During the Second World War, tanks played a decisive role in battles and operations; it is very difficult to single out the top ten from the many tanks; for this reason, the order in the list is rather arbitrary and the place of the tank is tied to the time of its active participation in battles and its significance for that period.
10. Tank Panzerkampfwagen III ( PzKpfw III)
PzKpfw III, better known as T-III, is a light tank with a 37 mm gun. Reservation from all angles – 30 mm. The main quality is Speed (40 km/h on the highway). Thanks to the advanced Carl Zeiss optics, ergonomic crew workstations and the presence of a radio station, the Troikas could successfully fight with much heavier vehicles. But with the advent of new opponents, the shortcomings of the T-III became more apparent. The Germans replaced the 37 mm guns with 50 mm guns and covered the tank with hinged screens - temporary measures yielded results, the T-III fought for several more years. By 1943, production of the T-III was discontinued due to the complete exhaustion of its resource for modernization. In total, German industry produced 5,000 “triples”.
9. Tank Panzerkampfwagen IV (PzKpfw IV)
The PzKpfw IV looked much more serious, becoming the most mass tank Panzerwaffe - the Germans managed to build 8,700 vehicles. Combining all the advantages of the lighter T-III, the “four” had high firepower and protection - the thickness of the front plate was gradually increased to 80 mm, and the shells of its 75 mm long-barreled gun pierced the armor of enemy tanks like foil (by the way, it was fired 1133 early modifications with a short-barreled gun).
The weak points of the vehicle are that the sides and rear are too thin (only 30 mm in the first modifications); the designers neglected the slope of the armor plates for the sake of manufacturability and ease of operation for the crew.
Panzer IV is the only German tank that was in mass production throughout World War II and became the most popular tank of the Wehrmacht. Its popularity among German tankers was comparable to the popularity of the T-34 among ours and the Sherman among the Americans. Well-designed and extremely reliable in operation, this combat vehicle was, in the full sense of the word, the “workhorse” of the Panzerwaffe.
8. Tank KV-1 (Klim Voroshilov)
“...from three sides we fired at the iron monsters of the Russians, but everything was in vain. The Russian giants were coming closer and closer. One of them approached our tank, hopelessly stuck in a swampy pond, and without any hesitation drove over it, pressing its tracks into the mud ... "
- General Reinhard, commander of the 41st tank corps of the Wehrmacht.
In the summer of 1941, the KV tank destroyed the elite units of the Wehrmacht with the same impunity as if it had rolled out onto the Borodino field in 1812. Invulnerable, invincible and incredibly powerful. Until the end of 1941, all the armies of the world had no weapons capable of stopping the Russian 45-ton monster. The KV was 2 times heavier than the largest Wehrmacht tank.
Armor KV is a wonderful song of steel and technology. 75 millimeters of solid steel from all angles! The frontal armor plates had an optimal angle of inclination, which further increased the projectile resistance of the KV armor - German 37 mm anti-tank guns they didn’t take it even at point-blank range, and 50 mm guns – no further than 500 meters. At the same time, the long-barreled 76 mm F-34 (ZIS-5) gun made it possible to hit any German tank of that period from any direction from a distance of 1.5 kilometers.
The KV crews were staffed exclusively by officers, only driver mechanics could be foremen. Their level of training far exceeded that of the crews who fought on other types of tanks. They fought more skillfully, which is why they were remembered by the Germans...
7. Tank T-34 (thirty-four)
“...There is nothing more terrible than a tank battle against superior enemy forces. Not in numbers - that didn’t matter to us, we got used to it. But against more good cars- this is terrible... Russian tanks are so agile, at close ranges they will climb a slope or overcome a swamp faster than you can turn the turret. And through the noise and roar you constantly hear the clang of shells on the armor. When they hit our tank, you often hear a deafening explosion and the roar of burning fuel, too loud to hear the dying screams of the crew ... "
- the opinion of a German tankman from the 4th Panzer Division, destroyed by T-34 tanks in the battle of Mtsensk on October 11, 1941.
Obviously, the Russian monster had no analogues in 1941: a 500-horsepower diesel engine, unique armor, a 76 mm F-34 gun (generally similar to the KV tank) and wide tracks - all these technical solutions provided the T-34 with an optimal ratio of mobility, fire power and security. Even individually, these parameters of the T-34 were higher than those of any Panzerwaffe tank.
When the Wehrmacht soldiers first met the “thirty-four” on the battlefield, they were, to put it mildly, in shock. The cross-country ability of our vehicle was impressive - where German tanks didn’t even think about going, the T-34s passed without much difficulty. The Germans even nicknamed their 37mm anti-tank gun the “tuk-tuk beater” because when its shells hit the 34, they simply hit it and bounced off.
The main thing is that Soviet designers managed to create a tank exactly as the Red Army needed it. The T-34 ideally suited the conditions of the Eastern Front. The extreme simplicity and manufacturability of the design made it possible to establish mass production of these combat vehicles in the shortest possible time; as a result, the T-34s were easy to operate, numerous and ubiquitous.
6. Tank Panzerkampfwagen VI “Tiger I” Ausf E, “Tiger”
“...we took a detour through a ravine and ran into the Tiger.” Having lost several T-34s, our battalion returned back..."
- a frequent description of meetings with PzKPfw VI from the memoirs of tank crews.
According to a number of Western historians, the main task of the Tiger tank was to fight enemy tanks, and its design corresponded to the solution of precisely this task:
If in the initial period of World War II the German military doctrine had a mainly offensive orientation, then later, when the strategic situation changed to the opposite, tanks began to be assigned the role of a means of eliminating breakthroughs in the German defense.
Thus, the Tiger tank was conceived primarily as a means of combating enemy tanks, whether on the defensive or offensive. Taking this fact into account is necessary to understand the design features and tactics of using the Tigers.
On July 21, 1943, the commander of the 3rd Tank Corps, Herman Bright, issued the following instructions for the combat use of the Tiger-I tank:
...Taking into account the strength of the armor and the strength of the weapon, the Tiger should be used mainly against enemy tanks and anti-tank weapons, and only secondarily - as an exception - against infantry units.
As combat experience has shown, the Tiger's weapons allow it to fight enemy tanks at distances of 2000 meters or more, which especially affects the enemy's morale. Durable armor allows the Tiger to approach the enemy without the risk of serious damage from hits. However, you should try to engage enemy tanks at distances greater than 1000 meters.
5. Tank "Panther" (PzKpfw V "Panther")
Realizing that the Tiger was a rare and exotic weapon for professionals, German tank builders created a simpler and cheap tank, with the intention of turning it into a mass medium tank Wehrmacht.
Panzerkampfwagen V "Panther" is still the subject of heated debate. Technical capabilities the cars do not cause any complaints - with a mass of 44 tons, the Panther was superior in mobility to the T-34, developing 55-60 km/h on a good highway. The tank was armed with a 75 mm KwK 42 cannon with a barrel length of 70 calibers! Armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile, fired from its hellish mouth, flew 1 kilometer in the first second - with such performance characteristics, the Panther's cannon could make a hole in any Allied tank at a distance of over 2 kilometers. The armor of the Panther is also considered worthy by most sources - the thickness of the forehead varied from 60 to 80 mm, while the angles of the armor reached 55°. The side was weaker protected - at the level of the T-34, so it was easily hit by Soviet anti-tank weapons. The lower part of the side was additionally protected by two rows of rollers on each side.
4. Tank IS-2 (Joseph Stalin)
The IS-2 was the most powerful and most heavily armored of the Soviet production tanks during the war, and one of the strongest tanks in the world at that time. Tanks of this type played a big role in the battles of 1944-1945, especially distinguishing themselves during the assault on cities.
The thickness of the IS-2 armor reached 120 mm. One of the main achievements of Soviet engineers is the efficiency and low metal consumption of the IS-2 design. With a mass comparable to that of the Panther, the Soviet tank was much more seriously protected. But the too dense layout required the placement of fuel tanks in the control compartment - if the armor was penetrated, the Is-2 crew had little chance of surviving. The driver-mechanic, who did not have his own hatch, was especially at risk.
City assaults:
Together with the self-propelled guns at its base, the IS-2 was actively used for assault operations in fortified cities, such as Budapest, Breslau, and Berlin. The tactics of action in such conditions included the actions of the OGvTTP in assault groups of 1-2 tanks, accompanied by an infantry squad of several machine gunners, a sniper or a marksman with a rifle, and sometimes a backpack flamethrower. In case of weak resistance, tanks with assault groups mounted on them broke through at full speed along the streets to squares, squares, and parks, where they could take up a perimeter defense.
3. Tank M4 Sherman (Sherman)
"Sherman" is the pinnacle of rationality and pragmatism. It is all the more surprising that the United States, which had 50 tanks at the beginning of the war, managed to create such a balanced combat vehicle and rivet 49,000 Shermans of various modifications by 1945. For example, in ground forces the Sherman with a gasoline engine was used, and the units Marine Corps There was a modification M4A2, equipped with a diesel engine. American engineers rightly believed that this would greatly simplify the operation of tanks - diesel fuel could easily be found among sailors, unlike high-octane gasoline. By the way, it was this modification of the M4A2 that came to the Soviet Union.
Why did the Red Army command like the “Emcha” (as our soldiers nicknamed the M4) so much that elite units, such as the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps and the 9th Guards Tank Corps, moved entirely to them? The answer is simple: Sherman had the optimal ratio of armor, firepower, mobility and... reliability. In addition, the Sherman was the first tank with a hydraulic turret drive (this ensured special pointing accuracy) and a gun stabilizer in the vertical plane - tankers admitted that in a duel situation their shot was always the first.
Combat use:
After the landing in Normandy, the Allies had to come face to face with German tank divisions, which were sent to defend Fortress Europe, and it turned out that the Allies had underestimated the degree to which the German troops were saturated with heavy types of armored vehicles, especially Panther tanks. In direct clashes with German heavy tanks, the Shermans had very little chance. The British, to a certain extent, could count on their Sherman Firefly, whose excellent cannon made a great impression on the Germans (so much so that the crews German tanks they tried to hit Firefly first, and then deal with the rest). The Americans, who were counting on their new weapon, quickly found out that the power of its armor-piercing shells was still not enough to confidently defeat the Panther head-on.
2. Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. B "Tiger II", "Tiger II"
Combat debut Royal Tigers took place on July 18, 1944 in Normandy, where the 503rd heavy tank battalion managed to knock out 12 Sherman tanks in the first battle.”
And already on August 12, Tiger II appeared on the Eastern Front: the 501st heavy tank battalion tried to interfere with the Lviv-Sandomierz war. offensive operation. The bridgehead was an uneven semicircle, its ends resting on the Vistula. Approximately in the middle of this semicircle, covering the direction to Staszow, the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade defended.
At 7.00 on August 13, the enemy, under the cover of fog, went on the offensive with the forces of the 16th Tank Division with the participation of 14 Royal Tigers of the 501st Heavy Tank Battalion. But as soon as the new Tigers crawled to their original positions, three of them were shot from an ambush by the crew of the T-34-85 tank under the command of junior lieutenant Alexander Oskin, which, in addition to Oskin himself, included driver Stetsenko, gun commander Merkhaidarov, radio operator Grushin and loader Khalychev . In total, the brigade's tankers knocked out 11 tanks, and the remaining three, abandoned by the crews, were captured in good condition. One of these tanks, number 502, is still in Kubinka.
Currently, the Royal Tigers are on display at the Saumur Musee des Blindes in France, the RAC Tank Museum Bovington (the only surviving example with a Porsche turret) and the Royal Military College of Science Shrivenham in the UK, the Munster Lager Kampftruppen Schule in Germany (transferred by the Americans in 1961) , Ordnance Museum Aberdeen Proving Ground in the USA, Switzerlands Panzer Museum Thun in Switzerland and the Military Historical Museum of Armored Weapons and Equipment in Kubinka near Moscow.
1. Tank T-34-85
The T-34-85 medium tank, in essence, represents a major modernization of the T-34 tank, as a result of which a very important drawback of the latter was eliminated - the cramped fighting compartment and the associated impossibility of complete division of labor among the crew members. This was achieved by increasing the diameter of the turret ring, as well as by installing a new three-man turret of significantly larger dimensions than the T-34. At the same time, the design of the body and the arrangement of components and assemblies in it have not undergone any significant changes. Consequently, there are still disadvantages inherent in vehicles with a stern-mounted engine and transmission.
As is known, two layout schemes with a bow and stern transmission are most widely used in tank building. Moreover, the disadvantages of one scheme are the advantages of another.
The disadvantage of the layout with a rear-mounted transmission is the increased length of the tank due to the placement in its hull of four compartments that are not aligned along the length, or the reduction in the volume of the fighting compartment with a constant length of the vehicle. Because of long length engine and transmission compartments, the combat compartment with a heavy turret is shifted to the nose, overloading the front rollers, leaving no space on the turret plate for the central and even side placement of the driver's hatch. There is a danger that the protruding gun will “stick” into the ground when the tank moves through natural and artificial obstacles. The control drive connecting the driver with the transmission located in the stern becomes more complicated.
T-34-85 tank layout diagram
There are two ways out of this situation: either increase the length of the control (or combat) compartment, which will inevitably lead to an increase in the overall length of the tank and a deterioration in its maneuverability due to an increase in the L/B ratio - the length of the supporting surface to the track width (for the T-34- 85 it is close to the optimal - 1.5), or radically change the layout of the engine and transmission compartments. What this could lead to can be judged by the results of the work of Soviet designers when designing the new medium tanks T-44 and T-54, created during the war and put into service in 1944 and 1945, respectively.
T-54 tank layout diagram
These combat vehicles used a layout with a transverse (and not longitudinal, like the T-34-85) placement of a 12-cylinder V-2 diesel engine (in the B-44 and B-54 variants) and a combined significantly shortened (by 650 mm ) engine and transmission compartment. This made it possible to lengthen the fighting compartment to 30% of the hull length (for the T-34-85 - 24.3%), increase the diameter of the turret ring by almost 250 mm and install a powerful 100-mm cannon on the T-54 medium tank. At the same time, we managed to move the turret towards the stern, making room on the turret plate for the driver's hatch. The exclusion of the fifth crew member (the gunner from the course machine gun), the removal of the ammunition rack from the fighting compartment floor, the transfer of the fan from the engine crankshaft to the stern bracket and the reduction in the overall height of the engine ensured a decrease in the height of the hull of the T-54 tank (compared to the hull of the T-34- 85) by approximately 200 mm, as well as a reduction in the reserved volume by approximately 2 cubic meters. and increased armor protection by more than two times (with an increase in mass of only 12%).
During the war they did not agree to such a radical rearrangement of the T-34 tank, and, probably, it was the right decision. At the same time, the diameter of the turret ring, while maintaining the same hull shape, of the T-34-85 was practically maximum, which did not allow placing an artillery system in the turret of more than large caliber. The tank's armament modernization capabilities were completely exhausted, unlike, for example, the American Sherman and the German Pz.lV.
By the way, the problem of increasing the caliber of the main armament of the tank was of paramount importance. Sometimes you can hear the question: why was the transition to an 85-mm gun necessary, could it be improved ballistic characteristics F-34 by increasing the barrel length? After all, this is what the Germans did with their 75-mm cannon on the Pz.lV.
The fact is that German guns traditionally distinguished by better internal ballistics (ours are equally traditionally external). The Germans achieved high armor penetration by increasing the initial speed and better testing of ammunition. We could respond adequately only by increasing the caliber. Although the S-53 cannon significantly improved the firing capabilities of the T-34-85, as Yu.E. Maksarev noted: “In the future, the T-34 could no longer directly, in a duel, hit new German tanks.” All attempts to create 85-mm guns with an initial speed of over 1000 m/s, the so-called high-power guns, ended in failure due to rapid wear and destruction of the barrel even at the testing stage. To “duel” defeat German tanks, it was necessary to switch to a 100 mm caliber, which was carried out only in the T-54 tank with a turret ring diameter of 1815 mm. But this combat vehicle did not take part in the battles of World War II.
As for the placement of the driver's hatch in the front hull, we could try to follow the American path. Let us remember that on the Sherman the driver and machine gunner’s hatches, originally also made in the sloping frontal plate of the hull, were subsequently transferred to the turret plate. This was achieved by reducing the angle of inclination of the front sheet from 56° to 47° to the vertical. The T-34-85's frontal hull plate had an inclination of 60°. By also reducing this angle to 47° and compensating for this by slightly increasing the thickness of the frontal armor, it would be possible to increase the area of the turret plate and place the driver’s hatch on it. This would not require a radical redesign of the hull design and would not entail a significant increase in the mass of the tank.
The suspension hasn't changed on the T-34-85 either. And if the use of higher quality steel for the manufacture of springs helped to avoid their rapid subsidence and, as a result, a decrease in ground clearance, then it was not possible to get rid of significant longitudinal vibrations of the tank hull in motion. It was an organic defect of the spring suspension. The location of the habitable compartments in the front of the tank only aggravated negative impact these fluctuations affect the crew and weapons.
A consequence of the layout of the T-34-85 was the absence of fighting compartment rotating tower tower. In combat, the loader worked standing on the lids of cassette boxes with shells placed on the bottom of the tank. When turning the turret, he had to move after the breech, while he was hampered by spent cartridges falling right there on the floor. When conducting intense fire, the accumulated cartridges also made it difficult to access the shots placed in the ammunition rack on the bottom.
Summarizing all these points, we can conclude that, unlike the same "Sherman", the possibilities for modernizing the hull and suspension of the T-34-85 were not fully used.
When considering the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34-85, it is necessary to take into account one more very important circumstance. The crew of any tank, as a rule, in everyday reality does not care at all about the angle of inclination of the frontal or any other sheet of the hull or turret. It is much more important that the tank as a machine, that is, as a set of mechanical and electrical mechanisms, works clearly, reliably and does not create problems during operation. Including problems associated with the repair or replacement of any parts, components and assemblies. Here the T-34-85 (like the T-34) was fine. The tank was distinguished by its exceptional maintainability! Paradoxical, but true - and the layout is “to blame” for this!
There is a rule: to arrange not to ensure convenient installation and dismantling of units, but based on the fact that until they completely fail, the units do not need repair. The required high reliability and trouble-free operation are achieved by designing a tank based on ready-made, structurally proven units. Since during the creation of the T-34, practically none of the tank’s units met this requirement, its layout was carried out contrary to the rule. The roof of the engine-transmission compartment was easily removable, the rear hull sheet was hinged, which made it possible to dismantle large units such as the engine and gearbox in the field. All this was of enormous importance in the first half of the war, when more tanks failed due to technical faults than from enemy action (on April 1, 1942, for example, in active army there were 1642 serviceable and 2409 faulty tanks of all types, while our combat losses in March amounted to 467 tanks). As the quality of the units improved, reaching its highest level in the T-34-85, the importance of the repairable layout decreased, but one would hesitate to call this a disadvantage. Moreover, good maintainability turned out to be very useful during the post-war operation of the tank abroad, primarily in the countries of Asia and Africa, sometimes in extreme climatic conditions and with personnel who had a very mediocre, to say the least, level of training.
Despite the presence of all the shortcomings in the design of the "thirty-four", a certain balance of compromises was maintained, which distinguished this combat vehicle from other tanks of the Second World War. Simplicity, ease of use and maintenance, combined with good armor protection, maneuverability and fairly powerful weapons, became the reason for the success and popularity of the T-34-85 among tankers.
Films about tank crews are another special, more detailed case from the selection of films about the war. This can be explained quite simply, since you can hardly see a tank in films that do not describe military operations. Although tanks are also used in training and can be used, for example, in films about the army, the absolute majority feature films, where tanks play an important role, are dedicated to military operations. A significant place among such films is played by films about the Great Patriotic War, which lasted from 1941 to 1945.
The tank, in itself, is necessarily an armored vehicle. This point always remains unchanged, since its other characteristics may change from machine to machine. For example, most tanks have a tracked movement system, while some tanks move on conventional wheels. Much more expanded options are present in terms of the tank’s armament. Although tanks are by no means machines with only one type of weapon, one of them still plays a leading role. The most developed and the first thing that comes to mind as the main armament of a tank is the cannon. Although, before the good development of cannon armament, most tanks were armed with machine gun armament, which took second place due to the advent of cannon armament. These two types of weapons still remain the most popular in tank building, although more exotic versions of tanks are also common, for example, with missile weapons or with flamethrowers.
Also speaking about tanks, I would like to definitely note that such a large and well-equipped vehicle in the conditions of military operations is almost impossible to handle alone. Therefore, the tank team consists of several people, which, depending on the size of the tank, can vary from 2-3 to 10-12 people. All this requires good and well-coordinated teamwork, where the absence or incapacity of one of the crew members can lead to the death of the tank and the entire crew during a tank battle. And of course, all these details will be perfectly displayed in any film about tanks, an excellent example of which is the film Fury with Brad Pitt.
When and where did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually take place?
both as a science and as a social instrument, alas, it is subject to too much political influence. And it often happens that for some reason - most often ideological - some events are extolled, while others are forgotten or remain underestimated. Thus, the overwhelming majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up during the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the battle of Prokhorovka to be the largest tank battle in history - component battle on the Kursk Bulge. But in fairness, it is worth noting that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually took place two years earlier and half a thousand kilometers to the west. Within a week, two tank armadas with a total number of about 4,500 armored vehicles converged in the triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody.
Counterattack on the second day of the war
The actual beginning of the Battle of Dubno, which is also called the Battle of Brody or the Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was June 23, 1941. It was on this day that the tank corps - at that time they were usually called mechanized - corps of the Red Army, stationed in the Kiev Military District, launched the first serious counterattacks against the advancing German troops. Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, insisted on counterattacking the Germans. Initially, the attack on the flanks of Army Group South was carried out by the 4th, 15th and 22nd mechanized corps, which were in the first echelon. And after them, the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the second echelon, joined the operation.
Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, which was part of Army Group South and was rushing towards Kyiv in order to encircle and destroy it. In addition, the battles of the first day, when some Soviet divisions- like, for example, the 87th division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - managed to stop the superior forces of the Germans, giving hope that this plan could be realized.
In addition, the Soviet troops in this sector had a significant superiority in tanks. On the eve of the war, the Kiev Special Military District was considered the strongest of the Soviet districts, and in the event of an attack, it was assigned the role of executing the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here first and in large quantities, and the training of the personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterattack, the troops of the district, which by that time had already become the Southwestern Front, had no less than 3,695 tanks. And on the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.
In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision on an offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which Soviet troops were defeated.
Tanks fight tanks for the first time
When the tank units of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps reached the front line and entered the battle from the march, this resulted in an oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Although the concept of wars of the mid-twentieth century did not allow such battles. It was believed that tanks were a tool for breaking through enemy defenses or creating chaos on his communications. “Tanks do not fight tanks” - this is how this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery, as well as carefully dug-in infantry, had to fight the tanks. And the battle of Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions went literally head-on into German tanks. And they lost.
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the German troops were much more active and smarter than the Soviet ones, using all types of communications, and the coordination of the efforts of various types and branches of troops in the Wehrmacht at that moment was, unfortunately, head and shoulders above that in the Red Army. In the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: rifle units moved on their own two feet and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves, at the level above the battalion, acted without general coordination, on their own. It often happened that one mechanized corps was already rushing west, deep into the German defense, and the other, which could support it, began to regroup or retreat from occupied positions...
Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno. Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA
Contrary to concepts and instructions
Second reason mass death Soviet tanks in the battle of Dubno, which needs to be mentioned separately, was their unpreparedness for tank battle- a consequence of those same pre-war concepts “tanks do not fight tanks.” Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks accompanying infantry and raid warfare, created in the early to mid-1930s, were the majority.
More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, there were 2,803 tanks in five Soviet mechanized corps - the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd. Of these, there are 171 medium tanks (all T-34), heavy tanks- 217 pieces (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks of the T-26, T-27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7 types , which can be considered the most modern. And the 4th Mechanized Corps, which fought just west of Brody, had another 892 tanks, but exactly half of them were modern - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.
Soviet light tanks, due to the specific tasks assigned to them, had bulletproof or anti-fragmentation armor. Light tanks are an excellent tool for deep raids behind enemy lines and operations on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuited for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strong and weak sides armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours in both quality and weapons, in defense, negating all the advantages Soviet technology.
German field artillery also had its say in this battle. And if, as a rule, it was not dangerous for the T-34 and KV, then light tanks it wasn't easy. And against the Wehrmacht’s 88-mm anti-aircraft guns deployed for direct fire, even the armor of the new “thirty-fours” was powerless. Only the heavy KVs and T-35s resisted them with dignity. The light T-26 and BT, as stated in the reports, “were partially destroyed as a result of being hit by anti-aircraft shells,” and did not simply stop. But the Germans in this direction used not only anti-aircraft guns in anti-tank defense.
The defeat that brought victory closer
And yet, Soviet tankers, even with such “inappropriate” vehicles, went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, which is why German aircraft knocked out almost half of the columns on the march. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes penetrated even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communication and at your own peril and risk. But they walked.
They went and got their way. In the first two days of the counteroffensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other, achieved success. On the fourth day, Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to achieve success, in some areas throwing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. In the evening of June 26, Soviet tank crews even took the city of Dubno in battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat... to the east!
Shot down German tank PzKpfw II. Photo: waralbum.ru
And yet, the Wehrmacht’s advantage in infantry units, without which in that war tankers could only operate fully in rear raids, soon began to take their toll. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all the vanguard units of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And with each passing hour, the tankers increasingly lacked serviceable vehicles, shells, spare parts and fuel. It got to the point that they had to retreat, leaving the enemy with almost undamaged tanks: there was no time or opportunity to put them on the move and take them with them.
Today you can come across the opinion that if the leadership of the front, contrary to the order of Georgy Zhukov, had not given the command to move from offensive to defensive, the Red Army, they say, would have turned back the Germans at Dubno. I wouldn't turn back. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active cooperation with other branches of the military. But the Battle of Dubno played its role in thwarting Hitler’s Barbarossa plan. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the Wehrmacht command to bring into battle reserves that were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And after this battle the direction to Kyiv itself began to be considered a priority.
And this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, it broke them - and broke them so much that the tempo of the offensive was catastrophically lost. And although the difficult autumn and winter of 1941 lay ahead, the largest tank battle had already spoken its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This, the battle of Dubno, echoed two years later on the fields near Kursk and Orel - and was echoed in the first volleys of victorious fireworks...
Traditionally, the largest tank battle is considered to be the battle near Prokhorovka in the summer of 1943. But, in fact, the world's largest tank battle took place two years earlier: in June 1941 in the Brody-Dubno-Lutsk area. If we compare the numbers, Prokhorovka is clearly inferior to the Western Ukrainian Tank Battle.
The Battle of Prokhorovka took place on July 12, 1943. According to official Soviet data, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns converged on both sides: 800 Soviet against 700 Nazi Germans. The Germans lost 350 armored vehicles, ours - 300. Allegedly, after this, the turning point in the Battle of Kursk came.
However, this officialdom was questioned even by many Soviet researchers. After all, such a calculation contains obvious distortion. Indeed, in the 5th Guards tank army General Pavel Rotmistrov, who on that day counterattacked the advancing German troops, had about 950 tanks. But as for the Germans, there were approximately 700 tanks and self-propelled guns in the entire German group on the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge. And near Prokhorovka there was only the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Waffen-SS General Paul Hausser - about 310 combat vehicles.
Therefore, according to updated Soviet data, 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns converged near Prokhorovka: just under 800 Soviet versus just over 400 German (losses were not specified). At the same time, neither side achieved its goal, but the German offensive was objectively losing momentum.
According to very precise data, in tank battle On July 12, near Prokhorovka, 311 German tanks and self-propelled guns took part against 597 Soviet ones (some of the 5th GvTA vehicles failed after a 300-kilometer march). The SS men lost about 70 (22%), and guardsmen - 343 (57%) armored vehicles. At the same time, their irretrievable losses in 2 SS TK were estimated at only 5 vehicles! The Germans, which even Soviet military leaders admitted, had better evacuation and repair of equipment. Of those shot down near Prokhorovka Soviet cars subject to restoration 146.
According to Russian historian Valery Zamulin ( Deputy for Science Director of the State Military Historical Museum-Reserve “Prokhorovskoe Field”), by decision Supreme Commander-in-Chief A commission was created to investigate the causes of the large losses suffered by the 5th GvTA near Prokhorovka. The commission's report called the military actions of Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka "an example of an unsuccessful operation." General Rotmistrov was going to be court-martialed, but by that time the general situation at the front had changed - and everything turned out okay. By the way, the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily had a great influence on the outcome of the Battle of Kursk, after which the headquarters of the 2nd SS Tank Corps and the Leibshatnadrt division were sent to Italy.
Now let's go back two years to Western Ukraine- and compare
If the battle of Prokhorovka lasted only one day, then the Western Ukrainian tank battle (it is difficult to determine it by any one region - Volyn or Galicia - not to mention one settlement) lasted a week: from June 23 to 30, 1941. It was attended by five mechanized corps of the Red Army (2803 tanks) of the Southwestern Front against four German tank divisions (585 tanks) of the Wehrmacht Army Group South, united in the First Tank Group. Subsequently, another tank division of the Red Army (325) and one tank division of the Wehrmacht (143) entered the battle. Thus, 3,128 Soviet and 728 German tanks (+ 71 German assault guns) fought in a gigantic oncoming tank battle. Thus, total tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the Western Ukrainian battle - almost four thousand!
On the evening of June 22, the troops of the Southwestern Front (the most powerful grouping of Soviet troops on the western border of the USSR) received orders to “make powerful concentric attacks mechanized corps, with all aviation of the Southwestern Front and other troops of the 5th and 6th armies, encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky, Dubno. By the end of June 24, take possession of the Lublin region.”
Considering the balance of forces (primarily in tanks, but also in artillery and aviation), the counteroffensive had a very high chance of success. The Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Georgy Zhukov, personally arrived to coordinate the actions of the Southwestern Front.
To implement the task, the command of the Southwestern Front decided to create two shock groups: each has three mechanized and one rifle corps. However, the breakthrough of the German tank group forced the front commander, General Mikhail Kirponos, to abandon this plan and give the order to launch a counteroffensive without waiting for the concentration of all forces. Tank formations entered the battle separately and without mutual coordination. Subsequently, orders changed several times, which is why some units made multi-kilometer marches under enemy air attacks.
Some units did not take part in the counterattack. Part of the forces was sent to cover Kovel from the Brest direction, from where German tanks were allegedly also advancing. But, as it later became clear, the intelligence report was completely inaccurate.
On June 27, the strike group of the 8th mechanized corps under the command of brigade commissar Nikolai Popel successfully counterattacked the Germans in the Dubno area, inflicting serious losses on the enemy. However, here the Soviet tankers stopped and, waiting for reinforcements, stood for two days! During this time, the group did not receive support and, as a result, was surrounded.
It is interesting that the German tank and motorized divisions, despite the Soviet tank counterattacks, continued the offensive, as if “running forward.” In many ways, the burden of the fight against Red Army tanks fell on the Wehrmacht infantry. However, oncoming tank battles that was also enough.
On July 29, the withdrawal of the mechanized corps was authorized, and on June 30, a general retreat. The front headquarters left Ternopil and moved to Proskurov. By this time, the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. About 10% of the tanks remained in the 22nd, about 15% in the 8th and 15th, about 30% in the 9th and 19th.
Member of the military council of the Southwestern Front, corps commissar Nikolai Vashugin, who at first actively organized counterattacks, shot himself on June 28. The remaining members of the Military Council proposed to retreat beyond the line of the old Soviet-Polish border (which existed until September 1939). However, German tanks broke through the line of fortified areas on the old border and reached the rear of the Soviet troops. Already on July 10, German troops took Zhitomir...
It cannot be said that the Soviet troops showed complete failure in those battles. It was then that the Germans first started talking about the superiority of the T-34 and KV, against which the Germans were powerless anti-tank guns(only 88-mm anti-aircraft guns took them)…
However, in the end, the defeat was complete. By June 30, the Southwestern Front troops participating in the counteroffensive had lost 2,648 tanks—about 85%. As for the Germans, the First Panzer Group lost about 260 vehicles during this period (for the most part these were not irretrievable losses).
In total, the Southwestern and Southern Fronts lost 4,381 tanks in the first 15 days of the war (according to the collection “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: Losses of the Armed Forces”) out of 5,826 available.
The losses of the First Tank Group by September 4 amounted to 408 vehicles (of which 186 were irrecoverable). A little more than half. However, with the remaining 391 tanks and assault weapon By September 15, Kleist managed to connect with Guderian and close the encirclement ring around the Southwestern Front.
One of the main reasons for the defeat lies in the unprecedentedly large non-combat losses of the Red Army. For example, non-combat losses in tanks (abandoned due to a lack of fuel and lubricants, breakdowns, falling from a bridge, getting stuck in a swamp, etc.) in different divisions amounted to about 40-80%. Moreover, this cannot be attributed solely to the poor condition of supposedly outdated Soviet tanks. After all, the newest KV and T-34 failed in the same way as the relatively old BT and T-26. Neither before nor after the summer of 1941, the Soviet tank forces We did not know such non-combat losses.
Considering that the number of missing soldiers and those lagging behind on the march also noticeably exceeded the number of killed and wounded, we can say that the Red Army soldiers sometimes simply ran away, abandoning their equipment.
It is worth looking at the reasons for the defeat from the angle of Stalin’s postulate “personnel decide everything.” In particular, compare the biographies of the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt, and the commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos.
66-year-old Runstedt graduated from the Military Academy back in 1907 and became an officer of the General Staff. During World War I he was chief of staff of the corps, in 1939 he commanded an army group during the war against Poland, and in 1940 - an army group in the war against France. For successful actions in 1940 (it was his troops who broke through the front and surrounded the allies at Dunkirk) he received the rank of field marshal.
49-year-old Mikhail Kirponos started out as a forester. During the First World War he was a paramedic, during the Civil War he commanded a regiment for some time, then held various positions (from commissar to head of the economic command) at the Kyiv School of Red Petty Officers. In the 1920s he graduated from the Military Academy. Frunze, then was chief of staff of the division for three years and head of the Kazan Infantry School for four years. During Finnish war was a division commander and distinguished himself in the battles for Vyborg. As a result, after jumping over several steps career ladder, in February 1941 he headed the Kiev Special Military District (the largest in the USSR), which was transformed into the Southwestern Front.
Soviet tank forces were inferior to the Panzerwaffe in training. Soviet tank crews had 2-5 hours of driving practice, while German tank crews had about 50 hours.
As for the training of commanders, the Germans noted the extremely inept conduct of Soviet tank attacks. This is how he wrote about the battles of 1941-1942. German General Friedrich von Mellenthin, author of the study “Tank Battles 1939-1945: The Combat Use of Tanks in the Second World War”:
“Tanks were concentrated in dense masses in front of the German defense front; uncertainty and the absence of any plan were felt in their movement. They interfered with each other, collided with our anti-tank guns, and if our positions were broken through, they stopped moving and stopped, instead of building on their success. During these days, individual German anti-tank guns and 88-mm guns were most effective: sometimes one gun disabled over 30 tanks in an hour. It seemed to us that the Russians had created an instrument that they would never learn to use.”
In general, the very structure of the mechanized corps of the Red Army turned out to be unsuccessful, which already in mid-July 1941 were disbanded into less cumbersome formations.
It is also worth noting factors that cannot be attributed to defeat. First of all, it cannot be explained by the superiority of German tanks over Soviet ones. Quite a lot has already been written about the fact that at the beginning of the war, Soviet supposedly outdated tanks, in general, were not inferior to German ones, and the new KV and T-34 were superior to enemy tanks. There is no way to explain the Soviet defeat by the fact that the Red Army was led by “backward” cavalry commanders. After all, the German First Panzer Group was commanded by Cavalry General Ewald von Kleist.
Finally, a few words about why Brody-Dubno-Lutsk lost the championship to Prokhorovka.
In fact, they talked about the Western Ukrainian tank battle in the Soviet period. Some of its participants even wrote memoirs (especially the memoirs of Nikolai Popel - “In a difficult time”). However, in general, they mentioned it in passing, in a few lines: they say there were counterattacks that were not successful. Nothing was said about the number of Soviet ones, but it was emphasized that they were outdated.
This interpretation can be explained by two main reasons. First of all, according to the Soviet myth about the reasons for the defeat in the initial period of the war, the Germans had superiority in technology. To be convincing, in Soviet history about the initial period of the Second World War, the number of all German tanks (and their allies) was compared with the number of only medium and heavy Soviet tanks. It was generally accepted that the Red Army soldiers stopped the German tank hordes only with bunches of grenades, or even bottles with a combustible mixture. Therefore, there was simply no place for the largest tank battle in 1941 in the official Soviet history of the Second World War.
Another reason for the silence of the greatest tank battle the fact that it was organized by the future Marshal of Victory, and at that time the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Georgy Zhukov. After all, the marshal of victory had no defeats! In the same connection soviet history The Second World War hid Operation Mars, the failed large-scale offensive at the end of 1942 against the German-held Rzhev salient. The actions of two fronts here were led by Zhukov. So that his authority would not suffer, this battle was reduced to a local Rzhev-Sychev operation, and they knew about the large losses from Alexander Tvardovsky’s poem “I was killed near Rzhev.”
Apologists for the Marshal of Victory even made candy out of the catastrophe of the Southwestern Front. Allegedly, already in the first days of the enemy invasion, Zhukov organized a counterattack on the Southwestern Front with the forces of several mechanized corps. As a result of the operation, the plan of the Nazi command to immediately break through to Kyiv and reach the left bank of the Dnieper was thwarted. Then the enemy suffered considerable losses in military equipment, which noticeably reduced its offensive and maneuver capabilities.
At the same time, about the initial goal of the offensive (to capture the Lublin region), they said that the order given was unrealistic, based on an overestimation of one’s troops and an underestimation of the enemy. And they preferred not to talk about the ruined tank armada, only casually mentioning that the tanks were outdated.
In general, it is not surprising that the tank championship was given to Prokhorovka.
Dmitro Shurkhalo, for ORD
Historians still argue about where the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place. It is no secret that history in many countries of the world is subject to excessive political influence. Therefore, it is not uncommon that some events are praised, while others remain underestimated or are completely forgotten. So, according to the history of the USSR, the largest tank battle took place near Prokhorovka. It was part of the decisive battle that took place on But some historians believe that the most ambitious confrontation between the armored vehicles of the two warring sides took place two years earlier between three cities - Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. Two enemy tank armadas, numbering a total of 4.5 thousand vehicles, converged in this area.
Counterattack of the second day
This largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place on June 23 - two days after the invasion of Nazi-German invaders on Soviet soil. It was then that the mechanized corps of the Red Army, which were part of the Kyiv Military District, were able to deliver the first powerful counterattack against the rapidly advancing enemy. By the way, G.K. insisted on carrying out this operation. Zhukov.
The plan of the Soviet command, first of all, was to deliver a significant blow from the flanks to the 1st tank group of the Germans, rushing towards Kyiv, in order to first encircle and then destroy it. Hope for victory over the enemy was given by the fact that in this sector the Red Army had a solid superiority in tanks. In addition, the Kiev Military District before the war was considered one of the strongest, and therefore it was entrusted with the main role of carrying out a retaliatory strike in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany. It was here that all military equipment went first and foremost, in large quantities, and the level of training of personnel was the highest.
Before the war there were 3,695 tanks here, while German side advanced with only eight hundred armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery installations. But in practice, what seemed like an excellent plan failed miserably. A rash, hasty and unprepared decision resulted in the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War, where the Red Army suffered its first and so serious defeat.
Confrontation of armored vehicles
When the mechanized Soviet units finally reached the front lines, they immediately went into battle. It must be said that the theory of wars until the middle of the last century did not allow such battles, since armored vehicles were considered the main tool for breaking through enemy defenses.
“Tanks don’t fight tanks” - this was the formulation of this principle, common to both the Soviet and all other armies of the world. Anti-tank artillery or well-entrenched infantrymen were called upon to fight the armored vehicles. Therefore, the events in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno area completely broke all theoretical ideas about military formations. It was here that the first largest oncoming tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place, during which Soviet and German mechanized units faced each other in a frontal attack.
The first reason for the defeat
The Red Army lost this battle, and there were two reasons for this. The first of them is lack of communication. The Germans used it very wisely and actively. With the help of communications, they coordinated the efforts of all branches of the military. Unlike the enemy, the Soviet command managed the actions of its tank units very poorly. Therefore, those who entered the battle had to act at their own peril and risk, moreover, without any support.
The infantrymen were supposed to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery, but instead the rifle units, forced to run after the armored vehicles, simply could not keep up with the vehicles that had gone ahead. The lack of overall coordination led to the fact that one corps began an offensive, and the other retreated from already occupied positions or began to regroup at this time.
Second reason for failure
The next factor in the defeat of the Soviet mechanized corps near Dubno was their unpreparedness for the tank battle itself. This was a consequence of the same pre-war principle “tanks don’t fight tanks.” In addition, the mechanized corps were equipped for the most part with infantry escort armored vehicles produced back in the early 1930s.
The largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War was lost Soviet side due to the specifics of Soviet combat vehicles. The fact is that the light tanks in service with the Red Army had either bulletproof or anti-fragmentation armor. They were perfect for deep raids behind enemy lines, but were completely unsuited for breaking through defenses. Hitler's command took into account all the weak and strengths of its equipment, drew the appropriate conclusions and was able to conduct the battle in such a way as to reduce to zero all the advantages of Soviet tanks.
It is worth noting that German field artillery also worked well in this battle. As a rule, it was not dangerous for medium T-34s and heavy KVs, but for light tanks it represented a mortal threat. To destroy Soviet equipment, the Germans used 88-mm guns in this battle. anti-aircraft guns, which sometimes penetrated the armor of even new T-34 models. As for light tanks, when shells hit them, they not only stopped, but were “partially destroyed.”
The armored vehicles of the Red Army went into battle near Dubno completely unprotected from the air, so German planes destroyed up to half of the mechanized columns while still on the march. Most of the tanks had weak armor; it was pierced even by bursts fired from. In addition, there was no radio communication, and the Red Army tankers were forced to act according to the situation and at their own discretion. But, despite all the difficulties, they went into battle and at times even won.
In the first two days it was impossible to predict in advance who would win this largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War. At first, the scales fluctuated all the time: success was now on one side, then on the other. On the 4th day, Soviet tankers still managed to achieve significant success, and the enemy in some areas was driven back 25 and even 35 km. But by the end of the day on June 27, the shortage of infantry units began to take its toll, without which armored vehicles could not operate fully in the field, and, as a result, the advanced units of the Soviet mechanized corps were practically destroyed. In addition, many units were surrounded and forced to defend themselves. They lacked fuel, shells and spare parts. Often tankers, when retreating, left behind almost undamaged equipment due to the fact that they did not have enough time or opportunity to repair it and take it with them.
The defeat that brought victory closer
Today there is an opinion that if the Soviet side had gone on the defensive, it would have been able to delay the German offensive and even turn the enemy back. By and large, this is just a fantasy. It must be taken into account that the Wehrmacht soldiers fought much better at that time, and they also actively interacted with other branches of the military. But this largest tank battle during the Great Patriotic War still played its part positive role. It disrupted the rapid advance fascist troops and forced the Wehrmacht command to introduce its reserve units intended for the attack on Moscow, which thwarted Hitler’s grandiose Barbarossa plan. Despite the fact that many difficult and bloody battles still lay ahead, the battle of Dubno still brought the country much closer to victory.
Battle of Smolensk
According to historical facts, the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War took place in the first months after the attack Nazi invaders. It must be said that the Battle of Smolensk is not an isolated battle, but a truly large-scale defensive-offensive operation of the Red Army against the fascist conquerors, which lasted 2 months and took place from July 10 to September 10. Its main goals were to stop at least for some time the breakthrough of enemy troops in the direction of the capital, to enable Headquarters to develop and more thoroughly organize the defense of Moscow, and thereby prevent the capture of the city.
Despite the fact that the Germans had both numerical and technical superiority, Soviet soldiers still managed to delay them near Smolensk. At the cost of huge losses, the Red Army stopped the enemy's rapid advance deep into the country.
Battle for Kyiv
The largest battles of the Great Patriotic War, which included the battles for the Ukrainian capital, were long-term. Thus, the siege took place from July to September 1941. Hitler, holding his positions near Smolensk and believing in a favorable outcome of this operation, transferred part of his troops in the Kiev direction in order to capture Ukraine as soon as possible, and then Leningrad and Moscow.
The surrender of Kyiv was the hardest blow for the country, since not only the city was taken, but also the entire republic, which had strategic reserves of coal and food. In addition, the Red Army suffered considerable losses. According to estimates, about 700 thousand people were killed or captured. As you can see, the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place in 1941, ended with the resounding failure of the plans of the high Soviet command and the loss of vast territories. The mistakes of the leaders were too costly for a country that had been so a short time lost hundreds of thousands of its citizens.
Defense of Moscow
Such biggest battles The Great Patriotic War, like the Battle of Smolensk, was just a warm-up for the occupying forces who sought to capture the capital Soviet Union and thereby force the Red Army to capitulate. And, it should be noted that they were very close to their goal. Hitler's troops managed to get almost close to the capital - they were already 20-30 km from the city.
I.V. Stalin perfectly understood the gravity of the situation, so he appointed G.K. Zhukov as Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front. At the end of November, the Nazis captured the city of Klin, and that was where their successes ended. The leading German tank brigades were far ahead, and their rear were significantly behind. For this reason, the front turned out to be greatly extended, which contributed to the loss of the enemy’s penetrating ability. In addition, they came very coldy what was becoming common cause failure of German armored vehicles.
Myth dispelled
As we can see, the first major battles of the Great Patriotic War showed the extreme unpreparedness of the Red Army for military action against such a strong and experienced enemy. But, despite the gross miscalculations, this time the Soviet command was able to organize a powerful counter-offensive, which began on the night of December 5-6, 1941. The German leadership did not expect such a rebuff. During this offensive, the Nazis were driven back from the capital to a distance of 150 km.
Before all the previous ones did not provoke such significant losses from the enemy. During the battles for the capital, the Germans immediately lost more than 120 thousand of their troops. It was near Moscow that the myth of the invincibility of Nazi Germany was first refuted.
Plans of the warring parties
The second largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War is an operation that was part of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It was clear to both the Soviet and fascist commands that during this confrontation a radical turning point would occur and, in essence, the outcome of the entire war would be decided. The Germans planned a major offensive for the summer of 1943, the goal of which was to conquer strategic initiative, to turn the outcome of this company in their favor. Therefore, Hitler’s headquarters developed and approved in advance military operation"Citadel".
Stalin's Headquarters knew about the enemy offensive and drew up their own countermeasures plan, which consisted of the temporary defense of the Kursk ledge and the maximum bleeding and exhaustion of enemy groups. After this, it was hoped that the Red Army would be able to launch a counteroffensive, and later a strategic offensive.
The second largest tank battle
On July 12, near the Prokhorovka railway station, which was located 56 km from Belgorod, the advancing German tank group was suddenly stopped by a counterattack launched by Soviet troops. When the battle began, the Red Army tankers had some advantage in that rising Sun blinded the advancing German troops.
In addition, the extreme density of the battle deprived fascist technology of its main advantage - long-range powerful weapons, which were practically useless at such short distances. And the Soviet troops, in turn, had the opportunity to fire accurately and hit the most vulnerable points of German armored vehicles.
Consequences
On both sides, no less than 1.5 thousand units of military equipment took part, not counting aviation. In just one day of battle, the enemy lost 350 tanks and 10 thousand of its troops. By the end of the next day, we managed to break through the enemy’s defenses and advance 25 km. After this, the advance of the Red Army only intensified, and the Germans had to retreat. For a long time It was believed that this particular episode of the Battle of Kursk represented the largest tank battle.
The years of the Great Patriotic War were full of battles, which turned out to be very difficult for the entire country. But, despite this, the army and people overcame all the trials with dignity. The battles described in this article, no matter how successful or failed they were, still inexorably brought us closer to winning such a desired and long-awaited Great Victory by all.
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