From the first day of the war, mechanized corps were involved in fierce battles with German troops. They did not have to break through the enemy’s defenses, enter a breakthrough and operate deep in the rear, as envisaged by pre-war plans. The main type of their combat activity was launching counterattacks against enemy strike groups that had broken through, which in itself was considered unlikely before the war.
In the first days of the war combat activity mechanized corps was determined by order People's Commissar Defense of the USSR No. 3, issued at 22.07 on June 22, 1941. It read:
“1. The enemy, delivering main attacks from the Suwalki salient to Olita and from the Zamosc region on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Radzekhov front, and auxiliary attacks in the directions of Tilsit, Siauliai and Sedlitz, Volkovysk during June 22, suffering heavy losses, achieved little success in these areas... 2. I order:
a) The armies of the Northern Front continue to firmly cover the state border, the border on the left is the same;
b) The armies of the Northwestern Front, firmly holding the coast Baltic Sea, deliver a powerful counterattack from the Kaunas region to the flank and rear of the enemy’s Suwalki group, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and, by the end of June 24, capture the Suwalki region, the border on the left is the same;
c) The armies of the Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction, launch a powerful counterattack with the forces of at least two mechanized corps and front aviation on the flank and rear of the enemy’s Suwalki group, destroy it together with the Northwestern Front and, by the end of June 24, capture the Suwalki area...
d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the state border with Hungary, with concentric attacks in the general direction of Lublin with the forces of the 5th and 6th armies, at least 5 mechanized corps, and all front aviation, encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky front, Krystynopol, by the end of June 24, take possession of the Lublin region, securely secure yourself from the Krakow direction;
e) The armies of the Southern Front should prevent the enemy from invading our territory; when the enemy tries to strike in the Chernivtsi direction or cross the Prut and Danube rivers with powerful flank attacks of ground forces in cooperation with aviation, destroy it with two mechanized corps on the night of June 23, concentrate in the area of Chisinau and forests northwest of Chisinau.”
This NGO directive reflected the desired rather than the actual state of affairs at the front. Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, who was at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front at that time, did not take part in its preparation and in telephone conversation with his deputy Vatutin remarked: “But we still don’t know exactly where and with what forces the enemy is delivering his attacks. Isn’t it better to figure out what’s happening at the front before the morning, and then take action?” the right solution"However, the issue had already been resolved by Stalin and Timoshenko.
The mechanized corps did not achieve great success in these battles, but they managed to slow down the advance of enemy troops in the directions of the main attacks, although at the cost of huge losses. In the first weeks of the war, the mechanized corps lost almost all tanks and most of its personnel - the result of this was a directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters dated July 15, 1941, which provided for the abolition of the mechanized corps. Tank divisions were transferred to the subordination of army commanders, motorized divisions were reorganized into rifle divisions.
Tankers choose a place to cross. Commander of the amphibious tank unit KOVO Art. Lieutenant Gunnikov and vehicle commander Podkhalzin.
BT-7 model 1937 of the 7th micro-military military district during exercises in October 1940.
Northwestern Front
On the eve of the war, the troops of the Baltic Military District included the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps. The 12th Mechanized Corps began advancing to the border by order of the commander district Mr. F.I. Kuznetsova back on June 18th. After the start of hostilities, the commanders of the mechanized corps received an order from the front commander to launch a counterattack against the enemy group that had broken through: “The 12th mechanized corps-su is to eliminate the 23rd enemy tank tanks in Kretinga, deploy the main forces of the corps on the Teltyai-Poventis front to attack the flank and to the rear of the enemy, breaking through to Taurogen, the 3rd mechanized corps, leaving the 5th tank division at the disposal of the commander of the 11th army, the 2nd tank division and the 84th infantry division on the night of June 23, to go out in advance on the route of movement in the Rosiena area to strike interaction of the 12th MK with the 9th anti-tank artillery brigade against the enemy." The 12th mechanized corps and parts of the 10th rifle corps from the Varniai, Uzventis area and the 2nd tank division of the 3rd mechanized infantry unit, together with the 48th rifle division from the Keidaniai, Raseiniai area, were supposed to defeat the Tilsit army with a strike in converging directions on Skaudvile group of Germans. But, due to bad organization and support, the counterattack on June 23-24 came down to hasty actions that were not coordinated in place and time.
The commander of the ABTV NWF P.P. Poluboyarov described these events as follows:
“The movement of troops for a counterattack took place in conditions when the divisions of the first echelon of the 8th Army were retreating under enemy pressure... The divisions of the 12th Mechanized Corps were subjected to strong impact enemy aviation. In the Zharenai area there was an unexpected clash between units of the 23rd tank division with the enemy. The enemy managed to cut off the rear of its 46th Tank Regiment from the combat units. Nevertheless, the regiments of this division were still able to concentrate in time for a counterattack in the Laukuwa area. As for the 28th Panzer Division, its units reached the intended areas three hours late. Part of its forces found itself tied up in repelling enemy tank attacks in the Kelme area. Here the 202nd Infantry Division also fought fierce battles with the enemy. The start of the counterattack had to be delayed by three hours. The actions of the 12th Mechanized Corps practically resulted in a counter battle without proper preparation."
The 2nd Tank Division of the 3rd MK, together with units of the 48th and 125th Rifle Divisions, counterattacked the enemy on the morning of June 23, but its actions did not bring territorial success. On June 24, a fierce counterattack unfolded in the direction of the counterattack. tank battle. On a front of approximately 60 km and a depth of up to 25 km, up to 1,000 tanks simultaneously participated in battles on both sides. By evening, the 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded by German troops and destroyed on June 26.
On the eve of the war: BT-7 LenVO at the May Day parade in 1941. The May snowstorm was then perceived by many as a bad omen...
BT-5 and BT-7 during exercises before the war.
On June 27, the headquarters of the 12th Mechanized Corps was destroyed. Corps commander N.M. Shestopalov was captured (instead of him, on July 1, V.Ya. Grinberg was appointed commander of the 12th corps). On July 4, the corps was transferred to the front reserve.
And here is a view from the other side - the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff Halder:
"The troops of Army Group North on almost the entire front (with the exception of the 291st infantry division, advancing on Liba-vu, repelled enemy tank counterattacks, which were presumably led by the Russian 3rd Tank Corps with the support of several mechanized brigades. Despite this, the reinforced right wing of the army group managed to advance to Viilkomir (Ukmerge). On this section of the front, the Russians are also fighting stubbornly and fiercely” (entry dated June 24). On June 25, Halder makes the following entry: “It is only clear that only the enemy’s 3rd Panzer Corps, which was in this area from the very beginning, was defeated by Reinhardt’s Panzer Corps and that Manstein’s Panzer Corps advanced so far to the east that it forced the Russians to begin withdrawing beyond the Western Dvina. The enemy is retreating in an organized manner, covering the retreat with tank formations." The results were insignificant, and the losses in tanks were high. Only the 12th mechanized corps lost up to 80% of its materiel by June 29. Already from June 25, the mechanized corps fought rearguard battles in separate units, covering the withdrawal of the 8th, 11th and 27th armies of the Northwestern Front.
As a result of the breakthrough of the 4th Tank Group, the NWF troops retreated in diverging directions - the 8th Army to Riga, the 11th to Polotsk, and the road to Daugavpils and to the crossings across the Western Dvina was open. Already on the morning of June 26, the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th MK Manstein approached Dau-Gavpils. To eliminate the breakthrough from the MVO to the NWF, the 21st Mechanized Corps of Mr. D.D. Lelyushenko was transferred, receiving orders to cover the Daugava-Pils direction, and with part of the forces to destroy enemy troops in the Rezekne area. On the morning of June 28, formations of the 21st MK, which had only 98 tanks,
kov, went on the offensive. The result of the three-day battles was the stopping of the German offensive until July 2, until the arrival of the main forces of the German 4th Tank Brigade. The commander of the 56th Motorized Corps, Manstein, described these events in his memoirs as follows: “As could have been predicted, the enemy brought up fresh forces not only from Pskov, but also from Minsk and Moscow. Soon we had to defend ourselves from enemy attacks on the northern bank of the Dvina, supported by one panzer division... In some sectors, things took a serious turn... Finally, on July 2, we were able to set out again after the third mechanized formation arrived in the corps - the SS division "Totenkopf", and on our left the 41st Panzer Corps crossed Dvina near Jakobstadt (Jekabpils)."
Pictures taken by German war correspondent Arthur Grimm on the morning of June 22 near the village of Suden. Armored personnel carriers SdKfz 251/1 and "troikas" from the 1st TD pass by burning armored vehicles. SdKfz 251/1 are equipped with mounts for launching rockets.
In July, to thwart the Germans’ intentions to break through to Novgorod, the 1st Mechanized Corps of Mr. M.D. Chernyavsky, which was part of the Leningrad Military District before the war, was sent to the NWF. By this time, there was only one 3rd tank division left in it, and even that without one tank battalion, infantry and rear units. Even before the war, on June 17, the 1st Tank Division was removed from its composition. On June 30, the corps became part of the Northern Western Front, and the next day the 163rd Infantry Division was transferred to the 27th Army. On July 5, units of the 1st Mechanized Corps occupied the city of Ostrov after a heavy battle, but by the evening they were forced to leave it. On July 14-15, the corps attacked the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Mk in the area of the city of Soltsy, throwing it back 40 km. This counterattack resulted in the suspension of the German offensive on Leningrad until the main forces of the German 18th Army reached the Luga River line and the 4th TF was completely brought into order. But the 1st Mechanized Corps itself ceased to exist as a tank formation, having lost most of its tanks.
By mid-July, all four mechanized corps operating in the NWF zone, as a result of huge losses (from June 22 to July 9 - 2523 tanks), turned into weakened rifle units covering the withdrawal of front troops, and were soon disbanded.
Western Front
Here, Directive No. 3 of Tymoshenko’s NGO on the evening of June 22 set the commanders of the mechanized corps the task of striking in the Grodno region in the direction of Suwalki, together with the NWF troops, to encircle and by the end of June 24 destroy Suwalki a certain group of Germans. The 6th Mechanized Corps of the 10th Army, the 11th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Army and the 6th Cavalry Corps were involved in the counterattack. The overall leadership of the mechanized group was entrusted to the deputy front commander, General I.V. Boldin.
The 11th mechanized corps of General D.K. Mostovenko already entered the battle on June 22 on the right flank of the Western Front, contact with it was lost. On June 23, the 6th mechanized corps of General M.G. Khatskilevich began moving from the Bialystok area in the direction of Grodno, having suffered losses from German air strikes. The 4th and 7th Panzer Divisions reached their deployment line by noon on June 23, where they were met with heavy anti-tank fire and came under air strikes. As a result of a fierce battle, they managed to push back the Wehrmacht units that had broken through southeast of Grodno and by evening reached the defense zone of the 27th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army. The next day, after the Germans captured Grodno, the 6th Mechanized Corps struck in a northerly direction. Encountering powerful anti-tank defenses, the corps suffered heavy losses.
In the afternoon of June 24, the tank divisions of the 6th Mechanized Corps were redirected to the southeast of Grodno, where in the evening they entered into battle with formations of the 3rd Panzer Group of Hoth, trying to stop its advance in the Minsk direction. Having brought the 8th and 20th Army Corps into the battle, on June 25 the enemy managed to dismember the divisions of the 6th Mechanized Corps, which were forced to fight scattered battles not connected by a common plan. General Boldin and his headquarters found themselves surrounded and lost contact with the command of the 6th MK. The commander of the Polar Fleet, Pavlov, on the evening of June 25, gave the order to the commander of the 6th Corps: “Immediately interrupt the battle and, by forced march, following night and day, concentrate in Slonim” (which was captured by the 17th TD of General von Arnim on June 24). The 6th and 11th mechanized corps, operating against two army corps of the German 9th Army, suffered significant losses and, due to the lack of proper logistics, found themselves without fuel and ammunition at the height of the battle. Under attack German troops they, together with units of the 3rd Army, were forced to retreat towards Nalibokskaya Pushcha, which led to the formation of a large gap between the flanks of the Northwestern Front and the Western Front. At the end of June, divisions of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps were surrounded west of Minsk.
BT-7 on the march. The tank is equipped with a pair of “combat light” headlights on the gun mantlet to illuminate the target during night shooting.
T-26 model 1939 with a conical turret and a turret box with inclined armor plates. On a tank that belonged to NIIBT, in an unusual way The side number is marked not only on the turret, but also on the front plate of the hull.
The 14th Mechanized Corps of General S.I. Oborin, which was part of the 4th Army of General A.A. Korobkov, on the evening of June 22 received a combat order from the commander of the 4th Army No. 02, which read: “To the 14th Mechanized Corps (22 -I and 30th TD, 205th med) in the morning of June 23, strike from the Kryvlyany, Pelishcha, Khmelevo line in the general direction of Vysoke-Litovski with the task of destroying the enemy east of the Western Bug River by the end of the day." At six o'clock on June 23, units of the 14th Mechanized Corps, 28th Infantry Corps, and 75th Infantry Division launched counterattacks against the 47th, 24th Mechanized Corps and 12th Army Corps. By the beginning of the attack, the 30th Panzer Division had up to 130 tanks, the 22nd Panzer Division had about 100. During the battle, the divisions suffered heavy losses from artillery, aviation, and tank fire. Finding themselves under the threat of encirclement as a result of a detour from the north by the forces of the 17th Tank Division of the Germans, the Sov. the troops were forced to retreat. The total losses of the 14th Mechanized Corps in tanks amounted to 120 vehicles. The counterattack was unsuccessful, and the 4th Army was dismembered by Guderian's troops and began to retreat in the direction of Slutsk. The 14th Mechanized Corps covered its retreat. By June 28, only 2 T-26 tanks remained in it, the corps was withdrawn to the rear and disbanded. General S.I. Oborin was blamed for the failure (he was wounded on June 25, and command of the 14th MK was taken over by I.V. Tugarinov), he was arrested and then shot.
T-26 makes its way through the forest. Spare support and support rollers are mounted on the fender.
T-26 units of Captain Khomyakov are moving through the village near Yelnya. Western Front, July 1941
Tankers are inspected before entering the line.
T-34 undercover anti-tank artillery goes on the attack. Western Front, July 1941
The 13th, 17th and 20th mechanized corps were still in the process of formation at the beginning of the war, so they were used in battles as rifle units, remaining without tanks by July.
At the beginning of July, the troops of the Western Front included the 5th mechanized corps of General I.P. Alekseenko, previously intended for the Southwestern Front, and the 7th mechanized corps of General V.I. Vinogradov from the Moscow Military District, which had 924 and 715 tanks, respectively. They were included in the 20th Army of General P.A. Kurochkin, who received an order from the commander of the Polar Fleet: “firmly holding the boundaries of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, from the morning of July 6, 1941, go on a decisive offensive to destroy the enemy’s Lepel group.” The depth of strikes was determined for the 5th mechanized corps to be up to 140 km, for the 7th - up to 130 km. On the morning of July 6, the 5th, 7th Mechanized Corps entered the battle. At first, their actions developed quite successfully: both corps, overcoming enemy resistance, reached the area north and south of Senno. The enemy moved the 17th and 18th tank divisions here. For two days, our corps repelled the onslaught of these formations, which delayed the advance of the entire 3rd enemy tank group to the Dnieper... However, the counterattack of the mechanized corps did not develop. The Nazis sent large air forces here, and our corps found themselves in a difficult situation, suffering losses. They were forced to begin their retreat in difficult conditions under attacks from enemy tanks and aircraft.
The T-26 column moves into position for a counterattack.
BA-20M stuck in the mud and abandoned.
A tank unit hit by an air strike on the road. The high accuracy of the bombing of German dive bombers is noticeable: the dispersion of bombs does not exceed several meters, and most BT-7 and KB were destroyed by direct hits.
A retreating artillery unit after an attack by German tankers.
Shielded KV-1 "Beat the Nazis".
The Komsomolets tractor, which was given to the Germans with ammunition.
Major General tank troops A.V. Borzikov, in a report to the head of the GABTU of the Red Army, assessed their actions as follows: “The corps (5th and 7th) are fighting well, the only bad thing is that the headquarters are inefficient and slow, and it’s even bad that the enemy gets a lot of vehicles from for trivial malfunctions. Neither the division, nor the mechanized corps, nor the army, nor the front know how to organize repairs or evacuation. There was no locking up the mechanized corps had to cover the mechanized corps from the air, but due to huge losses it could not complete this task. Due to the above reasons, the mechanized corps entered fight in different time, as you approach the battlefield.
The main goal of the counterattack was the defeat of the 1st Tank Group of E. Kleist, which broke through at the junction of the 5th Army of General M.I. Potapov and the 6th Army of General I.N. Muzychenko. An oncoming tank battle unfolded in the area of Lutsk, Dubno, Rivne on June 23; From Lutsk and Dubno, on the left flank of the 1st regiment, the 9th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky and the 19th mechanized corps of General N.V. Feklenko attacked. From the south, from the Brody area, the 15th mechanized corps of General I.I. Karpezo and the 8th mechanized corps of General D.I. Ryabyshev attacked Radekhov and Berestechko. On June 23, German troops continued their attack on Lutsk and Berestechko, widening the gap between the 5th and 6th armies. On the same day, a counterattack began. In the morning, in the Radekhov area, on a front 70 km wide, the 15th Mechanized Corps went on the offensive, but, having suffered heavy losses, was forced to retreat. The 4th mechanized corps of Mr. A.A. Vlasov, instead of participating in the attack on the 1st tank group, was sent to eliminate the enemy breakthrough at the junction of the 6th and 26th armies in the Mostisk area (except for the 32nd TD, which operated together with the 15th MK). The 22nd Mechanized Corps, which went on the offensive on June 24, advanced from the Voinitsa - Boguslavskaya line 7-10 km to Lokache. But, acting independently, without air support, the corps lost more than 50% of its tanks and retreated to its original positions. The 41st Tank Division of the 22nd MK did not participate in the counterattack at all.
In the "Description of combat operations of the 22nd mechanized corps of the Southwestern Federal Front for the period from 22 to 29.06.1941." it is said this way:
“On June 24, 1941, the 19th Tank Division at 13.30 counterattacked the advancing enemy units in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 228.6, Aleksandrovka, Markovitsy. T-26 tanks were brought into the attack, 45 old ones, BA-10 armored vehicles - 12 pieces. Most of these tanks were destroyed by the enemy and put out of action.When the tanks reached the forest area south of height 228.6, north of Kanevichi, the enemy infantry began to retreat, and strong artillery and rifle-machine gun fire was opened from the forest, followed by the withdrawal of medium and heavy tanks. Started strong tank battle, which lasted 2.5 hours. The tanks remaining after the battle began to leave the battle. The infantry began a disorderly retreat... The 19th TD retreated to the line of the Serzha River. In this battle, the commander of the 22nd MK, Mr. Kondrusev, was killed (he was replaced by the chief of staff, Mr. Tamruchi)...
On the morning of June 25, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps went on the offensive from the north, pushing back parts of the German 3rd MK to the southwest of Rivne. But it was not possible to build on the success due to the fact that the attack from the south, due to the unpreparedness of the troops, was postponed to the next day. On June 26, the troops of the 1st Tgr and 6th Army were counterattacked by the 9th and 19th MK from the north, the 8th and 15th MK from the south, entering into a counter tank battle with the 9th, 11th , 14th and 16th German tank divisions. During June 26-27, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps fought with the divisions of the 3rd MK, but under air strikes they were forced to retreat to the area west of Rivne. The 8th mechanized corps struck the 16th TD, advancing 12 km. On the night of June 27, he was withdrawn from the battle and began concentrating behind the 37th sk."
German soldiers walk past bombed tanks. Northwestern Front, July 1941.
T-38 abandoned on the street of a Lithuanian city.
Operational report of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front No. 09 dated June 26, 1941 reported:
“The 8th mechanized corps at 9.00 on June 26 hesitantly attacked enemy mechanized units from the Brody area in the direction of Berestechko and, not having sufficient aviation support and from the neighbor on the left - 15 mk, was stopped by the enemy in the initial area for the attack. The 15th mechanized corps is also operating hesitantly, not following the order to attack. By 9.00 on June 26 - the beginning of the attack - MK was not yet concentrated in the initial area for the attack." The headquarters of the Southwestern Front, seeing the low effectiveness of counterattacks, decided to strengthen the defense at the Lutsk-Kremenets line with the front reserve (31st, 36th, 37th sk), and withdraw MK from the battle to prepare a new powerful counterattack. The headquarters did not approve this decision, ordering the attacks to continue on the morning of June 27. The retreating divisions of the 8th MK were turned back, but their efforts were not supported by other MKs, and the 8th Mechanized Corps itself was surrounded. The commander of the 8th MK, Mr. D.I. Rya-byshev, in a combat report dated June 28, 1941, reported: “The situation of the units is difficult, I ask for air support on June 28. Enemy units are on the Verba, Dubno road. Tanks that have left to the Dubno area, cut off from the 7th division, the situation is unknown, heavily bombed by aircraft. The 7th division suffered heavy losses."
Anti-aircraft self-propelled gun Sd Kfz 10/4 with a 20-mm Flak 30 automatic cannon fires at Soviet tanks. Small-caliber, rapid-firing anti-aircraft guns on half-track and vehicle chassis turned out to be a formidable opponent for lightly armored BTs and T-26s.
Pz tanks Kpfw III Ausf E attacked a Soviet artillery battery.
Counterattacks by the Southwestern Front mechanized corps delayed the advance of the 1st Tank Group for a week and thwarted the enemy’s plans to break through to Kiev and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th Army of the Southwestern Front on the Lvov ledge, but failed to achieve a turning point in the fighting.
One of the main reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet mechanized corps in this battle was the lack of communication and interaction between them. Commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps K.K. Rokossovsky:
"... with the information of the troops about the situation at the front, things were very bad. We had to get the information ourselves. And if we were able to more or less find out and guess about the events in our direction, then about what had happened or was happening in the sector of other armies of the South-Western "We knew nothing from the front. Apparently, the headquarters of the 5th Army also knew nothing, because they did not inform us. Communication between the corps and the headquarters of the 5th Army was most often absent, and with its neighbors it was periodically interrupted."
Burnt out T-34 model 1940. Western Front, July 1941
Damaged and burned trucks, BT-7 and KB tanks after the battle near Velikaya. KB of early releases with an F-32 cannon and a shielded turret. Northwestern Front, Pskov direction, August 1941
T-28, out of action after a gun explosion.
Commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 43rd tank division of the 19th MK V.S. Arkhipov:
"... communication was our weakest link. And not only the connection between two groups of mechanized corps striking from the south (8th and 15th MK) and from the north (9th and 19th MK), but also communication between the highest headquarters and these groupings - the headquarters of the Southwestern Front... and the headquarters of the 5th Army. Weak, with long interruptions, radio communications were the reason for the delays in information sent from the front line to the highest headquarters. Therefore, the decisions that were made at the headquarters and, in their own queues, transferred to the front, often did not correspond to the changed combat situation. For example, on the evening of June 26, when, having crushed the right flank of the 11th German tank regiment and defeated one of its tank regiments, our division reached Dubno, none of us knew that from the south, having inflicted huge losses on other formations of the 48th German motorized corps, the 8th mechanized corps of General D.I. Ryabyshev was successfully advancing towards us... a similar situation repeated the next day, when all three corps - the 36th rifle , 8th and 19th mechanized - again advancing in the Dubna direction. Again we and our neighbors, the riflemen of the 36th Corps, reached the approaches to Dubno, but did not know that the 34th Tank Division of I.V. Vasilyev's regiment from the 8th Mechanized Corps had already broken into the city. Thus, on June 26 and 27, Soviet tank wedges twice and very deeply - up to 30 km - crashed into both flanks of the German 48th MK. However, the lack of communication between these wedges and mutual ignorance did not allow the matter to be brought to its logical conclusion - to the encirclement of the 48th MK between Brody and Dubno."
The 34th Panzer Division, which occupied Dubno, was surrounded by German troops and destroyed - all tanks were destroyed, commander of the unit I.V. Vasiliev died.
Tank Pz Kpfw II Ausf F, destroyed by artillery fire and half-sunk in the river.
Red Army soldiers at the captured light staff armored car Sd Kfz 261. Western direction, August 1941.
In general, the leadership of the combat operations of the mechanized corps left much to be desired. Commanders' orders different levels often contradicted one another. This is clearly seen in the example of the 8th Mechanized Corps. Here is an excerpt from brief overview actions of mechanized formations of the fronts for the period from June 22 to August 1, 1941:
“On June 22, 1941, without allowing the corps to carry out the order of the 26th Army, the front commander appoints a new concentration area and subordinates the corps of the 6th Army. The commander of the 6th Army, not taking into account that the corps is marching, carrying out the order of the commander of the Southwestern Front, gives a new concentration area. By virtue of this order, the commander had to turn the marching units in a new direction. On June 24, the commander of the 6th Army transferred the corps to a new area. On June 26, by order of the front commander No. 0015, the corps was transferred to a new area. Thus, not participating in hostilities, but making “super-forced” marches in a closed circle, sequentially carrying out orders from the commanders of the 26th, 6th armies and the front, the corps covered an average of 495 km, leaving 50% of the available combat equipment on the roads during the marches material part, exhausting the remaining material part and the driver's personnel.On June 26, following front orders No. 0015 and 0016, the MK commander, without concentrating all the units, introduced his corps into battle in parts without reconnaissance of the enemy, without finding out his location and strength. As a result of this, the units run into strong anti-tank missiles and swamps and suffer considerable losses without completing the assigned task. The corps' actions were not covered from the air, and interaction on the front scale was not organized. The nervousness of the highest headquarters in management and setting tasks, the abundance of orders not related to one another, non-compliance with elementary statutory norms in organizing and conducting marches were main reason loss of combat effectiveness of the corps and loss of materiel."
Recaptured by Soviet troops Pz Kpfwlll Ausf G with a 50 mm Kwk L/42 cannon.
Kiev residents inspect a captured assault rifle StuG gun III Ausf C, captured near the village of Vita-Pochtovaya and towed to the city. On a self-propelled gun in the center stands the deputy military commissar of the Kyiv Fortified Area, battalion commissar M.V. Pankovsky. Kyiv, August 10, 1941.
The situation was no better in the 15th Mechanized Corps.
“Frequent changes in tasks for the corps and the delivery of orders from the headquarters of the front and the 6th Army with great delay introduced ambiguity, confusion and unnecessary waste of motor resources. For example, on June 24, an order was received from the front headquarters about the withdrawal of the 15th mechanized corps from the Kolesniki-Kholoyiv line to the area southwest of Broda to deliver a joint strike from 8 mk in the direction of Berestechko, Dubno. Units of the corps began to carry out this order and were en route, and some had already reached their concentration area. On June 25, an order followed for the return of corps units to the previously occupied line with the aim of preparing an offensive in the direction of Radzekhov, So-kol together with the 4th MK. At 23.00 on June 26 received new order front headquarters: defeat the enemy mechanized group operating on Dubno, striking in the direction of Lopatyn, Berestechko, Dubno. On June 27, a new order was received again, radically changing the task of the corps: to withdraw to the Zlochuv Heights area. The corps began to carry out the order, but a new order from the front followed: “Despite any difficulties and the technical condition of the equipment, on June 28, advance in the direction of Berestechok.”
Comments are unnecessary here.
Destroyed Pz Kpfw and Ausf S. July 1941
A Pz Kpfw 38(t) shot down by artillerymen, known to us as “Prague”. July 1941
Having launched a counterattack, the 8th Mechanized Corps penetrated deep into the German lines, going to the rear of their 11th Tank Division and threatening the enemy warehouses deployed in Dubno. The German offensive was delayed for several days, but by July 1 the main forces of the corps were surrounded, left without fuel and ammunition. There was no longer any talk of continuing the counterattack. The tankers went on the defensive, fighting back from dug-in tanks. The fate of the corps was deplorable, as Halder noted a couple of days later, “during prolonged stubborn battles, the enemy’s forces were crushed and most of its formations were defeated.” On June 30, front troops received orders to withdraw to the line of fortified areas along the old state border.
In early July, troops from Army Group South managed to break through the Soviet defenses. On July 7, the German 11th Panzer Division reached Berdichev, and the 3rd Motorized Corps of the 1st Panzer Group and the 6th Army reached Zhitomir. As a result of this breakthrough, there was a threat of the capture of Kyiv and the encirclement of units of the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front southwest of Kyiv. Hitler demanded that the largest possible enemy forces west of the Dnieper be destroyed in order to deprive him of the opportunity to conduct organized operations with large masses of troops east of the Dnieper.
The command of the Southwestern Front was forced to take urgent measures to counter the German troops. In the Berdichev area, counterattacks were carried out by combined detachments of the divisions of the 4th and 15th mechanized corps. The 16th Mechanized Corps, transferred to the Western Front from the Southern Front, was also sent here. His divisions entered the battle directly from the echelons. From units of the 4th, 15th, 16th MK, the Berdichev group was formed under the command of division commander A.D. Sokolov. As a result of counterattacks, it was possible to force the Germans to go on the defensive, stopping their advance towards Bila Tserkva. Moreover, only the 11th German TD, according to German data, lost more than 2,000 people in battles. At the cost of a bloody battle, it was possible to delay the advance of Army Group Center to the south for a whole week (on July 18, 1941, Halder recorded the problem of the flank of the 1st Panzer Group: “It is still trampling around in the area of Berdichev and Bila Tserkva.”). In the battles near Berdichev, the 8th and 10th tank divisions especially distinguished themselves, pinning down the main forces of the Kleist tank group for a week. At this time, heavy fighting was taking place in the Novograd-Volynsky area, where troops of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front launched counterattacks on the northern flank of the German group that had reached Kiev. The main striking force of the 5th Army were three mechanized corps: the 9th Mr. A.G. Maslova (19.07 replaced K.K. Rokossovsky), the 19th Mr. N.V. Feklenko and the 22nd Mr. V.S. Tamruchi, who had only 30-35 tanks (in the 19th MK - 75 tanks).
However, the forces of the mechanized corps were exhausted by counterattacks, and the group near Korosten was forced to go on the defensive (as the Germans noted, “there are no more tanks observed”).
By this time, only a shadow of its former power remained from the mechanized corps. According to certificates from the headquarters of the Main Command of the South-Western direction on the state of the rifle and tank divisions of the fronts dated July 22, 1941, “tank divisions numbered: less than 1 thousand people - about 20% of all divisions, 1-2 thousand people each - about 30%, 3-5 thousand people - about 40%, 10-16 thousand people - 10% of all divisions. Of the 12 tank divisions, only two have 118 and 87 tanks each. Most of the rest have only a few tanks." In the second half of August, formations of the 5th Army, including the mechanized corps, retreated beyond the Dnieper.
Attack of cavalrymen with the support of T-26.
In general, the actions of the mechanized corps in the first week of the war against strike groups the enemy in order to change the course of events were not successful in any of the strategic directions. The German command, assessing the actions Soviet troops when delivering counterattacks, noted:
“Before Army Group South, the enemy proved to be at his best in matters of general leadership and conducting offensive actions on an operational scale. Before Army Groups Center and North, the enemy showed himself to be bad in this regard. Command of troops at the tactical level and the level of combat troop training is mediocre."
Southern Front
In the Southern Fleet zone, the Soviet mechanized corps had a huge superiority over the enemy - 769 tanks of the 2nd and 18th mechanized corps were opposed by 60 Romanian ones. The ratio was 12.8:1. But front commander Tyulenev believed that his troops were opposed by 13 German tank and motorized divisions, although in fact there were none. Here in June-July the 2nd Mechanized Corps of General Yu.V. Novoselsky was most active. Together with the 48th Rifle Corps of General R.Ya. Malinovsky, he launched counterattacks on German and Romanian troops at the turn of the Prut River. On July 8, with a strike at the junction between the 4th Romanian and 11th German armies, the 2nd Mechanized Corps stopped the enemy advance. On July 22, the 2nd Mechanized Corps launched a counterattack from the Khristianovka area to Uman against the 11th and 16th tank divisions of the Germans, throwing them back 40 km, eliminating the threat of encirclement of the 18th Army.
On June 30, the 18th Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from Akkerman to the Vopnyarka area for recruitment and on July 4 transferred to the Southwestern Front. On July 19, he became part of the 18th Army and launched a counterattack on the right flank of the 52nd Army Corps of the 17th Army south of Vinnitsa, with 387 tanks. On July 25, divisions of the 17th Army broke through the defenses in the zone of the 18th MK and 17th SK in the Gaisin-Trostyanets area. Until July 30, the 18th Mechanized Corps occupied the defense at Gayvoron, and in August it was transferred to Pavlograd.
At the end of July, divisions of the 2nd Mechanized Corps tried to help the 6th and 12th armies of the Southern Fleet, half-encircled in the Uman region, but were unable to break through the front of the German troops. In addition, by this time the tank units of the Southern Front had suffered significant losses, although their combat potential was still quite large. According to the report of the assistant commander of the Southern Fleet troops for the ABTV, Mr. Shtevnev, dated July 31, 1941, the mechanized corps of the Southern Fleet had:
in the 2nd MK combat-ready: 1 KB, 18 T-34, 68 BT, 26 T-26, 7 flamethrower, 27 T-37, 90 BA-10, 64 BA-20 (total tanks - 147, as of 22.06. - 489);
18 Mk: 15 BT and T-26, 5 T-28, 2 flamethrower, 1 BA-10, 4 BA-20 (total tanks - 22, as of 06/22 - 280);
16 mk: 5 T-28, 11 BA-10, 1 BA-20 (as of June 22 - 608 tanks);
24 Mk: 10 BT, 64 T-26, 2 flamethrower, 10 BA-10, 5 BA-20 (total tanks - 76, as of June 22 - 222).
It also said:
"As a result of the consumption material resources, accidents, breakdowns require medium overhaul: for the 2nd micron - up to 200 units, in the 18th micron - up to 200 units."
“The 16th mechanized corps with minimal remnants: the 240th infantry division, the 15th and 44th TD, from which an infantry detachment with the strength of a battalion, MCP, with the strength of a battalion was formed. The 16th mechanized corps does not represent anything at all real power."
Repair of the T-26 by the crew and a team of workers. During the days of retreat, it was possible to remove the damaged vehicle only if it kept moving - there was nothing and no time to tow the disabled tanks.
Odessa tank-tractors based on STZ-5 with armor made of ship steel. The front armored tractor is armed with DP infantry machine guns. Pay attention to the figure of the sailor - the navy actively participated in the manufacture of these machines, and they were often driven into battle by sailor crews.
Repair of BT-2 in the workshop of one of the factories in Leningrad.
KV-1 with a welded turret and F-32 cannon.
The crew camouflages their T-34 in a shelter.
The mechanized corps stationed in the internal districts were disbanded after the start of the war, and ten tank divisions were created on their basis. new organization. The main reason for the reformation of those who accepted German blow The mechanized corps became “completely exhausted of their material.”
When considering the events of the first weeks of the war, the question arises: why, having a huge quantitative superiority in tanks (in the Polar Fleet the ratio was 2.7:1, Southwestern Fleet - 5.6:1, Southern Federal District - 12.8:1), having tanks that are not inferior , and even superior in their combat qualities to German and Soviet armored forces suffered such a crushing defeat? Explaining it by the enemy’s superiority in military equipment and the surprise of the attack, as was done before, will be very unconvincing. Therefore, we present here the considerations of the commanders of tank forces, direct participants in the events described.
P.P. Poluboyarov, commander of the ABTV NWF:
“For the most part, counterattacks were carried out by our troops frontally, often scatteredly, without concentrating the main efforts on decisive directions, against undisturbed and strong enemy groups. The enemy had good results aerial reconnaissance. Hitler's pilots quickly discovered the regroupings and concentrations of our troops, especially they monitored the movements of tank formations."
K.K. Rokossovsky, in June 1941, commander of the 9th mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front:
“From the very first day of the war, the troops of this district (KOVO) turned out to be completely unprepared to meet the enemy. Their deployment did not correspond to the situation of a clear threat of a possible attack created near our border. Many formations did not have the required set of ammunition and artillery, the latter was taken to training grounds located near border itself, and left there. What happened on June 22 was not included in any plans, so the troops were taken by surprise in the full sense of the word. The loss of contact between the district headquarters and the troops aggravated the difficult situation. They died in unequal battle good tank personnel, selflessly performing the role of infantry in battles. Even when the directions of the main attacks inflicted by the German troops, as well as their grouping and forces, were completely clear, the district command turned out to be unable to take responsibility and make a fundamental decision to save the situation, to save most of the troops from complete defeat, pulling them back old fortified area."
Major Baranov's tank battalion takes positions in the Crimean Wall area. The open hatch in the upper turret hatch is intended for flag communications and the launch of signal flares. October 1941.
We will not touch on the causes of defeats that are of a strategic nature - a lot of literature is devoted to them, especially in last years. The reasons for the failures at the operational-tactical level were assessed back in 1941. In documents not intended for wide use, they were presented in exhaustive detail. As an example, here is the report of the assistant commander of the troops Mr. tank Volsky's troops to the deputy NPO of the USSR Mr. Fedorenko dated August 5, 1941. In it we're talking about about the actions of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, but its conclusions can be extended to the corps of other fronts. In this document, the main reasons for the rapid failure of tank units are named:
"1. From the very first day of the war, the mechanized corps were misused, because they were all assigned to the armies...
2. Everything fighting mechanized corps took place without thorough reconnaissance; some units were completely unaware of what was happening in the immediate vicinity. There was absolutely no aviation reconnaissance in the interests of MK. The control of the mechanized corps by the combined arms commanders was poorly managed, the formations were scattered (8 microns) and were separated from each other by the time of the offensive. The army headquarters were completely unprepared to manage such large mechanized formations as the mechanized corps...
3. The army headquarters completely forgot that the material unit has certain operating hours, that it requires inspection, minor repairs, additional replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and the technical staff and the chiefs of the ABTO armies did not tell them this, and instead of withdrawing the mechanized corps after completing the task Having given them the time necessary for this purpose, the combined arms commanders only demanded give and nothing more. The mechanized corps had absolutely no cover both on the march and on the battlefield.
4. Information from top to bottom, as well as with neighbors, was delivered very poorly. From the first day the war took on a maneuverable character, the enemy turned out to be more mobile...
That's all for combined arms commanders. But there were many shortcomings made directly and by the commanders of mechanized units and formations. These include:
1. The headquarters of MK, etc. have not yet acquired the proper operational-tactical outlook. They couldn't do correct conclusions and did not completely understand the intentions of the army and front command.
2. There was no maneuverability - there was lethargy, slowness in solving problems.
3. Actions, as a rule, were in the nature of frontal attacks, which led to unnecessary loss of material and personnel...
4. Inability to organize the combat formations of the corps in directions, to cover the enemy’s routes of movement, and the latter mainly moved along the roads.
5. There was no desire to deprive the enemy of the possibility of supplying fuel and ammunition. Ambushes in the main directions of his operations were not practiced.
6. Large ones were not used settlements to destroy the enemy and the inability to act in them.
7. Management, starting from the platoon commander to senior commanders, was poor, the radio was poorly used, covert command and control of troops was poorly established...
8. Crew training in matters of preserving materiel is extremely poor. There have been cases when crews abandoned vehicles containing ammunition, there were individual cases when the crews left the cars and left on their own.
9. In all units and formations there were no evacuation means, and those available could provide MK, etc. only in offensive operations.
10. Personnel new technology have not mastered, especially KB and T-34, and are completely untrained in performing repairs in the field.
It is difficult to add anything to these conclusions, we can only confirm specific facts. Here are just a few:
In the 8th TD of the 4th MK SWF, the crews destroyed 107 tanks, including 25 KB, 31 T-34. 18 T-34s disappeared altogether for an unknown reason.
During the withdrawal, 140 tanks were abandoned in the 10th TD of the 15th MK of the Southwestern Front, of which 34 KB and 9 T-34. 6 cars were missing.
The 7th TD of the 6th MK Polar Fleet lost 63 tanks to air strikes on June 22 alone.
The 13th TD of the 5th MK Polar Fleet stopped due to lack of fuel in the midst of a counterattack. The TDs of the 6th, 11th, 12th and other MCs found themselves in the same position.
In July, the 5th and 7th Mk Polar Fleet launched a counterattack on terrain completely unsuitable for tank operations, which led to heavy losses.
The 22nd TD of the 14th MK Polar Fleet, stationed in Brest, lost most of its tanks and artillery as a result of artillery shelling on the morning of June 22. Depots of fuel and lubricants and ammunition were destroyed.
The 23rd and 28th TDs of the 12th MK Northwestern Front, participating in a counterattack against the Tilsit group, entered the battle at different times, there was no coordination of actions. The 28th Tank Division also found itself without fuel and lubricants and was forced to remain inactive for half a day.
KB, destroyed by an explosion of ammunition.
T-34 after the battle with German tanks. There are many holes in the side, traces of fire are visible. The support roller was torn out, and the explosion of the ammunition demolished the turret hatch and fan.
To be continued...
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Using the document shared by uv. Maxim Kolomiets, we managed to find out the serial number of the shielded tank KV-1 No. 20 and clarify the reason for its loss. Previously, from other documents of the 21st Mechanized Corps, it was known that one KV tank was destroyed and burned in the Bukmuiža region (the modern name of Ezernieki).
Pictures of the tank were signed as Dagda and, in famous selection photographs of a German from the 122nd Infantry Division, like Zilupe, and Bukmuiza is located between these cities.
As it has now become known, on July 2, 1941, the KV-1 tank was left in the Bukmuiža area with its manager. No. 4793. While on the march, the tank ran out of fuel. As we can see in the photographs, it was not possible to blow up the tank.
Below I will give a number of quotes from combat reports to highlight the situation with fuel in the 21st Mechanized Corps:
on 26.06. " ...ammunition and fuel are extremely limited. I ask you to send
".
at 3.00 28.06. " in parts of fuel there is an average of 1/4 filling. Tanks cannot be used - there is no fuel
".
30.06. "...there are 20 KVs on the way, which, due to lack of gas oil, were not brought to the front
".
Apparently, at least some of the KV tanks from the heavy battalion of the 42nd TD reached the Dagdy area in early July and, judging by the presence of battle damage on tank No. 20, took part in the battles.
Some uncertainty remains with the date of loss. The tank was probably abandoned on July 3 or even 4, 1941. It is known that the tank from the manager. No. 4793 was sent from LKZ to the station only at 15.30 on June 30. Novosokolniki. On July 2, there were no battles in the Bukmuiža area yet.
The situation as of 13.00 on July 3 is set out in combat order No. 9 of the commander of the 21st mechanized corps. I will give an excerpt here:
"1. On the morning of July 2, 1941, the enemy launched an offensive on the front of Somerset, Rageli and from the direction of Kraslava, broke through the front in the sector of the airborne brigade and the 185th motorized rifle division at the line of Exty, Somerset. Its advanced motorized units were spotted at Andrupene at 7:20 a.m. and at Chornai at 9:00 a.m. on July 3, 1941.
2. The 21st mechanized corps, holding back the enemy with rearguard units, begin to retreat sequentially along the lines, avoiding defeat order of battle in parts
".
Below in the order is the route for the 42nd Panzer Division:
" 8. The commander of the 42nd Tank Division, following in the rear, organizes strong covering detachments of infantry, tanks and artillery, delaying the enemy at the withdrawal lines. Left side detachment along the route Dagda, Bukmuiza, Vecsloboda, Zilupe...".
The withdrawal of KV tanks was led by the deputy commander of the 42nd TD for combat units, Colonel Bulakh. Even lower in the same order:
"12. KV tanks, under the command and responsibility of Colonel Bulakh, should be brought to Sebezh, later to Opochka
".
Corrections and additions are welcome.
21st Mechanized Corps.
Formed in March-June 1941 in the Moscow Military District from the personnel and equipment of the 24th Light Tank Brigade, 1st Special Cavalry Brigade, 1st Motorized Rifle Moscow Red Banner Division, 185th Infantry Division, 452nd Howitzer artillery regiment.
As of June 22, 1941, the corps consisted of only 98 light tanks (BT-7 and T-26) and 30 flamethrower tanks. However, starting on June 23, 1941, the corps' combat power increased due to the acquisition of over 100 guns and two tank battalions (both included in the corps on June 24, 1941), armed with one hundred and five BT-7s and two T-34s. And subsequently with Kirov plant Several KV-2 heavy tanks also arrived.
IN active army from June 22, 1941 to September 5, 1941.
Combat strength and deployment as of June 22, 1941:
- corps headquarters, 42nd tank and 185th motorized division - in the village of Idritsa, Sebezh region at that time Kalinin (now Tver), and now modern Pskov region;
- 46th Tank Division - in the regional city of Opochka at that time in the Kalinin (now Tver) region, and now in the modern Pskov region.
On June 23, 1941, the military camps of the corps became the target of an enemy airstrike, as a result of which some of the military warehouses were destroyed, plus the ranks of the personnel were killed and wounded.
On June 25, 1941, the corps received the task of moving to Daugavpils, where they would organize defenses and occupy defenses along the riverbed Western Dvina north of Daugavpils - at the Nitsgale-Krāslava border.
The march took place under conditions of powerful enemy air attacks.
The corps arrived in Daugavpils on June 27, 1941, but the 56th Motorized Corps of the Wehrmacht was already here.
On June 28, 1941, the 21st Mechanized Corps began the assault on Daugavpils, with the 42nd Tank Division attacking the city from the southeast, and the 185th Motorized Division advancing to its right. Some units and subunits managed to break into the city, but by the end of the day they were driven out of here by the 8th Panzer Division and the 3rd Motorized Divisions of the Wehrmacht.
By the beginning of the day on June 29, 1941, the 46th Tank Division was removed from the corps and reassigned to the Combined Group of Lieutenant General S.D. Akimova.
As of June 30, 1941, there were: the 42nd Tank Division - 270 people with 14 guns and 7 tanks, the 46th Tank Division - 400 people with 7 guns, the 185th Motorized Division - 2259 people with 56 guns (in including 33 anti-tank ones).
From July 5, 1941 - on vacation in the Sebezh region. But already on July 7, 1941, he received an order to move to the area of Usadishte, Barsuki, Selivanovo, where on the same day he took part in an unsuccessful counterattack in the general direction of Strelkino, Marshavitsy, Gubino, after which he retreated to a line located 15-25 kilometers away northwest of the city of Novorzhev...
As a combat unit, the corps ceased to exist in August 194, but de jure - from September 5, 1941.
On February 12, 1941, a new mobilization plan"Mobplan-23" or otherwise called "MP-41".
According to this plan, it was assumed that the peacetime army would have 2 motorized rifle, 60 tank and 30 motorized divisions. This actually meant the creation of another 20 new mechanized corps, which began in February - March 1941.
According to MP-41, among the existing and formed 30 mechanized corps in February 1941, 19 mechanized corps of the “first stage” and 11 mechanized corps of the “second stage” (“reduced strength”) were identified.
Of the 11 mechanized corps of the “second stage,” four mechanized corps were operational formations from the existing tank fleet of the military districts:
23rd MK (ORVO, 161 tank),
25th MK (HVO, 163 tanks),
26th MK (SKVO, 125 tanks),
27th MK (SAVO, 308 tanks).
The remaining seven were deployed in the rear areas of border military districts (two in KOVO - 19th and 24th, three in Western Military District - 13th, 17th, 20th, one in OdVO - 18th, one in Moscow Military District - 21st).
The supply of additional tank equipment for 1941 was provided only for the 13th, 17th, 19th, 24th mechanized corps (a total of about 500 vehicles, including 324 tanks for the 13th MK ZapVO).
The reason is quite simple - there simply were not the required number of tanks for all 30 mechanized corps. In the same “Mobplan No. 23” it was noted that 13,012 vehicles were required to deploy new mechanized corps, but during 1941 only about 3,650 tanks could be supplied.
Therefore, it is quite logical that the main task of forming mechanized corps of the “second stage, reduced strength” was to create formations “although not fully provided with material, but allowing to train personnel ... and put them together as combat organisms.” That is, these were training units that were supposed to be equipped with tanks and equipment at the right time. But as history has shown, the 4 months allotted to them by fate were completely insufficient to “knit them together as fighting organisms” - they had the opportunity to acquire the necessary experience directly in cruel and bloody battles.
On March 8, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the appointment of commanders to the newly formed mechanized corps, tank and motorized divisions.
Major General Nikolai Yakovlevich Kirichenko (until that moment - commander of the 10th Cavalry Division) was appointed commander of the 26th Mechanized Corps.
Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Grigory Mikhailovich Mikhailov, who had just completed his studies at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army named after I.V. Stalin, was appointed commander of the 52nd Tank Division.
The 26th Mechanized Corps (military unit 7476) began to form on March 18, 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District with the corps command and control stationed in the city of Armavir.
The formation of mechanized corps was regulated by Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated July 6, 1940 No. 1193-464ss, which stated:
“The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:
1. Approve the organization of the mechanized corps consisting of two tank divisions, a motorized division, a motorcycle regiment, one air squadron, a road battalion and a corps communications battalion.
The mechanized corps will be given one air brigade consisting of 2 short-range bomber and one fighter air regiments.
2. Approve the organization of a tank division of a mechanized corps and a separate tank division consisting of:
a) 2 tank regiments, one battalion of heavy tanks (each), 2 battalions of medium tanks and a battalion of flamethrower tanks in each regiment;
b) one motorized regiment consisting of 3 rifle battalions and one 6-gun battery of regimental artillery;
c) one artillery regiment consisting of 2 divisions: one division of 122 mm howitzers and one division of 152 mm howitzers;
G) anti-aircraft division, reconnaissance battalion, bridge battalion and rear service units...
4. Approve the staffing level:
a) control of a mechanized corps with a motorcycle regiment on Peaceful time- 2,662 people, and on war time- 2,862 people;
b) a tank division in peacetime - 10,943 people, and in wartime - 11,343 people ... "
The 26th Mechanized Corps included three divisions:
52nd Tank,
56th Tank,
103rd Motorized,
as well as the 28th Motorcycle Regiment, 548th separate battalion communications, the 88th separate motorized engineering battalion and the 126th separate corps air squadron.
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