The influential British publication “The Independent” believes that the civil war in Syria has ethno-religious roots going back 1,400 years, that is, since the death of the Prophet Muhammad. To confirm its message, the newspaper conducts historical excursion, and based on it, points to the long-hidden and now emerging antagonism between the ruling elite of Syria, belonging to the small Shiite Alawite community, and the Sunnis who make up the majority of the country’s population.

This conflict, according to editorial scholars of the East and Islam, is the main source of violence and tension within the Muslim world, ranging from Iraq and Egypt to Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is based on a long-standing and irreconcilable enmity between the two main Muslim religious movements.

The newspaper writes that the leading expert on Muslim politics in Great Britain, Baroness Warsi, spoke about this on February 18 in her speech in one of the strategically important countries of the Persian Gulf - Oman. She emphasized that the religious tolerance present in Oman can serve good example for other Muslim countries.

However, “The Independent” notes that in Oman, unlike other Muslim countries, along with two main movements - Shiism and Sunnism - there is a third sect - the Ibadis, who make up the majority and occupy a dominant position. In other countries where there are conflict processes, Shiites and Sunnis are in a balanced state. Of the one and a half million Muslims, approximately 10-20% are Shiites and in many countries they are a minority. However, in Iraq, Iran, Bahrain and Azerbaijan, the Shiites have an advantage.

Today, the confrontation between these two currents is becoming a fundamental factor in determining future fate countries of the Middle East. Supporters of both movements from many countries are fighting in Syria. Their civil war involves Al-Qaeda jihadists and Sunni volunteers on one side, and Hizbullah militants on the other.

Syria is an exceptional situation, with a Sunni majority ruled by a Shia minority. President Bashar al-Assad himself and most of his army officers belong to the Shiite Alawite community. A similar situation occurred in Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein. However, there the Sunni minority ruled over the Shia majority. After the US military intervention, the situation there changed, the leadership of the country passed into the hands of the Shiites, which further aggravated the situation and led to chaos.

It should be noted that the contradictions between the two movements of Islam are deeper than between Catholics and Protestants. At the time of the conflict, Christianity already had a 1,500-year history, and contradictions in Islam began immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, at the beginning of the 7th century.

Over the years, the split deepened even more, although both sides referred to the Holy Quran. There was an ambiguous, different attitude towards the hadiths written by the followers of the Prophet and Islamic traditions. Soon the rules of prayer began to be interpreted differently. A hierarchy of imams and ayatullahs appeared in Shiism, while the Sunnis refused to recognize intermediaries between themselves and Allah. The result was the emergence of extremist fanatics such as members of Al-Qaeda. The Sunnis advocated state control over their supporters.

Various sub-currents appeared in Shiism, including fanatics, and in Syria - Alawites and Ismailis. Many mystical Sufi movements were able to create bridges between Sunnis and Shiites, but irreconcilable Sunnis considered the visit to be Shiites sacred places blasphemy, which is why Sunni extremists bombed the sacred land of Shiites in Iraq - Karbala.

At the same time, for 1400 years after the death of the Prophet, most Shiites and Sunnis did not want the conflict to deepen. Although many Sunnis cursed the Shiites in their prayers, during for long years these two currents preferred peaceful coexistence. However, conflicts accompanied by violence periodically broke out, as a result of which the Shiites were brutally exterminated. So, in 1514 Ottoman Sultan gave the order to exterminate 40 thousand Shiites, in India the Mughal Empire in XV-XIX centuries periodically persecuted the Shiites and destroyed their shrines; there were also clashes in Pakistan involving members of these movements.

At the same time, there were countries where a truce was observed. In 1959, in Cairo, which is considered the center of the Sunni ulema, Shiism even began to be taught at Al-Azhar University, and in some mosques in Azerbaijan, Shiites and Sunnis perform namaz prayer together.

However, at the beginning of the 20th century the royal family Saudi Arabia pursued a policy of discrimination against officials, adhering to Shiism, and destroyed most of their shrines. With the strengthening of the position of Wahhabism there, strict sanctions began to be applied to adherents of Shiism, including the arrest of their leaders. To this day, many Saudi religious leaders consider Shiism “worse than Christianity and Judaism” and “blasphemy.” Even Al-Qaeda fanatics were raised on the ideology of Wahhabism. Many of them believe in killing Shiites.

Over the years, outside forces have tried to exploit this confrontation between the two sects of Islam for their own purposes. In the 1920s, British colonists in Iraq used the Sunni officer elite to suppress Shia uprisings, thereby opening the way for the rule of Saddam's Sunni minority. The result of this policy was the extermination of many thousands of Shiites, which continues to this day. Last year alone, more than 6 thousand Shiites and Sunnis combined were killed in Baghdad. And now this brutal sectarian war is being waged in Syria.

IN last period Two major events occurred in the world that increased tensions between Shiites and Sunnis. One of them is the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, as a result of which the pro-Western Shah Reza Pahlavi was overthrown, and power passed to the Shiite theocracy led by Ayatollah Khomeini. And although he did everything possible to improve relations between Shiites and Sunnis in his country, between Islamic leaders and the heads of Islamic states remained difficult relationship. From the very beginning of his reign, Khomeini called Saudi Arabia's Sunni aristocracy "servants of America" ​​and "corrupt dictators."

And today in Iran there are no mosques for millions of Sunnis, although Christian churches function. There is no place for Sunnis in the highest echelons of power, it is difficult for Sunni businessmen to obtain licenses to carry out export and import transactions, and most ordinary Sunnis are unemployed.

But in Saudi Arabia the situation is exactly the opposite - Shiites are subject to discrimination there.

The leaders of Islamic countries, whose leadership includes representatives of various movements, periodically make attempts to improve relations and want to show that the tension is not of a religious nature. In 2007, King Abdullah warmly welcomed Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and tried to convince the world that relations between the countries had improved, even criticizing those who promote hostility between Shiites and Sunnis. However, the actual policy has not changed. Each of the two oil giants continues to see the other as a danger to its interests.

The confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites was further deepened by the war in Iraq launched in 2003 by George Bush and Tony Blair, as a result of which the Sunni elite and the power of Saddam Hussein were overthrown, and the new government, the majority of which were Shiites, contributed to the flourishing of state terror. It should be recalled here that it was the United States that incited Saddam to war with Iran in the 80s.

Only after the events of September 11, 2001, the United States changed its attitude towards Saddam Hussein, overthrew him and brought democracy to Iraq. As a result of the elections, the Shiites came to power and began to discriminate against the Sunnis, who responded by choosing the method of terror, as a result of which thousands of ordinary people die every year.

And now this hostility has spread to Syria. In 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring, protests in Syria were anti-corruption, anti-clan in nature. People demanded democracy, respect for rights and freedoms. However, in two years protest movement developed into an armed confrontation, the political opposition, supported by the West, began to lose its position in front of Islamic radicals. Today, radicals from many countries around the world are fighting as part of a group called the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, but they are financed by Saudi Arabia.

And recently Hezbollah militants arrived in Syria from Lebanon, fighting on Assad’s side. The result is a full-scale civil war.

All this suggests that Sunnis and Shiites from all countries are embroiled in conflict throughout the Middle East. Each side strengthens its position opposite side sees this as a threat to itself, and the Sunni-Shiite confrontation has already become a source of tension that endangers the whole world.

The Muslim Ummah has been divided into many different currents and directions for 1,400 years. And this despite the fact that in the Holy Quran the Almighty tells us:

“Hold onto the rope of Allah and do not be separated” (3:103)

The Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) warned about the division of the Muslim community, saying that the ummah would be divided into 73 movements.

In the modern Muslim world, we can distinguish two of the largest and most influential directions of Islam that were formed after the death of the Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.) - Sunnis and Shiites.

History of the schism

The death of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) raised the question of a possible successor to the Muslim ummah as the ruler of a Muslim state, as well as the spiritual leader of believers. The majority of Muslims supported the candidacy of the closest companion of the Messenger of Allah (s.g.w.) - (r.a.), who was one of the first to accept Islam and was a companion of the Messenger of Allah (s.g.w.) throughout his prophetic mission. In addition, during the life of Muhammad (s.g.w.), Abu Bakr replaced him as an imam at collective prayers when he was not well.

However, a small part of the believers saw his son-in-law and cousin Ali ibn Abu Talib (ra) as the successor of the Final Prophet (s.a.w.). In their opinion, Ali, who grew up in the house of the Prophet (s.a.w.) and was his relative, has more rights to become their ruler than Abu Bakr.

Subsequently, that part of the believers who came out in support of Abu Bakr began to be called Sunnis, and those who supported Ali - Shiites. As you know, Abu Bakr was chosen as the successor of the Messenger of God (s.g.w.), who became the first righteous caliph in the history of Islam.

Features of Sunnism

Sunnis (full name - Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jama'a - “People of the Sunnah and Community Harmony”) are the largest and most influential movement in the Islamic world. The term comes from the Arabic “sunnah”, denoting the biography of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.), and means following the path God's Messenger(s.g.v.). That is, the main sources of knowledge for Sunni Muslims are the Koran and the Sunnah.

Currently, Sunnis make up about 90% of Muslims and live in most countries of the world.

In Sunni Islam, there are many different theological and legal schools, the largest of which are 4 madhhabs: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. In general, the Sunni madhhabs do not contradict each other, since the founders of these legal schools lived at approximately the same time and were students and teachers of each other, and therefore the Sunni madhhabs rather complement each other.

There are some minor disagreements between madhhabs on certain issues, which are related to the specifics of each legal school. In particular, these disagreements can be examined using the example of the permissibility of eating the meat of certain animals from the point of view of various Sunni legal schools. For example, eating horse meat, according to the Hanafi madhhab, belongs to the category of undesirable actions (makrooh), according to the Maliki madhhab - forbidden acts (haram), and according to the Shafi'i and Hanbali madhhabs, this meat is permitted (halal).

Features of Shiism

Shiism is an Islamic movement in which, together with their descendants, they are recognized as the only legitimate successors of the Messenger of Allah Muhammad (s.w.). The term “Shiite” itself comes from the Arabic word “shi`a” (translated as “followers”). This group of Muslims consider themselves followers of Imam Ali (r.a.) and his righteous descendants.

Now the number of Shiites is estimated at approximately 10% of all Muslims in the world. Shiite communities operate in most states, and in some of them they constitute an absolute majority. These countries include: Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain. In addition, quite large Shiite communities live in Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.

Within Shiism today there are many trends, the largest of which are: Jafarism, Ismailism, Alawism and Zaydism. Relations between their representatives cannot always be called close, since on some issues they take opposing positions. The main point of disagreement between Shiite movements is the issue of recognizing certain descendants of Ali ibn Abu Talib (ra) as immaculate imams. In particular, the Jafarites (Twelver Shiites) recognize 12 righteous imams, the final one of which is Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, according to Jafarite teaching, who went into “concealment” as a child. In the future, Imam Mahdi will have to fulfill the role of the Messiah. The Ismailis, in turn, recognize only seven imams, since this part of the Shiites recognizes the imamate of the first six imams, like the Jafarites, and they recognized the seventh imam as the eldest son of the sixth imam, Jafar al-Sadiq, Imam Ismail, who died before his father. Ismailis believe that it was the seventh Imam Ismail who went into hiding and that he will become the Messiah in the future. The situation is similar with the Zaydis, who recognize only five righteous imams, the final of which is Zeid ibn Ali.

Main differences between Sunnis and Shiites

1. The principle of power and continuity

Sunnis believe that Muslims who have the necessary level of knowledge and unquestioned authority in the Muslim environment have the right to be the ruler of the faithful and their spiritual mentor. In turn, from the point of view of the Shiites, only the direct descendants of Muhammad (s.g.w.) have such a right. In this regard, the legitimacy of the rise to power of the first three righteous caliphs - Abu Bakr (r.a.), Umar (r.a.) and Uthman (r.a.), recognized along with Ali (r.a.) is not recognized with them .), in the Sunni world. For Shiites, only the authority of immaculate imams, who, in their opinion, are sinless, is authoritative.

2. The special role of Imam Ali (r.a.)

Sunnis revere the Prophet Muhammad (s.g.w.) as the Messenger of the Almighty (s.g.w.), sent by the Lord as a mercy for the worlds. Shiites, along with Muhammad (s.g.w.), equally reverence Imam Ali ibn Abu Talib (r.a.). When pronouncing the azan - the call to prayer - Shiites even pronounce his name, indicating that Ali is a ruler from the Almighty. In addition, some extreme Shiite movements even recognize this companion as an incarnation of a deity.

3. Approach to considering the Sunnah of the Prophet (s.a.w.)

Sunnis recognize the authenticity of those hadiths of the Prophet (s.a.w.) contained in 6 collections: Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmidhi, Abu Daud, Nasai, Ibn Majah. For Shiites, such an indisputable source is the hadiths from the so-called “Quadrateuch”. That is, those hadiths that were transmitted by representatives of the family of the Prophet (s.g.w.). For Sunnis, the criterion for the reliability of hadiths is the compliance of the chain of transmitters with the requirements of honesty and truthfulness.

The main event of last year for believers in Azerbaijan was the approval by deputies of the national parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan of a draft banning Islamic propaganda in the country. The forerunner of the event was the introduction of a similar ban, but this time on receiving religious education abroad.

From now on, sending citizens from Azerbaijan to study in foreign religious educational establishments will be considered illegal if this is not agreed upon with the relevant executive authority. What threat is Azerbaijan so afraid of if it introduces such harsh laws in response to it?

And he is afraid of a rapid Islamic revival in the country. On the one hand, the country is experiencing a revival of Shiite Islam. A terrible dream for Baku is if this process takes over neighboring Iran. At the same time, Sunni Islam is rapidly reviving in Azerbaijan.

About 30% of Azerbaijani Muslims are Sunnis, large Sunni communities are represented by Lezgins, Avars, Tsakhurs and other peoples of Dagestan, as well as Chechens. The Azerbaijani leadership is very afraid of the formation of a new opposition force based on the reviving Sunni activity, aimed at leaving the jurisdiction of Baku.

Against this background, the Baku authorities found nothing better than to stage a very dangerous provocation against the Sunni and Shiite communities of the republic exactly 2 years ago. It could lead to a very deep split among the believers of Azerbaijan. And at the center of all this provocation was the Lezgi architectural monument “Lezgi Mosque”.

However, despite the name, the mosque is visited not only by Lezgins, but also by other Sunnis living in Azerbaijan - Avars, Chechens, who make up numerous diasporas in the country, as well as ethnic Azerbaijanis professing Sunnism. Thus, “Lezgi Mosque” is one of the few pan-Sunni centers in Baku and all of Azerbaijan.

However, 2 years ago, the life of the Sunni community at the historical mosque was overshadowed by the authorities’ attempts to liquidate the community itself and stop its religious and educational activities.

Similar pressure attempts were made against the Sunni Abu Bakr mosque and other Sunni communities in the suburbs of Gobustan, Alyat, and Mushfigabad. The Sunni mosques “Abu Bakr” and “Shehidlyar” were already closed by that time.

We also note that in recent years, cases of closure or demolition of mosques have become more frequent in Azerbaijan. In 2009 it was noted whole line such cases. Then in Baku, after the closure of the Shehidlyar mosque on the Alley of Martyrs, the mosque in the Yasamal district was demolished the next day.

In the same year, the mosque on Neftyanye Kamni (a town on stilts in the Caspian Sea) was closed, and a few days later it was destroyed. In the same year, the Ilahiyat mosque was closed in the Yasamal district of Baku.

As for the “Lezgi Mosque”, in all scandalous story around her, behind the scenes of obvious facts, one could discern a growing confrontation between the two branches of the ummah in the Caucasus - Sunnis and Shiites.

Without a doubt, inciting contradictions between Shiites and Sunnis, pitting these two communities against each other is part of global strategy, implemented in the Islamic world by the hawks of the Atlantic bloc, together with their Zionist allies in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, many Sunni websites talk about the efforts of Azerbaijani clerics to forcibly instill Shiism among the Sunni Lezgins and Avars in the regions of Azerbaijan bordering Russia, they talk about the oppression of Sunnis by the authorities, etc.

Even if these reports are not so close to the truth, behind them there are still numerous miscalculations of the Azerbaijani authorities. And all these facts and even speculation simultaneously sow the seeds of a possible future intra-Islamic confrontation in Azerbaijan.

It is clear that ambitions to Shiize everything spiritual space Azerbaijan could not have come at a more opportune time in line with these interests and this destructive strategy. But, of course, those who are driven by the impulse to ban, close and block any Sunni activity in the republic, most likely, do not think about what a gift their clumsy actions are to the enemies of the ummah.

This policy is the best gift to all anti-Azerbaijani forces that can use the topic of oppression of the Sunni minority in their information war against this Transcaucasian republic. In addition, in the event of an escalation of the Shiite-Sunni confrontation, this conflict will affect not only the image, but also the integrity of Azerbaijan itself.

The bulk of them live in Iran (more than 75 million, over 80% of the total population, while Sunnis in Iran are 18%), Iraq (more than 20 million), and Azerbaijan (about 10 million). In these three countries, Shiites dominate numerically, culturally and politically.

In a number Arab countries(Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc.) there are numerous Shiite minorities. Shiites inhabit the central, mountainous part of Afghanistan (Hazaras and others - about 4 million) and some areas of Pakistan. There are Shiite communities in India, although there are many more Sunnis here. In the south of India, “black Shiites” live among Hindus.

In the Pamir Mountains (in the Tajik and Afghan parts of the historical region of Badakhshan, in the Sarykol region in the far west of China), several small nations profess Ismailism-Nizarism, a type of Shiism. There are quite a few Nizari Ismailis in Yemen (here, as well as in India, there is another type of Ismailism - Mustalism). The center of Ismaili-Nizarism is located in Mumbai, India, in the Red Palace of their spiritual leader Aga Khan.

Another variety of Ismailism is common in Syria. The most important ethno-confessional group of Shiites in Syria are the Alawites, the peasantry of the mountainous northwestern region. The Shiites also include the Druze - a very distinctive ethno-confessional group inhabiting the Shuf region in Mount Lebanon, the Hauran highlands on the border of Syria and Israel, the mountainous region of Jebel Druz in southeastern Syria and groups of villages along the routes connecting these three regions.

In Turkey, in addition to the majority of Sunni Turks and Sunni Kurds, there are Shiite Turks (a very unique ethnographic community) and Shiite Kurds (some tribes), as well as Alawite Arabs.

In Russia, almost all Shiites are Azerbaijanis and Tats; Of these, only the residents of Derbent in the south of Dagestan and some surrounding villages (including one large Lezgin aul) are the indigenous population.

In the Arab Mashreq (in the East), apart from Iraq, Shiites form a majority only in the small island state of Bahrain, but Sunnis are in power here. In North Yemen, Zaydi Shiites are much more numerous than Sunnis.

Are Shiites the oppressed?

The culture of the Shia part of the ummah is in many ways different from the Sunni one. Its central elements are the especially strict mourning of Ashura on the day of remembrance of Imam Hussein, who died a martyr in 680, a number of other holidays (birthdays and deaths of the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, imams - spiritual leaders and descendants of Caliph Ali), pilgrimages in a row holy cities, a curse on the widow of the prophet Aisha and the caliphs who ruled after Ali.

Shiites (except for the clergy) must observe the rule of taqiyya - hiding, if necessary, their faith among people of other faiths, especially Sunnis. Only the Zaydis - a Shiite sect in Yemen (including the Houthis) - do not recognize taqiyya.

Everywhere except Iran and Azerbaijan, Shiites have been poorer and more humiliated than their Sunni neighbors for centuries. The only exception is the urban Nizari Ismailis - subjects of the Aga Khan, one of richest people in the world. But the Nizari Ismailis of villages and small towns in Syria, Oman, the Pamir mountains, as well as the Mustalit Ismailis of Yemen, Gujarat and Mumbai (in India, where they live next to the rich Nizari Ismailis) are poor.

In Iraq, the Shiites were poorer than the Sunnis; in Lebanon, the Shiite peasants of the Bekaa Valley were the poorest and most numerous in the country in the middle of the 20th century; in Syria, the Alawites were very poor mountaineer peasants until the second half of the 20th century; in Yemen, the Zaidi mountaineers were much poorer Sunnis, in Afghanistan, the Shiite Hazaras (Mongols who had lost their language) were poorer than all their neighbors, and in southern India the “black Shiites” were the poorest of all Muslims in the region.

In recent decades, in various countries (Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, etc.), Shiites are seeking - including with arms in their hands - power and wealth, which they enjoy (or enjoyed in the recent past ) Sunnis (and in Lebanon - Christians).

In all the countries mentioned above, except Iran (where the Shiites are a single multi-ethnic group) and Azerbaijan, the Shiites constitute ethno-confessional groups with the same clear cultural and political self-identification as in Europe - national identification. This phenomenon is historical, rooted in extreme antiquity and enshrined in the mass consciousness by the orders of the Ottoman and other Muslim empires.

The main cult centers of Shiism are located in Arab world- except for Mecca and Medina, common to all Muslims - in Iraq; The main ritual language of Shiites, like all Muslims, is Arabic, not Farsi. But for the Iranian and non-Iranian peoples of the vast region within the Islamic civilization, which includes Iran, Kurdistan, Tajikistan, part of Uzbekistan (with the cities of Bukhara, Samarkand, etc.), Afghanistan, part of Pakistan (west of the Indus Valley), Farsi is a highly developed language Persian culture.

The Shiite Arabs who inhabit the Khuzistan region of Iran and some others are more strongly influenced by Persian culture than other Arabs. All this facilitates the spread of many of its elements, including those related to the sphere of cult, among fellow Shiites in Arab countries. Moreover, this process affects not only the Imamis, but also the Ismailis, Alawites, Zaydis, Shia Kurds to the west of the borders of Iran. In recent years, among the Zaidi Houthis of Yemen, as eyewitnesses say, a pan-Shiite (as in Iraq and Iran) version of Ashura mourning, previously unknown here, has been spreading.

Perhaps this is one of the signs of cultural and political integration of various Shiite communities in Arab countries?

Knots of contradictions

In Iraq, the confrontation between the Sunnis of the North and the more numerous Shiites of the South is the main dominant feature of political life. The situation is similar in Bahrain. The indigenous Baharina Arabs, the Imamites (the main branch of Shiism), make up the majority. Arab Sunni minorities, descendants of settlers from the mainland, from Saudi Arabia: Wahhabis are the ruling minority and Sunnis of the Shafi'i and Maliki madhhabs are the other two minorities, with all Sunni Arabs belonging to certain tribes.

In Kuwait, the indigenous Arab Shiite minority, once unprivileged, now, like the Sunni majority, enjoys many advantages over the numerous foreigners. In Syria there are four Shia ethno-confessional groups of Arabs (ruling Alawites, Imami Mutawali, Ismaili Nizari and Druze), two each in Lebanon (Mutawali and Druze), Yemen (Zaydis and Ismaili Mustalis), Saudi Arabia (Imamits and Zaydis, and also foreigners).

In Lebanon, the ratio of the size and influence of ethno-confessional groups changed significantly after it was enshrined in the constitutional acts of first the autonomy in the 1930s and 1940s, and since 1946 - the independent republic. Small state Greater Lebanon was created by France after the First World War as a mandate territory. Greater Lebanon was formed from several regions Ottoman Empire with different ethnic and religious composition.

The core of the state was Mount Lebanon, which consisted of the Land of the Maronites (historically, a vassal emirate, headed by the noble Arab family of al-Sheibani, who was secretly baptized, but was officially considered Sunni). The Maronite Church once entered into a union with the Roman Church. Adjacent to the Maronite land is the Chouf region, where the Maronites live together with the Druze - a very unique syncretic community, headed for centuries by the feudal Jumblatt family. From here the Druze migrated to the rain-watered mountain oases of southern Syria: Hauran, Jebel Druz, etc. The Maronites and Druze were mountain warrior-farmers, whose independence all rulers of the region had to reckon with.

To Mount Lebanon, where Christians made up the vast majority of the population, French politicians annexed the coastal lowland adjacent to it, river valleys and foothills. Here, in towns and villages, Sunni Muslims (the relative majority), Christians of different Churches (primarily Orthodox and Uniate Catholics), Druze in the South, and Alawites in the North lived in stripes or in separate neighborhoods. The Shia Mutawali lived compactly in the southeast. They were the poorest of all, their level of education was lower than other ethno-confessional groups, and their rural housing was especially archaic. In the 20-40s of the twentieth century, Sunnis showed all-Syrian patriotism, and Maronites and partly other Christians, as well as Druze (not all) were supporters of an independent Lebanon.

In 1926, Greater Lebanon was renamed the Lebanese Republic, political system which formally copied the French Republic. But in reality it was based on an agreement between influential clans that headed the main ethno-confessional groups. The first president of the Lebanese Republic was a Christian, Charles Debbas (Orthodox), but since 1934 all presidents have been elected from among the Maronites. Since 1937, prime ministers have been appointed only from Sunni Muslims. Other ethno-confessional groups were represented in parliament and other government bodies in proportion to their numbers and influence. They created their own political and other organizations (for example, the Druze became social democrats) under the leadership of traditional hereditary leaders.

This system has evolved under the influence of internal and external factors. In the first decades of the existence of the Lebanese Republic, there were slightly more Christians than Muslims, and the Druze were incomparably more influential than the Mutawali Shiites. Over time, the relative numbers and political and economic influence of the Maronites, other Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Armenians, and Druze declined. But the Mutawali Shiites, who in the early 1930s made up 17-18% of the Lebanese population and almost did not live in cities, sharply increased in strength. Poverty and low level education was combined among the Mutawali with large families, as a result their numbers grew faster than those of other groups, and they populated the cities.

Like other groups, the Lebanese Mutawali emigrated to South America and West Africa, where they engaged in trade, grew rich, and supported their relatives in Lebanon. The emigration of Christian groups began much earlier, heading to different countries and regions of the world (France, USA, Latin America, etc.) and having similar consequences. But Christians, Druze and Sunnis, who had long lived in cities, owned estates and received the best education, large families were replaced by small children.

Maronites and other Christian groups were losing their influence, while Muslim groups were gaining strength. Accordingly, the Maronite president gradually ceded his first role to the Sunni prime minister. As the number and political role of Christians decreased, their confrontation with Muslims receded into the background compared to the contradictions between Muslims - Sunnis and Shiites.

Not only Christians and Druze, who had long cast their lot in with the West, but also the Mutawali and Alawites armed themselves - with the help of their coreligionist Iran. Like the Druze, they created their own political and other organizations; The radical Shiite organization Hezbollah (Party of Allah), armed and supported by Iran, was especially active. Like some other Arab militant organizations, it used terrorist actions against its opponents - Sunnis, Christians and Israel.

After the creation of the State of Israel (1947) and the Arab-Israeli wars (1947-1973), Palestinian refugees, mostly Sunnis, poured into Lebanon, becoming a numerically significant and politically influential part of the population. Syria, Iran, Israel and the great powers (including the USSR, France and the USA) had a variety of influences on Lebanon, including the invasion of troops, the arming of local and Palestinian militias (the Christian Army of South Lebanon, etc., the Shiite Hezbollah, etc. .) As a result, Lebanon was rocked by civil war from 1975 to 1990, in which Hezbollah fought against Christian and Sunni militias.

Sunnis remained a relative majority, but among them, all-Syrian patriotism and political orientation towards Syria gave way to distancing from the Syrian authorities, whom they considered the patrons of Shiites and Christians. Today, Sunnis are the dominant group in Lebanon. The end of the civil war gradually weakened the confrontation between ethno-confessional groups and transferred them to the socio-political sphere, but the events of recent years in Syria and Iraq have once again intensified the rivalry between them. The Mutawali Shiites continue to grow in numbers and establish themselves in different areas life and challenge the power of the Sunnis.

After the First World War, France, establishing a mandate territory regime in Syria, encountered patriotic resistance from some Sunnis. In contrast, the French tried to rely on Christian and Shiite ethno-confessional groups.

Some of the Alawites who inhabited the mountainous region between Lebanon and the lower reaches of the Nahr al-Kalb River received territorial autonomy (Alawite State, L’Etat des Alaouyes); the French granted the same autonomy to the easternmost of mountain areas, where the Druze lived - Jebel Druz. In addition, they returned to Turkey the northwestern border region of Hatay (as the Turks called it) with the ancient cities of Antioch and Alexandretta, although all together the Arab communities (including Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, etc.) were more numerous here than the Turks and others ( Kurds, Yezidis, etc.) combined. At the same time, part of the Mutawali Shiites moved to Iraq.

It is paradoxical that the creation political parties formally modern type gave new impetus to the delimitation of ethno-confessional groups. This can be seen in the evolution of the Baath Party in Syria and Iraq.

United United Arab Emirates(UAE) is the youngest of the Arab countries. About a century ago, there was a conglomerate of alliances of Bedouin tribes and principalities (emirates) of the Pirate Coast - a buffer zone between Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and the Ibadi (Kharijite) Imamate of Oman (and the Muscat Sultanate). Having established a protectorate over the Muscat Sultanate and Qatar, the British also made a group of principalities, which they called Treaty Oman, their protectorate. The vast majority of the local population were Sunni Arabs; Only on the border with mountainous Oman did some branches of local tribes profess Ibadism, and on the seashores Shia Baharina lived in separate fishing villages. Now those Baharina who have UAE citizenship enjoy all the benefits of citizens, receive education, enter public service etc. But many Baharina are foreigners.

In the Bahrain archipelago itself, the Shiite majority is fighting for equal rights. It is associated with the Baharina in other Gulf countries and with Iran, as well as with the Shiite majority Arabs of Iraq. In eastern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Shia minority (mainland Baharina) are in opposition to the dominant Sunnis. Other Shiite Arabs in the UAE are Iraqis. But the majority of Shiites here are Iranians, some Indians and Pakistanis. In cities they form communities, have their own schools (with education in Farsi, Gujarati and other languages), even branches of universities in their homeland.

In Yemen, Shiism in its Zaydi form throughout the 10th-11th centuries was distinguished by relative religious tolerance, but intransigence towards foreign domination. In 1538 and subsequent years, the Turks tried to conquer Yemen, but the areas inhabited by the Zaydis did not submit to them. Zaydis and Sunnis united in the fight against the invaders, and after a hundred years of domination Turkish troops left Yemen. Following this, the Zaydi imam al-Mutawakkil Ali Ismail extended his power to Aden and a number of Sunni sultanates, and in 1658 to Hadhramaut. Even in early XVII centuries, the Sultan of Hadhramaut was a follower of Zaydism. But at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 17th centuries, Yemen was again divided into a predominantly Zaydi North and a union of Sunni possessions of South Yemen.

In the 19th century, the entire Arabian Peninsula was divided into spheres of domination by the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. The first went to Northern Yemen, the second to Southern Yemen, as well as the emirates of Eastern Arabia: Kuwait, Muscat, the emirates of Treaty Oman.

First World War led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and caused a new political situation on the Island of the Arabs, which was finally established only in the 1920s and early 1930s. The states of Northern and Central Arabia united into the vast Wahhabi Saudi Kingdom. It also occupied part of the Shiite region on the shores of the Persian Gulf and a small Zaydi region in the north of what was then Yemen. At the same time, the Zaydi Imam Yahya was also proclaimed king and tried to unite all of Yemen, including the sultanates of the South, which were under British protectorate. But Yahya was not successful in this and, according to the 1934 treaty, he recognized the division of Yemen into North - an independent kingdom and South - the British colony of Aden and protectorates. Subsequently, the growth of the city of Aden attracted people from the Zaydi North. The unification of both Yemen into one state took place only in 1990.

Thus, over the vast territory from the Balkans to the Hindustan, ethno-confessional groups are no less important than nations. The Shiite community of Muslim peoples is not a union of (ethnic) nations, but a spiritual and political community of ethno-confessional groups of Shiites within the Islamic world. It serves as an important factor in cultural and political life.



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Sunnis are the largest sect in Islam, and Shiites are the second largest sect of Islam. Let’s figure out where they agree and where they differ.

Of all Muslims, 85-87% of people are Sunni and 10% of people are Shia. Sunnis number more than 1 billion 550 million people

Sunnis place special emphasis on following the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (his actions and statements), on loyalty to tradition, on the participation of the community in choosing its head - the caliph.

The main signs of belonging to Sunnism are:

  • Recognition of the authenticity of the six largest collections of hadith (compiled by Al-Bukhari, Muslim, at-Tirmidhi, Abu Dawood, an-Nasai and Ibn Majah);
  • Recognition of four legal schools: Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanafi and Hanbali madhhabs;
  • Recognition of the schools of aqidah: Asarite, Ash'arite and Maturidi.
  • Recognition of the legitimacy of the rule of the Rightly Guided Caliphs - Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali (Shiites recognize only Ali).

Shiites Unlike the Sunnis, they believe that the leadership of the Muslim community should belong not to elected officials - caliphs, but to Imams - appointed by God, chosen individuals from among the descendants of the prophet, to whom they include Ali ibn Talib.

The Shia faith is based on five main pillars:

  • Belief in One God (Tawhid).
  • Belief in the Justice of God (Adl)
  • Belief in Prophets and Prophecies (Nabuwwat).
  • Faith in the Imamate (belief in the spiritual and political leadership of the 12 imams).
  • The Underworld (Maad)

Shiite-Sunni split

The divergence of currents in Islam began under the Umayyads and continued during the Abbasids, when scholars began to translate into Arabic the works of ancient Greek and Iranian scientists, analyze and interpret these works from an Islamic point of view.

Despite the fact that Islam united people on the basis of a common religion, ethno-confessional contradictions in Muslim countries have not disappeared. This circumstance is reflected in different currents of the Muslim religion. All differences between currents in Islam (Sunnism and Shiism) actually come down to issues of law enforcement, and not dogmatics. Islam is considered the unified religion of all Muslims, but there are a number of disagreements between representatives of Islamic movements. There are also significant discrepancies in the principles of legal decisions, the nature of holidays, and attitudes towards people of other faiths.

Sunnis and Shiites in Russia

In Russia, mostly Sunni Muslims, only in the south of Dagestan are Shiite Muslims.

In general, the number of Shiites in Russia is insignificant. The Tats living in the Republic of Dagestan, the Lezgins of the village of Miskindzha, as well as the Azerbaijani communities of Derbent, who speak the local dialect of the Azerbaijani language, belong to this direction of Islam. In addition, the majority of Azerbaijanis living in Russia are Shiites (in Azerbaijan itself, Shiites make up up to 85% of the population).

Killing Shiites in Iraq

Of the ten charges brought against Saddam Hussein, only one was chosen: the murder of 148 Shiites. It was carried out in response to the assassination attempt on Saddam himself, a Sunni. The execution itself was carried out during the days of the Hajj - the Muslim pilgrimage to holy places. In addition, the sentence was carried out several hours before the start of the main Muslim holiday - Eid al-Adha, although the law allowed this to be done until January 26th.

The choice of a criminal case for execution, a special time for hanging Hussein, indicates that the behind-the-scenes authors of the script for this massacre planned to provoke Muslims to protest all over the world, to new feuds between Sunnis and Shiites. And, indeed, the contradictions between the two directions of Islam in Iraq have worsened. In this regard, a story about the roots of the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, about the reasons for this tragic split that occurred 14 centuries ago.

History of the Shia-Sunni split

This tragic and stupid division is not based on any serious or deep differences. It is rather traditional. In the summer of 632, the Prophet Mohammed was dying, and behind a curtain of palm fibers a dispute had already begun about who would replace him - Abu Bekr, Mohammed's father-in-law, or Ali, his son-in-law and cousin prophet The struggle for power was the root cause of the split. Shiites believe that the first three caliphs - Abu Bekr, Osman and Omar - non-blood relatives of the prophet - illegally usurped power, and only Ali - a blood relative - acquired it legally.

At one time there was even a Koran consisting of 115 suras, while the traditional Koran contains 114. The 115th, inscribed by the Shiites, called “Two Luminaries,” was intended to raise Ali’s authority to the level of the Prophet Mohammed.

The power struggle eventually led to Ali's assassination in 661. His sons Hasan and Hussein were also killed, and the death of Hussein in 680 near the city of Karbala (modern Iraq) is still perceived by Shiites as a tragedy of historical proportions. Nowadays, on the so-called day of Ashura (according to the Muslim calendar on the 10th day of the month of Maharram), in many countries Shiites celebrate funeral processions, accompanied by a violent manifestation of emotions, people strike themselves with chains and sabers. Sunnis also honor Hussein, but consider such mourning unnecessary.

During the Hajj - the pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca - differences are forgotten, Sunnis and Shiites worship together at the Kaaba in the Forbidden Mosque. But many Shiites make a pilgrimage to Karbala - where the prophet's grandson was killed.

The Shiites have shed a lot of blood of the Sunnis, and the Sunnis have shed a lot of the blood of the Shiites. The longest and serious conflict The conflict facing the Muslim world is not so much a conflict between Arabs and Israel, or between Muslim countries and the West, but a conflict within Islam itself due to the split between Shiites and Sunnis.

“Now that the dust has settled from the war in Iraq, it has become clear that the unexpected victors were the Shiites,” wrote shortly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein Researcher London's Royal Institute of International Affairs Mai Yamani, "The West has realized that the location of major oil reserves coincides with those areas in which Shiites form a majority - Iran, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Southern Iraq." That is why American government flirts with the Shiites. Even the murder of Saddam Hussein is a kind of sop to the Shiites. At the same time, this is evidence that the scriptwriters of Iraqi “justice” wanted to create an even greater split between Shiites and Sunnis.

Now there is no Muslim caliphate, because of the power in which the division of Muslims into Shiites and Sunnis began. This means there is no longer a subject of dispute. And theological differences are so far-fetched that they can be leveled out for the sake of Muslim unity. There is no greater stupidity than for Sunnis and Shiites to forever cling to these differences.

The Prophet Mohammed, shortly before his death, said to the Muslims gathered in the mosque: “See that after me you do not become lost, cutting off each other’s heads! Let the one present inform the one who is absent about this.” Mohammed then looked around at the people and asked twice: “Have I brought this to your attention?” Everyone heard it. But immediately after the death of the prophet, Muslims began to “cut off each other’s heads” by disobeying him. And they still don’t want to hear the great Mohammed.

Isn't it time to stop?