Soviet flamethrower tank OT-26. Combat weight - 9 tons. Crew - 2 people. Armament - one flamethrower, one 7.62 mm machine gun. Armor thickness: forehead, hull side and turret - 15 mm. Engine - T-26, 90 liters. With. Highway speed - 30 km / h. Cruising on the highway - 150 km.
We can say that the flamethrower is almost the same age as the tank: it began to be used in battles just a year before the tanks received their baptism of fire. Note: for the first time used by the Germans in mass quantity July 30, 1915 against the British, they achieved, perhaps, a greater moral effect than the "battleships". The fact is that the flamethrower turned out to be very useful in trench warfare when hitting bunkers, shelters, etc. And since it was not a bulky weapon, then, as expected, it was subsequently installed on tanks. But this happened, however, not so soon - in 1933. Then in our country, on the basis of the T-26 tank, the OT-26 flamethrower tank was built.
In combat, such vehicles, or wedges (CV3 / 33), as they were called, were the first to be used by the Italians in 1936 during the war of conquest against Ethiopia.
Widely used flamethrower tanks(let us abbreviate them as OT) and in the Second World War. In addition to the Red Army, similar vehicles were in service with the American, British, German and Italian armies.
The flamethrower can be the main or secondary armament of the tank. In the first case, all equipment (and this is a fire hose, tanks with fire mixture, compressed air cylinders, a mixture ignition system, etc.) is installed in the car instead of a gun, or it is replaced with a smaller caliber artillery system. In addition, the ammunition load is also reduced. From the flamethrower installed in the turret of the tank, you can conduct circular fire. This was our OT-26, in which one tower was removed for the sake of placing a tank with a fire mixture. Recall that in 1931 our T-26, the German T-III flamethrower and the Italian CV3 / 33 and CV3 / 35 were double-turret. But they turned out to be ineffective in combat: after all, the flamethrower is a melee weapon (its range is several tens of meters), and therefore it is powerless against tanks and anti-tank artillery. Such vehicles required the support of linear (conventional) tanks. In the second case, the OTs, which had the main armament, were used in the same conditions as the linear ones. But then the flamethrower, forcedly installed not in the tower, but in the frontal sheet or on the roof of the hull, did not have the ability to conduct circular fire. Yes, and the supply of fire mixture was small. The British and Italians tried to remedy the situation by placing the tank with the mixture in a special armored trailer. This is how the Churchill-crocodile tank was born (1942). Of course, the design had a win: the fire hazard of the tank decreased. But the plus gave rise to many minuses: the maneuverability and patency of the vehicle decreased, and the flamethrower system became more complicated.
In the 30s, in addition to the OT-26, we built the OT-130 flamethrower tank based on the single-turret T-26. Instead of a cannon, a flamethrower was installed on it. Both vehicles retained a coaxial machine gun, and also had equipment for creating smoke screens. The OT-26 and OT-130 were equipped with pneumatic flamethrowers, since the flammable liquid was pushed out through the hose with compressed air at a pressure of 25 (for OT-26) or 35 (for OT-130) atmospheres. The ejection range of the liquid reached 50 m, the amount of fire mixture (fuel oil + kerosene) - 360 l, which was quickly consumed in 40 one-second shots (OT-130).
Flamethrower tanks based on the T-26 performed excellently in the battles on Lake Khasan (1938). and a year later on the Khalkhin-Gol River. During the war on the Karelian Isthmus of 1939-1940, several OT battalions and separate companies participated in operations. In 1941, our designers created the ATO-41 automatic powder flamethrower. It used the powder charges of a cartridge for a 45 mm cannon. When the charge was detonated, the powder gases pressed on the piston, which pushed the fire mixture out of the cylinder. Throwing" flammable liquid"It was possible to fire single shots or bursts of 4-5 shots due to the presence of a mechanism for automatically recharging the mixture using compressed air. In 1942, an improved model of the ATO-42 flamethrower with a doubled rate of fire entered service. The firing range of both flamethrowers with a standard mixture of 60-70 and viscous - up to 100 m. T-034-75).
In 1942, we also produced a KV-8 flamethrower heavy tank with an ATO-41 in the turret, but due to the installation of a 45-mm gun instead of a 76-mm one. The stock of fire mixture was 100 liters for T-034, 200 liters for T-034-85, and 570 liters for KV-8. These vehicles were used in the Red Army until the end of the war as part of flamethrower tank battalions. During the offensive, they followed the line tanks, and when approaching the object for attack (fortifications, houses, etc.), they moved forward.
In the UK, in addition to the already mentioned "Churchill-crocodile", (on the basis of "Churchill VII"), the Osa flamethrower armored personnel carrier also appeared. Both machines were supplied in small quantities to the USSR. They were equipped with flamethrowers of pneumatic action (working on compressed nitrogen). Throwing range with a viscous mixture - 135-150 m. The supply of fire mixture "Crocodile" - 1800 l, which could be thrown out in 60 shots. If necessary, the Churchill armored trailer was separated due to the explosion of the charge in the uncoupling mechanism. "Crocodile" was in service with the British army after the war and took part in the imperialist war against the Korean people.
American pneumatic flamethrowers (keeping the main armament) were installed on M3A1, M5A1, M4A2 tanks and on LVT (A) 1 and LVT (A) 2 floating vehicles. The viscous mixture was thrown out to a distance of 90 m. After the war, the M67 tank, created on the basis of the M48 medium tank, entered the American army. A flamethrower instead of a gun was installed in the turret of the car. The range of the weapon was 190, and with a special fire mixture even 270 m.
The Germans first used flamethrower tanks in June 1941 on the Soviet front. These vehicles, created on the basis of the T-II light tank of modifications D and E, had small turrets with a machine gun. Two flamethrower hoses were mounted on the front corners of the hull. The stock of a combustible mixture (coal tar) was 320 l, the throwing range was 40 m. Due to poor armor, these vehicles suffered heavy losses and were soon removed from service.
In 1943, factories produced 100 OTs based on a medium tank T-III modifications M. This machine has a flamethrower installed in the turret instead of a 50-mm cannon. The stock of the mixture was 1000 liters. The vehicle retained two machine guns and received six mortars for firing smoke cartridges.
The Italians produced two types of flamethrower vehicles based on tankettes CV3 / 33 and CV3 / 35, which were used in battles in North Africa in 1940-1941 and on the Soviet-German front in 1942. A pneumatic action flamethrower was placed on them instead of a machine gun. The tanks were placed either on the machine itself or in a wheeled trailer. Throwing range up to 60 m.
As we can see, the flamethrower began to be used as a tank weapon. After the war, this idea was further developed.
Rice. 64. Italian flamethrower tankette. Combat weight - 3.3 tons. Crew - 2 people. Armament - one flamethrower. Armor thickness: forehead of the hull - 13 mm, side - 8 mm. Engine - "Fiat", 40 liters. With. Highway speed - 42 km / h. Cruising on the highway - 150 km.
Rice. 65. English heavy flamethrower tank "Churchill-crocodile" ("Churchill VII"). Combat weight - 45 tons. Crew - 5 people. Armament - one 70 mm cannon, two 7.92 mm machine guns, one 7.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun, one flamethrower. Armor thickness: forehead of the hull - 152 mm, side - 95 mm, turret - 152 mm. Engine - "Bedford", 350 hp. With. Speed on the highway - 20 km h. Power reserve on the highway - 200 km.
In the thirties, the Soviet Union began work on flamethrower tanks, and by the time the Great Patriotic War began, there were a number of such combat vehicles in the units. After the start of the war, work in this direction continued, resulting in the appearance of several new models of flamethrower tanks, produced in a fairly large series. Tanks armed with flamethrowers turned out to be useful for a number of specific tasks, thanks to which interest in them remained even after the end of World War II. Already in the second half of the forties, the first projects were launched, during which it was supposed to create flamethrower tanks that meet modern requirements. As it turned out later, three projects of such equipment, created in the fifties, turned out to be the last in Soviet tank building.
"Object 481" - OT-54
Attempts to equip medium tank T-54 flamethrower began as early as 1946. Initially, it was supposed to use the ATO-42 automatic flamethrower, created for the tanks that were in service. Two options for placing this were considered: in a tower or in a hull. The first option provided greater efficiency, but at the same time complicated the layout of the fighting compartment, and the second was simpler, but at the same time did not allow the fire to be quickly transferred. As a result of analyzes and comparisons, it was decided to install a flamethrower in the tank turret. In addition, the customer, represented by the Ministry of Defense, wished to receive a new flamethrower.
In the middle of 1948, a special design bureau SKB-1 was formed at the Kharkov plant No. 75, whose tasks included the creation of promising projects, including flamethrower tanks. Further work in this direction was carried out by Kharkov designers with the active participation of related enterprises. Already in February 1951, two prototypes of the Object 481 flamethrower tank were presented for testing. Tests have shown that further refinement of the project is required.
In the course of refinement, the new flamethrower tank retained the main features of the first version of the project, which eventually reached mass production. At the same time, he had a number of differences, primarily related to weapons and related systems. When converting the T-54 medium tank into a flamethrower version, the design of the combat vehicle underwent minimal changes, affecting only the layout of the internal volumes. So, in place of the front ammunition rack for 20 shells and an additional fuel tank, a 460-liter tank for fire mixture, a temperature sensor and several units of fire-fighting equipment were placed. It was supposed to fill in and drain the flammable liquid through the necks, covered with small hatches in the roof and bottom of the hull.
In all versions of the Object 481 project, an automatic powder flamethrower was located in the tower, next to the gun. Because of this, the tank lost the SGMT machine gun coaxial with the cannon. On prototypes of a promising tank, flamethrowers of the ATO-42 and ATO-49 models were used. In addition, different prototypes of the flamethrower tank were equipped with various types of ignition systems.
The first prototype of the Object 481 tank, which was tested in 1951, carried an ATO-42 flamethrower paired with a gun. The dimensions of the flamethrower required the turret to be modified by welding a tubular casing onto its frontal part, which protected the protruding parts of the flamethrower. Tests of the first prototype of a promising machine showed its ambiguous characteristics. Due to the installation of a tank for fire mixture, the ammunition load of the gun was reduced to 24 shells. In addition, a flamethrower was installed instead of a machine gun coaxial with a cannon, which had a corresponding effect on the capabilities of the combat vehicle when operating against infantry. The portable supply of fire mixture was enough for 28-30 shots, and the maximum range of throwing flammable liquid did not exceed 100-110 meters. Such characteristics generally suited the customer, but in the early fifties the military wanted to get a new model flamethrower.
The second prototype was equipped with a new ATO-49 automatic flamethrower with an electric gasoline ignition system. The overall layout of the internal units of the hull and turret of the second prototype corresponded to the layout of the first prototype. At the same time, the gun ammunition was reduced to 19 rounds, and the flamethrower - to 20 rounds. During the tests, claims were caused by an electric-petrol ignition system that did not provide the required reliability of operation. In this regard, the ATO-49 flamethrower soon received a new ignition system.
By 1953, the finalization of the first version of the Object 481 project was completed, which resulted in the construction of five prototypes at once, armed with ATO-49 flamethrowers with a pyrotechnic ignition system. The new flamethrower consisted of several main parts: a reservoir, a breech, a valve, a nozzle, an air system and an ignition system. Before firing, the electrical control system, using two 10-liter compressed air cylinders, supplied 20 liters of AP-7 fire mixture (a mixture of gasoline and kerosene with the addition of xylenol and OP-2 thickener) to the tank. At the same time, powder and pyrotechnic cartridges were fed into the corresponding chambers. When the shutter button was pressed, the pyrotechnic cartridge was ignited first. A jet of fire was discharged in front of the flamethrower nozzle. After 0.1-0.2 seconds after that, the powder cartridge ignited and the resulting gases, pushing the piston, squeezed the valve and ejected the fire mixture through the nozzle. After the shot, the tank and nozzle were blown with compressed air.
The pyrotechnic ignition system, without greatly complicating the design of an automatic flamethrower, ensured sufficient reliability of its operation. A 460-liter tank of fire mixture was enough for 20 shots. The same number of pyrotechnic and powder cartridges were placed in flamethrower stores. During the tests, the third prototype of the tank "Object 481" was able to achieve a maximum range of throwing a mixture of about 160 meters. The practical rate of fire did not exceed 7 rounds per minute, although, if necessary, the crew could fire at a high rate, which, however, led to a rapid consumption of an already small supply of fire mixture.
Maintaining the capacity of the fire mixture tank at the level of 460 liters did not allow leaving a large ammunition load of barreled weapons. So, on the third prototype and subsequent experimental machines, only 19 shells for the gun were placed in the stacks. 1500 rounds of ammunition fit in the boxes of the course machine gun. The design of the armored hull and turret has undergone minor changes associated with the installation of new equipment. At the same time, the electrical system of the T-54 base tank had to be finalized in connection with the use of electric flamethrower units, and additional carbon dioxide cylinders and one more nozzle were added to the fire-fighting equipment. The crew of the flamethrower tank corresponded to the crew of the base vehicle and consisted of four people. For firing from a flamethrower, an additional telescopic sight TSh-19 was installed, which was used in the very first version of the Object 481 project. The equipment of the tank allowed aimed shooting from a flamethrower only from a place.
In the last months of 1953, Kharkov designers presented five new flamethrower tanks for testing at once. Improvements to the base medium tank T-54 did not have a significant impact on the mobility of the flamethrower. Wherein new development demonstrated high firing characteristics that interested the military. In 1954, the Object 481 flamethrower tank received the official name OT-54 and was put into service. Some sources mention an alternative designation for the T-54-ATO tank. The ATO-49 flamethrower also received a new index - ATO-1. Serial construction of new flamethrower tanks was carried out at the Kharkov plant No. 75, as well as at the plant No. 174 (Chelyabinsk). In a few years, two enterprises built a total of 110 flamethrower tanks. Such a small number was due to the specific tactical role of armored vehicles of this class.
"Object 482" - TO-55
After the adoption of the OT-54 tank, the employees of the Kharkov SKB-1 continued to develop tank flamethrowers. Already in 1955, a preliminary draft of a new system appeared, capable of throwing a flammable liquid at a distance of up to 200 meters. The firing range was fixed in the name of the project - ATO-200. In 1956, testing of the first prototype of a new weapon began, and two years later a prototype of a new flamethrower tank armed with ATO-200 was assembled.
When designing a new flamethrower tank "Object 482", the same approach was used as in the previous project. The T-55 medium tank was taken as the basis for the combat vehicle (some sources mention that a vehicle based on the T-54 was used in the tests), on which an automatic flamethrower was installed with minimal design modifications. The flamethrower was placed in the tower, in place of the coaxial machine gun. An interesting feature of the new version of the flamethrower tank was a two-plane armament stabilizer, which ensured firing on the move from both a cannon and a flamethrower. Parts of the ATO-200 flamethrower, taken out of the tower, were covered with a cylindrical casing. The fire mixture tank with a capacity of 460 liters remained in its original place - next to the control compartment.
The new ATO-200 flamethrower was a further development of the ATO-1, but it had a number of differences. First of all, it is necessary to note the use of a larger capacity tank - the volume of one shot has increased to 35 liters. The principle of operation of the flamethrower mechanisms remained the same. Saving the capacity of the fire mixture tank affected the number of possible shots. The ATO-200 flamethrower could fire only 12 shots on one tank of flammable liquid and with one set of cartridges. The quantitative shortcomings of the ammunition load were compensated by the qualitative ones, namely, the large volume of the ejected flammable liquid and the greater range of its throwing. The maximum firing range was brought to the required 200 meters.
In addition to a larger tank, the ATO-200 flamethrower received a new relay-based electrical system that made it truly automatic. The gunner or tank commander now only needed to point the weapon at the target and press the trigger button. All necessary operations were performed automatically. A characteristic feature of the ATO-200 flamethrower was the ability to fire bursts. The electric flamethrower control system allowed the tank crew to fire several shots in a row by holding the trigger button. In the case of the ATO-1 flamethrower, this required a series of clicks. Automation ATO-200 independently determined in which mode the crew was going to shoot and worked accordingly. The maximum rate of fire of the new flamethrower was 8 rounds per minute.
The combat weight and main characteristics of the Object 482 tank remained at the level of the base T-55. However, the barrel armament ammunition, as in the case of the OT-54, was reduced. In the modified stacking, 25 shells for the cannon and 750 rounds for the course machine gun were placed.
Testing of the Object 482 flamethrower tank began in 1958. The new flamethrower by this time had been finalized and tested separately, which had a positive effect on the course of the project. In January 1960, the "Object 482" was put into service under the name TO-55, but mass production began later. The first batch of 10 serial machines was assembled only in 1961. At this time, the military began to doubt the advisability of developing and building flamethrowing tanks. In the armies of potential opponents, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers became widespread, and the first missile systems designed to destroy armored vehicles. All these anti-tank weapons had an effective firing range that was not inferior or even superior to the capabilities of the ATO-200 flamethrower. The absence of a machine gun coaxial with the gun was also the subject of controversy, since it could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the tank in the fight against infantry. Because of this, TO-55 tanks were built in small batches. A total of 830 such machines were assembled.
"Object 483"
After completing the design work on the Object 482 project, SKB-1 engineers took up a new flamethrower tank project based on the T-54/55. This time it was planned to increase the combat capabilities of the flamethrower to a level limited only by the characteristics of the available fire mixtures. Calculations showed that the properties of flammable liquids of the BBU and SKS-15 brands make it possible to make volleys of up to 100 liters and shoot at a distance of at least 200-250 meters. Such figures looked promising, which led to the start of the Object 483 project.
The basis for a promising flamethrower tank was taken fighting machine model T-54B. However, unlike previous projects, the flamethrower was supposed to be not an additional weapon of the tank, but the main one. It was proposed to install it instead of a 100-mm gun. The new OM-250 flamethrower was mounted on modified gun trunnions. Outside the tower, the flamethrower nozzle was closed with a tubular casing. The fire mixture tank with a capacity of 1600 liters was placed in the fighting compartment, to the right of the flamethrower. It was mounted on shock absorbers and rotated along with the tower. The filler neck of the tank was under the right hatch on the roof of the tower. To ensure the optimal temperature regime of the flamethrower, a hole was made in the rear of the tower, in which a fan was placed.
Due to the lack of free space in the tower, borrowed from the T-54B tank without major design changes, the flamethrower combat vehicle lost its coaxial machine gun. The embrasure of the machine gun was absent, and the embrasure of the sight was reduced in accordance with the capabilities of the flamethrower. However, the new flamethrower tank "Object 483" carried the SGMT course machine gun, located in the frontal hull plate. The absence of a gun made it possible to exclude the loader from the crew. The flamethrower was supposed to be controlled by the gunner and, if necessary, the tank commander.
The design of the OM-250 flamethrower was a further development of the ATO-200, adjusted for a larger volume of the mixture being thrown. One filling of the fire mixture tank was enough for 14 shots. The same number of cartridges with a pyrotechnic and propellant charge was placed in the drum stores of the flamethrower. The flamethrower automation, using the already tested and mastered method of operation, made it possible to fire up to five shots per minute, both single and in bursts. The OM-250 flamethrower project used technical solutions created during the development of the ATO-1 and ATO-200. Because of this, the design of the flamethrower did not allow the use of relatively powerful powder cartridges. The maximum throwing speed of the fire mixture, due to strength restrictions, was limited to 100 meters per second. In this regard, the maximum firing range did not exceed 250-270 meters.
The development of the project "Object 483" took several months. Already at the end of 1959, plant No. 75 began construction of the first prototype. Only in 1961, the prototype was transported to the NIIBT test site, after which its testing began. In terms of its firing characteristics, the new OM-250 flamethrower surpassed all types of weapons of its class that existed at that time, but it was not without claims. As in the case of the "Object 482" / TO-55, some doubts were raised by the effectiveness of using a flamethrower against manpower and unprotected enemy equipment in the light of the widespread use of infantry anti-tank weapons. In addition, the absence of a machine gun coaxial with the main weapon was again negatively manifested, due to which new tank could hit targets at a distance of no more than 250-270 meters. Finally, the OM-250 flamethrower took the place of the gun, which is why the "Object 483", having a large range of throwing a fire mixture, lost to its predecessors in the total firepower of all weapons. The Ministry of Defense considered that the adoption of a new tank was not advisable. In 1962, the Object 483 project was terminated. The only built prototype is now stored in the museum of armored vehicles in Kubinka near Moscow.
Latest in its class
"Object 483" was the last domestic flamethrower tank. The combination of characteristics of machines of this class did not allow to effectively hit targets on the battlefield of the proposed full-scale war. In addition, the use of a large tank of fire mixture had a corresponding effect on the survivability of the tank. Finally, the emergence of new weapons for the infantry has significantly increased the risks of attacking enemy manpower. As a result, the OT-54 and TO-55 flamethrower tanks were built in relatively small numbers: less than one thousand vehicles of two models.
The specific tactical role of flamethrower tanks did not fit well with the expected nature of future armed conflicts. As a result, this technique has not been widely adopted. Moreover, already in the early sixties, all work in this direction was stopped. The unpromising flamethrower tank "Object 483", which was preceded by the mass-produced OT-54 and TO-55, became the last domestic armored vehicle of its class.
According to the websites:
http://dogswar.ru/
http://armor.kiev.ua/
http://vadimvswar.narod.ru/
http://pro-tank.ru/
http://tankinfo.ru/
Ardashev A.N. Flamethrower-incendiary weapon. - M .: Astrel / AST, 2001
The Germans used flamethrowers en masse as early as 1915, and they achieved, perhaps, even a greater morale effect than tanks.
The flamethrower proved to be very useful in trench warfare when hitting various shelters, in addition to this
it was not a bulky weapon, so, as one would expect, it was subsequently installed on tanks.
In June 1939, an article was published by engineer Oberleutnant Olbrich, who worked in Wa Pruef 6 (department of armored
technique), entitled "Flame Throwers on Tanks" ("Flammwerfer in Panzerkampfwagen"). As can be seen from the quotes below, Olbrich's article contained important information about the problems that German designers faced when creating a flamethrower tank. Olbrich reports that for the first time
flamethrower tanks were used by the Italians in 1936 during the war in Abyssinia. The flamethrower was
installed on light tank"Ansaldo C.V.33 Carri-Fiami" instead of the standard machine gun. The combustible mixture tank was located on a trailer behind the tank.
The principle of operation of a flamethrower is based on pushing a combustible mixture through a nozzle using high pressure, which can be obtained in three ways:
1. using gravity (if you place a tank with a combustible mixture above the nozzle);
2. using compressed gas;
3. using a pressure pump.
The Germans considered only the last two methods as the most applicable in practice. In addition to pressure, many factors affect the jet of a combustible mixture:
1) the shape and cross-sectional area of the nozzle;
2) flow through the nozzle;
3) the ratio of the cross section of the nozzle and the supply hose;
4) air resistance, strength and direction of the wind;
5) the duration of the flight of the combustible mixture jet from the nozzle to the target;
6) nozzle elevation angle;
7) pressure loss in the system.
The pressure drop in the system can be so great that no combat
the use of a flamethrower is out of the question. To avoid this loss, a compressed gas cylinder
or the pressure pump is installed as close as possible to the nozzle. To even more
to reduce pressure losses, the Germans installed tanks with a combustible mixture and supply
system inside the tank, as close as possible to the nozzle, in a dangerous neighborhood with the crew. Pressure loss
can also be reduced by ensuring the tightness of the system. The Germans believed that high pressure -
more than eight atmospheres, can cause a feeling of danger in the crew.
In principle, increasing the pressure in the system should increase the firing range,
but above all, the speed of the ejection of the combustible mixture increases, and this, in turn, causes an increase in air resistance.
Tests carried out by the Germans made it possible to determine the optimal pressure and nozzle cross section for maximum range.
By 1939, it was found that in calm weather, the range of throwing a combustible mixture is about 80 m. When shooting at this
range for one shot is consumed from sixty to seventy liters of combustible mixture,
when shooting at close range, its consumption was lower. The tests also showed that the lateral
the wind reduces the firing range to 50 m. When firing at a distance of less than 30 meters, the effect
side wind was not so significant. When firing at full speed, throwing range
the combustible mixture also decreases due to the fact that air resistance increases. Range
shooting can be accurately determined only if all inputs are fully taken into account.
factors. Taking into account the limited capacity of tanks with a combustible mixture, two
flamethrower firing mode: 1) at close range (up to 40 meters), when the stock is enough for
a large number of shots, and 2) at long distances (up to 80 meters), when the stock is enough for
a small number of shots.
The Italians found a way out of the created
situations by increasing the volume of the combustible mixture. At the same time, a large-capacity tank filled with fuel
mixture, placed on a trailer, which significantly reduced maneuverability and increased
tank turning radius. In addition, the trailer reduced the speed of the car and worsened its cross-country ability.
The Germans considered that
the characteristics of the tank cannot be sacrificed and were limited to the internal tanks of a small
volume, assuming that this amount of combustible mixture will be sufficient for effective
targeting at close range. And although the Germans had quite long-range
flamethrowers, they preferred the mobility of the tank to the range of fire
Panzer I
The first attempt to install a flamethrower on the tank, undertaken by the Germans, was not related to the engineering surveys described above.
During the Spanish Civil War, German tankers were dissatisfied with the accuracy of the standard tank machine gun. In their opinion, a flamethrower would be a more suitable weapon for a tank. Reported to
PzKpfw I instead of the right turret machine gun, a small knapsack flamethrower (kleine Flammenwerfer) was installed. The report also said that it would be desirable to install a more long-range flamethrower on the tank, since its insufficient
range led to heavy losses among the crews.
Based on the experience of "volunteers" from the 6th tank regiment who fought in
Spain, and the success of the Italian C.Y.33 Carri-Fiammi, tankers from the 5th Panzer Regiment
repeated the experiment in North Africa. Small backpack flamethrower, which is usually
used in the engineering troops, again installed in the PzKpfw 1 Ausf. BUT.
Converted tanks were used to smoke the enemy out of the concrete fortifications that protected the perimeter of Tobruk.
Panzer II (F) (Sd Kfz 122)
Description and specification
The first specially designed flamethrower tank was the Panzerflammwagen II (Sd Kfz 122), also called the Panzerkampfwagen (F) (Sd Kfz 122). This name was later changed to the better known Panzerkampfwagen II (Flamm) (Sd Kfz 122).
In accordance with their plans, the Ministry of Armaments of the Ground Forces
production of an experimental zero-series of flamethrower tanks. Wa Pruef 6 (Department of Armored Vehicles Heereswaffenamt) developed a specification and signed a contract with MAN (Nuremberg) for the development of the chassis, and with Daimler-Benz (Berlin-Marienfelde)
for the development of the turret and hull of the tank. The result of the work done was a tank,
equipped with two flamethrowers mounted in two small turrets (Spritzkoepfe) on the wings of the tank. Each turret could independently rotate in a 180° sector (in extreme positions, the flamethrower nozzle
located perpendicular to the sides of the tank). Each flamethrower had its own tank with
combustible mixture with a capacity of 160 liters. This amount of the mixture was enough for 80 shots lasting 2-3 seconds.
The necessary pressure in the system was provided by four cylinders with compressed nitrogen. used to ignite the combustible mixture.
compressed acetylene.
In the main turret of the tank, a MG 34 machine gun was placed in a ball mount, the elevation angle was from -10 ° to + 20 °. The machine gun had a KZF2 sight, calibrated at a distance of up to 200 meters. The ammunition for the machine gun was 1800 SmK rounds (armor-piercing) - 12 tapes of 150
cartridges.
Tank weight - 12000 kg, crew - three people. The tank commander, who was in the tower, simultaneously served the machine gun and both flamethrowers. The gunner-radio operator kept in touch with the radio station Funkgeraet 2 (FuG 2), and was also the second flamethrower. The place of the gunner-radio operator was located in front of the hull on the right.
The driver was located to the left of the gunner-radio operator.
The frontal armor of the tank was 30 mm thick, side and rear armor - 14.5 mm.
Frontal armor provided sufficient protection against fire from anti-tank weapons of up to 25 mm caliber at a distance of up to 600 meters. Armor 14.5 mm thick protected the crew from armor-piercing bullets (up to 8 mm) at any distance.
The tank chassis was used for the tank PzKpfw II Ausf. D - LaS 138, developed by MAN. The tank was driven by a Maybach HL 62 TRM six-cylinder liquid-cooled carburetor engine with a working volume of 6.2 liters and a power of 140 hp.
at 2600 min-1. The Maybach SSG 14479 semi-automatic seven-speed gearbox transmitted torque to the side clutches and then to the drive wheels. Chassis (from each side) consisted of four road wheels large diameter. This tank was one of the first tanks with torsion bar suspension.
Issue from April to August 1939, MAN manufactured 46 LaS 138 chassis, intended for the construction of flamethrowing tanks. The prototype (Versuchtsfahrzeug) was ready in July 1939. On the prototype, ordinary mild steel was used instead of armor.
The final assembly of flamethrower tanks was carried out at Wegmann & Co. (Kassel) in January 1940. In March 1940, another 43 PzKpfw II Ausf. D were transferred from military units to the plant for conversion into flamethrower
tanks. March 8, 1940 ten PzKpfw II Ausf. D from the 7th tank regiment and twenty tanks of that
The assembly of the first PzKpfw II (F) (Sd Kfz 122) 1. Serie LaS 138 (F) (serial numbers 27001-27085 and 27801-28000) was started in May 1940 and continued until October. In total, 86 cars were produced. Another source from the Ministry of Armaments reports that by October 1940, 87 tanks had been assembled and three more tanks were unfinished. The final assembly of these three tanks was delayed until February 1941, when they promised to supply the missing parts (suspension).
Before the tests of the zero-series tanks were completed, another 150 LaS 138 chassis and hulls were ordered. The monthly production was planned in the amount of 30 vehicles, and the entire order was to be completed by the end of 1941.
Tanks of the second series received serial numbers 27101-27250. In August 1941, the MAN company announced that the production of the first tanks had already begun. Soon the order was reduced to 90 flamethrower tanks, the remaining 60 vehicles were to be completed as conventional tanks PzKpfw II Ausf. D. In November 1941, the decision was changed again and flamethrowers were to be put on all
150 tanks. On December 20, 1941, the Heereswaffenamt decided to produce self-propelled guns based on these chassis. In March 1942, 62 flamethrower tanks were completed, however, all 150 chassis, including already completed 62, were rearmed with a 7.62 cm Pak 36 (g) anti-tank gun.
Organization of parts On March 1, 1940, the formation of the first battalion of flame-throwing tanks began. This battalion became the Panzerabteilung (F)
100, formed on the basis of the tank school in Wunsdorf. The battalion had the following structure:
Stab PzAbt (F) (battalion headquarters);
Stbskp PzAbt (F) (headquarters company);
Staffel PzAbt (F) (battalion reserve);
3 PzKp (F) (three companies of flamethrower tanks);
KolPzAbt (F) (supply column);
PzWerkstZug (repair platoon).
It was envisaged that the battalion would be fully equipped and trained by July 1940. Thus, the General Staff did not intend to use flamethrower tanks in the French campaign.
The headquarters of the 100th flamethrower tank battalion was formed on March 5, 1940, and the formation of three companies was completed by March 21.
The headquarters of another, 101st, flamethrower tank battalion was formed on May 4, 1940. The 1st company of the 101st battalion was formed on April 26,
2nd company - May 10, and 3rd company - May 1, 1940. By June 19, 1940, the Germans had only 16 PzKpfw II (F) tanks at their disposal. To distinguish their tanks from the same vehicles of other units, each battalion had its own emblem. The emblem of the 100th battalion of flamethrower tanks was a multi-colored flame, and the 101st battalion - crossed flamethrowers on a green background. As a rule, emblems were applied to the back
In each company of flamethrowing tanks, according to the state of KStN 1177, adopted on February 1, 1941, there was a company headquarters (2 tanks PzKpfw II - Sd Kfz 121, armed with a 20 mm caliber gun), three platoons of flamethrowing tanks (four flamethrowing tanks PzKpfw II (F) - Sd Kfz 122), and a fire support platoon (five conventional PzKpfw II).
In the reserve of the battalion there were two PzKpfw II - Sd Kfz 121 and six PzKpfw II (F) - Sd Kfz 122 ( staffing KStN 1179 of February 1, 1941). In practice, the reserves did not last long. For example, in the 101st battalion, the reserve was exhausted on the very first day of the war and was abolished on June 23, 1941.
Tactics
Guide combat use flamethrower tanks, adopted on September 1, 1940, established the following tactical principles: "A flamethrower tank is designed for use at close range. These tanks serve to destroy the enemy in cases where other types of weapons are not effective. Flamethrower tanks have a strong demoralizing effect on enemy soldiers .
Flamethrower tanks are armed with flamethrowers designed for firing at short (up to 30 meters) distances, and a machine gun designed for firing at medium (up to 400 meters - most effectively up to 200 meters) distances. One full filling of the tank with a combustible mixture allows you to fire 80 shots lasting 2-3 seconds.
The ignited combustible mixture strikes the enemy, and also forces enemy soldiers to leave their shelters, thereby facilitating the destruction of manpower with the help of other types of weapons. Flamethrower tanks are especially effective against field fortifications, bunkers, and wooden structures.
The target can be hit with a shot from either one or both flamethrowers. When firing at an undigged enemy, the maximum effect is achieved at a zero elevation angle of the flamethrower. In this case, an area with a width of 10-20 meters along the front is affected. If you rotate the flamethrower while firing, the affected area will increase to 50 meters. For conducting aimed fire, the possibility of vertical aiming of the flamethrower is provided. When shooting at scattered targets, it is recommended to fire from both flamethrowers at once.
Higher shooting accuracy is achieved while the tank is stopped. For a more complete destruction of the target, it is necessary to make several shots with a cold mixture, and then set fire to it by firing an ignited mixture.
Flamethrower tanks operate under the cover of artillery and tanks. On the battlefield, tanks from the fire support platoon provide cover.
To achieve maximum effect, a battalion of flamethrowing tanks operates on a front no wider than 850 meters. All units of the battalion must act together if the conditions of the terrain allow it. A flamethrower tank battalion never acts alone, but only as part of a tank division, or, as an exception, an infantry division."
In all cases, it is necessary to achieve maximum coordination of actions. Tanks and artillery must suppress the anti-tank defense of the enemy. On the other hand, when firing from a flamethrower, a large amount of thick smoke and fire is formed, behind which flamethrower tanks should act as a shield.
It took 30 minutes of pure time to fill a tank with 320 liters of combustible mixture and change cylinders with compressed nitrogen and acetylene. With properly supplied supplies, it was possible to refuel all the tanks of the battalion in one hour.
Combat use
PzAbt (F) 100 was attached to the 18th Panzer Division and was part of the XLVII Panzer Corps. As of June 18, 1941, the battalion had 24 PzKpfw II, 42 PzKpfw II (F), 5 PzKpfw III (5 cm) and one grPzBefWg (Sd Kfz 267). On November 5, 1941, the 100th Flamethrower Tank Battalion was withdrawn to the rear for reorganization and rest. All surviving tanks of the battalion were transferred to the 18th Panzer Division. On the basis of the 100th battalion on December 22, 1941, the 100th tank regiment was formed. On February 5, the former 100th Battalion of Flamethrower Tanks, and now the 1st Battalion of the 100th Tank Regiment, was reorganized and renamed.
Now in the battalion, which began to be called " Greater Germany"there were three medium companies (10 PzKpfw IV in each). As part of the motorized division" Great Germany "
the battalion returned to Russia in time for the summer offensive of 1942.
By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the 101st flamethrower tank battalion, which was part of the 3rd Panzer Group, had 25 PzKpfw II, 42 PzKpfw II (F), 5 PzKpfw III (5 cm) and 1 grPzBefWg (Sd Kfz 267) . PzAbt (F) 101 was assigned to the 7th Panzer Division. Below is a report on the battle that took place on August 26, 1941. “By forcing the Loinya River near Bolotin, the enemy captured a section 2,000 meters wide along the front and 2,000 meters deep. The 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment managed to restore its original position after a counterattack.
The counterattack of the battalion was supported on the left flank by the 101st battalion of flamethrower tanks, and on the right flank by the 25th tank regiment. PzAbt (F) 101 launched an offensive at 6.00. The 3rd company was on the right flank, the 2nd company on the left, the 1st company followed the 2nd. A broad attack along the entire front was impossible due to the difficult terrain. Advancing, the companies overcame several deep ravines without losing much time.
Although the enemy fired only with small arms, the possibility was foreseen that he had anti-tank rifles and would be supported by heavy artillery. It was reported that the enemy infantry lay down in the bushes at the edge of the forest. The left flank of the enemy was protected by a deep ravine, which the tanks could not overcome. 101st Flamethrower Tank Battalion
approached the edge of the forest without encountering artillery fire. The tanks could not enter the forest, so it was ordered to bypass the forest on the left. However, this maneuver also ended unsuccessfully due to ravines and swamps encountered on the way.
Meanwhile, the infantry tried to enter the forest, but was stopped by dense machine-gun and rifle fire. Then the tanks approached the western edge of the forest. The 3rd company and a squad of two PzKpfw IIIs moved ahead, the 2nd company followed. The 1st company was in reserve and was located in a ravine to the west of the edge of the forest. The 2nd squad of the PzKpfw III was sent to reconnoiter along the edge of the forest to the east. The 2nd and 3rd companies opened fire on
undergrowth. It turned out that there was a large amount of enemy manpower in the bush. The infantry attack progressed slowly, because the Russians had time to dig in.
Nevertheless, the infantry managed to push the enemy back and reach the edge of the undergrowth. At this time, tanks approached and began to systematically smoke out the enemy infantry. The first prisoners were taken, who abandoned their positions in a panic. Horror was on their faces.
Flamethrowers burned out bush after bush. A number of Russians managed to hold their positions and opened fire from behind. Therefore, it was necessary to re-comb the area.
The 1st company advanced along the eastern edge of the forest, destroying the enemy infantry that came across on the way. His resistance in this area was finally broken when the 1st company was reinforced by a platoon of flamethrower tanks from the 2nd company. At this time, the 3rd company went to a large area open area. A large number of enemy soldiers dug in here. The 2nd company also joined in taking over this territory.
At this time, our infantry reached the designated goal and dug in. At 11.00 flamethrower tanks withdrew to their original positions,
after the 25th Panzer Regiment provided infantry support.
At about 12.30 a radio message was received that the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment was attacked by the enemy from the front, from the flanks and from the rear. The 1st company of flamethrower tanks was sent to rescue the infantry, but soon a report came from the commander of the infantry
battalion that the situation has cleared up and the support of flamethrower tanks is no longer required. Nevertheless, the 1st company remained at the forefront until 19.00 and returned only in the evening. During the battle, the 101st battalion of flamethrower tanks destroyed several hand
and 11 heavy machine guns, a mortar, two cars, three trucks and one tank. One heavy tank and two anti-tank guns were also apparently destroyed.
Forty prisoners were captured, who were handed over to our infantry. 100-150 enemy soldiers were destroyed by fire from machine guns and flamethrowers. The 101st battalion did not suffer any losses in manpower and equipment."
In the autumn of 1941, the 10.1st battalion was withdrawn from the front. On December 10, 1941, it was disbanded, and the 24th tank regiment was created on its basis. As part of the 24th Panzer Division, the battalion returned to the Eastern Front in time for the beginning of the 1942 summer offensive.
Panzer B2 (F) May 26, 1941 the problem of flamethrower tanks was raised at a meeting with Hitler.
Photographs of 85 built PzKpfw II (F) were shown. In addition, the possibility of arming with flamethrowers was discussed.
captured French tanks PzKpfw B2 (Char B Ibis). Hitler ordered the formation of two companies of 12 flamethrower tanks, equipped with converted PzKpfw B2. The tanks were to be ready by 20 June 1941. On the first 24 PzKpfw B2 installed
flamethrowers of the same system that were used on the PzKpfw II (F). A compressed nitrogen flamethrower was located inside the hull, in place of the removed 75 mm gun.
All 24 PzKpfw B2s were sent to the 102nd Flamethrower Tank Battalion, which was formed on 20 June 1941. The battalion included two heavy companies of flamethrower tanks. In addition to 12 flamethrower tanks, each company had three support tanks (serial PzKpfw B1, armed with a 75 mm cannon). The 102nd battalion of flamethrower tanks arrived at the front on June 23, 1941 and was subordinated to the headquarters of the 17th Army On June 24, 1941, the battalion supported the offensive of the 24th Infantry Division on one of the major forts.
attacks on the fort were continued, this time the battalion supported the actions of the 296th Infantry Division. On June 24, 1941, one of the pillboxes was captured with the participation of flamethrower tanks.
The report of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 520th infantry regiment allows us to paint a picture of the battle. "On the evening of June 28, the 102nd battalion of flamethrower tanks reached the specified initial
positions. At the sound of tank engines, the enemy opened fire from cannons and machine guns, but there were no losses.
aiming at the embrasures of pillboxes. Anti-aircraft gunners fired until 7.04, when most of the embrasures were hit and fell silent.
Using a green rocket, the 102nd battalion of flame-thrower tanks went on the attack at 07:05.
Engineering units escorted the tanks. Their task was to install high-explosive charges under defensive fortifications enemy. When
some pillboxes opened fire, the sappers were forced to take cover in an anti-tank ditch. 88-
mm anti-aircraft guns and other types of heavy weapons returned fire. Pillboxes No. 1-4 were
suppressed by flamethrower tanks. The sappers were able to reach the assigned targets, lay and detonate high-explosive charges
Pillboxes No. 1, 2 and 4 were heavily damaged by 88 mm guns and could only fire intermittently. Flamethrower tanks were able to approach the pillboxes almost closely.
The defenders of the pillboxes, despite significant damage and losses, offered desperate resistance. Two flamethrower tanks were
were shot down with a 76.2 mm cannon from pillbox No. 3a. Both tanks burned down, the crews managed to leave the wrecked
cars. The wounded tankers were saved thanks to the brave actions of the non-commissioned officer of the medical service Kannengiesser. Flamethrower
the tanks never managed to hit the pillboxes. The combustible mixture could not penetrate through the spherical
installations inside the pillbox. The defenders of the fortifications continued to fire."
Further development of tank
flamethrowers took place using the same PzKpfw B2. For new flamethrowers used a pump driven by
J10 engine. These flamethrowers had a range of up to 45 meters, and a stock of combustible mixture
allowed to fire 200 shots. New flamethrowers were installed in the same place - in
case. At Daimler-Benz, they developed a scheme for improving tank armor, at the company
Kyobe is a flamethrower, and Wegmann did the final assembly. "A tank with a combustible mixture was installed on the back of the armor.
In addition to the flamethrower, the tank was armed with a 47 mm SA 35 L/34 cannon and a machine gun.
MG 34 placed in the turret. Armor thickness: 40-60 mm forehead, 60 mm sides and 55 mm feed. cast
the tower had the following armor thickness: 55 mm forehead and 45 sides and rear wall. Tank in motion
powered by Renault's six-cylinder liquid-cooled engine
16.94 liters and 300 hp at 1900 min-1. Torque through a five-speed gearbox
gears were fed to the final drives and further to the drive wheels.
(now - Tver) and in its suburbs, the strip from Staritskoye to Volokolamskoye highway became the dividing line between the Soviet and German units on the southern bank of the Volga. Fierce street fighting began.
Forward, on both banks of the Volga
In order to break through to the city center and capture the highway Volzhsky bridge, the advancing German units needed to break the resistance of the 5th rifle division with attached units of cadets, a fighter battalion and a militia. In the Trans-Volga region, the 900th motorized training brigade of the Wehrmacht stood at the northwestern borders of the city, with plans to capture an important intersection of the highway and railway (Humpback Bridge). Her opponent was the soldiers of the 256th Infantry Division.
Machine gunner of the 1st Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht on Krasnoarmeyskaya Street (now Novotorzhskaya). Soviet Square ahead. On the buildings we can distinguish anti-aircraft camouflage in the form of large uneven spots. By the time of the shooting, the Volga bridge had already been captured by the Germans.
Haupt W. Battles of Army Group Center
The battles for the city, which flared up with renewed vigor in the early morning of October 14, are described in sufficient detail by the German historian, former Wehrmacht officer Werner Haupt:
"Order of the commander of the 41st tank corps to the commander of the 1st tank division with command post in Danilovsky reads: “Take control of the city of Kalinin and the highway bridge across the Volga two kilometers behind it!” While her battle group“B” (reinforced 1st Motorized Regiment), covering the left flank of the division and supply routes from the north, still repelled fierce enemy attacks on the bridgehead near Staritsa, the main forces of the division prepared to storm Kalinin.
The commander of the 113th Motorized Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Wend von Wietersheim, on an armored personnel carrier with the headquarters of the regiment, followed by advanced units, placed his units on both sides of the Staritsky highway, mainly to the north of the road.
1st Company of the 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment, supported by the 1st Artillery Battalion of the 73rd artillery regiment(commander - Major Born), at 2:00 approached Kalinin and prepared at the Migalovo airfield captured the day before for an attack along the Staritskoye Highway. It was supported by the tanks of the "Herschel detachment" (six Pz.Kpfw.III under the command of Lieutenant Pöl, four Pz.Kpfw.IV and several Pz.Kpfw.II under the command of Lieutenant Dunch).
The 1st battalion of the 113th motorized regiment with the attached 3rd company of the 1st tank regiment (six Pz.Kpfw.III and two Pz.Kpfw.IV under the command of Captain Count von der Schulenburg) advanced along the northern streets, stretched parallel to the highway .
An abandoned tram car is one of the most common subjects german photos made on the streets of Kalinin
The 1st motorcycle battalion (commander - Major F. von Wolf) launched an attack at 5:00. Ahead was the 1st company of the battalion, followed by a strike engineer detachment, two anti-tank guns and one light infantry gun, followed by the 5th company of the motorcycle battalion, then the battalion headquarters (commander - adjutant Oberleutnant F. von Fridag) with the rest of the forces battalion.
At first, the attack of the motorcycle battalion developed unsuccessfully. The strong fire of the defending Soviet units prevented us from moving quickly along the Staritsky highway. The 1st company of motorcyclists deployed in the dead zone south of the road to Staritsa, after which it continued to advance slowly. Under the dead zone of the railway embankment, Major von Wolf deployed the battalion to the south, gradually moving towards the Lotoshino-Kalinin road (Volokolamsk highway) under the cover of fire from tank guns of the 2nd battalion of the 1st tank regiment, as well as guns of the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the 73rd Artillery Regiment. Here the Germans were opposed by the Soviet 336th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division, which took up defense along the Nikulino-Lebedevo line.
"Extremely fierce enemy resistance"
At the same time, the 3rd company of the 113th motorized infantry regiment under the command of Lieutenant Katsman attacked the positions of the Soviet troops on the Staritsky highway. During the battle for the overpass near the railway, three Pz.Kpfw.III tanks came close to the highway, but 80 meters from the overpass, they were all hit by Soviet anti-tank guns. The platoon commander of the 3rd company of the 1st tank regiment, Lieutenant Otto, was wounded, his gunner was killed, and all other crew members were also injured. Suffered losses and paratroopers on the armor; many, including Lieutenant Katzman, were wounded. The company, commanded by Lieutenant G. Feig, was forced to moderate their ardor and suspend the offensive.
The Kalinin area, bounded by two bridges across the Volga (on the left - railway, on the right - highway): 1 - Staritskoye highway, 2 - overpass, 3 - Kalinin Avenue, 4 - Proletarka factory ("factory quarter"; south of it, on the opposite bank river Tmaka - a complex of brick industrial and residential buildings "Proletarka Yard"), 5 - Sophia Perovskaya Street.
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In general, the Soviet soldiers and commanders of the 5th Infantry Division put up powerful and well-organized resistance against the obviously stronger enemy. The experience of previous battles, in which a significant part of the personnel of the unit participated, had an effect.
Moreover, at 6:30, the forces of the 142nd and 190th regiments (the latter, after unloading at the station the day before, concentrated on Kalinin Avenue in the area of the 12th school and from there was sent to the western outskirts of the city) launched a counterattack in order to return previously lost positions, first of all - the railway bridge. The combat log of the 1st Panzer Division noted that "Russian counterattacks in the direction of the railway bridge were repulsed".
Then the Germans went on the attack again. After the advance units of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment came out to the northeast of the railway embankment, and the 1st Battalion of the 113th Regiment was able to move further into the northwestern part of the city, the main forces of the division began to attack deep into Kalinin .
Significant support for the German motorized infantry during street fighting was provided by the flamethrower tanks of the 101st flamethrower tank battalion. Several Flammpanzer II tanks, together with a half-platoon of Lieutenant Remler (three Pz.Kpfw.IVs of the 4th company of the 1st tank regiment) operated in the area of the 1st battalion of the 113th regiment of Major Eckinger. The rest of the Flamingos supported a half-platoon of Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks of Lieutenant Koch and Ober-Sergeant Felter from the 8th company of the 1st Tank Regiment in the area of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Regiment.
A typical industrial building for Dvor Proletarka late XIX century. Some of them were turned by the defenders of the city into defense nodes.
By 09:00, the 1st company of the 1st battalion of the 1st motorized regiment under the command of Lieutenant Becker broke, according to Haupt, "extremely fierce enemy resistance". After other companies joined it, heavy street fighting began with “The bravely fought defenders of Kalinin, who firmly held the numerous defense centers in the city. They were forced to withdraw only after their strongholds were set on fire by flamethrower tanks or from flamethrowers, which were in the units of the 37th engineer battalion. It took a long time".
Entries in the combat log of the Soviet 30th Army somewhat shift the events in time, but on the whole they are quite consistent with the harsh realities of the battle:
“At 10:30 the enemy launched an attack with the forces of the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Divisions, inflicting main blow along the Volga river. Parts of the army, offering resistance on the occupied lines, repelled enemy attacks. The enemy, having transported up to an infantry battalion to the northern bank of the Volga River, advanced along the Volga and, breaking through the defenses in the area of the 5th Infantry Division, broke into the city by 12:30, occupying Kalininsky Prospekt ".
The involvement of units of the 36th Motorized Division in the offensive (albeit somewhat later than the time indicated by Soviet sources) is also confirmed by German documents. The combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group shows that by 12:10 Berlin time the division had reached the railroad south of Kalinin, with the support of the 1st Panzer Division as one of its main tasks.
Flamingo tank PzKpfw.II (F) "Flamingo" - quite possibly belonging to the 101st flamethrower tank battalion
Meanwhile, the tanks of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Tank Regiment under the command of Lieutenants Pöl and Dünch and the motorized infantry of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Regiment slowly moved along Kalinin Avenue towards the city center. Werner Haupt describes this episode as follows:
“Because of the riflemen sitting everywhere on the roofs, the 1st Battalion was forced to clear every house in the vast factory district on all streets, and advanced very slowly. With great difficulty, they had to take the rest of the streets and fiercely fight for every inch of land. The Soviet authorities, meanwhile, rounded up Kalinin's factory workers, armed them, and threw them into a street fight in civilian clothes. The attack threatened to choke.
In this case, it is interesting to recall the report of a member of the military council of the 30th Army, Brigadier Commissar V.N. “After the first shot of the enemy, they fled in panic”. The Germans, apparently, did not think so. Veterans of numerous campaigns in the initial period of World War II, soldiers and officers of the 1st Panzer Division not only noticed the resistance from yesterday's inhabitants, but considered it a real threat.
Soldiers of the people's militia detachment of the Kalinin spinning and weaving factory named after Vagzhanov, autumn 1941
One can only imagine what psychological effect, in addition to a purely military one, the impact of flamethrowing tanks on workers poorly trained in military affairs, but even in these conditions they continued to fight. The combat log of the 1st Panzer Division contains the following entry dated 14 October:
"Fierce street fighting with hastily formed enemy units, in which even workers and women participated, forced the attackers to slowly reclaim territory."
Meanwhile, in the Trans-Volga region, the advancing German units were pushing back units of the 934th Infantry Regiment of the 256th Infantry Division. According to the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group, by 11:00 “The training brigade captured the Doroshikha station 5 km west of Kalinin”. Then the Humpback Bridge was under the control of the Germans.
Kalinin Zavolzhye, northern part of the city: 1 - Doroshikha station, 2 - Humpback bridge, 3 - car building plant, 4 - Pervomaiskaya embankment, 5 - bridge over Tvertsa.
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Interestingly, the commanding staff of the regiments of the 256th division opposing the Germans on the northern bank of the Volga were skeptical about their own skills in organizing and conducting street battles. So, N. B. Ivushkin, party organizer of the 937th rifle regiment, transferred to the northern part of Kalinin from the city garden, later recalled:
“None of our commanders had any experience in street fighting. I had to learn actions in the city on the go, master tactics that require quick decisions. From the streets, shot through by the enemy, people were moved to the alleys. They used windows and attics of houses for firing points. We moved forward, clinging to the walls. After about 30 minutes, they broke out onto Pervomaiskaya embankment. A head-on battle ensued, as a result of which the Nazis were driven back. Our fighters from somewhere in the yards rolled barrels onto the street, dragged logs, removed gates, broke fences. Soon the street was blocked by barricades.
On the southern bank of the Volga in the middle of the day, the 1st battalion of the 113th regiment on armored personnel carriers gradually pushed through the defenses of the Soviet units in the factory districts. Waging a heavy battle, the motorized infantrymen of the 3rd company saw the Volga and the openwork spans of the Volga bridge to their left.
Top: Gorbaty Bridge (photo from the early 20th century), bottom: Volzhsky Bridge (German photo)
It is interesting that the 3rd company itself was isolated for a while, since the main forces of the 1st Panzer Division were advancing somewhat to the south, across Sofia Perovskaya Street. According to Haupt, the further course of the battle was as follows:
“When Major Dr. Ekinger, with his armored personnel carrier and two tanks, made his way to Faig's company, he saw around him only Red Army soldiers and armed workers. The bridge was now a magnet for his attacking archers. They were joined by a flamethrower tank, which was accompanied by two Pz.Kpfw.III tanks. They suppressed machine gun emplacements. But when Lieutenant Feig already thought that the time had finally come to break through to the bridge, a canal suddenly appeared in front of him and his people. Opposite, on the east bank, were the Russian positions! Behind them was a 250-meter bridge. But in front of him was a canal, behind which was the Kalinin stadium occupied by the enemy. To the right of the small church, they reconnoitered the crossing over the canal. And everywhere - Russians, Russians and again Russians! From the stadium near the Volga, field and anti-tank artillery... Finally, the mortars brought up opened fire with smoke mines on enemy positions on the other side of the canal and in front of them. Oberleutnant Feig, under the cover of a smoke screen, attacked along the bridge over the canal. Turning to the right, he and 36 soldiers of his company managed to get ahead of the enemy guards, overcome the stronghold system and break through the position along the canal bank.
Sofia Perovskaya Street, along which the German units advanced into the city center (German photo)
For the canal, the Germans took the Tmaka River, which flows within the city and flows into the Volga from the south in its historical center. The Red Army soldiers simply did not have time to destroy two small bridges across it, a tram and an auto-drawn bridge, as is often the case.
According to Soviet data, the capture of bridges looked somewhat different. The fact is that units of the 1st Panzer Division broke through, in fact, almost to the headquarters of the 30th Army, which was located on the first floor of the building of the regional NKVD (today - the building of the Tver Medical University). It was to him that the fighters of the fighter battalion retreated. A participant in the battle, an employee of the NKVD N. A. Shushakov described the battle for mastering the bridges as follows:
“In connection with the threat of the Germans breaking through to the city center from the side of the Proletarka, on the morning of October 14, the headquarters security company took up defense along the Tmaka River, near the city garden and near the regional executive committee building ... At 15:00, they were joined by a group of fighters from the UNKVD fighter battalion under the command of Major G. A. Mitkova. These were mainly management officers who had taken part in the battle near Migalov the day before. At about 17:00, German tanks appeared from the side of Sofia Perovskaya Street. The infantry followed the tanks. When the tanks approached the bridge across the Tmaka, a cannon fired from the side of Sovetskaya Street. The leading tank stopped in front of the bridge and fired back. The brave "forty-five" was smashed along with the calculation.
Area of the Volga Highway Bridge: 1 - a four-story residential building on Sofya Perovskaya Street from the previous photo, 2 - school building No. 6, 3 - St. Nicholas Church in Kapustniki, 4 - Dynamo Stadium, 5 - building of the UNKVD, 6 - building of the regional executive committee (Putevoy palace) and the city garden around it, 7 - the Volga bridge, 8 - one of the "factory quarters" through which the company of Lieutenant Faig broke through to the bridge.
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According to the memoirs of State Security Sergeant G.K. Rassadov, who fought as part of the fighter battalion, even after the Germans broke through positions on the banks of the Tmaka, the battle did not fade away:
“Besides rifles and carbines, we had nothing to meet with tanks. At this time, machine gunners appeared from behind a wrecked tank. Under the cover of machine-gun fire, they jumped into the building of School No. 6 and began to hit us from the windows of the second floor. Conducting aimed fire from behind the lattice of the city garden and the UNKVD building, we blocked this group. Then the Germans placed a machine gun on the bell tower that towered behind the stadium, and our positions were in the zone of fire.
The Church of St. Nicholas in Kapustniki, an architectural monument of the mid-18th century, was indeed the then dominant feature of the area next to the bridge. Having occupied it, the Germans perfectly saw all the movements of the defending Soviet units. Perhaps later they also observed the withdrawal along Sovetskaya Street of the headquarters of the 30th Army, covered by a security company.
View of the bridge from the southern bank of the Volga. On the left - the plank walls of the Dynamo stadium, on the right - the city garden
Haupt spoke about the continuation of the battle for the Volga bridge, quoting the diary of Lieutenant Faig:
“When the smoke cleared again, we reached the now plank walls of the stadium, and the Russians completely disappeared from sight. And now- faster forward, to the big bridge, it's almost a stone's throw away! The Russians who had dug in before that at the stadium had already retreated ... Having completely exhausted themselves, everyone lay down on the bridge. The cable was broken. “Quickly, to the other side! Get up, let's go!" For us it was a race against death. 250 meters of the bridge was a long road! On the northern shore we could see a gun, a machine-gun pillbox and positions. An animated fire hit us, but it was no longer possible to stop.
The compilers of the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group made a much more concise entry in the document: "The highway bridge in Kalinin, after a heavy battle, was captured at 16:30, the planted explosive device was removed."
Cherished Bridge
The Germans once again in the campaign of 1941 got a very important highway bridge intact. Of course, the Soviet sappers who mined it and did not have time to destroy it can be understood. Parts of the Red Army actively moved along the bridge, it provided transport connectivity for the defense of the city (for example, on the afternoon of October 14, soldiers of the 937th Infantry Regiment, who approached from the city garden, crossed the Volga along it, setting off to defend the northern part of the city), and a premature undermining could significantly weaken the positions of the defenders troops. On the other hand, the capture of the bridge by the Germans became a real disaster for the entire Soviet defense system.
Pz.Kpfw.III tanks and motorized infantry of the 1st Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht are slowly moving along Sovetskaya Street
According to N. B. Ivushkin, “The Germans threw several tanks with a landing of machine gunners across the Volzhsky bridge onto Pervomaiskaya embankment. They walked towards their units, moving from the side of the car building plant.. Thus, the 937th regiment could simply get surrounded with vague prospects for maneuvering combat against obviously more mobile enemy units. In these difficult conditions, the Soviet units were forced to retreat to the Tvertsa River, which flowed into the Volga from the north, trying to hold positions on its banks.
The combat log of the 30th Army almost verbatim confirms the words of the political worker:
“On the north bank, the German offensive was held back by the stubborn resistance of units of the 256th Infantry Division, but with the enemy’s access to the highway bridge across the Volga, he gave him the opportunity to throw several tanks and submachine gunners in the rear of our troops operating on the north bank. As a result, our units began to retreat to the Tveretsky bridge, where by 18:00 they took up defensive positions.
Ivushkin outlined the location of the units and subunits even more specifically: the 3rd battalion entrenched itself on the right bank of the Tvertsa, the 2nd battalion - on the left, along the Zatveretskaya embankment. The 934th rifle regiment of the division retreated to the Nikolo-Malitsa line and to the north, having the task, together with the approaching 16th NKVD border regiment, to prevent the enemy from breaking through along the Leningrad highway to Torzhok.
In turn, units of the 5th Infantry Division retreated from the city blocks engulfed in fire to the then southeastern outskirts of Kalinin. The units, exhausted by heavy battles, having exhausted the already far from limitless ammunition, moved towards the Moscow highway. Together with them, the fighters of the fighter battalion and the militia retreated.
In description combat way 5th Rifle Division, created much later than the events that took place, the retreat from the city is mentioned quite succinctly: “On the night of October 15, 1941, under the onslaught of superior enemy infantry and tanks, the strong influence of aviation, the division retreated to the eastern outskirts of Kalinin”. Divisional commissar P.V. Sevastyanov noted:
“On the outskirts of Kalinin, near the famous elevator with its reinforced concrete walls and convenient loopholes, we got hooked. Leave him- meant to give the Germans the Moscow Highway. The regiments entrenched themselves here with the intention of holding out to the last and began to build defenses, especially- anti-tank".
Only by this time did the 27th artillery regiment finally come to the aid of the rifle regiments. The support of his guns was very useful in subsequent battles for the city.
The capture of Kalinin was not an easy walk for the Germans. Having thrown the monument to Lenin from the pedestal in the square of the same name, the invaders erected a hastily made swastika in its place. On the square itself, a cemetery was laid out for the dead soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht. It is believed that the most distinguished of them were buried here. The Germans' craving for decorating their burials is amazing: palm trees, put up in tubs right in the snow, probably immediately died. However, the cemetery of the occupiers will not last much longer.
Aviation activity on both sides during the day was quite high. Entries in the combat log of the Soviet 6th Air Defense Fighter Air Corps on the actions of the German Air Force report that “the enemy is actively conducting reconnaissance in the front line, simultaneously bombing suitable reserves, concentrations of our ground troops, places of loading and unloading”. Soviet air units also did not remain in debt. The documents of the 3rd Panzer Group eloquently testify: "strong enemy air raids lead to significant losses".
The result of heavy fighting for both sides on October 14 was the establishment by the Germans of control over most of Kalinin. The Wehrmacht captured an important foothold and transport hub, which over the next few days ensured the predictability of the intentions of the Soviet command in the Kalinin direction. The city needed to be recaptured, but for now two months of occupation were waiting for it ...
Sources and literature:
- NARA. T 313. R 231.
- NARA. T 315. R 26.
- Ivushkin N. B. Your place is ahead. - M.: Military Publishing, 1986.
- On the right flank of the Moscow battle - Tver: Moskovsky worker, 1991.
- The Hidden Truth of War: 1941. unknown documents. - M.: Russian book, 1992.
- Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. - M.: Yauza-Eksmo, 2006.
- https://pamyat-naroda.ru.
- http://warfly.ru
Flamethrower (chemical) tank - a tank, or other armored vehicle, whose main armament is a flamethrower - a weapon, hitting a target fire mixture (a burning substance that burns or sets fire to the target). Some tanks, in addition to the flamethrower, were equipped with smoke launchers and toxic sprays, so such tanks were called not flamethrower, but chemical. The purpose of the flamethrower tank is to support infantry during the assault on fortified enemy positions (suppression of enemy firing points in embrasures (bunkers, bunkers, URs), destruction of infantry in trenches). As a rule, a flamethrower tank was created on the basis of production tanks by installing a flamethrower in place of the main or auxiliary weapons.
The first experiments with the installation of flamethrowers on tanks were carried out during the First World War, but flamethrower tanks became widespread only by the 1930s. Seriously engaged in the creation of flamethrower tanks in the interwar years only in the USSR. Before the start of the war, more than 1,300 flamethrower tanks of various types were produced. In other countries, including those with a developed tank-building industry, a new type of weaponry until the start of World War II received practically no development. The only exception was Italy, which had large quantity flamethrower CV-3 L.F based on the tankette CV-3 / 33.
In the pre-war years and during the war, 6 countries produced 4,960 heavy tanks of 28 types in 31 modifications. However, the data given cannot be exhaustive, since many flamethrower vehicles were manufactured as needed by field workshops from serial tanks or armored vehicles.
Estimated number of flamethrower tanks used in the war by countries (without captured and transferred / received)
The history of the development of the construction of flamethrower tanks in different countries is as follows.
Mass production of flamethrower tanks in England began in 1943 on the basis of the Churchill tank with a built-in pneumatic flamethrower system using nitrogen pressure. The tank was named "Churchill Crocodile". 1818 l of fire mixture was in an armored trailer, which weighed 6.6 tons, compressed nitrogen was placed in the trailer in five cylinders. The firing range was 120-135 meters. The supply of the mixture was enough for 80 one-second shots. The jet was ignited by an electric spark plug. As a fire mixture, gasoline with aluminum shavings was used. If necessary, all flamethrower equipment could be removed, and the Crocodile turned into a cannon tank. When emptying or hitting, the tank trailer could be disconnected using a squib in the hitch mechanism, which reduced the fire hazard of the tank. At the same time, this reduced maneuverability (the tank could not move in reverse) and cross-country ability (tankers were constantly afraid of losing the trailer when driving over rough terrain and overcoming obstacles), worsened agility. Actions in settlements hampered through a small sector of rotation of the hose.
In Germany, the development of flamethrower weapons began only in 1939. The first vehicles were produced on the chassis of the Pz.II ausf.D / E tanks in 1940. The pressure for flamethrowing was created using compressed nitrogen. Cylinders with nitrogen were inside the tank hull. Weak armor and increased fire hazard quickly affected the losses - by the beginning of 1942, there were practically no such vehicles left in the units.
The second German flamethrower tank was the B-2 (f) based on captured French B-1bis. The flamethrower, which was powered by a two-stroke motorcycle engine, was provided by Koebe. It was installed in a ball mount instead of a 75 mm gun. A booth with viewing devices for the flamethrower was built above the flamethrower. The fire mixture was in an armored tank at the stern of the tank.
At the end of 1942, a batch of flamethrower tanks based on the Pz.III ausf M with a flamethrower in the turret was released for the battles in Stalingrad. Instead of a gun in the Pz.III turret, steel pipe 1.5 m long, which was a protective cover for a 14-mm flamethrower barrel, so that the tank did not look much different from the linear ones. The working pressure in the barrel, which reached 15 MPa, was created using an auxiliary two-stroke DKW engine with a power of 3 hp. Before firing, both tanks with a fire mixture with a capacity of 100 liters each were heated for five minutes with hot water coming from the tank's engine cooling system. To enhance the armor on the frontal part of the hull, an additional 30-mm armor plate was welded, due to which the thickness of the frontal armor of the hull was 80 mm. It was also noted that the StuG and Hetzer self-propelled guns, the Sdkfz 251 armored personnel carrier, were converted into flamethrower vehicles.
In general, German flamethrower tanks had major flaws. Despite the fact that they had a large number of fire shots, the power of these shots and the range of flame throwing were very small. Weak armor and the lack of artillery weapons did not give these tanks the opportunity to conduct combat operations on their own. In most cases, German flamethrowing tanks were not successful due to the fact that they could not approach the objects of flamethrowing at the distance of a fire shot, since this was almost always prevented by the anti-tank artillery of the defender.
The Canadians developed the original Ronson flamethrower, which was installed on British-made vehicles, which were also in service with the Canadian army. In addition, the Wasp flamethrower equipment was installed on the recovery vehicle, converted from the American M-3 General Lee medium tank. This self-propelled flamethrower is known as the "Badger".
In the USSR, the first model of a flamethrower tank was created in 1933 on the basis of a two-turreted T-26 tank under the designation OT-26 / KhT-26. Unlike the linear prototype, the left turret was dismantled, and flamethrower equipment was placed in the hull under it. The aiming of the flamethrower and machine gun at the target was carried out with the help of a shoulder rest. The fire mixture, consisting of fuel oil and kerosene, was ignited from a torch of burning gasoline, and gasoline from an electric spark plug. In addition to the flamethrower, the tank was equipped with a smoke release system. The tank could also be filled with a smoke-forming mixture, poisonous substances of a persistent or unstable type, as well as water or soapy liquid to degas the area. For spraying the poisonous substance and smoke release, a sprayer was used, located in the rear of the machine.
Another tank - KhT-130 (OT-130) - was built starting from 1936, already on the basis of the single-turret version of the T-26. The tower was shifted to the right relative to the longitudinal axis of the tank. To her left were two tanks for fire mixture. In 1938-1940. flamethrower tanks were modernized (ХТ-131, 132, 133). In 1940, the KhT-134 flamethrower tank appeared. Power plant, transmission and chassis flamethrower tanks remained unchanged. They were not equipped with radio stations. In addition to flamethrowers, tanks were equipped with devices for spraying poisonous substances. For the latter purpose, two tanks of 200 liters each were installed on the fenders. At a tank speed of 12 km / h, the width of the infection strip was 25 m, and total area area infected by one machine - 10,000 sq.m. In total, 1,336 units of flamethrower tanks based on the T-26 were produced (12% of the total production of T-26 tanks).
For the first time, flamethrower tanks were used in the summer of 1939 during the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River to eliminate the 6th Japanese army. The weak point in the use of flamethrowing tanks was poor reconnaissance and preparation of vehicles for an attack. As a result, there was a large consumption of fire mixture in secondary areas and unnecessary losses. During the very first battles, it was found that the Japanese infantry could not withstand flamethrowing and was afraid of a chemical tank. In battles where flamethrower tanks were used, the Japanese invariably left their shelters without showing stamina. Negative sides recognized the short range of flamethrowing, which does not provide the tank from throwing a hand grenade.
Conclusions were drawn, and already during the first Soviet-Finnish war, chemical tanks were used most massively, actively and quite effectively in their entire history. As a rule, the assault group included three cannon and two flamethrower tanks, a platoon of sappers, up to an infantry company, two or three machine guns and one or two guns. Cannon tanks with fire at the embrasures and trenches adjacent to the bunker ensured the approach of flamethrower tanks, which filled the embrasures and doors of the bunker with fire mixture and ignited it. At this time, the sappers were working on undermining, and the infantry covered the sappers from the attacks of the Finns.
Flamethrower tanks proved to be more vulnerable than conventional tanks, and therefore suffered heavy losses. The explanation for this is the inevitable occurrence of a fire when fragments get into tanks with fire mixture. Despite the rather high efficiency of chemical tanks during the battles, they revealed the main drawback, however, inherent in all T-26 tanks, the weakness of the armor, since the small flame throwing range did not allow chemical tanks to hit targets at a distance of more than 50 meters. Therefore, some XT-133s that came to replenish losses directly from the factory received additional shielding from 30-40 mm armor.
The experience of using flamethrower tanks confronted the designers with the problem of increasing the firing range, strengthening the armor protection and pointed out the need to keep the cannon armament in the tank. We also noticed that the flamethrower tank should not look different from the linear one, because. the enemy, knowing the importance and vulnerability of flamethrower tanks, tracked them down and tried to knock them out in the first place. These problems were already solved by creating flamethrower tanks based on the new KV and T-34 tanks.
The battles in Finland showed that pneumatic flamethrowers (in which the fire mixture was ejected using compressed air) were no longer suitable for arming tanks due to their short range. It was this fact that influenced the future creation of revolutionary new tank flamethrowers. In 1941, the ATO-41 automatic tank flamethrower was created. Unlike the previous ones, the fire mixture here was thrown out by a piston under the action of powder gases of a special cartridge on it, as in a high-explosive flamethrower, and ignited by a gasoline torch ignited by an electric spark plug. Ejection and ignition were carried out powder charges 45 mm anti-tank gun. In one shot, up to 10 liters of the mixture were thrown out. The firing range with a conventional mixture is 60-70 m, with a viscous mixture - 110-130 m. To create a viscous fire mixture in the USSR, a "cocktail" of gasoline and OP-2 powder was used.
The rate of fire was up to 10 rounds per minute. The following year, the flamethrower was modernized, the firing range was increased to 120 m, and the rate of fire was up to 25-30 rounds per minute. Flame throwing could be carried out with single shots and automatic bursts. He received the designation ATO-42.
Thus, the problem of pre-war chemical tanks was solved - flamethrowers became more long-range, the gun could be saved, and with the KV and T-34 armor it was not scary to approach the enemy at a flamethrowing range. Flamethrower tanks based on the T-34 received the designation OT-34 and OT-34-85. The disadvantage of the tank was that the flamethrower was controlled by the tank driver, and he still had to control the tank. An important advantage of the OT-34 and OT-34-85 was their almost complete external resemblance to linear battle tanks and the preservation of conventional combat properties, as well as the availability of communications. The disadvantages included the lack of circular flamethrowing, a small sector of fire vertically and the limited ability to conduct aimed fire from a flamethrower. In fact, these were line tanks with additional flamethrower weapons.
A flamethrower tank based on the KV-1 received the designation KV-8. The flamethrower was installed in a modified turret next to the coaxial DT machine gun. But it was not possible to leave the KV armament, as in the case of the T-34, due to lack of space in the tower. That is why instead of a 76.2 mm gun, a 45 mm tank gun mod. 1934/38 with 88 rounds of ammunition. To make the KV-8 look like a regular KB-1 (so as not to allocate special vehicles for the enemy in order of battle) The 45-mm cannon was covered with a casing, giving it a resemblance to the F-32 cannon.
On the basis of the upgraded KV-1S tank, they began to produce flamethrower machines called KV-8S. The ATO-42 flamethrower was installed on this machine. In general, the KV-8 became a compromise between the desire for a circular fire with a flamethrower (the main advantage of this tank, which allowed it to choose hidden approaches to the target, not to turn around in front of trenches) and the desire to keep artillery weapons. But the reduction in firepower compared to line tanks did not pay off with flamethrowing. The 45-mm gun was weak in the fight against firing points and counterattacking enemy tanks. Soon, the KV-based flamethrower tanks were discontinued, and vehicles based on the T-34 became the main flamethrower tank.
During the offensive, flamethrower tanks were usually located behind line tanks, and when approaching the objects of attack (fortifications, houses, etc.), they moved forward and destroyed designated targets with flamethrowing, burned out manpower from structures. When attacking heavily fortified firing points, concentrated fire was required, and sometimes the first shot was fired without igniting the jet, igniting the fire mixture with a second shot - this ensured a more reliable defeat and less mixture burned out in flight. Attacking field defenses, flamethrower tanks tried to approach the very trenches and, turning around, carried out flamethrowing along the trenches. Acting as close infantry support tanks, flamethrower tanks, like line tanks, could carry infantry on armor. In battles on the streets of cities and when breaking through heavily fortified positions, they were included in small groups or one at a time in the composition of assault detachments and groups.
Tank flamethrowers especially proved themselves at the final stage of the war, when the Red Army repeatedly had to storm the German fortress cities. In these urban battles, they often turned out to be more effective than tank machine guns, burning out shooters and “faustniks” (soldiers with faustpatrons) of the enemy in shelters, fired at firing points on the lower floors and in basements, bunkers and bunkers.
Since flamethrower tanks were used to storm fortified positions, their close cooperation with sappers was required - in particular, during the battles, OT-34s overcame minefields after the minesweeper tanks. To block the path of movement, flamethrower tanks often took sappers on their armor.
In the United States, the first flamethrower tanks appeared in 1943, when the American Marine Corps faced fierce Japanese resistance in the jungles, fortifications and caves of the Pacific Islands. The first flamethrower was a converted light tank M-3 "General Stuart" under the nickname "Satan". In the future, flamethrower tanks were built on the basis of the medium tank M-4 "General Sherman" in various modifications: M-3-4-3 (installation instead of a course machine gun with a fire mixture tank in the hull); ROA model (a flamethrower instead of a 105-mm howitzer, in which the bolt was replaced by a hose, but the gun barrel remained); model POA-CWS-75-H1 (same with 75 mm gun); model POA-CWS-75-H2 (a hose was installed instead of a coaxial machine gun, cannon armament remained); some tanks were equipped with the Canadian Ronson flamethrower or the British Crocodile system. A modification with four flamethrowers is known to protect against attacks by Japanese kamikaze soldiers. In 1944, several LVT amphibious armored personnel carriers were also equipped with Ronson flamethrowers instead of 37 mm guns. In addition, flamethrowers were installed on line tanks instead of a machine gun.
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