" In addition, this tank is a turning point and important milestone in the development of domestic tank building, and the world too. The KV became a stage in the formation of the famous Leningrad school of tank building, which throughout its history created many excellent vehicles. Many design solutions used on modifications of the KV tank were used in later Soviet vehicles.

The history of the creation of the KV tank began at the end of 1938 with a resolution of the USSR Defense Committee, which ordered the Leningrad design bureau Kirov plant start creating a heavy tank, with projectile-proof armor and powerful weapons. The Kirov plant was not the only enterprise that worked on creating a heavy tank for the Red Army. In the same Leningrad, plant No. 185 received a similar task. In general, it should be noted that at that time the idea of ​​​​building a powerful tank with projectile-proof armor was in the air, and the leadership of the USSR was well aware of the need to create such a vehicle.

In the mid and late 30s, multi-turreted tanks were in fashion. It was believed that by installing many turrets on a tank one could seriously increase its combat power. According to this scheme, the T-28 and T-35 were mass-produced in the USSR, the PzKpfw NbFz V was created in Germany, and the Vickers “Independent” was created in England. Promising heavy tanks have not escaped this fate either. Initially, the future KV was supposed to be made according to a multi-tower design and install three towers. This tank at the drawing stage was called SMK (S.M. Kirov). At the same time, a group of young specialists working at the Kirov plant created a heavy single-turret tank with a diesel engine based on SCM. The tank turned out to be very successful and at the end of 1939 it was adopted by the Red Army. The new car received the proud name KV (Klim Voroshilov).

Tank characteristics

The Soviet KV-1 tank had a classic layout. The control compartment was located at the front edge of the machine, followed by fighting compartment, then the engine compartment and transmission compartment. The crew of the KV-1 tank consisted of five people: tank commander, driver, gunner, loader and radio operator-machine gunner.

The tank's hull consisted of rolled armor, the thickness of which reached 75 mm. The tank was armed with a 76 mm cannon. Initially, the vehicle was equipped with the L-11 gun, then the F-32, and after several months of the war, the ZIS-5 gun. The tank also had several machine guns: coaxial, forward and stern. Some vehicles were also equipped with an anti-aircraft machine gun. The KV-1 had a diesel engine with a power of 600 hp. The mass of the tank was 47.5 tons. Below are brief technical characteristics of the tank.

Total information
Crew, people		5
Length, mm		6675
Width, mm		3320
Height, mm		2710
Ground clearance, mm		450
Armor/tilt angle, mm/deg:
body forehead (top sheet)		75/30
hull side		75/0
feed (top sheet)		60/50
forehead of the tower		75/20
gun mask		90
Speed, km/h:
average on roads		25
Maximum		34
Cruising range, km		225
Armament
gun		gun L-11/F-32/F-34
Caliber, mm		76
Ammunition, L-11/F-32, ZiS-5 shells,		111/114
Machine guns		DT
Quantity, pcs		4
Power point
Engine		diesel V-2K, V-shaped
Number of cylinders		12
Power, hp		600
Fuel used		diesel diesel fuel, gas oil grade “E”
Tank capacity, l:		600-615
Transmission
Main clutch	multi-disc, dry
Gearbox
Type		three-way, with transverse shafts
Number of gears, forward/backward		5/1

Immediately after its creation, the KV-1 tank was supposed to go for testing, but it turned out differently. It was at this time that the Soviet-Finnish war began and the car was sent to the front instead of a training ground. Together with the KV, the T-100 and SMK were sent to the Karelian Isthmus. As part of the 20th Tank Brigade, experimental vehicles entered the battle and took part in the assault on the Mannerheim Line. The SMK was blown up by a landmine, and the KV showed its best side and received praise. True, it turned out that the 76-mm cannon was not suitable for destroying long-term fortifications.

In 1941, they planned to produce several hundred KV-1 units, as well as the KV-2 (a tank with a 152-mm howitzer mounted on it) and the KV-3 tank, which had even thicker armor and greater weight. Drawings of even heavier machines appeared. The assembly of the HF took place at several factories. At the same time, no one was working on improving the weak points of the KV-1, but there were plenty of them: a bad gearbox, an unusable air filter, poor visibility from the tank. Well, gigantomania and the pursuit of quantity at the expense of quality will play a cruel joke on Soviet gunsmiths more than once.

Tank KV-1 in the Great Patriotic War

Enough a large number of KV-1 tanks were in service with units western districts, so these vehicles went into battle from the very first day of the war. The Russian tank caused a real shock among the Nazis; the Wehrmacht had nothing like it at that time. No one took the armor of the Russian KV-1 anti-tank gun Germans, not a single German tank could do anything with the Russian giant. Only an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which the Nazis often used as an anti-tank gun, could cope with the KV-1.

At the end of 1941, the main assembly of KV tanks was moved to the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant.

But most of the losses of these tanks at the beginning of the war were due to breakdowns and malfunctions. The crews simply abandoned their tanks and left. The weaknesses of the KV-1 were primarily: poor quality of components and assemblies, poor visibility from the tank, an unsuccessful gearbox, and especially a lot of complaints about the air filter. Tankers were often unable to reach the battlefield. But the picture with the training of tank crews was even more depressing. The tankers had virtually no experience driving their tanks.

Well-trained tank crews, who knew the characteristics of their vehicle, performed real feats with them. For example, a tank company (5 vehicles) of Lieutenant Kolobanov destroyed 22 enemy tanks in an hour without suffering any losses. Russian tankers on KV often simply pressed German tanks, and there are many descriptions of such feats, both in Soviet and German documents.

Disadvantages of the tank and attempts to eliminate them

But if we talk about the disadvantages of the KV-1 tank, then the main one is not the engine or the air filter. This tank simply turned out to be unnecessary. At the beginning of the war he had no worthy opponents. Not a single German anti-tank gun or tank penetrated its armor, but they also did not take the armor of the T-34. A howitzer or 88-mm anti-aircraft gun easily disabled both tanks. Both the KV and T-34 were armed with the same 76-mm cannons, but the T-34 was more mobile and cheaper. The KV-1 tank was a huge, slow tank that moved over rough terrain not much faster than a pedestrian, so it was easier to hit than the T-34.

This was the case until 1943, when the Germans began mass-producing Tigers and Panthers. At this point, the KV-1 tank instantly became obsolete. The long-barreled guns of German tanks penetrated the KV's armor at such distances that the latter's gun did not threaten the enemy. We can also add that the KV tank was capable of “killing” any road; few bridges could withstand the weight of this giant.

In 1942, the KV-1S (high-speed) was released. It was made according to the same scheme. The armor protection on this tank was reduced, thereby reducing the weight of the vehicle, and some of the problems of the KV-1 were eliminated. The chassis of the car was improved, visibility was improved, and there were fewer problems with the gearbox. The tank's speed characteristics have become better. In 1943, another modification of the tank was released - the KV-85, armed with an 85-mm cannon. But they managed to produce this car only in a small series (less than 150 pieces) and it did not play an important role in the history of the war.

Video about KV-1

Between 1940 and 1944, 4,775 KV tanks of various modifications were produced. These vehicles played an important role, especially in the early stages of the war. Unfortunately, this tank went into production without eliminating the defects that were identified at the factory testing stage. During the war, these shortcomings had to be paid for in blood. On the basis of the KV tank, a heavy IS tank was created, which became a more advanced vehicle and could compete on equal terms with the German Tigers and Panthers.

If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them

Main characteristics

Briefly

Details

4.3 / 4.0 / 4.3 BR

5 people Crew

Mobility

49.0 tons Weight

5 forward
1 ago checkpoint

Armament

111 rounds of ammunition

5° / 25° UVN

1,890 rounds of ammunition

63 rounds clip size

600 rounds/min rate of fire

Economy

Description

In order to enhance the armor protection of the KV-1 heavy tank, an additional shielding scheme was developed and approved on June 19, 1941. It was decided to shield the sides of the turret with 30 mm armor, the frontal part of the hull and some places on the sides with 25 mm armor. The gun mantlet and turret forehead were not shielded in order to maintain the balance of the turret and artillery system; the armor thickness remained the same - 75 mm.

The first KV-1, used for shielding, was somewhat different from the tanks produced in the spring of 1941. The main difference was the turret, assembled using a new technology - on goujons. According to the new technology, the front and rear sheets were attached to the side sheets at the joint, using goujons and welding. Weld seam at the same time it was located on the sides, at a distance of 75 mm (thickness of the front and rear sheets) from the edge.

As a rule, shielded vehicles had enhanced protection for the sides of the hull and turret in late June - early July 1941. In addition to shielding the sides of the turret and hull, the frontal parts of the hull were additionally armored with welded armor plates.

Shielded tanks produced at the end of July 1941 had reinforced rollers with additional stiffening ribs; only the sides of the turret were shielded.

Main characteristics

Armor protection and survivability

Additional screens - 25-30 mm

Excellent armor is the main advantage of the KV-1E tank. In addition to the main armor, the tank's protection was significantly strengthened by additional screens, which increased the armor thickness in some places to 100 mm or more.

Problem areas on the tank's forehead

So, for example, the thickness of the sides of the tower was 105 mm, and the armor in this area was almost continuous. The joints of the turret's forehead are partially reinforced with shields, but the forehead itself and the gun mantlet have standard armor. This is done to maintain the balance of the turret and gun.

The weak point is the protective casing of the gun's damping system; the armor thickness in this place is 75 mm, at an angle of only 4°. Penetration of the casing by any projectile disables the weapon. The gun mantlet is better protected; the armor thickness is already 90 mm, while the mantlet has a rounded shape, which further increases the chance of a ricochet. In general, armoring the front of a turret is worse than armoring its sides, so it is better to “tank” enemy shots with the side of the turret, exposing it to the enemy’s shot at an effective angle of 35-45°. This will significantly increase the reduced armor thickness, up to impenetrable 170-180 mm.

The forehead of the tank hull is reinforced unevenly, the lower frontal part is not completely covered by the screen, and a fairly wide strip at the bottom of the NLD remains unprotected. The "shelf" of the hull's forehead is protected by a screen in the area of ​​the driver's observation devices and the machine-gun nest. The KV-1E's armor has practically no rational angles of inclination, so when playing on this tank it is vitally important to be able to defend itself with a "diamond" formation.

Mobility

Despite the fact that the weight of the tank, compared to the KV-1, increased by three tons and amounted to 49 tons (the KV-1 weighs 46 tons), the KV-1E did not lose any of its dynamics and mobility. On the contrary, the specific engine power was increased to 12.24 horsepower per ton versus 11.52 for the KV-1. This happened thanks to the installation of a more powerful 600-horsepower engine.

The tank is quite dynamic for its weight, quickly picks up the stated speed, and responds well to control. It moves briskly across rough terrain at a speed of over 24 km/h. But the reverse gear let us down, only 6 km/h, which could cause the death of the tank, since it may not have time to escape the massive enemy fire in time. You need to remember this and wisely plan your escape routes.

Armament

Main weapon

The 76-mm F-32 gun is no different from other Soviet tank guns of the early World War II; players familiar with the guns of this period presented in the game will not have to retrain to play this tank. Vertical gun aiming angles, traditionally for Soviet technology, have bad negative values, only -5° down. The gun can rise upward by 25°. The gun's ammunition capacity is 116 shells, which is a lot. At the top, the tank's rate of fire is 6.3 seconds. In order to fire the entire ammunition load, it will take 12 minutes of firing without stopping. You don't have to worry about saving ammunition.

Since the tank is premium, all types of ammunition are immediately available. Therefore the projectile BR-350A- an armor-piercing blunt-headed chamber projectile with an MD-5 fuse will never be used, even though the armor-piercing effect of a blunt-headed projectile is stronger than a sharp-headed projectile BR-350B. A blunt-nosed projectile is inferior to its counterpart in armor-piercing power, and when it penetrates armor, the result for both types of projectile is the same - the complete destruction of the enemy. High-explosive fragmentation projectile OF-350M also not used, it is successfully replaced by a shrapnel shell Sh-354T, which successfully destroys lightly armored vehicles, and at close ranges is capable of destroying a medium armored tank, which a landmine cannot do.

Available ammo:

• BR-350A- blunt-headed with a ballistic tip, tracer;
• BR-350B- blunt-headed with a ballistic tip, with localizers, tracer;
• OF-350- steel high-explosive fragmentation projectile;
• Sh-354T- shrapnel with a T-6 tube.

Machine gun weapons

DT (Degtyarev tank) - Soviet tank machine gun of 7.62 mm caliber. It is a modification of the 7.62 mm DP light machine gun designed in 1927. It is practically useless in the game, capable only of destroying the crew in unarmored anti-aircraft installations, as well as “raising dust” - shooting at the ground in front of the enemy, making it difficult for him to aim.

Use in combat

Fuel tanks are very vulnerable

The KV-1E is one of the most durable tanks in the entire Soviet development tree. The presence of excellent armor, complemented by screens, good weapons and satisfactory dynamics for a heavy tank - all this allows you to go into the thick of battle without fear of receiving serious damage. And why all? That's because it's a rhombus. In this position the tank is practically immortal. The main thing to remember is the only rule - be constantly in the diamond, even when you are just driving.

It is very important not to expose the side of the tank to a shot; the fuel tanks occupy the entire middle part of the hull; a hole in the tank almost always results in a fire. When moving across the battlefield, you need to take into account that the tank's turret rotates very slowly, only 11.3 ° per second. Sometimes it’s faster to tighten the hull than to turn the tank’s turret, so plan your firing sector in advance.

If you are thrown against strong opponents, play prudently in the second line, trying to cover the rear of your allies, play dirty tricks on your opponents, knocking down tracks and breaking their guns. If the enemy is weak, then you need to be at the epicenter of events, rush into the enemy’s forehead and destroy everything that moves. What doesn’t move, push and destroy.

Speaking of opponents. We have a fairly comfortable battle rating, but our opponents are often not a gift at all. At combat ratings of 3.3-4.3, you need to be afraid of opponents with high penetration, such as: M10 Wolverine, Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. F2, Sturmgeschütz III Ausf. F. But thanks to the excellent gun of the F-32, they are not a big problem for us. If we get to 5.0-5.3, then we are absolutely afraid of everyone. We live in an eternal diamond, we were a little slow and didn’t complete the hull with the turret - hello hangar.

Advantages and disadvantages

The KV-1E is a powerful tank, with good armor and a lethal gun. Very durable with skillful use of the diamond tactical technique. Does not like hilly terrain due to poor elevation angles. It is a threat to opponents of its own combat rating and lower, but is weak against opponents with a combat rating above 5.0.

Advantages:

• Powerful weapons
• Fast gun reload (6.3 seconds at the top)
• Good mobility, like for a heavy tank
• Additional reservation (shielding)

Flaws:

• Insufficient armor on the turret's forehead
• Low turret traverse speed
• Vulnerable location of fuel tanks
• Bad UVN

Historical reference

Penetration of KV-1E armor by an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun shell

Serial production of KV tanks began in February 1940 at the Kirov plant. In accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 19, 1940, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ) was also ordered to begin production of HF. On December 31, 1940, the first KV was assembled at ChTZ. At the same time, the plant began construction of a special building for the assembly of HF.

For 1941, it was planned to produce 1,200 KV tanks of all modifications. Of these, 1000 pieces are at the Kirov plant. (400 KV-1, 100 KV-2, 500 KV-3) and another 200 KV-1 at ChTZ. However, only a few tanks were assembled at ChTZ before the start of the war. In 1940, 243 KV-1 and KV-2 were built (including 104 KV-2), and in the first half of 1941 - 393 (including 100 KV-2). On May 13, 1941, options for shielding drawings for KV-1 tanks were reviewed and approved by the directors of the Kirov and Izhora plants, who were to participate in the modernization of the KV-1.

On June 19, 1941, a protocol was signed for the final approval of the shielding scheme for KV tanks. It said: “The KV-1 tank should be shielded on the sides of the turret with armor 30 mm thick, the frontal part and places on the sides of the hull with armor 25 mm thick in accordance with the drawings signed for the prototypes” and further - “To maintain the balance of the turrets and artillery systems of the KV tanks -1 and KV-2 (part 57-70) and the movable armor of the guns should not be shielded, leaving a thickness of 75 mm."

Apart from the essentially experimental use of the KV in the Finnish campaign, the tank went into battle for the first time after the German attack on the USSR. The very first meetings of German tank crews with the KV put them in a state of shock. The tank was practically not penetrated by German tank guns (for example, a German sub-caliber projectile from a 50-mm tank gun penetrated the side of the KV from a distance of 300 m, and the forehead only from a distance of 40 m).

The Germans evacuate a damaged KV-1E

Anti-tank artillery was also ineffective: for example, the armor-piercing shell of the 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank gun made it possible to hit KVs in favorable conditions at a distance of less than 500 m. Only 105-mm howitzers and 88-mm anti-aircraft guns were more effective.

However, the tank was “raw”: the novelty of the design and the haste of introduction into production affected it. The transmission, which could not withstand the loads of a heavy tank, caused a lot of trouble - it often broke down. And if in open battle the KV really had no equal, then in conditions of retreat many KVs, even with minor damage, had to be abandoned or destroyed. There was no way to repair or evacuate them.

Several KVs - abandoned or damaged - were recovered by the Germans. However, captured HFs were used for a short time - the lack of spare parts affected them and the same frequent breakdowns occurred.

The HF caused conflicting assessments by the military. On the one hand - invulnerability, on the other - insufficient reliability. And with cross-country ability, not everything is so simple: the tank had difficulty negotiating steep slopes, and many bridges could not support it. In addition, it destroyed any road - wheeled vehicles could no longer move behind it, which is why the KV was always placed at the end of the column.

In general, according to contemporaries, the KV did not have any special advantages over the T-34. The tanks were equal in firepower, both were slightly vulnerable to anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the T-34 had better dynamic characteristics, was cheaper and easier to produce, which is important in wartime.

Media

see also

• link to the family of equipment;
• links to approximate analogues in other nations and branches.

And similar ones.

Links

· KV family
With 75 mm gun	▀Pz.Kpfw. KW I C mit 7.5 cm KwK L/48
With 76 mm gun	KV-1 with L-11 cannon · KV-1E· ▀KV-1B (Ps. 272-1) · KV-1 with ZiS-5 cannon · KV-1S
With 85 mm gun	KV-85 KV-220
With 107 mm gun	KV-2 with ZiS-6 cannon
With 122 mm gun	KV-122
With 152 mm gun	KV-2 arr. 1939 · KV-2 mod. 1940 · ▀Pz.Kpfw. KW II - 754(r)
self-propelled guns	SU-152

· Soviet heavy tanks
HF	KV-1 with L-11 cannon · KV-1E ·

Heavy tank

Official designation: KV-1
Start of design: 1939
Date of construction of the first prototype: 1939
Stage of completion of work: serially produced in 1939-1943, used on all sectors of the Eastern Front until May 1945.

The rapid progress of anti-tank artillery, which occurred in the mid-1930s, led to the fact that tanks that had just recently been put into service were already outdated. This primarily affected medium and heavy class vehicles. By 1936, the only Soviet heavy tank was the five-turret T-35, which, in addition to its enormous size, was distinguished by very powerful weapons. Then it fully met the requirements, but after assessing the use of anti-tank guns in the Spanish Civil War, it was concluded that the “thirty-fifth” was practically no different from light tanks in terms of protection. In addition, the T-35 had very poor performance characteristics, which greatly reduced its chances of surviving a modern battle. Attempts to strengthen armor through shielding (applying an overlay layer of armor) and the introduction of conical turrets were temporary measures that had virtually no effect on the combat effectiveness of these vehicles, but they were also in no hurry to abandon the construction of multi-turret giants. The fact is that at that time there was no worthy replacement for them, so they made a compromise decision - to continue the construction of the T-35 and at the same time begin designing a completely new heavy tank, with no less powerful weapons and strong armor.
In the fall of 1938, the USSR NKO put forward requirements for such a combat vehicle, still focusing on the old concept of a multi-turret tank with armor thickness of at least 60 mm and mandatory armament, consisting of 76 mm and 45 mm guns. This is how QMS projects appeared (developed by SKB-2, chief designer Zh.Ya.Kotin) and T-100 (developed by the design bureau of plant No. 185 in Leningrad). At first, options for placing weapons in five towers were indeed considered, but later their number was reduced to three. Both cars turned out to be surprisingly similar both in appearance and in technical specifications, all that remained was to determine which of them would be adopted...

At the same time, the NPO ordered the design of a heavy tank with a single turret. Apparently, this was not just a matter of “insurance just in case.” The practice of using multi-turret T-35 tanks in training combat conditions showed that the commander of the vehicle had a very difficult time in terms of controlling all parts of the fighting compartment. Sometimes it turned out that the commander of each of the five towers chose his own target and fired independently. It was, of course, much easier to manage with two or three towers, but their presence was already considered to some extent superfluous.
The design of a single-turret tank was entrusted to SKB-2, where, under the leadership of engineers L.E. Sychev and A.S. Ermolaev, a group of VAMM graduate students developed an out-of-competition design for the tank, now better known as HF (“Klim Voroshilov”).
The SMK tank was taken as a basis, quite naturally, but one should not assume that the KV was its “smaller single-turret copy.” The length of the tank was indeed noticeably reduced, and the main armament, consisting of 76.2 mm and 45 mm tank guns, was concentrated in one turret, which in its dimensions (both external and internal) was almost the same as the SMK. At the same time, however, we had to abandon the DK turret-mounted machine gun, since there was simply no room left for it.
The crew was accordingly reduced to 5 people. The total weight saved in this way made it possible to increase the thickness of the frontal plates of the hull and turret to 75 mm, thereby surpassing the unique record previously held firmly by the French heavy tank 2C. Moreover, instead of aircraft engine The AM-34 was equipped with a diesel V-2 on the HF. Although it had less power (500 hp versus 850 for SMK), this type of engine burned less expensive fuel and was more fireproof. This entailed a change in the rear part of the hull, the height of which became smaller due to the use of a new roof over the engine compartment. The chassis of the tank, for one side, consisted of six road wheels with internal shock absorption and individual torsion bar suspension, and three rubberized support rollers. The lantern gear drive wheel had a removable ring gear and was installed at the rear. The combat weight of the KV reached 47 tons.

At the beginning of December 1938, the mock-up commission approved the final appearance of the SMK tank, recommending the removal of its third (aft) turret and strengthening of the armament. Then one of the first versions of the HF was presented, which also received good reviews and was recommended for construction. Five months later, on April 9, 1939, the technical design was approved and construction of the prototype began soon, which was completed at the end of August. After modifications, on September 1, 1939, the KV prototype made its first run at the factory site.
Further events unfolded no less rapidly. On September 5, the tank was sent to Moscow to demonstrate the new vehicle to the country's leadership. The premiere screening took place on September 23 and made the most favorable impressions. Together with the KV, the SMK tank demonstrated its capabilities, so that the country’s top leadership could easily agree on an opinion about both vehicles.
SMK was the first to enter the testing track. According to the recollections of the mechanic-driver of the KV tank, P.I. Petrov, there were strong fears that the “double-turret”, which had a longer base chassis, would show better data when overcoming obstacles, but everything turned out quite the opposite. SMK easily overcame the scarp, then the ditch and paused a bit on the craters. The shorter KV, on the contrary, easily passed all the obstacles, which caused applause from those present. However, not everything was as smooth as we would like. The V-2 engine regulator worked intermittently and therefore Petrov had to drive the tank at constantly high speeds, which threatened an accident. While overcoming water obstacles on the Moscow River, the tank began to fill with water, but the KV was very lucky that time.

After this, on October 8, the KV was returned to the Leningrad plant for routine repairs and elimination of identified defects. A little more than a month later, on November 10, 1939, the tank was sent to the NIBT test site, where full-scale factory tests began. Over the course of several days, having covered 485 km, another 20 different defects were identified in the design of the HF, primarily related to the operation of the power plant and transmission.

Based on the test results, it was determined that the KV tank was better than its double-turreted counterparts in terms of its main indicators. The lower HF height, obtained due to the absence of a turret box, contributed to better protection and projectile resistance of the tank. The running characteristics also turned out to be higher, since the KV had a shorter running gear while maintaining its width. But the most important thing is that now the vehicle commander could control the fire of guns and machine guns without wasting his forces. Negative qualities noted were the cramped work of the crew in the fighting compartment, the lack of a front-mounted machine gun, and the heavy weight of the vehicle. The last drawback, first of all, negatively affected the operation of the most important components and assemblies of the HF. While the chassis and suspension of the tank could still withstand significant loads, the transmission and engine were operating at their limit. The developers were advised to quickly deal with these shortcomings, but throughout the entire period of operation of the KV tanks they were not completely eliminated.

The HF tests were quite expectedly interrupted in December 1939. Just a few days after the start Soviet-Finnish war units of the Red Army faced a very serious problem in the form of long-term fortifications erected on the Karelian Isthmus. The “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be an extremely “tough nut to crack” and breaking through it with the help of artillery and aviation alone was not at all easy. To storm Finnish positions, a powerful assault tank with projectile-proof armor was required, and this was not produced in mass quantities in the USSR at that time. The only heavy vehicle capable of operating in harsh winter conditions was the T-28 medium tank, but its 30 mm frontal armor was easily penetrated by Finnish anti-tank guns. Fortunately, they didn’t think of using five-turret T-35s at that time, although some domestic and foreign “historians” claim without a shadow of embarrassment that the Red Army lost from 60 to 90 (!) tanks of this type on the Karelian Isthmus. So the appearance of new heavy tanks, even in prototypes, was very timely.

Thus, field tests smoothly turned into combat tests, with all the ensuing consequences. The decision to transfer tanks to combat units was made by the leadership of the Leningrad Military District, sending KV, SMK and T-100 to the 91st tank battalion (tb) of the 20th tank brigade (tbr). The crew of the KV tank during the combat tests was mixed: G. Kachekhin (tank commander), military technician 2nd rank P. Golovachev (driver), Red Army soldiers Kuznetsov (gunner) and A. Smirnov (radio operator), as well as specialists testers of the Kirov plant A. Estratov (motor operator, also loader) and K. Kovsh (reserve driver, was outside the tank during the battles). New vehicles were not immediately rushed to Finnish positions. For the first two weeks, the crews mastered the tanks. At the same time, the 45-mm cannon was removed from the KV, replacing it with a 7.62-mm DT machine gun. This tank went into battle only on December 18th. The tankers had a difficult task - to break through the Finnish defenses in the Babokino area. Previously, they tried to solve the problem using medium T-28s, but in conditions of strong anti-tank missile defense, the weakly armored “twenty-eighths” suffered losses and positive result have not reached. The battle, which began on the morning of December 18, unfolded according to approximately the same scenario, only heavy tanks marched next to the T-28. In winter conditions, when the snow well masked the Finnish bunkers, the KV crew had to act almost blindly. At the very beginning of the battle, the T-28 in front was shot down and blocked the KV's path. Having walked around it, the commander noticed an enemy fortified point and ordered to open fire on it. After a few minutes, it became clear that several bunkers were firing at the tank at once, but the 37-mm Finnish anti-tank guns were never able to penetrate the thick armor of the KV. While the fight was going on with the first bunker, another shell hit the front of the tank. Since the shelling continued, it was then impossible to establish the nature of the damage and Kachekhin decided to move on. At the end of the battle, an order was received to approach the next damaged T-28 and, if possible, evacuate it, which was done. The result of the first experience of combat use of the KV turned out to be impressive: not a single hit, one hit each in the barrel, front plate and hub of the 4th road wheel, three hits each in the right track tracks and on the side. The damage was inspected by senior officers and the head of the armored department, concluding that the KV tank was invulnerable to modern anti-tank guns.

The gun barrel was replaced the next day, and on the evening of December 19, by decree of the USSR NKO, the KV tank was adopted by the Red Army. And this despite the fact that even the installation series of these machines has not yet been ordered, and the first prototype traveled no more than 550 km. As for additional testing of such important components as the suspension, transmission and chassis, which failed in the first place, they proceeded as follows - since these elements had a high degree of unification with the QMS, the test results of both tanks were combined, concluding that they passed satisfactorily. The director of the Kirov Plant (LKZ) was ordered to “eliminate all defects discovered during testing” and begin serial production on January 1, 1940, delivering 50 tanks by the end of the year.

The fact that the combat use of the two-turreted SMK was not nearly as successful also played a role. This tank, in terms of projectile resistance, showed its best side, but during the battle on December 17, 1939 on the Kameri-Vyborg road, the SMK ran into a camouflaged landmine and lost speed. The crew was successfully evacuated on a nearby T-100, but they were able to tow the damaged vehicle for repairs only after the war. At the same time, Finnish intelligence officers managed to remove the hatch cover from the tank.
At the same time, the situation with the installation batch of HF was corrected. A total of 12 vehicles were ordered, which received additional “U” indices - for example, the KV prototype, according to the documents, was described as U-0 (tank of the installation series, zero sample). In addition, the military demanded that the tank be equipped with a 152-mm howitzer, which came as somewhat of a surprise to the designers. The main problem was not so much the modifications to the tank design, but the lack of an appropriate tank gun. To be fair, it is worth noting that nowhere in the world have guns with a caliber of more than 105 mm been installed on heavy tanks - by the way, here too, the championship belonged to the French 2C, one of the samples of which was used for some time with just such a gun.

For the “artillery” tank, we had to re-develop a new turret of increased dimensions on the previous pursuit and look for a 152-mm howitzer. The first option with a howitzer of the 1909/1930 model was rejected immediately, giving preference to the newer M-10 of the 1938 model. Work in this direction was carried out by a team of engineers, which included about 20 people, under the leadership of N. Kurin. The young designers were given only a few days, transferring them to a barracks position. Two weeks later, they began manufacturing the first prototype of such a plant, called MT-1. In January 1940, it was installed on an experimental KV tank, recently recalled from the front for modifications, and on February 10 it was fired at at a shooting range. In addition to the original design of the MT-1, the gun barrel was covered with a special cover, which was supposed to protect it from bullets and shrapnel, but this improvement turned out to be ineffective and not other tanks abandoned it. Instead, special rings made of 10 mm thick armor were placed on the howitzer barrel. In production, this solution was used on all production tanks.

On February 17, 1940, the U-0 and U-1 tanks (with MT-1 installations) were again sent to the front. On February 22, the U-2 tank with the turret of the experimental U-0 tank with a 76.2 mm gun went to the front, and on February 29, the U-3 tank with the MT-1 installation. They also managed to build and send the U-4 tank to the front (the last of the installation series with the MT-1), but on March 13, 1940, a truce was signed and it was not possible to test this tank in battle. Since numerical designations began to be used much later, the KV with the MT-1 installation was called “KV with a large turret”, and with a 76-mm gun - “KV with a small turret”.

The resulting KV tanks and the only copy of the T-100 were combined into a separate tank company, transferring it first to the 13th and then to the 20th Tank Brigade. Since in March the line of fortifications had already been broken through, it was not possible to test the tanks with the “big tower” by firing at the bunkers in combat conditions. However, the report on the combat use of the KV indicated that the tanks performed well, but also noted that they were overweight and had insufficient engine power.

Production serial tanks KV “with a small turret”, renamed KV-1, was planned to begin at the end of March 1940, but due to the fact that LKZ was not ready for mass production new products, until the beginning of May, HFs from the installation series were still being assembled here.

The leadership of the ABTU of the Red Army, very concerned about the incoming reports, proposed to conduct a full test cycle in order to identify all the defects in the design of the KV. In May 1940, such tests were carried out at the training grounds in Kubinka and near Leningrad on the U-1, U-7 (both with a 76-mm cannon) and U-21 (with a 152-mm howitzer) tanks.
Having covered 2,648 km, the tank of the U-1 installation series failed several times for technical reasons due to breakdowns of the transmission and engine, which was replaced twice. The U-7 and U-21 tanks traveled slightly less - 2050 and 1631 km, but this did not save them from similar problems. Among the most significant shortcomings were noted bad design transmission and air filter, insufficient strength of tracks and road wheels, cramped conditions in the crew compartment, poor visibility. The turret also caused a lot of problems: on the KV-1 it weighed 7 tons, and on the KV-2 - 12 tons. In this regard, problems arose with rotation associated with large forces on the handles of the guidance mechanisms and low power electric motors. In addition, when tilted, the turret on tanks of the first series could not rotate at all.

It was quite possible to deliver the required order of 50 cars by the end of the year, but at the end of May the plant received a new order. Now it was necessary to produce 230 kV of both modifications in the period from July to December, of which 15 units by August and another 70 by September. The plant was under pressure “from above”, insisting on delivery finished products on time. In fact, the plant produced 5 tanks in July 1940, while the remaining 10 were delivered on August 22-24.
Knowing what measures might follow for failure to comply with this order, LKZ director Zaltsman reported that tank deliveries were on schedule. Understanding the current situation, military engineer 2nd rank Shpitanov, who was a military representative from the army, met the factory workers halfway and signed payment certificates retroactively (July 31). This fact of “flagrant violation” was described in detail in a letter written by another representative of the military acceptance department, military engineer 2nd rank Kalivoda. Full text This document can be read in the issue “Front-line Illustration. History of the KV tank. Its essence boiled down to the following:

— the plant is in no hurry to finalize KV tanks

- all tanks, even those accepted by the military representative, have a huge number of defects

— the plant management hides the shortcomings of the HF.

In addition, several more significant shortcomings of the tanks of both the installation and the first series were revealed. At the same time, the military engineer only indirectly took into account the fact that LKZ and SKB-2 were heavily loaded with current work, and it was necessary to carry out the plan without delay. As a result, an authoritative commission was appointed, which generally confirmed the conclusions made by Kalivoda, but only “disciplinary sanctions” were given as punishment to all those responsible.

However, it was impossible to say that the plant did nothing to eliminate the identified defects. In July 1940, 349 design changes were made to the tank's drawings, of which 43 were related to the technological process. In August-September the number of changes increased to 1322 and 110, respectively. For the entire 1940, LKZ produced 243 tanks, exceeding the plan, but the quality of the products still suffered greatly due to the great rush.

The design of the KV tank of the 1939 model was based on the SMK design and borrowed many elements from it. First of all, this concerned the chassis and individual elements of the body. However, the remaining components and assemblies were designed anew.

The chassis of the KV tank of the 1939 model, compared to the SMK, was shortened by one road wheel and one support roller, respectively, which had a positive effect on the weight characteristics and maneuverability of the tank. For one side, the chassis consisted of the following elements:

— six road wheels with internal shock absorption and individual torsion bar suspension;

— three support rollers with rubber bands;

— front steering wheel;

— rear drive wheel with a cast hub and two 16-tooth rims;

— a caterpillar chain of 87-90 tracks with a width of 700 mm and a pitch of 160 mm, the tracks are cast, made of steel 35ХГ2 with two rectangular windows for the teeth of the drive wheel.

The hull was a rigid welded box with differentiated armor, during the assembly of which corners and overlays were used to enhance rigidity. The bow of the hull consisted of upper, middle and lower armor plates. The upper and lower armor plates, 75 mm thick, were installed at an angle of 30. The middle armor plate, 40 mm thick, had an installation angle of 85 and a hole on the left side for the antenna output. The upper armor plate had cutouts for the driver's hatch and a ball machine gun mount. The bottom sheet was equipped with two towing hooks.

The side armor plates were made in the form of a single casting 75 mm thick. They had 6 holes for the passage of the suspension balancer axles and 3 holes for the passage of the support wheel brackets. In the front part, a bracket for the crank mechanism was welded on which the guide wheel was attached, and in the rear part there were holes for installing the final drive. The combat compartment was separated from the engine-transmission compartment by an armored partition.

The roof was made in the form of three armored sections. The first section, 40 mm thick, covered the fighting compartment and had a cutout for the turret ring, to protect which side strips 80 mm high and 40 mm thick were welded. The second section, 30 mm thick, with hatches for access to the engines and cooling system filler necks, protected the engine compartment. In the roof of the transmission compartment of similar thickness there were two hatches for access to the transmission mechanisms.

The bottom consisted of a front sheet 40 mm thick and a rear sheet 30 mm thick. Armor plates were butt welded and attached to the side sections. In the front part of the bottom, next to the driver’s seat, there was an emergency hatch. In the rear there were four holes for draining fuel and an under-engine hatch.

The turret of the KV-1 tank of the first series was riveted and welded and had a faceted shape. The forehead, sides and rear were made of armor 75 mm thick, the gun mantlet was 90 mm thick. The sides were installed at an angle of 15, the frontal armor plate was 20. The wing was made of a solid 40-mm armor plate. It had cutouts for the commander's hatch and sighting devices. The sides had viewing slots with glass blocks. A machine-gun turret was sometimes mounted on the base of the hatch for firing at air targets.

Unlike the SMK tank, which was equipped with an M-17 aviation gasoline engine, the KV tank received a V-2K diesel engine. Its maximum power was 600 hp. at 2000 rpm, nominal - 500 hp. at 1800 rpm. The engine had 12 cylinders installed in a V-shape at an angle of 60°; The fuel used was diesel fuel of the “DT” brand or gas oil of the “E” brand, which was located in three fuel tanks with a capacity of 600-615 liters. Two tanks were installed in the front part of the hull in the control compartment (capacity 230-235 liters) and the combat compartment (capacity 235-240 liters). The third tank, with a capacity of 140 liters, was located on the left side in the fighting compartment. Compared to the T-34 medium tank of the same year of production, this arrangement of fuel tanks was more rational and allowed us to avoid unnecessary losses. The fuel supply was carried out by the NK-1 pump. The engine could be started using two ST-4628 electric starters with a power of 4.4 kW or compressed air from two cylinders. To cool the engine, two tubular radiators with a capacity of 55-60 liters were used, installed on the sides of the engine and tilted towards it.

The mechanical type transmission consisted of a multi-disc main dry friction clutch, a 5-speed twin-shaft gearbox, multi-disc dry friction onboard clutches with band floating brakes and two planetary onboard double-row gearboxes.

The means of communication consisted of a telephone-telegraph radio station 71TK-3 and an internal intercom TPU-4-bis. The electrical equipment (made according to a single-wire circuit) included a GT-4563A generator with a power of 1 kW and four 6-STE-144 batteries with a capacity of 144 amperes each. Consumers of electricity included the tower's rotating mechanism, communications equipment, control devices, internal lighting equipment, headlights and electrical signals.

The tank's crew consisted of five people: a driver, a gunner-radio operator, a commander, a gunner and a loader. The first two of them were located in the control compartment in the front part of the hull, the other three were located in the combat compartment.

The KV-1 tanks of the 1939 model were equipped with a 76.2 mm L-11 cannon with a barrel length of 30.5 calibers. This artillery system, created by the LKZ Design Bureau, had good armor penetration characteristics and could hit any type of enemy tank at a distance of up to 500 meters. The initial speed of the armor-piercing projectile was 612 m/s, which made it possible to pierce a vertically mounted sheet of armor up to 50 mm thick at a specified distance. Vertical guidance angles ranged from -7° to +25°; The cannon was fired using foot and manual mechanical triggers. To aim at the target, a TOD-6 telescopic sight and a PT-6 periscopic panoramic sight were used.

At the same time, the original recoil system used on the L-11 was its weak point. In the design of the recoil device, the compressor fluid was in direct contact with the air of the reel through a special hole, which was blocked at certain angles of rotation of the gun. As a result, after several shots the liquid boiled, which often led to damage to the gun. This defect was most acutely revealed during the 1938 maneuvers, during which most of the T-28 tanks, recently rearmed from KT-28 to L-11, turned out to be ineffective. The defect was corrected by using an additional hole, but this did not save the situation as a whole.

Light small arms included four 7.62 mm DT machine guns. The first of them was installed in the frontal plate of the hull on the left in front of the gunner-radio operator. The ball mount provided horizontal firing within 30°, and vertical firing from -5° to +15°; The second machine gun was coaxial with the cannon, and the third was mounted at the stern, also in a ball mount. In contrast to the directional DT, the vertical firing angles ranged from -15° to +15°; The fourth machine gun was a spare and was transported stowed on the left side of the hull.

The gun's ammunition consisted of 111 rounds. The range of ammunition was quite wide and included unitary cartridges from divisional guns of the 1902/1930 model. and model 1939, as well as from a regimental gun of model 1927:

— high-explosive fragmentation grenade OF-350 (steel) or OF-350A (cast iron) with a KTM-1 fuse;

— high-explosive grenade F-354 with fuses KT-3, KTM-3 or 3GT;

— armor-piercing tracer unitary projectile BR-350A and BR-350B with MD-5 fuse;

- a projectile with bullet shrapnel (Sh-354T) or Hertz shrapnel (Sh-354G) with a 22-second tube or T-6 tube;

— a projectile with Sh-361 rod shrapnel with a T-3UG tube;

- shell with Sh-350 buckshot.

One of the main tasks for the coming 1941 was to re-equip the tank with a more reliable weapon. Although the L-11 guns, released in 1939, were modified, their installation in the KV-1 and T-34 tanks was considered as a temporary measure. Instead, in 1940, the production of F-32 guns, developed for the design bureau of plant No. 92 under the leadership of V.G. Grabin, was to be launched. Using the regimental 76.2-mm cannon as a basis, the Grabinites managed to create a simple and reliable tank artillery system. However, in the summer of 1940, the L-11 continued to be produced in Leningrad, while simultaneously trying to improve its design. Only after the direct intervention of the head of the ABTU, D.G. Pavlov (in May 1940), did the LKZ begin to establish production of the F-32. By the end of the year, only 50 guns were produced, and they began to be installed on KV-1 tanks only in January 1941.

Compared to the L-11, the vertical guidance angles were slightly reduced (from -5° to +25°), but this disadvantage was compensated by the better reliability of the gun and higher combat qualities. F-32 guns with a barrel length of 31.5 caliber were equipped with a semi-automatic wedge breech of a mechanical copy type. The failure brake was hydraulic, the knurler was hydropneumatic. The maximum rollback length was 450 mm. The gun was balanced using a weight secured to the sleeve catcher bracket. In addition to this, the TOD-6 telescopic sight was replaced by the TOD-8.

The delay in re-equipping the KV did not help. The fact is that at the same time, T-34 tanks received F-34 guns, the power of which was higher than that of the F-32. The reasonable solution seemed to be the installation of a more powerful artillery system with a caliber of 85 mm or 95 mm. The same design bureau of plant No. 92 was actively involved in the development of such guns, and during 1939-1940 several promising samples were submitted for testing. For the KV-1 tank, the 76.2 mm F-27 gun was chosen, which had ballistics anti-aircraft gun 3K of a similar caliber with an initial projectile speed of 813 m/s. In terms of weight and dimensions, the F-27 fit perfectly into a tank turret, and in April 1941 the prototype tank was successfully tested. However, due to the start of work on the KV-3 project, it was concluded that the KV-1 could easily get by with a less powerful gun.

As part of further modernization, a tank project was developed under the designation Object 222. A distinctive feature of this vehicle was a new turret with an F-32 cannon and a new rotation mechanism, the thickness of the frontal armor increased to 90 mm, a 10RT radio station, a new planetary gearbox, a commander's cupola, an improved driver's viewing device and a number of other changes. Partially individual modernized units were tested on experimental KVs in April-May 1941, but the improved tank project could not be fully implemented due to the outbreak of the war.

The only unit that was armed with KV tanks after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war was then the 20th Tank Brigade, which was armed with 10 vehicles of the pilot batch (U-0, U-2, U-3, U-11, U-12 , U-13, U-14, U-15, U-16, U-17). The crews of the tank brigade had considerable combat experience and, most importantly, mastered the new equipment well. During the operation of KV tanks of the installation series in the interwar period, the issue of the low reliability of the transmission, which could not withstand overloads and often failed, as well as the overweight of the vehicles, was repeatedly raised. Based on the experience gained, it was planned to create training units for each tank brigade, but in the summer of 1940, all KV tanks were removed from the 20th Tank Brigade and transferred to the 8th Tank Division of the 4th Mk. At the same time, the 2nd TD of the 3rd MK in the Baltics began to receive new tanks, where the first KV-1 and KV-2 (with the MT-1 installation) arrived in August. To train tank crews, several KV-1s were sent to the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (Moscow), the Leningrad Tank Forces Command Improvement Courses and the Saratov Tank Technical School. By December 1, 1940, the troops had 106 new heavy tanks, and by June 1, 1941, their number had increased to 370. They were distributed among military districts as follows.

Kyiv OVO – 189

Western OVO – 75

Baltic OVO – 59

Privolzhsky VO – 18

Odessa VO – 10

Oryol VO – 8

Leningrad Military District – 4

Moscow VO – 3

Kharkov VO – 4

It is worth noting here that only 75 vehicles were in direct operation, while the remaining 295 were idle waiting for spare parts or were undergoing routine repairs. However, further the number of heavy tanks continued to increase.

As you can see, the absolute majority of KV-1s were concentrated in the border districts. Although the existence of a plan for an attack on Germany (Operation Thunderstorm) is questioned so much big number heavy vehicles in shock units (mechanized corps) makes us think about the opposite.

At the forefront of the main attack of the Soviet strike group in the western direction was the 6th Mechanized Corps, subordinate to the 10th Army. The formation of the corps began on July 15, 1940 near Bialystok and by June 1, 1941, it had 999 tanks, 114 of which were KV-1 and KV-2. According to the latest data, the 6th MK received the largest number of new types of vehicles before the war, even to the detriment of other units. On June 22, the total number of tanks increased to 1131, which amounted to 110% of the regular number. However, such rapid quantitative growth also had negative consequences. Due to the wide variety of tank types (XT-26, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, T-28, T-34, T-37, T-38, T-40, KV-1, KV-2 and AT-1 tractors) there were great difficulties in providing fuel and spare parts, so in combat condition Not all the cars were there. And yet the 6th MK was a very formidable force. The largest number At that time, the 4th TD had KV tanks (63 units), and the 7th TD had 51 vehicles of this type.

On June 22, 1941, the corps, due to the lack of communication with the army headquarters, did not conduct active operations. At this time, it was possible to renovate the apartments in which the officers were quartered. Only in the evening did Marshal Timoshenko receive a directive to strike at Suwalki and destroy the enemy by June 24. General I.V. Boldin ordered the concentration of tank divisions northwest of Bialystok, but this decision later turned out to be fatal for the entire corps. During June 23, units of the 6th MK tried to make their way along the roads to the designated line through the randomly retreating units of the 10th Army. The corps was repeatedly subjected to air strikes and suffered significant losses on the march. Finally, having arrived at the designated area, Boldin's group was very difficult situation. The neighboring units retreated, exposing their flanks, there was no air support, and there was practically no fuel left in the hull. Despite this, the front command ordered to strike at 10 a.m. on June 24 in the direction of Grodno-Merkin and capture the Lithuanian city by the end of the day. The tanks of the 6th MK moved in the indicated directions: the 4th division to Indura, the 7th division in two columns - the 13th tank tank to Kuznitsa, and the 14th tank tank to Staroe Dubovoe. The offensive was immediately exposed by German reconnaissance aircraft, which made it possible for infantry and tank units located 20-30 km from the initial line to prepare a dense defense. Having virtually no contact with the enemy, the 4th TD reached the Lebezhan area, losing many tanks from dive bombers. At the same time, the report of the division commander indicated that the KV tanks withstood direct hits from aerial bombs and suffered the least losses. At this time, the 7th Panzer Division entered into battle with German infantry units in the Kuznitsa - Staroe Dubrovoye area.

Despite the weakening of the corps by constant fighting, the offensive continued on June 25. No reconnaissance or artillery preparation was carried out - the tanks launched frontal attacks on German positions, being destroyed by anti-tank fire, but due to the presence of a huge mass of tanks, the enemy’s defenses were broken through. The advance of the 6th MK was stopped at the villages of Indura and Staroye Dubrovoye.

Not knowing about the state of affairs and the losses suffered by the corps, Marshal Pavlov on the evening of June 25 ordered to begin a retreat and go to Slonim to regroup. This order remained unfulfilled - the Volkovysk-Slonim road was literally littered with broken and abandoned equipment and in some places the detour became impossible. In addition, the Germans landed troops, capturing several important bridges, so the surviving tanks had to be simply abandoned or drowned in rivers.

In fact, by the evening of June 29, the corps ceased to exist. Some groups were still trying to break through the encirclement, although it was practically impossible to do so. Many light tanks were burned near the villages of Klepachi and Ozernitsa, through which the corps headquarters made their way.

The tank crews of the 6th MK probably fought their last battle on July 1st. In the evening of that day, two T-34s and one KV-1 from the 13th tank regiment burst into Slonim from the forest. They managed to knock out one German tank and fire at the headquarters of one of the units. The Germans, in turn, knocked out both "thirty-fours", but they could not cope with the KV - they tried to transport the heavy tank to the other side of the Shchara River, but the wooden bridge could not withstand the 47-ton vehicle and collapsed.

Apparently, the KV-1 and the 11th MK subordinate to the 3rd Army ended their combat career in the same area. In total, the corps had 3 heavy tanks of this type (two in the 29th TD and one in the 33rd TD), and the bulk of the tanks were BT and T-26 of various modifications. They entered the battle at about 11 a.m. on June 22, covering the approaches to Grodno. Having carried out a series of battles at the line of Gibulichi, Olshanka, Kulovtse (16 km southwest of Grodno), Sashkevtse, the corps, according to the command, lost 40-50 tanks, mostly light ones, in two days. What followed was what was to be expected - the 11th MK was deployed to attack Grodno, which had been captured by the Germans just a few hours earlier. The offensive began on June 24 and resulted in a total of about 30 tanks and 20 infantry fighting vehicles remaining in both divisions. During the retreat, the corps endured a heavy battle near the Ross River, blowing up bridges behind it. Having reached the Shchara River, the commander of the 29th TD ordered the 18 most combat-ready tanks to be prepared for the attack, draining the rest of the fuel and removing small arms. Having destroyed the German barrier, the strike group moved on, and at this time the Germans again captured the bridge and the main forces of the corps had to knock out the enemy again. The next day the crossing was restored, but German aircraft destroyed it and did not allow it to be restored. As a result, on the western bank of Shchara it was necessary to destroy almost all the remaining equipment, transporting only a few tanks to the opposite bank. KV was no longer among them...

Located to the north, the 2nd TD of the 3rd MK, whose headquarters was in Ukmerge (Lithuania), had 32 KV-1 and 19 KV-2 out of 252 tanks on June 20. It was this division that withstood the first blow of the Germans, delaying the enemy on the Dubissa River. You can read about the feat of the crew of a single KV-2, which blocked the Germans’ passage across the river in separate article. Next, the actions of the corps as a whole will be considered.

From June 23 to June 24, instead of taking a tough defense, Soviet tanks launched several counterattacks. So, on the morning of June 23, German tanks, breaking through the loose defensive formation, bypassed the positions of the 3rd and 4th tank tanks from the left flank. To rectify the situation, 6 KV tanks were allocated from the 3rd tank tank, which forced the enemy to retreat, knocking out two tanks without losses on their part. At noon, the division went on the offensive on a front only 10 km wide. According to eyewitnesses, the density of tank formations was so high that almost every German anti-tank gun shot reached the target. Having reached the city of Skaudville, Soviet tanks met with a powerful German group, which, in addition to the 114th motorized division, included two artillery divisions and a formation of light tanks (about 100 units). In the oncoming tank battle, the KVs especially distinguished themselves, destroying enemy anti-tank missiles and tanks not only with cannon and machine-gun fire, but also crushing them with their tracks.

Being subjected to constant attacks from the air and remaining practically surrounded, the command of the 2nd TD never received the order to retreat to a new line. All this led to the fact that on the afternoon of June 26, a group of German tanks and motorized infantry bypassed the brigade’s position from the rear, completely encircling it and almost completely destroying the command of the 3rd MK. In the evening, when the German attacks were repulsed, no more than 20 tanks remained in the 2nd TD, most of which had almost no fuel and ammunition. The new commander, General Kurkin, ordered to disable all surviving vehicles and make his way to his own. Subsequently, the crews that emerged from the encirclement, having acquired precious combat experience, formed the backbone of the 8th Tank Brigade under the command of P.A. Rotmistrov.

The 7th MK, which arrived near Polotsk at the end of June, had 44 combat-ready KV-1 and KV-2 tanks. However, already on a short march, inexperienced driver mechanics burned out the main clutches on 7 vehicles, and several more HFs failed for other reasons. The corps went into battle on July 7, having lost 43 KV tanks of both types by the 26th - in other words, it practically ceased to exist as a combat unit.

One of the first to take the battle was the 20th TP (10th TD 15th MK), fully equipped with KV tanks. The regiment, stationed in the town of Zolochev near Lvov, was alerted on June 22 at about 7 a.m. The battalion column moved out of the city towards the border a few hours later, ahead of it was a military outpost consisting of light tanks. They were the first to be ambushed and were unable to warn the following KV about the danger. Along the route of the column, the Germans placed several anti-tank batteries and light tanks, hoping that those following soviet cars will also become their easy victims. However, everything happened quite the opposite. Despite the fact that the KV-1 had to attack the enemy head-on in an open wheat field, the heavy tanks showed an undeniable advantage over the German vehicles, forcing the enemy to abandon their positions with minimal losses. However, it was not possible to develop this success. The command of the Southwestern Front sought to oust the Germans by “crushing them in mass,” which ultimately led to the loss of the most combat-ready 20th Tank Regiment, which suffered heavy losses already on June 23 during German air raids. Judging by the report of the commander of the 10th TD, from June 22 to August 1, the division irretrievably lost 11 KV tanks in battle, another 11 were knocked out, abandoned due to the impossibility of evacuation - 22, destroyed by its own crews - 7, stuck on obstacles - 3, remained in the rear due to lack of fuel and spare parts - 2. That is, out of 56 tanks, only 22 were lost directly in combat conditions.

One of the most strong units before the war there was the 4th MK with headquarters in Lvov. This corps had 101 KV tanks of various modifications, 50 of which belonged to the 8th TD and 49 to the 32nd TD. On the first day of the war, heavy tanks were just moving to combat positions, while two battalions of medium T-28s and a motorized infantry battalion struck with the goal of knocking out parts of the German 15th Motorized Corps, which had broken through to Radekhov. Success was achieved only partially and on the morning of June 23, the army command set the task of the 32nd TD to completely defeat the enemy. However, while on the march, the division received a new order - to destroy German units in the Great Bridges area. Having established cooperation with the 3rd Cavalry Division, the tankers began to carry out the combat mission, but in the evening the 2nd Tank Division was sent to eliminate another enemy group located in the Kamenka area. As a result, the division's forces were divided. Two tank battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lysenko remained near Radekhov and, during a continuous battle that lasted from 7 to 20 hours, destroyed 18 tanks and 16 guns with their own losses of 11 tanks.

On the morning of June 24, the 8th Panzer Division was withdrawn from the corps, and the 32nd Panzer Division was ordered to concentrate at Nemirov, where the next morning the division entered into battle with the German 9th Panzer Division. Since by that time most of the tanks were on the verge of completely exhausting their service life, the command acted very wisely, sending KV tanks in the first echelon, and concentrating T-34 and T-26 on the flanks. This tactic brought success - the enemy immediately lost 37 tanks, several armored vehicles and anti-tank missiles. The losses of the 32nd TD turned out to be much smaller and amounted to 9 tanks and 3 BA. However achieved success was not assigned due to lack of support from infantry units.

In the evening of the same day, the division was forced to leave the encirclement with the remaining forces, destroying 16 tanks in a counterattack and losing 15 of its own.
During this time, power in Lviv actually passed into the hands of nationalists, who sowed panic not only among the civilian population, but also in the rear units. Soviet troops began to gradually abandon the city, on the outskirts of which the 32nd Tank Division and the 81st Infantry Division were still fighting, and by July 1, Lvov was occupied by German troops.

Subsequently, units of the 8th and 32nd tank divisions fought defensive battles, inflicting significant damage on the enemy. For example, on June 9, near the village of Zherebki, tanks of the 32nd TD, with the support of aviation from the Southwestern Front, destroyed more than 30 enemy tanks during several battles. However, the most combat-ready at that time, the 63rd Tank Division itself had 30 tanks (out of 149 at the beginning of the war), which forced the command to withdraw the division to the rear. On the afternoon of July 12, the remaining tanks entered Kyiv, taking up defensive positions in the Urals, and the personnel left for the Vladimir region.

In the 43rd Panzer Division on the 18th mechanized corps By the beginning of the war there were only 5 KV-1s. Its individual units began fighting the very next day, but the division fully went into battle only on June 26, delivering a surprise attack on the flank and rear of the 11th Division of the 48th Motorized Corps of the Germans. Only two heavy tanks took part in this attack, but this was enough for the mixed tank group of Colonel Tsibin (it also included 75 light T-26 and XT-130\133 and 2 medium T-34) to throw the enemy back 30 km and went to Dubno. Eleven T-26s, 4 flamethrower tanks and both KV-1s were lost in this battle. The division commander's report on its actions from June 22 to August 10, 1941 stated the following:

“...Chasing enemy infantry, our tanks were met by fire from enemy tanks from ambushes from the spot, but (the ambush) was attacked by KV and T-34 tanks that rushed forward, and after them by T-26 tanks... KV and T-34 tanks, not Having a sufficient number of armor-piercing shells, they fired fragmentation shells and, with their mass, crushed and destroyed enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, moving from one line to another...”

Soon the number of heavy tanks was reduced to zero, since due to technical problems the remaining vehicles had to be abandoned on enemy territory. The 8th Mechanized Corps was interesting because, in addition to light tanks, it had 51 heavy five-turreted T-35 tanks. There were also plenty of new types of vehicles - as of June 22, the corps included 100 T-34s, 69 KV-1s and 8 (according to other sources - 2) KV-2s.
On the morning of June 22, the 8th MK was ordered to move to Sambir, and in the evening the corps was redirected to Kurowice, where the appearance of advanced German forces was expected. Having reached the designated area, the tanks were again turned to the west, with the task of reaching Lvov. Here they met with the retreating units of the 32nd TD and were stopped by the command on the Western Bug River. Part of the forces was forced to engage in battle with Ukrainian nationalists, and the rest headed to the area of ​​​​Srebno, Boldury, Stanislavchik, Razhnyuv. By the evening of June 24, having practically encountered no Germans, they counted their losses. Having covered 495 km, the corps lost almost 50% of its original strength on the march. The most annoying thing was the loss of not only new equipment, but also a large number of tractors, tractors and vehicles with ammunition. Being in such an unfavorable situation, the corps was forced to obey the next order and move in the direction of Brody, Berestechko, Boremel, where fierce battles were fought over the next three. Since the situation on other sectors of the front was quickly changing for the worse, part of the forces of the 12th Panzer Division, which was then on the march from Brody to Podkamen, was abandoned near Dubno and Kozin. 25 T-34 and KV tanks were tasked with covering the advance of the corps from the southwestern direction, while the rest of the forces were replenished with fuel and ammunition. Only a few hours were allotted for everything, after which the division went on the offensive towards Dubno, liberating several settlements and overturning German barriers. One of the main tasks was to connect with units of the 7th Motorized Division, but this was never done. On June 28, the Germans themselves switched to attacking actions, going to the rear of the Soviet formations. However, it was not possible to achieve an easy victory here. Two groups of tanks (six KV and four T-34) allocated to eliminate the German breakthrough literally shot down enemy vehicles in a head-on collision without suffering their own losses.

On the same day, the corps was wisely transferred to the front reserve. Out of 899 tanks, only 96 were lost in combat conditions - a good indicator, given the difficult situation in which units of the 8th MK operated. The greatest losses fell on the T-35 heavy tanks, which by July 1 were completely gone. The least number of KV and T-34 tanks were lost - 3 and 18 vehicles, respectively.

Left with 207 combat-ready tanks (43 KV, 31 T-34, 69 BT-7, 57 T-26 and 7 T-40), the corps reached Proskurov on July 2, from where 134 vehicles were sent to Kharkov for repairs. Then the remnants of the 8th MK were transferred to Nezhin, where the corps administration was disbanded in mid-July.

The 15th Mechanized Corps under the command of Major General I.I. Karpezo took a very active part in the battle of Brody. At its disposal were 64 (according to other sources - 60) KV, 51 T-28, 69 (according to other sources - 71) T-34, 418 BT-7 and 45 T-26 of various production series, as well as 116 BA-10 armored vehicles and 46 BA-20. The bulk of the heavy tanks were in the 10th TD, and only one KV-1 was in the 37th TD, which was basically equipped with BT tanks.

The first battle was carried out by the forward detachment of the 10th TD, consisting of the 3rd battalion of the 20th TD (T-34 and BA-10), on the morning of June 23 near Radekhov. Soviet tank crews managed to knock out 20 tanks here and destroy 16 anti-tank missiles, losing 6 T-34s and 20 armored vehicles. The detachment was forced to abandon its position only when its ammunition and fuel ran out, leaving the city to the Germans. The rest of the division acted discordantly and were unable to provide support to their comrades. For example, on the night of June 23-24, two battalions of German Pz.Kpfw.III attacked a column of BT-7 tanks, knocking out 46 of them with minimal losses of their own.

Having no information about the enemy, the 37th Division entered the Adama area, where there were no enemy tanks at all. At the same time, the 19th tank regiment of the 10th tank division was stuck in a swampy area between Sokołówka and Kontami. Its first battalion consisted of 31 KV-1 and 5 BT-7 tanks, the second was fully equipped with T-34s, and the third had only light tanks - as we see, this unit was very powerful and posed a serious threat if the material was used correctly. Having barely got out of the swamp, the regiment on June 25 received the order to advance on Brody. The tanks had to travel about 60 km in the heat and in conditions of heavy dust on the roads. According to the report of the commander of the heavy tank battalion, Captain Z.K. Slyusarenko, half of the vehicles were stuck due to numerous breakdowns, and no enemy tanks were found near Brody. Immediately there followed an order from the command to return to the previous area, but at dawn on June 26 another order was received - to move to Radekhov, where the 10th mechanized and 20th tank regiments entered the battle. Of the 31 KVs, 18 vehicles took part in the attack, going head-on at the German anti-tank batteries. The battalion managed to advance only 2 km, losing 16 tanks in this attack. Subsequently, Captain Slyusarenko recalled:

“Enemy shells cannot penetrate our armor, but they break the tracks and demolish the towers. The KB to my left lights up. A plume of smoke with a fiery core, thin as a sting, shot up into the sky above him. “Kovalchuk is on fire!” - my heart skipped a beat. I can’t help this crew in any way: twelve cars are rushing forward with me. Another KB stopped: a shell tore off its turret. The KB tanks were very strong vehicles, but they clearly lacked speed and agility.”

A day earlier, the 20th Tank Regiment found itself in a similar situation, which irretrievably lost 4 heavy vehicles during an attack on enemy positions. The remaining HF divisions were used scatteredly and did not bring much benefit.

In order to save the remaining tanks, permission to retreat was received on June 28. The division, still possessing about 30 heavy tanks, moved to Toporuv, where a major bridge made it possible to transport the KV to the other side of the river. From June 30 to July 2, tankers fought several battles in Buska, Krasny, Koltuv and Tarnopol, losing several more vehicles, until the order was given to retreat to Podvolochissk. On the road to the new location, the division commander, Major General Ogurtsov, ordered the establishment of defensive positions to delay the German tank column that had broken through. At about 8 o'clock in the evening, a German tank unit was ambushed, losing 6 tanks and 2 guns. The next morning, the 19th TD reached the Zbruch River, the bridge across which was blown up. Unable to transport heavier vehicles, Ogurtsov sent 6 KV-1s and two T-34s south to the Tarnorud area, where this group was tasked with delaying the German advance as much as possible. On July 8, the main forces received a new combat mission - to capture the city of Berdichev and at the same time organize the defense of crossings across the Gnilopyat river and at the village of Plekhovaya.

On July 10, the 15th and 16th mechanized corps launched a counteroffensive, delivering powerful attacks south of Berdichev against units of the German 11th Panzer Division, which had mainly medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV. The battles for the city lasted two days, with Soviet tanks breaking into the streets of Berdichev twice, but without infantry support they were forced to retreat. The combined tank detachment of the 10th TD, which collected almost all the surviving KV tanks, especially distinguished itself in these battles. They had to act in conditions of strong anti-tank defense, and the Germans tried to counterattack themselves as soon as they were given the right opportunity. In one of these attacks against eight BT-7s, twelve Pz.Kpfw.IIIs took part, but two KV-1s (recently received from the factory) came to the aid of their comrades in a timely manner, one of which was commanded by the commander of the 16th Mechanized Corps A.D. Sokolov . The Germans, seeing the further futility of this attack, chose to retreat, which made it possible for the infantry to occupy the previously captured airfield and move forward a couple of kilometers. On the morning of July 11, a flamethrower battalion of HT-130 and HT-133 under the command of Captain Krepchuk from the 44th Tank Division burst into Berdichev, and KV and T-34 from the 10th Tank Division came out from the southern outskirts. They managed to temporarily drive the Germans out of Berdichev, but a few hours later the enemy quickly counterattacked, forcing our units to retreat. The flamethrower battalion suffered the most, with only 5 vehicles remaining. Sokolov reinforced it with two KV-1s and one T-34, but by the end of the day only 4 tanks survived. The division command was unable to organize a withdrawal - by July 13, all KVs and most of the Thirty-Fours were lost. Attempts to carry out unblocking strikes using BT tanks were unsuccessful. By the end of July 17, the 10th Panzer Division, finding itself completely surrounded, practically ceased to exist as a combat unit.

To be fair, it is worth noting that the 1st German tank group, advancing on Kyiv, lost 40% of its tanks in 13 days, some of which could not be restored. Although the Soviet armies failed to destroy German troops in this area, they significantly delayed the enemy’s advance deeper into right-bank Ukraine, although almost all T-34 and KV tanks were lost. In the 37th Tank Division, things were much worse - by June 15, only 6 tanks (one T-34 and five BT-7) and 11 BA-10s remained in it, while the command reported the destruction of “24 tanks and 8 tankettes... ”

The report on the actions of the 15th Mechanized Corps, presented on August 2, 1941, indicated that the KV tanks had performed well. At the same time, their main disadvantages were emphasized: when hit by a shell and large-caliber bullets, the turret becomes jammed, the engine life is extremely short, the main and side clutches often fail, and only another HF could evacuate a damaged HF. Below are statistics on losses and availability of HF on the Southwestern Front, compiled on August 1, 1941:

- sent for repairs to industrial plants - 2 (4th mechanized corps);

— 10 units were left at the place of quartering (2 in the 4th mechanized corps, 6 in the 8th mechanized corps, 2 in the 19th mechanized corps);

- fell behind on the way and went missing - 24 (8 in the 4th mechanized corps, 10 in the 8th mechanized corps, 5 in the 15th mechanized corps, 1 in the 19th mechanized corps);

- transferred to other units - 1 (4th mechanized corps);

- irretrievable losses - 177 (73 in the 4th mechanized corps, 28 in the 8th mechanized corps, 52 in the 15th mechanized corps, 2 in the 19th mechanized corps, 22 in the 22nd mechanized corps).

- in total, as of August 1, units of the Southwestern Front had 7 combat-ready KB - 1 in the 22nd mechanized corps and 6 in the 8th mechanized corps.

Thus, in the battles in Ukraine, the troops of the Southwestern Front lost 94% of all KV-1s available on June 22, 1941. By the way, on the Western Front, over the same period of time, this figure was 100%...

As already mentioned, unsuccessful actions in Belarus and the Baltic states led to the fact that on July 16, advanced German units found themselves on the near approaches to Orsha and Shklov, pincering the remnants of the armies of the Western Front. The 7th Tank Division, which took the lead, with the support of a parachute landing, cut the Minsk-Moscow highway, blocking the Soviet armies' escape route. A day later, in the Dukhovshchina area, a major battle took place, during which the 69th Tank and 110th Rifle Divisions inflicted several counterattacks on the Germans, but after suffering heavy losses they were forced to retreat to their original lines. During this time, in the area of ​​Orsha and Smolensk, the 16th Army, which had recently arrived from the Far East, was almost completely surrounded, which consisted of 1,300 tanks.

By July 19, the German 10th Panzer Division captured Yelnya, forming a large ledge extended to the east. Here the Soviet command had a real opportunity to create their own cauldron, but in the meantime, the 38th Infantry and 101st Tank Divisions (80 BT-7 and 7 KV-1) under the command of General Rokossovsky tried to delay the advance of enemy forces on this section of the front. First, they were given the standard offensive task of attacking Dukhovshchina and Yartsevo, then developing an attack on Smolensk. In the battle for Yartsevo, this group managed to stop the 7th Panzer Division, and the city repeatedly changed hands. Heavy tanks performed best here, especially since the basis of the German forces were light Pz.38(t) and medium Pz.Kpfw.III, the armor of which could not withstand fire from a 76-mm KV gun.

At the end of July, Rokossovsky’s group was withdrawn to a new line, but by this time the tank division had lost most of its armored vehicles, and only two T-34s and three armored cars arrived from the replenishment. This, however, did not greatly influence the decision of the Headquarters to strike again at Smolensk. From July 25 to July 27, troops of the 28th and 30th armies managed to break through German positions and advance several tens of kilometers along the Smolensk highway. At the same time, the 101st Tank Division again launched an attack on Yartsevo, capturing the city and gaining a foothold on the opposite bank of the Vop River. Over the next two days, the tankers continuously attacked the Germans in the Yelnya area, but achieved no success. On June 30 alone, Soviet tanks attacked the positions of the SS division “Reich” and the 10th Panzer Division 13 (!) times. All this led to the fact that on September 10, the remnants of Rokossovsky’s group had to be withdrawn to the rear for reorganization, due to large losses in material.

In parallel with it, the 28th Army of General V.Ya. Kachalov was advancing. In the period from July 18 to July 27, its formations advanced along the Smolensk highway, inflicting, in their words, “critical losses” on the Germans. However, on August 1, having regrouped his forces, Guderian sent two army and one motorized corps to eliminate this breakthrough. Near Roslavl, the remnants of the 28th Army were almost completely destroyed. About 250 tanks, 359 guns, and 38,000 personnel, including the army commander, were lost. The total losses in tanks in the battles near Smolensk are estimated at 2000 units.

Having defeated the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts by the end of August, the Germans received a virtually open road to Moscow, where there was no continuous line and long-term fortifications. However, in the southern direction, the army group of the Southwestern Front continued to stubbornly defend itself, covering the approaches to Kyiv. The front commander, General Kirponos, had at his disposal 69 divisions and 3 brigades. Of these, in the Korostenets direction, with a length of about 200 km, 6 tank and 3 mechanized divisions of the 5th Army operated under the overall command of General Potapov. The strike force in this area consisted of units of the former 9th, 19th and 20th MK, where the bulk of the tanks still consisted of T-26s and BTs. By the end of July, after a month of continuous fighting, about 140 tanks remained in the mechanized corps, but at the same time the Germans had none at all (!). Until August 10, having received about a hundred KV-1s and T-34s as reinforcements, Potapov’s group launched counterattacks, forcing the Germans to deploy additional divisions to the north, instead of delivering a concentrated attack on Kyiv.

At the same time, a major battle took place in the Uman direction, in which the remnants of the 15th, 16th and 24th mechanized corps took part. Many divisions had no more than 30% of their regular strength, and only a few new tanks remained in them. Trying to prevent a new encirclement, the command of the Southwestern Front, the forces of the 6th and 26th armies, launched several counterattacks on the flank of the German 1st Panzer Group, temporarily stopping its advance to the south. At the same time, the 2nd Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from the Southern Front, where on July 20 there were 468 tanks and 155 armored vehicles. The lion's share of tanks in it were still BT-7 and T-26, but the 11th Tank Division also had several KV-1 and T-34 units - at the beginning of the war there were 50 and 10 of them, respectively. During the battles on the Dniester River, which took place from June 23 to July 9, the division did not lose a single heavy tank and only four T-34s, while the main losses occurred in light armored vehicles (about 20 units). Having taken a position on the Reut River, the 2nd MK was soon transferred to reserve. At this time, it included 10 KV-1, 46 T-34, 275 BT-7, 38 T-26, 9 KhT-130\KhT-133, as well as 13 T-37 and T-38 amphibious tanks. The heavy tanks were repaired in a timely manner by field brigades, which made it possible to avoid losses among KVs outside combat conditions.

Near Uman, the corps received the task of holding the city and defeating the enemy group. All day on July 22, the tanks attacked the enemy, forcing him to retreat to the Berestovets area, irretrievably losing only five BT-7s and five T-34s. However, the Germans then put up very fierce resistance. On July 23, the 11th and 16th tank divisions were able to advance several kilometers, reaching the village of Yarovatka and the villages of Potash and Podobnaya, where they had to fight defensive battles, covering the withdrawal of units of the 6th and 12th armies . During this time, the number of tanks in the corps was reduced to 147 units (KV-1, T-34 - 18, BT - 68, T-26 - 26, HT - 7, T-37 - 27), but there were more armored vehicles left - 90 BA -10 and 64 BA-20. Rolling back, the 2nd MK over the next two weeks was left practically without any materiel, and on August 6, an order was issued by the commander of the 6th Army to destroy all equipment left without ammunition and fuel... The remnants of the 11th Tank Division were taken out of encirclement by Colonel Kuzmin, which allowed 27 August to form the 132nd Tank Brigade on its basis.

Following the tank divisions of the 2nd MK, their fate was repeated by the 12th Tank Division, assembled from the remnants of the 8th Corps and supplemented by new KV-1 and T-34 that came straight from the factory. On the morning of August 7, General Kostenko’s troops, with the support of tank groups, reached the Ros River southeast of Boguslav. The next day, the combined mobile group, consisting of units of the 12th TD and the 5th Cavalry Corps, received the task of breaking through to the Dnieper through Rzhishchev, striking the enemy’s flank. Stubborn fighting here continued until August 12, bringing only new tank losses. This made it possible by August 24 to completely eliminate the Soviet group near Uman and defeat the troops in the “Gomel cauldron.”

Having crossed the Dnieper, the front command prepared to defend Kyiv, having previously brought up reserves. In particular, the 10th and 11th tank brigades, formed on the basis of the “horseless” 43rd division, arrived at the front from near Kharkov. Each of them had about 100 KV-1, T-34 and T-60 tanks, two artillery divisions, and a motorized rifle battalion. Next, the 12th, 129th and 130th brigades, equipped in a similar way, went to Kyiv.

However, the command was unable to effectively use these forces. Units were transferred to the front quite quickly, but they were brought into battle separately. As a result, Kleist's 1st Panzer Group, which had not received reinforcements from Germany for a month and had only 190 tanks, defeated the troops of the Southwestern Front. After the end of the Battle of Kyiv, on September 20, 1941, 884 Soviet tanks became trophies of the Germans, some of which were in good condition.

During the repulsion of the next German offensive on Moscow, carried out as part of Operation Typhoon, the 4th Tank Brigade, formed from the crews of the destroyed 15th Tank Division, operated particularly successfully. The brigade had 49 tanks (a battalion of T-34 and KV-1 and a battalion of T-60 light tanks). The brigade was commanded by Colonel Katukov, who at the end of June 1941 took part in a tank battle in western Ukraine. Then under his leadership was the 20th TD, equipped with BT tanks of various modifications. In the battle near Klevan, the division lost almost all its materiel and was reorganized into a rifle division, but Katukov correct conclusions from this. He later wrote in his memoirs:

“...The experience of fighting in Ukraine for the first time made me think about the issue of the widespread use of tank ambushes...”

On October 4, 1941, tanks of the 4th Tank Brigade advanced onto the Orel-Tula road, along which Langerman's 4th Tank Division was advancing. Not wasting his energy on a head-on collision, Katukov decided to act more carefully. When the Germans moved towards Tula on October 6, Soviet tanks launched a surprise flank attack, destroying more than 30 tanks. Then Katukov retreated to previously prepared positions and met the enemy near the village of Pervy Voin south of Mtsensk. In the battle, which lasted 12 hours, the Germans lost another 43 tanks, 16 anti-tank missiles and up to 500 soldiers, while the 4th Tank Brigade had minimal losses in equipment. By the end of the battle, it turned out that the brigade had lost only 6 tanks, of which 2 were completely burned out, and 4 were able to be evacuated to the rear for repairs. KV tanks in this battle were used as reinforcement vehicles, spending part of the time in reserve.
The final defeat of Langerman's division took place on October 11. Having entered the outskirts of Mtsensk abandoned by Soviet troops, the column of the 4th Panzer Division stretched for almost 12 km, so that the artillery and infantry units assigned to it were out of radio communication range. At this moment, the Germans were attacked by Soviet tanks, which cut the column into several parts. A few hours later, the battle was over - according to the Germans themselves, in the battles near Mtsensk, the 4th Panzer Division lost 242 tanks, practically ceasing to exist. Of this number, 133 tanks were destroyed by the Katukovites, earning their brigade the title of 1st Guards.

However, in most cases the KV-1 was used the old fashioned way. For example, at the end of October 1941, the newly formed 29th Tank Brigade under the command of Colonel K.A. Malygin was transferred to the 16th Army. The brigade had two tank battalions (one with 4 KV-1 and 11 T-34, the second was equipped with 20 T-60 tanks), a battalion of machine gunners, artillery and mortar batteries. In the first battle on October 29, defending the village of Rozhdestveno, 24 tanks and two armored personnel carriers were shot down and destroyed. However, the very next day the brigade was given the task of capturing the village of Skirmanovo, which the Germans turned into a well-defended stronghold. Malygin understood perfectly well that a frontal attack would, at best, lead to heavy losses, but he could not contradict the order. This is how the commissar of the 29th Tank Brigade V.G. Gulyaev described this scene:

“To coordinate the efforts of the two brigades, Colonel Myakunin arrived from the front headquarters. Malygin proposed to bypass Skirmanovo on the left and strike at the flank and rear. But the front representative resolutely rejected this option. He believed that there was neither time nor strength for a roundabout maneuver.

“But attacking here head-on means sending people to their deaths,” Malygin insisted.

- What do you want to do in a war without losses? — Myakukhin objected with a sarcastic grin...”

In the first attack, the brigade lost six T-34s. Then, trying to break through the defense from the south, the Germans knocked out five T-60s, one T-34 and one KV. As a result, by the end of the day on October 30, 19 tanks remained in the 29th Tank Brigade. By the way, by this time only 2 KV, 7 T-34 and 6 BT-7 remained in the famous 1st Guards Tank Brigade. The subsequent failed defensive operation of the 16th Army, operating in the Volokolamsk-Istra area, turned into a new disaster and allowed the Germans to reach Klin on November 22. The task of defending the city was assigned to the 25th and 31st Tank Brigades, but the tanks were still used ineffectively, and by the end of November 24, both brigades, which had no more than 10 tanks left, were forced to abandon the city. By December 5, Soviet troops abandoned Naro-Fominsk and nearby settlements. According to Zhukov, then “the most threatening moment was created” in the battle for Moscow. Trying to push back the enemy, the command planned several spontaneous counterattacks, although in most tank units only 10 to 30% of the original strength remained.

Until the enemy brought up reserves, the headquarters carried out a new counter-offensive, this time more prepared. By December 25, 1941, the forces of the 16th and 20th armies had driven the enemy back almost 100 km, having lost about 150 tanks that were out of action due to technical problems, and it was not possible to evacuate them due to the rapid advance of Soviet troops .

In 1941, due to the transition of industry to a “military footing,” the design of the KV-1 tank underwent a number of changes. In the fall of 1941, to increase the cruising range, 3-5 additional fuel tanks began to be installed on the side fender niches (they were not connected to the power system), and stamped tracks were replaced with cast ones. Since December 1941, the 71TK-3 radio station was replaced by 10-R. After the transfer of KV-1 production to ChKZ, some tanks were equipped with cast turrets, which differed from welded turrets in the rounded shape of the aft niche. The armor thickness was increased to 82 mm.

Instead of the F-32 cannon, the supply of which ran out at the end of 1941, they began to install the ZIS-5. This weapon was created on the basis of the F-34, differing from it in the design of the cradle and armored mask elements. Externally, tanks with the new gun could be distinguished by their barrel length, which was 41.5 calibers. Due to the modifications carried out, the initial speed of the armor-piercing projectile increased to 680 m/s, although this was no longer enough to fight the German Pz.IV equipped with long-barreled 75-mm guns. The vertical guidance angles remained the same as those of the F-32, but the recoil length was reduced to 390 mm.

The installation of a new gun entailed the replacement of the TOD-8 telescopic sight with the TMFD-7 and the PT-6 periscopic sight with the PT-4-7. Due to the shortage of TMFD-7, some tanks could be equipped with alternative sights 9T-7, 10T-7 or 10T-13. Instead of PT-4-7, the installation of PT-4-3 was provided. To combat new German tanks, the BR-353A armor-piercing projectile with a BM fuse was introduced into the ammunition load since 1942, which, with an initial speed of 352 m/s, can penetrate armor up to 75 mm thick at a distance of up to 1000 meters. In addition to the armor-burning ones, sub-caliber ammunition BR-350P and BR-350PS were supplied, which had an initial speed of 965 m/s. Their armor penetration at a distance of 500 meters was 92 mm, and at a distance of 1000 meters - 60 mm. Since October 1943, BR-345A sub-caliber armor-piercing tracer shells appeared. The total stock of shells increased to 114 pieces. However, all of the above measures did not lead to a significant improvement in the design of the KV-1 and for the most part were “wartime measures.”

After receiving the first information from the front about the combat use of heavy tanks at LKZ, work began to strengthen the KV's armor. The only weapon that could penetrate the frontal armor of a Soviet tank was the 8.8 Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun. Anti-aircraft shells, even without an armor-piercing steel core, had an initial speed of 810 m/s and could penetrate a sheet of 80 mm armor installed at an angle of 30 degrees with distance 1000 mm. At shorter distances this figure increased to 87-97 mm. As a rule, the KV-1 was able to be disabled after 2-3 hits in the turret and hull. In this regard, it is interesting to mention that the leadership of the Red Army was well acquainted with reports of the use of the Flak 18 in France, where this gun was used to combat the French B-1bis heavy tanks, the armor of which was not inferior to the KV-1, but timely conclusions in 1940 were not made.

Since the only plant that produced the KV-1 in mass quantities was LKZ, its specialists developed a simple but effective scheme for enhancing the armor, previously used on the T-28 medium tank. 25 mm armor plates were additionally welded onto the tank's turret, bringing the total armor thickness to 100 mm. At the same time, there was a small gap between the turret and the hanging armor, which improved the tank’s protection when fired by cumulative (then called “armor-burning”) shells.

Tanks modified in this way could be distinguished by the huge rivets with which the mounted armor plates were attached. In Soviet and some Russian sources they were sometimes called KV-1e(“shielded”). According to some reports, work to strengthen the armor in the fall of 1941 was also carried out by the Leningrad Metal Plant.

The bulk of the “shielded” tanks were sent to the Leningrad Front, but the positional nature of the combat operations did not allow the full capabilities of the KV to be fully revealed. In addition, tank units constantly received complaints about the tank being overweight, which entailed not only technical problems. After the march of even several KV units, the road along which they passed became impassable for other types of equipment, including tracked ones. Bridges that could support a 47-48-ton vehicle were discussed earlier - there were often cases when the HF was carried into the river along with a structure that was clearly not designed for such loads. As for the maneuverability of a heavy tank on loose soil or swampy terrain, in this regard the KV was much inferior to the T-34, in which this indicator also did not differ for the better.

All these factors led to the fact that in the spring of 1942, work was launched to lighten the heavy tank in order to increase its mobility and speed performance. The design of the new modification was carried out by ChTZ specialists, who were given a difficult task.
Based on the experience of battles, which showed that even 100 mm armor does not save from concentrated fire from 75 mm anti-tank guns or 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, it was decided to partially weaken the armor protection of the turret and hull. Now the thickness of its frontal part was 82 mm, the sides and roof - 40 mm, the stern - 75 mm. The tower was cast and had a completely new, streamlined shape with a single hatch. Based on the experience of German tank builders, a commander's cupola with five glass blocks was introduced, which allowed the tank commander to conduct all-round observation of the battlefield without the use of optical instruments. The thickness of the armor of the frontal part of the hull corresponded to the usual KV-1 and amounted to 75 mm, but the sides were covered with 40 mm armor. To reduce the weight of the tank, lightweight road wheels were used, and the width of the cast track tracks was reduced to 608 mm. In addition, individual components of the power plant, which had an improved lubrication and cooling system, were lightened.

One of the most important points was the installation of a new gearbox, designed by engineer N.F. Shashmurin. It had 10 gears (eight forward and two reverse) and was equipped with a range multiplier. In addition, a new main clutch and final drives were installed on the tank. The composition of the weapons did not change, although due to a shortage of ZiS-5 guns, the F-34 was installed on production tanks - in this case, the ammunition was increased from 90 to 114 shells. On the modified tank, the commander's position was moved from the right front to the left rear corner, behind the gunner. The loader's duty was transferred to the gunner of the rear machine gun, and the machine gun itself was moved to the left, which allowed the tank commander to fire from it.

In total, these measures made it possible to increase the mass of the modified KV-1 to 42,500 kg and increase its mobility. During state tests, which took place from July 28 to August 20, 1942, the new heavy tank showed better speed characteristics with essentially the same level of armor protection. On the last day of testing it was put into service under the designation KV-1s(“high-speed”) and from the end of the same month it began to replace conventional KV-1s on the assembly line. In September 1942 alone, the Chelyabinsk plant produced 180 serial tanks, but by the end of the year the production of KV-1s began to decline. The reason for this step was quite understandable - apart from more powerful armor, the heavy tank did not have any advantages over the medium T-34.

In September 1942, Major General of Tank Troops Katukov, who was familiar to us, was summoned to the Headquarters of the Main Command and answered Stalin’s question about tanks that KV-1s often fail, break bridges, are too slow and are no different in armament from the “thirty-fours.” " The problem with the KV was to equip it with more powerful guns, then the question of their effectiveness would be posed completely differently...

Although Katukov’s opinion was subjective and did not fully reflect the opinion of all tankers, in many ways the combat general, who had gone through more than one tank battle, was absolutely right. The main problem of the KV-1 then was precisely its armament, since the 76.2-mm ZiS-5 cannon by the beginning of 1943 turned out to be practically powerless against the armor of the new German tanks Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther”, Pz.Kpfw.VI “Tiger” ” and new modifications of the Pz.Kpfw.IV medium tank (with mounted armored screens). But back in 1940, an order was given for the construction and subsequent launch of mass production of tanks KV-3, equipped with a 107 mm ZiS-6 cannon, and ( T-220) with an 85-mm F-39 gun. In terms of armor and armament power, these combat vehicles were noticeably better than the serial KV-1, but in the summer of 1941, due to the outbreak of war, work on them was suspended and then completely stopped. As a result, the tank armies of the Red Army until the fall of 1943 were forced to make do with the existing fleet of heavy tanks, which were inferior to the new German vehicles of a similar class. As a consequence of this, from August 1942, the production of the KV-1s began to gradually wind down and was completely stopped in December, temporarily replacing it with an “intermediate” heavy tank.

Such a large number on the designation of the next modification of the KV indicated the caliber of the gun with which the tank was equipped. As has been repeatedly pointed out, one of the most significant shortcomings of the KV-1 was its short-barreled 76.2-mm cannon, which by the fall of 1942 could not successfully combat enemy heavy armored vehicles. When selecting a new weapon, the emphasis was on defeating the 100-mm frontal armor of German heavy tanks “Panther” and “Tiger”. The most effective in this regard were the 122-mm A-19 cannon, the 152-mm ML-20 howitzer gun and the 85-mm 52-K anti-aircraft gun model 1939. It was the latter that became the prototype of the D-5T tank gun, which was developed completed in May 1943. To speed up testing and subsequent mass production, the hull, chassis and turret were transferred almost unchanged from the KV-1s. Assembly of the KV-85 tanks began in August, but it was produced in small quantities, since in the spring of 1944 more than perfect tank IS-2. For the same reason, the GBTU did not accept the version with the 122-mm D-25T gun for serial production.

During the war, attempts were made to strengthen the armament by installing a 122 mm U-11 howitzer in a new turret. This variant, designated , was tested in March 1942 and was recommended for mass production as a fire support tank (essentially a self-propelled gun).
A more radical option provided for the installation of three guns (two 45 mm 20K and one 76.2 mm F-34) in a fixed wheelhouse. A heavy tank with similar armament was tested at the end of 1941, after which the armament was reduced to two F-34 guns. As one might expect, such a modernization did not find support and remained at an experimental level.

The last attempt to seriously improve the characteristics of the KV was made in mid-1942 and led to the appearance of the “heavily armored medium tank.” Since it was possible to reduce the huge mass of the tank only by reworking its chassis on the KV-13, it was shortened by one road wheel, as a result of which the length of the hull was reduced to 6650 mm and the width to 2800 mm. In terms of armament and equipment, the medium tank did not differ from the KV-1.
During tests carried out in the fall of 1942, the KV-13 did not perform well - the vehicle constantly broke down, and in terms of the sum of its characteristics it turned out to be worse than the T-34. However, the path chosen by the designers turned out to be correct and subsequently led to the appearance of much more successful IS-1 and IS-2 tanks.

Things were much better with flamethrower modifications. The first heavy tank of this type was created by LKZ to replace the light OT-130 and OT-133, most of which were lost in the summer battles of 1941. Compared to the conventional KV-1, its flamethrower modification KV-6 had a minimum of differences, since the ATO-41 flamethrower was mounted in the frontal plate of the hull instead of the front-facing machine gun. There is no information on the number of vehicles built, but in September 1941, four tanks were sent to the 124th Tank Brigade operating on the Leningrad Front.
Work in this direction was continued in Chelyabinsk, where production of the modification began in January 1942, and then KV-8s. On these tanks, the flamethrower was installed in the turret, which increased the destruction sector. However, due to the cramped conditions in the fighting compartment, the ZiS-5 gun had to be replaced with a more compact 20K 45-mm caliber. To hide this drawback from the enemy, the gun barrel was equipped with an additional casing. The total production of KV-8 of all modifications was 137 copies.
During the combat use of the KV-8, it quickly became clear that without the support of tanks with stronger weapons, as a rule these were serial KVs or T-34\76s, flamethrower units suffered heavy losses. The engineers of Plant No. 100 tried to correct this shortcoming, who in the spring of 1942 proposed a modification with a 76.2 mm cannon and an ATO-41 flamethrower, essentially returning to the KV-6 variant. They refused its serial production, considering that the existing “eights” would be quite enough for the front.

As the tank forces became saturated with new equipment, heavy KV tanks began to be gradually converted into ARVs, removing the turret with the main armament from them and installing the equipment necessary for such vehicles. About the exact number of such tank-tractors, designated as KV-T, no information has been preserved.

However, work on the design of a heavy tractor-transporter began shortly before the war. The need for such a vehicle was felt not only in the Red Army BTV, but also in other branches of the military. In theory, a heavily armored transporter could follow infantry or tank units, towing a field gun behind it. After the appearance of the KV and repeated demands from the Soviet-Finnish front, LKZ began to create a similar machine. The transporter was developed since January 1940 by a team led by leading engineer N. Halkiopov and bore the design designation. True, then his main task was to evacuate damaged tanks from the battlefield.

Compared to the KV tank, the tractor-transporter received a completely new layout. The transmission compartment was located in front, behind it there was a control compartment and places for technicians, the engine was installed in the middle part of the hull, and the rear part of the hull was reserved for the transport compartment. The vehicle used most of the elements from the KV-1 chassis, including road wheels and suspension, but the drive and idler wheels (the location of which had changed) were designed anew. In addition, three support wheels were replaced with four.

Work on the Object 212 tractor moved quickly and by February 1940 a full-size wooden model was ready. ABTU representatives spoke positively about the new armored vehicle, but the work could not be advanced further. Permission to build a prototype was not even obtained. A possible reason for this step was the high workload of the LKZ with the production of serial KV-1s, so that there were simply no manpower resources or production capacity left for finishing the Object 212.

During the war years, they remembered another method of using tanks. In the mid-1930s. Several experiments were carried out to install missile weapons on light tanks BT-5. The system turned out to be unfinished, although it showed good destructive characteristics. A few years later, in May 1942, plant No. 100 began designing a similar installation for the KV-1 tank. The most effective seemed to be the use of 132-mm rockets from the BM-8. On the sides of the tank were mounted two armored boxes with two guides for the RS, which were controlled from the driver’s seat. This system, designated KRAST-1 (short rocket artillery tank system), was tested at the Small Arms Research Site near Chebakul station and earned a good rating from the military. With the advent of the KV-1s modification, the system was transferred to a new model of the tank. Based on the test results, ChKZ director Zh.Ya. Kotin considered it necessary to contact NKTP with a proposal for serial production of KRAST-1. His appeal indicated that this system is easy to use, does not require large material costs and can be installed by field repair teams. However, the People's Commissariat did not give permission for the release of KRAST-1.

As can be seen from the above material, the KV-1 heavy tanks, for a number of reasons, were unable to make a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, it was an epoch-making and no less legendary vehicle than the well-known T-34.

It is interesting that before the war, German intelligence was well aware of the presence in the Soviet troops of completely new tanks with anti-ballistic armor that could withstand long-term fire from 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns. The first information about the combat use of these vehicles came from Finland back in 1940, but Hitler stubbornly refused to believe in the existence of KV tanks in mass quantities. On December 5, at the next meeting, the Fuhrer said literally the following:

“The Russians are inferior to us in weapons... Our Pz.III tank with a 50-mm cannon is clearly superior to the Russian tank. The bulk of Russian tanks have poor armor..."

The German General Staff of the Ground Forces had approximately the same information:

“Scarce data on Soviet tanks: they are inferior to ours in armor and speed. Maximum armor - 30 mm...Optical instruments are very poor: cloudy glass, small angle of view.”

All this most likely applied to the T-26 and BT light tanks, although these vehicles in terms of the sum of their characteristics were no worse than the German Pz.II and Pz.III. German tank crews were able to verify this during the Spanish Civil War, and in the fall of 1939, on the territory of defeated Poland, the Soviet and German sides staged a kind of exchange of experience, demonstrating their main tanks. The Germans had a positive overall impression of the Soviet light tanks - they concluded that the Pz.II and Pz.III were superior in terms of protection and optical equipment. However, at that time, none of them knew about work on the KV and T-34 tanks...

In the first days of the war, the appearance of the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks became a very unpleasant surprise for the Germans. The bulk of anti-tank artillery and tank guns could not cope with them, but the most unpleasant fact was that the German tank industry did not have the opportunity to supply anything equivalent at that time. It was possible to disable the HF only by destroying its chassis, but not all crews had the opportunity to do this in combat conditions. Particularly hard hit were divisions equipped with Czech light tanks Pz.35(t) and Pz.38(t), whose guns were only suitable for fighting lightly armored vehicles.
There is one more interesting fact- in the summer of 1941, the KVs had a much greater effect on the Germans than the T-34s. In contrast, heavy tanks were crewed by officers who had much better combat training. Here are some examples of the combat use of the KV-1, which took place in June-August 1941. The Thuringian 1st Panzer Division, advancing in the Baltic States, was one of the first to come under a massive attack from Soviet heavy tanks. The report on the battle included the following:

“The KV-1 and KV-2, which we met here for the first time, were something unprecedented! Our companies opened fire from about 800 meters, but to no avail. The distance was decreasing, while the enemy was approaching us without showing any concern. Soon we were separated by 50 to 100 meters. The fierce artillery duel did not bring any success to the Germans. Russian tanks continued to advance as if nothing had happened, and armor-piercing shells simply bounced off them. Thus, an alarming situation arose when Russian tanks went straight through the positions of the 1st Tank Regiment towards our infantry and into our rear. Our tank regiment, making a complete turn, hurried after the KV-1 and KV-2, almost following in the same formation with them. During the battle, using special ammunition, we managed to disable some of them from a very short distance - from 30 to 60 meters. Then a counterattack was organized and the Russians were driven back. A defensive line was created in the Vosiliskis area. The fighting continued."

He describes the meeting with the KV more dramatically in his book “Eastern Front. Hitler is coming to the East” Paul Karel is an eyewitness to one of the battles near Senno, which took place on July 8, 1941. The Soviet tanks most likely belonged to the 5th Mechanized Corps, and their enemy was the 17th Panzer Division.

“At dawn, the forward regiment of the 17th Panzer Division went into action. He passed through tall stands of grain wheat, through potato fields and scrubby wasteland. Shortly before 11.00, Lieutenant von Ziegler's platoon came into combat contact with the enemy. Having let the Germans get closer, the Russians opened fire from well-camouflaged positions. After the first shots were fired, the three battalions of the 39th Tank Regiment fanned out along a wide front. Anti-tank artillery rushed to the flanks. A tank battle began, which took a prominent place in military history, - the battle for Senno.

A fierce battle raged from 11.00 until dark. The Russians acted very skillfully and tried to get into the Germans' flank or rear. The hot sun was blazing in the sky. On the vast battlefield, tanks, German and Russian, were blazing here and there.

At 17.00, German tank crews received a signal on the radio:

— Take care of ammunition.

At that moment, radio operator Westphal heard the commander’s voice in his tank:

- Enemy heavy tank! Tower - at ten o'clock. Armor-piercing. Fire!

“Direct hit,” reported non-commissioned officer Zarge. But the Russian monster did not seem to notice the shell. He just walked forward. Two, three, then four tanks from the 9th company hit the Soviet vehicle from a distance of 800 - 1000 m. No sense. And suddenly he stopped. The tower turned. A bright flame flashed from the shot. A fountain of mud shot up 40 meters in front of the tank of non-commissioned officer Gornbogen from the 7th company. Gornbogen hurried to leave the line of fire. The Russian tank continued to advance along the dirt road. There was a 37 mm anti-tank gun there.

- Fire! “But the giant didn’t seem to care. Grass and straw from crushed ears stuck to its wide tracks. The driver was in last gear - not an easy task given the size of the car. Almost every driver had a sledgehammer at hand, with which he hit the gearshift lever if the gearbox began to act up. An example of the Soviet approach. One way or another, their tanks, even heavy ones, ran briskly. This one is right on the anti-tank gun. The artillerymen fired like hell. Twenty meters left. Then ten, then five. And now the colossus ran straight at them. The crew members jumped to the sides screaming. The huge monster crushed the gun and rolled on as if nothing had happened. The tank then turned slightly to the right and headed towards the field artillery positions in the rear. He completed his journey fifteen kilometers from the front line, when he got stuck in a swampy meadow, where he was finished off by a 100-mm long-barreled gun of the divisional artillery.”

The commander of the 41st German Motorized Army Corps, Reinhardt, later recalled the battles with the 2nd Panzer Division:

“About a hundred of our tanks, of which about a third were Pz.Kpfw.IV, took up their starting positions for a counterattack. Part of our forces had to advance along the front, but most of the tanks had to bypass the enemy and attack from the flanks. We fired at the Russian iron monsters from three sides, but it was all in vain. The Russians, on the contrary, fired effectively. After a long battle, we had to retreat to avoid complete defeat. The Russian giants, echeloned along the front and in depth, came closer and closer. One of them approached our tank, hopelessly stuck in a swampy pond. Without any hesitation, the black monster drove over the tank and crushed it into the mud with its tracks. At this moment a 150 mm howitzer arrived. While the artillery commander warned about the approach of enemy tanks, the gun opened fire, but again to no avail.”

The famous German commander Heinz Guderian was also forced to appreciate the new Soviet tanks. For the first time I was able to get acquainted with the KV in July 1941 - in one of the battles, the forces of the 18th Panzer Division captured several of these vehicles, which they managed to knock out with the help of an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. The next meeting with the KV took place only in October near Bryansk and Tula, when units of the 4th Tank Division were practically powerless against the tanks of the Soviet 1st Tank Brigade and suffered heavy losses.

Thanks to their resilience and ability to use trusted equipment, a number of crews showed fantastically high efficiency. Just look at the battle carried out by a single KV-1 tank under the command of Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov on August 18, 1941. This battle was repeatedly described in various publications (for example, in the article "The Hero Who Didn't Become a Hero" Online "Courage"), so let’s focus on its main points.
To cover the Leningrad direction in the Krasnogvardeysk area, the 3rd tank company of the 1st tank battalion of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division, consisting of 5 KV-1, was allocated. Having stood at the fork in three roads, Kolobanov sent two tanks to the side branches, and he himself prepared to meet the enemy on the Tallinn highway. Having dug out the caponier and carefully camouflaged the tank, Kolobanov waited until the morning of August 19, when a German column of 22 tanks appeared on the horizon. The enemy, unaware of the ambush, went at an extremely close range, which gave the Soviet tank crews the opportunity to knock out the lead and trailing vehicles within the first minute of the battle, and then the KV crew set fire to the rest of the enemy tanks.

An equally striking fact of the skillful use of the KV-1 can be seen in the battle near the villages of Nefedyevo and Kuzino, where units under the command of Colonel M.A. Sukhanov stubbornly defended for several days. The enemy captured both settlements on December 3, and on the night of December 5, Sukhanov had to prepare an offensive in order to dislodge the Germans from their occupied positions. Of the reinforcements, he was given a battalion of the 17th Tank Brigade, consisting of one (!) KV-1 tank. However, even one heavy tank was enough to break through the German defense - this KV was commanded by Lieutenant Pavel Gudz, who already had 10 enemy vehicles on his account. Earlier, in the summer of 1941, this young lieutenant distinguished himself while acting as part of the 63rd Tank Division of the 32nd Tank Division near Lvov. On the morning of June 22, his platoon, consisting of five KV-1s, two T-34s and two BA-10s, entered into battle with the German advance detachment, completely defeating it. Gudz's crew accounted for 5 destroyed German tanks. In this case, a counter battle was completely contraindicated, so the KV crew, taking advantage of the darkness and artillery support, was able to secretly approach the forward positions near the village of Nefedvo. As it turned out, the enemy forces were very significant - there were more than 10 tanks alone. However, numerical superiority did not save the Germans at all - the battle began with the fact that at dawn the KV shot two German tanks almost point-blank and, wedged into their defensive formation, knocked out 8 more cars. The remaining 8 were forced to leave the village...

On November 8, 1941, the KV-1 crew under the command of Lieutenant A. Martynov from the 16th Tank Brigade of the Volkhov Front distinguished themselves. Having taken on 14 German tanks near the village of Zhupkino, Soviet tankers knocked out five of them and captured three more as trophies. These tanks were then repaired and soon included in the brigade.

And here is another example of the resilience of a single heavy tank, which was surrounded, but until the last resisted the German units trying to destroy it. Despite the fact that this episode was taken from a foreign source and the period of action dates back to 1943, there are a number of inconsistencies in it, which does not allow us to be completely convinced of its authenticity.

“One of the KV-1 tanks managed to break through to the only road along which the German strike group of troops in the northern bridgehead was supplied, and block it for several days. The first unsuspecting trucks delivering equipment were immediately shot down and burned by a Russian tank. There was practically no way to destroy this monster. Due to the swampy terrain, it was impossible to get around it. The supply of food and ammunition stopped. The seriously wounded soldiers could not be evacuated to a hospital for surgery and died. An attempt to disable the tank using a battery of 50 mm anti-tank guns fired from a distance of 450 meters resulted in heavy losses for the crews and guns.

The Soviet tank remained unharmed, despite, as it was later established, 14 direct hits. The shells left only bluish dents in his armor. When a camouflaged 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was brought up, Soviet tank crews calmly allowed it to be installed 600 meters from the tank, and then destroyed it along with its crew before it could fire the first shell. The sappers' attempt to blow up the tank at night also turned out to be a failure.

True, the sappers managed to sneak up on the tank shortly after midnight and plant explosives under the tank's tracks. But the wide tracks suffered little damage from the explosion. The blast wave tore several pieces of metal from them, but the tank remained mobile and continued to cause damage to rear units and block the delivery of equipment. At first, Russian tank crews received food at night from scattered groups of Soviet soldiers and civilians, but then the Germans cut off this source of supply, cordoning off the entire surrounding area.

However, even this isolation did not force the Soviet tankers to leave the advantageous position they had occupied. In the end, the Germans managed to deal with this tank by resorting to the following maneuver. Fifty tanks attacked the KV from three sides and opened fire on it to attract the attention of the crew. Under the cover of this diversionary maneuver, it was possible to install and camouflage another 88-mm anti-aircraft gun behind the Soviet tank, so that this time it was able to open fire. Out of 12 direct hits, three shells penetrated the armor and destroyed the tank...”

However, there were other reviews of meetings with the KV-1. For example, Franz Kurowski’s book “500 Tank Attacks” describes a whole series of battles involving Soviet heavy vehicles, which were opposed by German tank aces. Already in the first chapter, dedicated to the combat path of Michael Wittmann (132 destroyed tanks and self-propelled guns and 138 anti-tank guns), you can read the following:

“...A gap appeared between the trees in the telescopic sight. Then he saw the barrel of the KV gun, behind it the front plate, and, finally, the mighty turret. He hesitated slightly, slightly adjusting his aim. Then Klink pressed the fire button. The echo of a powerful gun shot and the crushing impact of a shell on the armor almost merged. The shell hit the joint between the hull and the turret, tearing the turret off the tank. The heavy turret fell to the ground with a roar, and the muzzle of the long-barreled gun buried itself in the soft ground. A few seconds later, two surviving crew members jumped out of the tank...”

It should be noted that the author “slightly” embellished most of the moments of this battle. The action took place at the end of June 1941 in the area of ​​​​the cities of Rivne, Lutsk, Brody, where the largest tank battle in the entire history of wars took place. In this battle at a height of 56.9, 18 Soviet tanks fought against Vitman’s only self-propelled gun (and he fought on a StuG III Ausf.C with a short-barreled StuK 37 L/24 gun), three of which Vitman himself identified as KV-1. But the fact is that in June 1941, the Germans did not yet know the names of the new Soviet tanks and therefore called them “26-ton” (T-34) or “50-ton” (KV-1). But these are trifles - the main doubts are caused by the terrifying effectiveness of the German short-barreled 75-mm cannon, which the Germans themselves called a “stump.” This weapon was originally created for fire support of infantry and tanks, so it was not tasked with combating enemy armored vehicles. However, provided that an armor-piercing projectile of the Gr38 H1 type was used with an initial speed of about 450 m/s, it was indeed possible to penetrate a 75-mm vertical armor plate, only this could be done from a distance of no more than 100 meters. Of course, in the case of Vitman there was no talk of any “tower failure” - a projectile weighing 4.4 kg simply did not have the necessary weight and impact power for this. It would be another matter if the shell penetrated the side armor and caused the detonation of the ammunition, but in this case no one from the crew survived.
A huge number of similar descriptions can be found in foreign literature dedicated to German tank crews. As a rule, the winners in them are always the Germans, and “tower collapses” and “torn hulls” of Soviet tanks (mainly T-34) are sometimes encountered there too often.

However, after the appearance of the Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther” and Pz.VI “Tiger” medium tanks in the hands of the Wehrmacht, the situation for the KV-1 became much more complicated. The same Vitman, in battle on Kursk Bulge, on his “tiger” successfully shot at Soviet heavy tanks dug into the ground from a distance of about 500 meters, while the shells of the 76.2 mm cannon could not penetrate his frontal armor.

Somewhat earlier, in February 1943, in a battle near Lake Ladoga, a squad of “tigers” from the 502nd tank battalion collided with a KV-1 group and, having knocked out two Soviet vehicles, forced the rest to retreat. A year later, on June 25, 1944, in the battle of Shapkovo, the same “tigers” from the 2nd company of the 502nd battalion under the command of Captain Leonhardt successfully repelled an attack by Soviet infantry and tanks, knocking out three KV-1s without their own losses.

After the completion of the Moscow operation, major offensives on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, like this one, were not carried out until the end of 1942. This made it possible to saturate, to some extent, battle-worn tank units with new equipment. Although the production of KVs at the Chelyabinsk plant had already gained momentum, many tanks arriving at the front had a lot of technological defects. In this regard, Stalin proposed that the GBTU reduce the production of heavy tanks and staff tank brigades with a new staff - 5 KV-1 and 22 T-34. The proposal was accepted almost immediately and already on February 14, 1942, the formation of the 78th Tank Brigade with 27 tanks was completed, and a few weeks later several more brigades of similar composition left for the front.

Although the KV-1 was much inferior to the “thirty-four” in terms of mass production, the presence of heavy tanks in the units, until the Germans acquired new vehicles with more powerful weapons, played a big role. In May 1942 alone, the Chelyabinsk plant sent 128 tanks to the front: 28 went to the Bryansk Front, 20 to the Kalinin Front, 30 to the Crimean Front, and another 40 went to the Don and the Caucasus.

The KV-1 brought the greatest benefit precisely in the southern and northern directions. The new KV-1s, which had entered service by that time (November-December 1942), were transferred to the guards tank regiments, which were supposed to have 214 personnel and 21 KV-1s or “Churchill” tanks. These units were given as reinforcement to rifle and tank formations and were essentially assault units. They first went into battle on the Don and Voronezh fronts in December 1942, taking part in the defeat of the encircled units of the Paulus group at Stalingrad. At that time, the Don Front had the most significant number of heavy tanks, which had at its disposal five guards tank regiments with KV-1s and two with “Churchill”. They were used very intensively, which caused the huge losses suffered by the guards units during this period. By the beginning of January, some of the regiments had only 3-4 tanks, which they continued to use to break through enemy defenses together with infantry.

In the midst of it Battle of Stalingrad, in October-November 1942, no less heavy fighting took place near Vladikavkaz and Nalchik. The main striking force here was the T-34 medium tanks and the light T-60 and T-70 tanks, while there were no more than two dozen heavy tanks. The 37th Army, which occupied the defense here, had no tanks at all, and in order to strengthen it, the 52nd Tank Brigade, 75th Brigade and 266th Brigade were brought forward to help. There were 54 vehicles in total, of which only 8 were KV-1 (all of which belonged to the 266th battalion). The forces were clearly not equal - against them the Germans fielded the 13th Panzer Division of the III Panzer Corps, which had modified Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.F2 medium tanks equipped with 75-mm long-barreled guns 7.5 KwK 40 L/43, the shell of which penetrated an armor plate 98 mm thick from a distance of 100 meters and an 82 mm sheet from a distance of 1000 meters. Thus, it became possible to successfully hit any Soviet tank at distances beyond its reach. The defensive operation, which began on October 26, mainly involved T-34s and light T-70s, while the 266th Tank Battalion remained in reserve. The battles to contain the enemy lasted a little more than a week, and on November 6, the battalion, as part of a mixed group, launched a counteroffensive near the village of Gisel. The Germans skillfully defended themselves, burying their own vehicles in the ground, and over the course of the entire day they were able to knock out 32 tanks and destroy another 29. However, with the help of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, which arrived in time, the tankers managed to surround the enemy, leaving him only a narrow 3-km passage. The final defeat of the German tank group ended on November 11 at the cost of heavy losses, however, Soviet troops managed to capture 140 tanks and self-propelled guns, most of them in disrepair.

In the history of the KV tank there was also such a not-so-famous combat episode. In November 1942, when the German offensive on the Don was successfully developing, the advanced units of the enemy’s motorized infantry easily reached the Novocherkassk direction and by July 21 reached the Mokry Log farmstead. The forces to repel the attack from the Soviet side on this section of the front were very modest - units of the 25th Cahul Border Regiment and police divisions of the NKVD troops. They had no heavy artillery at their disposal, but the 37th Army helped with armored vehicles, providing several tanks from the 15th Tank Brigade.
The Germans moved in two columns, and in the second they counted up to 100 units of heavy equipment. Join open fight it was reckless with them, and the command of the 15th Tank Brigade decided to inflict maximum damage on the enemy by placing tanks in ambush. For this purpose, a group of two KV-1 and one T-34 was allocated. Tank commanders: junior lieutenants Mikhail Ivanovich Bozhko and Grigory Dmitrievich Krivosheev and senior lieutenant Nikolai Fedorovich Gauzov.
They decided to set up an ambush between the villages of Mokry Log and Mokry Kerchik, the distance between which was 15 km. The exact chronology of this battle has not been preserved, since out of 14 crew members only two managed to survive: senior lieutenant Gauzov (died in battle in 1944) and foreman N.A. Rekun (commander of the gun of the second KV). This is how this battle is described by the commander of the 15th Tank Brigade, Major Savchenko, and the commander of the 1st Tank Battalion, Senior Lieutenant Vasilkov, who spoke about it only on November 21, 1942:

“On July 21, 1942, in the area of ​​the village of Mokry Log, the KV tank of Senior Lieutenant Gauzov received the task with two other tanks to prevent the enemy’s motorized tank column from breaking through to the city of Shakhty and to ensure the withdrawal of units of the 37th Army and its rear. Having chosen a convenient position and carefully camouflaged the tank, Senior Lieutenant Gauzov waited for the Nazi column to appear. Despite the fact that there were up to 96 tanks in the column, Comrade. Gauzov, at a distance of 500-600 meters, opened fire from a cannon and both machine guns, forcing the enemy column to turn around and take on an unequal battle. The battle lasted 3.5 hours. While in the ring of fire, Senior Lieutenant Gauzov showed composure, Bolshevik restraint and heroism. His tank withdrew from enemy artillery fire optical instruments and sighting device. Comrade Gauzov got out of the tank and, while on it, continued to accurately adjust the fire of his gun. The tank caught fire, but nevertheless Gauzov did not give up the fight. Commanding: “Direct fire. “For beloved Stalin. For the Motherland. Fire". “For my dead brother. “For the company commander who fell in battle. Fire,” he continued to repel the attack of the advancing enemy.”

According to Soviet data, the KV crew destroyed 16 German tanks, 2 armored vehicles, 1 anti-tank gun and 10 vehicles with enemy soldiers and officers. Gauzov himself was seriously wounded in the right leg, but managed to get out to his own. Later, for his heroism, he was worthy of being awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. Even if we assume that the number of destroyed German equipment was smaller (the battlefield remained with the Germans), this does not at all diminish the feat of the Soviet tank crews who entered into an obviously unequal battle. Delaying the advance for 3-3.5 hours is a very difficult matter, and the battle of July 21, 1942 in this regard is quite comparable to the feat of the crew of the KV-2 tank near the Dubisa River and the battle of the KV-1 crew under the command of Kolobanov in 1941.

Events developed more dramatically in the Middle Don. As part of Operation Little Saturn, the troops of the Southwestern Front had to break through the defenses on the weakest section of the front, where Romanian and Italian troops were located. As before, most of the available tanks were T-34 and T-70, although the 1st Mechanized Corps had 114 British Matilda and 77 Valentine infantry tanks. The KV-1 heavy tanks were then part of the 1st and 2nd Tank Corps, where there were 5 and 38 vehicles of this type, respectively. Little is known about the fate of these tanks. Apparently, the 2nd Tank Tank lost most of the KVs in the January battles of 1943, transferring the surviving vehicles to the 1st Tank Tank.

Heavy tanks played a significant role in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansk operation, which took place from January 13 to 27, 1943. Of the 896 tanks of the Voronezh Front, KVs of various modifications accounted for 112 vehicles. Most of them were transferred to direct infantry support of the front's three strike groups. For example, in the 40th Army, the 116th and 86th TB had 23 and 6 KV-1s, respectively, and the 262nd TB with 21 KV-1s tanks operated as part of the 18th Rifle Corps. Thanks to tactical flexibility, this time it was possible to avoid major losses, breaking through the enemy’s defenses in all three directions and destroying his main forces.

Building on the success achieved at Stalingrad, the command of the Voronezh Front in mid-January developed a plan for a new offensive, called “Zvezda”. The main striking element was the 3rd Tank Army, which was the most powerful unit of the Red Army. It consisted of two tank corps, a separate tank brigade, two rifle divisions, mortar and anti-tank fighter regiments. There were no more than a dozen KV tanks and they were kept most of the time as an operational reserve. The operation, whose goal was to liberate Kharkov, ended in partial success, with the 3rd Army losing only one KV, 33 T-34, 5 T-70 and 6 T-60 in the period from January 20 to February 18, 1943. By the time the operation was completed, only one KV-1 remained in the 12th Tank Tank and the 179th Brigade. At the same time, the report from the army headquarters emphasized that heavy tanks have severe wear on their engines, which have worked 50-70 hours in harsh winter conditions, and require repairs.

The 2nd Tank Army operating nearby had no less strength. It was formed in early 1943 and located near the city of Yelets, where it was gradually replenished with materiel and personnel. In February, they decided to use the army in an offensive operation near Dmitriev-Lgovsky and Sevsk. The tanks had to travel 250-270 km to the place of their new deployment, so it is not surprising that out of 408 vehicles, only 182 reached the deadline set for February 15. It took another week to fully concentrate forces and by February 24, army units reached their starting line on the river Swapa. The composition of the 2nd is interesting in that it was one of the few formations where there were separate units equipped only with KV-1 tanks. We are talking about the 29th separate guards tank regiment, which included 15 heavy vehicles. In addition, 11 KV-1, 1 T-34, 41 light tanks T-60 and T-70, as well as 49 British tanks were part of the 16th Tank. The offensive was generally successful and no combat losses among the KVs were reported.

The Battle of Kursk was the last major battle where KV-1 heavy tanks were used in mass quantities. The 203rd separate heavy tank regiment of the 18th tank corps (included conventional KV-1s, but there are allegations that there were assault KV-2s), which was at the disposal of the Voronezh Front, was used only sporadically and had a significant influence on the course of the battle did not provide. At the same time, the neighboring 15th and 36th Guards Tank Regiment, which were armed with British Churchill infantry tanks, took an active part in the famous battle of Prokhorovka, although they lost almost all of their vehicles. As a result, the 15th Regiment moved to the KV-1s, and the 36th Regiment was again replenished with British tanks. In total, the Central Front had 70 tanks of this type, and Voronezh had 105 units.

Even before the end of the Battle of Kursk, heavy tanks were used to break through the so-called “Mius Front” in July-August 1943. As part of the 1st Guards Tank Regiment, KV-1s took part in attacking enemy strongholds, as a result of which on the very first day of the offensive 10 tanks were lost during the operation (2 burned out, 2 were knocked out and 6 were blown up by mines).

The last guards tank regiment with KV-1s was formed in January 1944, but in the fall the outdated tanks were transferred to secondary sectors of the front, and the “guardsmen” moved to the more powerful IS-2. Nevertheless, the KV-1s fought until the very end of the war. As part of the 1452nd SAP (self-propelled artillery regiment), they took part in the liberation of Crimea, but due to heavy fighting, none of the five tanks of this type reached the final stage of the operation. The surviving KV-1s from other tank units then fought in Poland and Germany, where they took their last battle in the spring of 1945.

The largest number of KV tanks, as would be expected, were located in the Leningrad direction. The close proximity to the manufacturing plant made it possible to repair failed vehicles in a short time, while most of the tanks stationed in the western and southern OVO were idle waiting for spare parts.

Already during the war, in July 1941, a tank training center was created at the Kirov Plant, in which classes were held directly in the workshops with the involvement of cadets in the assembly of tanks. From the first training team On August 6, a tank company of 10 vehicles was formed, which was then transferred to the 86th detachment.
By August, the Leningrad Front became the undisputed leader in the number of heavy tanks, since its units received almost all KVs produced by LKZ.

It was here that the first meeting of heavy tanks of different generations took place. We are talking, of course, about the appearance of the Pz.Kpfw.VI “Tiger” tanks, which in the fall of 1942 arrived at the disposal of the 502nd heavy tank battalion. In one of the battles, which took place on February 12, 1943, three “tigers” knocked out and burned ten KV-1s without their own losses. It would probably be difficult to find a more effective proof of the KV’s non-compliance with the requirements for a heavy tank.

On the Leningrad Front in last time The KV was activated in the summer of 1944. By the beginning of the Vyborg operation (June 10), the front had the 26th separate Guards breakthrough tank regiment, equipped with both Soviet heavy tanks and British Churchill tanks. By the way, KV-1s tanks were transferred to this unit from other regiments, re-equipped with IS-2, and were overstaffed. This regiment fought heavy battles for Vyborg from June 18 to 20, retaining 32 KV-1s and 6 “Churchills” by the time the city was liberated. It should be noted that the 26th Guards Division had the opportunity to fight against captured T-26 and T-34, which were the main tanks Finnish army.

In September 1944, the 82nd Regiment (11 KV-1s and 10 “Churchill”), part of the 8th Army, participated in the liberation of Talin and the Moonsund Islands, where the Red Army ended the use of British heavy tanks.

Much less known are the exploits of Soviet tanks that fought surrounded on the Crimean Peninsula. For example, on February 27, 1942, on one of the sections of the Crimean Front, infantry, with the support of several KVs that remained in service in the 229th separate tank battalion, once again tried to recapture the high-rise 69.4 from the Germans, which dominated the area. During the next attack, only one KV of the company commander, Lieutenant Timofeev, managed to reach the German trenches. A nearby shell explosion damaged the tank's track, but the crew decided not to abandon the damaged vehicle. Over the next five days, gunner-radio operator Chirkov made his way to his own troops several times and brought back provisions and ammunition. The infantry tried to break through to the besieged “fortress,” which the Germans were never able to completely destroy, but every time Soviet soldiers had to retreat under heavy enemy fire. In turn, the Germans, realizing the futility of trying to throw grenades at the tank, decided to take a desperate step - douse the KV with gasoline and set it on fire. However, this “operation” ended in failure. Meanwhile, after receiving reinforcements and regrouping forces, Soviet troops managed to take the heights on March 16th. A significant role in this was played by the reports of the KV crew, who managed to reveal the location of most of the enemy’s firing points. Among other things, the stationary tank successfully supported the infantrymen with fire, destroying three bunkers, two machine gun nests and incapacitating up to 60 German soldiers. In total, the tankers spent just under 17 days in the besieged KV.

In addition to supplying military equipment to the USSR, the Allies were actively interested in the use of Soviet equipment in battles on the Eastern Front. Particular attention was paid to the T-34 medium tank and the heavy KV-1, but in the first months of the war it was not possible to obtain at least one example of each type. Only in mid-1942 did the Soviet side, within international cooperation, provided the Americans with one KV-1 and T-34 of the 1941 model. In a document drawn up by the deputy commander of the BT and MV, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Korobkov and the deputy head of the GBTU RCAA, Lieutenant General of the Tank Engineering Service Lebedev, the following was reported.

On the merits of the report of the engineer of the tank department of the Soviet purchasing commission in the USA, Comrade Prishchepenko, about his conversation with Robert Pollak, I report:

1. One sample of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks was sent to the USA via Arkhangelsk at the end of August 1942.

2. The KV-1 tank was manufactured at the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk, and the T-34 tank was manufactured at plant No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil.

3. The tanks were assembled under special supervision and were tested longer and more thoroughly than is usually done for production tanks.

4. In their design, the tanks were no different from the serial tanks produced in 1942.

5. In July 1942, before sending the tanks to the USA, the armored department of the GBTU KA sent to Comrade Krutikov drawings of tanks, instructions and manuals on tanks and engines, as well as lists of the main design changes made to the designs of tanks produced in 1942 for transmission to General Famousville. compared to the types described in the instructions and manuals.

6. Since General Faymonville proposed sending all these materials to America by plane, it follows that they should have been received there before the arrival of the tanks.
Since then, we have never received any requests for additional instructions or clarifications.

7. Our instructions are much more complete than the American and English instructions. At the same time, our manuals provide all the information on adjusting individual mechanisms and servicing tanks.

8. Therefore, the claims of the Americans, which were expressed by Robert Pollak in a conversation with Comrade Prishchepenko, that some parts in the KV tank differ from those described in the manuals, are not solid, since this was made known and by reporting the list changes.

9. The fact that the KV and T-34 tanks were equipped with R-9 radio stations, and not 71TK-3 (outdated radio stations out of production) was also reported to the Americans in the lists of changes.

10. Unlike the Americans and the British, we gave with tanks significant amount spare parts and units.
At their request, we sent them an additional main clutch for the KV tank.

11. How they managed to ruin the side clutches of the KV tank is unclear to us. These are very strong machine components and very rarely fail. They probably violated their regulation in the most flagrant way.

All these unfounded claims occur because the American command has refused technical assistance from our tank engineers who are in America and, moreover, has not yet asked us about the maintenance technology for our tanks.”

We must pay tribute to the Americans - they tested the equipment “with special passion,” trying to “squeeze” literally everything possible out of the tank. This, in part, justifies their attitude towards Soviet vehicles, which were considered completely unsuitable for use in American army, which especially concerned such quality as comfort. On the other hand, when testing our own tanks, the attitude towards the technology was more “humane”. The Soviet side drew its own conclusions from the report received from the United States. At a meeting held on October 25, 1943, dedicated to the American assessment of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks, the following was noted about the first:

- the indication of the insufficient initial speed of the ZiS-5 cannon is considered correct, as a result - armor penetration is worse than that of American guns of a similar caliber;

— the DT machine gun requires replacement with a more durable and rapid-fire one;

— no anti-aircraft weapons (all American tanks have them);

— the KV suspension is significantly better than the T-34 torsion bar suspension, the design of which was outdated and was practically unsuitable for use on a tank weighing almost 30 tons;

— the V-2 engine is not a tank engine, both in terms of its dimensions and the reliability of the operation of its individual mechanisms (water pump) and service life in general;

— the assessment of Soviet-designed transmissions is correct, the lag in this area is most striking;

— an indication of the difficulty of operating the machine correctly;

- onboard clutches, as a mechanism for turning tanks, are outdated;

— the indication of a large number of adjustments is correct and requires attention from NKTP and BTU.

In accordance with these comments, the commission concluded that it was necessary to improve the quality of Soviet tanks, but something else was more interesting. As it turned out, the Americans liked the Soviet TMF and TP-4 sights, and this despite the fact that their optics required improvement. The thickness of the KV-1's armor was superior to all production American tanks, therefore its protection was noticeably better. In particular, the description of the KV-1 prepared by the US Army Training Department stated the following:

“...The very strong armor of the tank allows it to withstand any enemy artillery fire, except for direct hits from large-caliber guns, and this tank is very difficult to disable.

Even when disabled, this tank can maintain heavy fire until reinforcements drive the Germans back..."

The overall assessment of the KV-1 among American experts was satisfactory, but we should not forget that this tank was created according to technical specifications issued in 1938, and tests in the USA were carried out at the end of 1942, when “tigers” and “Tigers” appeared at the front. Panthers" and the requirements for heavy tanks were completely different.

There is no reliable information about the use of the KV-1 on the enemy side. As one might expect, the Germans got the most heavy tanks. Basically, these were technically faulty vehicles or damaged in battles, but some of the KVs were in fully combat-ready condition and were abandoned due to lack of fuel and ammunition. No separate units were recruited from them, and all captured KVs that were able to be put into operation were initially transferred to combat units, sending several tanks to Germany for comprehensive testing. In the German army they received the designation Pz.Kpfw.KV I 753 (r).
Some of the KV-1s were later modernized by installing German optics and commander's cupolas. At least one tank was experimentally equipped with a 75mm 7.5cm KwK 40 cannon.

Captured tanks were used not only in training units. Judging by German photographs, former Soviet KV-1s took a very active part in battles from the autumn of 1941 to the winter of 1942. They probably continued to be used until the engine life expired or the tank failed due to combat damage or serious technical malfunctions. Although most of the KV-1s were still used in the rear for training tank crews and as security equipment.

According to OKN documents, the number of captured KVs had decreased to 2 units by March 1, 1943, and by December 30, 1944, not a single tank of this type officially remained. In reality, there were several dozen of them left, since the documents took into account cars in “running” condition.

The only Finnish armored brigade also had several KVs. Two of them were captured in the summer-autumn battles of 1941, repaired and put back into service. By June 9, 1944, when the brigade was thrown into battle on the Karelian Isthmus, it consisted of only one heavy tank with additional armor. It has not yet been possible to find information about its combat operation, but this vehicle continued to be used in the Finnish army until 1954.

Several more KV-1s became trophies of the Hungarian and Slovak armies, but about them future fate no information yet.

Sources:
V.N. Shunkov “Red Army”. AST\Harvest. 2003
M. Baryatinsky “Soviet tanks in battle.” YAUZA\EXMO. Moscow. 2007
A. Isaev, V. Goncharov, I. Koshkin, S. Fedoseev and others “ Tank strike. Soviet tanks in battles 1942-1943". YAUZA\EXMO. Moscow. 2007
V. Beshanov “Tank pogrom of 1941.” AST\Harvest. Moscow\Minsk. 2000.
M.V. Kolomiets “History of KV tanks” (part 1)
M.V. Kolomiets “History of KV tanks” (part 2)
tankarchives.blogspot.com.by: More on tank bunkers
The story of one KV tank
Kolomiets M., Moshchansky I. “KV-1S” (M-Hobbi, No. 5 for 1999)
Tank battle near the village of Mokryi Log
Mechanized corps of the Red Army

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEAVY TANKS
KV-1 and KV-1s

	KV-1 model 1941	KV-1s model 1942
COMBAT WEIGHT	47000 kg	42500 kg
CREW, people	5
DIMENSIONS
Length, mm	6675	6900
Width, mm	3320	3250
Height, mm	2710	2640
Ground clearance, mm	450	450
WEAPONS	one 76.2 mm ZiS-5 or F-34 cannon and three 7.62 mm DT machine guns (local, coaxial and rear turret)	one 76.2 mm ZiS-5 cannon and three 7.62 mm DT machine guns (local, coaxial and rear turret)
AMMUNITION	90-114 shots and 2772 rounds	111 shots and 3000 rounds
AIMING DEVICES	telescopic sight - TOD-6 periscope sight - PT-6 commander's panorama - PT-1
RESERVATION	body forehead (top) - 40-75 mm body roof - 30-40 mm hull side - 75 mm hull rear (top) - 40 mm hull rear (bottom) - 75 mm gun mask - 90 mm welded tower forehead - 75 mm forehead of the cast turret - 95 mm turret side - 75 mm turret feed - 75 mm tower roof - 40 mm bottom - 30-40 mm	body forehead (top) - 40-75 mm body roof - 30 mm hull side - 60 mm hull rear (top) - 40 mm hull rear (bottom) - 75 mm gun mask - 82 mm turret forehead - 75 mm turret side - 75 mm turret feed - 75 mm tower roof - 40 mm bottom - 30 mm
ENGINE	diesel, 12-cylinder, V-2K, 600 hp.
TRANSMISSION	mechanical type: multi-disc main and side dry friction clutches, 5-speed gearbox	mechanical type: multi-disc main and side dry friction clutches, range multiplier, 10-speed gearbox
CHASSIS	(per side) 6 dual main rollers with individual torsion bar suspension, 3 support rollers, front drive and rear idler wheels, large-link caterpillar with steel tracks
SPEED	35 km/h on the highway 10-15 km/h on a country road	42 km/h on the highway 10-15 km/h on a country road
HIGHWAY RANGE	150-225 km on highway 90-180 km by terrain	1250 km by highway up to 180 km terrain
OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME
Elevation angle, degrees.	36°
Wall height, m	0,80
Ford depth, m	1,60
Ditch width, m	2,00
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION	radio station 71TK-3 or R-9

. This proposal was received by Zh.Ya. Kotin in December 1938 in the Kremlin during a report to the Main Military Council of Leningrad tank builders on the work done on the design of tanks and.

Design of the KV-1 tank

For 1940 serial KV-1 was a truly innovative design that embodied the most advanced ideas of the time: an individual torsion bar suspension, reliable anti-ballistic armor, a diesel engine and one powerful universal weapon within the framework of a classic layout. Although individual solutions from this set have been repeatedly implemented previously in other foreign and domestic tanks, KV-1 was the first combat vehicle to embody their combination. Some experts consider it as a landmark vehicle in world tank construction, which had a significant influence on the development of subsequent heavy tanks in other countries. The classic layout on a serial Soviet heavy tank was used for the first time, which made it possible KV-1 obtain the highest level of security and great modernization potential within the framework of this concept compared to the previous production model of a heavy tank and experimental vehicles And(all are multi-tower type). The basis of the classic layout is the division of the armored hull from bow to stern, successively into a control compartment, a fighting compartment and an engine-transmission compartment. The driver and gunner-radio operator were located in the control compartment, three other crew members had jobs in the fighting compartment, which combined the middle part of the armored hull and the turret. The gun, its ammunition and part of the fuel tanks were also located there. The engine and transmission were installed at the rear of the vehicle.

The armored body of the tank was welded from rolled armor plates with a thickness of 75, 40, 30 and 20 mm. The armor protection is equally strong (armor plates with a thickness other than 75 mm were used only for horizontal armoring of the vehicle), and is projectile-resistant. The armor plates of the frontal part of the vehicle were installed at rational angles of inclination. Tower serial HF was produced in three versions: cast, welded with a rectangular niche and welded with a rounded niche. The armor thickness of welded turrets was 75 mm, and that of cast turrets was 95 mm, since cast armor was less durable. In 1941, the welded turrets and side armor plates of some tanks were further strengthened - 25-mm armor screens were bolted onto them, and an air gap remained between the main armor and the screen, that is, this option KV-1 actually received a spaced reservation. It is not entirely clear why this was done (in fact, it was done because the Germans misinformed our intelligence - propaganda materials were planted about heavy German tanks, which the Germans did not have at that time, in order to overextend Soviet industry.

KV-1 with F-32 cannon and shielded turret and hull, 1941

The Germans had been actively developing heavy tanks since the 30s, but did not plan to use them on the eastern front), since even the standard armor for 1941 KV-1 was, in principle, redundant. Some sources erroneously indicate that the tanks were produced with rolled armor 100 mm thick or more - in fact, this figure corresponds to the sum of the thickness of the main armor of the tank and the screens. The front part of the turret with the embrasure for the gun, formed by the intersection of four spheres, was cast separately and welded with the rest of the armored parts of the turret.

The gun mantlet was a cylindrical segment of bent rolled armor plate and had three holes - for a cannon, a coaxial machine gun and a sight. The turret was mounted on a shoulder strap with a diameter of 1535 mm in the armored roof of the fighting compartment and was secured with grips to prevent stalling in case of a strong roll or overturning of the tank. The turret shoulder straps were marked in thousandths for firing from closed positions. The driver was located in the center in front of the armored hull of the tank, to the left of him was workplace gunner-radio operator. Three crew members were located in the turret: to the left of the gun were the workstations of the gunner and loader, and to the right was the tank commander. The crew entered and exited through two round hatches: one in the turret above the commander’s workplace and one on the roof of the hull above the gunner-radio operator’s workplace. The hull also had a bottom hatch for emergency escape by the crew of the tank and a number of hatches, hatches and technological openings for loading ammunition, access to the necks of fuel tanks, and other components and assemblies of the vehicle.

KV-1 tank engine

The KV-1 was equipped with a four-stroke V-shaped 12-cylinder diesel engine V-2K with a power of 500 hp. With. (382 kW) at 1800 rpm, subsequently, due to the general increase in the mass of the tank after installing heavier cast turrets, screens and eliminating the shavings of the edges of the armor plates, the engine power was increased to 600 hp. With. (441 kW). Starting the engine was ensured by an ST-700 starter with a power of 15 hp. With. (11 kW) or compressed air from two 5-liter tanks in the fighting compartment of the vehicle. KV-1 had a dense layout, in which the main fuel tanks with a volume of 600-615 liters were located in both the combat and engine compartments. In the second half of 1941, due to a shortage of V-2K diesel engines, which were then produced only at plant No. 75 in Kharkov (in the fall of that year, the process of evacuating the plant to the Urals began), tanks KV-1 were produced with four-stroke V-shaped 12-cylinder carburetor engines M-17T with a power of 500 hp. With. In the spring of 1942, a decree was issued to re-equip all tanks in service KV-1 with M-17T engines back to V-2K diesel engines - the evacuated plant No. 75 established their production in sufficient quantities at the new location.

Armament of the KV-1 tank

The first production tanks were equipped with a 76.2 mm L-11 cannon with 111 rounds of ammunition (according to other sources - 135). It’s interesting that the original project also included a paired

, although the armor penetration of the 76-mm L-11 tank gun was practically not inferior to the 20K anti-tank gun. Apparently, strong stereotypes about the need to have a 45-mm anti-tank gun along with a 76-mm were explained by its higher rate of fire and larger ammunition load. But already on the prototype, aimed at the Karelian Isthmus, the 45-mm cannon was removed and a machine gun was installed instead. Subsequently, the L-11 gun was replaced by a 76-mm F-32 gun, and in the fall of 1941 - by a ZiS-5 gun with a longer barrel of 41.6 calibers.

On a tank KV-1 three 7.62-mm machine guns were installed: coaxial with the gun, as well as forward and stern in ball mounts. The ammunition load for all was 2772 rounds. These machine guns were mounted in such a way that, if necessary, they could be removed from the mounts and used outside the tank. Also, for self-defense, the crew had several F-1 hand grenades and was sometimes equipped with a pistol for firing flares. On every fifth HF They mounted an anti-aircraft turret for, but in practice anti-aircraft machine guns were rarely installed.

Combat use of the KV-1 tank

Tank debut HFtook place on the front of the Soviet-Finnish war. First HFwere sent to the front as part of the 91st tank battalion of the 20th heavy tank brigade. First fight HFtook over on December 17 during the breakthrough of the Khottinensky fortified area of ​​the Mannerheim Line. Tank HFacted in battle much better than the SMK tank, which was blown up by a camouflaged landmine, and the T-100. He confidently moved through enemy territory along the course indicated by radio, firing from a gun at detected targets, and on the way back he towed a damaged medium tank to the location of his troops. After the battle, when examining the tank, its crew counted traces of 43 shell hits in the hull and turret. The tank's gun barrel was shot through, several tracks were damaged, the support roller was punctured, the spare fuel tank was torn off, and the fenders were dented.

The tank successfully passed combat tests: not a single enemy anti-tank gun could hit it. The only thing that upset the military was that the 76-mm L-11 gun was not strong enough to fight the bunkers. For this purpose, it was necessary to create a new tank armed with a 152 mm howitzer.

The very first meetings of German tank crews with HF put them into a state of shock. The tank was practically not penetrated by German tank guns (for example, a German sub-caliber shell from a 50-mm tank gun penetrated the side HF from a distance of 300 m, and the forehead - only from a distance of 40 m). Anti-tank artillery was also ineffective: for example, the armor-piercing projectile of the 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank gun made it possible to hit KVs in favorable conditions at a distance of only less than 500 m.

Repeatedly tanks KV-1 withstood the battle not just with a few, but with several dozen German tanks. Thus, on August 20, 1941, the tank of Senior Lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov from the 1st Tank Regiment of the 1st Tank Division destroyed 22 German tanks of the 3rd Tank Company of the 1st Tank Regiment of the 1st Tank Division of Major General Walter with 98 shots. Kruger of the 4th Panzer Group of Army Group North. This famous one seriously delayed the enemy’s advance near Leningrad and saved the city from lightning capture. By the way, one of the reasons why the Germans were so eager to capture Leningrad in the summer of 1941 was precisely because the Kirov plant, which produced KV tanks, was located in the city.

However, many tanks were abandoned by their crews in the first days of the war and were willingly put into service by the Germans.

under the symbol 753(r). The Germans drilled out the charging chamber of a tank gun to install a 2.5 times larger powder charge, thus turning captured KVs into an effective means of combating Soviet tanks.

German KV-1 753(r)

See also:

The experience of using medium and heavy tanks in the war with Finland showed that 30-40 mm armor can no longer provide protection from anti-tank gun fire and that controlling multi-turreted tanks in battle is very difficult. For this reason, the new heavy tank KV-1 received shell-proof armor and was made with a single turret, with a classic layout. The control compartment was located in the front part of the welded box-section hull, the fighting compartment was in the middle, and the power plant was located in the rear part of the hull.

The tank was produced with two types of turret: welded from sheets 75 mm thick or cast with a wall thickness of 95 mm. During production, the armor protection of the hull was reinforced with additional 25 mm screens, and the wall thickness of the cast turret was increased to 105 mm. Therefore, it is not surprising that the KV-1 emerged victorious from the battle, sometimes bearing dozens of dents from shells on its armor. Initially, a 76.2 mm L-11 cannon was installed, then an F-32 of the same caliber, and since 1941 the KV was produced with a 76.2 mm ZIS-5 cannon. The KV-1 was mass-produced from 1940 to 1942. A total of 4,800 KV vehicles of various modifications were produced. On the basis of the KV-1, the KV-2, KV-3, KV-8, KV-9 and others tanks were created.

Combat use of the KV-1 tank

In places!

"BUILDING AND OPERATION OF THE CREW AT THE TANK (*)

1. At the command (signal) “To the vehicles,” the crew lines up in front of the tank, facing the field, in one line, one step ahead of the tracks, in the following order: tank commander - CT, gun commander (firing) - KO, driver junior (loader) - M, senior driver - MV, radio telegraph operator - R, and receive the command "Attention".

2. At the command (signal) “Take your seats,” landing is carried out in the following order: everyone turns around, the senior driver climbs into the tank through the front hatch and sits down in his place, followed by the radiotelegraph operator and closes the hatch behind him; the tank commander takes a step to the left and lets the gun commander pass ahead of him, who climbs onto the tank and, on the starboard side, runs to the turret, opens the hatch and sits down in his place; he is followed by the tank commander; The last to get in is the junior driver, who closes the hatch behind him.

3. After the crew has boarded the tank, the tank commander gives the command: “Prepare for loading.” At this command, the senior mechanic-driver opens the central fuel valve, creates pressure in the fuel system, and turns on the “mass”. The junior driver opens the fuel and oil valves, after which the senior driver reports that the engine is ready to start.

At the “Start” command, the senior driver presses the main clutch, gives a signal and starts the engine. After starting the engine, the tank commander gives a signal that the tank is ready to move.

4. At the command (signal) “To the machines,” exit from the tank is carried out in the following order: the radiotelegraph operator is the first to exit through the front hatch, followed by the senior driver, who closes the hatch; The junior driver (motor operator) comes out first through the turret hatch and stands in front of the tank, followed by the tank commander, then the gun commander, who closes the turret hatch.

Upon exiting the tank, the crew lines up in the order shown in the diagram in Fig. 109, and remains in this position until the command (order) of the platoon commander.
=======================

(*) The crew of a tank with a large turret consists of 6 people: a tank commander, a gun commander, a foremen driver, a junior driver, a radio telegraph operator and a castle officer."

The German offensive, launched on June 22, 1941, caught the Red Army by surprise - it was not properly deployed and was in the middle of a process of global reorganization. During 1941, the USSR army suffered enormous losses in manpower and equipment, losing most of its gigantic tank fleet. Despite the poor overall performance of the Soviet forces, the invulnerability of the KV-1 and KV-2 came as a shock to the Germans. They did not have at their disposal tanks comparable to the KB in terms of armor and armament, and they had a small number of anti-tank guns capable of destroying them. In his memoirs "A Soldier's Duty" Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky wrote: "KB tanks literally stunned the enemy. They withstood cannon fire from absolutely all German tanks. But in what form did they return from the battle! Their armor was full of dents from enemy artillery fire."

In July 1941, Soviet troops had 500 KV-1 and KV-2 tanks. In October 1941, production of KV-2 tanks was suspended as the evacuation of tank factories to the east began. By this time, only 434 cars had been produced. They were used in positional battles during the defense of Moscow in the winter of 1941 and near Stalingrad as part of the 62nd Army of Major General V. Chuikov. An effective means of KB was the fire of 88-mm Flak 35/36 anti-aircraft guns. For example, this is how the commander of the 41st German Tank Corps, General Reinhart, describes the clash with KB tanks from the 2nd Panzer Division (we are talking about the battles of June 23-24 in the Rossiniai area.

“About a hundred of our tanks, a third of which were Pz.IV, prepared for a counterattack. Some of them were directly in front of the enemy, but most were located on the flanks. Suddenly, they were sandwiched on three sides by steel monsters, trying to destroy them was a futile task. On the contrary , soon some of our tanks were disabled... The giant Russian tanks were coming closer and closer. One of them approached the shore of the swampy pond where our tank was standing. Without hesitation, the black monster pushed it into the pond. The same thing happened to a German cannon, which failed to quickly dodge.

Its commander, when he saw the approaching enemy heavy tanks, opened fire on them. However, this did not cause them even minimal damage. One of the giants quickly rushed towards the cannon, which was located 100 meters away from him. Suddenly one of the fired shells hit the tank. He stopped as if struck by lightning. “He’s ready,” the gunners thought with relief. “Yes, he’s ready,” the gun commander said to himself. But soon their feelings were replaced by a cry: “He’s still moving!” Without any doubt, the tank was moving, its tracks were creaking, it was approaching the gun, threw it away like a toy and, pressing it into the ground, continued on its way."

General Reinhart's story is complemented by the memories of one of the officers of the 1st Panzer Division:
“KV-1 and KV-2 were 800 meters away from us. Our company opened fire - to no avail. We moved closer and closer to the enemy, who continued to move forward. For several minutes, only 50-100 m separated us. Each one opened fire, but to no avail: the Russians continued on their way, all our shells bounced off them. We found ourselves in a threatening situation: the attacking Russians overturned our artillery and penetrated our battle formation. Only by bringing up anti-aircraft guns and firing from short distances was it possible to stop the onslaught of enemy armor. Then Our counterattack pushed back the Russians and established a line of defense at Vasiliskis. The fight was over."

According to the memoirs of D. Osadchy, commander of a company of KV-1 tanks in the 2nd Tank Division, “On June 23-24, even before entering the battle, many KB tanks, especially the KV-2, broke down during the marches. There were especially big problems with the gearbox and air filters. June was hot, there was a huge amount of dust on the roads of the Baltics and the filters had to be changed after an hour and a half of engine operation. Before entering the battle, the tanks of my company managed to replace them, but those of the neighboring ones did not. As a result, by the middle of the day, most of the vehicles in these companies had broken down."

Near Leningrad, perhaps the most famous battle took place with the participation of the KV, in which he had the opportunity to demonstrate all his positive qualities in the most vivid way. On August 19, 1941, in the Krasnogvardeets area, a KV company under the command of Z.G. Kolobanova, consisting of five KV tanks, destroyed 43 German tanks in one battle, three of them by ramming. The crew of Z.G. himself Kolobanova burned 22 tanks within an hour. The KV safely survived the impact of 156 armor-piercing shells fired from tank guns from a distance of less than 200 m. To be fair, it should be noted that the Soviet tank acted from an ambush, and the enemy vehicles were “locked” in the marching column and were deprived of maneuver.

The fate of the KB from the 6th Mechanized Corps of the Western Military District is sad. Having practically failed to fire a single shot at the enemy, these KBs were either blown up by their crews or simply abandoned due to lack of fuel.
KB tanks were more active on the Southwestern Front. But here, too, the main losses of these vehicles were not from enemy fire, but due to illiterate operation, lack of spare parts and technical malfunctions. And of course, one cannot ignore the actions of the KB tanks in the light of the general condition in which the tank forces of the Red Army were by June 1941.

Heavy tank KV-2

The tank was adopted by the Red Army in 1940 and was a modification of the KV-1, designed to combat long-term firing points. The prototype, released in February 1940, took part in the war with Finland and proved to be a positive one. In accordance with its intended purpose, the KV-2 was armed with a very powerful 152-mm M-10 gun mounted in a high armored turret of circular rotation. This gun was fired with separately loaded rounds, so the combat rate of fire was low.

In addition, the KV-2 could only fire from a standing position. Fire control was carried out using a T-5 telescopic tank sight and a PT-5 panoramic tank sight. Radio station 71-TK-Z was installed on all vehicles. To protect against air attack, some KV-2s were armed with an anti-aircraft machine gun mounted on the roof of the turret. Production was stopped with the outbreak of World War II. In total, about 330 KV-2 were produced.

The KV-2 serial heavy tank with anti-shell armor was designed in Leningrad at the Kirov plant under the leadership of Zh. Ya. Kotin and manufactured in February 1940. The senior design team was N.L. Dukhov. The KV-2 was intended to break through heavily fortified defensive lines (destroy pillboxes and bunkers with direct fire) and to reinforce units armed with light and medium tanks.

A special feature of this vehicle was the installation in the turret of an increased size (compared to the KV-1) of a 152-mm M-10 howitzer of the 1938-1940 model. In the world practice of tank building at that time, this was a unique case. To install such a large system, it was necessary to develop a new tower. The turret with the M-10S howitzer for the KV received the factory designation MT-1, and the tank itself received the KV with a “big turret” (the designation KV-2 appeared only in 1941)

Live-fire tests were carried out on a trench stand right on the factory premises. No one knew how the tank would behave after being fired from a gun of this caliber. They shot from a position along the side, that is, the most dangerous for capsizing the car. The experiment was successful, the car did not tip over, and the engine started on the first try.

In addition to the howitzer, the KV-2 tank was also armed with three 7.62-mm DT tank machine guns (coaxial with the howitzer; in a ball joint in the rear wall of the turret; in the front plate of the turret box to the left of the driver). The howitzer had relatively high performance at that time. Its armor-piercing projectile (naval grenade) weighing 52 kg with an initial speed of 436 m/s pierced an armor plate 72 mm thick at a distance of 1500 m, at an angle of 60°. For firing at reinforced concrete fortifications there was a concrete-piercing projectile weighing 40 kg with an initial speed of 530 m/s. The howitzer's pointing angles are horizontally 360, vertically from -5° to +12. For vertical aiming, a sector mechanism was used. The shooting was carried out using a T-5 telescopic sight (TOD-9) or a PT-5 periscope sight (PT-9). The ammunition consisted of 36 separate-loading artillery rounds and 3,087 rounds of ammunition for DT machine guns (49 magazines).

At the rear of the turret there was a hatch for loading ammunition; on the roof there were hatches for landing the crew, observation devices and fans. On the side walls there are brackets for climbing to the roof and embrasures for firing personal weapons, closed from the inside with conical plugs. The same embrasure was on the door of the rear wall of the tower. The rotation of the turret was controlled using mechanical and electric drives.
The armor has been changed compared to the KV-1. It consisted of rolled armor plates with a thickness of 75 mm (frontal part, sides and turret), 60 mm (aft part), 40 mm (bottom) and 30 mm (roof), connected by electric welding. The engine, transmission and chassis, as well as external and internal communications, are unified with the KV-1.

With a combat weight of 52 tons, the tank had good cross-country ability for its type, comparable to the KV-1.
The crew consisted of six people: a commander, a driver, a gun commander (gunner), a castle officer, a junior driver and a gunner-radio operator. The driver and gunner-radio operator were located in the front part of the hull (control compartment), and the remaining crew members were located in the turret (combat compartment).

In November 1940, a vehicle with the so-called “lowered turret” was put into production. Compared to the MT-1, the new turret (armed with the same 152-mm howitzer and designated MT-2) had smaller overall dimensions and was easier to manufacture. At the rear of the turret, a 7.62 mm DT machine gun was mounted in a ball mount. To dismantle the gun, there was a hatch in the rear wall of the turret, which was also used for loading ammunition and boarding and disembarking the crew.

The gun mask has been changed. As a result of the alterations, it was possible to reduce the weight by 2 tons. The tank had standard external fuel tanks, a radio station and an intercom system for four crew members. Some of the vehicles received anti-aircraft machine guns on the turrets. The gun was fired only from a standing position, which is why the vehicle is often classified as a “self-propelled gun with a rotating turret.”

Several KV-2s were tested during the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in mid-February 1940. With the help of artillery fire, they made passages in the granite gouges and destroyed them with close range pillboxes that hindered the advance of rifle units. The armor withstood heavy fire from enemy anti-tank artillery. In particular, one of the vehicles received 48 dents from being hit by shells, but remained in service. After successful completion of the tests, the KV-2 was put into service and was in mass production until the second half of 1941. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the tank was discontinued.

In the early years of the war, the KV-2 remained virtually invulnerable to almost all types of anti-tank artillery, with the exception of guns with high muzzle velocity, which fired direct fire from a dangerously short distance. The only thing the enemy could do was force the crew to abandon the vehicle by disabling the rollers or tracks. Due to the large size and thickness of the armor of the KV-2 and its crew of 6 people, the tank received the nickname "Dreadnought".

However, the KV-2 paid dearly for its powerful gun and impenetrable armor. Its mobility on the move and in combat was severely limited by problems with the clutch, transmission and crew accommodations it inherited from the KV-1. The situation was aggravated due to the increased weight (53.8-57.9 tons depending on the modification), as well as due to the use of an unimproved 500 hp engine.

Problems with turret rotation, which arose when the tank was not on a relatively flat surface, affected its effectiveness in combat. The KV-2 was a formidable opponent when stationary, but it lacked mobility and speed, both of which were vital in the first year of the war on the Eastern Front.

The Germans first encountered the KB-2 on June 23 during fighting in Lithuania. According to the recollections of servicemen from the 1st Tank Division, this is recorded as follows: “Our companies opened fire from 700 m. We were getting closer. Soon we were already 50-100 m apart. But we could not achieve success. Soviet tanks continued to advance, and our armor-piercing shells simply bounced off their armor. Tanks withstood direct fire from 50 mm and 75 mm cannons. The KV-2 was hit by more than 70 shells, but not one was able to penetrate its armor. Several tanks were disabled when we managed to hit the tracks and then shoot them with a short distance from cannons. Then they were attacked by sappers with backpack charges." .

From the memoirs of G. Penezhko, an officer of the 8th Mechanized Corps: “Several KVs appeared from behind the forest. One of the tanks stopped on a hill. The gun in the giant turret turned in our direction. The thunder of a shot rang out. Where a German tank had been a second ago, now lay a twisted pile of armor. Slowly the turret turned to the right. The tank took on another fascist. A shot, an explosion, the turret of the German tank was torn off its shoulder strap, and the hull came apart at the seams.".

Most of the KV-2 losses in 1941 were caused by the lack or shortage of fuel, which is why they had to be simply abandoned. The 41st Panzer Division lost two-thirds of its 33 KV-2s, with only five of them lost in action.

Performance characteristics

Read also: "Heavy tank T-35"	KV-85	"big tower"	"lowered tower"
Combat weight, t
Crew, people
Case length, mm
With the gun forward, mm
Width, mm
Tower roof height, mm
Clearance
Armament
Machine gun	Zx7.62-mmDT		4 x 7.62 mm DT
A gun	85-mm D-5T-85 Model 43	152.4 mm M-10 mod. 1938/40	152.4 mm M-10 mod. 1938/40
Ammunition:
shells
cartridges
Booking, mm:
forehead of the body
hull side
roof
tower
Engine
power, l. With.
Max speed on highway, km/h
Cruising range on the highway, km

Read also:
	Magazine "Russian Tanks". KV-2.
	Operation Barbarossa - KV tanks in battle
	Magazine "Russian Tanks". KV-1.
	Tank KV. Service manual.

KV tanks in the first battles Production of the KV-2 was just beginning when, in the summer of 1941, German troops attacked the USSR, beginning the implementation of Plan Barbarossa. Therefore, the number of tanks available in the Red Army units was small. By the time the Great Patriotic War began, only some units received the number of KB tanks that were assigned to them according to the state, while the rest had only a few vehicles. In addition, the supply system for spare parts and especially ammunition for the 152 mm howitzer was not developed. Some units had no ammunition at all, and some did not know that 09-30 concrete-piercing shells could also be used as armor-piercing shells. As a result, the command of the Red Army had at its disposal only a very small number of fully combat-ready units with a regular number of tanks, trained crews, provided with transport and ammunition that would be able to fully realize the combat potential of their mighty vehicles. The KV-2 was originally designed to combat field fortifications, both wooden and concrete, which it could approach at low speed, protected from enemy fire by its powerful armor. A significant limitation in this tactical use was that the KV-2's main armament, a 152 mm howitzer, could only be fired when the tank was standing on more or less level ground. Even a slight tilt made it much more difficult to turn the heavy turret and made combat almost impossible. In addition, the low mobility of the KV-2 did not correspond to the highly mobile nature of the fighting imposed on the Red Army during Operation Barbarossa. The consequences of this situation that developed in the summer and autumn of 1941 became catastrophic for the KV-2. For example, on July 6, 1941, only 9 of the original 32 KV-2 tanks remained in the 41st Tank Division. Five were destroyed in battle with German troops, 12 were abandoned by their crews due to breakdowns and 5 required major repairs. The use of KV-2 tanks was contrary to their original purpose and intended tactics, as a result they had to fight German infantry and armored vehicles in frontal attacks or serve as a mobile firing point when defending key positions on the battlefield. The main areas of use of the KV-2 were Ukraine (Kiev region), the Baltic states and Belarus. Photo of a KV-2 tank destroyed in battle. Apparently the tank was from the 3rd TD of the 1st MK and was knocked out at the entrance to the city of Ostrov. However, despite everything, the KV-2 performed these tasks very well, presenting German troops unpleasant surprises. Considering that the Wehrmacht units were armed with anti-tank guns of only 37 and 50 mm caliber and tanks with guns of 37, 50 and 75 mm caliber, they had to face an almost invulnerable tank, which delayed and slowed down the advance of even large German units. But it was timing that was the critical moment in German strategy, since reaching Moscow before the onset of winter determined the success of the entire campaign. Although German troops had problems in direct contact with the KV-2, this was compensated for by the German tactics of quick detours, breakthroughs and encirclements used in 1941. As a result, most KV-2 tanks were lost during the retreat due to mechanical failures, rather than in battle. During combat, the Russische Kollloss and its crew often put up fierce resistance. Its destruction was possible only with the involvement of heavy field artillery or in close combat by special assault groups. Very indicative in this regard is the battle with the participation of the KV from the 2nd Tank Division, which took place on June 24-25, 1941 at the turn of the Dubissa River, in the offensive zone of the 6th German Tank Division. On June 25, 1941, the following entry appeared in the combat diary of the 11th Tank Regiment of the 6th Panzer Division: “In the morning, the 2nd battalion of the regiment, together with von Seckendorff’s battle group, moved forward in a column. Throughout the day, the column was attacked several times by units of the Soviet 2nd Panzer Division. As it turned out, Soviet 52-ton tanks are completely insensitive to the fire of our 10.5-cm howitzers. Even several hits from 150-mm shells did not cause any harm to the enemy. However, the attacks of our PzKpfw IV tanks caused heavy losses to the enemy, which allowed our units to advance 3 km east of Dubissa. The bridgehead captured by Kampfgruppe Routh remained behind us. After noon, a reinforced company and the headquarters of the 65th Tank Battalion advanced to the crossroads northeast of Rasseiny. Meanwhile, a Soviet heavy tank blocked the road, cutting off Kampfgruppe Routh from the main forces. During the night it was not possible to destroy the tank. A battery of anti-aircraft 88s moved forward to fight the tank -mm cannons. However, the 88-mm cannons turned out to be no more effective than the 105-mm howitzers. The sappers' attempt to blow up the tank with a landmine also failed." A damaged KV-1 tank, probably from the 2nd Tank Division The Germans are towing a captured KV tank. Lithuania. June 1941 Somewhat earlier, from the direction of Keidan, the Soviet 2nd Tank Division attacked the Germans, with the goal of not only stopping, but also destroying the enemy. A tank battle took place near Raseiniai and above Dubissa, which lasted two days. For the first time, the Germans encountered Soviet KV-1, KV-2 and T-34 tanks, paving the way for the lighter and more numerous T-26 and BT tanks. The crew of the KV-1 tank, who died heroically in June 1941 near the village. Give me... A German tankman from the crew of the PzKpfw IV (1st Tank Regiment of the 1st Tank Division, operating on the left flank of the 6th Panzer Division) spoke about the battle over Dubissa: "The KV-1 and KV-2, which we met for the first time, were very different in appearance. Our companies opened fire from a distance of 800 meters, but to no avail. We got closer, and soon we were separated by 50-100 meters. We shot point-blank, but: our the armor-piercing shells simply ricocheted. We circled around the enemy tanks, firing from a distance of 60-30 meters with special PzGr 40 armor-piercing shells. By sunset, more than 180 vehicles were burning on the battlefield." German soldiers inspect a damaged KV-2 (U-4) tank, probably from the 3rd Mechanized Corps. Lithuania, summer 1941 On the bridgehead occupied by the 6th Panzer Division, they managed to take several dozen prisoners. The commander of the German detachment ordered the prisoners to be escorted to the division headquarters in Rasseiniai. The prisoners were loaded onto a truck, with the village and several guards in the back. But less than an hour later, the truck driver returned and reported that halfway between the river and Rassein, the car had been fired upon by a giant Soviet tank. The truck caught fire. The prisoners, taking advantage of the confusion of the convoy, fled. It seemed that the only road along which the bridgehead was supplied was cut off. Of course, one tank didn’t mean anything, but others could have come up. The night passed peacefully, and reconnaissance sent out in the morning found the tank in the same place. Around noon, the bridgehead received a radiogram from headquarters that twelve trucks with ammunition and food had been sent to them. Soon, several powerful explosions were heard from Rasseiny. It was a Soviet tank that knocked out the first and last vehicle in the column. Cars on fire blocked the road. Within a few minutes, the entire column turned into a pile of flaming rubble. The commander of the 6th Panzer Division, Major General Landgraf, ordered the mysterious tank to be immediately neutralized. The commander of one of the companies of 50 mm anti-tank guns was ordered to approach and burn the tank. Using folds in the terrain, four half-track tractors with anti-tank guns in tow approached the tank and stopped 600 meters from it. The artillerymen rolled out their cannons in their arms. combat positions. The tank stood in the small forest and was silent. The battery commander thought that the crew had abandoned the tank, but still ordered fire on the vehicle. The first three shells hit the target. But the tank was still silent. Just to be sure, let's get a few more hits and we'll be done! - ordered the battery commander. The gunners opened rapid fire, no longer observing any camouflage rules. All the battery's guns were firing. After the eighth hit: the tank returned fire. It was so unexpected that the Germans were simply taken aback. The ground rose like fountains around the unmasked German guns. Smoke obscured the positions, and powerful explosions shook the air. The tank fired three shots in total. When the ground settled and the smoke cleared, the surprised Germans discovered that two of the battery’s guns were simply nowhere to be found, and the rest were disabled. The surviving artillerymen immediately left the battlefield. Since the 50 mm RAK 38 cannons were unable to knock out the Soviet tank, General Landgraf decided to use the 88 mm FLAK 37 anti-aircraft guns. At noon, one 88 mm cannon from the 298th anti-aircraft battalion was delivered to the scene by a half-track tractor. 900 m from the tank, the cannon was unhooked from the tractor and they began to roll it out to the firing position. Suddenly the tank began to deploy the turret. The first 152-mm shell exploded 2 meters from the gun, and with the second shot, the Soviet tank crews smashed the anti-aircraft gun to smithereens. Seeing no way out of this situation, General Landgraf ordered the tank to be simply destroyed with a high-explosive charge. At about one o'clock in the morning, a platoon of sappers from the 57th sapper began to carry out their plans. Half an hour later there was a dull explosion, after which the machine guns immediately started talking. However, the machine guns quickly fell silent. However, the commander of the returning sappers reported that the charge was too weak. The explosion only tore off the tank's track. So three attempts to destroy the KV-2 tank ended in complete failure. "Russische Kollloss" continued to stand in the woods, ready to open fire at any moment. Then it was decided to carry out a diversionary attack and, under its cover, move another 88-mm anti-aircraft gun into a firing position. On the morning of June 25, the KV-2 was attacked by several dozen PzKpfw 35(t) from the 11th Tank Regiment. The German vehicles fanned out and opened hurricane fire, diverting the attention of the Soviet tankers while another 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was brought up from the direction of Rasseiny. Only after the first shot did the tank crew notice the danger. The turret began to turn in the direction of the German gun when the anti-aircraft gunners scored two more hits. Taught by bitter experience, the Germans fired a few more shots, after which silence reigned. When the German soldiers approached the silent tank, they found only two holes in its armor. Five other shells only pierced the armor. The 50mm shells left only eight pockmarks. A landmine, detonated at night, smashed the track, tore off part of the wing and slightly damaged the cannon barrel. A German Pz 35(t) tank destroyed in June 1941 in the vicinity of the city of Raseiniai Despite their power, by the end of 1941 almost all KV-2 tanks were lost. In 1942, there were still a number of these tanks, but their actual number is unknown, mainly due to the fact that in the reports and reports of that time, which can be found in the archives, the calculations did not make a distinction between the KV-2 and the KV-2. One German archival photo shows a KV-2 tank still in service in 1943, but it remains unclear whether this is true or whether the photographer simply made a mistake in dating the photo. Thus, the combat use of the KV-2 was limited only to the first year of the war. After 1941, the KV-2 was no longer assigned any tactical or strategic role. When in 1943, during offensive operations, the need for a heavy breakthrough tank and a means of combating long-term enemy fortifications again arose, the role of the KV-2 was transferred to the SU-152 self-propelled gun, and then the ISU-152. Both were armed with a 152 mm howitzer, but the design of the first was based on the chassis of the KB tank, and the second on the more advanced chassis of the heavy IS tank. Based on materials from the series "War Machines"

The first clashes of the Wehrmacht with KV-2 tanks

pro-tank.ru

2011-05-08T01:44

The first clashes of the Wehrmacht with the KV-2 = "KW-SHOCK" When, in the morning hours of June 22, 1941, the German army launched Plan Barbarossa, an attack on the Soviet Union, Soviet troops were taken by surprise. And although the Red Army was armed with a large number of types armored vehicles, which were completely unknown to the Germans, however, this technical superiority could not compensate for the catastrophic tactical mistakes of the army command. An unexpected fact for the Wehrmacht was not only the large number of Soviet tanks that the German troops had to face, but also their high combat qualities, especially the latest tank designs. Although produced in limited quantities, literally in the last months before the German attack, new types of Soviet tanks - T-34 and KV, were a very serious opponent. Even before the start of Operation Barbarossa, their number and combat characteristics, and in some cases even their very existence, were not discovered by the German military intelligence services. KV-2 tank captured by the Germans About what's new soviet tanks, including the KV-2, turned out to be a surprise for the German command, as evidenced, for example, by an entry in the diary of Colonel General Franz Halder, who wrote on June 24, 1941: “New Russian heavy tanks have appeared on the front of Army Group North, which are most likely armed with an 80 mm gun, or even a 150 mm gun, which, however, is unlikely.” But the very next day, when new updated reports arrived, Halder was forced to agree with reality. He wrote: “Scattered information is being received about new Russian tanks: weight 52 tons, armor front 37 cm (?), sides 8 cm, armament 152 mm cannon and three machine guns, crew 5 people, speed 30 km/h, cruising range 100 km. Capabilities for combat: 50 mm cannons penetrate armor under the turret, 88 mm cannons probably also penetrate side armor (not known for sure)." An excellent example of such complete ignorance is a conversation that took place in early August 1941 between Adolf Hitler and the commander of Panzergruppe 2, General Guderian: Hitler: "If I had known that the data on the number of Russian tanks given in your book ( Guderian "Achtung Panzer", 1937) were true, then I think that I (perhaps) would never have started this war." Guderian in his book estimated the number of Soviet tanks at 10,000, which caused a sharp reaction from German censors. However, it turned out that Guderian's estimates were even too low. On August 6, 1941, the command of the German army officially announced that the total number of destroyed Soviet tanks was 13,145. This figure seems to be true, given that between 1933 and 1941 the USSR built more than 30,000 armored vehicles of all types (including armored cars). Approximately 20,000 of this number were light tanks, while the number of heavy tanks was only 1,800, including the latest types. This number seems relatively small compared to the production of tanks in the USSR (for example, T-26 light tanks), but compared to the tank fleet of other European armies it is quite significant. Quite recent Russian sources provide the following data on the composition of the Red Army on June 1, 1941: personnel - 5,224,066; field artillery - 48,647; mortars - 53,117; anti-aircraft guns - 8,680; tanks and other armored vehicles - 25,932; trucks - 193,218; tractors and tractors - 42,931; horses - 498,493. The German High Command quickly realized the danger of the situation. The fight against the new T-34 and KB tanks required huge efforts and led to heavy losses. Therefore, just a month after the outbreak of hostilities, the army information leaflet "D 343 Merkblatt fur die Bekampfung der russischen Panzerkampfwagen" was issued to instruct German soldiers on methods of fighting Soviet tanks. We can say that it was a symbol of shock from the collision with the T-34 and KV. By the way, it is interesting that when faced with KV-2 tanks, the Germans initially believed that the KV-2 tank of the 1939 model is a later version of the vehicle, and accordingly assigned it the index KW-IIB, i.e. an improved version compared to the 1940 model, which received the KW-IIA index. Despite the fact that most KV-2 tanks were lost not in battle, but due to mechanical failures, as a result of which they had to be abandoned due to the impossibility of repair and restoration, the German offensive was significantly slowed down. Sometimes only one single KV-2, occupying a key position on the front line and supported by infantry, was able to stop the enemy advance. The powerful armor of this tank and the weakness of German anti-tank weapons of that time made it possible to delay even large units for many hours or even days. Some KV-2s withstood up to 20 direct hits before being destroyed by 88mm anti-aircraft guns acting as anti-tank guns or calling in Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers to attack. Another way to fight the "Russischer Koloss" was to attack with infantry and conduct close combat, which usually involved heavy losses. Heavy field artillery could also play a role in solving the "KV-2 Problem". However, only 10 cm Kanone 18, lFH 10.5 cm and sFH 15 cm had a limited number of anti-tank shells in their ammunition for direct fire. Other field guns had to rely mostly on luck in trying to achieve a direct hit when firing the KV-2 along ballistic trajectories. The main German tanks of that period, which were at the forefront of the offensive, were rarely used to combat the KV-2. They were too poorly armed to effectively fight the Soviet heavy tank: PzKpfW III had a 3.7 cm KWK gun; PzKpfW III - 5 cm KWK L/42; PzKpfW IV -7.5 cm KWK L/24; PzKpfW 38 (t) - 3.7 cm; PzKpfW 35 (t) - 3.7 cm. Despite the fact that the number of KV-2 tanks in the first months of hostilities remained relatively small and many of them were lost without effort on the part of the enemy, in the technical aspect its influence can hardly be overestimated. The consequence of the "T-34, KW Shock" for the Wehrmacht was the adoption of significantly better armed and armored PzKpfW tanks VI "Tiger" in 1942 and PzKpfW V "Panther" in 1943. KV-2 training models for training Wehrmacht soldiers After the Wehrmacht encountered medium and heavy Soviet tanks in the first days of the Barbarossa plan, the German command took urgent measures to effectively prepare its troops to fight this new unexpected enemy. The German infantry and panzergrenadier units quickly adopted a new training program that was adequate to the current situation. Using a large number of different models to train soldiers since the early 1930s, German units also built their own wooden models of Soviet tanks on a 1:1 scale. They were often extremely detailed and precisely executed. High level And good quality mock-up work, made it possible to create models of a combat vehicle corresponding to a real tank not only in size, but also to reproduce on it various angles of inclination of armor protection sheets, for training in the use of magnetic anti-tank mines, handrails and steps for climbing onto the tank, the location of hatches and viewing devices , firing angles, not only the main weapons, but also machine guns. Training mock-ups of tanks were often mounted on four-wheeled chassis so that they could simulate their movement at the actual speed of tanks. Although most of these training mock-ups were built to imitate the average Soviet T-34 tank, some other much less common types of armored vehicles were also reproduced. Currently, the existence of only one wooden KB-2 can be documented. Capabilities of German anti-tank guns in the fight against the KV-2 The armament and tactics of the German Wehrmacht in 1939 were fully consistent with the tactics adopted by the German command for extremely mobile military operations during the Blitzkrieg. Particular attention was paid to quick breakthroughs over significant distances, bypassing enemy resistance centers. Despite the available information that the enemy, in particular the French armed forces, has heavy tanks of the Char B1 type, the German command believed that their use in battle would be compensated by the tactical advantages obtained through the close interaction of the ground forces with Luftwaffe units. At the same time, special hopes were placed on the Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers, which were supposed to provide direct support to the advancing troops. In accordance with these provisions, the Wehrmacht anti-tank units were armed mainly with two types of anti-tank guns: the 3.7cm RAK 35/36 cannon of 37mm caliber and the 5cm RAK 38 cannon of 50mm caliber. The 50 mm anti-tank gun RAK 38 L/60 entered service with the Wehrmacht at the end of 1940 to replace the 37 mm anti-tank gun On June 22, 1941, with the start of Operation Barbarossa, the situation on the front line changed significantly for German soldiers. Firstly, the number of Soviet tanks that took part in the hostilities turned out to be significantly greater than expected, and secondly, the new tanks of the T-34 and KB type were well armored. In order to effectively fight against these unexpected enemies, the crews of the 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns, due to their weak armor penetration, had to allow Soviet tanks to close distances - up to 30 meters. Such tactics were possible, but extremely dangerous and led to heavy losses. Schemes for conducting effective fire on the KV-2 from the 88 mm L/56 tank gun. A 1942 instruction sheet for German Tiger tank crews dating back to 1942. An even more difficult opponent was the KV-2, with its armor thickness reaching 75 mm at the front of the hull and 110 mm at the front of the turret. 37 mm and 50 mm German armor-piercing shells bounced off it without any visible effect, even when fired from very close distances. Their use was completely ineffective, except for those cases when the gunners managed to damage the tracks or jam the KV-2 turret. The Soviet concept of a "mobile fire bunker" turned out to be quite effective, although in a slightly different aspect than originally planned. The only German weapon capable of fighting the KB-2 at long distances was the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun, which in this case was used to fire at ground targets. The excellent characteristics of this weapon often saved the situation when it was used as an emergency measure in critical combat situations that arose on the front line. The development of the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun began in 1928. By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, a more advanced modification of this gun was in service - Model 36, which replaced the older one - Model 18 Given the negative combat experience with the use of 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns in the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht immediately made efforts to develop new, more powerful weapons, which ultimately culminated in the creation of the 7.5 cm RAK 40 (75 mm anti-tank gun), 8.8 cm RAK 43/41 (88 mm anti-tank gun) and 12.8 cm RAK K.44 (128 mm anti-tank gun). Although these guns were adopted too late to fight against the KV-2, they later fought quite successfully against a number of other Soviet tanks, the successors to the KV.