(now Tver) and in its suburbs, the dividing line between Soviet and German units on the southern bank of the Volga became the strip from Staritsky to Volokolamsk highway. Fierce street fighting began.
Forward, along both banks of the Volga
In order to break through to the city center and capture the Volzhsky highway bridge, the advancing German units needed to break the resistance of the 5th rifle division with attached units of cadets, a fighter battalion and militia. In the Volga region, the 900th motorized training brigade of the Wehrmacht stood at the northwestern borders of the city, with plans to capture an important intersection of highways and railways (Humpback Bridge). Her opponents were soldiers of the 256th Infantry Division.
Machine gunner 1st tank division Wehrmacht on Krasnoarmeyskaya Street (now Novotorzhskaya). Sovetskaya Square is ahead. On the buildings we can see anti-aircraft camouflage in the form of large, uneven spots. By the time of filming, the Volzhsky Bridge had already been captured by the Germans.
Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center
The battles for the city, which flared up with new strength early in the morning of October 14, are described in sufficient detail by the German historian, former Wehrmacht officer Werner Haupt:
“The order from the commander of the 41st Tank Corps to the commander of the 1st Tank Division from the command post in Danilovsky reads: “Seize the city of Kalinin and the highway bridge across the Volga two kilometers beyond it!” While its combat group “B” (reinforced 1st Motorized Regiment), covering the left flank of the division and supply routes from the north, was still repelling fierce enemy attacks on the bridgehead at Staritsa, the main forces of the division prepared for the assault on Kalinin.”
The commander of the 113th Motorized Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Wend von Withersheim, in an armored personnel carrier with the regimental headquarters, followed by advanced units, placed his units on both sides of the Staritskoye Highway, mainly to the north of the road.
1st Company, 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment, supported by the 1st Artillery Battalion, 73rd artillery regiment(commander - Major Born), at 2:00 approached Kalinin and prepared at the Migalovo airfield captured the day before for an attack along the Staritsky highway. It was supported by the tanks of the “Herschel detachment” (six Pz.Kpfw.III under the command of Oberleutnant Pöhl, four Pz.Kpfw.IV and several Pz.Kpfw.II under the command of Oberleutnant Duntsch).
The 1st Battalion of the 113th Motorized Regiment with the attached 3rd Company of the 1st Tank Regiment (six Pz.Kpfw.III and two Pz.Kpfw.IV under the command of Captain Count von der Schulenburg) advanced along the northern streets stretched parallel to the highway .
An abandoned tram car is one of the most common scenes German photos made on the streets of Kalinin
The 1st Motorcycle Battalion (commanded by Major F. von Wolf) began the attack at 5:00. The 1st company of the battalion was ahead, followed by a shock sapper detachment, two anti-tank guns and one light infantry gun, followed by the 5th company of the motorcycle battalion, then the battalion control (commander - Adjutant Oberleutnant F. von Friedag) with the rest of the forces battalion
At first, the attack by the motorcycle battalion was unsuccessful. Driving quickly along the Staritskoye Highway was hindered by heavy fire from the defending Soviet units. The 1st company of motorcyclists deployed in a dead zone south of the road to Staritsa, after which they continued to slowly advance. Under the dead zone of the railway embankment, Major von Wolf turned the battalion to the south, gradually moving towards the Lotoshino - Kalinin road (Volokolamsk highway) under the cover of fire from tank guns of the 2nd battalion of the 1st tank regiment, as well as guns of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 73rd artillery regiment. Here the Germans were opposed by the Soviet 336th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division, which occupied the defense along the Nikulino-Lebedevo line.
"Extremely fierce enemy resistance"
At the same time, the 3rd company of the 113th motorized infantry regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Katsman, attacked the positions of Soviet troops on the Staritsky highway. During the battle for the overpass near railway three Pz.Kpfw.III tanks came close to the highway, but 80 meters from the overpass they were all hit by Soviet anti-tank guns. The platoon commander of the 3rd company of the 1st tank regiment, Lieutenant Otto, was wounded, his gunner was killed, and all other crew members were also wounded. The armored paratroopers also suffered losses; many, including Lieutenant Katzman, were wounded. The company, whose command was taken over by Chief Lieutenant G. Faig, was forced to curb its ardor and suspend the offensive.
Kalinin area, bounded by two bridges across the Volga (on the left - railway, on the right - highway): 1 - Staritskoye Highway, 2 - overpass, 3 - Kalinin Avenue, 4 - "Proletarka" factory ("factory quarter"; south of it, on the opposite bank Tmaki River - a complex of brick industrial and residential buildings "Proletarka Yard"), 5 - Sofia Perovskaya Street.
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In general, the Soviet soldiers and commanders of the 5th Infantry Division offered powerful and well-organized resistance to the obviously stronger enemy. The experience of previous battles, in which a significant part of the formation’s personnel participated, had an impact.
Moreover, at 6:30, the forces of the 142nd and 190th regiments (the latter, after unloading at the station the day before, concentrated on Kalinin Avenue in the area of the 12th school and from there was sent to the western outskirts of the city) launched a counterattack in order to return previously lost positions, primarily the railway bridge. The combat log of the 1st Panzer Division noted that “Russian counterattacks in the direction of the railway bridge were repulsed”.
Then the Germans went on the attack again. After the advanced units of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment reached the northeast of the railway embankment, and the 1st Battalion of the 113th Regiment was able to advance further into the northwestern part of the city, the offensive of the main forces of the division began deep into Kalinin .
The flamethrower tanks of the 101st flamethrower tank battalion provided significant support to the German motorized infantry during street battles. Several Flammpanzer II tanks, together with half a platoon of Lieutenant Remler (three Pz.Kpfw.IV of the 4th company of the 1st tank regiment) operated in the sector of the 1st battalion of the 113th regiment of Major Eckinger. The remaining Flamingos supported a half-platoon of Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks by Lieutenant Koch and Chief Feldwebel Fölter from the 8th Company of the 1st Tank Regiment in the sector of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Regiment.
A typical industrial building from the end of the 19th century for the Proletarka Courtyard. Some of them were turned into defense centers by the city's defenders.
By 9:00, the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Regiment, under the command of Oberleutnant Becker, had broken, according to Haupt, "extremely fierce enemy resistance". After other companies joined it, heavy street fighting began with “The bravely fought defenders of Kalinin, who firmly held numerous defense centers in the city. They were forced to retreat only after their strong points were set on fire by flamethrower tanks or from flamethrowers that were in the units of the 37th Engineer Battalion. It took a lot of time".
Entries in the combat log of the Soviet 30th Army somewhat shift events in time, but on the whole they are quite consistent harsh realities battles:
“At 10:30 the enemy launched an attack with the forces of the 1st tank and 36th motorized divisions, inflicting main blow along the Volga River. Units of the army, offering resistance on the occupied lines, repelled enemy attacks. The enemy, having transported up to a battalion of infantry to the northern bank of the Volga River, advanced along the Volga and, having broken through the defenses in the sector of the 5th Infantry Division, by 12:30 burst into the city, occupying Kalininsky Avenue.".
The involvement of units of the 36th Motorized Division in the offensive (albeit somewhat later than the time indicated by Soviet sources) is also confirmed by German documents. The combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group shows that by 12:10 Berlin time the division had reached the railway south of Kalinin, having as one of its main tasks the support of the 1st Panzer Division.
Flamethrower tank PzKpfw.II (F) "Flamingo" - quite possibly belonging to the 101st Flamethrower Tank Battalion
Meanwhile, the tanks of the 2nd battalion of the 1st tank regiment under the command of chief lieutenants Pöhl and Duntsch and the motorized infantry of the 1st battalion of the 1st motorized regiment slowly advanced along Kalinin Avenue towards the city center. Werner Haupt describes this episode as follows:
“Because of the riflemen sitting everywhere on the roofs, the 1st Battalion was forced to clear every house in the vast factory district in all the streets, and progressed very slowly. With great difficulty they had to take the remaining streets and fight fiercely for every inch of land. The Soviet authorities, meanwhile, rounded up the factory workers of Kalinin, armed them and threw them into a street battle in civilian clothes. The attack threatened to fizzle out".
In this case, it is interesting to recall the report of a member of the military council of the 30th Army, Brigade Commissar V.N. Abramov, about work detachments that allegedly “after the first shot from the enemy, they fled in panic”. The Germans, apparently, did not think so. Veterans of numerous campaigns in the early period of World War II, soldiers and officers of the 1st Tank Division not only noticed resistance from yesterday's inhabitants, but considered it a real threat.
Soldiers of the people's militia detachment of the Kalinin spinning and weaving factory named after Vagzhanov, autumn 1941
One can only imagine what psychological effect, in addition to the purely military one, the impact of flamethrower tanks had on workers poorly trained in military affairs, but even in these conditions they continued to fight. The combat log of the 1st Armored Division contains the following entry for October 14:
“Brutal street fighting with hastily formed enemy units, in which even workers and women participated, forced the attackers to slowly recapture territory.”
Meanwhile, in the Volga region, advancing German units were pushing back units of the 934th Infantry Regiment of the 256th Infantry Division. According to the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group, by 11:00 “The training brigade captured the Doroshikha station 5 km west of Kalinin”. Then the Gorbaty Bridge came under German control.
Kalinin Trans-Volga region, northern part of the city: 1 - Doroshikha station, 2 - Gorbaty Bridge, 3 - carriage building plant, 4 - Pervomaiskaya embankment, 5 - bridge over the Tvertsa.
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It is interesting that the command staff of the regiments of the 256th division opposing the Germans on the northern bank of the Volga was skeptical about their own skills in organizing and conducting street fighting. Thus, N.B. Ivushkin, party organizer of the 937th Infantry Regiment, transferred to northern part Kalinin from the city garden, later recalled:
“None of our commanders had experience in street fighting. I had to learn on the fly how to operate in the city, master tactics that required quick decisions. People were moved from streets under enemy fire to alleys. They used windows and attics of houses for firing points. They moved forward, pressing against the walls. About 30 minutes later we reached Pervomaiskaya embankment. A counter battle ensued, as a result of which the Nazis were driven back. From somewhere in the courtyards, our fighters rolled barrels into the street, dragged logs, removed gates, and broke fences. Soon the street was blocked with barricades.”
On the southern bank of the Volga in the middle of the day, the 1st battalion of the 113th regiment in armored personnel carriers gradually pushed through the defenses of Soviet units in the factory districts. While fighting a heavy battle, the motorized infantrymen of the 3rd company saw the Volga and the openwork spans of the Volzhsky Bridge to their left.
Above: Gorbaty Bridge (early 20th century photograph), below: Volzhsky Bridge (German photograph)
It is interesting that the 3rd company itself was temporarily isolated, since the main forces of the 1st Tank Division were advancing somewhat to the south, across Sofia Perovskaya Street. According to Haupt, the further course of the battle was as follows:
“When Major Dr. Eckinger with his armored personnel carrier and two tanks made his way to Feig’s company, he saw only Red Army soldiers and armed workers around him. Now the bridge, like a magnet, attracted his attacking shooters. They were joined by a flamethrower tank, which was accompanied by two Pz.Kpfw.III tanks. They suppressed machine gun points. But just when Oberleutnant Feig thought that the time had finally come to break through to the bridge, a canal suddenly appeared in front of him and his men. Opposite, on the eastern bank, there were Russian positions! A 250-meter bridge was visible behind them. But in front of him was a canal, behind which was the Kalinin stadium occupied by the enemy. To the right of the small church they scouted out the crossing of the canal. And everywhere - Russians, Russians and Russians again! Field and anti-tank artillery fired from the stadium near the Volga... Finally, the delivered mortars opened fire with smoke mines at enemy positions on the other side of the canal and in front of them. Oberleutnant Faig, under the cover of a smoke screen, launched an attack along the bridge over the canal. Turning to the right, he and 36 soldiers of his company managed to get ahead of the enemy guards, overcome the strong point system and break through the position along the canal bank.”
Sofia Perovskaya Street, along which German units advanced into the city center (German photo)
The Germans mistook the Tmaka River, which flows within the city and flows into the Volga from the south in its historical center, as a canal. The Red Army soldiers simply did not have time to destroy two small bridges across it, a tram and a horse-drawn one, as often happens.
According to Soviet data, the capture of bridges looked somewhat different. The fact is that units of the 1st Tank Division broke through, in fact, almost to the headquarters of the 30th Army, which was located on the first floor of the building of the regional NKVD (in our days - the building of the Tver Medical University). It was to him that the fighters of the destruction battalion retreated. NKVD officer N.A. Shushakov, a participant in the battle, described the battle for the capture of the bridges as follows:
“In connection with the threat of a German breakthrough to the city center from the Proletarka side, the headquarters security company on the morning of October 14 took up defense along the Tmaka River, near the city garden and near the regional executive committee building... At 15:00 they were joined by a group of fighters from the NKVD destroyer battalion under the command of Major G. A. Mitkova. These were mainly management officers who had taken part in the battle at Migalov the day before. At about 17:00, people appeared from the direction of Sofya Perovskaya Street. German tanks. The infantry followed the tanks. When the tanks approached the bridge over the Tmaka, a cannon struck from Sovetskaya Street. The leading tank stopped in front of the bridge and fired back. The brave “forty-five” was blown apart along with its crew.”
Area of the Volzhsky Highway Bridge: 1 - four-story residential building on Sofia Perovskaya Street from the previous photo, 2 - school building No. 6, 3 - St. Nicholas Church in Kapustniki, 4 - Dynamo stadium, 5 - UNKVD building, 6 - regional executive committee building (Putevoy palace) and the city garden around it, 7 - Volzhsky Bridge, 8 - one of the “factory blocks” through which the company of Chief Lieutenant Faig was breaking through to the bridge.
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According to the recollections of state security sergeant G.K. Rassadov, who fought as part of the destroyer battalion, even after the Germans broke through the positions on the banks of the Tmaka, the battle did not fade away:
“Besides rifles and carbines, we had nothing to meet the tanks with. At this time, machine gunners appeared from behind a damaged tank. Under the cover of machine-gun fire, they jumped into school building No. 6 and began hitting us from the windows of the second floor. Conducting targeted fire from behind the bars of the city garden and the NKVD building, we blocked this group. Then the Germans placed a machine gun on the bell tower, which rose behind the stadium, and our positions were in the fire zone.”
The Church of St. Nicholas in Kapustniki, an architectural monument of the mid-18th century, was indeed the dominant feature of the area near the bridge at that time. Having occupied it, the Germans had a clear view of all the movements of the defending Soviet units. Perhaps later they observed the retreat of the 30th Army headquarters along Sovetskaya Street, covered by a guard company.
View of the bridge from the side south coast Volga. On the left are the boardwalk walls of the Dynamo stadium, on the right is the city garden
Haupt spoke about the continuation of the battle for the Volga Bridge, quoting the diary of Chief Lieutenant Faig:
“When the smoke cleared again, we reached the plank walls of the stadium, and the Russians completely disappeared from sight. And now- Fast forward, to the big bridge, it’s almost a stone’s throw away! The Russians who had previously dug in at the stadium had already retreated... Having completely exhausted themselves, everyone lay down on the bridge. The cable was broken. “Quickly, to the other side! Get up, let's go ahead!” For us it was a race with death. 250 meters of bridge was a long journey! On the northern bank we could see a gun, a machine-gun pillbox and positions. Lively fire hit us, but it was impossible to stop any longer.”
The compilers of the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group made a much more concise entry into the document: “The highway bridge in Kalinin, after a heavy battle, was captured at 16:30, the planted explosive device was removed.”
Treasured Bridge
The Germans once again got a very important highway bridge intact in the 1941 campaign. Of course, the Soviet sappers who mined it and did not have time to destroy it can be understood. Units of the Red Army actively moved along the bridge; it provided transport connectivity for the city’s defense (for example, on the afternoon of October 14, soldiers of the 937th Infantry Regiment, who had come from the city garden, crossed the Volga, setting off to defend the northern part of the city), and a premature explosion could significantly weaken the positions of the defenders troops. On the other hand, the capture of the bridge by the Germans was a real disaster for the entire Soviet defense system.
Pz.Kpfw.III tanks and motorized infantry of the 1st Wehrmacht Panzer Division slowly advance along Sovetskaya Street
According to N.B. Ivushkin, “The Germans threw several tanks with a landing of machine gunners across the Volzhsky Bridge onto the Pervomaiskaya embankment. They walked towards their units, moving from the direction of the carriage factory.". Thus, the 937th Regiment could simply be surrounded with vague prospects for a maneuverable battle against obviously more mobile enemy units. In these difficult conditions, the Soviet units were forced to retreat to the Tvertsa River, which flowed into the Volga from the north, trying to hold positions on its banks.
The combat log of the 30th Army almost verbatim confirms the words of the political worker:
“On the northern bank, the German offensive was held back by stubborn resistance from units of the 256th Infantry Division, but when the enemy reached the highway bridge across the Volga, it gave him the opportunity to throw several tanks and machine gunners into the rear of our troops operating on the northern bank. As a result, our units began to retreat to the Tveretsky Bridge, where by 18:00 they took up defensive positions.”
Ivushkin outlined the location of the units and subunits even somewhat more specifically: the 3rd battalion was entrenched on the right bank of the Tvertsa, the 2nd battalion - on the left, along Zatveretskaya embankment. The 934th Infantry Regiment of the division retreated to the Nikolo-Malitsa line and further north, having the task, together with the approaching 16th NKVD Border Regiment, to prevent the enemy from breaking through along the Leningradskoye Highway to Torzhok.
In turn, units of the 5th Infantry Division retreated from the city blocks engulfed in fire to the then south-eastern outskirts of Kalinin. The units, exhausted by heavy fighting, having depleted their already far from unlimited ammunition, moved towards the Moscow Highway. The fighters of the destroyer battalion and the militia retreated with them.
In description battle path The 5th Infantry Division, created much later than the events that took place, mentioned the retreat from the city quite succinctly: “On the night of October 15, 1941, under the pressure of superior enemy infantry and tanks, strong impact aviation, the division retreated to the eastern outskirts of Kalinin". Division Commissioner P.V. Sevastyanov noted:
“On the outskirts of Kalinin, near the famous elevator with its reinforced concrete walls and convenient loopholes, we got hooked. Leave him- meant giving the Moscow Highway to the Germans. The regiments entrenched themselves here with the intention of holding out to the last and began to build defenses, especially- anti-tank".
Only by this time to the rescue rifle regiments The 27th Artillery Regiment finally arrived. The support of his guns was very useful in subsequent battles for the city.
The capture of Kalinin was not an easy walk for the Germans. Having toppled the monument to Lenin from its pedestal on the square of the same name, the invaders erected a hastily made swastika in its place. On the square itself, a cemetery was laid out for the fallen soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht. It is believed that the most distinguished of them were buried here. The Germans’ desire to decorate their burials is surprising: palm trees placed in tubs directly in the snow probably died immediately. However, the cemetery of the occupiers will not last much longer
Air activity on both sides was quite high during the day. Entries in the combat log of the Soviet 6th Air Defense Fighter Corps about the actions of the German Air Force report that “the enemy is actively conducting reconnaissance in the front-line zone, simultaneously bombing suitable reserves, concentrations of our ground troops, and loading and unloading sites.”. Soviet air units also did not remain in debt. The documents of the 3rd Panzer Group eloquently testify: “strong enemy air raids lead to significant losses”.
The result of the difficult battles for both sides on October 14 was the establishment of control by the Germans over most of Kalinin. The Wehrmacht captured an important bridgehead and transport hub, which for many subsequent days ensured the predictability of the intentions of the Soviet command in the Kalinin direction. The city needed to be recaptured, but in the meantime two months of occupation awaited it...
Sources and literature:
- NARA. T 313. R 231.
- NARA. T 315. R 26.
- Ivushkin N. B. Your place is ahead. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1986.
- On the right flank of the Moscow Battle - Tver: Moscow Worker, 1991.
- The hidden truth of war: 1941. Unknown documents. - M.: Russian book, 1992.
- Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. - M.: Yauza-Eksmo, 2006.
- https://pamyat-naroda.ru.
- http://warfly.ru.
Soviet flamethrower tank OT-26. Combat weight - 9 tons. Crew - 2 people. Armament: one flamethrower, one 7.62 mm machine gun. Armor thickness: forehead, hull side and turret - 15 mm. Engine - T-26, 90 l. With. Speed on the highway is 30 km/h. Cruising range on the highway is 150 km.
We can say that the flamethrower is almost the same age as the tank: it began to be used in battles only a year before tanks received baptism of fire. Note: first used by the Germans in mass quantity On July 30, 1915, against the British, they achieved perhaps a greater moral effect than the “battleships.” The fact is that the flamethrower turned out to be very useful in trench warfare when destroying bunkers, shelters, etc. And since it was not a bulky weapon, then, as one would expect, it was later installed on tanks. But this happened, however, not so soon - in 1933. Then in our country, on the basis of the T-26 tank, the OT-26 flamethrower tank was built.
In battle, such vehicles, or wedges, as they were called (CV3/33), were first used by the Italians in 1936 during the war of conquest against Ethiopia.
Widely used flamethrower tanks(we will abbreviate them as OT) and in the Second World War. In addition to the Red Army, similar vehicles were in service with the American, British, German and Italian armies.
The flamethrower can be the main or auxiliary weapon of a tank. In the first case, all the equipment (and this is a fire hose, tanks with a fire mixture, compressed air cylinders, a mixture ignition system, etc.) is installed in the vehicle instead of a gun, or it is replaced with an artillery system of a smaller caliber. In addition, the ammunition load is also reduced. A flamethrower mounted in the tank's turret can fire in a circular manner. This was our OT-26, which had one turret removed to accommodate the fire mixture tank. Let us remember that in 1931 our T-26, the German T-III flamethrower and the Italian CV3/33 and CV3/35 had two turrets. But they turned out to be ineffective in battle: after all, the flamethrower is a melee weapon (its range is several tens of meters), and therefore it is powerless against tanks and anti-tank artillery. Such vehicles required the support of linear (conventional) tanks. In the second case, the combat vehicles that had the main weapons were used in the same conditions as the linear ones. But then the flamethrower, which was forced to be installed not in the turret, but in the front plate or on the roof of the hull, did not have the ability to conduct all-round fire. And the supply of fire mixture was small. The British and Italians tried to correct the situation by placing the tank with the mixture in a special armored trailer. This is how the Churchill Crocodile tank was born (1942). Of course, the design had a benefit: the fire hazard of the tank was reduced. But the plus also gave rise to many minuses: the maneuverability and maneuverability of the vehicle decreased, and the flamethrower system became more complicated.
In the 30s, in addition to the OT-26, we built the OT-130 flamethrower tank based on the single-turret T-26. Instead of a cannon, a flamethrower was installed on it. Both vehicles retained a coaxial machine gun and also had equipment for creating smoke screens. The OT-26 and OT-130 were equipped with pneumatic flamethrowers, since the flammable liquid was pushed through a fire hose by compressed air under a pressure of 25 (for OT-26) or 35 (for OT-130) atmospheres. The liquid ejection range reached 50 m, the amount of fire mixture (fuel oil + kerosene) was 360 liters, which was quickly consumed in 40 one-second shots (OT-130).
Flamethrower tanks based on the T-26 worked well in the battles on Lake Khasan (1938). and a year later on the Khalkhin Gol River. During the war on the Karelian Isthmus of 1939-1940, several battalions and individual OT companies took part in operations. In 1941, our designers created the ATO-41 automatic powder flamethrower. It used powder charges cartridge for a 45 mm cannon. When the charge was detonated, the powder gases pressed on the piston, which pushed the fire mixture out of the cylinder. Throwing a “flammable liquid” could be carried out in single shots or in bursts of 4-5 shots due to the presence of a mechanism for automatically recharging the mixture using compressed air. In 1942, an improved model of the ATO-42 flamethrower with a doubled rate of fire entered service. The range of shots of both flamethrowers with a standard mixture is 60-70, and with a viscous mixture - up to 100 m. No army in the world had such flamethrowers. ATO-41 was installed instead of a frontal machine gun in the T-34 (designated T-034), and ATO-42 in the T-34-85 (vehicle T-034-75).
In 1942, we also produced the KV-8 flamethrower heavy tank with an ATO-41 in the turret, but by installing a 45-mm cannon instead of a 76-mm one. The supply of fire mixture was 100 liters for the T-034, 200 liters for the T-034-85, and 570 liters for the KV-8. These vehicles were used in the Red Army as part of flamethrower tank battalions until the end of the war. When advancing, they followed the line tanks, and when approaching the target for attack (fortifications, houses, etc.) they moved forward.
In the UK, in addition to the already mentioned "Churchill Crocodile", (based on the "Churchill VII") a flamethrower armored personnel carrier "Wasp" also appeared. Both cars were supplied to the USSR in small quantities. They were equipped with pneumatic flamethrowers (powered by compressed nitrogen). The throwing range of the viscous mixture is 135-150 m. The reserve of the Crocodile fire mixture is 1800 liters, which could be thrown out in 60 shots. If necessary, the Churchill armored trailer was separated by detonating the charge in the release mechanism. "Crocodile" was in service English army after the war and took part in the imperialist war against the Korean people.
American pneumatic flamethrowers (while retaining the main armament) were installed on M3A1, M5A1, M4A2 tanks and on LVT(A)1 and LVT(A)2 amphibious vehicles. The viscous mixture was thrown at a distance of 90 m. After the war in American army The M67 tank, created on the basis of the M48 medium tank, arrived. The flamethrower, instead of a cannon, was installed in the vehicle's turret. The range of action of the weapon was 190, and even 270 m with a special fire mixture.
The Germans first used flamethrower tanks in June 1941 on the Soviet front. These machines, created on the basis of a lightweight T-II tank modifications D and E, had small turrets with a machine gun. Two flamethrower nozzles were installed on the front corners of the hull. The supply of flammable mixture (coal tar) was 320 liters, the throwing range was 40 m. Due to weak armor, these vehicles suffered heavy losses and were soon withdrawn from service.
In 1943, factories produced 100 OT based on a medium tank T-III modifications M. This vehicle has a flamethrower installed in the turret instead of a 50 mm cannon. The supply of the mixture was 1000 liters. The vehicle retained two machine guns and received six mortars for firing smoke cartridges.
The Italians produced two types of flamethrower vehicles based on the CV3/33 and CV3/35 wedges, which were used in battles in North Africa in 1940-1941 and on the Soviet-German front in 1942. A pneumatic flamethrower was installed on them instead of a machine gun. The tanks were placed either on the vehicle itself or in a wheeled trailer. Throwing range up to 60 m.
As we can see, the flamethrower began to be used as a tank weapon. After the war, this idea was further developed.
Rice. 64. Italian flamethrower wedge. Combat weight - 3.3 tons. Crew - 2 people. Armament: one flamethrower. Armor thickness: hull forehead - 13 mm, side - 8 mm. Engine - "Fiat", 40 l. With. Speed on the highway is 42 km/h. Cruising range on the highway is 150 km.
Rice. 65. English heavy flamethrower tank "Churchill Crocodile" ("Churchill VII"). Combat weight - 45 tons. Crew - 5 people. Armament: one 70 mm cannon, two 7.92 mm machine guns, one 7.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun, one flamethrower. Armor thickness: hull front - 152 mm, side - 95 mm, turret - 152 mm. Engine - "Bedford", 350 hp. With. Speed on the highway - 20 km/h. Cruising range on the highway - 200 km.
FIRST SOVIET FLAMETHROWER TANKSA “Flamethrower Tank” or “Chemical Tank” is a combat vehicle armed with a flamethrower.
Of course, this special type of weapon is not comparable in scale of production and combat use with linear vehicles. However, precisely because of the specific purpose of the device and application, it is interesting to consider this weapon as an independent type of armored vehicle.
Views on the nature of offensive operations, prevailing in the 20s, required a high rate of advance into the very core of the enemy’s defense, therefore, in the early 30s, Soviet military theorists put forward the idea of the need to create armored vehicles armed with powerful chemical weapons. This marked the beginning of the development of flamethrower tanks.
The main purpose of flamethrower tanks is to support infantry and storm fortified enemy positions. These tanks can be used to organize infection, establish a smoke screen or decontaminate the area. These tanks are also used for flamethrowing against enemy personnel and firing points.
Like linear tanks, flamethrower tanks were equipped with smoke bombs to set up screens. Essentially, these were linear tanks with additional flamethrower weapons.
Preparing for a future war with widespread use chemical weapons, The USSR made its first attempts to create chemical tanks. OT-1 is the first flamethrower tank based on the serial MS-1 tank (not mass-produced). Projects for flamethrower tanks were also developed in Germany and the USA, but they were never implemented at that time.
The first use of chemical tanks took place in the mid-1930s. Italy used its flamethrower wedges in 1936-1938. Soviet troops used their flamethrower tanks in 1938.
XT-27
The first real embodiment of the USSR chemical tank was the HT-27 (OT-27) tankette, which was put into service in 1932.
Chemical tanks were built on the basis of amphibious tanks, such as the T-37 (chemical modification of the HT-38 or BKhM-4), T-38 (chemical modification of the HT-38), as well as high-speed wheeled and tracked tanks of the BT series. The design of such tanks was created on the basis of the T-29.
In 1938, the Leningrad-Kirov plant developed a design for a tank for mechanized brigades of the RRKA, equipped with a 76-mm cannon, a heavy machine gun, and flamethrower equipment was also planned. But this idea remained at the project stage.
In the 40s, the USSR had significant amount chemical tanks, but in most cases these were outdated vehicles, mainly equipment based on the T-26, etc. At that time, work was already underway on a flamethrower tank based on the A-32, which became the prototype of the T-34, and by the beginning of 1942, serial production of the OT-34, the most popular chemical tank of World War II, was launched.
The tank was put into service in 1942 and entered service with separate flamethrower tank battalions (each with 10 KV-8 tanks and 11 OT-34 tanks) and separate flamethrower tank brigades of the RVGK (59 tanks in each brigade). OT-34 was created on the basis of the T-34 linear tank produced in 1942 with the installation of an ATO-41 or ATO-42 piston flamethrower in the front hull instead of a frontal machine gun. The flamethrowing range with a standard mixture was 60-70 meters, when using a special mixture - 90-100 m.
The rate of fire from the flamethrower was 3 shots per 10 seconds. During an offensive battle, flamethrower tanks usually moved in a line with infantry direct support tanks. When it was necessary to fire flames, they moved forward and, using flamethrowers, suppressed enemy firing points in embrasures, burned out infantry in trenches, and destroyed armored vehicles. A total of 1,170 OT-34 tanks were produced; they were replaced in production by the OT-34-85 tank.
The large-scale use of flamethrower tanks in combat during the Soviet-Finnish War made it possible to identify both positive and negative sides this type of weapon. Along with the high effectiveness of flamethrower weapons against enemy personnel in trenches and bunkers, the main drawback was noted - weak armor. Given the short flamethrowing range, the tanks were forced to approach the target at extremely short distances, which led to large losses. In addition, flamethrower tanks were very different in appearance from linear vehicles, which allowed the enemy to identify them in advance and focus anti-tank fire on them.
To increase the flamethrowing range, a special combustible mixture of high viscosity was developed, and instead of pneumatic flamethrowers, powder (high-explosive) flamethrowers were designed. Powder charges of a cartridge for a 45 mm cannon were used. The powder gases pressed on the piston, which pushed the fire mixture out of the cylinder, which was ignited at the outlet by a gasoline torch, ignited by an electric spark plug (from a tank battery). Reloading the flamethrower and supplying the next cartridge was carried out automatically by the hydraulic pressure of the fire mixture. After comparative tests of several models in May 1941, a powder flamethrower designed by plant No. 174 was adopted for service under the designation ATO-41. The flamethrowing range reached 90 - 100 m (with a special mixture), the rate of fire was 18 rpm, the capacity of the fire mixture per shot was 10 liters. Serial production of ATO-41 was organized at the Lyubertsy Agricultural Machinery Plant named after. Ukhtomsky. With the adoption of the T-34 medium tank, the development of its flamethrower modification began, which was developed at the end of 1940 in the design bureau of plant No. 183 together with the design bureau of plant No. 174. The prototype was manufactured in December 1940 at plant No. 183, and in February 1941 it was successfully tested.
One of the first two experimental A-34s (No. 311-18-3, which differed from the production vehicles) was used as a testing base; the installation on it was of a “temporary nature” and the flamethrower was designated OP-34.The OP-34 flamethrower consisted of the following parts:
The tank was put into service, and serial production was planned in June. But the outbreak of war prevented these plans. There was no time to release new models, so in 1941 the production of OT-34 never began. The initial period of the war confirmed the need for flamethrower tanks in the troops. In connection with this, in the spring of 1942, first at plant No. 183, and then No. 112, production of flamethrower modifications of the T-34 tank began. The vehicle differed from the T-34 linear tank by installing an ATO-41 powder flamethrower as an additional weapon, instead of a front-facing machine gun. The flamethrower attachment was completely covered by a movable armored mask. Firing was carried out in single shots or bursts of 3-4 shots at a rate of three shots per 10 s. The flamethrowing range with a standard mixture of fuel oil and kerosene was 60-65 m, the tank capacity (100 l) was enough to fire ten shots. The tank with the fire mixture was mounted in the tank body to the right of the driver’s mechanic.
- four air cylinders with a capacity of 13 liters and a pressure of 150 atmospheres;
- pressure reducing valve for transferring air from cylinders to the device with a decrease in pressure;
- a control cylinder for opening the ball valve, which is located in the mixture tank installed on the floor of the tank on the right;
- mixture tank with a capacity of 100 l. in addition, another 100 liters were in the left side fuel tank;
- fire hose with a nozzle at the end;
- a gasoline tank with a capacity of 0.8 liters, installed on a fire nozzle with a pump to create pressure;
- gasoline injectors for supplying gasoline to the fire nozzle;
- an electric switch for igniting gasoline at the fire nozzle;
- air and liquid pipelines with ball valve;
- foot pedal.
In connection with the installation of flamethrower equipment, the gunner-radio operator was excluded from the crew of the vehicle, and his functions were transferred to the tank commander. The fire from the flamethrower was fired from his place by the driver, so horizontal guidance was carried out mainly by turning the tank (the flamethrower monitor allowed only small aiming angles both horizontally and vertically). The main armament of the T-34 tank was retained, the cannon's ammunition remained the same as that of the linear tanks, only the machine gun's ammunition was reduced. Since the right side of the control compartment turned out to be completely occupied by flamethrower equipment, the radio station on the radio machines had to be moved to the tower, and accordingly the antenna input moved from the starboard side to the rear wall of the tower. Perhaps this was the only thing external difference flamethrower tanks OT-34 from linear ones. With the introduction of the T-34 modification of 1942 into production, the flamethrower tank began to be built on its basis. At the end of 1942, a modernized version of the ATO-41 automatic tank flamethrower was adopted for service under the designation ATO-42. It differed mainly in the design of individual parts and assemblies. The flamethrowing range with a standard mixture has increased to 70 m (with a viscous special mixture - up to 130 m) and the rate of fire of the flamethrower has increased to 24 - 30 rounds per minute. ATO-42 was produced until the end of the war and from 1943 was installed on flamethrower tanks. Almost all variants and modifications of the T-34 tanks had their own flamethrower twins.
In 1942, 309 OT-34 flamethrower tanks were produced, in 1943 - 478, in 1944 - 383, a total of 1,170 of them were produced. An important feature of the OT-34 and OT-34-85 was their almost complete similarity with linear vehicles while maintaining their combat properties (the presence of full-fledged cannon armament and communications equipment). Essentially, these were linear tanks with additional flamethrower weapons. Organizationally, flamethrower tanks were consolidated into separate flamethrower battalions and brigades. IN field conditions a tank flamethrower was often a weapon more psychological than lethal. The fact is, as noted in the reports, that enemy infantry, as a rule, “... when a tank approaches, they run away to distances that do not allow the use of flamethrowers.” At the same time:"The effectiveness of the application is good. When flamethrowing, the enemy runs out of the bunkers, abandoning everything. The flamethrower is an excellent means of fighting counterattacking infantry. Although when flamethrowing... the mixture does not reach the enemy, but the enemy runs in panic... Practice has shown that in night conditions the use of flamethrowers has a stunning effect on the enemy".
Tanks armed with flamethrowers acquired particular value during battles in populated areas and wooded area, where the combat distances were minimal.
At the same time, flamethrower vehicles based on the T-34 tank had a significant disadvantage inherent only to them, due to the location of the flamethrower. According to the same reports, “... flamethrowers on OT-34 tanks, as a rule, are not used, since control of the tank and flamethrower is concentrated on the driver, and on the battlefield all his attention is concentrated on the combat course of the tank and it is difficult for him to break away from the control levers without compromising the performance of the combat mission." However, flamethrower tanks were dangerous not only for the enemy, but also for their own crew - our tank crews had practically no chance of surviving when this tank was hit by an enemy armor-piercing incendiary shell - the tank flared up like a match, “thanks” to its own fire mixture.Based on the results of the first battles, the head of the combat training department of the GABTU KA, Major General Krivoshein, compiled a “Brief report on the use of TO-34 flamethrower tanks for the period February - July 1942”:
"TO-34 flamethrower tanks were used on the Southwestern Front in the Barvenkovo area in February 1942 as part of the 121st tank brigade, and 2 battalions of 18 tanks each on the Volkhov Front in the areas of Kirishi, Gruzino Park, Dymno in July 1942 in cooperation with 185 and 29 tank brigades. Limited experience with flamethrower tanks has shown:
1. When operating against enemy personnel, both open and in cracks, dugouts, houses, a flamethrower gives a great moral effect and inflicts great material damage to the enemy. The action of the flamethrower caused panic in the ranks of the enemy, who threw down their weapons and fled from the battlefield, shot by machine guns from tanks. When the burning mixture hit people, they were burned, dugouts and buildings caught fire and forced the enemy’s manpower to leave them and come under machine-gun and artillery fire from tanks. There were no examples of flamethrower tanks operating against enemy tanks, and in this regard their action in combat has not been tested. Taking into account the combat effect on other targets, it must be assumed that a fire jet hitting enemy tanks will cause a fire.
2. The action of flamethrower tanks gives a good effect from a distance of 50-100 meters to the target of attack. Approaching this distance is not always and not possible everywhere. On the Volkhov Front, very often flamethrower tanks had to operate with a machine gun and cannon while they overcame anti-tank obstacles, minefields and water obstacles; in a number of cases, tanks did not reach their target because they were hit by anti-tank artillery, blown up by mines and stuck in swamps and anti-tank obstacles. The use of flamethrower tanks is possible only under the condition of thorough reconnaissance of the area and with mandatory interaction with artillery and linear tanks, ensuring the approach of flamethrower tanks to the targets of attack.
3. The lack of T-34 radio tanks among TO-34 company platoon commanders makes it difficult to control in battle.
4. Practice has shown that the placement of the ATO-41 flamethrower in the bow of the tank and, as a result, the limited horizontal sector (15 degrees) of flamethrowing reduces the combat qualities of the TO-34 flamethrower tank (flamethrowing from ambushes and when the tank is forced to stop on the battlefield). Preferably in On the flamethrower tank TO-34, install the flamethrower in the turret.
5. The flamethrower installed on the TO-34 and KV-8 vehicles has a number of design and operational shortcomings that reduce the combat qualities of the TO-34 and KV-8 flamethrower tanks. The main ones:
1). Leakage of fire mixture into the valve and cases of incomplete closing of the valve; 2). Unreliable exhaust system for powder gases, as a result of which the exhaust valve gets stuck and an unburnt cartridge is ejected from the chamber during air shots; 3). In the flamethrower installations of TO-34 tanks, the fire mixture leaks in the connection of the liquid pipeline, due to the rigid system, flows into the stuffing box seal of the ball joint and makes it difficult to tighten it.4). To master the ATO-41 flamethrower to perfection, a lot of time and money (cartridges, fire mixture) are required. 5). Large dimensions The ATO-41 flamethrower does not allow it to be paired with a 76-mm cannon in the tank turret without significant changes in the turret design.6). The complexity of manufacturing ATO-41 is too high.
Conclusion.1. The ATO-41 flamethrower mounted in the TO-34 and KV-8 tanks justifies itself as an additional weapon for tank troops.2. the presence of design and operational shortcomings of the ATO-41 flamethrower reduces the combat qualities of flamethrower tanks.
Offers.
1. Demand that the factories of the People's Commissariat of Tanks Industry produce flamethrower tanks in order to be able to use them widely.2. In order to improve the combat and operational qualities of flamethrower tanks, the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry is required to:
1). In the shortest possible time, eliminate the defects and shortcomings of the ATO-41 flamethrower in the valve, the powder gas exhaust system, as well as the shortcomings of flamethrower installations.2). Accelerate the development and testing of the T-34 flamethrower tank, in which compressed air (gas burned from 1-2 diesel cylinders of the tank) is used to eject the fire mixture. The design of such a flamethrower should be much simpler to manufacture, operate and master. 3. Organization of separate flamethrower tanks battalions have the following: one KV-8 company consisting of 5 vehicles and two companies of TO-34 tanks, with each company having 9 TO-34 tanks (3 platoons) and 4 radio tanks for platoon and company commanders. For the battalion command - 2 radio tanks T-34. In total, the battalion has 33 tanks, of which: 5 KV-8 tanks, 18 TO-34 tanks, 10 T-34 radio tanks."
Shortcomings in the design of the ATO-41 were also reported from training units that were preparing to be sent to the front:
“A. Cable control (ignition, magazine feed, sear recess) is unreliable, difficult to adjust and causes frequent operational failures.
B. During flamethrowing, there were cases of arbitrary automatic reloading with the ejection of burning cartridges into the inside of the tank and with the ignition of cartridges in the receiver (magazine), which led to the defeat of the crew and a fire in the tank.
B. The exhaust valve is malfunctioning.
D. There are cases of breakdown of the shutter extractors, leakage of fire mixture through the valve, misadjustment of the automation levers and failure of the lighter.
D. The installation of flamethrowers in tanks is carried out poorly, resulting in leakage of the fire mixture at the connection of the front cover with the ATO-41 cylinder, air leakage in the air valves of the air ducts, clogging of gas injectors, and leakage in the VKU ball joint."
Perhaps a flamethrower jet bursts directly from the cannon barrel, capable of hitting various targets in battle? No, this is a real artillery gun of 100 mm caliber, which is designed to perform its direct functions: destroying tanks, self-propelled artillery units and other armored targets of the enemy, suppressing his artillery, various fire weapons, and destroying manpower.
Structurally, the flamethrower is located in the tank turret in the place where a machine gun coaxial with a cannon is usually installed. And the flamethrower equipment is mounted in the tank hull - in fighting compartment and management departments. If we adhere to the exact terminology, then we should say that the TO-55 is equipped with an automatic tank-type powder piston flamethrower of multiple actions with pyrotechnic ignition of the jet. This flamethrower consists of a liquid part, a gas part with automation, a pyrotechnic ignition system and a safety system.
In turn, the liquid part of the flamethrower includes: a valve with a movable needle, a cylinder with a front cover and a supply pipe, a return pipe and a piston.
The basis of the gas part is the gas cavity of the cylinder, that is, the space located between the rear cover and the piston. All parts and assemblies that are mounted here are elements of automation. The pyrotechnic ignition system is designed to ignite a jet of fire mixture at the moment it leaves the flamethrower nozzle with a burning torch of an incendiary cartridge.
To activate the flamethrower, two release buttons are provided, one is located on the control panel, and the other is on the flywheel of the rotary mechanism, which greatly facilitates the actions of the crew when firing. Automatic firing from a flamethrower is ensured by several systems and mechanisms. The main ones are a chamber drum, equipped with powder cartridges, and a pyrotechnic ignition system drum, which houses incendiary cartridges. In the chambers and nests of these drums, twelve cartridges are installed, respectively, since the flamethrower consists of twelve flamethrower shots. The capacity of the fire mixture tank is 460 liters, and the fuel consumption per shot is 35 liters.
The powder consists of a steel casing into which an electric capsule sleeve is screwed. A charge of nitroglycerin powder weighing 460 g and a combined igniter is placed inside the cartridge case. The weight of the finally loaded cartridge reaches 1.34 kg. The incendiary cartridge is a sleeve in which a squib with an electric igniter and a pyrotechnic element are placed.
How does a flamethrower shot occur? When you press the release button, voltage is simultaneously applied to the timer and to the next incendiary squib. The latter ignites and throws a torch of flame in front of the nozzle. Thus, the pyrotechnic ignition system is brought into a state of readiness and is now only “waiting” for the supply of fire mixture.
After 0.1...0.2 s, the time relay supplies voltage to the electric capsule sleeve of the powder cartridge, which instantly fires. The pressure of the powder gases in the cylinder quickly increases, and when it reaches 15 kgf/cm2, the valve needle begins to move back and opens the hole connecting the liquid cavity of the cylinder with the valve nozzle.
The piston, under the influence of powder gases, sharply moves forward and pushes the fire mixture out of the cylinder through the nozzle. The pressure at which the bulk of the fire mixture is ejected at a speed of 100 m/s reaches 50...75 kgf/cm2. Flying through the torch of an incendiary cartridge, the jet ignites and flies to the target in this form.
At the end of the piston stroke, the valve system is activated: the nozzle is purged - the remaining fire mixture is removed from it, the piston, under the pressure of the fire mixture in the tank, returns to initial position, both drums rotate, feeding the next cartridges. The flamethrower is ready for a new shot.
Such a successful design of a flamethrower naturally determines its tactical and technical characteristics. Let's start with the most important thing - flamethrowing range. The tank commander and gunner often have to solve the problem: will the flamethrower or another target be “reached”? Of course, you need to think quickly, and your eye must be excellent. In any case, with such powerful jet parameters maximum range flame throwing is quite large and reaches 200 m.
The flamethrower fully lives up to its definition - “automatic”. The practical rate is seven rounds per minute. In other words, the entire flamethrower “ammunition”, all 460 liters, can be “shot” in less than two minutes.
The automatic flamethrower works quickly and accurately. Moreover, if there is a need to quickly create a zone of continuous fire in a given area, then the gunner does not have to press the trigger button every time. Automation allows, with the button constantly pressed, to conduct continuous shooting in the form of a burst of flamethrower shots until the fire mixture is completely used up. It is not difficult to imagine the powerful effect such a unique fire attack has on the enemy.
As you can see, the flamethrower installed on board the tank significantly complemented its combat qualities. However, let's not forget that a tank remains a tank in all cases; it is a formidable combat vehicle, with powerful weapons, reliable armor protection and high maneuverability. The longest sighting range of a 100 mm cannon when using a standard sight is 6900 m. But, if necessary, the tank can also be used for firing from indirect firing positions. Then it becomes like the classic artillery gun, shooting is carried out using a side level at a range of up to 14,600m. In the vast majority of cases, shooting is carried out at direct fire. Of course, it is the most effective, accurate and efficient: after all, the gunner sees the target right in front of him. Direct shot range armor-piercing projectile is 1000 m, and with a high-explosive fragmentation grenade - 1100 m. It is noteworthy that direct fire can be fired at night: with the help of an infrared sight, the gunner takes any target “at gunpoint” at a distance of up to 800 m.
The gun's rate of fire of up to seven rounds per minute is achieved by the fact that loading is carried out with unitary cartridges, in which the projectile and cartridge case are connected into one unit. The loader sends an artillery shot into the breech of the cannon in one motion. This is simple and convenient, despite the fact that the mass of the projectile is 15 kg, and the mass of the unitary cartridge as a whole is 30 kg.
High shooting accuracy is ensured not only by advanced sighting devices, but also by a weapon stabilization system. The gunner hits the target on the move with almost the same accuracy as from a standing position. The considered tank armament is complemented by a 7.62 mm PKT machine gun with 750 rounds of ammunition, a Kalashnikov, and 12 F-1 hand grenades.
The tank gun and the flamethrower paired with it rotate together with the turret in a circle. This is very important in modern combat, since the crew can hit any target that appears in front of the tank, from the side or even from behind, using various types of weapons: a cannon, a flamethrower or a machine gun. To quickly rotate the turret, motor drives are used, which, in addition, can smoothly aim the cannon and flamethrower at the target.
The low vulnerability of a tank in battle is ensured by many factors: speed and maneuverability characteristics, its dimensions, the shape of the hull and turret, armament, and finally, the degree of training of the crew. And yet, the most important thing is the reliability of the armor, which, in addition, protects the crew from the effects of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion, toxic and radioactive substances.
The flamethrower tank weighs 36 tons and, despite this, it has good maneuverability. He is able to move on a dirt road with average speed up to 27 km/h, and on the highway - 32...35 km/h. The maximum speed that can be achieved on the highway is 50 km/h. Power reserve is up to several hundred kilometers. The tank also has good cross-country ability. It can, for example, immediately overcome a ditch up to 2.7 m wide, “take” a vertical wall 0.8 m high, and force a ford of a water barrier if its depth does not exceed 1.4 m.
To overcome more serious water hazard The flamethrower tank is equipped with equipment for underwater driving OPVT, which ensures reliable tightness of the combat vehicle and normal air supply to the crew and engine. The width of the water barrier to be overcome is 700 m, and the depth reaches 5 m. The tank is significantly enhanced by an automatic anti-nuclear protection system and fire-fighting equipment, which also operates automatically. As a means of camouflage, the tank can use a smoke screen, for which a smoke exhaust system is provided, operating on the same diesel fuel, that and . The invisible length of the smoke screen can be in the range of 250...400 m, and its durability is from two to four minutes.
Thus, the successful combination of many tactical and technical characteristics makes the TO-55 flamethrower tank a truly formidable combat vehicle, capable of delivering fire strikes against various targets and taking part in various types of combat.
radio station antenna; 6 - guns; 7-barrel; 8-caterpillar; 9- building; 10- support roller; 11 - nozzle: 12 - valve body; 13-cylinder; 14-chamber drum; 15 - back cover. 16-switch; 17 - slider; 18 - fork; 19 - check valve; 20 - supply pipe; 21 - gas valve ">
Flamethrower tank TO-55: a-general view; b-flamethrower; 1-tower; 2- flamethrower; 3, 5 - infrared light spotlights; 4- radio antenna; 6 - gun barrel; 7-barrel brake; 8-caterpillar; 9- building; 10- support roller; 11 - nozzle: 12 - valve body; 13-cylinder; 14-chamber drum; 15 - back cover. 16-switch; 17 - slider; 18 - fork; 19 - check valve; 20 - supply pipe; 21 - gas valve
Bibliography:
Material provided by Sergey Zykov
Encyclopedia of tanks. 2010 .
The first attempts to create a flamethrower tank were made already at the beginning of the development of domestic tank building - on the basis of the first production tank MS-1, the flamethrower OT-1 was developed, which, however, did not go into production. More precisely, work was widely carried out on “chemical” tanks. The USSR, like all other countries, was preparing for a future war with the widespread use of chemical weapons. And then this included not only chemical warfare agents, but also incendiary weapons and means of setting up smoke screens. According to the views of the military in the 1930s, chemical tanks were intended “both for chemical attack or defense, and to cover the action of linear tanks. These tanks can be used to organize infection, establish a smoke screen or decontaminate the area. Some of these tanks are used for flame-throwing when operating as line tanks against enemy personnel and firing points. Chemical weapons (smoke launcher or flamethrower) can also be installed on some linear tanks. However, in this case it is difficult to deploy sufficiently powerful chemical weapons and the required amount of fuel.” That is, the role of “flamethrowers” was considered only one of the possible for chemical tanks.
Work on chemical tanks began on the basis of the order of the Chief of Armaments of the Red Army “On the Chemical Weapons System” dated August 28, 1931
Dominant in the 1920s - 1030s. views on the nature of offensive operations required a high rate of advancement into the depths of the enemy’s defense, which required powerful and at the same time sufficiently mobile means to destroy or suppress resistance nodes that hindered the advance. Therefore, by the beginning of the 1930s. Soviet military theorists formulated the idea of the need to create armored vehicles armed with powerful flamethrowers, which could be used to destroy the enemy defending in field fortifications and fortifications, as well as for spraying combat agents and setting up smoke screens to cover tank battle formations from the front or flanks. According to Soviet doctrine, such tanks, although they carried the property of chemical troops, were considered an integral part of armored units.
Chemical modifications with flamethrower equipment were developed for almost all production and most prototype tanks. The first self-propelled flamethrower actually embodied in metal was the HT-27 (OT-27) wedge, built in 1932 and even used by the Red Army.
Flamethrower wedge OT-27 (first version)
Chemical tanks were built on the chassis of amphibious tanks T-37 (ХТ-37 or БХМ-4) and Т-38 (ХТ-38), light tanks for direct infantry support T-26, and high-speed wheeled-tracked BT tanks.
The flamethrower tank project was also created on the basis of the wheeled-tracked medium tank T-29, and in 1938 SKB-2 Leningradsky Kirov plant developed the project tracked tank weighing 30 - 32 tons for mechanized brigades of the Red Army. It was assumed that, in addition to the 76-mm cannon and heavy machine gun, it would also have a flamethrower. True, as in the case of the XT-29, the matter did not go further than the project.
The main developer and supplier of “tank flamethrower devices” since the early 1930s. became the Moscow plant "Compressor", which produced a family of pneumatic flamethrowers of the KS brand. They all had the same principle of operation. Highly compressed air came from the cylinders through a reducer, which reduced the pressure to working pressure, into a tank with a combustible mixture. The mixture was supplied by air pressure to the fire nozzle, through which it was released onto the target in a concentrated stream, ignited by a gasoline torch at the outlet. The torch, in turn, was ignited by an electric candle. The final adaptation of the equipment for installation on tanks was usually carried out by the design bureaus of tank factories.
LIGHT FLAME-THROWER TANKS
LIGHT CHEMICAL TANK XT-26
Chemical (flame-thrower) tank XT-26 during testing at the NIBT Test Site in Kubinka. 1932
The T-26 light direct infantry support tank, produced in several modifications in Leningrad by the Bolshevik plant and machine-building plant No. 174 named after K.E. Voroshilov, was in the 1930s. the most numerous in the Red Army. Mass production, combined with a relatively simple and reliable chassis design, led to its widespread use for experimental development and the creation of special machines based on it. It is not surprising that this tank was considered preferable for the production of serial chemical machines. The project of a two-seat chemical tank T-26 with an installation for flamethrowing and contamination of the area was proposed back in June 1932 by G.E. Schmidt. But the experimental tank BKhM-3, made on the basis of a two-turret version of the T-26 model 1931, turned out to be more successful. The KS-2 equipment developed at the Kompressor plant allowed the use of the BKhM-3 for flamethrowing, setting up smoke screens and contaminating the area, or, on the contrary, degassing.
This vehicle entered service under the designation "chemical tank" XT-26 (although often referred to as the flamethrower tank OT-26). The left turret was removed and a hatch was made in its place, and a KS-24 flamethrower with a flamethrowing range of 35 m (noticeably less in a headwind) and a DT machine gun were installed in the right turret. The frontal armor of the turret has changed somewhat. In the fighting compartment of the tank, under the hatch, the rest of the chemical equipment was placed, consisting of a reservoir (tank) for a fire mixture (liquid agent, degassing liquid), three 13.5-liter cylinders with compressed air, a gasoline tank with a capacity of 0.7 liters and an ignition system, hoses , pipelines, valves. The pressure in the cylinders is 150 kg/cm2, the working pressure is 12 kg/cm2. Up to 5 liters of fire mixture were thrown out in one shot. To ignite it, a torch of burning gasoline was used, and an electric spark plug was used to ignite the gasoline. The supply of fire mixture (a mixture of fuel oil and kerosene) was enough for 70 shots. The hose was aimed using a shoulder rest similar to a DT machine gun.
The tank was equipped with a smoke exhaust system for setting up smoke screens. The combination of two “chemical” systems (flamethrower and smoke) on one chassis was rational, since the same combustible mixture was used for smoke generation. The smoke outlet nozzle was mounted at the stern. This vehicle became the first mass-produced flamethrower tank and allowed the development of a number of constructive solutions, but overall it caused a number of complaints. After 1937, the HT-26 (OT-26) remaining in service were modified by installing flamethrower equipment from the HT-130.
The original version of using a flamethrower on a tank was developed in the Research Department of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization under the leadership of Zh.Ya. Kotin in 1936. At the stern of the double-turret T-26 tank, a pneumatic flamethrower with a flamethrowing range of 12 - 15 m was installed to protect the tank from the side stern from enemy infantry. This option remained experimental (interesting fact: almost 70 years later, this idea was uniquely revived in a “flame-thrower device” patented in South Africa to protect a car from an attack by an armed criminal).
LIGHT CHEMICAL TANK XT-130
Based on the T-26 mod. 1933, with one cylindrical tower in KB-2 of plant No. 174, according to the design of SKB of the Kompressor plant, the chemical tank HT-130 was created. The turret was shifted to the right of the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, which freed up space to accommodate the KS-25 flamethrower equipment. The hull contained two tanks for fire mixture with a total capacity of 400 liters (initially a smaller supply of fire mixture was assumed), in the tower there were four cylinders with compressed air of 13.5 liters each and a gasoline tank of the ignition system with a capacity of 0.8 liters. The fire hose with an armored casing was mounted in the same mantlet as the DT machine gun. The flamethrower was aimed using a shoulder rest, and the sight was a periscope TOGI. The elevation angle of the fire hose is up to +10°, the horizontal guidance angle without turning the turret is 20°. The automatic igniter at the end of the fire hose also had an electric spark plug and was protected by an armored casing. To fill the tanks with fire mixture, filler necks in the roof of the turret box to the left of the turret were used. The air pressure in the cylinders is 150 kg/cm2, the working pressure is 18 kg/cm2. In one second shot, the flamethrower threw up to 9 liters of fire mixture (a mixture of fuel oil and kerosene), while the flamethrowing range increased to 45 - 50 m, but the number of shots decreased to 40 (when pouring 360 liters). After the shot, the fire hose was automatically purged of the remaining mixture with compressed air. We simplified the process of cleaning the reservoir (tank) - to drain the remaining mixture; a valve was installed in its bottom instead of a pipe. The same equipment could be used to contaminate the area, while the capture width of one tank was 25 m at a speed of 12 km/h, and the contaminated area was 20,000 m2. There was a smoke exhaust system. XT-130 was equipped with a TPU-3 tank intercom. When upgrading the weapons, the tank was equipped with a second DT machine gun, and the ammunition load was increased to 3,150 rounds.
LIGHT CHEMICAL TANKS XT-131 - XT-133
Installing a flamethrower in the turret instead of a cannon allowed for all-round firing from it. But a flamethrower, a melee weapon with a range of several tens of meters, is powerless against tanks and anti-tank artillery. This limited the actions of flamethrower tanks and made them almost helpless and useless after the consumption of the combustible mixture (machine gun weapons were already considered auxiliary). Such vehicles required the support of line (cannon) tanks to suppress enemy anti-tank fire and were easily knocked out without their cover. Moreover, flamethrower vehicles differed in appearance from linear ones, which allowed the enemy to determine the direction of attack in advance and concentrate fire on them. Therefore, in 1939 - 1940. flamethrower tanks were created that retained the cannon armament of the base vehicle, although it was necessary to sacrifice the fire mixture supply.
Already in 1939, KB-2 of plant No. 174 developed and manufactured prototypes of chemical tanks XT-131 and XT-132. The HT-131 retained the cannon armament in the turret. But the combined installation of cannon and machine gun weapons with ammunition and KS-25 flamethrower equipment with a tank and cylinders in such a small vehicle simply did not leave the crew any room to work. Therefore, the HT-132 still abandoned cannon armament. A modernized version of this machine in the fall of 1939, i.e. almost immediately after the events on the Khalkhin Gol River and the beginning
World War II, entered service under the designation HT-133. This chemical tank was built on the T-26 chassis mod. 1939 with inclined installation of armor plates of the turret box and a conical turret, carried flamethrower equipment and 2 DT machine guns - coaxial in a single mantlet with a flamethrower and in a ball mount at the rear of the turret. The XT-133 turret was also shifted to the right, and a tank, cylinders and other elements of flamethrower equipment were mounted on the left. Instead of two PTK devices on linear tanks, one was mounted on the XT-133 turret. The chassis has been improved, just like on linear tanks. Serial production, which began in September 1939, proceeded with great difficulties - the XT-133, compared to the T-26, had 370 design changes, some of which reduced the rigidity of the hull and turret elements and complicated the installation of equipment. Like previous flamethrower tanks on the T-26 chassis, the XT-133 tank was not equipped with a radio station, but had a TPU-3. The first XT-133s released went to the troops operating on the Karelian Isthmus, where 17 vehicles received shielding from additional 30-40 mm armor plates to increase protection from enemy anti-tank fire.
LIGHT CHEMICAL TANK XT-134
Flamethrower tank XT-134 during testing at the NIBT Test Site in the summer of 1940. A flamethrower is clearly visible on the upper frontal plate of the hull. The car arrived from the Karelian Isthmus, where it took part in the battles. Additional shielding was preserved only on the turret; it was removed from the hull before testing to reduce weight
In January 1940, Plant No. 174, under the designation HT-134, built on the basis of the T-26 with a conical turret a new version of the chemical (flame-thrower) tank while retaining the cannon armament. The same KS-equipment was used. 25, but now the rotating L-shaped fire nozzle of the flamethrower was mounted in the upper frontal hull plate of the standard T-26 model 1939, and one of the two tanks with the fire mixture was located outside on the rear sheet of the turret box. A supply of flammable liquid of 145 liters provided 15 - 18 short shots. The diameter of the outlet of the flamethrower nozzle was 14 mm. The total mass of the flamethrower equipment with filled tanks was 568 kg, the working pressure in the mixture tanks was 25 - 27 atm. In addition, the tank was armed with a 45-mm tank gun model 1934/38 and two DT machine guns.
Two samples of HT-134, shielded with 30-mm armor plates, were sent to the 210th separate chemical tank battalion. Despite the success of their use, the XT-134 tank did not go into production. Firstly, flamethrower tanks needed much better armor protection, which required the use of medium or heavy tanks. Secondly, the flamethrowing range of 50 m was considered insufficient by that time; it was necessary to replace pneumatic flamethrowers with powder ones. Yes and release base tank was ending.
Note that the chemical tank XT-46 was developed on the basis of the T-46, a wheeled-tracked modification of the same T-26.
The total number of chemical tanks produced was: KhT-26 - 552 in 1932 - 1935, KhT-130 - 401 in 1936 - 1939, KhT-133 - 269 in 1939 - 1940, KhT-134 - 2 in 1940.
WHEEL-TRACKED FLAME-THROWER TANK XT-7 (OT-8)
In the USSR, much attention was paid to high-speed wheeled-tracked BT tanks, but chemical (flame-thrower) tanks based on them remained prototypes. Already in 1935, three prototypes of the BKhM-2 with KS-23 flamethrower equipment instead of cannon weapons were built on the BT-5 chassis; in 1937, the KhBT-5 with KS-34 equipment was built at the Kompressor plant. In 1936, the design bureau of the Kompressor plant, on the BT-7 chassis, created a prototype of the KhBT-7 (KhBT-III) tank with KS-40 equipment, capable of throwing a jet up to 70 m.
In 1940, when the XT-134 was built at plant No. 174, Kharkov plant No. 183 named after. The Comintern built several OT-7 flamethrower tanks with a 45-mm cannon and a DT machine gun in the “native” conical turret on the BT-7 chassis model 1937. The KS-63 pneumatic flamethrower from the Kompressor plant was installed in the frontal part of the hull to the right of the driver. Two tanks for the combustible mixture with a capacity of 85 liters each were removed from the tank hull onto the fenders and protected with 10 mm armor. The pneumatic system of the flamethrower consisted of three compressed air cylinders with a capacity of 13 liters; two gearboxes, a pipeline and a control valve. One reducer reduced the pressure to 8 - 10 atm (for supplying gasoline to the torch nozzle), the other (for firing the fire mixture) created a working pressure in the tanks of 20 - 25 atm. The jet throwing range reached 60 - 70 m (in favorable conditions- up to 90 m). The installation of a flamethrower in the body resulted in a dead zone of fire from it of 5.5 m. A supply of flammable liquid of 170 liters was enough for 11 - 17 (according to other sources 10 - 15) short shots, the practical rate of fire was 10 - 12 rounds/min. In this case, the horizontal firing angle was 55°, the elevation angle was +12°, and the declination angle was -9°. The flamethrower was controlled by the driver. His observation device had a built-in device for aiming a flamethrower with aiming marks and an arrow connected to the flamethrower. But they simply did not find an appropriate enterprise for the production of KS-63.
WHEEL-TRACKED FLAME-THROWER TANK OP-7
In 1941, the KS-63 flamethrower equipment was installed on the BT-7M wheeled-tracked tank (model 1940) with a V-2 diesel engine. This flamethrower tank was designated OP-7. The total weight of the KS-63 with filled tanks was 711 kg. Tanks with a fire mixture of 85 liters each were installed on fenders and protected by 10-mm armor plates. The fire mixture consisted of a mixture of fuel oil MZ (90%) and kerosene (10%), its supply was enough for 10 - 15 short shots. The fire hose was placed in a ball joint in the frontal plate of the hull; the diameter of the outlet hole of its nozzle was 19 mm. The fire hose was controlled by two handles. The mixture was ignited using an electric candle connected to a tank battery. Working pressure 25 - 27 atm. The range is up to 70 m. Like the OT-7, the OP-7 tank remained a prototype. It is, however, interesting as an example of a change in approach to the creation of flamethrower tanks on the eve of the war.
TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TANK OT-7 (OP-8)
Crew, people 3
Combat weight, t 14.3 (14.65)
Tank length, m 5.6 (5.66)
Width, m 2.29
Height, m 2.4 (2.5)
Ground clearance, m 0.35
Armor thickness, mm:
building 22
tower 15
Engine power, hp 400 (500)
Maximum speed, km/h:
on tracks 51(62)
on wheels 72 (86)
Power reserve, km:
on tracks 510(620)
on wheels 500 (1070)
Armament
Gun 45 mm mod. 1934/38
2x7.62 mm DT machine gun
Ammunition:
188 shots
cartridges 1827
Flamethrower KS-63
fire mixture reserve, l 170
flamethrowing range, m 54 - 60 (70)
FLAMETHROWS ON TELETANKS
A remote-controlled tank (apparently LT1-26), equipped with a flamethrower for testing at the NIBT Test Site. 1936 (left). The same vehicle with dismantled weapons is on display at the tank museum in Kubinka. 2001 (center). Refilling the remote-controlled tank TT-BT-7 with special fluid. 1940 (right)
Flamethrower weapons were considered the main weapon for most experimental and production models of radio-remotely controlled tanks (teletanks) built in the USSR in the 1930s. - TT-26, teletractor T-20, TT-38, BT-TT. They were planned to be used for reconnaissance of minefields and anti-tank obstacles and making passages through them, destroying pillboxes, short-range flamethrowing, and setting up smoke screens. Thus, a 1935 teletank with TOZ-IV telemechanical equipment carried flamethrower and machine gun weapons of the XT-130 type. Plant No. 174 built 37 telemechanical groups “teletank - control tank”. In 1938, 28 teletanks were also built with TOZ-VI equipment and a KS-25 chemical device for flame throwing or setting up smoke screens. In total, 1933 - 1938 162 TT-26 teletank and TU-26 control tank were produced in several batches.
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the telemechanical equipment on most teletanks was out of order, and the teletanks available in the border districts were lost in the first weeks, apparently without having time to take part in the battles.
Flamethrowers were later considered among the weapons of remotely controlled ground vehicles (in particular, the Radio-Craft magazine already in 1945, immediately after the end of the war, published a project for a radio-controlled wedge - a development of the German B-IV - equipped with a pneumatic flamethrower with a flamethrowing range of up to 40 m and a powerful explosive charge).
CHEMICAL TRAILER
To defeat enemy manpower by flamethrowing, produce smoke and contaminate the area with military agents, as well as degass it in 1939 - 1940. At the Vyksinsky DRO plant, the leading designer M.V. Sukhov, under the leadership of the head of the SKV M.U. Miroshin, developed special chemical trailers (CP). The HP-2 trailer was a single-axle trailer on wheels with special equipment, instrumentation and a tank with a capacity of 600 liters, which were protected by armor 6, 9 and 10 mm thick. The special liquid was released using compressed air. A device was installed on the trailer that ensured its coupling to the tank, and, if necessary, uncoupling without the crew leaving the tank. Not mass produced.
COMBAT USE OF CHEMICAL TANKS ON THE T-26 BASE
An XT-130 tank from the 210th separate chemical tank battalion fires at a Finnish pillbox. 1940
Chemical tanks entered service with the company combat support tank brigades (9 units - three platoons of three vehicles each), and since 1935 - separate chemical tank battalions, consolidated into chemical tank brigades 150 tanks each. By 1939, the Red Army had three such brigades - in the Moscow Military District, in the Volga region and in the Far East.
Back in 1938, 9 HT-26s were used in battles against Japanese troops in the area of Lake Khasan. And in 1939 - 1940. Soviet troops acquired very valuable experience in the combat use of flamethrower tanks both against field (on the Khalkhin-Gol River) and against long-term (on the Karelian Isthmus) fortifications. In the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River in May - August 1939, 10 XT-26 tanks from the combat support company of the 11th Tank Brigade and 9 XT-26 from the 6th Tank Brigade, as well as 18 XT-130 from the 2nd Tank Brigade, operated 1st chemical tank brigade. These tanks were used as flamethrowers to support infantry and destroy the enemy during the assault on fortified positions. Typically, a flamethrower tank was sent to a long-term enemy fire installation, which was key in this sector of defense, and after it was suppressed, it turned around and moved along the trench, burning out manpower from it. At the same time, to cover the flamethrower tanks, linear cannon tanks or armored vehicles were allocated - as a rule, a platoon of tanks or BA-10s per platoon (3 vehicles) of flamethrower tanks. The “Report on the actions of chemical troops during the battles near the Khalkhin Gol River” said: “Chemical tanks were widely used and fully justified themselves, gaining a strong reputation among rifle units.”
During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 - 1940. Chemical tanks of the 201st, 204th, 210th and 218th separate chemical tank battalions, as well as combat support companies for tank brigades, took part in the operations on the Karelian Isthmus. By the beginning of the war, the troops that took part in the battles had 208 XT-26 and XT-130 tanks (the latter made up the majority), subsequently their number was constantly increased, including the supply of XT-133 tanks. Tanks very effectively burned out enemy infantry both in the pillboxes and dugouts of the Mannerheim line, and on open area. K.G. Mannerheim himself, recalling the assault by Soviet troops on Finnish fortifications, noted: “What was new was that in many places the infantry was transported on armored sleighs attached to tanks, or on the armor of tanks. Self-propelled flamethrowers that spew burning oil were also new.” The uniqueness of the theater of military operations and the specifics of the attack on the enemy’s fortified area determined the features of the use of flamethrower tanks in their close cooperation with linear tanks, infantry and artillery. Flamethrower tanks operated most successfully against individual fortifications as part of assault (blocking) groups, into which they were introduced along with linear tanks, infantry and sappers, with artillery support. Tanks, under enemy fire, approached the pillbox within the range of a flamethrower shot and hit the embrasure with a stream of fire mixture, destroying or suppressing the garrison of the structure. However, despite all the effectiveness of flamethrower tanks, they turned out to be more vulnerable - due to the increased fire hazard - and their percentage of losses was almost 2.5 times higher than that of linear T-26s. Of the 446 chemical tanks that took part in the battles on the Karelian Isthmus, 124 were lost. War experience showed that flamethrower tanks become the first target for anti-tank artillery.
Flamethrower teletank TT-26 from the 217th separate chemical tank battalion, knocked out in the area of height 65.5. Karelian Isthmus, February 1940
Fighting 1939 - 1940 made it possible to clarify the role of chemical tanks, the tactics of their use and the requirements for them. Flame throwing became their main purpose. The use of flamethrower tanks to break through enemy defenses was considered, among others important issues. At a meeting of the senior leadership of the Red Army on December 23 - 31, 1940, this was reported by the commander of the Western Special Military District, Colonel General of Tank Forces D. G. Pavlov and the commander of the 5th Mechanized Corps of the Trans-Baikal Military District, Lieutenant General M. F. Terekhin . In the “Manual for a Tank Soldier,” published in 1941 on the eve of the war, the action of flamethrowing tanks was briefly discussed: “Flamethrowing is applicable in any situation: by advancing troops, flamethrowing is used against manpower located openly and in shelters, against enemy tanks, rear columns, to set fire to warehouses and structures.”
Thus, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had well-established views on the use of flamethrower weapons in battle. It was believed that flamethrowers did not solve independent combat missions, and therefore should only be used in close cooperation with infantry and tanks, artillery and sappers. Flame throwing had to be combined with rifle and machine gun fire and a bayonet strike. The task of flamethrowers in an offensive was to burn out the defending enemy from cover. The practice of using them in battles has shown that after flame-throwing, unaffected manpower, as a rule, left cover and came under fire small arms and artillery. In defense, flamethrowers were supposed to be used suddenly and en masse at the moment when the attacking enemy approached within the range of a flamethrower shot.
In 1940, in our country they revised organizational structure tank troops. The chemical tank brigades were disbanded, and their materiel was transferred from the summer to the tank divisions of the newly created mechanized corps. Each tank division included two battalions of chemical tanks with 54 vehicles each, directly subordinate to the division commander. But, according to the 1st Department of the GABTU of the Red Army, on June 22, 1941, in the mechanized corps there were chemical tanks on the T-26 chassis: in the 1st - 104, in the 2nd - 6, in the 3rd - 12 , 4th - 23, in the 5th - 59, in the 6th - 44, in the 7th - 68, in the 8th - 50, in the 9th - 4, in the 10th - 38, in 11th - 20, 13th - 20, 14th - 25, 15th - 9, 16th - 32, 17th - 2, 18th - 12, 19th -m - 47, in the 20th - 3, in the 21st - 30, in the 22nd - 49, in the 24th - 4, in the 27th - 4, in the 28th - 131, in the 30th m - 108. The 57th Tank Division had 42, and the 59th - 48 chemical tanks. As you can see, the staffing level was very uneven and differed greatly from the standard requirements. Thus, in the mechanized corps of the 5th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District, the shortage of chemical tanks was 84%. In total, the mechanized corps of the Red Army had 994 chemical tanks on the T-26 chassis.
Most of light chemical tanks were lost in the battles of the summer of 1941, and many failed due to technical reasons. Very typical for the beginning of the war, for example, a report on the combat operations of the flamethrower battalions of the 3rd tank division of the 1st mechanized corps: “By the beginning of hostilities, the 5th and 6th tank regiments each had one battalion (24 XT and 8 cannon T -26). The battalions fought their first battle outside the city of Ostrov on July 5, 1941.
The flamethrower battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment operated in the second echelon. At the moment of attack, collected from various parts the infantry fell behind and did not attack, so the tanks acted alone. The battalion was advanced after the heavy tanks, destroying the German infantry fleeing in panic with fire and successfully setting fire to the buildings where they were installed anti-tank guns and machine guns. Due to the fact that during the battle the flamethrower tanks lagged behind their heavy tanks and did not have infantry support, 10 flamethrower vehicles and six T-26s were lost.
On July 7, 1941, a flamethrower tank battalion took part in a battle to destroy German landing forces in the area of the village of Chisre. Due to the burning of the forest and moral impact, the enemy motorized infantry was scattered. Due to the fact that the flamethrower tanks were withdrawing from the battle through swampy terrain, five tanks got stuck in the swamp and were blown up by their crews.
In the area of the villages of Brovino, Udokha, Sitnya on July 9 - 10, three flamethrower tanks of the 6th Tank Regiment acted from ambushes, destroying up to 30 motorcyclists and three trucks with infantry. In recent battles, flamethrower tanks acted as line tanks.
On July 5, in the battle for the city of Ostrov, the commander of the 5th Tank Regiment used the battalion criminally. He placed one company in the first echelon with the task of destroying anti-tank guns. This company was completely destroyed within 30 - 40 minutes of battle. The remaining companies, due to the impossibility of flame-throwing, were used as line companies (they fired machine guns).
On the night of July 15, during a joint attack by heavy and light tanks, a flamethrower tank battalion consisting of 10 tanks acted to destroy enemy rear lines in the area of the village of Strokino. Flamethrower tanks were used for flamethrowing, destroying enemy vehicles with ammunition and fuel. The enemy was put into panic flight, leaving 240 vehicles with fuel and ammunition on the battlefield. Among the trophies, a car with secret documents from the 52nd Chemical Mortar Regiment was taken.”
The flamethrower tank XT-26 moves to fighting position. Summer 1941
From June 22 to July 7, 1941, the 12th Mechanized Corps lost all seven chemical tanks withdrawn on alert, three of which were combat losses, and four were left on the battlefield for technical reasons.
And here is an excerpt from the “Report on the actions of the 116th separate tank battalion”: “The 116th separate tank battalion, arriving at the front on September 11, consisted of: a) personnel - 440 people; b) tanks - 31, of which T-34 - 9, T-26 - 4, HT-26 - 18... On September 12, 1941, the battalion... first entered into battle with German fascists... As a result of the first battles with the enemy, the battalion did not complete the assigned task, suffering losses: a) in personnel: 10 killed, 10 wounded, 47 missing, for a total of 67; b) in material and weapons: remained on the battlefield and in areas occupied by the enemy: T-34 tanks - 8, of which ran into their own minefield - 2, got stuck in a swamp and on a bridge - 2, fell into an anti-tank ditch - 1, knocked out by enemy anti-tank artillery - 3, T-26 tanks - 3, XT-26 tanks - 15, total - 26. XT-26 tanks burned out from their own combustible mixture due to shells and armor-piercing bullets hitting them...
The reasons for the large losses of the battalion: a) due to repeatedly changing tasks and starting positions for the offensive, as well as a frivolous attitude towards this the most important element combat activities of tankers. The crew personnel did not know their tasks well, and the crews of the 3rd company did not know it at all. The tanks of the 3rd company were not prepared for flamethrowing (pressure was not created)...
b) ... no reconnaissance of enemy firing points was organized...
d) HT-26 flamethrower tanks were used incorrectly, like artillery tanks...”
Soviet flamethrower tanks captured by the German army were designated Flam.Pz.Kpfw. T-26 739 ®, although their combat use by the Germans is unknown. Flamethrower tanks captured by the Finns during the Soviet-Finnish War and at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War were restored and used in the Finnish army.
Left: Captured by the Finns soviet tank XT-26 at the repair plant in Varkaus. Spring 1940. A hole is visible in the front plate of the turret from anti-tank shell
Right: Captured Soviet flamethrower tank XT-133 at an exhibition in Helsinki. Spring 1942
As of May 31, 1941, the Finns had 4 XT-26 and 2 XT-130 in service; by the fall of 1941, 3 more XT-133 were added to them. But by the autumn of 1942, the Finns converted these tanks into cannon tanks.
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