In the absence of a land front in Europe, the German leadership decided to defeat Soviet Union during a short campaign in the summer - autumn of 1941. To achieve this goal, the most combat-ready part of the German armed forces was deployed on the border with the USSR 1 .
Wehrmacht
For Operation Barbarossa, out of the 4 army group headquarters available in the Wehrmacht, 3 were deployed (North, Center and South) (75%), out of 13 field army headquarters - 8 (61.5%), out of 46 army corps headquarters - 34 (73.9%), of 12 motorized corps - 11 (91.7%). A total of 73.5% was allocated for the Eastern Campaign total number divisions available in the Wehrmacht. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. Thus, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939-1941. 127 (81.9%) participated, and the remaining 28 were partially staffed by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht (see table 1). The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of flying units, 16.9% of air defense troops and over 48% of signal troops and other units to support Operation Barbarossa.
German satellites
Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy, which allocated the following forces to wage the war (see Table 2). In addition, Croatia contributed 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, which arrived later. Consequently, the German Allied forces deployed there included 767,100 men, 37 crew divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks and 886 aircraft.
In total, the forces of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front numbered 4,329.5 thousand people, 166 crew divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4,364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4,795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command and, together with 8.5 thousand Air Force personnel, are not taken into account in further calculations). 
Red Army
The armed forces of the Soviet Union, in the context of the outbreak of war in Europe, continued to increase and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world (see table 3). 56.1% of units were deployed in the five western border districts ground forces and 59.6% of Air Force units. In addition, from May 1941, the concentration of 70 divisions of the second strategic echelon from internal military districts and with Far East. By June 22 in western districts 16 divisions arrived (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized), which numbered 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks.
The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western theater of operations was quite powerful. The general balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in Table 4, judging by the data of which the enemy surpassed the Red Army only in the number of personnel, because its troops were mobilized.
Mandatory clarifications
Although the above data gives a general idea of the strength of the opposing factions, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht completed its strategic concentration and deployment in the theater of operations, while in the Red Army this process was in full swing. How figuratively A.V. described this situation. Shubin, “a dense body was moving from West to East at high speed. From the East, a more massive, but looser block was slowly moving forward, the mass of which was increasing, but not at a fast enough pace” 2. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the balance of forces at two more levels. Firstly, this is the balance of forces of the parties in various strategic directions on a district (front) - army group scale, and secondly, on individual operational directions in the border zone on an army - army scale. In the first case, only ground forces and air forces are taken into account, and for Soviet side also border troops, artillery and aviation of the Navy, but without information on the personnel of the fleet and internal troops of the NKVD. In the second case, only ground forces are taken into account for both sides.
Northwest
In the North-Western direction, the troops of the German Army Group North and the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) opposed each other. The Wehrmacht had a fairly significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, it should be taken into account that directly in the 50 km border strip there were only 8 Soviet divisions, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. As a result, in the direction of the main attack, Army Group North troops managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces (see Table 5).
Western direction
In the Western direction, the troops of the German Army Group Center and the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of the PribOVO opposed each other. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea were concentrated here (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest Luftwaffe air fleet (43.8% aircraft). In the offensive zone of Army Group Center in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 15 Soviet divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In addition, troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District were concentrated on the territory of the district in the Polotsk region, from which, by June 22, 1941, 3 rifle divisions and the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District arrived at the site - with a total number of 72,016 people, 1241 guns and mortars and 692 tanks. As a result, the ZAPOVO troops maintained at peacetime levels were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but superior to him in tanks, aircraft and slightly in artillery. However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete their concentration, which made it possible to defeat them piecemeal.
Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the Zapovovo troops located in the Bialystok ledge with a strike from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. The main blow was struck from the south (from Brest). The 3rd Tank Group of the Wehrmacht was deployed on the northern flank (Suwalki), which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of the PribOVO. Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th Army were deployed in the zone of the Soviet 4th Army German army and 2nd Panzer Group. In these areas the enemy was able to achieve significant superiority(see table 6).
Southwest
In the South-Western direction, Army Group "South", which united German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kyiv Special and Odessa Military Districts (KOVO and OdVO). The Soviet group in the South-Western direction was the strongest on the entire front, since it was it that was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. However, here too Soviet troops did not complete concentration and deployment. Thus, in KOVO there were only 16 divisions in the immediate vicinity of the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In the OdVO there were 9 divisions in the 50-km border strip, and 6 were located in the 50-100-km strip. In addition, troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived on the territory of the districts, from which by June 22, 10 divisions (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized) with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks were concentrated. Even without being staffed according to wartime levels, the Soviet troops were superior to the enemy group, which had only some superiority in manpower, but was significantly inferior in tanks, aircraft and somewhat less in artillery. But in the direction of the main attack of Army Group South, where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by parts of the German 6th Army and the 1st Panzer Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces for themselves (see Table 7).
Situation in the North
The most favorable ratio for the Red Army was at the front of the Leningrad Military District (LMD), where it was opposed Finnish troops and parts of the German Army "Norway". In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army were opposed by German units of the Norway Mountain Infantry Corps and the 36th Army Corps, and here the enemy had superiority in manpower and insignificant artillery (see Table 8). True, it should be taken into account that since military operations on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides were building up their forces, and the data provided do not reflect the number of troops of the parties at the beginning of hostilities.
Results
Thus, the German command, having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, was unable to achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the zone of the entire future front, but also in the zones of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, parts of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly near the border. This arrangement of the Soviet troops made it possible to destroy them piece by piece. In the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create a superiority over the Red Army troops, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern Campaign was delivered. In other directions, even in the zones of the covering armies, Soviet superiority in tanks affected. The general balance of forces allowed Soviet command prevent enemy superiority even in the directions of his main attacks. But in reality the opposite happened.
Since the Soviet military-political leadership did not correctly assess the degree of threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater of operations in May 1941, which was supposed to be completed by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and did not had neither offensive nor defensive grouping. The Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and were only completing the creation of command and control bodies in the theater of operations. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of the Red Army’s covering troops in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repel the enemy, of which only a few managed to occupy equipped positions on the border. The remaining troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If we take into account that the enemy immediately launched 103 divisions on the offensive, it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a continuous front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. Having forestalled the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, having created powerful operational groupings of their fully combat-ready forces in selected directions of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions to capture strategic initiative and the successful conduct of the first offensive operations.
Notes
1. For more details, see: Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. Scramble for Europe 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 3rd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2008. pp. 354-363.
2. Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004. P. 496.
In 1935, the main German armed forces were created, which bore the capacious name Wehrmacht // Photo: pikabu.ru
Three years later, the OKW was created - Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - the Wehrmacht command. It had enormous powers and was subordinate to only one person - Adolf Hitler himself. The Fuhrer at that time was the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the aggressor country. It was to him that all personnel of the military group were obliged to take an oath of allegiance.
OKW consisted of four departments at once:
· operations department;
· Abwehr - department of military and counterintelligence;
· the economic department, responsible for ammunition and providing troops with food;
· general purpose department.
An experienced military man, Field Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel, was appointed the first commander of the Wehrmacht.
Command of German troops // Photo: collections.ushmm.org
Creation of the SS
The SS was also Hitler's brainchild. This organization was born much earlier than the Wehrmacht. Its origins took place in rather difficult conditions. In 1925, after his release from prison, the Fuhrer issued a decree that stipulated the formation of a group of people to protect him. Initially, the SS was supposed to consist of only 8 people.The Commander-in-Chief had the following idea: while the Wehrmacht would defend the Reich from the outside, the SS would do it from the inside. The latter was called the “cover squadron” - Schutzstaffel (SS). At the same time, Hitler believed that the size of the SS should not be ten percent of the peacetime military personnel.
The SS is the brainchild of Hitler, which was supposed to become his personal guard // Photo: hystory.mediasole.ru
External differences between intelligence services
First of all, the SS sheep differed from all others in the color of their uniform. It was deep black. It was considered one of the most important in Germany. Because uniforms of this color were worn by the “free riflemen” (Freischutzen), who in the 19th century gave a worthy rebuff to Napoleon’s army. Over time, the black color has acquired some political meaning. Perhaps this happened because the officers of the Red Army wore black uniforms.Conflicts between intelligence services
There were a very large number of provocative situations that could lead to hostility between the SS and the Wehrmacht. One of the brightest examples Such a situation is when one of the Wehrmacht commanders in the battle of the Demyansk Pocket sent exclusively SS forces under fire. He carefully took care of his own personnel.The reason for the enmity was also the fact that while the Wehrmacht was suffering from a shortage food products The SS literally feasted on their abundance. One of the officers in his personal diary once wrote: “Himler made sure that the entire SS staff received special food for the Christmas holidays. At this time we were finishing horse meat soup.”
The conflict between the commander of one of the SS regiments K. Mayer and Lieutenant General of the Wehrmacht E. Feuchtinger received especially great publicity. It occurred at the very beginning of the Normandy campaign. The young commander was decisive and rushed into battle without hesitation. At the same time, the allied forces under the command of the lieutenant general did not move. After investigating this situation, it turned out that personal hostility was to blame. In addition, the Wehrmacht officer was somewhat jealous of the success of the SS.
The German Wehrmacht became a symbol of the Second World War.
Consequences of Versailles
The Entente's victory over Germany culminated in the Treaty of Versailles, signed in Compiegne at the end of 1918. The incredibly difficult conditions of surrender were complemented by the demand for the actual liquidation of the army. German Republic was allowed to have a small professional army, totaling one hundred thousand people, and equally reduced naval forces. Military structure, created on the remains of the army, was called Reichwehr. Despite such a small number, the Reichwehr, under the control of General von Seeckt, managed to become a base for the deployment new army The Third Reich and soon there were no those left who did not know what the Wehrmacht was.
Revival of the army
The coming to power of the National Socialists led by Hitler in 1933 was aimed at Germany's withdrawal from the rigid framework of the Treaty of Versailles. The Reichwehr had a highly trained and highly motivated personnel reserve to transform it into a real army. The Wehrmacht law, adopted shortly after Hitler took power, sharply expanded the scope of military development. Despite the envisaged increase in the armed forces by five times, in the first years it was not entirely clear what the Wehrmacht was. His appearance has not yet taken shape, distinguished by dynamic aggressiveness, high discipline and readiness to fight any enemy in any conditions. The Wehrmacht adopted the best traditions of Prussian and German imperial army, having received in addition to them a powerful ideological base based on the ideology of National Socialism.
Military ethics in the era of fascism
Nazi ideology had a significant influence on the personnel and fate of the Wehrmacht. Many perceive him as a party army, whose main task was to spread National Socialism to the captured territories. To some extent this was true. But life is more complex than dogma, and within the Wehrmacht the old Prussian and German military traditions remained in force. It was they who made him such a formidable opponent and powerful tool Nazi domination. It is very difficult to formulate what the Wehrmacht is ideologically. It bizarrely combined soldier camaraderie and party fanaticism. Defense of Vaterland and construction of a new ideological Empire. The preservation of the corporate spirit of the Wehrmacht was facilitated by the creation of SS troops, which accumulated the most fanatical elements
The Wehrmacht's only war
The war demonstrated strong and weak sides army of Hitler's Germany. When World War II began, the Wehrmacht represented the most powerful land army in the world. An excellent personnel base and the highest motivation were complemented by the industrial and scientific potential of Germany and Austria. The course of the war proved the highest combat capabilities this army. But it became clear with utmost clarity that the best tool was useless for achieving adventurous goals. The history of the best army at the beginning of World War II warns against the temptation to repeat the sad experience. The Reich was striving for war, and its army was a symbol of the word "war". The Wehrmacht as it is known today would not exist without her. The losses incurred during the battles changed the personnel composition. Instead of a highly professional army, the Wehrmacht increasingly acquired the features of the adventurous line of the Reich leadership posing the same impossible tasks. The restructuring of thinking from war to conquer territories to the defense of one’s own country in such conditions turned out to be impossible. As the fronts shrank, the rhetoric of propaganda changed, but its meaning did not change. The decline in professionalism, as a consequence of large losses, was not compensated by the influx of soldiers tuned to the defense of the state. At the end of the war, the Wehrmacht looked like a loose conglomerate of individual combat-ready units, blurred by a demoralized mass of conscripts and Volssturmists. They did not have time to adopt Prussian military traditions in order to become soldiers, and did not have the motivation to die for
Defeat and consequences
The defeat of Nazi Germany by 1945 became inevitable. When did the Second End? World War, The Wehrmacht ceased to exist. Along with him, much of what formed the basis of the combat effectiveness of the German army became a thing of the past. Despite the declared anti-fascism, the Soviet Union most fully preserved the traditions and spirit of the Prussian army in the recreated army of the GDR. Perhaps this is explained by the deep commonality inherent in Russian even before the First World War. Many Wehrmacht soldiers and officers continued their service, passing on the old traditions. They managed to demonstrate this during the suppression of the Czechoslovak uprising of 1968. This event reminded us what the Wehrmacht was. The German army underwent a greater transformation to interact with the Anglo-American troops, which had a completely different structure and history.
The Third Reich was preparing for an attack on the USSR very thoroughly; by the time the war began, a group of the armed forces of the Reich and the armed forces of Germany’s satellite countries, which had no analogues until that time, was concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union. To defeat Poland, the Reich used 59 divisions; in the war with France and its allies - Holland, Belgium, England - it deployed 141 divisions; 181 divisions were concentrated to attack the USSR, this together with the allies. Berlin made serious preparations for war, literally in a few years transforming its armed forces from one of the weakest armies in Europe, because according to the Versailles agreements, Germany was allowed to have only 100 thousand. army, without combat aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks, powerful navies, universal conscription, in the best army peace. This was an unprecedented transformation, of course, influenced by the fact that in the period before the Nazis came to power, with the help of the “financial international” it was possible to preserve the military potential of industry and then quickly militarize the economy. The officer corps was also preserved, passing on its experience to new generations.
The myth that “intelligence reported on time.” One of the most persistent and dangerous myths, which was created under Khrushchev, and even more strengthened during the years of the Russian Federation, is the legend that intelligence has repeatedly reported on the date of the start of the war, but “stupid”, or in another version “enemy of the people” “Stalin brushed aside these reports, believing more in his “friend” Hitler. Why is this myth dangerous? He creates the opinion that if the army were brought to full strength combat readiness, then it would have been possible to avoid the situation when the Wehrmacht reached Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, they say, it would have been possible to stop the enemy at the border. Moreover, it does not take into account the geopolitical realities of that time - the USSR could be accused of armed provocation, as in 1914, when the Russian Empire began mobilization and was accused of “starting a war,” Berlin received a reason to start a war. There was a possibility that we would have to forget about the creation of the “Anti-Hitler Coalition.”
There were intelligence reports, but there is a very big “But” - in the spring of 1941, the intelligence of the People’s Commissariats of State Security and Defense literally bombarded the Kremlin with reports about the “final and firmly established” date for the start of the invasions of the Reich troops. At least 5-6 such dates were reported. April, May, and June dates were reported about the Wehrmacht invasion and the start of the war, but they all turned out to be misinformation. So, contrary to the myths about the War, no one ever reported the date of June 22. The Reich troops should have learned about the hour and day of the invasion only three days before the war, so the directive stating the date of the invasion of the USSR reached the troops only on June 19, 1941. Naturally, not a single intelligence officer had time to report this.
The same famous “telegram” from R. Sorge that “an attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 along a wide front” is a fake. Its text differs sharply from real similar ciphergrams; Moreover, no responsible government leader would take any serious action on the basis of such reports, even if it comes from a reliable informant. As already mentioned, Moscow received such messages regularly. Already in our years, on June 16, 2001, the organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation “Red Star” published materials round table, dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where there were confessions from SVR Colonel Karpov: “Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in Khrushchev’s times. Such “fools” are simply launched...” That is, the lie that Soviet intelligence knew everything and reported the day and hour of the start of the invasion was launched by N. Khrushchev when he “debunked” the cult of personality.
Only after the Wehrmacht received the directive of June 19, various “defectors” and signals through border service let's go to Moscow.
Intelligence also made a mistake in the size of the grouping of Wehrmacht troops, which was allegedly thoroughly revealed Soviet intelligence officers. The total strength of the Reich's armed forces was determined by Soviet intelligence to be 320 divisions; in reality, at that time the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions. It was believed that the Reich's forces were divided equally in the western and eastern strategic directions: 130 divisions each, plus 60 in reserve, the rest in other directions. That is, it was not clear where Berlin would direct its attack - it was logical to assume that it would be against England. A completely different picture would have emerged if intelligence had reported that out of 214 Reich divisions, 148 were concentrated in the East. Soviet intelligence was unable to track the process of increasing the power of the Wehrmacht in the east. According to USSR intelligence data, the Wehrmacht grouping in the east from February to May 1941 increased from 80 to 130 divisions, a significant build-up of forces, but at the same time it was believed that the Wehrmacht grouping against England had doubled. What conclusions could be drawn from this? One could assume that Berlin was preparing for an operation against England, which it had been planning to do for a long time and was actively spreading disinformation about it. And in the east they strengthened the group to more reliably cover the “rear”. Wasn't Hitler planning a war on two fronts? This is unequivocal suicide for Germany. And a completely different picture would have emerged if the Kremlin had known that in February, out of all 214 German divisions, there were only 23 in the east, and by June 1941 there were already 148.
True, there is no need to create another myth, that intelligence is to blame for everything, it worked, collected information. But we must take into account the fact that she was still young, in comparison with Western intelligence services, she did not have enough experience.
Another myth is that Stalin is to blame for incorrectly determining the main direction of attack of the German armed forces - the most powerful group of the Red Army was concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), believing that this was where the main attack would be. But, firstly, this is a decision of the General Staff, and secondly, according to intelligence reports, the Wehrmacht command deployed at least 70 divisions, including 15 tank divisions, against the KOVO and the Odessa Military District (OVO), and the German command against the Western Special Military District (ZOVO) concentrated 45 divisions, of which only 5 were tank divisions. And according to the initial developments of the Barbarossa plan, Berlin planned the main attack precisely in the southwestern strategic direction. Moscow proceeded from the available data; we are now able to put all the pieces of the puzzle together. In addition, in southern Poland, south of Lublin, at the beginning of June 1941, there were actually 10 tank and 6 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops. And therefore, opposing them with 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of KOVO and OVO was a completely correct step by our command. True, the problem is that our reconnaissance missed the moment when 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions of Heins Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group were transferred to the Brest area in mid-June. As a result, 9 tank and 6 motorized divisions of Germany were concentrated against the Western Special Military District, and 5 remained against KOVO tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions.
T-2
The Wehrmacht group in the east consisted of 153 divisions and 2 brigades, plus reinforcement units; they were distributed mainly across theaters of military operations: from Norway to Romania. In addition to the German troops, large forces of the armed forces of Germany's allied countries were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian divisions, a total of 29 divisions (15 Finnish and 14 Romanian) and 16 brigades (Finnish - 3, Hungarian - 4, Romanian - 9).
The main striking power of the Wehrmacht was represented by tank and motorized divisions. What were they? In June 1941, there were two types of tank divisions: tank divisions with a tank regiment of two battalions, they had 147 tanks - 51 light tank Pz.Kpfw. II (according to the Soviet classification T-2), 71 medium tank Pz.Kpfw. III (T-3), 20 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. IV (T-4) and 5 command tanks without weapons. A tank division with a tank regiment of three battalions could be armed with German or Czechoslovak tanks. In a tank division equipped German tanks, the state had: 65 light tanks T-2, 106 medium tanks T-3 and 30 T-4, as well as 8 command tanks, a total of 209 units. The tank division, equipped mainly with Czechoslovak tanks, had: 55 T-2 light tanks, 110 light Czechoslovak Pz.Kpfw tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), 30 T-4 medium tanks and 14 Pz.Kpfw command tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), total – 209 units. We must also take into account the fact that most tanks T-2 and Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) managed to be modernized, they frontal armor 30 and 50 mm were now not inferior in armor protection to medium tanks T-3 and T-4. Plus better than Soviet tanks, quality of sighting devices. According to various estimates, in total the Wehrmacht had approximately 4,000 tanks and assault guns, with the allies - more than 4,300.
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t).
But we must take into account that a Wehrmacht tank division is not only tanks. Tank divisions were reinforced: 6 thousand motorized infantry; 150 artillery barrels, along with mortars and anti-tank guns; a motorized sapper battalion that could equip positions, set up minefields or clear minefields, and organize a crossing; A motorized communications battalion is a mobile communications center based on cars, armored cars or armored personnel carriers that could provide stable control of division units on the march and in battle. According to the staff, the tank division had 1963 units of vehicles, tractors (trucks and tractors - 1402 and cars - 561), in some divisions their number reached up to 2300 units. Plus 1,289 motorcycles (711 units with sidecars) in the state, although their number could also reach 1,570 units. Therefore, the tank divisions were in organizational plan a perfectly balanced combat unit, which is why the organizational structures of this formation of the 1941 model, with minor improvements, were preserved until the end of the war.
Tank divisions and motorized divisions were reinforced. Motorized divisions differed from ordinary Wehrmacht infantry divisions by the complete motorization of all units and subunits of the division. They had two regiments of motorized infantry instead of 3 infantry in infantry division, two light howitzer battalions and one heavy artillery battalion in an artillery regiment instead of 3 light and 1 heavy in an infantry division, plus they had a motorcycle rifle battalion, which was not in a standard infantry division. Motorized divisions had 1900–2000 cars and 1300–1400 motorcycles. That is, tank divisions were reinforced with additional motorized infantry.
The German armed forces were the first among other armies in the world to not only understand the need to have infantry to support their self-propelled artillery, but were also the first to put this idea into practice. The Wehrmacht had 11 divisions and 5 separate batteries of assault guns, 7 divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers, and another 4 batteries of 150-mm self-propelled heavy infantry guns were transferred to the Wehrmacht tank divisions. The assault gun units supported the infantry on the battlefield; this made it possible not to divert tank units from the tank divisions for these purposes. Divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers became the highly mobile anti-tank reserve of the Wehrmacht command.
The Wehrmacht infantry divisions numbered 16,500–16,800 people, but you need to know that, contrary to military myths, all the artillery of these divisions was horse-drawn. In the Wehrmacht infantry division, there were 5,375 horses in the state: 1,743 riding horses and 3,632 draft horses, of which 2,249 draft horses belonged to artillery regiment parts. Plus a high level of motorization - 911 cars (of which 565 are trucks and 346 are cars), 527 motorcycles (201 units with a sidecar). In total, the German armed forces, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, had more than 600,000 vehicles various types and more than 1 million horses.
Artillery
Traditionally, the artillery of the German Armed Forces was strong: up to a quarter of the guns of German divisions were guns with a caliber of 105–150 mm. Organizational structure Wehrmacht military artillery made it possible to provide significant reinforcement of infantry units in battle. Thus, the infantry regiments had 150-mm heavy field guns. This provided the German infantry with a significant advantage in battle. When firing direct fire with shells weighing 38 kg, 150 mm guns could quickly suppress enemy firing points, clearing the way for advancing units. Divisional artillery could support infantry and motorized regiments with a division of light 105-mm howitzers, while the commanders of the Wehrmacht infantry and motorized divisions still had a heavy howitzer division of 150-mm howitzers at their disposal, and the commanders of tank divisions had at their disposal a mixed heavy division of 105-mm guns and 150 mm howitzers.
The tank and motorized divisions also had air defense guns: according to the staff, the division had a company of ZSU (18 units), these were self-propelled anti-aircraft guns based on half-track tractors, armed with single-barreled or quadruple 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The company was part of the anti-tank fighter division. The ZSU could fire both stationary and on the move while on the march. Plus anti-aircraft divisions with 8-12 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, which, in addition to fighting the enemy air force, could fight enemy tanks, performing anti-tank functions.
To strike the Red Army, the Wehrmacht command also concentrated significant forces of the Reserve of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (RGK): 28 artillery divisions (12 105-mm heavy guns in each); 37 heavy divisions field howitzers(12 150 mm units each); 2 mixed divisions (6 211 mm mortars and three 173 mm guns each); 29 heavy mortar divisions (9 211 mm mortars in each division); 7 motorized heavy artillery divisions (9 149.1 mm heavy guns in each division); 2 heavy howitzer divisions (four 240 mm heavy Czechoslovak howitzers in each division); 6 anti-tank fighter divisions (36 37-mm anti-tank guns Pak35/36 in each); 9 separate railway batteries with 280 mm naval guns (2 guns per battery). Almost all of the RGK's artillery was concentrated in the direction of the main attacks, and all of it was motorized.
To ensure comprehensive preparation for combat operations, the Wehrmacht strike groups included: 34 artillery instrumental reconnaissance divisions, 52 separate engineer battalions, 25 separate bridge-building battalions, 91 construction battalions and 35 road-building battalions.
Aviation: 4 Luftwaffe air fleets, plus Allied aviation, were concentrated to strike the USSR. In addition to 3,217 bombers and fighters, the Reich Air Force had 1,058 reconnaissance aircraft that played vital role in supporting the actions of ground forces and the German Navy. Plus 639 transport and communications aircraft. Of the 965 German single-engine Bf.109 Messerschmitt fighters, almost 60% were aircraft of the new Bf.109F modification; they surpassed in speed and climb rate not only the old Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters, but also the new ones, only "Yak-1" and "LaGG-3" entered into the Red Army Air Force.
The Reich Air Force had a large number of communications and control units and units, which made it possible to maintain their high controllability and combat effectiveness. The German Air Force included anti-aircraft divisions that provided air defense for ground forces and rear facilities. Each anti-aircraft division included air surveillance, warning and communications units, logistics and technical support. They were armed with 8-15 anti-aircraft divisions with 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm and 20-mm Flak30 and Flak38 anti-aircraft automatic guns, including quadruple installations of 20-mm Flakvierling38/1 automatic guns. At the same time, the Air Force anti-aircraft divisions interacted well with ground forces, often moving directly along with them.
In addition to the armed forces themselves, the striking power was reinforced by numerous auxiliary paramilitary forces, such as the Speer Transport Corps, the Todt Organization, the National Socialist Automobile Corps and the Reich Labor Service. They carried out tasks in logistics, technical and engineering support Wehrmacht There were many volunteers from Western and of Eastern Europe, which were not formally at war with the USSR.
To summarize, it must be said that this war machine at that time she had no equal. It was not for nothing that Berlin, London and Washington believed that the USSR would not withstand the blow and would fall within 2-3 months. But we miscalculated once again...
Sources:
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg. M., 2010.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2005.
Pykhalov I. The great slandered leader. Lies and truth about Stalin. M., 2010.
http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2011-06-10/1_2ww.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Patriotic_War
http://vspomniv.ru/nemetskie.htm
http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=588260
http://waralbum.ru/
http://ww2history.ru/artvermaht
http://www.airpages.ru/lw_main.shtml
http://putnikost.gorod.tomsk.ru/index-1271220706.php
A total of 1,327 German soldiers were captured, a spokesman for the Canadian Second Army Corps told the Supreme Allied Command in Europe after the exceptionally fierce battle for the city of Caen in early August 1944. Although almost a quarter of fighters with German side belonged to Waffen-SS units, among the prisoners were no more than eight representatives of these special units of the Third Reich - that is, no more than 3% of the statistically expected number.
This is probably explained by two reasons: On the one hand, the Waffen-SS units fought especially fiercely, and the SS men were even more indoctrinated than soldiers from other units. On the other hand, their opponents from among the Allied forces especially feared and hated them. As a result, soldiers from Waffen-SS units were often not captured at all.
An SS man who surrendered was more likely to die on the way to assembly points for prisoners of war than ordinary soldiers. German soldiers, who did not have a double runic sign. In Caen, especially the French-speaking Canadians from the Regiment de la Chaudière (Régiment de la Chaudière) gave vent to their hatred in precisely this way.
The reason was that Waffen-SS units were considered by their opponents on the Western and Eastern Front to be particularly cruel, treacherous and fanatical National Socialists. It is true that the military units of Heinrich Himmler's Black Order took part in some of the most notorious war crimes - for example on the Western Front during carnage to Oradour-sur-Glane or Malmedy.
Historian Bastian Hein, who with his doctoral dissertation on the “General SS” (Allgemeine SS), has already significantly expanded our understanding of this part of the Nazi system, now in his new book, published in the popular scientific series of the publishing house C.H. Beck, gives interesting assessments regarding Himmler's apparatus.
As a result of his research, Bastian Hein came to the conclusion that the preserved today the Waffen-SS's reputation as a "military elite" may well be questioned. Hine gives three reasons. First, a clear distinction must be made between some of the well-equipped “model units” of the Waffen-SS with such sonorous names as the “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” or the “Totenkopf” division. In quantitative terms, however, especially in the second half of the war, those SS divisions that were formed from ethnic Germans living abroad, as well as sometimes forcibly from foreigners placed under arms, were of greater importance. Often they were armed only with captured weapons, were poorly trained and were not fully equipped. In total, the Waffen-SS included 910 thousand people, of which 400 thousand were so-called Imperial Germans, and 200 thousand were foreigners.
Secondly, the most famous “successes” of the Waffen-SS units occurred in the second half of the war, when “after the failure of the Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union and after the entry of the United States into the war, a “final victory” was already objectively excluded,” notes Hein. who currently works in the Office of the Federal Chancellor. However, the most important, apparently, is the third conclusion: Waffen-SS units suffered more serious losses in comparison with regular Wehrmacht units not because they fought more stubbornly. On the contrary - if distributed over time - the losses, according to Hein, were the same. “Only in the final phase of the war, in 1944-1945, did Waffen-SS units fight more desperately and suffer greater losses than Wehrmacht units.”
At the same time, Bastian Hein confirms the prevailing opinion about more high level indoctrination in the ranks of the Waffen-SS. Recruits were purposefully processed by experienced SS men in the spirit of the Black Order. In addition, the Waffen-SS developed centralized training programs faster than the Wehrmacht. Wehrmacht soldiers received a similar ideological corset only after the so-called National Socialist leading officers (NSFO) were sent to the army at the end of 1943.
The misconception that Waffen-SS units were superior to Wehrmacht units was the result of intense propaganda. Whenever the elite divisions of Himmler's SS apparatus took part in hostilities, a particularly large number of war correspondents were present on the spot, and Nazi publications such as Illustrierter Beobachter and Das Schwarze Korps were especially active in reporting on their “heroic deeds.” In fact, according to Hein, the result of such actions was the same: “They only prolonged a militarily hopeless war.”
Nevertheless, the following idea turned out to be correct: the SS men carried out more bloody massacres and other crimes than the Wehrmacht soldiers, who often themselves did not fight particularly discriminatingly. Hein quotes military historian Jens Westemeier, who rightly called the Waffen-SS's participation in the fighting "an endless chain of violent crimes." However, it does not follow from this that every individual SS man was a criminal. This also applies to the much larger Wehrmacht.
It must be borne in mind that at no time did the number of active members of the Waffen-SS exceed 370 thousand - while the regular Wehrmacht had about 9 million soldiers. That is, soldiers with runes made up about 4% of the total number of the German army.
However, Hein also refutes a convenient lie that is still widespread in right-wing extremist circles: Waffen-SS units allegedly have nothing to do with concentration camps. The management of these camps was, indeed, carried out by another part of Himmler’s “state within a state”.
However, of the 900 thousand members of the Waffen-SS between 1939 and 1945, almost half of them were not citizens German Reich— about 60 thousand people “served at least temporarily in the system concentration camps“- this applies, for example, to Hans Lipschis, a native of the Baltics, and Hartmut H. from Saarland.
The more closely we look at the Waffen-SS, the bleaker the picture becomes. Bastian Hein presented all this in a concise and visual form - this is the merit of his pocket-sized book.
Loading...
