At the end of the reign of Catherine II, Russia was in an alliance with Austria, England and Prussia, directed against France. Catherine even ordered A.V. Suvorov to begin the formation of a 60,000-strong corps to fight French revolution and the restoration of the monarchy there.
Paul I abandoned this plan, telling his allies that war with France was impossible, since the Russian army, being in a “continuous” war since 1756, needed rest. But he failed to maintain a policy of non-intervention, and for almost the entire reign of Paul, Russia was either at war with France or at war with England and Austria, changing its positions quite often. political interests. The foreign policy activities of Paul I were distinguished by the same inconsistency as their domestic ones.
A series of actions by the French government forced Paul to turn his attention to European affairs. His concern was caused by Napoleon's preparations for the Egyptian campaign, the arrest of the Russian consul in the Ionian Islands, French patronage of Polish emigrants, and rumors about the French intention to attack the northern shore of the Black Sea. However, the immediate cause for the outbreak of war with France were events related to the Order of Malta. In 1797, Emperor Paul I took Malta under his protection. Napoleon ignored this fact, and, setting off on the Egyptian campaign, captured the island. The Master of the Order of Malta fled. The offended Pavel assumed the title of grandmaster of the order. This circumstance prompted him to participate in the new (second) anti-French coalition, which was formed in 1798. In addition to Russia, it included Austria, the Ottoman Empire, England and the Kingdom of Naples.
Military operations took place both on land and at sea. The combined Russian-Ottoman fleet under the command of F.F. Ushakov, passing through the Black Sea straits, entered the Adriatic Sea and in the summer of 1798 captured the Ionian Islands and the fortress of Corfu. (At the end of March 1800, a convention was signed in Constantinople on the formation of the Republic of the Seven United Islands under the vassalage of the Ottoman Empire, but with internal self-government and the right to have its own fleet). In 1799, planted by F.F. Ushakov's landing force successfully conducted military operations against the French army on the Apennine Peninsula, liberating Naples and Rome from the French.
Napoleon conquered Italy during a brilliantly conducted military campaign with Austria in 1796-1797. The army of the talented 27-year-old general, unexpectedly for the enemy, passed along the coastal edge of the Alps, where the entire road was under fire from the sea.
During the Italian and Swiss campaign, Napoleon was in Egypt, which at that time was part of the Ottoman Empire. During this campaign, the French army won a famous victory at the Battle of the Pyramids on July 20, 1798. However, soon English fleet Under the command of Admiral Nelson at Abukir, he destroyed the French squadron that delivered Napoleon's troops to Egypt. Thus, the French army found itself in a trap - its exit from Egypt was cut off. When news of the successes of the second coalition in Italy reached Egypt, Bonaparte decided to take a risky step: leaving the army to the mercy of fate, he managed to break through the ring of the English blockade on two ships with a group of loyal generals and arrived in Paris on October 16, 1799. On Brumaire 18 (November 9), 1799, he carried out a coup d'état, overthrowing the government of the Directory. Power passed into the hands of three consuls. the main role in this triumvirate belonged to Napoleon, who established a personal authoritarian regime.
At the beginning of 1799, the command of the allied Russian-Austrian ground forces sent to help the Neapolitan king Ferdinand VI was entrusted to A.V. Suvorov. The main theater of military operations was Northern Italy, which was cleared of French troops in a month and a half. In a stubborn three-day battle on April 15-17, 1799, Suvorov defeated the French army at the river. Adde. After this, Turin and Milan were captured without a fight. On June 4, the allied army made an unprecedented march, covering about 80 miles in 36 hours and immediately began the battle near the river. Trebbia, during which the French army under the command of General Macdonald was completely defeated. The appointment of a new French commander, Joubert, did not improve the situation: his army was defeated by Suvorov near the city of Novi, and Joubert himself was killed. With the fall of the fortress of Mantua, northern Italy finally passed into the hands of the Russian army.
Successes A.V. Suvorov discovered the true goals of Austria - the desire to take possession of the territory liberated from the French. Under these conditions, the presence of the Russian army was undesirable for the Austrians. Suvorov was ordered to go to Switzerland to join Rimsky-Korsakov's corps in order to transfer military operations to French territory. Suvorov chose the shortest, but most hard way through the Gotthard Pass.
Suvorov began his campaign on September 21, when the Alps had already begun real winter. Making the trek in winter conditions seemed outright suicide, since most passes turn into impregnable snow fortresses, mountain paths disappear under a thick layer of snow, and endless snowstorms do not allow you to see anything beyond arm's length.
The first serious obstacle, besides weather conditions, became a French brigade under the command of Loison, which covered the crossing of the Saint-Gotthard Pass. Skillfully operating in three columns, Russian-Austrian troops under the command of Suvorov were able to push back the enemy and reach the village of Urzern.
The next obstacle on the way of Suvorov’s troops was the Devil’s Bridge (Teufelsbruecke), which spans the river. Reuss. Wanting to prevent excessive strengthening of the French on the left bank, Suvorov gave the order to General Kamensky to pursue the troops of the retreating General Lecourbe, exhausting the French units with constant rearguard battles. As a result, the French were unable to fortify the Devil's Bridge, but dismantled its central part, making passage impossible. Then Russian soldiers under the command of P.I. Bagration was dismantled from a nearby barn into logs, and, tying them together with officer scarves, they threw him through the gap. Under the onslaught of the Russians, the French were forced to retreat, and most of them were sent south for evacuation. In total, Lecourbes had 3,000 people left, after the evacuation no more than 900.
Already on September 29, Suvorov’s troops descended into the Muten Valley through the Kinzing-Kulm Pass. At the same time, the field marshal receives a report about the defeat of the forces of Rimsky-Korsakov and the Austrian commander Hotz from Andre Massena, the future marshal of France. As a result, Massena managed to encircle the Russian forces in the valley. Suvorov understood perfectly well the situation the troops were in. On the eve of this battle, he addressed the officers: “We are surrounded by mountains... surrounded by a strong enemy, proud of victory... Since the time of the incident at the Prut, under the Sovereign Emperor Peter the Great, the Russian troops have never been in such a situation threatening death... No, this is no longer treason, but an obvious betrayal... a reasonable, calculated betrayal us, who shed so much of our blood for the salvation of Austria. Now there is no one to expect help from, one hope is in God, the other is in the greatest courage and the highest self-sacrifice of the troops you lead... We have the greatest work ahead of us, unprecedented in the world! We are on the edge of the abyss! But we are Russians! God is with us! Save, save the honor and property of Russia and its Autocrat!.. Save his son...”
The senior officer, Otto Derfolden, answered the field marshal: “We will endure everything and will not disgrace Russian weapons, and if we fall, we will die with glory! Lead us wherever you want, do what you know! We are yours, father, we are Russian!”
On October 1, Russian troops numbering 14 thousand people under the command of General A.G. converged in the Muten Valley. Rosenberg with a 24,000-strong corps under the command of General Massena. Realizing their desperate situation, Russian troops began to attack French positions and started a general hand-to-hand combat. The onslaught of the Russian soldiers was such that the French center could not hold out for even half an hour - the French began a disorderly retreat. During the extermination of the French troops, Russian non-commissioned officer Ivan Makhotin reached Massena himself and tore off his golden epaulette, although the general managed to escape. As a result, the Russians lost 700 people killed and wounded. French losses ranged from 3,000 to 6,000. 1,200 soldiers and officers were captured, including General La Courque. The Russian trophies included seven guns and one banner.
Suvorov's crossing of the Alps was unprecedented in history. No one, either before or after Suvorov, performed it in winter. Russian troops valiantly fulfilled their allied obligations to the Austrians, which cannot be said about the latter.
The transition, which caused amazement throughout Europe, was successfully completed, however, help was late and Rimsky-Korsakov’s corps, operating in Switzerland, was defeated by the French at Zurich. Having entered Switzerland after a difficult transition, the Russian troops were not supported by the Austrians in time and were surrounded in the Muten Valley. With great difficulty, Suvorov managed, having won several victories, to leave for southern Germany. He rightly attributed the failures of the campaign to the poor orders of the Austrian military council, which wanted to direct the entire theater of military operations from Vienna. Emperor Paul I shared this opinion of Suvorov and, blaming the Austrians for the defeat of Rimsky-Korsakov’s detachment, recalled his troops to Russia. Suvorov was awarded the rank of Generalissimo and the honorary title of Prince of Italy.
Taking advantage of the recall of Russian troops, Bonaparte again went to Italy, on June 14, 1800, he defeated the Austrian army near the village of Marengo, thereby forcing Austria to conclude a peace treaty in February 1801. At the same time, the Turkish army was defeated in Egypt. After Russia and Austria left the war, England in March 1802 was also forced to sign the Treaty of Amiens with Napoleon. The second anti-French coalition collapsed completely.
The collapse of the second coalition was facilitated by a change in the foreign policy priorities of Paul I. The overthrow of the Directory government meant Bonaparte's clear desire to restore the monarchy. He turned to Paul with a flattering letter and returned all the Russian prisoners. On the other hand, English troops, having taken Malta from the French, were in no hurry to return the island to the Order of Malta. The result of all these events was Paul's peace with Napoleon, and the breaking of the alliance with Austria and England. In 1800, he concluded an alliance with Prussia directed against Austria, and an entire coalition was formed against England, consisting of Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia.
Particularly active preparations were made for military action against England. Wanting to deal her a sensitive blow, Paul sent 40 regiments of Don Cossacks to conquer India. The army set out on a campaign without accurate maps, without a definite plan of action, without knowledge of the terrain and, probably, would have been doomed to death in the Central Asian deserts if the death of Paul had not stopped this enterprise (on the night of the coup, Alexander gave the order to return the Cossacks home).
The Alps are the highest mountain system in Western Europe, and the passage of troops through them was considered impossible, because the passage of one person is an event, but the passage of an army with animals and convoys, weapons is already historical event. This impossible was accomplished only by two armies in the entire history of mankind: Hannibal at the head of the Carthaginian army and Suvorov at the head of the Russian army. Moreover, Suvorov was 69 years old, and Hannibal was only 29 years old.
Did these great generals know the difficulties their armies would face as they crossed the mountains? Have you had any experience of conducting military operations in the mountains? There are 2017 years between these campaigns, but did the commanders lead their soldiers along the same road? The answers to these questions became the subject of my research.
The object of the research was educational and reference literature, in which I received information about the reasons, events and results of the crossings of the troops of Hannibal and Suvorov through the Alps.
The literature describes very well the reasons, main events, and results of the Second Punic War, but only Titus Livius and Polybius have details of Hannibal’s army crossing the Alps. The authors who describe the war between Carthage and Rome give different information about the number of warriors, cavalry and elephants who began crossing the Alps and who entered Italy after crossing the Alps. Only Titus Livius honestly writes that “no one knows exactly how many troops Hannibal brought to Italy.” The authors even indicate different time years of passage of Hannibal's army through the Alps: autumn and spring 218 BC. e. and different times of the trek: 33 days or 15 days.
Fewer contradictions are found in the literature when describing Suvorov's Swiss campaign in 1799, although they still exist - these are contradictions about the duration of the campaign: 14 days or 16 days and about the number of Russian troops that entered the Alps: 20 thousand or 21 thousand infantry.
A lot of maps have been compiled on which one can trace Suvorov’s passage through the Alps, but not a single map where one could see Hannibal’s march through the Alpine mountains. There are many maps showing the military actions of the Second Punic War, but they all show only the general course of the war. In my work, I tried, based on the authors’ description of the transition of Hannibal’s troops through the Alpine mountains, to draw a map of the movement of troops.
No one has ever compared the campaigns of two armies led by outstanding commanders, and this is the scientific novelty of my research.
The crossing of the Alps by the Carthaginian and Russian armies was dictated by military necessity. Rome declared war on Carthage and, ahead of the Romans, Hannibal decided to invade Italy. To invade the Apennine Peninsula from the south, ships were needed, which Hannibal did not have, and it was impossible to create a fleet capable of transporting 10,000 horses for the army. And then, transporting the army by fleet, it was possible to meet a strong Roman fleet on the way, but unlucky for the Carthaginians naval battle could lead to the death of a significant part or even the entire army of Carthage. Therefore, Hannibal decides to move by land, but in order to get to Italy, it was necessary to go either through the Alps mountains or along the only coastal road along the Mediterranean Sea. The road did not suit Hannibal, since it was too narrow for his numerous infantry and it was possible to meet a Roman army on it, and Hannibal wanted to get to Italy unnoticed by the Romans and therefore he preferred a risky crossing through the Alps.
Suvorov crossed the Alps during the war with France. Russia joined the second coalition of countries (Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Turkey, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, etc.) and acting within the framework of this coalition, Russian troops under the command of Suvorov arrived in Italy to liberate it from French troops. After the liberation of Italy, Russian troops were transferred from Italy to Switzerland, where it was necessary to unite with the Russian corps of General A. M. Rimsky-Korsakov and the French emigrant corps of Prince L. J. Condé. Suvorov was supposed to become the head of these troops and lead them to France, to invade this country, and the commander of the Russian troops chose the shortest, although most difficult, route to move to join Rimsky-Korsakov - through the Alps.
If the passage through the Alps of the Carthaginian troops ended in the valley of the Po River, then the path of the Russian troops began from there. The route of the march of Russian troops from Italy to Switzerland ran through the Saint Gotthard Pass, the narrow gorge of the Reuss River, the Rostock ridge and the Muoten Valley. In the Muoten Valley, Suvorov learns that Mount Schwyz was occupied by the French and understands that his army was surrounded in the Muoten Valley. At the military council it was decided to fight our way to Glaris. From Glaris, in order to save the troops, Suvorov decided to retreat to Ilanz. After a difficult crossing through the Ringenkopf (Panix) ridge, Russian troops reached Ilanz, and then the Chur region, after which they retreated to Augsburg for winter quarters.
The Carthaginian army began its transition through the Alpine mountains in the area of modern. Col de Cremont or Col de Cabres, and starting to move from the Isar river valley to the upper reaches of the river. Druentsy, passed the Mont Cenis or Mont Genevre pass and reached the valley of the river. .
Hannibal did not have a map of the area). The Austrian command provided Suvorov with a map, but during the crossing of the Alps, it turned out that it had many errors and gave an incorrect idea of the area. Both commanders had to rely on local guides.
Both Carthaginian and Russian warriors had never crossed the mountains before. Moreover, the soldiers of the Carthaginian army had never seen mountains before, but, trusting Hannibal, they were ready to go through the Alps. However, as Titus Livy reports, “having seen the top of the mountains, the snow lost in the clouds, wretched huts clinging to the rocks, skinny cattle dried out by the cold, dirty people overgrown with hair and beards - seeing this with their own eyes, they were horrified.”
When crossing the mountains, both Carthaginian and Russian warriors had to move along narrow impassable mountain paths. Any path was steep, narrow, slippery and very often passed on the edge of a precipice. People climbed single file along the bare rocks, climbing the mountain on all fours. Carthaginian, and after 2017 years, Russian soldiers lost their balance and fell into the abyss.
The path of both armies passed through the snow-capped peaks of the passes, and if the Russian soldiers knew what snow was, then Hannibal’s soldiers were southerners and saw snow for the first time in their lives. Finding yourself in an unfamiliar place climatic conditions, many Carthaginian soldiers froze on the snow-covered mountain peaks. However, Russian soldiers also froze on the pass of the top of Mount Panikser due to the inability to light a fire. Snow also added problems when moving armies. Thus, during the descent of the Carthaginian army from the Mont Cenis pass along a narrow, steep road, “on top of the old snow left over from last winter, new snow fell this year; It was easy to break through this snow with your feet, since it had fallen recently, was soft and, moreover, shallow. But, having broken through the upper layer and stepping on the lower, hardened layer, the soldiers no longer pierced the lower one and moved on, sliding with both feet. leaning on their knees or hands, they slid even more, with all their limbs at once, since the places were very steep.” Also sliding, only on soft clay, were Russian soldiers in soaked and falling apart boots, since it was snowing and raining during the ascent of the Russian army to Mount Panikser. And on the mountain itself, whose height was 2400 m, the soldiers had to walk in waist-deep snow.
Both the army of Hannibal and the army of Suvorov consisted of infantry and cavalry. The Russians were armed with cannons that were dragged up to the Panikser mountain range, but due to the lack of a sufficient number of mules, the fatigue of the soldiers and the difficulty of the climb, Suvorov ordered the cannons to be buried, placing a cross at the top. This trick was revealed local residents, and the cannons were included by the French among the trophies. Food and uniforms were carried on horses and mules, and in the Carthaginian army also on elephants. If the transition of people was difficult, then one can imagine how difficult it was for horses and mules to move in the mountains, which lost their hooves, “at the slightest hesitation and confusion,” they fell into the abyss and carried the drivers along with them. The movement of elephants in the mountains was even more difficult, so it is not surprising that many authors state that all the elephants died while crossing the Alpine mountains. However, Hannibal managed to save part of the cavalry and take it out of the Alps, but Suvorov did not - during the descent of the Russian army from Mount Panikser, the last horses and mules died.
In addition to natural difficulties, the Carthaginian and Russian soldiers also had to fight in the mountains, and neither army had experience in mountain warfare. The Carthaginian soldiers fought with the Gallic tribe of the Allobroges, who constantly ambushed them. Russian soldiers fought with the French, who were constantly trying to encircle the army. However, Suvorov was not only able to lead the army out of encirclement, but also captured one and a half thousand French.
The Swiss campaign revealed to Paul I the dual policy of Austria and on October 11 he dissolved the alliance with it, ordering Suvorov to return with the army to Russia. For saving the Russian army and withdrawing it from encirclement, Suvorov was awarded the title of Generalissimo of the Russian Forces.
If crossing the Alps for Russia meant the end of the war with France, then for Carthage the war with Rome was just beginning. Having descended from the Alpine mountains to Italy, to the valley of the Po River, Hannibal gave rest to his exhausted army and replenished it with troops from local Gallic tribes. The sudden appearance of Hannibal's army in Northern Italy allowed it to defeat the Roman troops in the battles on the Ticina and Trebbia rivers. In the spring of 217, the Carthaginian army invaded Central Italy and defeated 40 thousand. Roman army at Lake Trasimene. There would be more military victories ahead, but the Romans would gather their strength and Carthage would lose the war with Rome.
Both transitions left their memories in the Alps. According to the historian Appian, the road built by Hannibal's soldiers continued to exist in the 2nd century. n. e. and bore the name of the commander. On many maps of Switzerland in the 19th century. the road from Altorf to the village of Muoten was designated as “Suvorov’s path in 1799.” Near the Swiss city of Andermatt, a monument was erected: a 12-meter cross carved into the rock, towering above the dedication: “To the valiant companions of Generalissimo Field Marshal Count Suvorov-Rymniksky, Prince of Italy, who died while crossing the Alps in 1799.” Representatives of Switzerland and the CIS countries celebrate in the city of Andermatt and on the St. Gotthard Pass the anniversary of the crossing of Alexander Suvorov's army through the Alps with the laying of wreaths and the service of a memorial service for those killed at the monument-cross. In June 1999, a monument to Suvorov, the work of Russian sculptor Dmitry Tugarinov, was erected at the St. Gotthard Pass.
The entire history of humanity, from the first civilizations of the Ancient East to the present day, has been accompanied by wars. Wars were fought in both mountainous and flat areas. The most difficult ones are precisely fighting held in mountainous area, in which the two armies of Hannibal and Suvorov took part while crossing the Alps. Neither Hannibal nor Suvorov had experience in mountain warfare, but despite this, both Hannibal and Suvorov showed examples of military operations in the mountains in unfavorable conditions, techniques for capturing mountain peaks and passes by combining attacks from the front with envelopments, making a valuable contribution to the theory of military art.
Two armies, Carthaginian and Russian, made a world record military history mountain crossing, for which the troops were completely unprepared, either materially or morally. Why then were two armies able to accomplish the impossible?
This was made possible by the relationship between commanders and soldiers. Both commanders understood that action is more expressive than words and showed examples of how to ignite the morale of soldiers by appealing to their feelings. They both valued the soldiers, building their self-esteem and showing their awareness of all their heroic deeds. As a result, they ensured that the soldiers doted on their commanders and were ready to follow them to the ends of the earth. In these mountain campaigns, the soldiers of both armies demonstrated the same qualities: the ability to endure and endure difficulties, submission to fate, humility, faith in their leadership, contempt for danger. " The greatest victory spirit over matter,” one of the military historians called the Alpine campaign of the Russian army.
The Russians accomplished an unprecedented feat by crossing impassable mountains. But this is not the only example in the history of Russia when Russian soldiers accomplished the impossible: for example, under the command of the same Suvorov, Russian soldiers took the Turkish fortress of Izmail, which was considered impregnable. And the Patriotic War of 1812 and the world wars of the 20th century are still ahead. Suvorov was right when he said: “Nature has produced only one Russia; it has no rivals. We are Russians, we will overcome everything!”
This is a paradox: the campaign of 1799 did not end in the best way for the allies and for the Russian Empire. France managed to play on the contradictions between Britain, Austria and Russia, managed to nullify Suvorov’s victories in Italy, managed to avoid defeat, and prevent the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the French Republic. From the critical situation of the summer of 1799 revolutionary France came out with minimal losses.
In this context, Suvorov’s Swiss campaign could be perceived as “a good mine for bad game" It would be possible, but the amazing circumstances of the campaign, the exploits of all its participants from the soldier to the generalissimo, the tactical genius of Suvorov, shown on the brink of death - all this prevents us from treating the Swiss campaign even with a degree of disdain.
At the end of summer, in the heyday of hot Italian velvet season, On August 28, Suvorov’s army in two columns (they were commanded by generals Rosenberg and Derfelden) set out from Rivalta and Asti in the direction of Taverno. Having learned about the advance of Moro's units on Tortona and Serravalle, Suvorov undertook a new maneuver: the columns turned back and a day later they were in Tortona and Alexandria. Moreau carried out reconnaissance - and he was impressed by the information about the presence of Russian units in Piedmont. The French retreated south, avoiding battle.
In Taverno, by order of Suvorov, the allies prepared mules and packs. Only Melas carried out this order from Suvorov unsatisfactorily. At Tortona, Suvorov received only a small part of the mules for the needs of the mountain artillery, and the remaining 1,430 promised mules had to wait for the Russian army in Taverno. But, arriving at Taverno, Suvorov did not see the mules...
None other than Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich proposed using Cossack horses for packs, especially since in mountain warfare dismounted Cossacks seemed more useful than cavalrymen. For mountain warfare, Cossack horses were “a fish out of fish.” It should be noted that the Cossacks jealously valued their horses and would hardly have risked their main property if not for the authority of Suvorov.
In an angry letter to Emperor Franz, Suvorov complained that, due to Austrian fault, he had lost the advantages of “the speed and swiftness of the attack,” lost the initiative, and lost time. Suvorov wrote to Rostopchin in his own way, very sarcastically and frankly:
“We came to Belinzona, but there are no mules, no horses, but there is Thugut, and mountains, and abysses... Thugut is everywhere, but Gotze is nowhere.”
Days passed. Melas poured out apologies - and finally delivered mules to the Russian army. But five days passed in delays! Suvorov and Melas parted, just as they met, with mutual hostility: “there was love without joy - there will be separation without sadness.” One thing brightened up Suvorov’s stay in the Tavern: his acquaintance with Antonio Gamba, the owner of the house where Suvorov stayed. They got along, became friends - and 65-year-old Gamba volunteered to be Suvorov’s guide in the Alps. He set out on a campaign with the Russian army, and right up to Kura he was constantly with Suvorov. Gamba was called a “living Russian proclamation”, so striking was the friendly attitude towards the Russians of this respected elderly Swiss.
In Belinzona, Suvorov determines the composition of the columns ready for the start of the mountain war. The vanguard of Major General Prince Bagration (as we see again, Suvorov especially trusted him, essentially equating him with senior generals), like the remaining three columns, consisted of 8 battalions with five guns: two battalions of the Jaeger regiment of Bagration himself, two Miller's battalion, the Lomonosov and Dendrygin grenadier battalions, the Sanayev and Kalyomin battalions.
Shveikovsky's division consisted of two battalions each from the grenadier regiment of Rosenberg and the musketeer regiments of Povalo-Shveikovsky, Kamensky and Baranovsky. The division had six guns. The division of Lieutenant General Foerster consisted of two battalions of musketeers Miloradovich, Foerster himself, Tyrtov and Veletsky. There were also six guns in Förster's division.
In the division of General General Rosenberg there were two battalions of rangers Kashkin, two battalions each of Rebinder, Mansurov and Fertch. Rosenberg's division moved in the rearguard and, in addition to the six assigned guns, it had two reserve guns. In addition to the specified number of guns and shells for them, each division received ten mules for a supply of rifle cartridges.
The columns had to march in concentration, in close quarters, but not in offence. And between the columns there was supposed to be an interval of two hundred steps. Suvorov bases his mountain warfare tactics on a combination of columns with loose formation - a Rumyantsev innovation that he used and developed starting from Turtukai:
“To take possession of a mountain occupied by the enemy, it is necessary, in proportion to the width of it, by a platoon and a company, or even more scattered, to climb to the top, while the other battalions follow at a hundred paces... With only one solid and unshakable support of the column, one can give courage and bravery to the scattered riflemen, who if If, due to strong enemy resistance, they were not able to go further, then the column should, without firing a single shot, with a great desire to reach the top of the mountain and strike the enemy with bayonets.”
These rules, developed on the eve of the campaign, very accurately describe Suvorov’s real tactics; it was truly the science of winning. Special meaning in the “Rules” Suvorov gives the maneuvers of envelopment and detours:
“There’s no need to climb a mountain front-on when you can go around it on the sides.”
“Transition of Suvorov’s troops through the Alps in 1799”, A. Popov, 1904
In the Alps, Suvorov will combine frontal pressure with deep flanking maneuvers, sometimes unexpected for sophisticated opponents.
“If the enemy hesitates to capture the heights of the mountains, then he must hastily climb onto them and attack the enemy from above with bayonets and shots,”
- with these words Suvorov completed his rules for conducting military operations in the mountains - the first such rules in the history of the Russian army and, according to some researchers, the first such precise instructions on the tactics of mountain warfare in the history of military art of modern times.
Suvorov's innovation was manifested in the decision to lead in the mountains offensive war large divisions. Jomini explained this violation of the accepted laws of war by the incredible strength of Suvorov's will. He was not going to abandon the principle of “onslaught” in the mountains - the highest tension of forces at the decisive moment of the battle - as a rule, this was manifested in bayonet attacks.
Next to Suvorov in this most difficult campaign were old men - Derfelden, Rebinder, and young generals - Bagration, Miloradovich, Kamensky.
The Swiss campaign began on September 10, when Russian units moved from Taverno to the North. Suvorov himself followed Belinzona as part of Derfelden's corps. At Biaschi they were joined by the Austrian brigade of Strauch. The French brigade of Lekurba was ready to give the first battle to Suvorov’s troops at the Saint-Gotthard Pass.
A mountain war began, unprecedented in tension and miracles of military fortitude. And the “old Scythian” Suvorov, in new conditions for himself, did not act straightforwardly, skillfully manipulating the small, mobile corps of his army. Rosenberg's corps marched separately from Suvorov, along the Ticino River. And Derfelden’s troops, after quick marches, stopped in Dazio, ten miles before Airolo, where the French troops were located. The approaches to Saint Gotthard were covered by the French brigades of Gudin and Loison with a total of 9,000 people. Attacking them in the mountains was an unthinkable task that Suvorov decided to undertake.
Saint Gotthard
The Russians attacked Saint Gotthard in three columns: the central column went to the French positions in Airolo, the left was supposed to cut through to the upper reaches of the Ticino River, and the right, commanded by Bagration, was destined to play a decisive role in the battle. Bagration's troops had to go around the left flank of the French, passing along steep peaks. In the disposition Suvorov wrote:
“The first or right column, consisting of the vanguard of Prince Bagration and the division of Lieutenant General Shveikovsky, having set out at 3 o’clock in the morning, will go along the high road to Val di Vedro and from there will take the right to Madderana and, through Balle, attack the enemy position in flank at Bosco. And since in this position there can be no more than 3 enemy battalions, then the mentioned column from half the road to Bosco should detach 4 battalions even further to the right, straight to the Hospice, on the top of St. Gotthard, in order to completely cut off the enemy’s retreat from the position at Bosco.”
The appearance of Bagration on the heights at the climax of the battle forced the French to hastily retreat. Suvorov occupied Saint Gotthard. At one of the heights of Saint Gotthard there was a hospice house, which was maintained by a small community. Prior cordially greeted Suvorov, and after thanksgiving prayer On the occasion of the victory, community members treated the Russians to potatoes and peas.
Derfelden's troops relentlessly pursued the French, descending from the heights of St. Gotthard. In new positions, the French were reinforced by the arriving troops of Lecourbe and were about to go on the offensive. But then news came of the approach of Rosenberg’s troops; The French were afraid of a blow to the rear and took up defense near the village of Hospital. The French battalions were driven out of the Hospital only after dark. It must be said that during the battle for St. Gotthard, the fate of Rosenberg’s troops was unknown to Suvorov. This Russian column had its own glorious path in those days.
The vanguard of Rosenberg's corps, commanded by the resilient Miloradovich, pressed the French outposts for three days. Suvorov's old comrade-in-arms, Fyodor Vasilyevich Kharlamov, a gray-haired, proven hero who had recently been promoted to major general, showed himself heroically in those days.
The French met the Russian vanguard at the top of Mount Crispalt. Miloradovich attacked the enemy from the left flank, Colonel Mansurov - from the right, and in the center - Kharlamov with 170 brave men chosen by him. With a bold throw, they knocked out the French riflemen from convenient positions; the enemy descended from the mountain and retreated to the village of Urzern, into the valley. Lecourbe also left reserves in Ursern: the French were preparing for serious resistance. But even there the Russian vanguard attacked the enemy; quietly rolling down the mountain, they suddenly with a mighty “Hurray!” rushed at the enemy who did not have time to look around. General Kharlamov was wounded twice in this battle, but continued to push back the French.
In Switzerland, the fury of Russian bayonet attacks increased: in a critical situation, the heroes knew how to sweep away any obstacle. And for old man Kharlamov it was his finest hour before sunset. The third wound - buckshot - stopped him and turned out to be fatal. The Russian general was dying in the house of a village priest, having said goodbye to his comrades. In the report on the Swiss campaign, Suvorov will write briefly, first in the description of the battle: “Major General Kharlamov was in front at this time, showed his courage with a double attack with bayonets and received a serious wound in the shoulder,” and only then, listing the wounded: “Kharlamov a bullet right through the shoulder.” This was a heavy loss for Suvorov.
In Ursern, the French lost 220 people killed and captured, leaving three guns, a lot of ammunition and a supply of provisions for the victors, which was enough for Rosenberg’s corps for a day. Rosenberg was thinking about pursuing the enemy. But fog fell on the mountains, it was getting dark - and a chase through unexplored terrain seemed too risky an undertaking. If he had known about the position of the troops of Suvorov and Derfelden, a new attack on the French would have brought a decisive victory to the Russian army. It would not have been easy for Lekurbe to avoid complete destruction.
Suvorov's troops settled down for a night's rest in the area of the village of Hospital, from where the French had recently retreated. Suvorov sent a small detachment under the command of Major General Kamensky early in the morning to march quietly to the left bank of the Reis, to Zumdorf and Geschenen. In Geschenen, Kamensky’s detachment found itself in the rear of the French, who were blocking the path of Suvorov’s army at the Devil’s Bridge. Kamensky’s warriors that day required enormous endurance, tenacity and endurance in order to fall upon the enemy’s positions after a difficult, hidden transition, scatter them and set out in pursuit.
Yes, it was the Arkhangelsk Musketeer Regiment. He was to distinguish himself in the battle for the Devil's Bridge. The young general Nikolai Mikhailovich Kamensky was the son of an old Suvorov acquaintance, Count Mikhail Fedotovich, with whom the commander never shared the victory at Kozludzhi. Suvorov treated the son of his enemy with complete respect and considered him a brave man and a hero worthy of great deeds.
At 6 o'clock in the morning Suvorov set out with the main forces from the Hospital. He linked up with Rosenberg in the Ursern area. The troops moved down the Reise River. Soon we had to go through the Urner Loch tunnel (Urzern hole), punched in the rocks, after which a narrow road along the edge of the rock passed over the Devil's Bridge, thrown over a deep abyss. This impressive structure consisted of two arches with a total length of about thirty meters.
Rosenberg's troops were the first to go on the offensive and, before others, Miloradovich's vanguard. Behind him are the rest of Rosenberg’s troops, and secondly, Derfelden’s division. The battle began upon entering the Urner Loch tunnel - three hundred French with one cannon controlled the exit from the tunnel. The French resistance was overcome with the help of flanking movements: three hundred heroes, hunters of the glorious Colonel Trubnikov, who commanded a battalion in Mansurov’s Oryol Musketeer Regiment, were sent to the mountains above Urner Loch, another two hundred, led by Major Trevogin, were sent through Reisu to threaten the French rear. They will walk waist-deep in cold water, overcoming a strong current - and, climbing and descending inaccessible rocks, will find themselves on the left bank of the cliff, in the French rear. Following Trevogin's detachment, Suvorov sent the battalion of Colonel Svishchov.
In this battle, Suvorov used three detours of varying depth - with the help of the detachments of Trubnikov, Trevogin - Svishchov, Auffenberg and, finally, Kamensky, who with his Arkhangelsk citizens set out on a campaign earlier than others.
Seeing Trubnikov's column on the slopes, the French, who were on the other side of the cliff, began to destroy the bridge in panic - now it was obvious that they were too late to do this. Trubnikov’s hunters made their way along the steep slope, securing positions on rare crevices. The Suvorov training system worked!
The French took up defensive positions on the left bank of the river. There were two battalions from among those who retreated from Urzern. The advance detachment of the French was cut off from the main forces - and Miloradovich took advantage of this. His soldiers, having broken through the tunnel, rushed at them at bayonet point, killed everyone, or pushed them into the abyss. Approaching the bridge, Miloradovich saw that the small arch that towered above the left bank was destroyed. A firefight began from opposite sides of the cliff.
Meanwhile, the troops of the Austrian general Aufenberg descended from Disentis and appeared in the French rear. And the Arkhangelsk residents of Count Kamensky, sent by Suvorov on the most distant detour, attacked the French, and after the retreat organized their pursuit.
Suvorov, preparing for the battle, assumed that the bridge would have to be patched. The Russians hastily began to restore the bridge. They dismantled the hut, hauled logs, and threw them over the cliff. Glorious Major Prince S.V. Meshchersky, who served impeccably under Suvorov in Polish campaign 1794, was the first to tie logs with his own officer's scarf. Many followed his example.
At 16:00 the bridge was built. The first to step onto the log bridge, Major Meshchersky's brother, Meshchersky 3rd, was mortally wounded by a stray bullet. According to legend, his last words were an appeal to his comrades: “Friends, don’t forget me in the report!” Suvorov will not forget the feat of Major Meshchersky. Already terminally ill, in February 1800 Alexander Vasilyevich will petition F.V. Rostopchin about the promotion of the hero to the next rank, recalling the scarf.
The Austrian 2.5-thousand detachment of Aufenberg, which first scattered the French posts at Amsteg, was unable to stop the retreating troops of Lekurbe and Loison. The French, inferior to the Austrians in numbers, managed to overthrow Aufenberg's troops into the Madderan Valley and retreat, taking up new advantageous positions in the path of Suvorov's army.
The troops crossed the Devil's Bridge and stopped for the night in the village of Vazen. Suvorov again sent Miloradovich forward - by nightfall his detachment ended up near the village of Weiler, three kilometers from the French camp in amsheg. And the vanguard showed itself admirably on September 14–15, fighting its way to Amscheg, where shortly before this Lekurbe’s troops pushed back the Austrian brigade of Aufenberg, advancing from Disentis.
In the Reis valley, the battle-worn Austrians united with Miloradovich's troops, and they together moved towards Altdorf, attacking Lekurbe's rearguard. At Altdorf the French were preparing for battle; Lekurbe's six-thousand-strong corps took up positions across the Schachen River. Under attack from the main forces of Rosenberg's corps, the French retreated to the shores of Lake Lucerne.
Russian troops managed to simultaneously strike from the front and flanks. Altdorf was busy, Suvorov settled down there for a short rest. “In the middle of a flat valley” it was much more comfortable than in the rocks - meadows and arable lands were green here, it was easier to find fodder for horses and bread and salt for soldiers. The army needed a significant respite. The grumbling of the soldiers would have forced any commander to stop in Altdorf for several days. The enemy did not prevent Suvorov from staying in Altdorf for an extended period. Lekurbe, who had already experienced the power of the Russian strike more than once, would not have dared to attack Suvorov’s army here.
This was not the first climax and critical moment of the campaign. Not the first, but, as it turned out, decisive. The roads along the shores of Lake Lucerne, which the Austrians reported to Suvorov, did not exist. Now the commander knew about this for sure. In Altdorf, Suvorov decided to go through the Rostock mountain range and descend into the Mutten Valley, from where there was a direct road to Schwyz. Milyutin enthusiastically wrote about this decision of Suvorov:
“It took an iron will to decide to go from Altdorf to Schwyz; Moreover, unlimited confidence in one’s troops was needed to choose such a path. Suvorov was not frightened by the very disorder in which his army was: after seven days of a difficult campaign, the troops were extremely tired; shoes are worn out, provisions are exhausted.”
It was the decision of a true maximalist - to take the most difficult and dangerous path, without wasting time, the very next morning after arriving in Altdorf. The most cold-blooded commentator on Suvorov’s campaign, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote quite emotionally:
“That Suvorov demanded this from his army in the exhausted state in which it arrived at Altdorf testified to the incredible strength of the commander’s will, and that he achieved this from it was evidence of Suvorov’s remarkable power over the spirit of his troops. A cautious commander, if such a commander can be imagined in such a position, would have stopped and then turned back. But Suvorov felt too strong to retreat in the face of such difficulties, and too proud to even admit the thought that, through his own fault, he would not arrive at the assembly point of the struggle that he himself had assigned to his generals. He couldn’t wait to arrive at this assembly point without wasting a moment, and he didn’t lose it. The very next morning he spoke to Mutten.”
The vanguard was supposed to be the detachment of Bagration, a proven iron general. Behind him are Derfelden's corps and Aufenberg's brigade. Rosenberg’s corps was in the rearguard, ready to repel attacks from the rear. Lekurbe launched two such attacks in the Altdorf area. The attacks were repulsed with heavy losses for the French - and were never repeated.
During the second attack, Lekurbe had a significant numerical superiority over Rosenberg, but the Russian rearguard managed to save even the pack animals, skillfully repelling all attacks, destroying the enemy. This skillfully organized transition and rearguard battles are one of Suvorov’s undoubted miracles. Lekurbe skillfully maneuvered, helping nature destroy Suvorov’s army at the transitions, but he had to abandon bold offensive tactics. Rosenberg showed himself to be an unbending general, a master of fierce rearguard battles.
At five o'clock in the morning on September 16, Bagration's troops wandered along a narrow path along the rocks of the Rostock ridge. Stones crumbled under the footsteps of the soldiers; sometimes the soles slipped on the clay. On the ridge tops, weary troops walked through the clouds as if in a dream. The transition lasted twelve hours. At 17 o'clock the vanguard was already descending into the Mutten Valley. Having received information about a small French detachment that was stationed in the village of Mutten, Bagration decided to defeat it, clearing the way for the main forces of the army. He managed to surround the French. Bagration himself with the rangers advanced from the front, the Cossacks came from the left flank, and the grenadiers from the right.
After a short attack by the Russians, the French laid down their arms: Bagration delivered 150 prisoners to his commander. In the rearguard of Suvorov’s army was Rosenberg’s corps, which successfully repulsed Lekurbe’s attacks from Altdorf. Rosenberg's troops descended into the valley following the pack train - and the French were afraid to attack the Russian rearguard.
But the hoped-for connection with fresh Russian and Austrian units in the Mutten Valley failed - and, of course, not through the fault of Suvorov and his generals. On September 14-15, Massena's troops on the banks of the Limata River, near Zurich, inflicted a severe defeat on Rimsky-Korsakov's corps. It's been a long time since Russian troops suffered such defeats! The remnants of the corps retreated to Schafhausen.
At the same time, Gotze's Austrian corps was defeated by Soult's division at the Linth River. Gotze himself died in the battle. Now the French intended to encircle and destroy Suvorov’s army in the Mutten Valley. Massena publicly promised to capture the legendary Suvorov within a few days. Who knows how strong the political subtext was in this statement.
In those days there were still many candidates for the vacancy of dictator, which General Bonaparte would soon firmly take control of. And the young, energetic, authoritative Massena was no stranger to political ambitions. Suvorov received information about the loud statements of the French general, and the Russian field marshal was not used to not noticing thrown gloves.
What happened near Zurich to Rimsky-Korsakov’s troops? In numerous biographies of Suvorov, little attention is usually paid to this event (as well as to the personality of General Rimsky-Korsakov): the inglorious defeat that Massena inflicted not on the great Russian commander, but on the ordinary General Rimsky-Korsakov.
But Zurich became the turning point of the Swiss campaign, after which the whole war took a threatening turn for Russia and Suvorov’s army, and we will talk about the Zurich collapse in more detail. Moreover, General Massena showed himself in those days to be a most talented and energetic tactician - one would like to say, going too far, like a general of the Suvorov school. The French, of course, had their own worthy school.
The French sent several formations against Suvorov’s army, tired of battles and transitions: in Altdorf there was the Lekurba division, reinforced with fresh forces, in Klental, on the way to Glaris, the Molitor brigade. At Schwyz, the exit from the valley was blocked by Mortier's division, which was quickly brought into order after the actions near Zurich.
Suvorov received General Linken’s report on the defeats of the allied forces on September 18. The most pessimistic information received from local inhabitants was confirmed, and rumors about the victory of General Linken dissipated like the smoke of a burnt-out fire. Linken was vigorously pressed by Molitor's troops. At the military council, Suvorov was as harsh as ever, openly calling Austrian policy treacherous. Suvorov considered the five-day delay of troops in the Tavern to be a fatal and malicious oversight of Vienna. It was this delay that prevented Suvorov from arriving at Schwyz on time and helping out Rimsky-Korsakov.
Suvorov initially feared that his brilliant plan offensive operation in Switzerland will not be implemented due to Austrian reinsurers. But he was hardly prepared for such a blow. Suvorov's army remained invincible, but circumstances did not allow it to complete the campaign with a decisive and complete victory. Now Suvorov was convinced that at Schwyz Massena would meet his army with superior forces, and this assumption turned out to be correct.
Suvorov’s speech at that military council was recorded by the “old warrior” Ya.M. Starkov from the words of General Bagration. This is a unique, although not entirely reliable source. It is likely that Suvorov said something similar that evening:
“Korsakov is defeated and driven out of Zurich! Gotz went missing and his corps was scattered. Other Austrian troops... marching to join us were driven away from Glaris and driven away. So, the entire operational plan for expelling the French from Switzerland has disappeared!.. Now it is impossible for us to go forward to Schwyz. Massena has over 60 thousand, but we don’t have even 20 thousand. It's a shame to go back! This would mean retreating, but the Russians and I never retreated!.. We are surrounded by mountains; we are in the mountains! We have few crackers left for food; and even less combat artillery charges and rifle cartridges. We will be surrounded by a strong enemy, proud of victory... a victory arranged by insidious treason!.. Now we can expect help from no one; one hope is in God, the other is in the greatest courage and the greatest selflessness of the troops you lead. This alone remains for us. We have great work ahead of us, unprecedented in the world! We are on the edge of an abyss!.. But we are Russian!”
These words are hard to forget. They are preserved in legends.
In a desperate situation, Suvorov proposed to make his way to Glaris, following northeast from the Mutten Valley, through Mount Bregel. According to Suvorov’s plan, the first to engage in battle with the French was the Aufenberg brigade, which was immediately supposed to occupy Mount Bregel, knocking down enemy posts. The next morning, Bagration's vanguard and Povalo-Shveikovsky's division were supposed to go into action. An important role was also assigned to the rearguard of Rosenberg and Foerster, who covered the bold march-maneuver of the main forces of the army.
Aufenberg's brigade successfully completed the combat mission, defeating the battalion left by Molitor at Bragelberg, and settled down for the night not reaching Lake Klönthal. At dawn on September 19, the troops of Bagration and Povalo-Shveikovsky set out, followed by the main forces of Suvorov. By 3 p.m. they descended into the valley. Molitor was still pursuing Linken's detachment, but upon learning of Aufenberg's advance, he returned to Bragelberg.
In the morning, Molitor's French division attacked Aufenberg's troops. The Austrian brigade retreated - and Aufenberg, ready to capitulate, had already entered into negotiations with the French. Only when he saw the approach of Bagration’s troops, he cast aside his hesitations and refused to surrender. Bagration threw his troops into battle from the march: he attacked Molitor with two battalions from the front, four from the right flank, and a ranger regiment from the left. The attack by Bagration’s tired, bitter soldiers was a great success. The French were driven back and suffered considerable losses.
Having retreated, Molitor stationed troops on the eastern shore of Lake Klöntal. He took up an impregnable position on a mountain slope, behind a stone church fence. Bagration attacked this fortification several times, but failed to overthrow Molitor’s troops before nightfall. Then Bagration undertook a roundabout maneuver, the skirmisher of which was the commander of the Jaeger regiment, Count Tsukato. At night, he bypassed Molitor’s positions from the right flank. Six battalions followed the rangers. The remaining vanguard forces were ready to attack Molitor from the front. At dawn, the French noticed the approach of the enemy and opened fire. But a vigorous attack from the rear and front forced Molitor to retreat.
Molitor took a new position between the Lint River and the mountain range, near the village of Näfels. With a quick attack, Bagration overthrew Molitor’s troops here too, occupying Näfels. Molitor's troops, reinforced by reinforcements (the troops of General Gazan arrived in time), returned to Nefels - and a stubborn battle ensued. By the evening of September 20, Bagration’s vanguard completed its combat mission: Molitor’s division was pushed north, and the Klöntal Valley was open to the army. The battle continued in Näfels when Suvorov ordered Bagration to move towards Netstall.
On September 19 and 20, when Bagration's vanguard fought in the Klönthal Valley, Rosenberg's corps fought rearguard battles in the Mutten Valley. Rosenberg's seven-thousandth corps took on a battle with a fifteen-thousandth detachment led by Massena himself. In this battle, Rosenberg, who had already gone through Suvorov’s school, will outmaneuver the French with his disposition and order to act with the bayonet, without wasting time on firing.
The first blow of the French was taken by Beletsky's regiment, which, fighting back, retreated to the left flank, luring the enemy into the valley, where they were met by those built in order of battle Rosenberg's troops. In a wide line, the Russians rushed into a bayonet attack. Suvorov wrote about this in a general report to the emperor about the Swiss campaign:
“The regiments of Förster, Beletsky, Mansurov and the Jaeger Kashkin did not stop hitting him as they ran, and Ferch’s battalion, seeing this, also rushed after him and continued to do the same.”
On September 19, Russian troops repulsed several attacks by Massena and drove the French back to Schwyz itself. The Russians fought bravely, and the French general recklessly did not bother to control the heights of the valley. The hero of the recent battles for St. Gotthard and Devil's Bridge, Colonel Trubnikov, fought in the ranks of Mansurov's regiment. He was mortally wounded. The heroes of the two-day battle were generals Rebinder and Miloradovich. On September 19, repelling the attacks of the French, Rebinder's Azov men bravely stabbed the enemy and took prisoners. They were attacked by the division of Mortier, the future Napoleonic marshal and military governor of Moscow. The next day, Massena launched a decisive counterattack, personally leading the attack, but Rosenberg's corps again held out and defeated the enemy with a powerful counterattack.
Miloradovich commanded the bayonet attacks perfectly. Rosenberg captured 5 guns and 1000 prisoners in these battles - including one general and fifteen officers. The soldiers captured rich booty: food, money, valuables. The main prey was General... Lacour. Rosenberg, in a report to Suvorov, called him Lakurgus. And in Suvorov’s reports, Lakurg turned into Lekurbe - it was more common, the name of the famous general was on the tip of his tongue, but in the heat of battle the mistake was not noticed. So historians and commentators started talking about the capture of the famous French general, who beat the Austrians more than once - both before the Alps and after.
Even a legend was born about Lekurbe’s stay in Russian captivity: a few weeks later, when releasing Lekurb from captivity, Suvorov, according to legend, will give him a flower for his young wife. Lekurbe will keep this flower as a relic. Perhaps the origins of this legend are the story that happened to General Lacourt? The real Lecourbe, continuing to fight under the command of Massena, indeed in those days and weeks was imbued with respect for Suvorov, whom he reverently remembered years later. But Lekurbe was not captured in the Mutten Valley!
Clausewitz, briefly describing the successful counterattack of Rosenberg, who threw back superior enemy forces beyond Schwyz, prefers to remain silent about the capture of Lacour... Clausewitz, who described the campaign of 1799 in detail, can be sent another reproach: when describing the victories of the Russians, for some reason he forgets about his manner of describing battles in detail and practically does not even mention such notable Russian generals as Miloradovich, Rebinder, Denisov...
Suvorov recalled with pride the battle in the Mutten Valley in the last months of his life: the famous French were put to shame, although their position in the Mutten Valley could not be called unfavorable. Massena abandoned his intention to defeat the Russians in the Mutten Valley and headed to join Molitor's brigade and Gazan's division. Leaving the valley, Rosenberg sent an order to Schwyz to stockpile food for an entire corps of soldiers. Having learned about this, the French were preparing for a new attack by the Russians from the Mutten Valley.
Meanwhile, Rosenberg did not even think about staying in the valley. His troops, famous for their victories in rearguard battles, were already following Suvorov’s main forces to Glarus.
Suvorov will not write the usual detailed report about these battles: there was no time for this. The battles were replaced by new battles and transitions. Only in a letter to Archduke Charles, written in Panix, in mortal fatigue, Suvorov briefly talks about the glorious deeds:
“Meanwhile, General Rosenberg expelled Massena himself from the Mutin valley on September 19-20. 20–1 attacked the troops that came to reinforce him and forced them to flee back to Schwyz with the loss of General Lecourbe, more than a thousand prisoners and the same number killed and wounded. Rosenberg restored calm."
In general, the correspondence with Karl became increasingly harsh, and the heated correspondents inflicted a lot of mutual insults on each other. Later, the Archduke will publish the book “The History of the 1799 Campaign in Germany and Switzerland,” in which he characterizes Suvorov’s military art as “standing at the stage of childhood.” About the Russian army he will write: “Their dignity was based mainly on the feeling of their physical strength, playing a decisive role in single battles and hand-to-hand combat.”
On the night of the 21st, the rearguard left the Mutten Valley. The seriously wounded were left in Mutten with paramedics and a note to the French command. The war was not total: the opponents had reason to rely on each other's generosity. The note was handed over to the French by Staff Captain Senyavin, who in 1800 would return to Russia with a response document in which the French testified to the fulfillment of their knightly duty.
Snow fell in the mountains, and the crossing of Bregel was delayed. I had to spend the night in the mountains, and Rosenberg arrived in Glaris only on September 23. So, all of Suvorov’s troops settled in Glaris, and the exit from the encirclement in the Mutten Valley was completed successfully. In Glaris, thanks to trophies and the help of the local population, the soldiers were given wheat crackers and a pound of cheese.
Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, who in Italy learned a lot from Suvorov and other heroes, flashed his nobility, paid the local peasants for food, so that everyone knew that the Russian soldier was not a robber. The Russian soldiers did not like the cheese: it was some kind of rottenness, and that’s all. But the officers had plenty of Swiss cheese to set their teeth on edge. The Grand Duke held his own in the Alps, boldly made his way into Bagration’s vanguard detachment, regardless of the hardships of the unprecedented campaign.
And the Grand Duke took away one more thing from Suvorov’s campaigns: contempt for the Austrians, reaching the point of undisguised hatred. At the direction of his father, Konstantin Pavlovich returned to Russia, bypassing Vienna. On his own initiative, he avoided contact with the Austrians, did not go under the same roof with them, and more than once demanded that the Tsars leave the room where the Grand Duke entered.
He will make an exception for only one high-born Austrian - the Prince of Coburg. Konstantin Pavlovich will even stop by Coburg with greetings from Suvorov. The old comrade will send a reply letter through the Grand Duke. A member of the imperial family, who knightly entered the war, had the right to feel insulted by the hypocritical policy of Vienna. But the irritation did not extend to Coburg, Russia’s old fighting friend.
There was an acute shortage of ammunition. In the same letter to Archduke Karl, Suvorov admitted: “In these stubborn battles we spent all our charges and therefore were forced to avoid new battles.”
Taking this circumstance into account, Suvorov had to choose a route for his speech from Glaris. The northern route lay through Näfels and Mollis. There they had to meet with superior French forces. And Suvorov chose a more mountainous, harsh, but free from the French path through the Panix (Ringenkopf) ridge.
One can once again be amazed at the speed of Suvorov’s thought and faith in the tirelessness of the army: the army in its entirety remained in Glaris for less than a day - and rushed into a new dangerous campaign. The last mountain crossing of Suvorov's army began on the night of September 24. Miloradovich’s detachment was in the vanguard, Bagration remained in the rearguard, replacing Rosenberg’s tired troops.
Snow fell again - and all day on September 25 the army slowly moved across the ridge. By evening, Miloradovich’s vanguard reached the village of Paniks. The main troops spent the night on the tops of the ridge, freezing in the cold. In the morning, Suvorov ordered us to descend - the memories of those hours of the campaign remained: “My eyes met our tireless leader, the immortal Suvorov. He was sitting on a Cossack horse, and I heard myself how he tried to break free from the hands of two stalwart Cossacks walking on either side, who were holding him and leading his horse.”
Massena tried to organize the pursuit of the Russian army. But the passage through Panix was reliably covered by Bagration’s bristling troops. At Glaris, a French detachment of seven thousand attacked the Bagration rearguard. A fierce bayonet attack drove the French back. Bagration ordered to pursue them to Glaris - it was a victory snatched by the teeth, out of desperation. Bagration had neither artillery nor ammunition. The rapid attack cooled the ardor of the French: there were no further attempts at pursuit.
Suvorov and the most difficult situation, when the main task was to save troops and avoid mortal danger, he remained committed to offensive war, he boldly throws his troops at the enemy and still uses the “fury” of the bayonet attack. And in the Alps, Denis Davydov’s thought was confirmed: “He anathematized any defensive, even more retreating action in the Russian army and for forty years in a row, that is, from the first combat shot until the last day of his service, he acted nothing but offensively.”
In the vanguard, Miloradovich’s detachment made its way along a narrow road through the Ringenkopf (Panix) ridge, followed slowly - by no means with the usual soldier’s steps - the rest of the units walked, followed by Suvorov, who portrayed a cheerful appearance for the soldiers. Having dealt with the enemy, Bagration’s rearguard walked after the army. We walked all day on September 24th. On the night of the 25th, Suvorov positioned his main forces in the village of Elm for a short restless rest. At 2 o'clock in the morning the army continued its march to meet the last inhuman tests on the 25th.
The descent from the tops of the ridge was the culmination of the last transition and another terrible test. The last horses and mules were dying. People turned out to be stronger than horses, stronger than metal.
Miloradovich and the vanguard were in Paniks on the night of September 26. All troops concentrated near the village of Panix by the end of the day. Before this, Suvorov’s main forces spent the night on the cold peaks. After a short rest, the army moved to Ilanets, where it settled down for the night. In Ilanets, the troops managed to warm up, dry off after mountain crossings, and somehow patch up their clothes and long-worn shoes. On the 27th, Suvorov was already in the city of Kur, where he finally gave the wounded troops a two-day respite. Having received some provisions, the army moved along the Rhine Valley and on October 1 arrived at the city of Feldkirch. Near Feldkirch, Suvorov ordered a camp to be set up. This day is considered the end of the Swiss campaign. A Russian bayonet broke through the Alps.
A handful of brave men fought far from native land so that the enemy does not come to Russia. And even in the Alpine campaign, Suvorov’s exhausted army won every battle.
His path lay in the area of Lake Zurich. There was the main French army in Switzerland under the command of General Massenb (38 thousand people). It was located opposite the Rimsky-Korsakov building. Suvorov planned his route so as to strike at the flank and rear of Massenb. The Russian commander intended to use his traditional method of speed and onslaught. He sought to quickly overcome his path in order to unexpectedly “attack the enemy from the most sensitive side.” Therefore, Suvorov chose the shortest, although most the hard way through the Gotthard pass. On September 4, Suvorov's army arrived in Tavern, where its journey to the Alps began. But there were neither pack mules nor food, which the Austrian commissariat had promised to prepare in advance. As a result, the Russian troops had to stay here for five whole days and set out on a campaign only on September 10. “The haste of our campaign turned out to be fruitless,” wrote Suvorov, “the decisive benefits of speed and surprise were lost for the important upcoming actions.” This delay became fatal for the Rimsky-Korsakov corps.
Battle of Zurich (1799). On September 14, 1799, in the area of the Swiss city of Zurich, the Russian corps under the command of General Rimsky-Korsakov (24 thousand people) that arrived there was attacked by a strong French army under the command of the famous General Massenbe (38 thousand people). Before this, the main Austrian units, led by Archduke Charles, left Northern Switzerland and went to Belgium. As a result, Korsakov's corps was actually given over to be torn to pieces by the superior forces of the French. In a brutal two-day battle on September 14-15, it was defeated piece by piece. Having lost 15 thousand people. (more than half the strength), Korsakov retreated north, to Winterthur. The damage to the French side amounted to 7 thousand people. After this victory, the French gained freedom of action in Switzerland, which put Suvorov's army in an extremely difficult situation. The Battle of Zurich was one of the most severe defeats of the Russian army in the 18th century.
Battle of the Gotthard Pass (1799). Suvorov's first major victory in the Alps was the capture of the St. Gotthard Pass by his troops on September 13. The almost impregnable positions on the pass were defended by the French detachment of General Lecourbe (8.5 thousand people). Before the battle, Suvorov sent a detachment of General Rosenberg (6 thousand people) around Saint Gotthard to go behind the French rear. The main Russian forces in three columns attacked the St. Gotthard positions from the front and from both flanks. The French repulsed two attacks, but during the third, General Bagration's detachment managed to climb the mountain peaks and bypass the positions of the defenders. Lekurbe had to leave the pass. At the same time, Rosenberg’s detachment hesitated in the mountains and did not have time to cut off the French’s path to retreat in time. They managed to retreat unhindered to the Devil's Bridge area and take up a new defensive position there.
Battle for the Urzensky Tunnel and Devil's Bridge (1799). On September 14, Suvorov's troops linked up with Rosenberg's detachment. In front of them was the Urzern mountain tunnel (60 m long and 3 m wide). In a dark rocky passage there was a cannon that fired buckshot. An attempt to break into the tunnel on the move was stopped by fire. Then the detachment under the command of Colonel Trubnikov climbed the mountain to bypass the French on the right, and the rangers with Major Trevogin began to descend down to the Reise River. Trubnikov's soldiers were the first to reach the French rear. They quickly attacked the gun crew, destroyed it, and threw the cannon into the river. The path to the tunnel was clear. Unable to detain the Russians in the tunnel, the French retreated across the Reyse River, blowing up the Devil's Mouse behind them. It was located above the river at an altitude of 22-23 m and had a length of 20 m. Having taken up defense on the opposite bank of the Reisse, the French hoped to hold back the onslaught of the Russian army at this steep mountain position. But Suvorov’s soldiers dismantled the nearby barn and, under French fire, began to pave the destroyed span with planks. On the initiative of Prince Meshchersky, they tied up the boardwalk with officers' scarves and belts, and then rushed to attack across the bridge. Meanwhile, Major Trevogin’s rangers had already descended to Reisa, walked waist-deep into ice water a stormy mountain stream, and then began to climb the steep slopes to the top of the opposite bank. Colonel Trubnikov’s detachment also went to the rear of the French. The appearance of Russian troops on the flanks and in the rear, as well as an attack from the front, forced the French to begin general waste from impregnable positions. On September 15, Suvorov's troops took the village of Altdorf in battle, where they were joined by the Austrian detachment of Aufenberg. In three days, Suvorov fought through unfamiliar, high-mountain terrain for more than 60 km. Having reached Aldorf, Suvorov was faced with another, in his words, “treason and duplicity” of his allies. It turned out that the road to Schwyz along Lake Lucerne, which the Russian army had approached, did not exist, and there were no means of transportation for movement by water. Suvorov had to go to Schwyz again through the mountains. On the way through the Rosstok ridge (about 2.5 thousand m above sea level), the soldiers were forced to climb a goat path, on which sometimes even the sole of a boot did not fit. Suvorov's army, lined up in single file, covered this 16 km route to the Mutten Valley in two days.
Battle of Mutten Valley 1799). Having reached the Mutten Valley, Suvorov received the tragic news of the defeat of Rimsky-Korsakov. Now Suvorov’s army found itself surrounded by superior French forces. Having won the battle of Zurich, Massenb moved towards Suvorov. In this situation, the Russian commander decided to change his route. Instead of Schwyz, which was occupied by Massenbe, it was decided to fight our way east to Glaris. On September 19, the Suvorov vanguard under the command of Prince Bagration drove the French brigade of General Molitor back from Glaris and opened the way for the entire army. On the same day, the Suvorov rearguard, led by General Rosenberg (7 thousand people), covering the withdrawal of the main units, entered unequal battle in the Mutten Valley with the vanguard of the French army under the command of General Massenb (15 thousand people). The Russians not only repulsed all attacks, but also drove the French back to Schwyz. The next morning Massena resumed his attack. The fierce battle lasted for several hours and ended with the defeat of the French, who again retreated to Schwyz. In these battles, Massena himself was almost captured, whom the grenadier Makhotin tried to pull from his horse. The Russian soldier was left with a torn general's epaulette in his hands. “The enemy,” reported Rosenberg, “was driven more than 8 miles to Schwyz.” In these battles, the French lost 5 thousand people. (including 1.2 thousand prisoners).
Transition from Glaris to Ilanz (1799). Having completed the task, Rosenberg went to Glaris on the night of September 21 and two days later, overcoming the snow drifts, he united with Suvorov. On September 21, Aufenberg’s Austrian detachment voluntarily left Suvorov’s army and went to Ilanets. The Russian commander could not move further to the east, where new battles awaited him with large French forces. He decided to take a roundabout, but very difficult route to the south, to Ilanets through the Paniks Pass. This was the last maneuver of the great commander who saved the army. To repel the onslaught of the French, a detachment of two thousand under the command of General Bagration was left in the rearguard. The most difficult was the passage through the Ringenkopf mountain range in a snowstorm. The guides left the army, and the Russian soldiers moved almost gropingly along narrow paths swept by drifting snow. The road passed through Panix for the most part along the edge of a steep icy cliff. The artillery had to be left at the foot of the pass. The guns were riveted and covered with stones. Finally, Suvorov's army overcame the pass and then crossed the Rhine. On September 26, she reached Ilanz, leaving the zone of action of French troops.
The great Russian commander passed through the Alps undefeated, retaining about 80% of his personnel in the ranks after an unprecedented transition in history, and at the same time withdrawing 1,400 prisoners. “The Alpine mountains are behind us - God is before us: Hurray! The Russian eagles have flown around the Roman eagles!” he told the troops after the end of the campaign. For the Italian and Swiss campaigns, Suvorov received the title of Prince of Italy and the rank of generalissimo. The crossing of the Alps, which was accompanied by almost continuous battles and skirmishes, lasted 17 days. People who have never been to the mountains, without any special equipment managed to overcome about 200 km of high mountain path in a short time and win difficult battles, including those with superior enemy forces. The Swiss campaign demonstrated not only the genius of Suvorov, but also the amazing resilience of the Russian soldiers, who did not allow themselves to be destroyed and came out of an almost hopeless situation with dignity.
"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.
- in August 1799, a significant change occurred in the plans of the allied Russian-Austrian troops operating against the French: Suvorov with Russian troops was supposed to move from Northern Italy to Switzerland (cf. Suvorov’s Italian campaign) and, joining there with the Russian corps of the Roman- Korsakov, stationed at Zurich, to act against Massena. Meanwhile, with the premature departure of the Austrian army of Archduke Charles from Switzerland, Massena outnumbered the allied troops remaining in this country, and, moreover, his troops were more concentrated. Their number reached 80 thousand, while in the allied detachments there were no more than 60 thousand. Massena did not fail to take advantage of his position and, having separated special detachments to the side of Northern Italy, the main mass of his forces went on the offensive against the corps of Rimsky-Korsakov, stationed near Zurich, and the Austrian detachment of Gotze, covering the Linta River between Zurich and Wallenstatt lakes. Suvorov, having learned about the speech of Archduke Charles from Switzerland and fearing for the fate of Rimsky-Korsakov, moved with intensified marches from Alessandria to Tavern, where he arrived on September 4. To move from there to connect with Korsakov, there were two routes: one was quite safe and convenient, but more circuitous, leading to the upper Rhine valley to the city of Chur, through Chiavenna and Mount Splügen, the other through Bellinzona, Saint Gotthard and the valley of the Reisa River to the lake four cantons. Unfamiliar with either the topography of the new theater of military operations or the location and strength of the enemy troops located there, Suvorov was forced to rely in all this on the assurances of the Austrian officers of the general staff. As a result, he chose more shortcut, which he believed, having reached Schwyz, to go to the rear of Massena. At the same time, the latter was supposed to be attacked from the side of the Linta River by the troops of General Gotze (who, after the addition of Austrian troops, could have had up to 20 thousand), and from the side of the Limmat River by the corps of Rimsky-Korsakov (24 thousand). This plan was sent for consideration to the Austrian generals Gotze and Strauch; neither one nor the other drew Suvorov's attention to the lack of a road along the lake to Schwyz and to the extraordinary difficulties of the offensive through St. Gotthard and the Reis gorge. At the same time, the Austrians considered Massena’s forces not to be 80, but only 60 thousand, which further misled the Russian commander. Suvorov's movement into Switzerland was, contrary to expectation, slowed down. While still in Italy and knowing that he had to march through a completely mountainous country, he instructed the Austrian general Melas to prepare 1,400 mules in the Tavern for transporting heavy loads on packs, and the necessary mountain artillery; but there were no mules there, and only a few days later 650 of them were sent. The missing mules were replaced with Cossack horses, but to do this, up to 1 1/2 thousand Cossacks had to rush. The convoy and field artillery were sent by roundabout routes to Lake Constance . Suvorov was forced to stand in the Tavern for almost a whole week, and only by September 10 was he able to more or less prepare for a further campaign. The first clash with the French troops of General Lecourbe followed on September 13, during a difficult climb to Mount Saint Gotthard, which was captured only thanks to the appearance of our encircling column on the French flank. On September 14, Russian troops moved further, through the Reisa valley, captured almost impregnable positions at the Devil's Bridge (see Devil's Bridge), and our vanguard, under the command of Miloradovich, reached the village of Veylen. Lekurbe retreated to Fluelen, where he boarded his detachment on waiting ships and thus escaped final destruction. Meanwhile, Suvorov, having reached Altorf, saw that there was no further road, and communication with Schwyz was possible only along the lake, on which the enemy had previously captured all the means of transport. From the Shahen Valley, located opposite Altorf, there was only a path to the upper reaches of the Linta River, where Suvorov could connect with Linken’s Austrian detachment, or he had to turn to the Maderan Valley and go to the upper Rhine; but in neither one nor the other way did he reach the agreed point of connection, Schwyz, and, therefore, put Korsakov and Gotze, whom he assumed to be advancing to the intended point, in a dangerous position. It was difficult to retreat along the path already taken, since the road was blocked by a pack train. Meanwhile, the soldiers' supplies were running low, their packs could not keep up, and Suvorov could only count on resupply in Schwyz. Finding himself in such a critical situation, he learned of the existence of two mountain paths leading through the snowy Rostock ridge to the village of Mutten, from where there is a road to Schwyz. Then he decided to send the entire army along the shortest of them in order to certainly reach Schwyz. At dawn on September 16, the vanguard moved under the command of Prince Bagration; he was to be followed by the troops of General Derfelden and Aufenberg, and then the packs. Rosenberg was ordered to cover the rear from possible attacks by Lecourbe and follow the packs. Crossing Roshtok, along a path accessible only to brave and habitual hunters, presented terrible difficulties: every wrong step cost lives, and many people, horses and mules died after falling off the steep slope. Only after 12 hours of this terrible journey, the vanguard reached the village of Mutten and captured the French post standing there. The remaining troops spread out along the entire route and partly spent the night on a snowy pass; Only on the evening of the 17th did the tail of the column reach Mutten (and the transition was only 16 versts). Then, for another 2 days, packs continued along the same road. During this time, Rosenberg successfully repelled two attacks by Lekurbe, and on September 17 he could calmly leave his position and be drawn into the Shahen Valley. Meanwhile, rumors began to reach Suvorov about the defeat of Korsakov at Zurich, Gotz - on the Linte River; The Klental valley, separated from the Mutten valley by the Pragel mountain range, was also occupied by the French detachment of Molitor; from Schwyz, Massena threatened. The position of our troops, exhausted, ragged, hungry and surrounded on all sides by the enemy, seemed almost desperate. On September 18, Suvorov convened a military council, at which it was decided that, due to the impossibility of a further offensive to Schwyz (which was proposed by the Austrian officers), to force our way through Pragel to the Klental Valley, to Glarus. On the same day, the Austrian brigade of Aufenberg moved to Pragel, knocked down enemy posts and descended into the valley for the night; she was followed by the rest of the troops, who gathered at Glarus by the evening of September 20. The retreat was carried out under the cover of a rearguard temporarily left at Mutten (4 thousand), under the command of Rosenberg, who brilliantly fulfilled the assignment assigned to him (see Mutten Valley), and on September 23rd he also arrived at Glarus. Aufenberg went beyond the Rhine on the 21st, following the retreating Austrian column of Linken, and Suvorov, left to his own forces, had no choice but to also retreat to the Rhine valley, moving along which, towards Hur and Feldkirch, he attracted convoys to himself and field artillery, and then could link up with Korsakov. So it was decided. On the night of September 24, the troops moved along the Zernft Valley, covered by a rearguard, under the command of Prince Bagration, who repeatedly had to fight off the French. On the 25th, the main forces had to cross the snowy Ringenkopf ridge, and this pass turned out to be almost the most difficult on the entire route: the guides ran away, a snowstorm arose, covering all traces of the mountain path. The guns had to be abandoned; many people and more than 300 packs died after falling into the abyss. On September 26, Russian troops reached the village of Paniks and only here could they breathe freely after the hardships and dangers they had endured. On the 27th they moved to Khur, where a two-day rest, with an abundance of food, was sufficient to restore their strength. On October 1, the troops camped near the village of Altenstat, near Feldkirch. This is how it ended famous hike, failed for Suvorov due to circumstances completely beyond his control. On October 19, he transferred his troops to Bavaria and placed them in winter quarters between the rivers Iller and Lech. Soon, Emperor Paul, convinced of the impossibility of joint actions with such allies as the Austrians, ordered Suvorov with all Russian troops to return to Russia. For the Swiss campaign
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