Many significant events in the life of the state are often shrouded in legends. There are mythical characters in the First Chechen War. Among them is the never-missing sniper Volodya Yakut.
There is a version that he was the real Russian shooter Vladimir Maksimovich Kolotov. By nationality, he was allegedly Evenk or Yakut, and representatives of these nationalities are excellent hunters and shooters. Because of his origin, the sniper received the call sign “Yakut”.
Legend Details
According to distribution among personnel Russian army Legend Volodya Yakut was very young, only 18 years old. They say that he went to fight in Chechnya as a volunteer, and before that he allegedly asked for “permission” from General Lev Rokhlin. In the military unit, Volodya Yakut chose a Mosin carbine as his personal weapon, choosing for it an optical sight dating back to World War II - from the German Mauser 98k.
In general, Vladimir was distinguished by his amazing unpretentiousness and dedication. He literally plunged into the thick of things. The only request that Volodya Yakut made to the soldiers of his unit was to leave him food, water and ammunition in an appointed place. The sniper was famous for some kind of fantastic elusiveness. The Russian military learned about its location only from radio interceptions.
The first such place was a square in the city of Grozny called “Minutka”. There, a sniper shot at separatists with amazing efficiency - up to 30 people a day. At the same time, he left something like a “brand name” on the dead. Volodya Yakut hit the victim straight in the eye, leaving him with no one chance for survival. Aslan Maskhadov promised a considerable reward for the murder of Kolotov, and Shamil Basayev - the Order of the ChRI.
There is also mention that the elusive Volodya Yakut was shot by Basayev’s mercenary Abubakar. The latter managed to wound the Russian sniper in the arm. Yakut stopped shooting at Chechens, misleading them about his death. A week later, Kolotov took revenge on Basayev’s mercenary for his injury. He was found dead in Grozny near the Presidential Palace. The Russian sniper did not calm down after destroying Abubakar. He continued to systematically shoot the Chechens, not allowing them to bury the mercenary according to Muslim tradition before sunset.
After this operation, Yakut reported to the command that he had killed 362 Chechen separatist, and then returned to the location of his unit. Six months later, the sniper left for his homeland. Was awarded the order. According to the main version of the legend, after the murder of General Rokhlin, Volodya went on a drinking binge and lost his mind. Alternative versions contain the story of the sniper’s meeting with President Medvedev, as well as details of the murder of Yakut by an unknown Chechen militant.
Real facts
There is no documentary evidence that could confirm the existence real person with the first and last name Vladimir Kolotov. There is also no evidence that the said person was ever awarded the order for courage. On the Internet you can find photographs of Volodya Yakut’s meeting with Medvedev, but in fact it shows Siberian Vladimir Maksimov.
In view of all these facts, we have to admit that the story of Volodya Yakut is a completely fictitious legend. At the same time, it cannot be denied that in the Russian army there were - and are - similar snipers, and equally courageous people. Volodya Yakut embodies the collective image of all these fighters. Its prototypes are considered to be Vasily Zaitsev, Fyodor Okhlopkov and many other brave soldiers who fought in Chechnya.
Some details of the legend also raise doubts: why on earth did an 18-year-old boy refuse modern weapons in favor of the old rifle; how he was able to get to a meeting with General Rokhlin, etc. All these points point to the fact that the image of the Russian sniper has been mythologized. As an epic hero, he is credited with supernatural abilities, unparalleled modesty and some kind of fantastic luck. Such heroes inspired Russian soldiers and instilled fear in the enemy.
Later legendary sniper became a hero of the series works of art. One of them is the story “I am a Russian Warrior,” published in the collection of Alexei Voronin in 1995. The legend is also spreading on the Internet in the form of all sorts of army fables told by “eyewitnesses”.
What did you do with Chechen snipers(women) in the war.
As is known in the first and second Chechen company Mostly mercenaries took part, but sometimes there were female mercenaries who fought exclusively by killing with sniper rifles. And when they caught the so-called snipers, they did this to them, it was a war and a cruel one.
For example:
The “Typhoon” special forces said that particularly militant staff colonels drowned a sniper in a well in the courtyard of the headquarters.
The Marines chopped them up with sapper blades. Here is a video where the Marine says:
She-wolves in white tights. Seventeen-year-old biathlete Lolita.
I will kill you slowly because I love you. I'll shoot you in the leg first, I promise to aim at kneecap. Then a hand. Then eggs. Don't be afraid, I am a candidate for master of sports. “I won’t miss,” the voice of the sniper Masha sounded clearly on the radio, as if she was lying somewhere very close, and not hiding hundreds of meters away.
A seventeen-year-old biathlete who came to Chechnya for
earnings from a small Ural town. She should have shot at her own people. However, she didn’t care who she aimed at. They just paid better on the other side. The contractor with whom she chatted on the walkie-talkie every night out of boredom was already accustomed to the sarcastic notes in her voice. Like the whistle of bullets from her rifle. As for "load 200". She didn't have time to kill anyone. And I didn’t earn anything. I came across a tripwire that our guys had set up in the mountains. And a day later they killed him. Headshot, bullet - 7.62. Sniper.
"White Tights" are ruthless ghosts that hit the target. They are hated. They are afraid. They are hunted. Only those who kill them know their faces.
Caught alive, these women perceive being shot on the spot, a bullet in the forehead, or instant death as the greatest mercy. After them, nothing remains, not even their real name. Only legends and curses.
True story Lolitas
A pink terry robe is tightly tied at the waist, and a transparent white scarf is on the head. She alternately fiddles with it in her hands and then brushes away a welling tear with it. Dyed blond hair, gold teeth, faded gray-green eyes and white, almost matte skin, it doesn’t seem ugly, but it will pass without you even noticing.
Every evening, when dozens of prisoners, after working in the sewing workshop, gather in front of the TV to watch the evening news, she crams into the farthest corner of the cell. “Well, he did the right thing by killing him. That’s what she needs, the bitch!” - the women shout excitedly when they see the trial of Colonel Budanov on the screen. "Yes, crush them, the bastards! Drench them in the toilet!" — the president’s favorite quote can be heard from everywhere.
“No one in the zone knows that she was a sniper in Chechnya and shot at Russian soldiers. And there is not a word about this in her criminal case, they immediately warned me in one of the women’s colonies Krasnodar region. “She doesn’t shy away from anyone, but she’s not friends with anyone either.” If you write her real name, she will be killed immediately.
It was about Lena that a terribly romantic story circulated throughout Chechnya during the first war. For her extraordinary beauty, youth and ability to shoot accurately, the militants nicknamed her Lolita. She appeared in Shamil Basayev’s detachment in 1995. I came from my native Ukraine to earn... for my wedding and dowry. However, she quickly forgot her fiancé, because she fell in love with a real “wolf,” field commander Sulima Yamadayev. Under the roar of battle and the whistle of bullets, their happiness did not last long - the “wolf” was killed, much later Aslan Maskhadov posthumously awarded him the rank of brigadier general, and the inconsolable “she-wolf” began to take revenge. Moreover, she aimed at our fighters at the “causal place”, below the belt. That's what the legend said, anyway.
“I don’t know anything about Lolita and “white tights,” Lena rolls her eyes theatrically and immediately brings her scarf to them. — And I came to Chechnya long before the war, at the very beginning of the 90s. She lived with her parents and little brother in Konstantinovka, Donetsk region, and studied well. My mother was working as a warehouse manager at the time, and my father was also not without work. True, he often took a drink from the bottle. After the 8th grade, together with Marinka, my school friend, we went to Nikolaev to study as a cook. For spring break, Marinka suggested going to Chechnya to sell clothes. We got to Prokhladny by train, and from there we got to Grozny by bus. On the train they took away our birth certificates, and I wasn’t even 16 then. They locked us in some apartment for four days and said that we couldn’t make it through the journey with our clothes alone. We practiced... Either they would take you to the field, or into the mountains - who would shoot, who would do something else - we had fun as we wanted. My girlfriend periodically disappeared somewhere, and I was sold to a new tormentor. I can’t remember all this... - and she cries. “My torment ended only when Musa heard about me and saved me. He didn't know anything about my past. For some reason I believed him.
From the MK dossier.
Musa Charaev, field commander. An active participant in the hostilities of 1994-1996, he and his squad “showed up” in many bloody skirmishes. A friend of Basayev, who often visited his house. And if before the war Charaev was a simple rural tractor driver who earned money by selling wine brought from the Kalinin winery, then after that he was the owner of a decent “piece” of the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, generously donated to him by the President of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov.
As numerous witnesses assured investigators, during the first Chechen campaign Lena walked with her head held high and a sniper rifle at the ready. About combat period her life, which she never wants to talk about, is the only documentary evidence that has survived. Red book with a photograph and her real name. Next to Basayev's signature is a modest position - nurse. During the investigation and trial, Lena did not hide the fact that in March 1995 she joined the detachment of field commander Abdul Khadzhiev-Aslambek in Argun. Although she was listed there only as a nurse, in fact she did everything they said: she washed, cooked, and sometimes, out of old memory, pleased the bearded freedom fighters. However, she did not stay in Abdul’s detachment for long.
"If only you were alive"
End of '95. Bloody raid of Salman Raduev’s gang on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoe. For two weeks the whole country did not leave their television screens, watching the development of dramatic events. Capturing the helipad. Shootings of people. A quick “visit” to the hospital, which almost ended in a repeat of Budennovsk. The ceremonial departure to Pervomayskoye in a convoy of buses along with the captured hostages. And, finally, a mysterious disappearance from the village, which was practically razed to the ground by artillery and surrounded by a triple ring of Russian troops. Among the several women who participated in that famous Raduev campaign was Lena.
This fact became known only after the arrest of Salman Raduev himself. An interesting document was found in his archives, in which he asked the head of the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny to allocate a two-room apartment for Elena P. “as an active participant in the hostilities in Kizlyar and Pervomaisky.” She got an apartment. It was then that I met Musa Charaev. The “wolf” and the “she-wolf” fell in love with each other - and this was true in the legend about Lolita.
“There was a war going on,” Lena continues. — Musa and his guys hid in the mountains, and rarely came to Ishcherskaya (a large border junction where militants sometimes rested after being wounded. - E.M.). I spoke Chechen very well. My mother-in-law immediately accepted me and even fell in love with me - she became like a mother. She prayed all the time. Looking at her, I also converted to Islam. And soon Musa and I were married by a mullah.
Having arranged her personal life, Lena finally called her parents in Konstantinovka. Her mother, who had known nothing about her for several years, fainted when she heard her voice. “If only you were alive,” she said and burst into tears. After this call, she began drinking with her father. And six months later, in the summer of 1996, the whole family was poisoned by mushrooms bought at the market. Doctors pumped out my father and brother. Lena saw her mother already in the coffin. As an active fighter and the wife of a field commander, Lolita was included in all operational reports. And she was immediately given new documents. “To pull less,” explains Lena. She used them to come home for the funeral. After the war, a son was born into the fighting family of the Charaevs. Musa still did not part with his machine gun and his soldiers, guarding the piece of oil pipeline entrusted to him. Lena was given a solid position at customs. “I cleared customs cargo, filled out paperwork, transported money to Grozny. Nothing special,” Lena is clearly being modest, because they won’t trust the treasury to just anyone. But Lena was not valued for this - she checked cargo and passenger trains, looking for “FSB agents” in them. If a person seemed suspicious to her, he was removed from the train and taken in an unknown direction. “She-wolf,” the peaceful villagers were afraid of her. “Our she-wolf! The commander is lucky,” the former militants approved. In March 1999, Musa was killed. He was found in his own car, not far from the “pipe”, with the same machine gun in his hands and two dozen bullets in his back and neck. He never found out that Lena was pregnant again - she wanted to make him happy the next day.
By order No. 101 of CRI President Maskhadov, Charaev was posthumously awarded the rank of brigadier general and his native village of Severnaya, Naursky district - the same place where he plowed the land for such a short time - was renamed Musa-Yurt. It turns out that the legend was right again.
False calculation
Baltic women, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Siberians, Ural girls, Leningrad women, Muscovites and, of course, Chechen women themselves - there is no end creepy stories about ruthless mercenary snipers who have been roaming the trenches, hospitals and newspaper pages for many years now. True, it is worth noting that the militants themselves are afraid of some fantastic and terribly hating Ossetian women, supposedly fighting on the Russian side. The most persistent myth about the “white tights” is that most of them are biathletes, and from the Baltic states. If you put together all the stories about blond beauties who spoke Russian with a pleasant light accent and shot at our soldiers, it turns out that not a single athlete who has ever held a weapon in her hands has long been left there - or has already been killed, or still fighting. However, during the first Chechen war our law enforcement agencies still tried to check one chilling the story of a Baltic sniper dropped by wounded paratroopers from a helicopter with a grenade in her vagina. The name of the mercenary biathlete was Milita Trankautene, and she became famous for castrating young Russian officers with special cynicism with well-aimed bursts. Maybe some girl fell while reaching for a cigarette from a Russian "turntable", but the body was never found. Just as they did not find any traces of a biathlete named Trankauten in the Baltic republics... The very name “white tights” comes from the white tights that fit the thighs, in which biathletes perform in competitions. Before Chechnya, they flashed in almost all the “hot spots” of the former Union, from Transnistria to Nagorno-Karabakh. However, then stories about mercenaries only caused surprise among the military. And the snipers themselves could be counted on one hand. Chechnya is another matter. Here - big war and, accordingly, completely different money. In most cases, the Chechens signed a contract with the new girl for a month. According to captured militants, before the crisis, snipers were paid up to $10,000. Sometimes they paid “to the head”; from 500 to 800 bucks were “unfastened” for a killed officer and 200 for a soldier. However, such fees were more likely to lure new mercenaries than to actually pay them - either the dollars would turn out to be counterfeit, or the field commander would think that the lady wants too much and it would be cheaper to just kill her. But all the same: in six months in Chechnya - unless, of course, the feds catch you or kill you with your own militants - you could earn money for the rest of your life. “Fatima - 170 thousand rubles, Oksana - 150 thousand, Lena - 30 (for two killed intelligence officers)” - this “pay slip” was found in the pocket of a killed sniper near the village of Bechik.
It is only in cheap films that the sniper works alone. In the worst case, he has one assistant - he will provide cover and count the dead. In the best and most common in Chechnya, “a hunter shooting from an ambush” (translated from English - E.M.), is covered by a pair of machine gunners, a machine gunner, grenade launchers, and an ammunition carrier. By the way, the role of the last member of such a mobile group is generally difficult to overestimate - thanks to him, the militants can “beat” for two hours without a break. “It’s better to undereat than not to sleep” and “you need to shoot like dancing a waltz: one-two-three - and change position, sitting still is not recommended” - the “golden rules” of every sniper, which they know on both sides . Before “lighting up”, a good “hunter” prepares 5-8 positions in advance and only then opens fire. “Find and neutralize” the enemy sniper, signalman and senior officers - combat mission has not changed since the middle of the 18th century, when the first mentions of “skirmishers” appeared in archival documents. Due to the number of wounds to the head and chest, military doctors have dubbed the current war in Chechnya a sniper war. But it begins only when troops are engaged in positional battles. — Previously, snipers were looked for among professional shooters. It was believed that accurate shooting in such work was the most important thing. But in Lately“, especially after Chechnya, we were convinced that strong nerves and the ability to hide well are still more important,” says Colonel Alexander Abin, author of the book “Tactics of using snipers in the city,” immediately classified by the FSB, teacher at the department of tactical and special training at St. Petersburg University Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. - A real sniper works primarily with his head - he knows engineering, topography, and medicine. There are few such professionals, and they improve throughout their lives. Alexey, a sniper of the elite St. Petersburg special forces, is one of them. “The most self-possessed and calm person, he never conflicts with anyone,” they say about him in the detachment.
“To aim, I need 2-3 seconds, maximum 10,” says Alexey. “I only worry when I don’t see the target.” As soon as it’s in front of my eyes, I instantly calm down and pull the trigger. A good shot comes between heartbeats, and women have a slower heart rate. It's easier for them, that's why they shoot better. By and large, biathletes need to be taught only tactics; technique is no longer needed. Athletes are hardy, and without this there is nowhere in the mountains. And they are better armed. They have SV-94 sniper rifles of 12 mm caliber, and “screw cutters”, and our same SVDshki (Dragunov sniper rifle, “workhorse” Russian snipers. - E.M.), only modernized. In addition, all their optics are anti-reflective. For now, we can only dream about such weapons.
A lieutenant colonel and a warrant officer tell how they captured a Lithuanian sniper. How she asked not to kill her. She allegedly has two children.
“They tied a grenade to his head,” says the ensign, “they pulled the pin and let him go.” Only the cowards flew in different directions.During the first armed clashes on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the winter of 1994-1995. revealed an almost complete lack of preparedness Russian troops to sniper warfare. During the fighting in Chechnya in 1995-1996, more than 26 percent of the wounds of federal troops were bullet wounds. According to some eyewitnesses, in the battles for Grozny in the 8th Army Corps at the beginning of January 1995, almost all the officers in the platoon-company link were knocked out by sniper fire. For example, in 1981 motorized rifle regiment At the beginning of January, ten soldiers and one officer remained in the ranks.
Chechen fighters prepared in advance for the defense of the city in general and for sniper warfare in particular: positions were equipped and prepared, communications were established, actions were coordinated and tactics were worked out. Dzhokhar Dudayev’s militants had enough time to prepare, and they also had enough weapons: when leaving Chechnya, the army, among other weapons, left 533 SVD sniper rifles. Chechen snipers worked very competently, efficiently and brutally. Most often, sniper pairs served as the basis of mobile fire groups, which, in addition to snipers, included two machine gunners, a machine gunner and a grenade launcher.
Our infantry turned out to be absolutely unprepared for sniper warfare in the city. There is a known case when an infantry colonel sent a whole motorized rifle company“catch” a very annoying sniper: “He’s sitting over there somewhere.”
However, not everyone has forgotten the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War. In the regiment airborne special forces In preparation for the trip to Chechnya, several sniper groups were created. During the fighting in the center of Grozny, the Volgograd corps of General Rokhlin lost up to 30 people per day from sniper fire, and after special forces snipers worked there airborne troops, losses were reduced to two people a day. By the beginning of February, most of Dudayev’s professional snipers had been destroyed - this was evidenced primarily by the changed nature of the wounds of federal troops.
Nevertheless, the conclusion of the first month of fighting showed that Russian soldiers were forced to start from scratch again and, at the cost of their blood, learn what they should have been taught long before the fighting.
At the end of the “first Chechen war,” our military leadership made the logical conclusion that the sniper war was lost. For about half a century, the Russian Armed Forces did not have special training units for snipers, as a result of which their experience was lost tactical application. The troops have neither weapons that meet modern requirements nor equipment for a military sniper.
A clear confirmation of how effective professionally trained sniper personnel are is the combat practice of Russian sniper personnel. training center in Solnechnogorsk (in the army it is usually called simply “K-43” - after the number of the order on its creation). This training unit was created in September 1999 by directive of the Commander-in-Chief Ground Forces. To staff the sniper school, officers most trained in the field of sniping were sent from the districts to its disposal. Selected personnel underwent 6 months of training and received the rank of sniper instructor. The main task of the Solnechnogorsk training company is to train instructors for sniper schools in military districts, develop curricula and in-depth development of tactical actions of single snipers and sniper groups in various types military operations.
Soldiers also study in the training company conscript service who have passed strict qualification selection. "K-43" regularly sends its students to undergo combat training in the Chechen Republic. According to media reports mass media, near Bamut during the counter-terrorism campaign in Chechen Republic snipers killed 44 militants, including 16 junior commanders, 3 leading field commanders and 12 instructors, including 7 foreign mercenaries; 8 units of equipment were disabled. During the assault on Grozny in the spring of 2000, this unit destroyed 51 militants, including 30 mid-level field commanders, 8 leading field commanders, 6 mercenary instructors; 20 units of equipment were disabled. During the entire period of hostilities in the spring and summer of 2000, Russian riflemen eliminated 28 Chechen snipers, thereby saving the lives of dozens of soldiers.
Today, the Solnechnogorsk training company is engaged in summarizing experience, improving application tactics and other issues in the development of sniping. In addition to training instructors for other schools in Solnechnogorsk, they create combat training programs for snipers for various military units, develop tactics for using snipers and entire sniper groups in various types of combat and on various terrain, and determine the needs for sniper weapons and equipment.
In terms of the development of tactics, this war has given a lot; now it is important not to lose the combat experience paid for in blood. One of specific features fighting in the North Caucasus region is the massive use of snipers in guerrilla warfare. During the fighting in Dagestan and Chechnya (1999-2000), the scale and effectiveness were such that the Russian military rightly spoke of a “sniper war.” Chechen riflemen used not only standard weapons Russian production(SVD and VSS), but also assault rifles equipped with optics, as well as sporting rifles adapted for sniping.
The typical armament of a militant squad consisting of 9-10 people is 6 Kalashnikov assault rifles of various modifications (7.62 mm AKM or AKMS), 1 manual or single machine gun(7.62 mm RPK, 5.45 mm RPK-74 or 7.62 mm PKM), 1 RPG-7 grenade launcher, 4-5 disposable grenade launchers (RPG-18, RPG-22 or RPG-26) and one sniper SVD rifle.
The main methods of combat operations of illegal armed groups are shelling of garrisons, outposts, checkpoints and security posts; carrying out attacks (raids); setting up ambushes; committing acts of sabotage and terrorism; capture of important objects and hostages.
When carrying out shelling, groups of 10 to 50 people are allocated. Most often, shelling is carried out at night, using all types of weapons available, including snipers.
Ambushes are most often carried out on roads or likely routes of movement of federal troops with the aim of destroying personnel, capturing prisoners, weapons and materiel; sniper groups They are usually part of a fire group that ensures the destruction of manpower and destruction of equipment, and a group that impedes the enemy’s maneuver.
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| In the mountains, a sniper has special tactics |
During the fighting on the territory of Dagestan (August-September 1999) Chechen militants The characteristic tactical methods of using snipers were actively used. In particular, they practiced capturing dominant heights, the most advantageous routes, passes and positioning long-range fire weapons there, including snipers. Small fire groups consisting of a mortar crew, a grenade launcher and a sniper pair were often used. At the same time, snipers fired under the cover of sounds from mortar and grenade launcher shots from caves and other shelters. When retreating, the militants used combined covering fire groups - 1-2 mortar crews, 2 crews heavy machine guns, 2 snipers, 2 grenade launchers, 1-2 AGS-17 crews.
A little later, when conducting military operations on the territory of the Chechen Republic (November 1999), illegal armed groups used guerrilla warfare methods. Just as during the first Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, without coming into direct contact with federal forces, illegal armed groups preferred to operate in small groups of 3-5 people, including a grenade launcher, a sniper, a machine gunner and 1-2 machine gunners. In many cases, this group also included sappers who mined the position after the group left. The principle of their actions is very simple: the main group opens fire (sometimes not even aimed) at the object federal forces, and the sniper, under the cover of the noise of battle, selects targets and destroys them.
The militants did not count on great results, being content with short, but frequent and successful shelling without losses on their part. Snipers often took up positions in trees. Not far from the shooters (in a circle or square forest area) there were observers who discovered targets and directed sniper fire at them.
Particular attention is drawn to the tactics of the so-called “combat trios”, consisting of a sniper, a grenade launcher and a machine gunner. This method of combat was perfected by Chechen fighters during the first assault on Grozny in the winter of 1995. On the ground, such a trio is located dispersedly. The machine gunner begins the battle by firing at the enemy and thereby causing fire on himself; the sniper identifies firing points that have indicated themselves with fire and destroys them; a grenade launcher, using the noise of battle as cover, hits armored vehicles and vehicles.
When defending a site, immediately before the start of artillery bombardment by federal forces or during air strikes, groups of militants made a quick dash towards Russian troops into a safe zone and hid in the area. After the start of the attack by federal troops, the militants shot the soldiers almost point-blank - from a distance of 100-150 meters. At the same time, the snipers sought to destroy the command staff and active soldiers and sergeants in the first minutes of the battle in order to sow panic.
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| Sniper of the first Chechen... |
Sniper groups are most effectively used by militants when fighting in locality. First of all, they incapacitate officers, drivers and radio operators. Each sniper operates under the cover of five to six militants, one of whom is at least a grenade launcher. Firing positions are usually chosen according to the classical principle - on the middle floors of buildings, in the depths of rooms. Breaks in the walls of houses are widely used. Submachine gunners occupy the lower floors, and grenade launchers are located on the upper level.
A very common technique among Chechen snipers is when, in order to destroy as much as possible more He first “shoots” one soldier (usually wounded in a limb), then immobilizes the comrades who came to his aid in the same way, and in the end methodically finishes off everyone.
Lone snipers were also used. These people, as a rule, professionals, planned their actions in detail in advance, choosing the most advantageous, unobtrusive positions in the attics and upper floors of houses (usually in corner apartments - from there it is convenient to fire in several directions). At prepared positions, caches of weapons and ammunition were installed.
As another characteristic feature war in Chechnya, it should be noted that the militants used special Russian-made sniper weapons - large caliber rifle OSV-96 and silent rifles VSS and VSK-94.
The sniper war in Chechnya through the eyes of a modern journalist: “Night. A pleasant time to work. The night sight, “fifty-one,” is an excellent thing, you can see everything through it. Last time, at a long distance, I shot at a Niva with militants, and inserted a clip into it. Who he got and who he didn’t is unknown, but he ruined the raspberries for them. According to information, in this house where the car drove up there was a gangster burial place. ... But this night is not like that at all. It is divided into seconds. The “night light” hurts the eye unbearably , but you can’t tear yourself away. Every second Oleg waits for a shot. Below, under the hill where they sat down with the radio operator, with the “Crossbow” radio station, there is a small factory. There is a sniper there, who has managed to do enough damage to ours. The task is to identify him, nothing more. At his own peril and risk, Truba decided to work in his own way. To spot this bastard - what's the point if he immediately changes position. We must try to hit the flash. This is the most difficult option, but if you're lucky, you can't think of anything better. There is no order to shoot, but he has been waiting for the moment for an hour and a half, without looking up from the sight... The radio operator is silent next to him, insuring him with a machine gun.
Finally he did wait. The flash of a shot flashed through the opening of a ribbed, duralumin-type hangar. He immediately took aim and sent the bullet there. The distance is about 350 meters. At that moment, he managed to take into account the fact that he needed to hit not at the flash itself, because it was the trunk, but slightly to the side, where the head of this creature should be. Or, at worst, the body. You can clearly hear the bullet passing through the thin wall. He hits the intended point. It is impossible to verify the defeat. He and the radio operator immediately run away so as not to fall under a very possible retaliatory strike. The sniper could easily work with cover. The job was done. No one else from the factory did anything dirty..." (O. Kolomiets. "It was not all in vain, sniper..." - Soldier of Fortune, 2001, No. 6).
And yet, despite all the difficulties, Russian snipers proved their skills many times in this war. In particular, sniper Alexander Chernyshov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for his courage and heroism shown during the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic.
How can a sniper survive and win on the battlefield? What is the secret to training an elite marksman? What weapons, what skills are needed to fulfill the covenants of A.S. Suvorov and the defenders of Stalingrad: “Shoot rarely, but accurately!”; “A sniper is a hunter. The enemy is a beast. Track him down and lure him out under fire. The enemy is cunning - be more cunning than him. He is resilient - be more persistent than him. Your profession is art. You can do what others cannot. Russia is behind you. You will win because you must win!
This book is not only an in-depth study of sniper business over two centuries, in both world wars, numerous local conflicts and secret intelligence operations, but also an encyclopedia of sniper rifles for military, police and special purpose, as well as ammunition for them and optical sights. Just as snipers themselves are the elite of the armed forces, so are sniper rifles the “major league” small arms. As much as sniper training is superior to the usual “young fighter course,” sniper weapons are more expensive, more complex, and more demanding than mass-produced models. In this book you will find comprehensive information about weapons and training of shooters, their tactics and combat use, sniper duels and counter-sniper combat, about the past, present and future of the main martial arts.
Sniper war in Chechnya
Sniper war in Chechnya
During the very first armed clashes on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the winter of 1994/95, the almost complete unpreparedness of Russian troops for sniper warfare was revealed. During the fighting in Chechnya in 1995–1996, more than 26% of the wounds of federal troops were bullet wounds. According to some eyewitnesses, in the battles for Grozny in the 8th Army Corps at the beginning of January 1995, almost all the officers in the platoon-company link were knocked out by sniper fire. For example, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment at the beginning of January there were ten soldiers and one officer left in the ranks.
Chechen fighters prepared in advance for the defense of the city in general and for sniper warfare in particular: positions were equipped and prepared, communications were established, actions were coordinated and tactics were worked out. Dzhokhar Dudayev’s militants had enough time to prepare, and they also had enough weapons: when leaving Chechnya, the army, among other weapons, left 533 SVD sniper rifles. Chechen snipers worked very competently, efficiently and brutally. Most often, sniper pairs served as the basis of mobile fire groups, which, in addition to snipers, included two machine gunners, a machine gunner and a grenade launcher.
During the first armed clashes on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the winter of 1994-1995. The Russian troops were almost completely unprepared for sniper warfare. During the fighting in Chechnya in 1995-1996, more than 26 percent of the wounds of federal troops were bullet wounds. According to some eyewitnesses, in the battles for Grozny in the 8th Army Corps at the beginning of January 1995, almost all the officers in the platoon-company link were knocked out by sniper fire. For example, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment at the beginning of January there were ten soldiers and one officer left in the ranks.
Chechen fighters prepared in advance for the defense of the city in general and for sniper warfare in particular: positions were equipped and prepared, communications were established, actions were coordinated and tactics were worked out. The militants of Dzhokhar Dudayev had enough time to prepare, too: when leaving Chechnya, the army, among other weapons, left 533 SVD sniper rifles. Chechen snipers worked very competently, efficiently and brutally. Most often, sniper pairs served as the basis of mobile fire groups, which, in addition to snipers, included two machine gunners, a machine gunner and a grenade launcher.
Chechnya. Fight in city neighborhoods
Our infantry turned out to be absolutely unprepared for sniper warfare in the city. There is a known case when an infantry colonel sent an entire motorized rifle company to “catch” a very annoying sniper: “He’s sitting over there somewhere.”
However, the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War has not been forgotten everywhere. In preparation for the mission to Chechnya, several sniper groups were created in the Airborne Special Forces Regiment. During the fighting in the center of Grozny, the Volgograd corps of General Rokhlin lost up to 30 people a day from sniper fire, and after snipers of the special forces of the airborne troops worked there, the losses were reduced to two people a day. By the beginning of February, most of Dudayev’s professional snipers had been destroyed - this was evidenced primarily by the changed nature of the wounds of federal troops.
Nevertheless, the conclusion of the first month of fighting showed that Russian soldiers were forced to start from scratch again and, at the cost of their blood, learn what they should have been taught long before the fighting.
At the end of the “first Chechen war,” our military leadership made the logical conclusion that the sniper war was lost. For about half a century, the Russian Armed Forces did not have special training units for snipers, as a result of which experience in their tactical use was lost. The troops have neither weapons that meet modern requirements nor equipment for a military sniper.
12.7 mm self-loading rifle OSV-96 – good weapon for long distance work. Its fighting qualities are especially pronounced in the mountains.
A clear confirmation of how highly effective professionally trained sniper personnel are can be seen in the combat practice of the personnel of the Russian sniper training center in Solnechnogorsk (in the army it is usually called simply “K-43” - after the number of the order on its creation). This training unit was created in September 1999 by directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. To staff the sniper school, officers most trained in the field of sniping were sent from the districts to its disposal. Selected personnel underwent 6 months of training and received the rank of sniper instructor. The main task of the Solnechnogorsk training company is to train instructors for sniper schools in military districts, develop training programs and in-depth development of tactical actions of single snipers and sniper groups in various types of combat operations.
Conscripts who have passed strict qualification selection also study in the training company. "K-43" regularly sends its students to undergo combat training in the Chechen Republic. According to media reports, near Bamut during the counter-terrorism campaign in the Chechen Republic, snipers killed 44 militants, including 16 junior commanders, 3 leading field commanders and 12 instructors, including 7 foreign mercenaries; 8 units of equipment were disabled. During the assault on Grozny in the spring of 2000, this unit destroyed 51 militants, including 30 mid-level field commanders, 8 leading field commanders, 6 mercenary instructors; 20 units of equipment were disabled. During the entire period of hostilities in the spring and summer of 2000, Russian riflemen eliminated 28 Chechen snipers, thereby saving the lives of dozens of soldiers.
Today, the Solnechnogorsk training company is engaged in summarizing experience, improving application tactics and other issues in the development of sniping. In addition to training instructors for other schools in Solnechnogorsk, they create combat training programs for snipers for various military units, develop tactics for using snipers and entire sniper groups in various types of combat and on various terrain, and determine the needs for sniper weapons and equipment.
Chechnya. Sniper internal troops. April 1995
In terms of the development of tactics, this war has given a lot; now it is important not to lose the combat experience paid for in blood. One of the specific features of the fighting in the North Caucasus region is the massive use of snipers in guerrilla warfare. During the fighting in Dagestan and Chechnya (1999-2000), the scale and effectiveness were such that the Russian military rightly spoke of a “sniper war.” Chechen riflemen used not only standard Russian-made weapons (SVD and VSS), but also machine guns equipped with optics, as well as sporting rifles adapted for sniping.
The typical armament of a militant squad consisting of 9-10 people is 6 Kalashnikov assault rifles of various modifications (7.62 mm AKM or AKMS), 1 light or single machine gun (7.62 mm RPK, 5.45 mm RPK-74 or 7.62 mm PKM), 1 RPG-7 grenade launcher, 4-5 disposable grenade launchers (RPG-18, RPG-22 or RPG-26) and one sniper rifle SVD.
The main methods of combat operations of illegal armed groups are shelling of garrisons, outposts, checkpoints and security posts; carrying out attacks (raids); setting up ambushes; committing acts of sabotage and terrorism; capture of important objects and hostages.
When carrying out shelling, groups of 10 to 50 people are allocated. Most often, shelling is carried out at night, using all types of weapons available, including snipers.
Ambushes are most often carried out on roads or likely routes of movement of federal troops with the aim of destroying personnel, capturing prisoners, weapons and materiel; sniper groups are usually part of a fire group that ensures the destruction of manpower and destruction of equipment, and a group that prevents the enemy from maneuvering.
In the mountains, a sniper has special tactics
During the fighting on the territory of Dagestan (August-September 1999), Chechen militants actively used characteristic tactical methods of using snipers. In particular, they practiced capturing dominant heights, the most advantageous routes, passes and positioning long-range fire weapons there, including snipers. Small fire groups consisting of a mortar crew, a grenade launcher and a sniper pair were often used. At the same time, snipers fired under the cover of sounds from mortar and grenade launcher shots from caves and other shelters. When retreating, the militants used combined cover fire groups - 1-2 mortar crews, 2 heavy machine gun crews, 2 snipers, 2 grenade launchers, 1-2 AGS-17 crews.
A little later, when conducting military operations on the territory of the Chechen Republic (November 1999), illegal armed groups used guerrilla warfare methods. Just as during the first Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, without coming into direct contact with federal forces, illegal armed groups preferred to operate in small groups of 3-5 people, including a grenade launcher, a sniper, a machine gunner and 1-2 machine gunners. In many cases, this group also included sappers who mined the position after the group left. The principle of their actions is very simple: the main group opens fire (sometimes not even aimed) at a federal forces facility, and the sniper, under the cover of the noise of battle, selects targets and destroys them.
The militants did not count on great results, being content with short, but frequent and successful shelling without losses on their part. Snipers often took up positions in trees. Not far from the shooters (in a circle or square of the forest) there were observers who identified targets and directed sniper fire at them.
Particular attention is drawn to the tactics of the so-called “combat trios”, consisting of a sniper, a grenade launcher and a machine gunner. This method of combat was perfected by Chechen fighters during the first assault on Grozny in the winter of 1995. On the ground, such a trio is located dispersedly. The machine gunner begins the battle by firing at the enemy and thereby causing fire on himself; the sniper identifies firing points that have indicated themselves with fire and destroys them; a grenade launcher, using the noise of battle as cover, hits armored vehicles and vehicles.
When defending a site, immediately before the start of artillery bombardment by federal forces or during air strikes, groups of militants made a quick dash towards Russian troops into a safe zone and hid in the area. After the start of the attack by federal troops, the militants shot the soldiers almost point-blank - from a distance of 100-150 meters. At the same time, the snipers sought to destroy the command staff and active soldiers and sergeants in the first minutes of the battle in order to sow panic.
Sniper of the first Chechen...
Sniper groups are most effectively used by militants when fighting in a populated area. First of all, they incapacitate officers, drivers and radio operators. Each sniper operates under the cover of five to six militants, one of whom is at least a grenade launcher. Firing positions are usually chosen according to the classical principle - on the middle floors of buildings, in the depths of rooms. Breaks in the walls of houses are widely used. Submachine gunners occupy the lower floors, and grenade launchers are located on the upper level.
A very common technique among Chechen snipers is when, in order to destroy as many people as possible, he first “shoots” one soldier (usually wounded in a limb), then in the same way immobilizes his comrades who came to his aid, and in the end methodically finishes off everyone.
Lone snipers were also used. These people, as a rule, professionals, planned their actions in detail in advance, choosing the most advantageous, unobtrusive positions in the attics and upper floors of houses (usually in corner apartments - from there it is convenient to fire in several directions). At prepared positions, caches of weapons and ammunition were installed.
Sniper Russian special forces with rifle SV-98
As another characteristic feature of the war in Chechnya, it is necessary to note the use by militants of special Russian-made sniper weapons - the OSV-96 large-caliber rifle and the VSS and VSK-94 silent rifles.
The sniper war in Chechnya through the eyes of a modern journalist: “Night. A pleasant time to work. The night sight, “fifty-one,” is an excellent thing, you can see everything through it. Last time, at a long distance, I shot at a Niva with militants, and inserted a clip into it. Who he got and who he didn’t is unknown, but he ruined the raspberries for them. According to information, in this house where the car drove up there was a gangster burial place. ... But this night is not like that at all. It is divided into seconds. The “night light” hurts the eye unbearably , but you can’t tear yourself away. Every second Oleg waits for a shot. Below, under the hill where they sat down with the radio operator, with the “Crossbow” radio station, there is a small factory. There is a sniper there, who has managed to do enough damage to ours. The task is to identify him, nothing more. At his own peril and risk, Truba decided to work in his own way. To spot this bastard - what's the point if he immediately changes position. We must try to hit the flash. This is the most difficult option, but if you're lucky, you can't think of anything better. There is no order to shoot, but he has been waiting for the moment for an hour and a half, without looking up from the sight... The radio operator is silent next to him, insuring him with a machine gun.
Finally he did wait. The flash of a shot flashed through the opening of a ribbed, duralumin-type hangar. He immediately took aim and sent the bullet there. The distance is about 350 meters. At that moment, he managed to take into account the fact that he needed to hit not at the flash itself, because it was the trunk, but slightly to the side, where the head of this creature should be. Or, at worst, the body. You can clearly hear the bullet passing through the thin wall. He hits the intended point. It is impossible to verify the defeat. He and the radio operator immediately run away so as not to fall under a very possible retaliatory strike. The sniper could easily work with cover. The job was done. No one else from the factory did anything dirty..." (O. Kolomiets. "It was not all in vain, sniper..." - Soldier of Fortune, 2001, No. 6).
And yet, despite all the difficulties, Russian snipers proved their skills many times in this war. In particular, sniper Alexander Chernyshov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for his courage and heroism shown during the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic.
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