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were transferred from the Western Front.

At the same time, a “debriefing” took place, that is, the reasons for the slow advance and large losses of the troops of the 4th Tank Army took place. On July 30, Headquarters representative Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Bryansk Front, General M.M. Popov was summoned to Headquarters to report on the actions of the army. In his memoirs about this, Army General M.M. Popov writes: “After my summary report, accompanied by comments from G.K. Zhukov, Headquarters made a decision: stop the offensive of the tank army immediately. That same night, replace Badanov with troops of the 11th Guards Army, which will be given a day to prepare and tasked with breaking through the enemy’s anti-tank line. Badanov urgently needs to put things in order and prepare for re-entry into the breakthrough.” From the army, on the basis of Directive No. 13335 of the General Staff of July 31, the 25th Tank Corps was transferred to the 11th Guards Army.

On August 5, formations of the 3rd and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front liberated Oryol. The Supreme High Command headquarters, trying to consolidate achieved success, on August 6 ordered the commander of the Bryansk Front to concentrate his main efforts on the rapid capture of Khotynets and Karachev. The commander of the Central Front was instructed to “use the 2nd and 3rd tank armies to strike in the direction of Shablykino with the task, in cooperation with the right wing of the Bryansk Front advancing on Karachev, to destroy the enemy retreating from Orel to the west.”

However, the offensive of the troops of the Central Front developed slowly. On the right wing they advanced only 10 km. Troops of the 65th and 70th armies supported by aviation of the 16th air army Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky was liberated on August 12. On the same day, formations of the 13th Army, having encountered organized enemy resistance from the western banks of the Vodocha and Lokna rivers, were forced to go on the defensive.

On the Bryansk front events developed as follows. On August 6, the 11th Guards Army went on the offensive. At the same time, the 1st Tank Corps was advancing in the direction of Vysokoye, the main forces of the 4th Tank Army were advancing from the Peshkovo area to Melovoe, bypassing Khotynets from the east, and the 25th Tank Corps was advancing towards Bunino. They with common effort defeated the Khotynets enemy group and liberated Khotynets. After this, the 1st Tank Corps struck at Karachev, and the 4th Tank Army somewhat to the south.

By August 18, the troops of the Bryansk, Western and Central Fronts reached the advanced positions of the enemy defensive line “Hagen” created in advance and were stopped on a line east of Lyudinovo, 25 km east of Bryansk, west of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky. This completed Operation Kutuzov, during which troops on three fronts advanced up to 150 km, eliminating the enemy’s Oryol bridgehead. We discussed the results of the operation in detail in previous chapters, so we will not repeat them.

After the completion of the Oryol operation, the troops of the 4th Tank Army did not participate in hostilities for quite a long time. On August 28, 1943, according to Directive No. 40508 of the General Staff, the 11th Tank Corps was withdrawn from the army and sent by rail to a new area. According to Directive No. 41361 of the General Staff of September 29, the army (6th Guards Red Banner Mechanized, 30th Volunteer Ural Tank Corps, 51st Motorcycle Regiment, 59th Armored Car Battalion, 593rd Air Squadron) was transferred to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. All existing tanks and self-propelled guns, except for command tanks, were ordered to be left on the Bryansk Front. The army was ordered to concentrate by the morning of October 2 in the area of ​​​​Karachev, Butra, Somovo.

On January 10, 1944, a new General Staff directive No. 291182 was sent to the headquarters of the 4th Tank Army on its transfer by rail from January 16 to the Bucha, Irpen, Belgorodka, Svyatoshino areas. The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front was ordered to ensure the deployment of the army in the specified area and enroll it in pay. On February 13, another directive No. 291824 was received from the General Staff:

“The Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered:

1. 4th Tank Army as part of the 10th Guards. Tank Corps, 6th Guards. mechanized corps, army administration with all army reinforcement units and rear services from 24.00 on February 13, 1944 to be transferred from the Headquarters reserve to the reserve of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

2. The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front is allowed to use the 4th Tank Army depending on the situation.”

The troops of the 4th Tank Army, together with the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Armies, were to take part in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy offensive operation. Therefore, in our further narration, we will touch only on those issues that are directly related to the 4th Tank Army.

Proskurov-Chernivtsi offensive operation (March 4 – April 17, 1944)

The troops of the 4th Tank Army, in accordance with Directive No. 220029 of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated February 18, 1944, along with the 13th, 60th, 1st Guards and 3rd Guards armies, were part of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front . It was supposed to strike from the front of Dubno, Shepetivka, Lyubar in a southern direction with the task of defeating the enemy group in the area of ​​Kremenets, Starokonstantinov, Tarnopol and capturing the line of Berestechko, Brody, Tarnopol (Ternopil), Proskurov, Khmilniki. In the future, firmly securing yourself from Lvov, advance in the general direction towards Chertkiv with the aim of cutting off southern group enemy troops have an escape route to the west in the zone north of the river. Dniester. The beginning of the offensive is March 4–6.

Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Army General N.F. Vatutin planned to introduce the 4th Tank Army into a breakthrough from the Sadki, Lyakhovtsy line with the aim of striking in a south-eastern direction to Yampol, Svyatets, Basalia, Cherny Ostrov, Proskurov. In cooperation with the 3rd Guards Tank Army, by the end of the 6-8th day of the operation, it was to capture the Proskurov area and reach the Cherny Ostrov, Nemychintsy, Grechany area. The actions of the troops of the 4th Tank Army were supported from the air by the aviation of the 2nd Air Army.

On March 4, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. Despite the muddy roads, formations of the 60th and 1st Guards armies, supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft, quickly broke through the enemy’s defenses and advanced 12 km. To develop success in the zone of the 60th Army in the Tarnopol direction, an army mobile group (4th Guards Tank Corps) was brought into battle, and in the Proskurov direction - a front mobile group (4th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies).

On March 7, the advanced units of the 60th Army reached Tarnopol, creating a serious threat to the Lviv-Odessa railway, the main communication line of the enemy’s entire southern strategic wing. A deep wedge had been driven between his 4th and 1st Tank Armies. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal E. von Manstein, trying to prevent the Soviet troops from capturing the road, moved 9 tank and 5 infantry divisions to the Tarnopol, Proskurov line. As a result, a battle broke out in which up to 1,300 tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns. Heavy fighting in the area of ​​Tarnopol and Proskurov exhausted the main forces of the front, which on March 12 were forced to go on the defensive.

At this time, Lieutenant General D.D. was appointed commander of the 4th Tank Army. Lelyushenko, who previously commanded the 3rd Guards Army (see Appendix No. 3). “The appointment as commander of the tank army made me very happy,” wrote Army General D.D. Lelyushenko in the book “Moscow – Stalingrad – Berlin – Prague. Notes of the Army Commander. – The experience of the war showed firsthand that large armored formations played vital role on the battlefields. The speed and maneuver of tank forces, the strength of fire, the surprise of a strike, access to operational space in short time“, the ability to encircle and defeat large operational reserves of the enemy, both independently and in cooperation with other branches of the military, were direct indicators of our increased military art and the presence of industrial power.”

March 9 General D.D. Lelyushenko, together with the chief of communications of the 3rd Guards Army, Lieutenant Colonel A.Ya. Ostrenko and operational department officer A.A. Dementiev arrived at the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front, located in the town of Slavuta. Front commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov briefed them on the situation and common tasks, which had to be resolved by the 1st Ukrainian Front, as well as the role assigned to the 4th Tank Army. He drew attention to the complexity of tank operations in conditions of spring thaw and to the increased enemy resistance in the zone of operations of front troops. Indicating which enemy units are operating against the 4th Tank Army in the Podvolochisk, Voytovtsy sector and along the line railway Tarnopol - Proskurov, Marshal Zhukov demanded to hold their positions at all costs.

According to Marshal Zhukov’s plan, after capturing Tarnopol and Proskurov, it was envisaged to give the front troops a five-six-day break, and then resume the offensive with the aim of reaching the river. Dniester and thereby cut off the southern group of enemy troops from the retreat route to the west in the strip north of the Dniester. The main blow by the forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the 1st Guards and 60th armies, reinforced artillery and with the support of all front aviation, was planned to be delivered from the area of ​​Tarnopol, Volochisk, Proskurov in the general direction of Chertkov, Kamenets-Podolsk . An auxiliary blow was to be delivered by the 18th and 38th armies from the Proskurov line, r. Southern Bug to Raigorod in the general direction to Novaya Ushitsa, Mogilev-Podolsky. In accordance with the decision of Marshal Zhukov, the troops of the 4th Tank Army were to strike parallel to the 1st Tank Army from the Volochisk area in the direction of Gusyatin, Kamenets-Podolsk and capture the Kamenets-Podolsk, Khotin area.

I.V. On March 11, Stalin approved the decision of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the same time, it was necessary not to limit the left wing of the front to the Dniester, but to force it on the move, developing an attack on Chernivtsi (Chernivtsi) with the aim of occupying this point and reaching the state border of the USSR. After capturing the line of Berestechko, Brody, Gorodishche, Buchach, it was prescribed to continue the offensive with the goal of capturing the area of ​​​​Lvov, Przemysl and reaching the right wing of the front on the river. Western Bug, i.e. on the state border of the USSR, for which purpose the regrouping should be carried out in such a way as to strengthen the right wing of the front.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General A.N. Bogolyubov informed General D.D. Lelyushenko that the former commander of the 4th Tank Army decided to deliver the main blow in the direction of Swiatiec-Frydrychowka. In the zone of the upcoming offensive, the SS assault brigade "Langemarck", battle group"Ebergart", SS infantry regiments "Zuid" and "Flanders", 677th Engineer Regiment, 218th Engineer Battalion and other units. To coordinate the actions of units of the 4th Tank and 60th armies, a task force of staff officers from both armies was located at the location of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. It was headed by Major General E.E. Belov, deputy commander of the 4th Tank Army. General A.N. Bogolyubov also reported that General V.M. Badanov is at army headquarters, unwell. “The army headquarters was moving to a new location,” Lelyushenko recalled. – Former commander, Lieutenant General V.M. Badanov flew straight from the old command post to Moscow for treatment. So we never saw him.”

On the morning of March 10, General D.D. Lelyushenko took the Po-2 plane to the headquarters of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. Corps commander General E.E. Belov reported to the new army commander that he had decided to firmly hold the railway line in the Friedrichowka-Voitovtsy section. He also said that the corps is under dual subordination - both to the commander of the 4th Tank Army and the commander of the 60th Army, and the 62nd Tank Brigade is temporarily transferred to the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

General Lelyushenko approved the decision of the commander of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. Then, having contacted Marshal Zhukov via HF, he asked him to return all the troops of the 4th Tank Army to the subordination of the army commander. The next day a front directive to this effect was received. However, the 62nd Tank Brigade returned without a single tank.

On March 11, the chief of staff of the front ordered the troops of the 4th Tank Army to securely gain a foothold on the reached line, replenish fuel and ammunition reserves, restore equipment and begin preparations for the offensive. The 1672nd, 222nd anti-tank artillery and 1442nd self-propelled artillery regiments, the 6th pontoon-bridge brigade and the 1506th automobile battalion were sent to strengthen the army.

According to the decision of General Lelyushenko, the 10th Guards Tank Corps was to, bypassing the town of Skalat from the east, in cooperation with the 8th Infantry Division of the 60th Army, destroy the opposing enemy and, by the end of the first day of the operation, capture the settlements of Grzymalów and Okno; by the end of the second day of the operation, capture Gusyatin and, developing the offensive, to the end fourth day drive the enemy out of Kamenets-Podolsk. 6th Guards mechanized corps(commander - Lieutenant General A.I. Akimov), in cooperation with units of the 23rd Rifle Corps, was ordered to destroy the enemy in the area of ​​​​the Malinnik tract and with the exit rifle units to the line of the southern edge of the Malinnik tract, Ivanovka, continue the offensive in the general direction of Krasnoye, Satanuv, securing the left flank of the army.

On the morning of March 21, after a short artillery preparation and an air strike, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front resumed their offensive. Troops of the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, having crossed the Dniester and Prut, liberated the Kolomyia station on March 28 and the next day the city of Chernivtsi.

In the direction of operations of the 4th Tank Army, events unfolded as follows. Having broken through the enemy’s defenses and repelled three counterattacks, the 10th Guards Tank Corps captured the village of Grzylow by 16:00 on March 22, and the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps captured the village of Okno. The neighbor of the 4th Tank Army, the 823rd, was advancing decisively rifle regiment 60th Army. The enemy put up stubborn resistance, using large quantities anti-tank mines, engineering obstacles and faust cartridges. Rasputitsa slowed down the pace of the offensive and the delivery of fuels and lubricants, ammunition and food. In the army's zone of action there was only one tolerable road with a cobblestone surface, going south in the direction of Chertkov, but, while retreating, the enemy destroyed and mined it in places, especially near crossings over rivers and streams.

On March 23, the 61st Guards Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, at top speed with headlights on, firing from cannons and machine guns, suddenly captured the village of Zinkovtsy. At half past ten on the morning of March 24, army headquarters received a directive from Marshal Zhukov, which stated:

“The 4th Tank Army will rapidly develop the offensive and capture the Kamenets-Podolsk area on March 25. In order to seize the crossing over the Dniester River in the Khotyn area, send one tank brigade with motorized infantry with the task of seizing the bridge at Zhvanets near Khotyn on the night of March 24-25, 1944 and firmly securing it to ourselves. Build a perimeter defense in this area. Move the 10th Guards Tank Corps to the Kamenets-Podolsk area, and the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps to the Zherdier area. Use barriers to occupy road junctions in the area of ​​Chemerontsy, Smotrich, Dunaevtsy, Lyantskorun and prevent the enemy from retreating to the south and southwest. Conduct reconnaissance in the direction of Yarmolintsy.”

Fulfillment of the task, as before, was complicated by the fact that the battle formations of the troops of the 4th Tank Army were too stretched due to bad roads, and for the same reason, an acute shortage of ammunition and fuel continued. Nevertheless, the formations continued to develop their offensive in a southeastern direction, overcoming the fierce resistance of the 7th Panzer Division and the Adolf Hitler Panzer Division, as well as enemy infantry formations. At half past four in the afternoon on March 24, the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade of Colonel M.V. Medvedev in collaboration with the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade, Colonel M.G. Fomicheva took possession of the town of Skala on the river. Harness, which lay in the deep operational rear of the enemy’s 1st Tank Army. The forward detachment of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps is the 49th Mechanized Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel P.N. Turkina - occupied the town of Orinino, not far from Kamenets-Podolsk. 61st Guards Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Zhukov and the 62nd Guards Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel S.A. Denisov was liberated by Gusyatin, capturing three trains with tanks and artillery, warehouses with food, uniforms and ammunition. In the evening, the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards Tank Corps captured the town of Dolzhok near Kamenets-Podolsk, cutting off the enemy’s escape route in the southwestern direction. The 20th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Tank Army crossed the Dniester near the settlements of Zalishchiki and Ustechko.

During the night of March 25, the troops of the 4th Tank Army, having occupied the suburbs of Kamenets-Podolsk, were preparing to storm the city. The enemy garrison numbered over 9 thousand soldiers and officers, 85 tanks (including many Tigers), 62 guns, 300 machine guns. The enemy's 1st Tank Army was approaching the city from the east. The garrison of Kamenets-Podolsk received orders to hold the city at any cost until her approach. Defensive structures were created in a hurry, since the enemy did not expect such a quick exit of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to Kamenets-Podolsk from the west.

By decision of General Lelyushenko, it was planned to deliver the main attack on Kamenets-Podolsk from the west and southwest with the forces of the 10th Guards Tank and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps. The attack began at 5 pm on March 25 after a short but powerful artillery fire attack and a salvo guards mortars. In order to divert the enemy's attention from the direction of the army's main attack, it was planned to strike from the southeast and north an hour earlier.

The assault on Kamenets-Podolsk was carried out at such a rapid pace that the enemy did not have time to blow up either the Turkish bridge, or the power plant, or any industrial enterprise. By the morning of March 26, the city was completely cleared of the enemy. 72 tanks, including 49 Tigers, and 400 vehicles were captured as trophies. More than 800 were released from prison Soviet citizens who faced certain death. Partisans under the command of I.I. took an active part in the liberation of Kamenets-Podolsk. Shitova and the underground workers.

With the loss of Chernivtsi, the enemy lost the last link between his troops operating north and south of the Carpathians. At the same time, the enemy’s 1st Tank Army was finally cut off from the 4th Tank Army, and with the exit of the right-flank formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the city of Khotyn on March 30, it found itself surrounded in the area north of Kamenets-Podolsk. According to some sources, up to 18 enemy divisions were surrounded, and according to other sources, 22 divisions, including 10 tank divisions. However, the encircled group was not destroyed, which was due to the lack of tanks and artillery of the advancing armies, the great stretch of communications, the lag of headquarters and rear agencies in conditions of severe spring thaw, poor organization of reconnaissance, and the untimely adoption of measures by the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to strengthen the 4th tank army and the creation of a strong internal front of encirclement from the west. The army had only 67 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the 30th Rifle Corps (121st and 30th Rifle Divisions, 29th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment) attached to it had a significant shortage, especially in equipment. The army experienced an acute shortage of fuel and ammunition. In addition, a gap of about 30 km wide opened between the 1st Guards and 4th Tank armies, which the front did not have the strength to cover.

As already noted, the commander of the German 1st Tank Army, Colonel General Hube, having concentrated his main forces north of Kamenets-Podolsk by the end of March, made a daring breakthrough in the northwestern direction. A strong blow from a large enemy group fell on the troops of the 4th Tank Army in the Kamenets-Podolsk region, since the only paved road leading west through Orinin and further to Buchach and Podgaitsy passed through this city. From March 28 to April 2, fierce battles took place to the death. Despite multiple superiority in manpower and equipment, the enemy failed to capture Kamenets-Podolsk, Zherdier, Orinin and Zhvanets. The troops of the 4th Tank Army steadfastly repelled all enemy attacks. Units of the 61st and 63rd Tank, 29th Unechskaya Motorized Rifle, 16th Mechanized Guards and 49th Mechanized Brigades, 121st Rifle Division, 127th, 28th and 56th Tank Regiments defending Kamenets-Podolsk recaptured 16 attacks by several tank and infantry divisions. In one of the battles, the commander of the 29th Guards Unechskaya was killed motorized rifle brigade Colonel M.S. Smirnov.

The cities of Orinin and Zherdier were defended by the 30th Rifle Division of the 30th Rifle Corps, the 312th Guards Mortar and 51st Motorcycle Regiments, and the 20th Engineer Brigade of the 4th Tank Army. The headquarters of the 4th Tank Army, 6th Guards Mechanized and 30th Rifle Corps with special units were also located there. The bloody battle for Orinin and Zherdier lasted five days. Although the enemy had a tenfold numerical superiority here and superiority in tanks, he was unable to achieve success. “The fascists broke into Orinin three times,” recalled Army General Lelyushenko, “each time it came to hand-to-hand combat, in which officers of the army headquarters, political department, all services and branches of the military took part. The enemy, leaving mountains of corpses of his soldiers and officers, rolled back. I still remember how G.K. had to interrupt his report three times. Zhukov on the radio in connection with the enemy's breakthrough on command post 4th Tank Army. At these moments the front commander said: “Go, lead the repulsion of the attack, I hope that you will not be captured, and then you will report.” Having suffered heavy losses and having failed to achieve success in the battles for Kamenets-Podolsk, Orinin, Zherdier, the enemy was forced to trudge through continuous mud, abandoning equipment in order to save at least part of the soldiers and officers from complete destruction.”

At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to advance to the Borshchev area (between Kamenets-Podolsk and Buchach) by April 2. Here he unexpectedly came across the 1672nd and 222nd anti-tank fighters. artillery regiments, traveling to the Kamenets-Podolsk area to help the troops of the 4th Tank Army. The artillerymen quickly found their bearings, deployed their guns and destroyed 22 enemy tanks, 17 self-propelled guns, up to 300 vehicles and more than 1,000 soldiers and officers.

At the same time, from the area of ​​Podhajtsy, Buchach, the forces of the SS Panzer Corps (9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions), 100th Mountain Rifle and 37th Infantry Divisions, transferred from the west, struck east towards the formations of the 1st Panzer Army , fighting his way out of the encirclement. E. von Manstein noted in his memoirs that by April 9, the 1st Panzer Army was liberated, without indicating the cost of the breakthrough to the west. According to Marshal Zhukov, the encircled group suffered huge losses, and only headquarters remained of some formations. “Neither I nor the front headquarters could determine exactly how many Nazis broke out of the encirclement,” he noted. Different numbers were mentioned. As it turned out later, it was not dozens of tanks with landing forces that emerged from the encirclement, as the troops then reported, but much more.”

The troops of the 4th Tank Army, reinforced by the 147th Infantry Division, received a new mission on April 6. By order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, on April 7, they made a forced march in vehicles to the western bank of the river. Stripa. From this line they had to strike at Podgaitsy and push the enemy back to the river. Koropets. However, here they met fierce enemy resistance and were forced to go on the defensive on the river. Stripa. The main forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front, having failed to break through to Lvov, by order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, also switched to a tough defense on April 17.

Despite the fact that the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front failed to fully complete their assigned tasks, they liberated a significant part of the territory of Right Bank Ukraine and defeated the enemy’s 1st and 4th tank armies. Soviet troops reached the foothills of the Carpathians, cutting the strategic front of the enemy’s southern group into two parts.

During the fighting, the 4th Tank Army covered more than 350 km in muddy conditions with bloody battles. Together with the 1st Guards, 60th, 1st Tank and 38th Armies, it defeated 7 enemy tank and 6 infantry divisions, destroyed and captured 230 tanks (of which 73 Tiger tanks), 386 guns and mortars , 230 armored personnel carriers, 9,500 vehicles, an armored train, 250 motorcycles, 60 tractors, 60 warehouses with ammunition, fuel and food. About 20 thousand soldiers and officers were killed, and more than 14 thousand people were taken prisoner. The Army gained valuable experience in completing a breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone in cooperation with combined arms armies, developing success in operational depth, independently seizing and holding large city(Kamenets-Podolsk), capture of the crossing on the river. Dniester.

After the completion of the Proskurov-Chernovtsy operation on April 18, 1944, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front ordered the troops of the 4th Tank Army to surrender their positions to the formations of the 1st Guards Army and on the night of April 19 to concentrate 60 km southeast of Ternopil ( in the area of ​​Jablonow, Maidan, Janow). However, the rest of the army troops did not take place due to the created difficult situation in the sector of the 1st Tank Army beyond the Dniester, in the Kolomyia region. By order of the front commander, on the night of April 20, the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps was sent to this area, where it assisted the 1st Tank Army in defeating large enemy forces. Parts of the 10th Guards Tank Corps went over to the defensive beyond the Dniester in early May, and the remaining army formations concentrated east of Ternopil, preparing for the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation.

Army troops were replenished, repaired military equipment and engaged in combat training. This took into account the experience gained in previous battles. And they revealed a number of significant shortcomings in the actions of units and formations. In order No. 0066 of General D.D. Lelyushenko dated April 22, 1944, noted insufficient cohesion tank crews, bad organization reconnaissance in battle, poor use of tank maneuvers directly on the battlefield, inability to properly organize the interaction of tanks with infantry and artillery, etc. In order to eliminate the noted shortcomings, the army commander ordered combat training to begin on April 23, for which 10 training hours per day were allocated .

Order No. 0119 of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front dated May 1 was also aimed at eliminating shortcomings in the combat operations of armored and mechanized forces. It noted that commanders, corps commanders and their staffs do not know how to organize and conduct reconnaissance, as a result of which tank and mechanized troops know the enemy very poorly and especially his anti-tank defense system and the regroupings carried out by the enemy. The 4th Tank Army stands out for the worse. When planning operations, headquarters do not think through the issues of command and control, communications and logistical support of units to the fullest depth. The headquarters of the 4th Tank Army was separated from its troops by up to 50 km, and the rear did not provide the troops with fuel and ammunition, which led to a loss of tempo of the offensive. The organization of interaction between tanks and artillery and aviation, the fire training of some young crews, the management of battle formations and the combination of fire and movement are not at the proper level.

The front commander ordered the commanders of the tank corps to be with the main forces, having with them an operational control group. Brigade commanders with their headquarters were to be located no further than 1 km from the battle formations, and regimental and battalion commanders were to be located directly in the battle formations. The tank attack had to be supported and accompanied by artillery, mortar fire and aviation to the entire depth order of battle enemy. The attack was to be carried out on maximum speeds, conducting intense fire on the move and from short stops. From May 1 to May 10, army commanders were ordered to conduct one lesson with corps headquarters, corps commanders with brigade headquarters - two, brigade and regiment commanders with headquarters and commanders of battalions and companies - three lessons each. At the same time, it was necessary to organize gatherings of intelligence officers by corps, paying special attention to the organization and technique of conducting reconnaissance day and night. All officers of the armored and mechanized forces were ordered to study by June 1, 1944 the Charter of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army, parts I and II.

From April to July, the 93rd Separate Red Banner Zhitomir Tank Brigade, Colonel S.K., was included in the 4th Tank Army. Doropeya and the 68th anti-aircraft artillery division of Colonel A.F. Kozlova. In addition, by July 10, the army was almost 100% staffed with personnel - 40,415 people, 80% with tanks and guns, and 60% with vehicles (2,788 vehicles).

There have been some changes in the command structure. Major General of Tank Forces K.I. became the chief of staff of the army. Upman, and the head of the operational department of the army headquarters since April 14 is Colonel S.S. Maryakhin.

The chapter “First Guards Tank Army” covers in detail all issues related to the preparation and planning of the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation. Let us recall that the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal I.S. Konev decided to deliver the main blow from the Ternopil region to Lviv with the forces of two combined arms (60 and 38), two tank (3rd Guards and 4th) armies and a cavalry-mechanized group of Lieutenant General S.V. Sokolova. The 5 air corps of the 2nd Air Army of General S.A. were intended for air support. Krasovsky.

In accordance with order No. 00596/239/op of the front commander dated July 7, the troops of the 4th Tank Army were introduced into the breakthrough in the 38th Army zone in order to rapidly develop it in the direction of Przemyshlany, Gorodok (Grudek Jagiellonski) and defeat the Lvov enemy group. On the second day of the operation, the army was ordered to reach the area of ​​Lyakhodov, Svirzh, Voitsekhovice, Borshchev. Subsequently, developing the offensive, bypass Lviv from the south, prevent the enemy from retreating from the city to the west and southwest, and on the fourth day of the operation, capture the area of ​​​​Velkopolye, Gorodok, Lyuben, Maly, Sukhovolya. Strong forward detachments needed to capture Mostiska and the river crossings. The Dniester southwest of Rudkov, at the same time conduct reconnaissance in Przemysl, Sambir, and in the Yanov, Yamelna area enter into combat cooperation with the 3rd Guards Tank Army. To support the 38th and 4th Tank Armies, the 8th Attack and 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of the 2nd Air Army were allocated. The readiness of the troops for the offensive is by 20.00 on July 12.

The commander of the 4th Tank Army, General Lelyushenko, decided to introduce the 10th Guards Tank Corps with reinforcements into the breakthrough on the second day of the operation in the sector of the 70th Guards Rifle Division of the 38th Army. The corps had to develop a rapid offensive to capture the western bank of the river. Zlota Lipa in the Remizovce, Koronets area and by the end of the day liberate the town of Svizh, the city of Peremyshlyany and the village of Bobrka. At the same time, the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps was introduced into the sector of the 211th and 221st Rifle Divisions with the task of developing an offensive towards Pomorzany, Ostałowice and, by the end of the second day of the operation, capturing the area of ​​Niedzeliska, Wojciechowice, Brzuchowice.

As already noted, enemy reconnaissance was able to reveal the location and composition of the combined arms armies operating in the first line, the concentration areas of the 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry, the 25th and 31st Tank Corps and the 3rd Guards Tank Army. At the same time, it was not possible to detect the regrouping of the 11th Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 10th Guards Tank Corps of the 4th Tank Army. The enemy believed that these corps still continued to remain in the Kolomyia region on July 13, while they were already in new concentration areas on July 7.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the troops of the 60th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, going on the offensive on July 15, during three days of stubborn fighting, broke through the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 18 km, forming the so-called Koltovsky (Koltuvsky) corridor 4–6 km wide. On the morning of July 16, the main forces of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were introduced into it.

Chief of Staff of the Front, Army General V.D. Sokolovsky, who arrived on the evening of July 15 at the observation post of the 38th Army, where the commander of the 4th Tank Army was located, reported by telephone to the front commander about the advisability of introducing a tank army into the 60th Army zone after the 3rd Guards Tank Army. At two o'clock on July 16, Marshal Konev ordered General Lelyushenko to leave the 63rd Guards Tank and 17th Guards Mechanized Brigades in the 38th Army zone, and send the main forces of the 4th Tank Army north to the 60th Army zone and at dawn On July 17, enter the breakthrough following the 3rd Guards Tank Army with the same task.

General Lelyushenko, having received the order, immediately took measures to coordinate issues of interaction with the 3rd Guards Tank and 60th Armies. The commanders of the 6th Guards Mechanized and 10th Guards Tank Corps were given the task of moving north, to a new entry point into the breakthrough - to settlements Koltov, Nusche. They were also instructed to coordinate cooperation with the 15th Rifle Corps of General P.V. Tertyshny and primarily with the 322nd Infantry Division of General P.N. Lashchenko. After this, General Lelyushenko and the task force went to the command post of the 60th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies, where he assessed the current situation on the spot and clarified the tasks of the corps by radio. After entering the breakthrough, units of the 10th Guards Tank Corps were ordered to develop an offensive following the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the direction of Trostyanets-Mala. Upon reaching the Zolochev area, it was necessary to turn in a southwestern direction, bypassing Lviv from the south, destroy enemy reserves and by July 18 capture the town of Gorodok (30 km west of Lviv). The formations of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps were supposed to move behind the 10th Guards Tank Corps, and from the Zolochev area turn southwest, capture Peremyshlyany, where they would leave one brigade. The main forces of the corps were to defeat enemy reserves in the area of ​​the town of Svizh, and by July 19 reach the line south of the town of Gorodok.

The entry of the 4th Tank Army into the Koltovsky corridor was ensured by the actions of two assault, two bomber and two fighter aviation corps. The expansion of the breakthrough was entrusted to the 106th Rifle and 4th Guards Tank Corps. The 31st Tank Corps was also deployed here.

On the night of July 17, the forward detachment of the 10th Guards Tank Corps - the 61st Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Zhukov, - having overtaken units of the 15th Rifle Corps, repelled three enemy counterattacks from the south in the Trostyanets-Maly area and at 8 o'clock in the morning captured a strong point near Zolochev. Following the advance detachment, the main forces of the 10th Tank Corps advanced, followed by the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps. They have already covered 5–8 km, like the enemy forces of the 1st and 8th tank divisions(more than 100 tanks) launched a counterattack on the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps from the south and units of the 13th Army Corps from the north. As a result, a fierce battle ensued, during which units of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps made desperate efforts to hold the corridor. On July 18, formations of the 10th Guards Tank Corps captured Olshantsy (40 km east of Lvov), located 70 km from the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps. The front commander, taking into account the current situation, ordered General Lelyushenko with the forces of the 10th Guards Tank Corps to continue to carry out the assigned task, and to leave parts of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, along with formations of the 60th Army, in the Koltovsky corridor until further notice.

Marshal Konev's decision meant that the corps of the 4th Tank Army were forced to conduct fighting in different directions. The allocation of only one corps to carry out the main task of the army to reach the operational depth and defeat large enemy reserves could lead to the failure of this task. In addition, the rear of the army was threatened by a large enemy group that was trying to break through to the south from the Brody area. In this regard, General Lelyushenko appealed to the front commander with a request to allow the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps to be withdrawn from the Koltovsky corridor to develop the attack on Lvov. It was proposed to entrust the holding of the corridor to other units of the front. However, Marshal Konev upheld the previous decision. On the evening of July 18, the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General V.N., arrived at the CP of the 4th Tank Army on instructions from the front commander. Kostylev. He understood the situation and visited the headquarters of the 4th, 3rd Guards Tank and 60th armies. After this, he reported to the front commander about the need to satisfy General Lelyushenko’s request. Soon Marshal Konev agreed to this. The directive to the commanders of the tank armies stated:

“The situation for the rapid actions of your army has developed favorably. The enemy has no reserves in the Lvov area.

I order:

1. The commander of the 3rd Tank, no later than the morning of July 20, will take Lvov by an outflanking maneuver from the north and northwest. I order General Baranov’s group to capture Zholkiev.

2. The commander of the 4th Tank with a swift attack bypassing Lvov from the south in cooperation with the 3rd Tank to capture Lvov. Ensure the operation from the south from the directions of Przemyshlany and Mikolajów. 93 Tank Brigade should be left in the Koltuv area until the enemy is eliminated.”

To replace the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 4th Guards Tank Corps of General P.P. moved into the Koltovsky corridor. Poluboyarova.