The armed struggle took place in various theaters of war using numerous artillery systems, aircraft, tanks, self-propelled artillery guns, small arms, optical instruments and ammunition for various purposes, cars and other military equipment. Each day of the war, the soldier’s military path was accompanied by the most widespread, widespread weapon - small arms. The main weapon of the German soldier on the eve of World War II was the 98k carbine of 7.92 mm caliber, which was a shortened modification of the rifle of the brothers W. and P. Mauser, and a number of carbines were equipped with optical sights and were used to arm snipers. The Mauser rifle model 1898, caliber 7.92 mm, also continued to be in service.
Both the rifle and the carbine were equipped with blade-type bayonets. Shooting from a carbine and rifle was carried out with cartridges equipped with bullets for various purposes. The F. Mannlicher M-35 repeating rifle was used as a small weapon in Hungary. At the end of the 1930s. The Italian army was equipped with a short M-38 rifle chambered for 7.35 mm. In pre-war Italy, there was also a carbine of the Carcano M91/24 system with a folding bayonet. The main types of rifles in the Romanian armed forces were the Mannlicher model 1892 and the Czechoslovakian Mauser model 1924, 7.92 mm caliber. In service with the Japanese army were infantry rifles N. Arisaki: “type 98”, sniper “type 97”, 7.7 mm caliber and “type 44” carbine, 6.5 mm caliber. The US Army infantry was armed with the A. Springfield M1903 repeating rifle with manual reloading and was used primarily as a sniper weapon. In 1929, the M1903A1 Garand modification appeared.
In Great Britain, the 7.7 mm J. Lee-Enfield rifle, widely used during the First World War and improved in the interwar years, served as a model for the creation of new models adopted by the army. The French army used rifles by A. Berthier and the original MAS-36 device of 7.5 mm caliber, which met all the latest requirements. The rapidly developing Wehrmacht required a large number of pistols. For this purpose, after 1934, the production of G. Luger parabellum caliber 9 mm (P-08) was restored in Germany. By the beginning of World War II, Wehrmacht units already had more than 500 thousand of these pistols. During the war, the production of parabellums ceased, and they were replaced by more technologically advanced and less sensitive to contamination F. Walter pistols of 9 mm caliber (P-38). During the war, some SS units and special units of the Wehrmacht used a limited number of Mauser brothers system pistols of the 1896 model, 7.63 mm caliber.
The Italian army was armed with Beretta pistols M-1923 and M-1934 of 9 mm caliber. Pistols designed by D. Sosso were also produced in Italy. Since 1929, the Hungarian army had been armed with the R. Frommer 29M pistol, and in 1937 the officers received the 37M pistol, which was a slightly improved version of the 29M model. The pistols were produced in two calibers - 9 mm and 7.65 mm. In Finland, the L-35 pistol of the A.I. Lahti system, similar in appearance to a parabellum, was in service. In the interwar years, the personal weapons of the Japanese army became Type 26 revolvers, as well as Hamada Type 1 and Nambu Type 14 pistols. In the mid-1930s. The Nambu type 94 pistol was also adopted. In 1921, after modernization, the United States adopted the 45-mm Colt M1911A1 as the main model. Colt pistols were widespread in many countries of the world and were in service in more than twenty.
In Great Britain powerful pistol company "Webley-Scott" served as the basis for the creation of a pistol of modifications in 1906, 1912, 1913 and 1915, adopted by the army and navy and used during two world wars. The designers of all pistols from this company were W. Whiting and D. Carter. By the beginning of World War II, the Colt Model 1911 became widespread, but adapted to fire Webley cartridges. Before World War II, France adopted the MAS-35 7.65 mm “MAB model D” converted from the Swiss pistol S. Petter. The Polish Army was armed with the Ng-30 revolver, exact copy Russian revolver, and VIS-35 - the army pistol of P. Wilniewczyc and J. Skrzypiski of the 1935 model. Sometimes it was called “radom” after the place of manufacture - the Broni factory in Radom. The army model of the pistol turned out to be similar in design to the Colt Model 1911. Long debates over the advisability of using submachine guns in the Wehrmacht weapons system ended with the decision of the Armament Directorate to develop
They are used for manning crews of armored vehicles, paratroopers, as well as commanders of squads, platoons and infantry companies. In 1938, the 9 mm MP-38 submachine gun created by Erfurt-Maschinenfabrik was adopted by the 203, which was a significant step in the development of this type of weapon, and two years later it was modernized (MP-40). In the Wehrmacht, 7.92-mm anti-tank rifles of the 1938/39 model were intended to fight tanks at close ranges, penetrating armor up to 25 mm at a distance of up to 300 m 204 .
On the eve of World War II, the Italian army was armed with a Beretta submachine gun model MAB-38/42. In addition to Italy, it was widespread in other countries. The Romanian infantry was armed with the Orita submachine gun, designed by L. Jasca. The Suomi M-31 submachine gun of the A.I. Lahti system was carried by the infantrymen Finnish army in 1931, and Japanese infantrymen were armed with a Type 100 submachine gun. In the US Army, the crews of armored vehicles were armed with J. Thompson submachine guns of 45 mm caliber. In the USA in the 1920s–1930s. they had little distribution. The complexity of manufacturing and the high cost of various models of a submachine gun turned out to be unacceptable in wartime conditions. During the first period of World War II, the Ordnance and Technical Supply Directorate developed the M3 submachine gun in 45 mm caliber. The British Army was armed with the Lanchester Mk I submachine gun, designed by G. Lanchester, and the Sten Mk I, designed by R. Shepherd and G. Turpin, which were distinguished by their simplicity of design and high technology. They were put into service in 1941 to replace the expensive J. Thompson submachine guns previously purchased from the USA. The infantry of the French army was armed with a compact submachine gun MAS-38 of 9 mm caliber. The Wehrmacht widely used the MG-34 machine gun, used both as a manual and easel machine gun.
Italian infantry armed heavy machine guns"Fiat Revelli M1914" and manual - "Breda 30". The Type 11 and Type 99 machine guns were in service with the Japanese army. The British Army was armed with Bren and Vickers machine guns. The main machine guns of the US armed forces were mainly obsolete Brownings - M1917 and M1919. The lighter K. Johnson model 1941 light machine guns were not widely used. Powerful weapons infantry support was the 12.7 mm M2 machine gun of the J. Browning system. The French army was armed with the Chauchat 1915 and MAC M1924/29 machine guns. The creation of the first German tanks was successfully carried out since the early 1930s. G. Guderian developed in detail the theory of small tank blitzkrieg - the tactics of tank forces in which the main emphasis is on maneuver, speed, surprise and the creation of overwhelming superiority in the direction of the main attack 205. For the purpose of misinformation, the first tank was given the name “agricultural tractor.” In 1934, it received the official name PzKrfw I Ausf (T-I A) series A, then series B began to be produced - T-I B.
T-I tanks of all series had only machine gun armament and bulletproof armor. In total, until mid-1937, 1493 tanks were produced (T-IA - 477, T-IV - 1016). In addition, command tanks, as well as assault guns and other special vehicles, were produced on the T-I basis. Although T-I tanks were originally intended for training tank crews, they were used as combat units when conducting operations in Spain, Poland, France. On September 1, 1939, the Wehrmacht had 1,445 T-I tanks, which accounted for 46% of the entire German tank fleet. In parallel with the T-I, the production of T-II tanks began, armed with a 20-mm cannon and also having bulletproof armor. These tanks were produced in various modifications (from A to L) from 1935 to 1941; a total of 2,628 T-II tanks rolled off the assembly line. By the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, there were 793 T-II tanks in the east, that is, 20% of the total number. In 1934, the German Army Armament Service issued an order to four companies for the production of a new T-III tank, which was also produced in several series (from A to O). At first, the tanks were equipped with a 37-mm cannon, then on the G series - a 50-mm cannon with a barrel length of 42 calibers, and on the J series, the barrel length was increased to 60 calibers. Production of the T-III took place from 1936 to 1943, with a total of 6,000 tanks produced. When developing them, “the Germans used the achievements of English tank building, however, making significant changes to the design.”
In February 1935, an order was placed with German companies for the production of new, more powerful tank T-IV, and in 1938 the first T-IV tanks of series A were produced. Then followed by series B, C, D, etc. With each new series, armor protection was strengthened, especially on series E and F, firepower increased and the tank's combat weight inevitably increased. Tanks of all series were equipped with a 75-mm gun, at first a short-barreled one with an initial velocity armor-piercing projectile 385 m/s. The T-IV turned out to be the only Wehrmacht tank that was produced throughout the Second World War (from 1937 to 1945) and essentially became a symbol of the German tank forces.
Former German general F. Mellenthin wrote that during the campaign in the West, “the T-IV tank gained a reputation among the British as a formidable enemy mainly because it was armed with a 75-mm cannon” 207 . In general, before the war, the German tank industry produced four types of tanks: T-I, T-II, T-III and T-IV, each of which had several modifications. As of September 1, 1939, the Wehrmacht had 3,195 tanks, of which 1,445 were T-I, 1,223 T-II, 98 T-III, 211 T-IV, 3 flamethrower, 215,208 commander tanks.
The main production of tanks was concentrated at the companies "Krupp", "Daimler" and "Rheinmetall", and armor castings - at the factories "Bochumer-Verrhein", "Krupp" and "Skoda". Since the autumn of 1940, the German leadership of the war economy began to use the industrial potential of the occupied countries. First of all, the military industry of Czechoslovakia was subordinated to the needs of the Wehrmacht: the Skoda and BMM factories produced Rz Kpfw 35 (t) and Pz Kpfw 38 (t) tanks, 240 mm M-16 guns, 170 mm and 210 mm guns for the Wehrmacht , 210 mm mortars. The aviation industry of Czechoslovakia produced up to 1,500 aircraft per year. The Wehrmacht also established the production of optical instruments, communications equipment, chemical, engineering and other equipment. At the expense of Czechoslovakia, Germany's military-industrial base increased by about 20–25% in the production of artillery, small arms and ammunition, and by 15–20% in the production of aircraft, tanks and tractors 209. Italian armored vehicles during the Second World War in their own way tactical and technical characteristics noticeably lagged behind the military equipment of Germany and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. It was based on CV-33 wedges, L6/40 light tanks and M13/40 medium tanks. Romanian armored vehicles had R-2 tanks - copies of the Czechoslovak LT vz 35, as well as outdated Renault FT-17. During the war, the Romanian army received German T-III and T-IV. The basis of Hungary's armored forces were the 38M Toldi light tanks and the 40M Turan medium tanks.
Before the start of the war with the Soviet Union in 1939, Finland had only a few Vickers Mk E and outdated Renault FT-17. But during the fighting, the tank fleet of the Finnish army was replenished with captured Soviet T-26, T-28 and armored vehicles. During the fighting, several more BTs and T-34s were added to them. The most popular tanks in the Japanese army were the light Ha-Go type 95 tanks and the medium Chi-Ha type 97 tanks. The Ha-Go tank was a development of the wedge class; it was armed with a 37 mm cannon and two 6.5 mm machine guns. A total of 1,161 such tanks were produced. The Chi-Ha medium tank became the backbone of the Japanese tank forces, and 1,220 of these vehicles were produced. The tanks were equipped with a 47 mm cannon and two 7.7 mm machine guns; the initial projectile speed reached 825 m/sec and ensured penetration of 75 mm thick armor at a distance of up to 560 m. The tanks were equipped with a two-stroke diesel engine. In 1941, Japan adopted medium tank"Chi-Nu", equipped with a 75-mm cannon with increased ballistics. However, only 60 units of these tanks were produced. In terms of its combat power, level of armor,
The quality of the chassis of Japanese tanks was significantly inferior to Soviet, European and American models. By 1939, the tank forces of the Japanese armed forces had more than 2 thousand combat vehicles, about half of which were obsolete 210 brands. Germany's main continental rival, France, occupied the 1930s. second place in the world in terms of number of tanks. Thus, in 1939, the French army had about three thousand light, 300 medium and 172 heavy tanks, and in addition, more than 1,600 obsolete Renault tanks. Among French theorists there was no consensus on the use of tank forces, although it was generally accepted that tanks were not only a means of reinforcing infantry, but could act independently. The B-1 heavy tank, which was in service with the French army, was a modernized version of the model from the late 1920s. It had powerful, but inconvenient to use weapons: two cannons of 47 mm and 75 mm caliber, reliable armor protection up to 60 mm. Bulky, inactive, with a short power reserve, difficult to control and operate, the tank turned out to be of little use for use in combat. The Renault 35 light tank, adopted in 1935, had good armor protection for this class of vehicle, but at the same time had a 37-mm cannon with a low muzzle velocity, low specific power and speed, in addition, was inconvenient to operate due to the cramped fighting compartment, in which the tank commander combined the duties of a gunner. The main medium tank of the French army was the Somua-35 tank, mass-produced since 1935, which had good armor protection (40–56 mm), a maximum speed of 40 km/h and a range of up to 260 km, equipped with a 47 mm cannon. By May 1940, 500 of these tanks were produced. Light French tanks were approximately equivalent to the German T-II, medium tanks S35 and H35 were not inferior to German T-III, and heavy B-1s were superior to all Wehrmacht tanks in terms of weapon power and protection, but were inferior to them in maneuverability and speed, which “had a very negative impact during their combat use."
British doctrine boiled down to the fact that tank forces should consist of tank units attached to the infantry, as well as tank formations, like “tank cavalry” 212. In accordance with this, the industry produced two types of combat vehicles: a tank for direct infantry support - an infantry tank and a cruising tank. In 1938, the Mk II Matilda infantry tank was adopted and put into production, which had powerful armor (75–78 mm) and a diesel engine, but extremely weak weapons - a 40 mm cannon and a 7.7 mm machine gun of the " Vickers." The Mk II was replaced in 1940 by the light tank Mk III Valentine, which gained a high reputation among the troops. Of the cruising ones, the Mk IV Covenanter, Mk V Covenanter and Mk VI Crusader were used in the initial period of the war. When creating the tank, as well as during the development of the Soviet BT tank, the ideas of the American W. Christie were used. However, British engineers failed to create a design that met the requirements of the time; they were forced to install outdated Liberty gasoline engines on them.
The tank remained poorly armed, difficult to maintain and control, and unreliable in operation. Cruiser tanks showed unsatisfactory combat qualities and were very quickly taken out of production. Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov recalled: “All this shows how difficult it was at that time to create good tanks” 213. Subsequently, production of the Mk IV Churchill heavy tank was launched in Great Britain. In addition, the British troops used American tanks"M4 Sherman", delivered under Lend-Lease. By the beginning of the war, the British army had no more than 1 thousand, mostly light tanks. Given its geographic location, the United States, until the beginning of World War II, focused on its navy and aviation.
Regarding tanks, the dominant idea was that they could only be used for direct infantry support. The organization of armored units as an independent branch of the military was not envisaged. Only in 1940 did tank forces take shape as an independent branch of the military. By the beginning of World War II, the American army had only 292 light double-turret tanks of the M2A2 and M2A3 models, armed with machine guns. In a short time, by March 1941, the Americans created and put into mass production the first light cannon tank under the M3 Stuart brand, equipped with a 37-mm gun. Using their powerful industrial potential, they began to develop and produce medium tanks, named after the military leaders “M3 Grant Lee” and “M4 Sherman”, armed with a 75 mm cannon. Thus, the M4 Sherman was produced during the war in large quantities and in various modifications with star-shaped and V-shaped gasoline power units. At the same time, the Americans also sought to use diesel engines, for which purpose they installed M4 Sherman tanks power plants of two diesels 214. In general, by the beginning of World War II, the US and British armies did not have a tank fleet suitable for conducting maneuverable combat operations. The armored vehicles of the Polish Army consisted only of TKS tankettes and 7TP light tanks. Before World War II, the artillery of most states was divided according to combat purpose - into cannon, howitzer, anti-tank, anti-aircraft artillery and mortars, and according to the organizational principle - into battalion, regimental, divisional, corps and reserve artillery of the main command. Battalion artillery included light mortars and 37–50 mm cannons. Regimental artillery consisted of 107–120 mm mortars and 75–76 mm guns (in the German infantry regiments, in addition, there were companies of infantry guns - six 75 mm and two 150 mm guns). Divisional artillery was represented in all armies by light 75–76 mm cannons (in England - 87.6 mm howitzer gun), light (105–122 mm) and heavy (150–155 mm) howitzers. The corps artillery was armed with heavy cannons and howitzers of 105–155 mm caliber. The artillery of the RGK was intended to qualitatively and quantitatively strengthen formations operating in the main directions; it consisted of units and formations armed with guns for various purposes of caliber from 76 to 305 mm.
In some countries there was a limited number of guns with a caliber over 305 mm: in the USA - 355, 406 mm; in Germany - 355, 380, 406, 420, 600, 806 mm. Many armies were armed with mortars, and in Germany, in addition, rocket artillery combat vehicles. In the field of anti-aircraft artillery, German designers managed to achieve significant success. They created anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of 20 to 150 mm, which provided reliable cover for ground forces from enemy air strikes, and also made it possible to withstand raids by many thousands of Allied heavy bombers on cities and industrial facilities in Germany. A peculiarity of German large-caliber anti-aircraft guns was that they were developed as part of complexes, which also included radars for detecting air targets and aiming anti-aircraft guns. Small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were created in both single-barreled and twin-barrel versions, and the 20-mm gun was created in the form of a quadruple installation.
At the same time, self-propelled guns were created to provide air defense for mechanized troops on the march. anti-aircraft installations on the chassis of tanks, armored personnel carriers or half-track artillery tractors. The development of assault guns was carried out quite consistently in Germany, although less attention was paid to this area than to tanks. The impetus for the development of assault guns was the Polish campaign. By the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht had the Artshturm assault gun, created by the Daimler-Benz concern, with a 24-caliber barrel, which was based on the T-III tank. Serial production of 75 mm assault guns in Germany began only in the second half of 1940, and they were used mainly for direct infantry support 215. Later, as part of the Artshturm modifications, a tank destroyer with a 48-caliber barrel was developed. In total, taking into account the vehicles delivered to Germany's allies (Romania, Finland, Bulgaria, etc.), about 10.5 thousand guns of various modifications were manufactured. Another assault anti-tank gun was made on the basis of obsolete Pz KpfwI tanks by installing Czechoslovak 47-mm anti-tank guns on them. In total, before the war, about 200 such guns were produced in Germany, which entered service with anti-tank fighter divisions.
In Germany, rocket artillery appeared as a result of a search effective means smoke interference. The first installations equipped with 150-mm rockets were called “Fog Thrower” (Nebelwerfer - a device that shoots smoke). This 150 mm mortar consisted of six barrels mounted on a modified carriage of a 37 mm Pak 37 cannon, with chemical, incendiary, high-explosive and high-explosive ammunition 216. By the beginning of the war, the Germans also had 210, 280 and 380 mm mines, the launchers for which were simple tubular barrels or wooden frames, which were used as stationary installations to create a fire shaft or by engineering assault groups to destroy houses and other well-protected objects . After the occupation of many European countries, the German army (judging by captured materials) was armed with about 170 types and calibers of various guns 217 . The Italian artillery used Canon 75/27 model 11 cannons, Obik 75/18 and Canon 149/35A mountain howitzers.
The anti-aircraft artillery was equipped with 20-mm anti-aircraft guns “20/60 Breda model 35” and “Canon 20/77”. 47-mm “Canon 47/32” were used as anti-tank weapons. Among the anti-tank guns in the Romanian army, the Pak 40 and the 37-mm Bofors gun were widely used. During the period between the world wars, the Hungarian armed forces had a 75-mm mountain gun of the 1915 model, a 149-mm howitzer of the 1914 model from Skoda. The Finnish ground forces were armed with 37 mm and 47 mm anti-tank guns, 75 mm regimental guns, 105 mm and 122 mm howitzers and 81 mm mortars. The artillery of the Japanese armed forces was represented by 75 mm Type 38 field guns, 75 mm Type 90 cannons, 70 mm Type 92 howitzers, 105 mm Type 91 howitzers, 37 mm Type 94 anti-tank guns ", 47 mm Type 1 anti-tank guns and 75 mm Type 88 anti-aircraft guns. In Great Britain, in the first months of the war, anti-tank artillery used the QF 2 pounder (“two-pounder”), which had a small caliber and was not capable of hitting most German tanks. The Vickers QF 2 pounder Mark VIII (an improved two-pounder) was used as an anti-aircraft gun, which was later replaced by the 20 mm Oerlikon and 40 mm Bofors. The organization of artillery in the US Army was no different from the British. The anti-tank guns included the 37 mm M3 gun, the British QF 6 pounder (“six-pounder”) and the 76 mm M5 gun. The infantry was supported by 75 mm M116 howitzers, 105 mm M101 howitzers and 155 mm M114 howitzers. The anti-aircraft artillery most often used were 37 mm M1 guns, Swedish Bofors guns produced under license, as well as 90 mm M2 guns. The artillery of the French army used 25 mm Hotchkiss anti-tank guns, 47 mm anti-tank guns of the 1937 model, 75 mm field guns of the 1897 model, 105 mm Bourget howitzer guns of the 1935 model and 75 mm Schneider anti-aircraft guns. Along with artillery, combat weapons were also progressively developed in the armies of the states that participated in World War II. engineering troops. The Wehrmacht entered the war with one sample of the T Mi 35 anti-tank mine (in two modifications), one sample of the Sprengmine-35 anti-personnel mine (in two versions - push and pull action). By the spring of 1941, the Wehrmacht adopted another light anti-tank mine, the Pz Mi, intended primarily for parachute units. In Germany, for the first time in the world, they adopted a program for the development of mine weapons, which included: one type of river mine with a fuse, a fire mine, a radio mine fuse, one type of anti-tank and anti-personnel mine each, and a special mine layer. At the same time, their projects in the field of mine development were based on fundamental principles: safety during installation, reliability, efficiency, simplicity, and most importantly, non-removal and durability.
In the pre-war years, German designers were the first in the world to develop an aircraft remote mining system using an original technical solution. By 1939, universal miniature fragmentation bombs “SD-2 Butterfly” were developed for the Junkers-87 dive bombers. They were equipped with three types of fuses: a) ensuring the bomb explodes in the air or when it touches the ground; b) slow action (5–30 minutes); c) triggered when the position of the bomb lying on the ground changed. These bombs weighed 2 kg and were placed in drop cassettes - Mk-500 (6 pcs.), AV-23 (23 pcs.), AV-24t (24 pcs.), AV-250 (96 pcs.), AV-250 -2 (144 pcs.). In September 1939, during the Polish campaign, the Germans used cluster bombs for the first time. German ammunition designers have developed delayed-action fuses with a delay of up to 2–3 days for conventional high-explosive bombs (100, 250, 500 kg).
They managed to turn aerial bombs into remotely deployed object mines, which excluded the possibility of carrying out rescue and restoration work at the bombing site, especially in cities. The mine detectors, which were in service with the Wehrmacht at that time, were divided into two main groups: heterodyne and those operating according to an electric bridge. The first included "Neptune", "Aachen-40", "Berlin-40", "Tempelhof-41", the second - "Frankfurt-42", "Vienne-41", "Herat". Before the war in Germany short time work began on the development of new and modernization of existing means of mechanization of road and earthworks. Various types of road-digging equipment have received further improvement: universal excavators “By-City”, “Climix”, bucket wheel excavator ATG, trench excavators “Austin”, “Barber-Green”, sawmills “Gutter”, “Hoffman”. Road-digging equipment, purchased before the start of the war in other countries and confiscated in the occupied territories, was widely used.
However, due to the insufficient number of mechanization means during the war, the main road and earth-moving work was carried out through the massive use manual labor prisoners of war and the local population. The experience of the Second World War showed that the use of vehicles to supply troops with all types of materiel had a serious impact on the course and outcome of operations. After the successful conduct of the first campaigns, the high command of the German ground forces was alarmed by the situation with the equipment of the troops with vehicles. It turned out that it was impossible to resolve this issue satisfactorily. Difficulties arose not only with a shortage of vehicles, but also with the low degree of their suitability for use by the troops. For the most part, the vehicles mobilized for the Wehrmacht were of different types, which made it extremely difficult to produce spare parts and supply them to the troops. Because of this, very often artillery and infantry had to resort to horse traction. As a temporary way out of the current situation, captured vehicles began to be used in large quantities, which, however, made vehicle repairs even more difficult 218 . The United States had enormous capabilities to use vehicles of all types and purposes in the military. The US automobile fleet at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War consisted of 32 million vehicles, of which about 4.5 million were trucks.
In the interwar years, the economies of many countries were faced with the task of creating modern means of communication. The German command in 1936 adopted a program for the development of military radio communications, which determined its organization, the range of radio equipment for various types of troops, their frequency ranges, radiation powers, issues electromagnetic compatibility And so on. By the beginning of the war, backpack radio stations of various modifications from Torn-Fu-a to Torn-Fu-t, operating in the HF and VHF wavelength ranges, were most widespread in the infantry units of the Wehrmacht. The most widespread HF radio stations in infantry units during the war were Torn-Fu-b1 and Torn-Fu-f. These radio stations provided a communication range of up to 20 km in telegraph mode, and 10 km in telephone mode. The equipment was placed in two 20 kg packages and carried by two soldiers. Fu series radios were used in tank forces. The most common were tank stations of the Fu-5 type, operating in the range of 27.2–33.3 MHz. On some German tanks, only Fu-2 type radios were installed, and on command tanks, additionally, Fu-7 radios (42–48 MHz) were installed for communication with aircraft. Accordingly, Fug-17 radio stations were placed on the aircraft of commanders of aviation units and units for communication with tanks. In the Luftwaffe, the most widely used radio stations were the Fug type (Fug-10, Fug-3a, etc.) both for communication between aircraft and aircraft with ground assets and tank forces. B. Müller-Hillebrand admits that the Wehrmacht lacked various types of technical equipment, including communications equipment.
Since the mid-1930s. In Germany, radar began to develop widely. Research in this area was carried out by separate groups of scientists at various universities and institutes of the country. Until 1938–1939 Research on “radio vision” was carried out mainly on the use of the meter and decimeter wave range. Germany started World War II with a significant number of meter and decimeter radar stations. They were widely used for naval ships, aircraft detection and gun guidance. UHF radars were among the best in the world 221. To detect aircraft, German air defense used stations such as Freya, Mammut and Wasserman. Thus, the Wasserman radar made it possible to detect aircraft flying at an altitude of 2000–3000 m above sea level 150 km away, and those flying at a higher altitude - at a distance of up to 300 km. In 1939, for gun guidance, the German military industry began to produce en masse the Little Wurzburg radar stations, operating in the decimeter range. In the initial stages of any operation, they posed a real threat, especially in conditions of darkness and poor visibility. During 1940–1943 These stations were modernized several times, equipped with attachments for protection against radio interference, their accuracy was increased and their design was simplified.
In 1940, German designers designed the Fug-25 “friend or foe” radar device to identify their ships and aircraft. In addition to radars for aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, designers produced a number of locators for their surface and underwater ships, tanks, coastal defense, FAA missiles and other things. Until 1943, ships were mainly equipped with stations operating at a wave length of 80 cm with an average power of 60 W. These stations were installed both on big ships, and on destroyers and submarines. To detect enemy aircraft, German destroyers were equipped with stations operating at a wavelength of 50 cm, with an aircraft detection range of up to 70 km and a range accuracy of 3–4 km. FuMo-61 stations with a detection range of 7 km for ships up to 3 thousand tons were installed on submarines. These stations operated at a wavelength of 42–50 cm with a pulse power of 25 kW. They detected aircraft at 10–40 km. German submarines were also equipped with receivers to detect the operation of enemy radar stations. The torpedo boats were equipped with Liechtenstein-type aircraft locators.
Strategic and human intelligence of Great Britain and the United States collected a lot of information about the state of German radar. Therefore, the Allies prepared and unexpectedly “brought down” the centimeter range radars they had developed on Germany. The first radars put into service became stations for detecting enemy aircraft. Chain Home radars (AMES Type 1) were later used in conjunction with the built Chain Home Low radars (AMES Type 2) to detect low-flying aircraft. The Chain Home line forced German aircraft to carry out low-level raids, thereby risking exposure to anti-aircraft batteries on ships and the coast.
Since the early 1930s. US scientists, commissioned by the military command, also began work in the field of radar. At the beginning they made three prototypes. The first of them, the SCR-268 T1, operated at a frequency of 133 MHz. The design of this sample formed the basis for the SCR-268 and SCR-270 radars. During 1933–1936 In the USA, the first experiments in aircraft detection have already been carried out using continuous centimeter wave radiation and the Doppler effect. By the early 1940s. created a centimeter-wave radar to detect aircraft at great distances. By December of the same year, the US Army Signal Corps had produced 18 stations on its own. In February 1941, the industry produced the first 14 radar stations. In the process of developing and improving the radar, American designers created three different antennas: for the transmitter, elevation receiver and azimuth receiver, new superheterodyne receivers and a new 5-10 kW transmitter were also developed. In the period between the two world wars, both individual designers and design teams of many countries were involved in the creation of aircraft. The German Air Force led the world in aviation at the beginning of World War II.
In the Luftwaffe fighter aviation, the most common combat vehicle was the Messerschmitt 109 222. The fighters were mainly armed with two machine guns mounted on the fairings and two 20 mm cannons located on the wings. German gunsmiths developed these guns based on the experience of the Spanish Civil War. The Messerschmitt-109 was also tested there, as were other, earlier types of fighters that were withdrawn from service by the beginning of World War II. On the eastern front, Messerschmitt-109F (Friedrich) appeared with the Daimler-Benz DB601N engine, and from August 1941 they began to arrive with higher-power DB601E engines (Me Bf 109F-2 and Bf 109F-8), which surpassed many fighters of the anti-Hitler coalition in speed and vertical maneuvering. The Junkers-87 dive bomber was used most often in bomber aviation in the first period of World War II; Heinkel-111, Junkers-88, Henschel-118 and Dornier-17 were quite common. Almost all aircraft were modern cars with excellent characteristics. Thus, the Junkers-88 could dive at an angle of 80 degrees, which ensured high bombing accuracy. The Germans had well-trained pilots and navigators; they bombed mainly with precision rather than in areas, using 1000 and 1800 kg bombs, which each plane could carry no more than one. Fighter-bombers, dive bombers and fighters could penetrate deep into enemy territory from front-line airfields at 375, 200 and 180 km, respectively, without additional fuel tanks 223 . By June 1941, the German Air Force consisted of about 10 thousand aircraft, of which 5.7 thousand were combat aircraft, including: for the war against the USSR - 3.9 thousand, for protecting German airspace - 282, in the West against England - 861, in the North - 200, in North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea - 423,224. In the initial period of the war, the Italians used the Fiat CR32 and Fiat CR42 Falcon biplanes as fighters, which were then replaced by the Macchi C200 Molniya and Macchi C202 Lightning Strike. Bomber aviation was represented by such aircraft as the SM79 Hawk, SM81 Bat, Fiat BR20 Stork and Kingfisher Z1007. At the beginning of World War II, Finnish aviation was represented by the Dutch Fokker DXXI fighters, as well as the English Bristol Bulldog and Gloucester Gladiator. Then the military department purchased American B-239 Buffalo aircraft. Bomber aviation used British Bristol Blenheim aircraft. Hungarian aviation consisted mainly of obsolete aircraft, such as the Italian Fiat CR32, Fiat CR42 Falcon and the German Junkers 86. Romanian aviation used IAR 80, IAR 81, IAR 37, IAR 38 and IAR 39 aircraft, as well as German Heinkel-111, Heinkel-112, Henschel-129, Messerschmitt-109, Junkers-87 " and "Junkers-88".
The main army fighter of the Japanese Air Force at that time was the Ki43 Hayabusa, which received the name “Oscar” from the allies. The fighter's armament consisted of two 7.7 mm 225 machine guns. The Air Force also had several types of fighters, among which, according to the Allied classification, were “Claude”, “Zero”, “Jack”. Direct support for the Japanese infantry was provided by Kate bombers and Val and Nal dive bombers. Until the spring of 1943, “Japanese planes flew without encountering almost any resistance. The quality of Japanese military equipment simply amazed the enemy” 226. The Battle of Britain required that all efforts be directed toward replacing losses in the Air Force, primarily fighter aircraft. During this period, the backbone of the UK's fighter aircraft fleet was the Spitfire and Hurricane.
Each aircraft was armed with eight machine guns mounted in the wings. American Browning machine guns were used. Bomber aircraft used mainly Bristol Blenheim and Vickers Wellington. They were soon replaced by more powerful aircraft such as the Avro Lancaster and Handley Page Halifax. In the US military at the beginning of World War II, fighter aircraft were dominated by the Curtiss P-40, which was then gradually replaced by the P-51 Mustang, P-47 Thunderbolt and P-38 Lightning. As strategic bombers The B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator were used, and after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the B-29 Super Fortress was developed for strategic bombing of Japan. The Moran-Saulnier MS406 and Devuatin D520 fighters were widely used in French fighter aviation, and the Pote 6311 was most often used as attack aircraft. Polish aviation in the first period of World War II used PZL P11 fighters, PZL23 Karas and PZL37 bombers, as well as Lublin R XIII reconnaissance aircraft. Navy (in a number of states - naval forces) was intended to solve strategic and operational problems in ocean and sea theaters of military operations. The German navy (Kriegsmarine) was smaller than that of its opponents; it was numerically inferior to the British fleet (in terms of total displacement - 7 times) 228. For several decades now, there has been a dispute between experts about whose ships turned out to be better - English or German, and in this dispute, preference in armor and the quality of naval artillery is often given to Germany 229. By September 1, 1939, the German Navy was armed with: two battleships (Bismarck and Tirpitz), three “pocket” battleships (Deutschland class), one heavy cruiser (the second, Admiral Hipper, was commissioned on September 20) ), seven light cruisers, two training battleships (old battleships), 21 destroyers (the 22nd was commissioned in September), 25 destroyers (13 from the First World War and 12 built in the 1920s), 57 submarines, 10 escort ships, 49 minesweepers (17 new, 32 old), 40 minesweepers and 17 torpedo boats.
Two battleships were being completed, as well as an aircraft carrier and three heavy cruisers, which were never commissioned. The main emphasis was not on the construction of submarines, but on the construction of battleships and cruisers 230. Thus, in the first half of 1940, an average of two submarines were built per month, in the second half - six, in the first half of 1941 - 13 instead of the planned 25 or 29,231. However, the bulk of the German fleet soon consisted of submarines. Coastal artillery included 25 batteries heavy guns and 99 batteries of medium caliber guns. Air defense of naval bases and coastal installations of the fleet was provided by 173 batteries of heavy anti-aircraft artillery, 65 batteries of light anti-aircraft artillery and 53 searchlight batteries. Great importance In the Kriegsmarine, mine work was assigned. The fleet was armed with magnetic and other the latest designs sea mines 232. The Italian Navy was armed with the battleships Andrea Doria, Giulio Cesare, Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, as well as 22 cruisers, 120 destroyers and destroyers, 105 submarines 233. These ships took part in hostilities quite rarely, primarily due to lack of fuel.
On the eve of the war, the Romanian Navy had seven torpedo boats and destroyers, one submarine, 19 gunboats, patrol boats, mine boats and torpedo boats, as well as two auxiliary cruisers. In addition, the Romanians had seaplanes from the Italian company Savoia-Marchetti. The Finnish Navy was armed with the coastal defense battleships Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen. The Imperial Japanese Navy was armed with the aircraft carriers Zuri, Hiryu, Shukaku, Shokaku, Kaga, Akagi, Shoho and Zuiho, as well as battleships such as Fuso and Ize. and "Nagato". Soon after the outbreak of war against the United States, the world's largest Yamato-class battleships were commissioned. At the end of 1939, the fleet consisted of 10 battleships, six aircraft carriers with 396 aircraft, 35 cruisers, 121 destroyers, and 56 submarines.
The command of the Imperial Japanese Navy paid great attention to carrier-based aircraft. The A6M Zero carrier-based fighter, armed with two 20 mm cannons and two 7.7 mm machine guns, was considered one of the best in the world at the beginning of the war. The Aisha D3A was used as a carrier-based bomber, and the Nakayama B5N 236 was used as a torpedo bomber. On the eve of World War II, the Royal Navy of Great Britain was the largest in Europe. It consisted of 15 battleships (Queen Elizabeth, Revenge, Nelson type), three battle cruisers (Rinaun and EVK Hood type), seven aircraft carriers (Illustrious, Implacable type, as well as "EVK Odesity", "EVK Eagle", "EVK Hermes", "EVK Unicorn" and "EVK Ark Royal"), 64 cruisers, a large number of destroyers and submarines 237. To this can be added six Australian cruisers and a dozen destroyers from Australia and Canada. The fleet's carrier-based aircraft consisted of the Sea Gladiator, Fairy Fulmar, Sea Hurricane and Fairy Firefly fighters, as well as the Fairy Swordfish, Fairy Albacore and Fairy Barracuda bombers and torpedo bombers. The American Navy, one of the largest in the world at the time, consisted of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines and other vessels. On December 7, 1941, the largest Pacific Fleet of the US Navy included: eight battleships (Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Tennessee, California, Maryland and East Virginia) ), aircraft carriers Saratoga, Interprice and Lexington, as well as a large number of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The US Navy's Atlantic Fleet included four aircraft carriers (Ranger, Yorktown, Hornet and Wasp), eight battleships (Arkansas, Texas, New Mexico, North Carolina, Washington) , "New York", "Mississippi" and "Idaho") and also cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The US Navy's carrier-based aircraft consisted of the Grumman F4F Wildcat, Grumman F6F Hellcat and Grumman F4U Corsair fighter aircraft. In addition, it included the Douglas SBD Dauntless and SB2C Helldiver dive bombers, as well as the Douglas TBD Devastator and Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers.
The main strike and defensive force at sea became aircraft carriers, with bombers and fighters capable of destroying surface ships and vessels, searching for and destroying submarines, and defending a formation of ships from air raids. Special attention was paid to the construction of aircraft carriers. Before the war, the French Navy entered service with battleships of the Dunkirk class, as well as leaders of the Le Fantask class. On the eve of World War II, the fleet included seven battleships, one aircraft carrier, 19 cruisers, 32 destroyers, 38 destroyers, 26 minesweepers and 77 submarines 238 . After the defeat of France, its fleet managed to evacuate to North Africa. It is rightly said that the army that is better armed and well trained wins a war. But with the growth of technical equipment, the ferocity of combat operations increased, and losses in equipment and people increased. In achieving victory, along with high technical equipment, the role of man, his skill, morale,
perseverance and courage. These qualities were capable of increasing the power of the weapon, making up for its quantitative and sometimes qualitative shortcomings, and becoming an important factor in the successful conduct of battles and operations. “It was clear to Western countries, of course, that they were dealing with a large and, from a material point of view, more or less equipped mass army,” note German military historians 239 . At the same time, the combat effectiveness of the Red Army was not assessed very highly “due to obvious shortcomings in management and combat training, and also because the weapons and equipment were considered insufficient, if not in quantitative, then in qualitative terms” 240. The German military command had no doubt that the Red Army would not be able to withstand the Wehrmacht, which had war experience and was accustomed to victories, for long. By June 1941, the Armed Forces of the USSR possessed mainly a modern small arms system, which in terms of tactical and technical characteristics was not inferior to the best foreign models. Soviet rifle of S.I. Mosin model 1891/30. and the German rifle of the brothers W. and P. Mauser 1898 had almost similar characteristics: high accuracy, fighting power and reliability. And thanks to the presence of self-loading rifles, which the enemy did not have in 1941, the Red Army rifle division had an advantage in small arms over the Wehrmacht infantry division.
German gunsmiths appreciated the high technical perfection of the SVT-40 rifle and took it as a basis when creating their own self-loading rifle. Soviet submachine guns PPD-40 and PPSh-41 were significantly superior to the German MP-38/40 assault rifle in terms of their main tactical and technical characteristics, ease of manufacture, reliability and ease of use. And here Soviet machine guns inferior to the German ones: the main disadvantage of the heavy machine gun of the H. S. Maxim system was that it weighed too much in the firing position - more than 60 kg. And the single German MG-34 machine gun was superior in its combat qualities to both the Maxim machine gun and the DP machine gun. In general, Soviet small arms had two obvious shortcomings. First of all, the large number of samples: two samples of personal weapons, three samples of individual weapons of rifle units, two sniper rifles, two heavy machine guns. This was a consequence of the fact that new models of small arms did not have long-term use among the troops, and it was necessary to duplicate them with old ones, proven by combat practice. Another drawback of the small arms system was the lack of mass-produced infantry anti-tank weapons. The Soviet infantryman with a rifle and a machine gun bore the brunt of the war.
He fought in unprecedentedly difficult conditions, showing courage, perseverance, ingenuity, sacrificing himself in the name of victory. A comparison of tanks produced in the pre-war years by their number and efficiency, including a comprehensive assessment of the properties of firepower, security and mobility, as well as such operational characteristics as reliability, controllability, habitability, degree of development, shows that German technology did not have any significant superiority. Already in the early stages of the creation and development of tank building, armed with machine guns domestic tanks The T-27 and T-28 were not inferior in their characteristics to the first German T-I tank. On January 13, 1941, at a debriefing of the command and staff game in the Kremlin, the head of the Main Armored Directorate, Lieutenant General Ya. N. Fedorenko, assessing the tank fleet, said that we still have little modern tanks and a number of tanks in service with the Red Army are already outdated 241. It’s unclear which tanks the general had in mind. Therefore, subsequently, a number of domestic historians, probably for the sake of ideological attitudes, considered the BT and T-26 series tanks that met the war to be obsolete 242, although in many respects they were superior to the German T-II and the Czechoslovak-made T-35 tanks that entered service with the Wehrmacht (t ) and T-38(t). If used skillfully, they could withstand the best German tanks of that time, which entered service in 1938.
T-III and even T-IV 243. The T-28 medium tank was considered quite competitive, and the T-35 heavy tank simply had no analogues in the armies of the world. The T-34 tank, which became a legend of Soviet tank building, was superior not only to German pre-war tanks, but also to the Soviet KV-1 heavy tank in terms of balance and the level of its main characteristics (firepower, security and mobility). The T-34 gun clearly had superiority over the guns of German tanks 244. A high level of protection was ensured due to the power of the armor and the applied design solution of placing large angles of inclination of the armor relative to the vertical, which made it possible to increase the equivalent calculated armor to 90 mm. The tank's protective properties became such that it was extremely difficult to defeat it with standard enemy anti-tank artillery. In terms of mobility, the T-34 was superior to German tanks due to the relatively low specific pressure on the ground, which made it possible to more successfully overcome off-road conditions, muddy roads and deep snow cover. A technical achievement was the development and installation of the V-2 diesel engine on tanks. The main disadvantage of this diesel engine was its low engine life, which was initially only 100 hours, but by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War it was increased to 150 hours. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov recalled, “to appreciate the significance of the creation of the V-2 diesel engine for our tank forces, it is enough to remember that German and American tanks had gasoline engines.”
Indeed, German tank builders from the very beginning abandoned attempts to install a diesel engine on their tank, while the Americans equipped some modifications of the Sherman 247 tank with diesel engines, but their diesel engine was less powerful. The widespread use of diesel tank engines in world tank construction began after the war. However, the maneuverability of the tank was reduced due to shortcomings in the design of such components and mechanisms as suspension, transmission, and gearbox. A significant design flaw of the T-34 tank remained the small volume of the turret, which was originally designed to accommodate a 45-mm gun.
After installing the 76-mm gun, the turret could hardly accommodate two people - the tank commander and the loader, with the latter serving as a gunner, which actually did not allow him to solve battle control tasks. Poor living conditions in the turret reduced the tank's rate of fire, which was also worsened by the placement of the ammunition rack on the floor of the fighting compartment. A significant drawback was poor handling, requiring from the crew, and above all from the driver, not only skills, but also great physical strength to change gears, control the main and side clutches, and perform other operations. The absence of radio stations on the vast majority of tanks led to the loss of stable communications within the tank forces themselves, as well as during their interaction with infantry, artillery and aviation. Assessing combat vehicles, Marshal of the Armored Forces P.P. Poluboyarov wrote after the war that in general “by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet tank forces, both in their technical weapons, organization and methods of use, and in their numbers, were superior to the tank forces of any foreign power ".
A comparison of the qualitative indicators of the artillery of the opposing sides, undertaken in the latest research, shows that there can be no talk of any significant superiority of the German artillery. In the pre-war years, the Red Army and the Wehrmacht were armed with almost the same anti-tank gun - the 37-mm Rheinmetall anti-tank gun: in the Red Army - the 37-mm anti-tank gun of the 1930 model, and in the Wehrmacht - the 37-mm Pak 37 The CCCP created an intermediate modification on its basis - the 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model, and then the final version - the 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model. In some works, attempts are made to equalize the capabilities of the Soviet and German anti-tank guns 249, but these guns were still significantly different from each other. Thus, the armor penetration of Soviet and German guns at a range of 500 m at an angle of 90 degrees was 43 and 30 mm, respectively. The Germans called the 37-mm anti-tank gun an “army mallet” 250 due to its lack of effectiveness. The 50-mm anti-tank gun Pak 38, which arrived in the Wehrmacht in 1940, was approximately equivalent in armor penetration to the Soviet 45-mm cannon of the 1942 model, but could not hit Soviet medium and heavy tanks. The regiments of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht entered the war armed with a 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model and a 75-mm light infantry gun. The Soviet cannon was superior to the German one in terms of initial projectile speed and firing range, which made it possible to use it during artillery preparation as a divisional weapon in the first years of the war. In addition, this gun provided 31 mm armor penetration and made it possible to use it as an anti-tank weapon. The advantage of the German gun was its half-weight, which ensured its greater mobility on the battlefield and the ability to point in an angle range from -10° to +73°. This made it possible to use it as a mortar and hit targets hidden behind the reverse slopes of the heights.
A feature of the Wehrmacht regimental artillery was the 150-mm heavy howitzer, whose powerful high-explosive shells easily destroyed enemy field fortifications. Thanks to these guns, the Wehrmacht infantry regiments could quickly solve problems that arose during the battle without the support of a divisional artillery regiment. Before the start of the war, there were certain differences in the organization of the divisional artillery of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. IN rifle division Red Army in composition of the lung The artillery regiment consisted of four batteries of guns (16 guns), and the howitzer regiment consisted of 44 howitzers. In Germany, divisional artillery regiments were armed only with howitzer guns, with three divisions armed with 105 mm howitzers (36 guns), and one division with 150 mm heavy howitzers (12 guns).
The basis of the weapons of the Wehrmacht artillery regiments were 105-mm howitzers; in the Soviet divisional artillery regiments, 122-mm howitzers were considered the main weapon. The Soviet howitzer, in comparison with the German one, was distinguished by a greater mass of high-explosive fragmentation projectile (1.6 times), a greater dead weight (1.3 times) and better suitability for transportation in off-road conditions. The decision of the German command to arm divisional artillery regiments only with howitzers led to very unpleasant consequences for the Wehrmacht: anti-tank companies and divisions turned out to be powerless against Soviet medium and heavy tanks, and divisional artillery could not provide them with the necessary support. The divisional artillery of the Red Army rifle division had quantitative and qualitative superiority over the divisional artillery of the Wehrmacht infantry division. Soviet guns were more maneuverable, and this, as the People's Commissar of Armaments of the USSR D. F. Ustinov emphasized, was a great advantage of Soviet artillery.
The Red Army and the Wehrmacht included rifle formations specially equipped and trained for combat in the mountains and on very rough terrain. The basis of their weapons were specially designed cannons, which could be divided into several parts for transportation. The Soviet mountain artillery was armed with a 76-mm mountain cannon of the 1938 model, as well as surviving 76-mm cannons of the 1909 model; German - 75 mm mountain gun. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the Soviet and German guns turned out to be approximately the same, but the Soviet gun in the stowed position weighed approximately twice as much as the German one. The Wehrmacht artillery was armed with a 105-mm mountain howitzer, but the Red Army did not have such howitzers, and their absence was partially compensated for by 107-mm mountain mortars of the 1938 model. During the war, the RGK formations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht were armed with quite a significant number of large guns and special power. The Soviet 152-mm cannon of the 1935 model, the 203-mm howitzer of the 1931 model and the 280-mm mortar of the 1939 model were created on a unified carriage of 203-mm howitzers, which at one time made it possible to reduce the development time of these systems and reduced their cost production. The same method was used by German designers, who developed 210-mm mortars on a carriage.
gun with a caliber of 170 mm. The series of 600-mm and 540-mm self-propelled mortars “Herat 040” and “Herat 041” should be considered as a very significant achievement of German designers. It should be noted that German divisions of large and special power took part in hostilities from the first to the last day of the war, while the corresponding regiments of Soviet artillery were withdrawn to the deep rear at the beginning of the war in order to avoid capture by the enemy. The superiority of German anti-aircraft artillery was noticeable. 105-mm and 128-mm anti-aircraft guns could hit air targets at altitudes of up to 13–15 km. In the Red Army, 76-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns had a fire range of only 10–11 km in height 252. In addition, Soviet anti-aircraft artillery was not unified. German analysts believed that “the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery was weakened by the diversity of weapons and other equipment associated with the supply and training of personnel.” These estimates are close to the truth, although it later turned out that the Red Army's anti-aircraft artillery fire could have been effective. The rockets used to fire from Soviet and German launchers were fundamentally different from each other.
Katyusha shells were stabilized in flight by the tail, and the shells of the German fog thrower were turbojet, that is, they were stabilized in flight by rotating around the longitudinal axis. The tail unit significantly simplified the design of the projectiles and made it possible to manufacture them using relatively simple technological equipment. To manufacture turbojet shells, metal-cutting machines for high-precision processing and a highly skilled workforce were needed. During the war, this became one of the main factors that hampered the development of German rocket artillery. Another difference between Soviet and German rocket launchers was a different approach to the selection of the base chassis. In the Red Army, rocket artillery launchers were considered as a means of conducting maneuverable combat operations. In the Red Army, cheap trucks were used as chassis, and in the Wehrmacht, a light wheeled carriage from an anti-tank gun or the chassis of a half-track armored personnel carrier was used. The latter immediately excluded the possibility of mass production of self-propelled launchers, since armored personnel carriers were in dire need of their main consumers - the German armored forces. D. F. Ustinov noted in his memoirs that in general, “Soviet guns in terms of power, initial projectile velocity, rate of fire, maneuverability, and degree of automation in most cases surpassed the best foreign models.”
The fleet of engineering vehicles of the Red Army was replete with many types of basic equipment (tractors, cars, various trailers) and various working parts for it. But engineering vehicles had low transport characteristics, which made their use in field conditions much more difficult, especially in winter. Some new engineering weapons used materials and structural elements, the mass production of which became extremely difficult under wartime conditions. Mine detectors, developed during the interwar years in the Soviet Union and Germany, detected anti-tank and anti-personnel mines whose bodies were made of metal. In terms of methods (induction - low-frequency, high-frequency), methods (portable) and design solutions (search element, rod, display system, power supplies), the mine detectors of both sides turned out to be identical. Before the war, the Soviet Union created a number of mines that reduced the required consumption in a minefield. The creation of the same mines in Germany came only in 1943. The means of overcoming obstacles in the Red Army were superior to those in the Wehrmacht in all main indicators. Germany, having attacked the Soviet Union, was quite well equipped with radio equipment, including radio communications, using both its own industrial potential and that of occupied European countries.
The Soviet fighter fleet largely consisted of I-16s. It was believed, note German military historians, that its armament, which most often consisted of four bow machine guns, could not compare with the German 255. The new LaGG-3 and Yak-1 fighters were basically not inferior to the Messerschmitt-109, but their number in the fleet was insignificant and amounted to only 9% 256. Aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev complained: “...we were upset that there were still few new aircraft in service with our aviation, the process of their mass production was just unfolding” 257 . The MiG-3 came close to the combat characteristics of the Messerschmitt 109, but it did not have cannon armament. The process of installing radio stations on Soviet fighters has just begun. Most Luftwaffe fighters by the beginning of World War II were equipped with bulletproof fuel tanks, but did not have armor protection for the pilot's cockpit. Among other things, the Messerschmitt-109 fighter turned out to be difficult to control, had a weak landing gear during takeoff and landing, and this drawback aggravated the situation by the fact that the Luftwaffe soon had to use insufficiently prepared airfields. However, a major drawback of German fighters “was the primitiveness of the on-board radio equipment” 258. “The Germans counted on the twin-engine Messerschmitt-110 fighter as a reliable means of the Luftwaffe, but it disappointed them with its flight-tactical characteristics.” Even during combat missions it was necessary to provide its cover with Messerschmitt-109 fighters. The Il-2 attack aircraft, which had no analogues in the world, turned out to be unsuitable for a dive of more than 30 degrees.
It was difficult to pilot in these modes - insufficient strength load interfered. The plane was equipped with a PBP-1b bomber sight, which was usually installed on bombers, but it was practically useless in low-level flight modes. Most often, aiming marks were used for aiming on the windshield of the cockpit canopy. The most effective weapon of the attack aircraft was the use of anti-tank cumulative bombs. The Luftwaffe only used Junkers 87 dive bombers as their battlefield aircraft. German attack aircraft had enough high efficiency bomb and cannon strikes (more powerful bomb salvo and higher accuracy from a dive). By the beginning of the war, the Pe-2 became the main Soviet front-line bomber. Until the end of 1943, he usually bombed from level flight and rarely from a dive. This was explained by the fact that the flight personnel were poorly trained in dive bombing. The plane had a rather weak bomb load - 600 kg, the main reason was that the Pe-2 was being converted from a fighter. The Soviet bomber used mainly small caliber bombs of 100–250 kg and a maximum caliber of 500 kg. German front-line bombers Junkers-88 and Heinkel-111 could take on board up to 2-3 thousand kg. The Tu-2, despite its lighter weight than the Junkers-88 and Heinkel-111 (11,400–11,700 kg versus 12,500–15,000 kg), had a similar bomb load. In terms of flight range, the Tu-2 was also at the level of German bombers. The Tu-2 could take 1 thousand kg of bombs into the bomb bay, while the Junkers-88 and Heinkel-111 could only be carried on an external sling. During the Second World War, all military shipbuilding of the warring parties was mainly based on the foundation laid in the pre-war years. The Soviet Navy was in full combat readiness. Former People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov testified: “In general, although we did not manage to create a large fleet, equip our naval forces with all using the latest means struggle, yet it was a combat-ready fleet, determined to defend the Motherland along with all its armed forces" 260. Germany also had a fairly strong fleet that could be effectively used both in the Atlantic and in closed naval theaters. During combat operations, the battleships and cruisers of the USSR Navy did not have combat collisions with enemy surface ships, so it is difficult to give a general assessment of the tactical and technical elements of Soviet battleships and cruisers. Ship survivability
of these classes turned out to be quite satisfactory. The general and local strength of the leaders and destroyers turned out to be insufficient, so already during the war their corps were reinforced. These warships, especially in the North, did not show their seaworthiness in the best possible way. The patrol ships also had insufficient seaworthiness. The stability of large and small hunters was at its limit. Minesweepers and torpedo boats generally satisfied the conditions of the combat situation. The naval artillery of the Soviet Navy was not inferior to the German one, and in some models it was superior. “We were strong in artillery,” recalled N. G. Kuznetsov. - It’s worth remembering our 130-mm cannon for destroyers with a combat range of 25 km or the 180-mm three-gun turret created in 1937 for Kirov-class cruisers, firing at a distance of over 45 km. No fleet had such perfect guns at that time." 262 The situation was worse with the air defense of Soviet ships. During the war, the anti-aircraft guns of these ships could not fire effectively at enemy dive bombers.
This qualitative lag is partly explained by the fact that by 1941 the production of anti-aircraft automatic small-caliber guns (37-mm 70-K assault rifles) was just beginning. There were not enough radar facilities for ships and naval bases. The German fleet differed from other navies in the world by the widespread use of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and naval catapult aircraft. German submarines, in comparison with Soviet ones, had better maneuverability and operational qualities with a slightly smaller displacement and armament. In terms of diving speed, Soviet submarines were slightly inferior to most submarines of the main foreign countries of similar displacement. During the interwar years, Soviet shipbuilders failed to resolve the problem with the tightness of the submarine fuel system. On the surface, the movement of submarines under diesel engines turned out to be quite noisy, especially at high speeds. An additional unmasking factor in the same area was the sparking of diesel exhaust. The Wehrmacht did not have a clear qualitative superiority in weapons and military equipment, but the training of its personnel turned out to be higher than in the Red Army.
In general, the Armed Forces of the USSR before the Great Patriotic War had a modern system of weapons and military equipment, which in terms of tactical and technical characteristics was not inferior to the best similar models of Germany and its allies. The main reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war were largely due to other factors. On the eve of World War II, Germany, Italy and Japan, implementing the doctrine of total lightning war, mobilized all resources in order to achieve victory in the shortest possible time. The German military machine turned out to be the most prepared for combat operations. The Wehrmacht, which had high professional training, received the latest weapons and military equipment for that time. The leaders of England, France, Poland and the USA did not use the available opportunities to equip the armed forces with the latest military equipment and weapons, as was done in the states of the fascist bloc. During the period between the world wars, the Soviet state made a colossal leap forward.
As a result of the industrialization of the national economy, metallurgy and mechanical engineering developed at a rapid pace, fuel production and electricity production grew. 1930s became significant for the domestic defense-industrial complex: aviation, tank, auto-tractor industries, and instrument making were created. It was at this time that the industrial base was laid and the scientific and technical basis was ensured, and the rearmament of the army and navy began. During the years of the pre-war five-year plans Soviet designers created new models of small arms, tanks, artillery, mortars and aircraft. More and more advanced destroyers, cruisers, as well as patrol ships, submarine hunters, armored boats, and minesweepers entered service with the Navy at an increasing pace; special attention was paid to the development of the submarine fleet.
Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. In 12 volumes. T. 7. Economy and weapons
war. - M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2013. - 864 pp., 20 l. ill., ill.
I tried to explain the idea through economic indicators, but it seems that not everyone understood what economic power was and how it directly influenced the course of the war. I became interested and started collecting data on the production of aircraft, tanks and warships. The so-called “patriots” somehow readily “forget” that that war was not limited to the Soviet-German front and even the European theater of operations. The war was truly global and covered virtually the entire Earth. In fact, the Pacific theater of operations was many times larger than the European one in terms of area covered. If in doubt, look at the globe. And if on land you can march on foot and cross rivers by swimming, even on tunics inflated with a bubble, then this does not work on the ocean expanses. The USSR did not have to wage a naval war, except for individual local submarine attacks. The USSR had no need for a large and powerful surface fleet. But for the United States this was a matter of paramount importance.
Speaking of ground armies, it’s good to note what the USA and the USSR approached the start of the war with. As of June 22, 1941, the Red Army had about 27 thousand armored vehicles in its arsenals. Of these, about 2 thousand were T-34, KV-1 and KV-2. The US Army had 400 light tanks in the summer of 1940. That is, in the USSR, before the start of the war, mass production of armored vehicles was created and debugged: from light armored vehicles and tankettes to heavy tanks. Dozens of factories were operating. In the USA there were automobile factories that produced a huge number of cars, but there was virtually no specialized tank production.
When Germany attacked the USSR, the disaster of 1941 consumed almost all the armored vehicles available before the war and the USSR lost 80% of its tank industry, which actually had to be created anew, beyond the Urals.
Let's see how much the USSR and the USA produced during their participation in the war. I warn you in advance that the quantity excludes what was produced before the start of the war and after September 2, 1945.
Production of armored vehicles in the USSR
| Type | Model | Qty |
| Heavy tank | KV-1 | 3,230 |
| KV-1S | 1,120 | |
| IS-1 | 107 | |
| IS-2 | 3,395 | |
| Medium tank | T-34-76 | 34,040 |
| T-34-85 | 10,662 | |
| T-44 | 471 | |
| Light tank | T-50 | 80 |
| T-60 | 5,920 | |
| T-70 | 8,231 | |
| T-80 | 70 | |
| self-propelled guns | Su-76 | 14,280 |
| Su-76I | 201 | |
| Su-85 | 2,050 | |
| Su-122 | 638 | |
| Su-100 | 1,115 | |
| Su-152 | 670 | |
| ISU-152 | 2,825 | |
| ISU-122 | 735 | |
| ISU-122S | 117 | |
| Surrogate self-propelled guns | ZIS-30 | 100 |
| HTZ-16 | 85 | |
| Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns | ZSU-37 | 75 |
| Armored cars | BA-64 | 9,110 |
| Total: | 99,327 |
Production of armored vehicles in the USA
| Type | Model | Name | Qty |
| Light tank | M3 | Stewart | 22,744 |
| M24 | Chaffee | 4,731 | |
| M-22 | Locust | 830 | |
| Medium tank | M3 | General Lee | 6,258 |
| M4 | Sherman | 49,234 | |
| M26 | Pershing | 978 | |
| self-propelled guns | M7 | Priest | 953 |
| M8 | Scott | 1,778 | |
| M10 | Wolverine | 6,406 | |
| M12 | 100 | ||
| M18 | Hellcat | 2,507 | |
| M36 | 2,324 | ||
| Cannon armored personnel carrier | M3 | 2,202 | |
| T48 | 962 | ||
| Half-track armored personnel carrier | M2 | 13,691 | |
| M3 | 52,311 | ||
| M5 | 7,484 | ||
| M9 | 3,500 | ||
| Amphibious armored jeep | Ford GPA | 12,778 | |
| DUKW | 21,147 | ||
| Tracked amphibious vehicle | LVT | Amtrack | 18,620 |
| Light reconnaissance armored personnel carrier | M3 | Scout Car | 20,994 |
| BMP | M8/M20 | Greyhound | 12,314 |
| Cannon armored car | T17 | Steghound | 3,844 |
| T18 | Borhound | 32 | |
| Self-propelled anti-aircraft armored personnel carrier | M13 | 1,103 | |
| M15 | 2,332 | ||
| M16 | 3,550 | ||
| M19 | 285 | ||
| Total: | 275,992 |
From these 2 tables we see that, firstly, the production structure was significantly different: the United States produced a lot of armored personnel carriers and amphibious vehicles, which is explained by the large number of amphibious operations, including landings in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Southern France. And the USSR produced more tanks and self-propelled guns, including heavy ones (7852 units), which the Americans did not produce at all. They successfully used artillery and self-propelled guns to fight enemy tanks. Thus, during the battle at Arracourt, M18 (Witch) self-propelled guns effectively knocked out Panthers in the frontal armor. Out of 110 Panthers in 2 armored grenadier brigades, only 3 left the battle. The Witches accounted for at least a third of the Panthers' losses.
Secondly, we see that the US produced 2.5 times more armored vehicles. It is interesting that during the war, Soviet factories produced 44,702 “legendary” T-34 tanks of all modifications, and the Americans, having started production of Sherman M4s in February 1942, managed to produce 49,234 vehicles of all modifications. 4.5 thousand more.
Aviation production in the USSR during the war
| Type | Model | Qty |
| Fighter | I-16 | 1,198 |
| Yak-2 | 8,735 | |
| Yak-3 | 4,848 | |
| Yak-7 | 6,399 | |
| Yak-9 | 19,769 | |
| LAGG-3 | 6,528 | |
| MIG-3 | 3,178 | |
| La-5 | 9,920 | |
| La-7 | 5,905 | |
| Fighter trainer | Yak-7UTI | 186 |
| Shtkrmovik/BB | IL-2 | 36,183 |
| Su-2 | 893 | |
| 2-engine bombers | IL-4 | 5,256 |
| Pe-2 | 11,247 | |
| Tu-2 | 800 | |
| Er-2 | 242 | |
| 4-engine bombers | Pe-8 | 93 |
| Training/Messenger/Night BB | U-2 | 23,000 |
| Seaplane | BE-4 | 44 |
| Total: | 144,424 |
I did not find data on the production of PS-84 transport vehicles during the war. Sorry.
US aircraft production during the war
| Type | Model | Name | Qty |
| 4-engine bombers | B-17 | Flying fortress | 12,731 |
| B-24 | Liberator | 9,256 | |
| B-29 | Superfortress | 3,906 | |
| 2-engine bombers | B-25 | Mitchell | 9,816 |
| B-26 | Marauder | 5,288 | |
| A-20 | Havoc (Boston) | 7,478 | |
| A-26 | Invader | 2,452 | |
| A30 | Baltimore | 2,150 | |
| B-34/37 | Lexington/Ventura | 3,028 | |
| Carrier bombers | SBD | Dauntless | 5,936 |
| SB2C | Helldiver | 7,140 | |
| Carrier-based bombers/torpedo bombers | TBD | Devastator | 130 |
| Deck torpedo bombers | TBF | Avenger | 9,839 |
| Aerodrome fighters | R-38 | Lightning | 10,037 |
| R-39 | Airacobra | 9,584 | |
| R-40 | Kittyhawk | 13,738 | |
| R-47 | Thunderbolt | 15,660 | |
| R-51 | Mustang | 16,974 | |
| R-63 | Kingcobra | 3,303 | |
| Carrier-based fighters | F4F | Wildcat | 7,885 |
| F6F | Hellcat | 12,276 | |
| F4U | Corsair | 12,571 | |
| Night fighters | R-61 | Black Widow | 742 |
| F7F | Tigercat | 364 | |
| Seaplanes | PBY | Catalina | 3,305 |
| P.B.M. | Mariner | 1,366 | |
| S.C. | Seahawk | 577 | |
| OS2U | Kingfisher | 1,550 | |
| Transport aircraft | S-36 | Commando | 3,140 |
| S-47 | Skytrain | 10,174 | |
| S-54 | Skymaster | 1,170 | |
| S-60 | Lodestar | 625 | |
| Scout | O-52 | Owl (Owl) | 203 |
| Total: | 214,394 |
Here, too, we see a different structure of aviation. First of all, the USSR did not produce certain types of aircraft. Such, for example, as carrier-based aviation - there are no aircraft carriers, there is no need to make carrier-based aircraft.
Secondly, there is a strong bias in bombers: the Americans produced 35,893 strategic 4-engine bombers versus 93 Soviet Pe-8 (TB-7).
For airfield-based fighters, there is approximate parity. The Americans produced only 3 thousand more than the USSR. But there were also night and deck fighters - about 34 thousand. But the Americans did not produce anything like the Il-2 attack aircraft. Actually, no one except the USSR produced this. The plane was extremely ineffective and suffered huge losses.
The very large number of transport aircraft on the American list is also noticeable. 15109 transport workers are both airborne assaults and a consequence of enormous distances.
6800 seaplanes - this was in great demand in the USA and England. But for the USSR this class of aviation was almost unnecessary. We made 44 Beriev cars and received several Catalinas under Lend-Lease. No more was required.
But the USSR produced a lot of U-2 (Po-2). About 23 thousand aircraft of this type were produced during the war years.
For the United States, the start of the war was very unfortunate, if not catastrophic. On December 7, 1941, with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese virtually disarmed the US Pacific Fleet. But defending the land of the islands without cover from the sea is a disastrous proposition. The Japanese very quickly captured Guam and the Philippines, taking control of almost the entire Pacific Ocean, and began preparations for the capture of New Zealand and the landing in Australia. The year 1942 passed in fierce battles between the remnants of the American fleet and the powerful Japanese imperial fleet. Gradually, the American fleet seized the initiative, but by the end of 1942 the United States had Pacific Ocean there is only one operational aircraft carrier left.
As soon as the United States entered the war, the mighty American shipyards began to work at full capacity. It took a year for new ships to join the fleet. The table that I provide below shows only ships that entered the fleet's operational composition after December 7, 1941 and before September 2, 1945. For example, the aircraft carrier Midway was built from 43 to 45, but became part of the fleet after the surrender of Japan and therefore is not in the table.
My father-in-law spent almost his entire work experience at the Nikolaev Shipyard. When I showed him this list, he, as a person who understands, simply collapsed... It’s impossible to imagine....
| Ships that entered the US Navy during World War II | Waterism. | Qty | total tonnage |
| Essex-class aircraft carriers | 36960 | 24 | 887,040 |
| Light aircraft carriers Independence class | 11000 | 9 | 99,000 |
| Saipan-class light aircraft carriers | 19000 | 2 | 38,000 |
| Avenger-class escort aircraft carriers | 8300 | 4 | 33,200 |
| Long Island class escort carriers | 12860 | 2 | 25,720 |
| Bogue-class escort carriers | 16890 | 45 | 760,050 |
| Sangamon-class escort carriers | 24665 | 4 | 98,660 |
| Casablanca-class escort carriers | 10902 | 50 | 545,100 |
| Commencement Bay-class escort carriers | 24500 | 21 | 514,500 |
| Iowa type battleships | 57400 | 4 | 229,600 |
| South Dakota class battleships | 44519 | 4 | 178,076 |
| Alaska-class battlecruisers | 34253 | 2 | 68,506 |
| Baltimore class heavy cruisers | 17000 | 14 | 238,000 |
| Atlanta-class light cruisers | 7400 | 8 | 59,200 |
| Cleveland-class light cruisers | 14464 | 27 | 390,528 |
| Gleaves-class destroyers | 2395 | 46 | 110,170 |
| Fletcher-class destroyers | 2500 | 175 | 437,500 |
| Giering-class destroyers | 3460 | 93 | 321,780 |
| Allen M. Sumner class destroyers | 3515 | 58 | 203,870 |
| Robert Smith-class destroyers | 2500 | 12 | 30,000 |
| Evarts-class destroyer escorts | 1360 | 97 | 131,920 |
| Bucclei-class destroyer escorts | 1740 | 102 | 177,480 |
| Cannon-class destroyer escorts | 1620 | 72 | 116,640 |
| Edsall-class destroyer escorts | 1790 | 85 | 152,150 |
| Rudderow-class destroyer escorts | 1770 | 22 | 38,940 |
| John S. Buttler-class destroyer escorts | 1745 | 83 | 144,835 |
| River class frigates | 1860 | 151 | 280,860 |
| Tacoma class frigates | 1284 | 96 | 123,264 |
| Gato type submarines | 2463 | 77 | 189,651 |
| Balao-class submarines | 2463 | 120 | 295,560 |
| Tench-class submarines | 2468 | 12 | 29,616 |
| Torpedo boats type PT-Boats | 56 | 531 | 29,736 |
| Minesweepers type Admiralsky | 625 | 123 | 76,875 |
| Large landing ships of the Maracalibo type | 4877 | 3 | 14,631 |
| Large landing ships type Mark I | 5497 | 3 | 16,491 |
| Large landing ships type Mark II | 3492 | 1000 | 3,492,000 |
| Large landing ships type LST(3) | 5060 | 61 | 308,660 |
| Transport vessels type Liberty | 14450 | 2710 | 39,159,500 |
| Total: | 5,791 | 50,047,309 |
From the very beginning of the war in the Pacific theater of operations, it became obvious that the main force of the fleet was now squadron aircraft carriers, and not battleships. The USA commissioned only 8 battleships, but twenty-four Essex-class aircraft carriers, which had no equal in the world at all.
These are simply incredible numbers. 24 aircraft carriers with a displacement of 37 thousand tons and a speed of 33 knots! Each aircraft carrier is about 100 aircraft.
This is a force that cannot be stopped. Throughout 1943, the US Pacific Fleet rapidly grew and developed, filling itself with both strike forces and transport ships. In 1944, all this power really fell on the head of the Japanese, quickly liberating territories on land and completely seizing control of the ocean.
Maybe the thesis about industrial power is now clear?
Experiencing dependence on external supplies of raw materials and supplies, the aggressors adhered to a strategy defined by the principle “war feeds war.” Following this principle, Germany and its allies increased military production, regardless of their real economic capabilities. This corresponded to the notorious concept of the “blitzkrieg economy”, which Germany was forced to abandon after the defeat near Moscow.
While preparing aggression against the Soviet Union, Germany used the economic potential of almost all of Europe.
The use of the economic resources of the occupied and dependent states, the expansion of basic industries and the military industry in Germany itself served as the basis for the rapid increase in military production. In 1940 alone, the increase in military production compared to 1939 was about 54 percent (274). Directly in the pre-war and first war years, a series of new types of aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and other types of military equipment were tested and launched. The military industry sharply increased the production of artillery, small arms, armored vehicles, and aviation weapons, and expanded the construction of submarines.
However, shortcomings emerged in the production of some types of military products, such as ammunition, which hindered the increase in their production.
In the context of a protracted military-economic confrontation, the German military economy faced a number of insurmountable difficulties. The shortage of labor was especially noticeable. Mobilization into the Wehrmacht reduced the number of human resources employed in the economy from 38.7 million in May 1939 to 34.5 million in May 1942, although the number employed in the military industry increased during this time from 2.4 million. up to 5.0 million people (275) . The shortage of labor was made up by using forced labor foreign workers, prisoners of war, and concentration camp prisoners.
The volume of capital construction decreased and continued to decrease. During the war, imports of raw materials decreased, and increasing amounts of metal and fuel were directed to the needs of the military industry. The fascist leadership was forced to repeatedly revise military-industrial programs. For example, the construction of large surface ships was stopped, and the production of artillery guns, ammunition, mortars, tanks and anti-tank artillery increased.
In the spring of 1942, measures were taken to centralize the management of the war economy. The Reich Ministry of Armaments and Munitions strengthened its management of the planning and production of military equipment for all branches of the armed forces. As a result, the output of military products increased significantly. At the beginning of 1943, the next stage of total mobilization was carried out, which contained a series of emergency measures to increase the production of weapons, ammunition and other types of military products.
The development of military production was decisively influenced by the situation in the theaters of military operations, especially on the Soviet-German front. The losses of military equipment and ammunition consumption here far exceeded the losses of the military campaigns in Poland and France. Despite the expansion of arms production, the German war economy was struggling to make up for its losses.
In 1943, German military production was approximately four times the level of 1939. It increased until mid-1941. Then its growth stopped. Priority was increasingly given to the production of means of armed struggle in the continental theater - armored vehicles, aircraft, artillery pieces, and ammunition. The structure of produced weapons has changed. The aviation industry accelerated the production of fighters and attack aircraft, while at the same time the production of bombers, transport aircraft and aircraft for naval aviation was reduced. The production of tanks increased sharply. The production of assault and anti-tank guns expanded at an even faster rate (Table 11). In 1943, the production of V-1 aircraft projectiles was mastered, and in 1944, the production of V-2 missiles. A total of 20 3 4 thousand V-1 and 6.1 thousand V-2 were produced.
Table 11. Production of the most important types of military equipment in Germany (276)
|
Military equipment |
1945, January-April |
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Rifles and carbines, thousand pieces. |
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Submachine guns, thousand pieces. |
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Mortars, thousand pieces |
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Tanks, assault guns, thousand units. |
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Combat aircraft, thousand units |
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Warships main classes, units |
If in 1940 - 1941. The production of main types of weapons increased slightly, but in 1942 there was a decline. The needs of the army were far from being fully satisfied. Thus, by the beginning of 1943, Italian troops were provided with ammunition by no more than 50 percent. The quality of produced weapons remained low. The system of government regulation turned out to be very ineffective, since military production programs did not correspond to real capabilities. The output of military products was hampered by a lack of raw materials and skilled labor. The development of military production was hampered by the bureaucratic management structure, speculative machinations, and departmental inconsistencies. All this accelerated the military defeat of Italy. The economy of militaristic Japan had its own characteristics. It entered the war with a relatively high level of military production, weapons reserves and, to some extent, raw materials. However, during the war, the sources of increasing military production changed. Initially (December 1941 - November 1942), the expansion of military production occurred mainly through the switching of civilian industries to the production of military products. Subsequently (December 1942 - September 1944), the increase in production capacity and the economic base of the military industry was associated with the restructuring military program. Particular emphasis was placed on expanding the production of aircraft, the production of aircraft weapons, and the construction of transport ships. At the same time, the production of weapons for the ground forces increased. The dynamics of production of the most important means of armed struggle is shown in Table 13. Table 13. Production of the most important types of military equipment in Japan (278)
As follows from the table data, the production of artillery pieces increased in 1943 compared to 1941 by 3.8 times. Due to a shortage of steel, the production of medium tanks was reduced and the production of light tanks almost ceased. Until September 1944, aircraft production expanded, and the share of aircraft in the total volume of military production increased (by the end of the war it exceeded 50 percent). The maximum military production was reached in September 1944. Then there was a reduction in the production of almost all types of weapons. The production capacities of the military industry were used completely, bottlenecks were discovered almost everywhere, and raw material reserves continued to decline catastrophically. In 1942 - 1944 The gap between the production of raw materials and the production of military equipment has widened. In 1944, steel production decreased, coal production decreased, and the production of aluminum and a number of other products of basic industries decreased. Meanwhile, the production of warships, small arms, and ammunition continued to increase. This was largely due to deterioration in quality, as well as cuts in other military programs. For example, the increase in the production of anti-aircraft guns occurred with a reduction in the production of other types of artillery weapons. Despite its developed shipbuilding, Japan could not make up for the losses in transport ships. Due to a shortage of tankers, the Japanese were forced to use warships to transport oil products. By July 1945, the production of main types of military equipment had decreased by more than half, and merchant ships and vehicles had decreased several times. Traditional sectors of the economy fell into decline, and the output of the most important types of products decreased. The Japanese economy was experiencing enormous and increasing stress: there was a shortage of equipment, raw materials, fuel, fertilizers, and labor. However, unlike Germany, by mid-1945 Japan still had sufficient industrial potential that allowed it to continue the war with the USA and Great Britain for a long time. The Japanese command's projects to continue military operations in China had a real economic basis. So, during the period of preparation and during the Second World War, the states of the fascist bloc launched the production of military equipment on a large scale. In Germany in 1944, compared with 1939, the level of military production increased five times, significantly exceeding the maximum level of the First World War, with an incomparably higher efficiency and complexity of the equipment produced. The increase in weapons production occurred spasmodically, and military programs were revised several times. It was not possible to maintain the military-technical advantage achieved at the beginning; in terms of the overall size of military production, the Axis countries were inferior to their opponents. Germany's main economic efforts were aimed at supporting Wehrmacht operations in land theaters in Europe, primarily on the Soviet-German front. This was one of the reasons that the Reich leadership was unable to allocate sufficient funds for naval operations. Mass production of submarines, which represented the main force in the fight on sea communications, was launched already during the war, approximately two years after its start. Second World War clearly revealed the organic weaknesses of the economy of Nazi Germany and its partners. It showed that the countries of the fascist bloc were unable to meet the growing needs and overcome internal contradictions. The Italian economy was the first to succumb to wartime stress. The vices and weaknesses of the economies of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan were clearly exposed, which led them to defeat in the economic confrontation with the states of the anti-fascist coalition. |
During the Second World War, the production of tanks increased sharply, both in the USSR and in the capitalist countries participating in the war.
Table- production of tanks during the Second World War
| Manufacturer country | Produced by the end of the year | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | for half a year 1945 | |
| Germany | 3805 | 6189 | 10700 | 18300 | |
| USA | 6123 | 27200 | 38500 | 20500 | 11300 |
| England | 4841 | 9233 | 7500 | 4600 | 1700 |
| USSR | 6590 | 24448 | 30100 | 33274 | 15450 |
The data presented in the table indicate that the Soviet military economy won a victory over the German military economy. This was achieved despite the fact that Germany was several times superior to the USSR in the production and extraction of such types of strategic materials as steel and coal. Annual steel production in 1940-1944. was kept in Germany (together with the occupied countries and satellites) at the level of 31-32 million tons, and coal production amounted to 390-460 million tons. In the USSR in 1940, 18 million tons of steel were produced and 154 million were mined. tons of coal With the loss of important economic regions, steel production decreased to 8 million tons, coal production - to 63 million tons. In 1944, steel production increased to 11 million tons and coal production - to 121.5 million tons. Thus, having approximately 3-4 times less steel and 3-3.5 times less coal, the USSR was able to produce almost 2.5 times more military equipment during the war. 8-11 million tons of steel were used annually in the USSR more efficiently than 32 million tons in Germany. The secret of this “economic miracle” lies in the advantages of the socialist system with its public ownership of the means of production and planned economic management.
In addition, these figures indicate the delusion of those cited in Lately ratios of tank losses Germany: USSR, which “according to the latest data” for some authors reach 1:6, and sometimes 1:10. As is known, starting from 1942, the Soviet Army had a constant numerical superiority in tanks. If we assume (in favor of Germany) constant numerical equality, then the ratio of losses should coincide with the ratio of production. Thus, if we discard 1944 (Germany started a war on two fronts), then the ratio for 1941-1943. it turns out 1:3, or even less, if you consider that in 1943 the tank fleet of the USSR significantly outnumbered the fleet of Nazi Germany.
During the war, tanks were constantly modernized, new models were created taking into account the shortcomings identified during the fighting.
Table- Basic data of tanks of the beginning of the Second World War
| Tank parameters | USSR | Germany | England | USA | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-34 | HF | PzIII | PzIV | Valentine | Churchill | M3A3 Stewart | M3A4 Grant | |
| Combat weight, t | 28 | 43 | 23 | 24,6 | 16 | 40 | 14,1 | 29 |
| Crew, people | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 6 |
| Gun caliber, mm | 76 | 76 | 37/50 | 75 | 40 | 40 | 37 | 37 |
| Caliber, mm and | 7,62 | 7,62 | 7,9 | 7,9 | 7,92 | 7,92 | 7,62 | 7,62 |
| number of machine guns | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Armor, mm | 45-60 | 75-100 | 20-30 | 20-30 | 50-65 | 75-87 | 25-38 | 38-57 |
| Maximum speed, km/h | 55 | 35 | 40 | 40 | 26 | 28 | 56 | 39 |
| Cruising range on the highway, km | 450 | 250 | 105 | 157 | 225 | 150 | 175 | 140 |
| 71 | 77 | 105 | 187 | 170 | 95 | 79 | 95 | |
4.1.1 German tanks
By the beginning of the Second World War, the fascist German army was armed with light tanks T-I and T-II of various modifications, medium tanks T-III and T-IV, as well as armored vehicles. Arming tanks with small-caliber semi-automatic cannons made it possible to create a zone of fire at close distances necessary to defeat enemy personnel. High speed of movement was the main factor in a rapid and deep breakthrough into enemy territory. Experience in combat in Poland and Western Europe revealed the poor quality of 37 mm and 75 mm short-barreled guns, so in 1940 a 50 mm gun was installed on the T-III tank.
Drawing- Medium German tank T-Sh J
On June 1, 1941, the Nazi troops had 4,198 serviceable tanks and 377 assault guns. More than 4 thousand tanks and assault guns were intended for the attack on the USSR.
The appearance of the T-34 tanks required a radical change in the design of German tanks, since there was a requirement to hit tanks at maximum range in order to create the preconditions for subsequent success in battle. For this purpose, medium tanks were rearmed with 75 mm long-barreled guns. Light tanks, as they did not meet the requirements of armed warfare, were withdrawn from service at the end of 1941. However, despite the modernization of the T-III and T-IV medium tanks, aimed at increasing their armor protection and firepower, they were inferior to the Soviet ones in key indicators tanks.
Drawing- Heavy German tank T-VI H1 "Tiger"
Since June 1943, production of the T-III tank ceased, and in 1942, the T-VI H1 ("Tiger") heavy tank, armed with an 88-mm cannon and having increased anti-ballistic armor, was put into service. But the course of hostilities showed that Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns successfully fought against this tank. Tigers had good fighting qualities for defensive operations (as did Soviet medium and heavy tanks), but in the offensive they always suffered heavy losses due to their low mobility.
In February 1943, production of a new tank began, in which German tank builders tried to compensate for the shortcomings of the Tiger. This is a more maneuverable T-V Panther tank with a 75 mm long-barreled gun. To ensure good protection, the hull shape of the Soviet T-34 tank was borrowed. But in terms of firepower, this heavy tank was inferior to the Soviet KB-85, which had an 85-mm cannon. Failures forced German specialists to make an attempt to combine the maneuverability of the Panther with the firepower of the Tiger. And in January 1944, production of the new T-VIB “Royal Tiger” heavy tank began. However, by this time, the Soviet troops received a new heavy tank, the IS-2, with a 122-mm cannon, which was superior to the Royal Tiger in all respects. The German tank industry could no longer organize its serial production and, produced in a small series, the "Royal Tiger" did not play a noticeable role in the battles. At the end of the war, the 180-ton “Mouse” tank was developed and built, the wreckage of which was found near Berlin.
Drawing- Heavy German tank T-V G "Panther"
Anti-tank self-propelled guns were initially created on the basis of light tanks, and then medium and heavy ones. They were armed with 75-, 76-, 88- and 188-mm guns.
Generally self-propelled artillery inferior to similar Soviet models.
Thus, the development of armored vehicles of the fascist German army in the Second World War followed the path of increasing firepower, increasing the reliability of armor protection and increasing mobility. However, throughout the war, Soviet tanks retained a qualitative superiority in basic parameters over enemy tanks.
4.1.2 US tanks
By the beginning of the Second World War, the armed forces of the United States and England did not pay due attention to the development of armored forces. The US tank fleet was small and consisted mainly of light and medium tanks. Light tanks had weak combined armament, bulletproof armor and high mobility.
The main models that were in service with tank formations and units of the American army during the Second World War were light tanks M2, M3, M5, M22, M24, medium tanks - M2, M3, M4, heavy tanks M6, self-propelled guns of various types, amphibious and others special tanks, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers.
Drawing- American medium tank M3 "Grant"
The American light tank M3 "Stuart" and the medium tank M3 "Grant" had the same light weapons, each with a 37 mm cannon and one 7.62 mm machine gun. The tanks were ineffective and during the war, new models of the M4A3 Sherman (medium) and M24 (light) with a gun caliber of up to 75 mm entered service with the American army.
The characteristic features of American tanks were large overall dimensions (especially height - up to 3 m or more), bulletproof armor (less often shellproof) without rational angles of inclination, high mobility and low firepower. Sponsored installation of weapons (Mb, M2A4, M3) and a small power reserve significantly reduced their combat capabilities.
Drawing- Medium American tank M4A1 Sherman
During the Second World War, self-propelled artillery became widespread in the United States. The basis for creating self-propelled guns were tanks and half-track armored personnel carriers. Despite the modernization of tanks, during the war, medium and heavy tanks of the American army were inferior in firepower and range to Nazi tanks. In total, during the war years, the United States produced 86.6 thousand tanks and 16 thousand self-propelled guns.
4.1.3 Tanks of England
During the Second World War, the British armed forces were armed with light, cruising, infantry tanks, self-propelled guns of various types, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the British army was armed with tanks MkII - "Matilda", MkIII - "Valentine" and since 1941 MkIV - "Churchill". The tanks had a 40-mm cannon (later replaced by a 57-mm cannon on the MkVI, and later by a 75-mm cannon) and 2-3 machine guns. The MkIV tank had bulwarks that often jammed the tracks. All tanks were characterized by low mobility.
Cruiser tanks "Cromwell" and "Comet" were intended for independent operations in operational depth and breaking through poorly prepared enemy defenses. Therefore, they were armed with 75 mm guns and three machine guns, had anti-ballistic armor and increased mobility. Maximum speed 50 km/h.
Drawing- English cruiser tank MkVIII Cromwell IV
Despite continuous modernization, the British were never able to radically improve the combat qualities of their tanks. Characteristic features of British tanks were large overall dimensions and weight, lack of rational angles of inclination of armor plates, low firepower and mobility. The armor protection of cruising tanks did not protect the crew and main units from anti-tank fire at medium ranges. The mobility of infantry tanks was low, as a result of which they suffered significant losses in battle. There was no qualitative difference in the armament of cruiser and infantry tanks.
Thus, during the Second World War, only Soviet tank building was able to create a type of tank that met the requirements of modern warfare. The medium Soviet tank T-34 gained fame as a classic tank of the Second World War.
Table- Basic data of tanks from the end of the Second World War
| Tank parameters | USSR | Germany | England | USA | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-34-85 | IS-2 | PzV Panther | PzVI Tiger | Cromwell VII | Churchill VII | M24 Chaffee | M4A3 Sherman | |
| Combat weight, t | 32 | 46 | 45,5 | 56 | 28 | 45 | 18,4 | 32 |
| Crew, people | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4-5 | 5 |
| Gun caliber, mm | 85 | 122 | 75 | 88 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 |
| Initial speed of an armor-piercing projectile, m/s | 792 | 781 | 935 | 780 | 620 | 620 | 620 | 620 |
| Armor, mm | 45-90 | 90-120 | 50-100 | 80-100 | 50-65 | 95-152 | 25-38 | 38-76/100 |
| Maximum speed, km/h | 55 | 37 | 45 | 38 | 52 | 28 | 55 | 48 |
| Cruising range on the highway, km | 300 | 220 | 155 | 100 | 160 | 200 | 200 | 250 |
| Average specific pressure, kPa | 81 | 80 | 90 | 105 | 100 | 95 | 78 | 100 |
Three conventional periods can be distinguished in German tank building. The beginning of the first is the appearance in the Reichswehr of an weapons inspection and swearing. unit, which united the infantry and artillery design bureaus, as well as a pyrotechnics laboratory. The inspectorate developed technical specifications for armored vehicles and also examined prototypes. Officially, its activities were limited only to armored vehicles developed in Hannover-Linden by the Deutsche Edelstalwerke company.
Direct work on tanks began in the second half of the 1920s at three machine-building plants in secret workshops. After the Nazi Party came to power, the process became much more intense.
The beginning of the second stage coincided, in fact, with the transformation of the Reichswehr into the Wehrmacht. In tank building, the customer was the Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the Ground Forces, OKN). According to the rules adopted at that time, each branch of the armed forces was entrusted with the design, delivery of orders, acceptance of ammunition and military-economic property, and development of plans for mat. ensuring our own production program. Administrative functions were assigned to the Waffenamt (weapons department), which included the departments of acceptance, design and WaPruf-6 (testing), engineering and inspection. The Armament Directorate was supposed to finance the tank industry, and also transfer purchased units, components, hulls, turrets, engines, transmissions, weapons, optical instruments, radio and electrical equipment to tank assembly enterprises free of charge.
By the end of the 1930s. German tank building was the responsibility of at least nine large concerns that supplied armored hulls and tanks. They controlled 32 enterprises belonging to 27 different companies. It is characteristic that these companies specialized in several areas at once. For example, out of eight Daimler-Benz enterprises, only one was engaged in the production of tanks. The other four were engaged in the production of automobiles, and another three were engaged in the production of aircraft engines. During the war years the situation remained virtually unchanged.
Workshop for the production of gun barrels at the German plant Rheinmetall-Borsig on the eve of the war
The beginning of the third and probably the most interesting period– 1940. The Second World War, which unfolded in Europe, required adjustments in industry. The formation of new units suffered greatly from a lack of equipment and weapons. The production of tanks lagged behind the Wehrmacht's needs for them. Yes, it probably couldn’t have been any other way, since economic mobilization was limited. Moreover, almost all areas of the economy were used in a rather unique way: they endlessly switched from the production of one product to another. At the same time, planning, as a rule, was adjusted to the priorities of military-strategic measures. In addition, it was necessary to urgently resolve many other organizational issues related to increasing the efficiency of use of production facilities, labor productivity and redistribution of labor.
A way out of this situation was found. On March 17, 1940, the Reichsministerium die Waffe und Munition (special imperial ministry of armaments and ammunition) was created, the head of which was engineer F. Todt. He is better known to Russian readers as the founder and leader of the national construction organization"Todt." It was thanks to his efforts that the famous Reichsautobahns were built. The same pressure of energy was probably needed in the military industry. However, Todt soon died in a plane crash.
After him, the ministry was headed by an equally talented organizer - the architect Speer. In a fairly short period - two years - Speer managed to triple the production of armored vehicles. Therefore, it is not surprising that his time at the helm of the ministry is often called the “Speer era.”
Off the assembly line German tanks Pz.Kpfw. V Ausf. D "Panther" and Pz.Kpfw. VI ausf.H "Tiger" in the courtyard of the Henschel plant
Now the Ministry of Arms and Ammunition was engaged in supply planning, issuing orders, and managing experimental work through the Commander-in-Chief for Tank Building. The scrupulousness of the approach can be judged by the structural divisions of the main committee: production and repair of tanks, design and supervision of production, improvement of armor, production of lightly armored vehicles, engines, supplies and others.
Let's consider new scheme"birth" of armored vehicles. The General Staff of the Ground Forces, taking into account the wishes of practitioners from the front-line units, issued approximate tactical and technical assignments to the weapons department (the General Staff also determined the required amount of equipment). In WaPruf-6, the task was worked out in detail, after which it was transferred to the Commander-in-Chief for Tank Construction, which, in turn, selected two or three design companies. A special commission consisting of representatives of interested parties studied ready-made projects, from which the best was selected. The design bureau that presented the selected project was appointed as the lead for this design, although the enterprise itself might not receive an order for the serial production of its own brainchild.
The prototypes underwent extensive testing at the Kummersdorf Central Test Site, located near Berlin. Tests were also carried out in branches of the test site: at a mountain test site in Thuringia, as well as in the Tyrolean Alps at the so-called snow test site. And only after this was the issue of transferring a self-propelled gun or tank into production was decided. The total volume of production was determined by the high command of the German army. The distribution of orders to factories and companies was carried out by the Ministry of Arms and Ammunition. Armored vehicles The ministry was in charge of the main tank production group. If the tank production plan was more or less stable, then the production programs for turrets, cabins for self-propelled guns and armored hulls, which were also drawn up for a year, could be adjusted several times.
The “geography” of German tank building was mainly determined by strategic considerations. Production facilities were deliberately dispersed to reduce their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. The principle of duplication of supplies of main units and components from various enterprises was also taken into account.
It should be noted that as much as such cooperation has been developed, it has also become more complicated. For example, 136 subcontractors were involved in the production of Panthers. Hulls were supplied by 6 factories, turrets - 5, gearboxes - 3, engines - 2, tracks - 4, optics - 1, weapons - 1, forgings - 15, steel castings - 14, the rest were finished parts, assemblies and fasteners.
Assembly workshop for German medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. III
In connection with the successes that emerged from the first year of the campaign against the Soviet Union, there was a tendency for German tank production to move to the East. In December 1941, a special commission for the production of tanks and spare parts studied the possibility of attracting the industry of occupied Ukraine for its own needs. Excellent prospects for the production of armored tank hulls opened up at the Mariupol plant named after. Ilyich, captured by the Germans. However, the rapidly changing situation on the German-Soviet front in this region did not allow these far-reaching plans to be realized. And after the Wehrmacht suffered defeats on the Volga and Kursk, production of tank units was stopped even in Poland and Silesia.
From the second half of 1943, large tank factories located in Germany became the target of attacks by Allied aviation. So, for example, until the end of the year production capacity Daimler-Benz, located in Berlin, was bombed three times. In 1944, MAN factories were added to them, as well as almost all enterprises located in the Rhine-Westphalian industrial region and engaged in the production of armored hulls.
To prevent disruptions in the well-functioning tank building system, some orders for important units and parts had to be transferred to small manufacturers. At large enterprises, they began to move some workshops, groups of machines along with personnel to safe places, and also... underground. So, for example, in September 1944, almost half of the structural divisions of Daimler-Benz, which specialized in the production of control mechanisms, turret box and chassis for the Panther, were relocated to the small towns of Falkensee near Berlin, Fitz near Küstrin, Kzeritz in Pomerania, Teltow, Oberprausnitz in the Sudetenland and even to the Deulivag wine cellar. We considered options for placing production equipment in potash mines, in former fortifications in Czechoslovakia, in caves...
The Pz IV tank was an example of a fairly successful design. Its production in Reich factories continued until the end of the war. This photo shows a tank of modifications N, which was tested at the Kummersdorf test site in 1944.
The measures taken to relocate production, naturally, did not contribute to the realization of the advantages of modern mass production, but only increased the already intense cargo flows. Despite this, Speer presented these circumstances as a virtue, saying that “German arms production does not accept the assembly line method of the USA and the USSR, but relies mainly on skilled German labor.” Although it was precisely the lack of large enterprises that did not allow German tank building to compete with the tank building of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition. German serial armor was divided into several groups based on steel grade and thickness. Along with heterogeneous armor, more homogeneous armor was produced. According to production technology, armor plates were divided into surface-hardened and uniformly hardened armor plates. After the loss of the Nikopol basin, the supply of manganese to Germany decreased. Nickel was delivered only from the north of Finland.
The result of a constant shortage of alloying elements was a deterioration in the quality of serial armor. For example, the frontal hull plates of the “Royal Tiger” and “Panther” quite often simply cracked after being hit by Soviet 122- and even 100-mm armor-piercing shells. To get out of this situation, protective screens were hung and the thickness and angles of the armor plates were increased. Among the armor grades, steels with reduced alloyability of the structural material have not been found with satisfactory projectile resistance.
Now a few words about the contribution made by the tank building of the occupied countries to the replenishment of the Wehrmacht armored vehicle fleet. Hungary and Italy will be discussed separately, since these countries were satellites of Germany and mainly armed their own armies. At the same time, Italian enterprises carried out some limited orders for the German armed forces. Tank enterprises in France and Poland were used for improvised conversions, as well as repairs of captured vehicles, and the manufacture of spare parts for them. Not a single self-propelled one artillery installation or the tank was not assembled there.
Assembling the chassis of the Pz.Kpfw tank. VI "Tiger" at one of the factories in Germany
COMPARATIVE DATA OF PRODUCTION OF ARMORED VEHICLES
Germany
The production of tanks, assault guns, tank destroyers and self-propelled guns in 1934-1945 was: in 1934-1937. – 1876 units, 1938 – 804 units, 1939 – 743 units, 1940 – 1743 units, 1941 – 3728 units, 1942 – 5496 units, 1943 – 12052 units, 1944 – 18821 units, 1945 – 3945 units. A total of 49,208 units were produced between 1934 and 1945.
In total, 75,513 armored vehicles were produced in Germany (or on its orders).
In addition, many command tanks (there were no guns), repair and recovery vehicles, artillery mobile posts and other equipment were produced. Taking into account this equipment, the total number of armored vehicles was 89,266 vehicles.
To this number it is necessary to add captured equipment that entered the Wehrmacht - 1577 units.
Thus, the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany received and used 90,843 armored vehicles during World War II.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
The production of tanks and self-propelled guns in the Soviet Union during World War II was: 1940 - 2421 tanks; 1941 - 6542 tanks; 1942 - 24,445 tanks and 59 self-propelled guns (total 24,504 units); 1943 - 19,892 tanks and 4,194 self-propelled guns (total 24,086 units); 1944 - 16,923 tanks and 12,061 self-propelled guns (total 28,987 units); 1945 - 16,295 tanks and 9,640 self-propelled guns (total 25,935 units). In total, between 1940 and 1945, 112,475 tanks and self-propelled guns were produced.
UK and USA
The production of tanks in Great Britain during the Second World War was: 1939 - 315 units; 1940 – 1399 units; 1941 – 4841 units; 1942 – 8611 units; 1943 – 7476 units; 1944 – 2474 units; 1945 – 612 units. Canadian industry also worked for Great Britain, producing 5,807 tanks. Total tank production is 31,534 vehicles.
Tank production in the USA during World War II was: 1939 – 96 units; 1940 – 331 units; 1941 – 4052 units; 1942 – 24997 units; 1943 – 29497 units; 1944 – 17565 units; 1945 – 11558 units. For the United States, 43,481 self-propelled guns must be added to the number of tanks. The total number of armored vehicles produced by the US industry during this period was 131,577 units.
In 40-41, German tank building companies, at the direction of mines. weapons and ammunition, some parts were ordered from small engineering firms in Belgium, France, Romania, and Denmark. Attempts were made to conclude contracts in Switzerland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.
The two countries deserve separate mention. In March 1939, the most developed regions of Czechoslovakia - Moravia and the Czech Republic - came under German protectorate. The tank factories located there, ČKD in Prague (renamed VMM by the Germans) and Skoda in Pilsen, until the very end of the war, first produced light tanks, and later self-propelled guns of their own design on their basis. The leaders of the Third Reich, for political reasons, did not dare to develop the production of heavy or medium tanks of German design there.
The heaviest production tank of World War II, the Tiger II. Launched into mass production at Henschel factories in January 1944.
Austria suffered the same fate. It was annexed by Germany in 1938. Even before the start of World War II, construction of a large metallurgical plant began on the basis of the Styrian mines located near Linz to meet the growing needs of tank building in Germany. Soon, workshops producing armored hulls appeared at this enterprise. At the same time, similar workshops began to operate in Kalfenberg at the old Beler company plant. This made it possible to build heavy and medium tanks in St. Valentin at the Nibelungen plant. Products of this enterprise, as well as the Czech VMM and Skoda, was always listed as German.
What is the result of the production activities of the German tank industry in the years 34-45? It is logical to take data that is the most objective, provided by authoritative researchers, and therefore least adjusted for moral, ideological and other reasons.
In this regard, preference should be given to the German author Müller-Hillebrand, although the third volume of the book “German Land Army 1933-1945,” translated into Russian and published in 1976 by the Military Publishing House, differs from the original in the absence of one appendix. It contains the information that interests us.
There are other sources. However, most of them were published in the West and are still inaccessible to a wide range of Russian readers.
Based on an article by Igor Shmelev, "Technique and Armament" magazine
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