As Jemal Paksadze, elected chief mufti of Georgian Muslims, told reporters, Georgian Sunnis and Azerbaijani Shiites decided to create a single department to resolve the spiritual issues of Georgian Muslims.
“We have made this decision and created a single department that will solve all our problems under one roof,” he said. Paksadze will also serve as mufti in five regions of Adjara, where Georgian Muslims live.
As 1news.az reports with reference to Georgian media, Vagif Akafilov was elected chief sheikh. He also noted in a conversation with reporters the importance of creating single center Muslims in Georgia to solve their problems here together.
Yasir Aliyev was elected chief imam of the Georgian Muslim Board. It should be noted that the creation of the Directorate of Muslims of Georgia was condemned by the Main Directorate of Muslims of the Caucasus, to which the Muslims of Georgia were previously subordinate and whose center is located in Baku.
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Like all Muslims, Shiitesbelieve in the messenger mission of the Prophet Muhammad. Distinctive feature Shiites are convinced that the leadership of the Muslim community should belong to Imams - appointed by God, chosen persons from among the descendants of the prophet, to whom they include Ali ibn Abu Talib and his descendants from the daughter of Muhammad Fatima, and not elected persons - caliphs. Shiites are critical of the caliphate of the first three caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman. Since, Abu Bakr was elected by a small number of companions, Umar was appointed by Abu Bakr, and Uthman was elected from the shura (council) of seven candidates who were appointed by Umar with such conditions that the election of anyone other than Uthman was not possible. According to Shiites, the election of the Leader - the Imam of the Muslim community, like the election of prophets, is the prerogative of God. Currently, followers of various Shiite communities exist in almost all Muslim, European and American countries. The Shia faith is adhered to by the overwhelming majority of the population of Iran and Azerbaijan, about two-thirds of the population of Bahrain, a third of the population of Iraq, a significant part of the population of Lebanon and Yemen, in Afghanistan - the Farsi in the west of the country and the Hazaras. The majority of the inhabitants of the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan - the Pamir peoples - belong to the Ismaili branch of Shiism. The number of Shiites in Russia is insignificant. The Tats living in the Dagestan Republic, the Lezgins of the village of Miskindzha, as well as the Azerbaijani communities of Derbent, who speak the local dialect of the Azerbaijani language, belong to this direction of Islam. In addition, Shiites are most of Azerbaijanis living in Russia (in Azerbaijan itself, Shiites make up, according to various estimates, up to 65 percent of the population).
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Sunnis (from Arabic: أهل السنة Ahl al-Sunnah as Salafiya - people of the Sunnah) are followers of the most numerous movement in Islam. There are also significant differences in the principles of legal decisions, in the nature of holidays, in attitude towards non-believers, in the details of prayers, etc.
Sunnis number more than one billion people - more than 90% of all Muslims.
The supreme power in the caliphate, according to the Sunnis, should belong to the caliphs, elected by the entire community. The Shiites recognize as legal only the instructions of the Prophet Muhammad on the transfer of power to his descendants along his line. cousin Ali. In Shiite Islam there is no church and clergy, similar, for example, to Christian ones, and Sunni theologians (ulema), unlike Shiite ones, do not enjoy the right to make their own decisions on the most important issues of religious and public life. Thus, the position of a theologian in Sunnism comes down primarily to the interpretation of sacred texts.
Answer: Most Shiites in our time belong to the so-called. Shia-imamitam (“ imami isna ash'ariya")* who share the following beliefs:
1. Belief in tahrif(distortion or inferiority) of the Quran.
Many Shia scholars believe that the Qur'an in its current state distorted and incomplete (1).
For example, At-Tabrasi, the famous Shia mufassir (interpreter of the Koran) (d. 620 AH), writes in his book Al-Ikhtiyaj:
ولو شرحت لك كلما أسقط وحرف وبدل مما يجري هذا المجرى لطال، وظهر ما يحظر التقية إظهاره من مناقب الأولياء ومثالب الأعداء
« If I could explain to you everything that has been omitted, changed and replaced in the Koran, it would be very long; and the rule of taqiyya (concealment) prohibits such disclosure."(Al-Ikhtiyaj, p. 377).
Fayz al-Kashani, another Shia mufassir (d. 1091 AH) writes in his Al-Tafsir al-Sawi after citing many reports of alleged corruptions of the Qur'an from mainstream Shia sources such as the tafsir of Ali ibn Ibrahim al-Qummi (d. 307 AH) and al-Kafi Muhammad ibn Yaqub al-Kuleni (d. 328 or 329 AH):
أقول: المستفاد من مجمع هذه الأخبار وغيرها من الروايات من طريق أهل البيت (عيهم السلام) إن القرآن الذي بين أظهرنا ليس بتمامه كما انزل على محمد (صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم) منه ما هو خلاف ما أنزل الله ومنه ما هو مغير ومحرف وإنه قد حذف عنه أشياء كثيرة منها اسم علي (عليه السلام) في كثير من المواضع ومنها غير ذلك وأنه ليس أيضا على الترتيب المرضي عند الله وعند رسوله (صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم) وبه قال علي بن إبراهيم
« I say: what we can deduce from these reports (of the above authors) and others besides them: that the Qur'an, which is now in our hands, is not the same complete Qur'an as it was revealed by Allah to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). blessing). Parts of it contradict what Allah has revealed, and parts of it have been changed or distorted (for example, Ali's name is omitted in many places). It also follows (from the above) that it (the Quran) was not compiled in the order that Allah and His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) preferred. This was stated by Ali ibn Ibrahim."
Ali ibn Ibrahim is one of the famous early Shia mufassirs. So, as can be seen, the great Shia scholars adhere to the belief that the Qur'an is corrupted.
2. Accusations against the first three Rightly Guided Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman (may Allah be pleased with them) and many other companions and wives of the Prophet(peace and blessings be upon him).
Shiites accuse the first three righteous caliphs of unjustly seizing power in the Muslim ummah (which should have supposedly belonged to Ali, may Allah be pleased with him), and many companions of distorting the religion.
We know that Abu Bakr and Umar (may Allah be pleased with them) were the closest companions and friends of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). Their self-sacrifice, bravery and support of religion are known from many historical facts. In addition, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) named them among the ten companions who were promised Paradise during their lifetime. The Shiites, however, call Abu Bakr and Umar (may Allah be pleased with them) hypocrites (munafiks) destined for hellfire, and pronounce curses and insults against them. Many Ahl-Sunnah scholars consider such beliefs to be disbelief.
Also, Shiites have a special dislike for the wife of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her), in particular, they consider her guilty of adultery (in the story with the necklace, when she was slandered, but Allah justified her) (3) .
3. The Special Role of Imam Ali and his wife Fatima (may Allah be pleased with them) - they are credited with special knowledge or qualities. Some Shiite sources even suggest that the angel Jibril mistakenly conveyed the revelation to Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) together with Ali.
When pronouncing the adhan and iqamat (call to prayer), Shiites after the words “Ashhadu anna Muhammadan rasulullah” add the words “Ashhadu anna Aliyan valiyullah (I testify that Ali is the ruler in the name of Allah).”
4. Imamate - belief in the special status of 12 imams(successors of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him).
Shiites believe that after the death of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), the leadership of the Islamic community passed to Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) and his descendants - the infallible imams.
The last, twelfth imam disappeared in early childhood, and as Shiites believe, he is now “in hiding” (in another world, from where he sends certain messages or instructions to the current leaders of the Shiite community - the ayatollahs). He, according to the Shiites, is the Imam Mahdi expected by Muslims (who will appear shortly before doomsday). Each imam is endowed with special powers, almost equal to prophetic powers - they have explicit and hidden knowledge, can perform miracles, are as sinless as prophets, etc.
Many Shia scholars consider anyone who does not share faith in the infallible imams to be kafirs.
5. Permission of mut"a - temporary marriage. In the pagan society of pre-Islamic Arabia there was the so-called. temporary marriage - when a man could marry a woman for a certain period of time (a week, a month, even one hour) for a certain fee. Such a marriage remained permitted for some time after the revelation, but was then prohibited by the Almighty through the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), who said:
« People, I [was] allowed you a temporary marriage [during the period of long and lengthy campaigns]. But, truly, the Lord forbade it until the End of the World"(Muslim, Ahmad and al-Bayhaqi).
Imam ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib narrated: “Verily, the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) forbade mut’a (temporary marriage) on the day of Khaybar.”(Bukhari, Muslim, At-Tirmidhi).
However, Imami Shiites consider such a marriage to be permissible (and reject the hadiths in which it was prohibited). To enter into a temporary marriage, it is enough to mention mahr (in this case, this is a material reward) and stipulate the period of cohabitation. The presence of witnesses at the wedding ceremony is not a necessary condition. There are no inheritance obligations in the event of the sudden death of one of the spouses, and this “marriage” is dissolved without a divorce procedure. In fact, such a “marriage” resembles veiled adultery.
6. Taqiyya - hiding one's true beliefs. According to Sunni scholars, a Muslim is only allowed to hide his faith (and even call himself a non-Muslim) if his life is in real danger. However, according to Shia scholars, a person can hide his beliefs in many cases - if for some reason it is beneficial or convenient for him.
In particular, for this reason, Shiites in Sunni society may not admit that they really share the above beliefs (denying the belief in the distortion of the Koran and assuring that they love all the Companions).
7. Shiites are also known for their the mourning ceremonies they perform on the day of Ashura, when, according to legend, Imam Hussein (may Allah be pleased with him), the grandson of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), was killed. On this day, to show their grief, many Shiites injure and mutilate themselves. Islamic scholars also condemn such things, considering them fanaticism and extremes.
It is difficult to conduct discussions with Shiites on issues of their beliefs, since they interpret the verses of the Koran in their own way, in the light of their beliefs, and collections of hadiths recognized in the Sunni world (for example, the so-called Qutub Sitta - six collections of hadiths) are not recognized since they were narrated by the Companions who they considered untrustworthy. They have their own collections of hadiths (many of which, it should be noted, are fabricated and false).
According to many Sunni scholars, people who share such beliefs cannot be called believers (4). However, it must be borne in mind that many simple people Those who call themselves Shia these days are often simply following their ancestors. Many of them have no idea about most of the above beliefs. So it is impossible to talk specifically about each Shiite - who he is, a believer or a lost one; it is necessary to analyze each case separately.
And Allah knows best.
Source Jamitul Ulama
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*In the Muslim world, Shiites live mainly in the state of Iran (where Shiite beliefs are officially accepted). In the territory former USSR and in Russia there are Shiites in Azerbaijan and in the Republic of Dagestan (for example, in Derbent).
يقول صاحب كتاب الوشيعة وهو الشيخ موسى جار الله الذي عاش بين الشيعة زمنا طويلا يدرس في حلقاتهم: القول بتحريف القرآن بإسقاط كلمات وآيات قد نزلت، وبتغيير ترتيب الكلمات أجمعت عليه كتب الشيعة. وقد لقيت في زيارتي للحوزة العلمية في قم كثيرا ممن يقول بهذا القول إما تصريحا وإما تعريضا (الفاضح لمذهب الشيعة الإمامية، ص٦٧)
Zahiraddin Ibrahimi
On May 20, Ilham Aliyev hastily flew to Riyadh. Why so hastily?.. Although he could well have avoided this event, citing the closure of the same Islamiad, which took place on the 22nd in Baku, especially since none of the leaders of Islamic countries deigned to appear at the opening of these games and send instead of himself, someone else from the ruling elite. And especially since this meeting, which took place on May 21st in Saudi Arabia, called the Arab-Islamic-American Summit, it was initially clear that it had an open anti-Iranian orientation, which was fully proven both by the speeches at this meeting and the final declaration adopted. But it turns out that Aliyev himself had to show up at this summit and let him know where he stands.
The issue that the Baku authorities want to Sunnize Azerbaijan has long been discussed within Azerbaijan and beyond its borders. Work in this direction has been carried out since the first days of the return of the now deceased worldly life Aliyev Sr. to power. All these years, the most favorable conditions were created in the country for pan-Turkists, Nursists and Wahhabis, and the Shiite clergy and activists were repressed by everyone possible methods, up to physical elimination.
If we have already touched on the topic of the Islamiada, which ended in Baku, then it is worth noting some details... It is interesting that the Islamiada was supposed to open with the sound of the Sunni azan, in a country where the majority of the population is Shiites. But after this became known to the Directorate of Muslims of the Caucasus, the leadership of the said organization immediately contacted the organizing committee of the games and the authorities, demanding that they abandon this idea. The UMC’s argument was: you are putting us in a very difficult position in front of believers and Iran. The authorities refused this not very good-naturedly, making it clear that these are precisely the goals they are pursuing, giving a kind of mess to all parties.
But at the end they voiced the Sunni kyalmaye-shahadat (making a confession of faith), without mentioning the name of the first Shiite imam - Ali ibn Abu Talib, as is customary among Shiites. To others interesting point was a message from Ilgam Aliyev regarding the opening of the games, in which he explained his love and loyalty to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, allegedly because of their position on the issue of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, and there was a subtle hint that such feelings do not extend to Iran .
Well, the Azerbaijani authorities made their choice, and made it a long time ago. And all these years they have repeatedly confirmed their choice and worked with all their might in this direction. And what about the believers of Azerbaijan themselves?.. The Azerbaijani Shiites made a number of serious mistakes, which led them to today’s difficult, but not hopeless, situation.
The first, the Shiite clergy, graduates of Iranian religious universities, rushed into the political struggle in the country without having the necessary political education for this, and, most importantly, ahead of time, when society was not yet ready to support their ideas. In a sense, there were also manipulations on the part of the Baku services, as well as the work of agents embedded in the Islamic movement. Over time, it became clear that such a policy was not agreed with the Iranian leadership, and even Tehran refused to support some activists, calling it internal matter Azerbaijan. That is, there was either the initiative of these activists, or, as we indicated above, skillful manipulation of them by third forces.
Secondly, flirting with the Islamist circles of Turkey, attempts to become on par with the Islamist movement of Turkey, faith in Erdogan, point blank not noticing Turkey’s policy of supporting Pan-Turkism, Nursism and Wahhabism, which in the end did not even want to engage in repressions against believers in Azerbaijan, and according to the reliable information we have, for his part he also demanded that Baku begin repressions against the Shiites.
Third, not carried out on the right level organizational work among Azerbaijani believers, lack of unity, both of ordinary believers and the clergy themselves, which led to the fact that when some rushed into battle, others remained on the sidelines, and some even opposed the former.
Fourth, the position taken by believers on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which was partly more radical than even the position of the Baku authorities and the pro-Western opposition. As we have emphasized repeatedly, the “Karabakh issue” was initially a matter of manipulation within Azerbaijan political struggle, to come to power and retain it. Political Islam, unfortunately, followed the same path, naively believing that by taking an even more radical position on this issue than the authorities themselves, it would be able to insure itself from the repressions of the regime. Without fully understanding how dependent the ruling clan has become on centers that despise any manifestation of Iranian influence, be it religious, national, etc. Believers in this matter did not take into account the very position of Iran, which is clearly against the start of new clashes on the Karabakh front, and regards this as nothing other than a provocation.
And also the interests of Russia, which cannot simply abandon its only military ally in the South Caucasus to the mercy of fate. And given this set of circumstances, for Russia today’s authorities in Baku look much more preferable than an unbridled crowd of fanatics who can seize power and create much more headaches than the ruling tribe. The latter skillfully took advantage of this state of affairs and began comprehensive repressions against Shiite activists and the clergy, while Iran, busy on several fronts and lacking sufficient leverage over Baku, is simply forced to contemplate what is happening under its nose in relation to its coreligionists.
And lastly, fifthly, Russia’s national interests lie not only in peace and security in the entire Caucasus, but the entire Caucasus is still included in the sphere of Russia’s national interests, and believers should this fact fully take into account and give the right signals regarding Moscow, find ways to reach it, and build your policy taking into account the interests of Russian state. And this should not be a humiliation, but look around - then they will notice that all anti-imperialist movements are trying to achieve the political patronage of the Kremlin in their struggle.
It is possible that today Russia is not yet ready to agree to the establishment of Islamic rule in Azerbaijan, but in fairness it should be noted that the Azerbaijani society itself is not yet ready for this, and this is not expected in the near future, and fortunately, the majority of Shiite activists themselves confirm they state that they do not set such goals, and on the other hand, Islamic Iran itself declares that the Velayat-Faqih system is an exclusively Iranian phenomenon, other Islamic countries should build systems suitable for their society, but the states themselves should take anti-imperialist positions against US hegemony, West and NATO.
Russia does not want the weakening of traditional Islam and the strengthening of such sectarians and radicals as the Nursists and Wahhabis, who have a terrorist underground in the North Caucasus, and, undoubtedly, remembers that these terrorists were given military and financial aid through the territory of Aliyev's Azerbaijan, and the wounded terrorists were treated in Baku hospitals. Moscow is clearly monitoring the constant and consistent inclinations of the Aliyev clan towards Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and their overseas masters, and the tilt towards the Sunnization, Nursification and Wahhabization of Azerbaijan.
And in the end... All traditional Islamic movements, which, like Russia, are fighting for a multipolar world that would balance the geopolitical thicket and create safe conditions for progress for all peoples, are simply obliged to support the Russian world in this fight so So that Russia does not fear new “stabs in the back”, it could continue this fight without looking back. And for this you need to be not in front of Russia, and not behind Russia, but next to Russia, together with Russia! Russia, in turn, through the mouth of its first person, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, has repeatedly stated that Islamic countries can always find in Russia their reliable support and patron in the struggle for a multipolar world, without dictate and hegemony of one side. Moreover, this favor should be taken advantage of by Azerbaijani believers, who are also at the forefront of the struggle against imperialism, and in front of the repressive apparatus of the Nakhichevan clan, which has long been in line with Riyadh.
The Muslim Ummah has been divided into many different currents and directions for 1,400 years. And this despite the fact that in the Holy Quran the Almighty tells us:
“Hold onto the rope of Allah and do not be separated” (3:103)
The Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) warned about the division of the Muslim community, saying that the ummah would be divided into 73 movements.
In the modern Muslim world, we can distinguish two of the largest and most influential directions of Islam that were formed after the death of the Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.) - Sunnis and Shiites.
History of the schism
The death of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) raised the question of a possible successor to the Muslim ummah as the ruler of a Muslim state, as well as the spiritual leader of believers. The majority of Muslims supported the candidacy of the closest companion of the Messenger of Allah (s.g.w.) - (r.a.), who was one of the first to accept Islam and was a companion of the Messenger of Allah (s.g.w.) throughout his prophetic mission. In addition, during the life of Muhammad (s.g.w.), Abu Bakr replaced him as an imam at collective prayers when he was not well.
However, a small part of the believers saw his son-in-law and cousin Ali ibn Abu Talib (ra) as the successor of the Final Prophet (s.a.w.). In their opinion, Ali, who grew up in the house of the Prophet (s.a.w.) and was his relative, has more rights to become their ruler than Abu Bakr.
Subsequently, that part of the believers who came out in support of Abu Bakr began to be called Sunnis, and those who supported Ali - Shiites. As you know, Abu Bakr was chosen as the successor of the Messenger of God (s.g.w.), who became the first righteous caliph in the history of Islam.
Features of Sunnism
Sunnis (full name - Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jama'a - “People of the Sunnah and Community Harmony”) are the largest and most influential movement in the Islamic world. The term comes from the Arabic “sunnah”, denoting the biography of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.), and means following the path God's Messenger(s.g.v.). That is, the main sources of knowledge for Sunni Muslims are the Koran and the Sunnah.
Currently, Sunnis make up about 90% of Muslims and live in most countries of the world.
In Sunni Islam, there are many different theological and legal schools, the largest of which are 4 madhhabs: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. In general, the Sunni madhhabs do not contradict each other, since the founders of these legal schools lived at approximately the same time and were students and teachers of each other, and therefore the Sunni madhhabs rather complement each other.
There are some minor disagreements between madhhabs on certain issues, which are related to the specifics of each legal school. In particular, these disagreements can be examined using the example of the permissibility of eating the meat of certain animals from the point of view of various Sunni legal schools. For example, eating horse meat, according to the Hanafi madhhab, belongs to the category of undesirable actions (makrooh), according to the Maliki madhhab - forbidden acts (haram), and according to the Shafi'i and Hanbali madhhabs, this meat is permitted (halal).
Features of Shiism
Shiism is an Islamic movement in which, together with their descendants, they are recognized as the only legitimate successors of the Messenger of Allah Muhammad (s.w.). The term “Shiite” itself comes from the Arabic word “shi`a” (translated as “followers”). This group of Muslims consider themselves followers of Imam Ali (r.a.) and his righteous descendants.
Now the number of Shiites is estimated at approximately 10% of all Muslims in the world. Shiite communities operate in most states, and in some of them they constitute an absolute majority. These countries include: Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain. In addition, quite large Shiite communities live in Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.
Within Shiism today there are many trends, the largest of which are: Jafarism, Ismailism, Alawism and Zaydism. Relations between their representatives cannot always be called close, since on some issues they take opposing positions. The main point of disagreement between Shiite movements is the issue of recognizing certain descendants of Ali ibn Abu Talib (ra) as immaculate imams. In particular, the Jafarites (Twelver Shiites) recognize 12 righteous imams, the final one of which is Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, according to Jafarite teaching, who went into “concealment” as a child. In the future, Imam Mahdi will have to fulfill the role of the Messiah. The Ismailis, in turn, recognize only seven imams, since this part The Shiites are recognized by the imamate of the first six imams, as are the Jafarites, and they recognized the eldest son of the sixth imam, Jafar al-Sadiq, Imam Ismail, who died before his father, as the seventh imam. Ismailis believe that it was the seventh Imam Ismail who went into hiding and that he will become the Messiah in the future. The situation is similar with the Zaydis, who recognize only five righteous imams, the final of which is Zeid ibn Ali.
Main differences between Sunnis and Shiites
1. The principle of power and continuitySunnis believe that Muslims who have the necessary level of knowledge and unquestioned authority in the Muslim environment have the right to be the ruler of the faithful and their spiritual mentor. In turn, from the point of view of the Shiites, only the direct descendants of Muhammad (s.g.w.) have such a right. In this regard, the legitimacy of the rise to power of the first three righteous caliphs - Abu Bakr (r.a.), Umar (r.a.) and Uthman (r.a.), recognized along with Ali (r.a.) is not recognized with them .), in the Sunni world. For Shiites, only the authority of immaculate imams, who, in their opinion, are sinless, is authoritative.
2. The special role of Imam Ali (r.a.)
Sunnis revere the Prophet Muhammad (s.g.w.) as the Messenger of the Almighty (s.g.w.), sent by the Lord as a mercy for the worlds. Shiites, along with Muhammad (s.g.w.), equally reverence Imam Ali ibn Abu Talib (r.a.). When pronouncing the azan - the call to prayer - Shiites even pronounce his name, indicating that Ali is a ruler from the Almighty. In addition, some extreme Shiite movements even recognize this companion as an incarnation of a deity.
3. Approach to considering the Sunnah of the Prophet (s.a.w.)
Sunnis recognize the authenticity of those hadiths of the Prophet (s.a.w.) contained in 6 collections: Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmidhi, Abu Daud, Nasai, Ibn Majah. For Shiites, such an indisputable source is the hadiths from the so-called “Quadrateuch”. That is, those hadiths that were transmitted by representatives of the family of the Prophet (s.g.w.). For Sunnis, the criterion for the reliability of hadiths is the compliance of the chain of transmitters with the requirements of honesty and truthfulness.
The bulk of them live in Iran (more than 75 million, over 80% of the total population, while Sunnis in Iran are 18%), Iraq (more than 20 million), and Azerbaijan (about 10 million). In these three countries, Shiites dominate numerically, culturally and politically.
In a number Arab countries(Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc.) there are numerous Shiite minorities. Shiites inhabit the central, mountainous part of Afghanistan (Hazaras and others - about 4 million) and some areas of Pakistan. There are Shiite communities in India, although there are many more Sunnis here. In the south of India, “black Shiites” live among Hindus.
In the Pamir Mountains (in the Tajik and Afghan parts of the historical region of Badakhshan, in the Sarykol region in the far west of China), several small nations profess Ismailism-Nizarism, a type of Shiism. There are quite a few Nizari Ismailis in Yemen (here, as well as in India, there is another type of Ismailism - Mustalism). The center of Ismaili-Nizarism is located in Mumbai, India, in the Red Palace of their spiritual leader Aga Khan.
Another variety of Ismailism is common in Syria. The most important ethno-confessional group of Shiites in Syria are the Alawites, the peasantry of the mountainous northwestern region. The Shiites also include the Druze - a very distinctive ethno-confessional group inhabiting the Shuf region in Mount Lebanon, the Hauran highlands on the border of Syria and Israel, the mountainous region of Jebel Druz in southeastern Syria and groups of villages along the routes connecting these three regions.
In Turkey, in addition to the majority of Sunni Turks and Sunni Kurds, there are Shiite Turks (a very unique ethnographic community) and Shiite Kurds (some tribes), as well as Alawite Arabs.
In Russia, almost all Shiites are Azerbaijanis and Tats; Of these, only the residents of Derbent in the south of Dagestan and some surrounding villages (including one large Lezgin aul) are the indigenous population.
In the Arab Mashreq (in the East), apart from Iraq, Shiites form a majority only in the small island state of Bahrain, but Sunnis are in power here. In North Yemen, Zaydi Shiites are much more numerous than Sunnis.
Are Shiites the oppressed?
The culture of the Shia part of the ummah is in many ways different from the Sunni one. Its central elements are the especially strict mourning of Ashura on the day of remembrance of Imam Hussein, who died a martyr in 680, a number of other holidays (birthdays and deaths of the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, imams - spiritual leaders and descendants of Caliph Ali), pilgrimages in a row holy cities, a curse on the widow of the prophet Aisha and the caliphs who ruled after Ali.
Shiites (except for the clergy) must observe the rule of taqiyya - hiding, if necessary, their faith among people of other faiths, especially Sunnis. Only the Zaydis - a Shiite sect in Yemen (including the Houthis) - do not recognize taqiyya.
Everywhere except Iran and Azerbaijan, Shiites have been poorer and more humiliated than their Sunni neighbors for centuries. The only exception is the urban Nizari Ismailis - subjects of the Aga Khan, one of richest people in the world. But the Nizari Ismailis of villages and small towns in Syria, Oman, the Pamir mountains, as well as the Mustalit Ismailis of Yemen, Gujarat and Mumbai (in India, where they live next to the rich Nizari Ismailis) are poor.
There were Shiites in Iraq poorer than Sunnis, in Lebanon, the Shiite peasants of the Bekaa Valley were the poorest and most numerous in the country in the middle of the 20th century; in Syria, the Alawites were very poor mountaineer peasants until the second half of the 20th century; in Yemen, the Zaidi mountaineers were much poorer than the Sunnis, in Afghanistan, the Shiite Hazaras (Mongols who had lost their language) were poorer than all their neighbors, and in southern India the “black Shiites” were the poorest of all Muslims in the region.
IN last decades in different countries (Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, etc.) Shiites are seeking - including with arms in their hands - power and wealth that Sunnis enjoy (or enjoyed in the recent past) ( and in Lebanon - Christians).
In all the countries mentioned above, except Iran (where the Shiites are a single multi-ethnic group) and Azerbaijan, the Shiites constitute ethno-confessional groups with the same clear cultural and political self-identification as in Europe - national identification. This phenomenon is historical, rooted in ancient times and consolidated in the mass consciousness by the orders of the Ottoman and other Muslim empires.
The main cult centers of Shiism are located in Arab world- except for Mecca and Medina, common to all Muslims - in Iraq; The main ritual language of Shiites, like all Muslims, is Arabic, not Farsi. But for the Iranian and non-Iranian peoples of the vast region within the Islamic civilization, which includes Iran, Kurdistan, Tajikistan, part of Uzbekistan (with the cities of Bukhara, Samarkand, etc.), Afghanistan, part of Pakistan (west of the Indus Valley), Farsi is a highly developed language Persian culture.
The Shiite Arabs who inhabit the Khuzistan region of Iran and some others are more strongly influenced by Persian culture than other Arabs. All this facilitates the spread of many of its elements, including those related to the sphere of cult, among fellow Shiites in Arab countries. Moreover, this process affects not only the Imamis, but also the Ismailis, Alawites, Zaydis, Shia Kurds to the west of the borders of Iran. In recent years, among the Zaidi Houthis of Yemen, as eyewitnesses say, a pan-Shiite (as in Iraq and Iran) version of Ashura mourning, previously unknown here, has been spreading.
Perhaps this is one of the signs of cultural and political integration of various Shiite communities in Arab countries?
Knots of contradictions
In Iraq, the confrontation between the Sunnis of the North and the more numerous Shiites of the South is the main dominant political life. The situation is similar in Bahrain. The indigenous Baharina Arabs, the Imamites (the main branch of Shiism), make up the majority. Arab Sunni minorities, descendants of settlers from the mainland, from Saudi Arabia: Wahhabis are the ruling minority and Sunnis of the Shafi'i and Maliki madhhabs are the other two minorities, with all Sunni Arabs belonging to certain tribes.
In Kuwait, the indigenous Arab Shiite minority, once unprivileged, now, like the Sunni majority, enjoys many advantages over the numerous foreigners. In Syria there are four Shia ethno-confessional groups of Arabs (ruling Alawites, Imami Mutawali, Ismaili Nizari and Druze), two each in Lebanon (Mutawali and Druze), Yemen (Zaydis and Ismaili Mustalis), Saudi Arabia (Imamits and Zaydis, and also foreigners).
In Lebanon, the ratio of the size and influence of ethno-confessional groups changed significantly after it was enshrined in the constitutional acts of first the autonomy in the 1930s and 1940s, and since 1946 - the independent republic. Small state Greater Lebanon was created by France after the First World War as a mandate territory. Greater Lebanon was formed from several regions Ottoman Empire with different ethnic and religious composition.
The core of the state was Mount Lebanon, which consisted of the Land of the Maronites (historically, a vassal emirate, headed by the noble Arab family of al-Sheibani, who was secretly baptized, but was officially considered Sunni). The Maronite Church once entered into a union with the Roman Church. Adjacent to the Maronite land is the Chouf region, where the Maronites live together with the Druze - a very unique syncretic community, headed for centuries by the feudal Jumblatt family. From here the Druze migrated to the rain-watered mountain oases of southern Syria: Hauran, Jebel Druz, etc. The Maronites and Druze were mountain warrior-farmers, whose independence all rulers of the region had to reckon with.
To Mount Lebanon, where Christians made up the overwhelming majority of the population, French politicians annexed the adjacent coastal lowlands, river valleys and foothills. Here, in towns and villages, Sunni Muslims (the relative majority), Christians of different Churches (primarily Orthodox and Uniate Catholics), Druze in the South, and Alawites in the North lived in stripes or in separate neighborhoods. The Shia Mutawali lived compactly in the southeast. They were the poorest of all, their level of education was lower than other ethno-confessional groups, and their rural housing was especially archaic. In the 20-40s of the twentieth century, Sunnis showed all-Syrian patriotism, and Maronites and partly other Christians, as well as Druze (not all) were supporters of an independent Lebanon.
In 1926, Greater Lebanon was renamed the Lebanese Republic, political system which formally copied the French Republic. But in reality it was based on an agreement between influential clans that headed the main ethno-confessional groups. The first president of the Lebanese Republic was a Christian, Charles Debbas (Orthodox), but since 1934 all presidents have been elected from among the Maronites. Since 1937, prime ministers have been appointed only from Sunni Muslims. Other ethno-confessional groups were represented in parliament and other government bodies in proportion to their numbers and influence. They created their own political and other organizations (for example, the Druze became social democrats) under the leadership of traditional hereditary leaders.
This system has evolved under the influence of internal and external factors. In the first decades of the existence of the Lebanese Republic, there were slightly more Christians than Muslims, and the Druze were incomparably more influential than the Mutawali Shiites. Over time, the relative numbers and political and economic influence of the Maronites, other Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Armenians, and Druze declined. But the Mutawali Shiites, who in the early 1930s made up 17-18% of the Lebanese population and almost did not live in cities, sharply increased in strength. Poverty and low level education was combined among the Mutawali with large families, as a result their numbers grew faster than those of other groups, and they populated the cities.
Like other groups, the Lebanese Mutawali emigrated to South America, V West Africa, where they engaged in trade, grew rich, and supported their relatives in Lebanon. The emigration of Christian groups began much earlier, heading to different countries and regions of the world (France, USA, Latin America etc.) and had similar consequences. But Christians, Druze and Sunnis, who had long lived in cities, owned estates and received the best education, large families were replaced by small children.
Maronites and other Christian groups were losing their influence, while Muslim groups were gaining strength. Accordingly, the Maronite president gradually ceded his first role to the Sunni prime minister. As the number and political role of Christians decreased, their confrontation with Muslims receded into the background compared to the contradictions between Muslims - Sunnis and Shiites.
Not only Christians and Druze, who had long cast their lot in with the West, but also the Mutawali and Alawites armed themselves - with the help of their coreligionist Iran. Like the Druze, they created their own political and other organizations; The radical Shiite organization Hezbollah (Party of Allah), armed and supported by Iran, was especially active. Like some other Arab militant organizations, it used terrorist actions against its opponents - Sunnis, Christians and Israel.
After the creation of the State of Israel (1947) and the Arab-Israeli wars (1947-1973), Palestinian refugees, mostly Sunnis, poured into Lebanon, becoming a numerically significant and politically influential part of the population. Syria, Iran, Israel and the great powers (including the USSR, France and the USA) had a variety of influences on Lebanon, including the invasion of troops, the arming of local and Palestinian militias (the Christian Army of South Lebanon, etc., the Shiite Hezbollah, etc. .) As a result, Lebanon was rocked by civil war from 1975 to 1990, in which Hezbollah fought against Christian and Sunni militias.
Sunnis remained a relative majority, but among them, all-Syrian patriotism and political orientation towards Syria gave way to distancing from the Syrian authorities, whom they considered the patrons of Shiites and Christians. Today, Sunnis are the dominant group in Lebanon. Ending civil war gradually weakened the confrontation between ethno-confessional groups and transferred them to the socio-political sphere, but the events of recent years in Syria and Iraq once again intensified the rivalry between them. The Mutawali Shiites continue to grow in numbers and establish themselves in different areas life and challenge the power of the Sunnis.
After the First World War, France, establishing a mandate territory regime in Syria, encountered patriotic resistance from some Sunnis. In contrast, the French tried to rely on Christian and Shiite ethno-confessional groups.
Some of the Alawites who inhabited the mountainous region between Lebanon and the lower reaches of the Nahr al-Kalb River received territorial autonomy (Alawite State, L’Etat des Alaouyes); the French granted the same autonomy to the easternmost of mountain areas, where the Druze lived - Jebel Druz. In addition, they returned to Turkey the northwestern border region of Hatay (as the Turks called it) with the ancient cities of Antioch and Alexandretta, although all together the Arab communities (including Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, etc.) were more numerous here than the Turks and others ( Kurds, Yezidis, etc.) combined. At the same time, part of the Mutawali Shiites moved to Iraq.
It is paradoxical that the creation political parties formally modern type gave new impetus to the delimitation of ethno-confessional groups. This can be seen in the evolution of the Baath Party in Syria and Iraq.
United United Arab Emirates(UAE) is the youngest of the Arab countries. About a century ago, there was a conglomerate of alliances of Bedouin tribes and principalities (emirates) of the Pirate Coast - a buffer zone between Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and the Ibadi (Kharijite) Imamate of Oman (and the Muscat Sultanate). Having established a protectorate over the Muscat Sultanate and Qatar, the British also made a group of principalities, which they called Treaty Oman, their protectorate. The vast majority of the local population were Sunni Arabs; Only on the border with mountainous Oman did some branches of local tribes profess Ibadism, and on the seashores Shia Baharina lived in separate fishing villages. Now those Baharina who have UAE citizenship enjoy all the benefits of citizens, receive education, enter public service etc. But many Baharina are foreigners.
In the Bahrain archipelago itself, the Shiite majority is fighting for equal rights. It is associated with the Baharina in other Gulf countries and with Iran, as well as with the Shiite majority Arabs of Iraq. In eastern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Shia minority (mainland Baharina) are in opposition to the dominant Sunnis. Other Shiite Arabs in the UAE are Iraqis. But the majority of Shiites here are Iranians, some Indians and Pakistanis. In cities they form communities, have their own schools (with education in Farsi, Gujarati and other languages), even branches of universities in their homeland.
In Yemen, Shiism in its Zaydi form throughout the 10th-11th centuries was distinguished by relative religious tolerance, but intransigence towards foreign domination. In 1538 and subsequent years, the Turks tried to conquer Yemen, but the areas inhabited by the Zaydis did not submit to them. Zaydis and Sunnis united in the fight against the invaders, and after a hundred years of domination Turkish troops left Yemen. Following this, the Zaydi imam al-Mutawakkil Ali Ismail extended his power to Aden and a number of Sunni sultanates, and in 1658 to Hadhramaut. Even in early XVII centuries, the Sultan of Hadhramaut was a follower of Zaydism. But at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 17th centuries, Yemen was again divided into a predominantly Zaydi North and a union of Sunni possessions of South Yemen.
In the 19th century, the entire Arabian Peninsula was divided into spheres of domination by the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. The first went to Northern Yemen, the second to Southern Yemen, as well as the emirates of Eastern Arabia: Kuwait, Muscat, the emirates of Treaty Oman.
First World War led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and caused a new political situation on the Island of the Arabs, which was finally established only in the 1920s and early 1930s. The states of Northern and Central Arabia united into the vast Wahhabi Saudi Kingdom. It also occupied part of the Shiite region on the shores of the Persian Gulf and a small Zaydi region in the north of what was then Yemen. At the same time, the Zaydi Imam Yahya was also proclaimed king and tried to unite all of Yemen, including the sultanates of the South, which were under British protectorate. But Yahya was not successful in this and, according to the 1934 treaty, he recognized the division of Yemen into North - an independent kingdom and South - the British colony of Aden and protectorates. Subsequently, the growth of the city of Aden attracted people from the Zaydi North. The unification of both Yemen into one state took place only in 1990.
Thus, over the vast territory from the Balkans to the Hindustan, ethno-confessional groups are no less important than nations. The Shiite community of Muslim peoples is not a union of (ethnic) nations, but a spiritual and political community of ethno-confessional groups of Shiites within the Islamic world. It serves important factor cultural and political life.
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