Operation "Eagle's Claw" was a failure of American intelligence agencies. How the "Eagle Claw" broke off or Why the "Delta" operation in Iran failed

Was Delta's failure in Iran accidental?

“Wow! .. A ball of blue fire shot up into the night sky ... The flame reached a height of 90-120 m,” the commander of the US Army’s Delta Counter-Terrorism Unit, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, nicknamed Attack Charlie, described “this breathtaking hell”. Fueled by thousands of liters of detonating aviation kerosene, the fire claimed the lives of five Air Force pilots and three US Marine Corps pilots in a matter of seconds.

Photo SoF

The immediate cause of the fire was crudely obvious: a pilot piloting a 15-tonne RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter, the largest in the US Marine Corps, was trying to fly away from a US Air Force C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft on the ground, lost his orientation in a cloud of sandy dust thrown up by the rotor blades of the helicopter. Blinded, he brought his giant Sea Stallion down on the fuselage of the Hercules; at the same time, the fuel tanks of the helicopter collapsed, and instantly flashed kerosene poured in a stream onto the aircraft under the helicopter.

To get out of the cockpit, and perhaps to assess the situation above and behind him, the navigator of the aircraft apparently opened the upper escape hatch and thereby unintentionally allowed the flow of fuel to flow into the fuselage. At the same instant, all seven rotor blades, each almost 12 m long, of the main rotor of the helicopter cut into the fuselage of the aircraft with all their might, causing a huge secondary fire of the spilled fuel.

The damage from America's failed attempt to save 53 of its citizens, who were taken hostage in their own embassy by Iranian militant fanatics in November 1979, is beyond calculus. The obvious initial damage was the loss of the lives of the pilots mentioned, as well as the loss of many millions of dollars of aircraft that burned out or were abandoned when the rescue team hurriedly got out of Iran. At the same time, it was not possible to save a single hostage, just as there were no meetings with a single enemy soldier. But the overall damage was much greater.

On the riotous streets of Tehran, this failure of the American intelligence agencies further consolidated the power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, one of the most implacable enemies of the United States. On the bleak streets of Washington, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest of the operation, and the administration of President Jimmy Carter began its final slide into ultimate political oblivion. In the confused corridors of the Pentagon, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff began to carry out damage reduction measures in order to save individual dignitaries from having to publicly justify this catastrophe.

But what was the real reason for the self-destruction of this American rescue team in Iran? Was it really just a combination of ignorance and bad weather, as the official Pentagon report would later claim? And another question that remains largely unanswered to this day: what would happen if the Delta fighters managed to infiltrate the American embassy in Tehran? If the official answers to the first two questions are hard to believe, the answer to the third question seems frankly frightening.

When the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, with the determined blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini, took over the American embassy on November 4, 1979, they came to stay. The Ayatollah demanded that the United States return the deposed Shah of Iran to the country for trial (the Shah, who had cancer at that time, was in the United States of America for treatment), threatening that otherwise the American "spies" from among the hostages taken at the embassy would be handed over to the court people. Subsequently, President Carter banned all purchases of Iranian oil and froze $5 billion worth of Iranian holdings in America.

Khomeini responded by publicly ridiculing Carter and intensifying his hateful calls to end "the great Satan." The situation turned into a dead end. The American press was screaming for President Carter to "do something." Under intense media pressure, Carter did something: He picked up the phone and called Harold Brown, the US Secretary of Defense.

This call, in turn, set off a series of events that led to Air Force General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordering the creation of a temporary combined arms task force of representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to rescue the hostages. In 1979, a temporary combined arms task force was the only possible solution to the problem, since after the end of the Vietnam War, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff allowed the once-powerful US Special Operations Force to wither. The stage of planning and preparing the operation to rescue the hostages received the code name "Pot of Rice", and the operation itself on the territory of Iran - "Eagle's Claw".

During the first month after the formation of the group, a plan of operation was developed in general terms. In accordance with this plan, individual elements of the group began to work out their individual tasks in various parts of America. But already at the initial stage, the root causes of the future failure of Operation Eagle Claw were laid into the structure of the temporary combined arms tactical group, leaving it to fate to decide when and where this will happen.

Critical trouble began when, by decision of General Jones, two generals with no experience in leading special operations were appointed to command this very risky operation.

Jones placed Army Major General James Voth in command of the group. His nominal deputy for aviation affairs major general Air Force Philip Gast was never formally included in the structure of the group. In fact, somewhere in the middle of the Pot of Rice, this former fighter pilot was assigned to the headquarters of the US Air Force Tactical Air Command with the rank of lieutenant general. The newly promoted three-star general now outranked the two-star commander of the temporary group, but continued to be the latter's second-in-command, though his responsibilities were never clearly delineated.

The confusion at the top level of management could not but affect the entire chain of command. General Voth's deputies for ground forces and aircraft - Army Colonel Beckwith and Air Force Colonel James Kyle, respectively - had experience in leading special operations, but did not have the authority of flag officers, which would allow them to strongly defend their own opinion in cases where, at the stage of preparation of the operation generals Vot and Gast themselves expressed incorrect judgments or agreed with dubious recommendations. The twisted spiral effect spread further down the chain of command, permeating the entire structure of the temporary combined arms tactical group.

The most important helicopter component was commanded by Navy captain (corresponds to the general military rank of colonel) Jerry Hatcher, minesweeper naval mines from helicopters. He was soon replaced by Colonel of the Marine Corps Charles Pitman, who enjoys well-deserved respect as an expert in the use of helicopters to transport marines from ships to shore. General Voth agreed to the appointment of a colonel in the Marine Corps (as was the case with Gast), despite the fact that Pitman did not receive formal status in the structure of the temporary combined arms tactical group. Neither Hatcher and Pitman nor the U.S. Navy/Marine Air Corps helicopter crew were volunteers and, in fact, were unaware of the risks involved in this mission until their transfer to the temporary combined arms task force.

Shortly after the participants embarked on Operation Pot of Rice, it became clear that airlifting Delta fighters to and from Iran would be one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult, elements of the entire operation. And although this task really turned out to be beyond the strength of the participants, it is also true that from the very beginning of the preparation, everyone could see eloquent signs of a future failure.

After the disaster, the Pentagon produced a report on Operation Rice Pot/Eagle Claw, which became known as the Holloway Commission Report. Retired US Navy Adm. J. Holloway chaired the commission, which included five other senior officers from the US Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. In his report, he called the unexpected failure of the helicopter and difficult weather conditions associated with poor visibility as direct reasons for the failure of the operation. It was tantamount to saying "guns kill people" when there is no mention of the role that man plays in turning an inert piece of metal into a killing tool. And it was not a mere coincidence that the findings of the Holloway Commission ruled out the possibility of bringing a specific official for the failure of the operation.

According to the plan (see map), on April 24, the rescue squad was supposed to secretly penetrate Iranian territory on six S-130 Hercules military transport aircraft. Three of them were to take on board the Delta fighters, and the other three were rubber containers with aviation kerosene for refueling helicopters at a gas station with the code name "Desert-1", which was located about 200 miles (370 km) southeast Tehran. On the same night, eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters were supposed to take off from the Nimitz aircraft carrier and, flying in a parallel course in four pairs, land at the Desert-1 point half an hour after the planes.

After the landing of the Delta fighters and the refueling of helicopters, the Hercules aircraft were to return to the departure airfield, about. Masirah off the coast of Oman, and the helicopters to deliver the Delta fighters to a pre-designated shelter in the holding area near Tehran, to which it was a two-hour flight, and then fly to another point, 90 km from the shelter of the Delta fighters, and within stay there under camouflage nets for the next day.

On the evening of April 25, US CIA operatives, who had been abandoned in Iran in advance, were to transport 118 Delta fighters (and two former Iranian generals) through the streets of Tehran in six Mercedes trucks and deliver them to the US embassy. Closer to midnight, the group was supposed to begin storming the embassy building: climbing the outer walls to the windows, getting inside, neutralizing (the military had long since learned not to use the word "kill" in public) the guards and freeing the hostages. Then it was planned to call helicopters over the radio to evacuate the participants in the operation and former hostages either directly from the territory of the embassy or from a nearby football field. Two AS-1 ZON fire support aircraft (arrived in Tehran from the Wadi Qena air base in Egypt), loitering over the embassy, ​​would support them with fire if the Iranians tried to prevent the helicopters from leaving.

In the predawn haze of the early morning of April 26, helicopters with rescuers and rescued were supposed to fly 65 km south and land at the Manzariye airfield, which by that time would have been in the hands of a company of US Army Rangers. From there, the hostages were supposed to be brought home on two S-141 jet planes, and the Rangers were supposed to return on C-130 planes.

This is not to say that this plan was simple. But, as Colonel Beckwith notes in his book, Delta Division, the plan was far more sensible than many other proposals sponsored by failed Pentagon commandos. Fine-tuned in the following months, this plan gave the various elements of the Interim Combined Arms Task Force a clear purpose in which to prepare for the operation. But even before the appearance of the final version of the operation plan, the command of the temporary combined arms tactical group had to face a problem that, if not corrected in time, could have ended in only one thing - a sudden and decidedly unpleasant cessation of the combat operation.

The problem was connected with helicopter pilots, or rather, with the fact that the principle of voluntariness was not observed in the selection of crews. The command of the temporary combined arms tactical group opted for the RH-53D "Sea Stallion" helicopters of the Navy aviation, because this helicopter has a higher payload (2700 kg more than that of the HN-53 Air Force helicopter). It was also taken into account that the release of helicopters into the air from an aircraft carrier on the high seas would not attract unnecessary attention to the upcoming special operation.

But the crews of RH-53D marine helicopters are prepared to perform one specific combat mission: searching and sweeping sea mines only in the daytime with the help of a mine detector lowered on a towing cable - a trawl of impressive size. The crews of minesweepers at sea take risks in their own way, but this risk has little to do with the requirements that Operation Eagle Claw placed on them. In his book The Test of Strength, Colonel Kyle recalls his failed attempts to motivate the failure of the Marine Helicopter Commanders, who seemed to be more concerned with violating Navy flight operations manuals than showing a desire to master the difficult art of night flying required to fulfillment of the assigned combat mission. By mid-December 1979, the issue came to a head, for it became clear that the crews of the Navy helicopters were mostly unsuitable for the tasks in the planned operation and should be replaced. Helicopters RH-53D, however, were left as part of a temporary combined arms tactical group.

When they were looking for a replacement for the helicopter crews, the group commander reported his difficulties to the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, according to rumors, was determined to personally resolve all issues within the competence of General Vot. The Deputy Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on Operational Affairs, Marine Corps Lieutenant General Philip Schutler, also joined this case. Soon, crews of HH-53 helicopters of the Marine Corps aviation arrived to replace the helicopter pilots of the Navy aviation in the temporary combined arms tactical group, who were trained and prepared for (mainly) daytime flights to land marines from ships to the shore.

The helicopter crews selected by Shutler from the Marine Corps Aviation were thus faced with the need to prepare for a 1000-kilometer flight to the enemy’s location in close formation, at night, at extremely low altitude, in order to find the desired point in the desert, where filling station.

Colonel Kyle appealed the decision of General Shutler, suggesting that instead of the Marine Corps pilots, volunteers be recruited from among the crew members of the HH-53 helicopters, who served in the special forces squadrons of the Air Force. However, neither Vot nor Gast wanted to support Kyle's proposal, and everything remained unchanged.

Stubbornly adhering to their choice in favor of the Marine Corps pilots, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and his deputy did not want to consider candidacies of almost 200 pilots who flew HH-53 helicopters, of which 96 people continued to serve in the Air Force special forces squadrons, and another 86 people, according to the Holloway report, "had relatively recent experience in special assignments" (that is, exactly the experience that was required to participate in the operation "Eagle Claw"). Obviously, due to "political" considerations, the only co-pilot of the HH-53 helicopter was assigned to the temporary combined arms tactical group, who took part in the flight to the Desert-1 gas station.

Training continued into the early 1980s. Gradually, various elements of the temporary combined arms tactical group improved their skills; their self-confidence grew, but again with the exception of the helicopter crews, who, according to eyewitnesses, did not share the enthusiasm that gripped the rest of the participants. There was a slight increase in the level of preparedness of the pilots of the helicopter detachment for night flights, however, subsequently published memoirs about this period of training often contained vague but disturbing hints of the poor preparedness of helicopter pilots. When the pace of training increased, and it became obvious that the exciting hour of the beginning of the real operation was not far off, everyone was ready to interpret their doubts in favor of the pilots of the helicopter detachment. As Beckwith himself later asked: "If not them, then who? If not now, then when?"

What Could Have Happened: An Interrupted Route to Tragedy

Beckwith's doubts and his obvious desire to give the Naval Airmen a chance to prove they can do it reveal something else that haunted the experienced senior officers of the Temporary Combined Arms Task Force on the eve of the operation; this "something" cost them dearly in the end. By March 1980, the leaders of Operation Eagle Claw were increasingly convinced that their training was a waste of time: Jimmy Carter would never give the green light to a planned operation. Gast's transfer to the headquarters of the US Air Force Tactical Air Command during the operation "Pot of Rice" only strengthened their premonitions. This attitude among senior management contributed to the fact that obvious problems (for example, poor results in the training of helicopter pilots) remained unresolved. They reasoned something like this: the operation is unlikely to take place, but if it does happen, then the pilots will somehow get out.

By March, the only person in the world capable of disbanding a temporary combined arms tactical group was the owner of the White House, but by that time he was determined to do only one thing - "open the gates of the stable and jump aside." In fact, three whole weeks before the alleged start of Operation Eagle Claw, he had already set free one "special horse" - he sent an American agent to Desert-1.

For the success of the whole plan, there was an obvious need to make sure that the heavily loaded C-130 Hercules aircraft could land at Desert 1 without their 75-ton weight breaking through the top layer of sandy soil and not burrowing into the sand. The only guarantee that such a disaster would not happen was to send someone to take soil samples on the spot. An additional task was to install special landing light beacons at the Desert-1 point, which would remain turned off and, therefore, invisible until the lead aircraft of the rescue squad gave a signal to turn them on.

The US CIA agreed to send the right person to Iran, and a volunteer was found in the Air Force itself - a certain Major John T. Carney Jr. During the described period of time, this major commanded a group of advanced aircraft controllers of the Air Force. More importantly, he was already known to and trusted by Beckwith.

The reader may be led to believe that our secret services have planes all over the world, which is why Carney was flown to the Middle East aboard some conventional military or commercial plane, then transferred to a waiting US CIA plane and smuggled into Iran. If the reader thinks so, then he is mistaken, at least as far as Carney's adventures are concerned.

This 190 cm former American football coach at the Air Force Academy made the entire journey from America to Desert 1 in a horizontal position, lying like a frozen salmon on a huge rubber fuel tank in the rear fuselage of a twin-engine propeller aircraft " Twin Otter. If there was enough room for him to stretch his legs, and the bladder relief tube was conveniently located, then the in-flight service was unobtrusive, and food was limited to sandwiches, which one of the pilots sometimes passed him. Rumors that the CIA does not understand jokes may be exaggerated, because this reconnaissance flight to Iran was scheduled for April 1st.

The CIA pilots may not have fully met the standards of passenger service on international airlines, but they knew their job poorly and delivered the major to the Desert-1 point, giving him the opportunity to take such important soil samples and install secret beacons, after which they returned unnoticed to one from nearby countries. The major, with metal containers hidden under his jacket, in which there were soil samples, accompanied by the above-mentioned secret officers, passed through control posts at various airports until he ended up in England. Unbeknownst to Carney, the Pentagon had assigned the highest urgency to the operation to return him (or rather, the soil samples he was carrying) home.

In London, two of his escorts proved that they understand what "urgent" means. Throwing 100-dollar bills left and right at the airport, the agents bought three tickets for the British Airways supersonic Concorde, which was flying to America with a stop at Dallas International Airport. Disheveled, dirty and rumpled after many days of deranged living, Major Carney was escorted by his bodyguards to the plush Concorde departure lounge, where fellow high society travelers greeted his arrival with the warmth usually reserved for carriers. plague.

Since there was nowhere to go at an altitude of 10 thousand meters, the impeccable stewards of the Concorde did everything in their power to make his trip enjoyable. In order not to offend anyone, the major allowed them to do everything in the best possible way, and, in the end, the precious metal containers ended up where they should have been. Shortly thereafter, the "Desert-1" point was approved as a gas station. End of mission?

Carney could not know that in 3 weeks he would again go to "Desert-1".

The temporary combined arms tactical group was allowed to move only step by step. On April 20, the formation made its first move to Wadi Qena, a remote airfield in Egypt built by the Russians in the 1950s and chosen as the group's main operating base. The next one was made only on April 24, when the group redeployed to the area of ​​concentration on about. Masirah.

Three hours after arriving at Masirah, the final command "Forward" was received. An hour later, in the advancing dusk, the forward C-130 took off in the direction of the Desert 1 site. On board were Colonels Attacking Charlie Beckwith, James H. Kyle, commander of the US Air Force C-130 aircraft unit, and Major Carney. An hour later, eight Sea Stallion helicopters took off from the deck of the Nimitz aircraft carrier. The "Pot of Rice" was left behind like an old snakeskin, and "Eagle's Claw" took its place in the ensuing darkness.

In less than two hours, fate intervened for the first time in the course of the operation, presenting a bill for errors made during the planning. Approximately 450 kilometers into their 1,000-kilometer dash to the north, low-flying Marine helicopter pilots encountered an unspecified weather phenomenon known in Iran as "haboob": airborne small particles dust.

Khabub reduced visibility to zero, and the pilots had no choice but to continue flying only according to the readings of the instruments. Even for experienced Special Forces pilots, low-altitude flights in poor visibility are challenging tasks.

Communication between helicopters would have made it easier for the pilots, but, unfortunately, this was impossible - the crews removed the blocks from the radio stations that ensured the secrecy of the communication. General Voth was informed of this, but neither he nor the Marines informed Kyle of this. However, even if the helicopters had the means of ensuring stealth communications, an attempt by the advanced C-130 to warn them of the approach of a second dust cloud would still fail: the crew of the transporter did not know how to use long-range satellite communications, because the group received them only immediately before the start of the mission . But this also did not matter, since a later check showed that the satellite communications equipment installed on the S-130 and on the helicopters turned out to be incompatible! For helicopter pilots, flying has become like a terrible nightmare.

Although nature was on full display of its bitchy nature that night, its whims should be at the end of the list of reasons for the abort of the mission by helicopter crews. Had the Marines gained a little more altitude, they could have reduced the danger of flying through the dust cloud, but remained undetected, as happened with the C-130s that had already passed overhead and were now waiting in the Desert I area for their arrival. . But in his latest briefing, the Marine Corps Helicopter Intelligence Officer on the USS Nimitz instructed the pilots to stay below 60m to avoid detection by Iranian radar, and this despite the fact that their course was almost identical to the course that aircraft flew at an altitude of up to 1000m US Air Force C-130. Obviously, none of the pilots had any questions about the dubiousness of the instructions, although some of them watched the 130s fly over them. Remembering the last briefing and fearing the disclosure of the mission, they kept at low altitude in a thick dust cloud.

Perhaps it was these critical omissions that were reflected in the following lines of Holloway's report: "Excellent in the upper levels, in the middle, command and control turned out to be weak and unreliable." Such a statement can be compared to congratulating the coaches on a great game plan without mentioning the insignificant fact that it was not communicated to the players.

Another critical mistake could have been prevented by holding a control commission before the start of the operation. When determining the flight time, an hourly miscalculation was made, as a result of which the C-130 transports with Delta on board arrived in the Desert 1 area an hour earlier than they should have.

It was during this hour that a bus carrying 45 Iranian civilians appeared on the road, driving right into the center of the landing zone. All Iranians were captured. And a few minutes later, a tank truck loaded with fuel appeared from the opposite side, rolling with a roar about its business, until one of the "rangers" stopped it with an anti-tank missile. After that, the Americans no longer needed night vision goggles. One can only guess how events would have unfolded if the lead S-130 had landed on time, and not an hour earlier.

Absolute minimum

Six of the eight helicopters that took off from the deck of the Nimitz were the bare minimum required to get a Delta team from the Desert 1 area to a position further north, and five further to the embassy. The first helicopter withdrew from the operation, landing in the desert with a broken rotor blade, which in peacetime would have caused the entire flight to stop. But there was a large-scale strategic special operation, and the crew of the disabled car was picked up by the last helicopter of the link, which then continued to fly. There are seven left.

The helicopter was next to go out of action, on board of which was Colonel Pitman, a senior officer of the Marine Corps in the helicopter link. 250 km from the Desert 1 area, the pilot of this helicopter - the last Navy pilot from the original composition - had problems with the instruments. Like the pilots of the other vehicles that continued to fly, he didn't know if the dust storm would end before they arrived in the Desert 1 area. But unlike the other crews, she and Pitman decided to turn around and fly back - 750 km through a raging dust storm - with faulty instruments to the Nimitz.

And there are six left.

To this day, many participants in the operation cannot calmly talk about Pitman's decision. However, the command of the Marine Corps, apparently, did not share their feelings, because before his retirement, Pitman had risen to the rank of admiral.

One of the six helicopters that arrived in the "Desert I" area, the continuation of the flight was immediately prohibited due to problems with the hydraulics. The pilot was ready to make the next flight to a covert position, but the senior Marine officer (due to Pitman's absence) forbade this for security reasons.

So there are five left.

At this critical moment, with more than five months of grueling training behind him, Beckwith fell into the most severe emotional grip. From his command post in Egypt, Major General Vot demanded that the Delta commander continue the operation with the remaining five helicopters. But Beckwith refused and gave the command to abort the operation. In his memoirs about his service with the Delta, he would later write that he could not forgive Vot for the pressure.

Within minutes of Beckwith's difficult decision, one of the remaining five helicopters collided with a C-130. The four remaining RH-53Ds (three of which carried classified mission-related documents) were damaged by debris flying in all directions and were abandoned by their crews, who quickly climbed aboard the roaring C-130s.

The tragedy that averted the catastrophe

Although the failures in leadership, planning, and execution that doomed Operation Rice Pot from the start were hidden in official Pentagon publications such as the Holloway report, the fiasco was so significant that it led to unprecedented intervention by the US Congress in the activities of military department. The ensuing Nichols-Goldwater Act and whole line Legislative initiatives overcame the stubborn resistance of the military and led to the creation of the modern US Special Forces. But in the course of this vigorous legislative activity, few have attempted to publicly predict what would happen if Delta, under Beckwith's command, infiltrated the US embassy in Tehran.

I believe that if that were to happen, the ensuing bloodshed would irreparably damage America's international prestige for decades to come. The truth is cruel, but perhaps the tragedy in the "Desert I" region prevented disaster.

Anyone who has had to live in Tehran (or any other big city) for any length of time will testify that no matter the place or time of day, there will always be a witness somewhere: a janitor, a teenager hired as a watchman at a construction site, or government soldiers. troops guarding the homes of the rich.

The leaders of the group received information that under the conditions of the Khomeini regime, fear makes people stay at home at night, and the streets are completely empty. Based on this, the Delta group believed that, under the cover of darkness, six trucks with its soldiers could reach the US embassy and using ladders to penetrate the wall into the territory of the most heavily guarded in Tehran land plot while remaining unnoticed.

Could they really do it? Even if this were allowed, then in this case they would have solved only the easiest part of the task.

Suppose the Delta group managed to secretly penetrate the territory of the embassy, ​​but what would be the chances of 118 soldiers to "neutralize" all the revolutionary guards on the embassy square of several hectares in such a way that not one of them would have time to fire from his AK-47 ?

In the end, all this secrecy hardly mattered at all, because the plan to withdraw the hostages from the territory of the embassy to the adjacent football field called for the use of a high-explosive charge in order to make a hole in the wall of the embassy, ​​"through which, sowing confusion among the local population. .. could pass traffic ... "(Beckwith writes in his book).

We should not forget another aspect of life in Tehran: the lightning speed with which the almost deserted streets are filled with a dense crowd of excited citizens. This fact is obvious to any Westerner who has ever lived in Tehran, and the cause can be anything from a street scandal to a religious holiday.

Seized with religious zeal, the Iranian, normally a polite person, turns into a distraught fanatic, with little or no fear of death. How else can one explain the readiness of Iranian teenagers, driven by the mullahs to a frenzy, to act in the Iran-Iraq war as live mine detectors, groping for mines with their bare feet? It seems alien to a person of Western culture, but, nevertheless, it is one of the main components of Iranian culture.

I believe that if the Tehran phase of the operation took place, then the scenario of "Eagle's Claw" would develop as follows: "Delta" captures the embassy, ​​frees most (but not all) of the hostages, neutralizes the guards ... and is trapped in the territory of the embassy or on the football field, surrounded by a screaming crowd of hundreds - if not thousands - of people, a seething wave of people, the power of which is growing from hour to hour. Such an opportunity seemed real enough to the command of Operation Eagle Claw, and a special plan of action was developed for this case.

In accordance with it, fire support planes were supposed to circle over the theater of operations at a working height of 180-200 m, holding at gunpoint their weapons - 20 and 40 mm caliber guns - the streets surrounding the embassy. If necessary, this terrible weapon should have been used to push back the rampaging Iranian mob.

It is unlikely, but possible, that a couple of shots from a 40mm cannon (which were used so effectively against trucks on the Ho Chi Minh trail) would have been enough to “push back” the crowd ... but these shots would have served as the start of a bloody stampede, no doubt which, according to the commander of the Delta group, would have begun as soon as a crowd of panic-stricken men, women and children would have rushed away along narrow and dark streets, fenced on all sides, as is customary in Tehran, with high walls. Perhaps more shots would have been required, or perhaps a machine-gun burst would have been needed. One way or another, one thing is certain - the number of victims would be measured in thousands.

"Badger"

If, in relation to Operation Eagle Claw, one has to prove that it would have ended in brutal bloodshed, then the next attempt to free the hostages was originally planned as a ruthless and powerful American strike. The command of this operation, codenamed "Badger", was given to Vot again, perhaps in an attempt to give him a face-saving opportunity. Major General Richard Secord, an officer who knows Iran well, and at the highest echelons of power, and has extensive experience in special operations, was appointed his deputy to replace the outgoing Major General Gast.

As the inevitable hearings in Washington began to take more and more of Vot's time, Secord became de facto commander. He owed this appointment not only to his track record. Even the general's friends invariably spoke of him as "brilliant, arrogant and utterly ruthless when it comes to completing a task." In Operation Badger, Secord needed all three qualities, but especially the last one.

In his book, Secord recalls the feeling of desperation that gripped him when, upon arriving at the location of the Special Operations Air Wing at Hurlburt Field in Florida, he found that the combat and morale of the formation were stricken. serious illness. A year before the events described, the US Air Force headquarters removed this single special operations air formation from the list of units to be funded as active service; now it consisted of reserve units and, in essence, was a pitiful remnant of what had once been the pride of this branch of the army.

The indifference of many senior officers, including the officer technical service who was a wing commander.

The demonstration of such an attitude affected him like a red rag to a bull, and the bull wasted no time in dismissing or replacing everyone who did not share his enthusiasm, including the commander. But not only the Air Force tried his whip.

Of course, Commander Delta Beckwith had his enemies in the ground forces, but firstly, he had a good reputation, and secondly, he enjoyed the support of the US Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Mayer. In his favor, too, was the contention, albeit debatable, that it was not Delta that had failed in Iran; She was simply not given the opportunity to express herself. When confronted by Secord, Attack Charlie discovered that this Air Force general knew far more about the Army and CIA Special Operations than any other bluecoats. Secord had carefully studied Operation Eagle Claw and, surprisingly, had doubts about Beckwith's prowess in Iran. His visit to the Delta at Fort Bragg also left a less favorable impression due to the obvious negligence in everything. But Secord's precarious trust in Beckwith collapsed a week before visiting Fort Bragg, when Beckwith openly questioned Secord's combat credentials and his right to command Operation Badger at a group headquarters meeting. The step was wrong. Secord soon informed the command of the operation that the time had come to part ways with Beckwith. It is difficult to say how much subsequent events were the result of this report, but, be that as it may, a month later the Delta group had a new commander.

Ready to go, but...

According to Vot and Secord, by August 1980, the Badger group was ready to act immediately upon receipt from the CIA complete information about the whereabouts of the hostages. However, neither the command of the operation nor White House were not satisfied with the incoming information due to its incompleteness, and the consequences of the release of only a part of the Americans were too obvious for everyone. Wanting no ambiguity, Secord made it clear to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Badger was a hammer, not a needle; casualties among the Iranian population will be huge.

Perhaps the Iranians and Americans were more fortunate than it seemed at the time. Operation Badger involved nothing less than the capture of Tehran International Airport by at least two Ranger battalions, the rescue of hostages by the Delta team from suspected holding sites in Tehran, and the evacuation of the involved troops and hostages by transport aircraft under the cover of attack aircraft, which from the beginning and before the end of the operation, they were supposed to circle over the city in readiness to complete the task of neutralizing. Even higher above them, US Navy F-14 fighters would be on duty to intercept any Iranian pilot who was crazy enough to try to interfere with the operation.

As Philip D. Chinnery writes in his book Anytime, Anywhere, more than a hundred aircraft and 4,000 military personnel should have struck with a hammer in the very heart of one of the largest cities in the world. By comparison, Operation Eagle Claw involved a total of 54 aircraft and helicopters, a Delta team of 118, and a ranger company stationed at an evacuation airfield.

No further attempts were made to rescue the hostages. Their release (after 444 days in captivity) and the subsequent dissolution of the provisional combined arms task force did not occur until the following January, immediately after President Ronald Reagan's inaugural address.

Operation Eagle Claw
300px The remains of a US tanker aircraft EC-130E Hercules(center) and a helicopter Sikorsky RH-53D Sea Stallion(right), abandoned helicopter Sikorsky RH-53D(up)
date of
A place	US Embassy in Tehran
Cause	US hostage taking in Iran
Outcome	The failure of the operation
Changes
Opponents
Commanders
Side forces
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Operation Eagle Claw(English) Eagle Claw) was carried out on April 24, 1980 by the US armed forces in Iran in order to rescue 53 hostages from the US Embassy in Tehran. The operation ended in complete failure.

background

The operation was opposed by US Secretary of State Vance, his position did not find a response from the president, and Vance resigned at his own request, which was accepted on April 28.

Operation progress

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Failures in the operation followed from the very beginning, mainly due to the lack of professionalism of the military, special forces, dust storms and equipment breakdowns. A minimum of four transport helicopters were required for the successful completion of the operation. Of the eight who flew on a mission, one fell into the water immediately after takeoff from an aircraft carrier due to a possible breakdown of the blade, another got lost in a storm and turned back. Only six helicopters reached the first temporary base (an abandoned British airfield) in the desert. The place chosen for landing turned out to be located, contrary to the assurances of intelligence, next to a busy highway, as a result, the operation was immediately unmasked. Special forces blocked an intercity bus with passengers and blew up an Iranian fuel truck passing by, the passenger of which died, and the driver fled in a passing car.

On one of the helicopters that reached the base, problems with hydraulics were discovered. During refueling, one of the helicopters crashed into a tanker aircraft, eight crew members and both vehicles died in the ensuing fire, after which it was decided to cancel the operation and leave Iranian territory. As a result, all the helicopters were abandoned in the desert (after which they passed to the Iranian army), the bodies of the dead pilots and other crew members, all the secret documentation on the operation and the radio code book. All surviving participants in the operation were evacuated on the remaining aircraft. The operation ended in complete failure.

Victims

USA

US Air Force personnel, aircraft crew EC-130

• Major Harold Lewis Jr.
• Major Lyn McIntosh
• Major Richard Bakke
• Captain Charles McMillian
• Tech Sergeant Joel Mayo

USMC military personnel, helicopter crew RH-53

• Staff Sergeant Dewey Johnson
• Sergeant John Harvey
• Corporal George Holmes

Iran

On the Iranian side, the Americans killed one civilian - a passenger of a fuel tanker. His identity has not been established.

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An excerpt characterizing Operation Eagle Claw

And so, from the same day, I began to notice that more and more often some unfamiliar moments and facts are opening up in my memory, which I could not know in any way, and every day more and more of them appear. I got a little tired of all this “influx” of unfamiliar information, which, in all likelihood, was simply too much for my childish psyche at that time. But since it came from somewhere, then, in all likelihood, it was needed for something. And I accepted all this quite calmly, just as I always accepted everything unfamiliar that my strange and unpredictable fate brought me.
True, sometimes all this information manifested itself in a very funny form - I suddenly began to see very vivid images of places and people unfamiliar to me, as if taking part in this myself. “Normal” reality disappeared and I remained in some kind of “closed” world from everyone else, which only I could see. And so I could remain for a long time standing in a “pillar” somewhere in the middle of the street, not seeing anything and not reacting to anything, until some frightened, compassionate “uncle or aunt” started shaking me, trying to somehow lead in a feeling, and find out if everything is all right with me ...
Despite my early age, at that time I already (from my bitter experience) understood perfectly well that everything that constantly happens to me, for all “normal” people, according to their usual and habitual norms, seemed absolutely abnormal (although about “ normality” I was ready to argue with anyone even then). So as soon as someone tried to help me in one of these “unusual” situations, I usually tried to convince me as quickly as possible that I was “perfectly fine” and that there was absolutely no need to worry about me. True, I was far from always able to convince, and in such cases it ended with another call to my poor, “reinforced concrete-patient” mother, who, after the call, naturally came to pick me up ...
This was my complex and sometimes funny, childish reality in which I lived at that time. And since I had no other choice, I had to find my "bright and beautiful" even in what others, I think, would never find it. I remember once after my next unusual “incident”, I sadly asked my grandmother:
Why is my life so different from everyone else?
Grandmother shook her head, hugged me and quietly answered:
“Life, my dear, is a tenth of what happens to us and nine-tenths of how we react to it. React fun baby! Otherwise, at times it can be very difficult to exist ... And what is not similar, we are all different in one way or another in the beginning. It’s just that you will grow up and life will begin to “tweak” you more and more to the general standards, and it will depend only on you, whether you want to be the same as everyone else.
And I didn’t want to ... I loved my unusual colorful world and would not exchange it for anything and never. But, unfortunately, every beautiful thing in our life is very expensive and we must really love it very much so that it does not hurt to pay for it. And, as we all know very well, unfortunately, you have to pay for everything and always ... It's just that when you do it consciously, there remains satisfaction from free choice, when your choice and free will depend only on you. But for this, in my personal opinion, it is really worth paying any price, even if it is sometimes very expensive for oneself. But back to my fasting.
Two weeks had already passed, and I still, much to the chagrin of my mother, did not want to eat anything and, oddly enough, physically felt strong and perfectly fine. And since I looked then, in general, very well, gradually I managed to convince my mother that nothing bad was happening to me and, apparently, nothing terrible threatened me yet. This was absolutely true, as I truly felt great, except for that "hypersensitive" mental state that made all my perceptions maybe a little too "naked" - colors, sounds and feelings were so vivid that from this sometimes it was hard to breathe. I think this "hypersensitivity" was the reason for my next and next "incredible" adventure ...

At that time in the yard was already late fall and a group of our neighbor's guys after school gathered in the forest for the last autumn mushrooms. And of course, as usual, I was going to go with them. The weather was unusually mild and pleasant. The still warm sunbeams jumped like bright bunnies through the golden foliage, at times seeping down to the ground and warming it with the last farewell warmth. The elegant forest met us in its festive bright autumn attire and, like an old friend, invited us into its affectionate embrace.
My beloved, gilded in autumn, slender birch trees, at the slightest breeze, generously dropped their golden “leaves-coins” on the ground and did not seem to notice that very soon they would be left alone with their nakedness and would bashfully wait for when spring will dress them again in their annual delicate attire. And only majestic, evergreen firs proudly brushed off their old needles, preparing to become the only decoration of the forest during the long and, as always, very colorless winter. Yellow leaves rustled softly underfoot, hiding the last russula and milk mushrooms. The grass under the leaves was warm, soft and damp, and as if inviting to walk on it...
I, as usual, kicked off my shoes and went barefoot. I loved to always and everywhere go barefoot, if only there was such an opportunity !!! True, for these walks very often I had to pay with a sore throat, which was sometimes very long, but, as they say, "the game was worth the candle." Without shoes, the legs became almost "sighted" and there was a particularly acute feeling of freedom from something unnecessary, which seemed to interfere with breathing ... It was a real, incomparable little pleasure and sometimes it was worth paying for it.

On April 25, 1980, the world learned about the collapse of the military operation to rescue American diplomats taken hostage by Islamic terrorists in Tehran.

The operation was called "Eagle's Claw" and its failure symbolized, at least in the eyes of the Islamic world, the beginning of the decline of the American world empire.

53 U.S. diplomats, including the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, the CIA's local station chief, and several American intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover were taken hostage by “revolutionary Islamic students” on November 4, 1979.

The students demanded the immediate return to Iran of Shah Reza Pahlavi and "an apology from the American imperialists" for the suffering inflicted on the Iranian people.

The administration of President Carter, showing a rare spinelessness, tried to negotiate unsuccessfully for the release of the hostages. The hostage-taking, however, sparked an unprecedented wave of patriotism in America, and, at the same time, the most negative feelings towards the new regime in Tehran. Iran's foreign assets were frozen by a special act of Congress, and Iranians living in the US were afraid to speak publicly about their country of birth.

Public opinion and pressure from the military forced Carter to agree to the secret services' proposal for the forceful release of the hostages.

The planning and timing of the operation was extremely difficult. The Americans decided to deploy a temporary refueling point in the Iranian desert of Yazd near the city of Tabas. 4 American Hercules transport aircraft were supposed to deliver the fuel needed to refuel 8 (originally 9) CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters to the base. The helicopters were later to transfer American special forces to the next temporary airstrip near Tehran.

The Sea Stallions were chosen because they had the longest range. They could reach the desert refueling point on their own by flying from an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf. Helicopter pilots, however, did not have experience flying in mountain and desert conditions.

The special forces landed by helicopters were supposed to be loaded into vans already bought by CIA agents in Iran and delivered at night to the embassy and to the Foreign Ministry building. After the release of the hostages, everyone was to be taken to the Amjadia stadium.
From there, the hostages and soldiers were to be evacuated to the Manzaria airbase in the vicinity of Tehran. Manzaria was supposed to be pre-captured by another group of American special forces. The entire operation in and around Tehran was to be covered by American attack aircraft from the air and accompanied by sabotage and blackouts in Tehran. From the Manzaria air base, all soldiers and hostages were to be evacuated on Hercules military transport aircraft, again under the cover of American fighters.

For 90 days, US spy satellites watched remote area desert Dasht-e-Kavir. It was here that it was decided to organize a base for the release of American diplomats in Tehran. During all this time, only two cars passed along the road leading from Qom to Mashad.
It was here that six C-130 military transport aircraft were supposed to land with fuel, special forces and equipment necessary for the successful completion of the operation. Eight Sea Stallion helicopters were supposed to fly here from the Nimitz aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, on which the American landing force would be transferred to Tehran.

The plan of operation in representation of the American analysts.

Before embarking on this operation, even the description of which seems rather complicated, the CIA sent Air Force Major John Carney to Iran. The Major was flying in a light spy plane. He had to make sure the ground around the proposed makeshift runway was firm enough to keep the C-130s from sinking into the sand.

After landing, Carney marked with four infrared sensors the square in which the planes were to land. The sensors were not visible to the naked eye, but when approaching a given area, the pilots could turn them on using the remote control remote control and see them in night vision devices. Karney carefully checked the field between the sensors, making sure that the soil was firm enough and that there were no piles of debris and dangerous holes in the middle of the field. In his opinion, the site was "almost perfectly flat." While Karney was working, two Iranian cars drove past him. Nobody noticed him.

Carney successfully completed the mission, returned together on a CIA plane to Oman, and then immediately flew to London. Soil samples he brought were studied and approved. The unusual activity of Iranian vehicles on the night that Carney was preparing the runway was explained as an "anomaly" and forgotten. The location of the Desert One base has been finalized.

Simultaneously, a group of American operatives led by Major Dick Meadows infiltrated Tehran. Meadows played the role of an Irish businessman, and his team portrayed "a group of entrepreneurs from the FRG." They checked hidden landing sites in the mountains near Tehran, where Delta Force assault teams from the desert were supposed to arrive just before the start of the assault on the building of the American embassy and the Iranian Foreign Ministry, where the US chargé d'affaires and his entourage were held separately from others. For several days and nights they observed the security of the embassy building and were satisfied with the results. "German businessmen" managed to visit the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, according to their recommendation, the assault group for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was significantly increased.

Delta Force, at a Marine Corps base in California, meanwhile, was engaged in an endless rehearsal of a complex mission. It seemed to the commandos that they could complete all the necessary stages already in their sleep. According to the plan, the paratroopers, having freed the hostages by force, were supposed to deliver them to the Amjadia stadium, located across the street from the embassy.

The Americans were pressed for time. Iranian nights with the onset of spring became shorter and shorter, taking away the much-needed night hours from the military. In diplomatic and moral terms, American humiliation has reached its limit. In those days, the following joke about Jimmy Carter's meeting with the spirit of the legendary imperialist President Theodore Roosevelt was popular: “Roosevelt asks Carter: Jimmy, tell me, how are you? Carter: Well, the Russians have invaded Afghanistan. Roosevelt: How many nukes did you drop on them? Carter: We're boycotting the Olympics. Roosevelt: What else? Carter: The Iranians have taken 53 US diplomats hostage in Tehran. Roosevelt: What? How many bombers are bombing Iran? How many divisions did you send? Carter: None. We are trying to use diplomatic deterrence. Roosevelt: Yeah, the next joke they'll tell me is America gave the Panama Canal!”

Jimmy Carter and his advisers could not adequately perceive Iran, because Iran was now ruled by inadequate people. Iran was torn apart by internal conflicts - between Islamists and the left guerrilla, between the state and armed ethnic militias. Saddam loomed on the horizon with his territorial claims, and neighboring Afghanistan had just been occupied Soviet troops. Under these conditions, from the point of view of Carter, Brzezinski and any rational politician, Iran, regardless of ideological and religious orientation, needed sources of weapons and finance - and there was no alternative to America. A few dozen American hostages were simply not worth a head-on collision with the United States, in the absence of another ally comparable in power.

President Bani Sadr promised Carter that the hostages would be transferred to the Foreign Office, which created a brief euphoria in the White House. Bani Sadr also demanded that the fate of the hostages should be finally decided by the Majelis - not yet elected and not convened, and until the moment when this happens, America "must refrain from hostile statements." Carter quietly agreed to this humiliating demand.

The hostages, however, were not transferred to the Foreign Ministry building, which showed the strength of the ayatollahs and the weakness of the Iranian puppet government. Carter, by his own admission, "felt like an idiot." Bani Sadr's deceit was the last straw that broke the patience of the martyred president.

Under the administration's decision, diplomatic relations with Iran were finally severed and Iranian diplomats expelled from America - including those who had applied for political asylum.

Ayatollah Khomeini.

Imam Khomeini commented on the rupture of diplomatic relations as follows: "The only worthy deed done by President Carter in favor of the oppressed peoples."

The short and successful excursions of John Carney and Jim Meadows to Iran had a huge impact in Washington. Secret hideouts, assembly areas, Delta Force trucks and hostages were ready.

The only alternative to sending special forces to Tehran, militarily, was a naval blockade of Iran and mining of its ports. Both the military and diplomats, however, agreed that this would not return to America its hostages - and if it does, then only in coffins.

Carter and Brzezinski toyed with the idea of ​​retaliatory taking of Iranian hostages on US soil for a while, but quickly abandoned it. The Americans were afraid that unpredictable ayatollahs would start shooting the hostages. Nobody knew how to deal with the Iranian hostages in this case. Brzezinski commented grimly: "They can always fall out of the helicopter into the Red Sea on their way home."

The creator of Delta Force, Colonel Backwith, was appointed to command a military expedition to free the hostages. He devoted his entire life and entire career to the creation of this elite combat group. Years of training and preparation were to culminate in a complex and brilliant operation, the analogue of which did not exist in the annals of military history. Backwith was summoned to the White House, where he told all the details of Carter's plan. At the end of the conversation, he said: "Mr. President, on behalf of my people, I hope that you will allow us to do this."

Eight helicopters were waiting below the deck of the aircraft carrier. The S-130s were supposed to take off from Wadi Qen, an abandoned Soviet airstrip in Egypt, to land on Masirah Island, off the coast of Oman.

The horror of the desert is a sandstorm.

The mission was scheduled for the night of April 24, 1980.

The military transport "Hercules" used for the Iranian expedition were converted. Everything was removed from the first C-130 flying to Desert One, including benches for paratroopers. The plane was loaded with a jeep, five motorcycles, a navigation system, aluminum plates on which the plane was supposed to stand while waiting in the desert, so as not to fall into the sand, Colonel Backwith and 74 Delta Force commandos.

At the border, the Hercules sailed at an altitude of less than 100 meters in order to evade Coast Guard radars installed by the Americans themselves. After that, the plane climbed to a height of a thousand meters, which continued to be dangerous - the flight took place over the Zagras mountains and the radar in the cockpit constantly rang warning.

Backwith, after the final decision was made to deploy soldiers to Iran in Hercules, rather than helicopters, increased the number of people taking part in the mission at the expense of rangers from Fort Benning. The task of the rangers was to protect the perimeter of Desert One, including from a possible air attack by the Iranians, if the base was discovered. The Rangers were commanded by Captain Wade Ishimoto, a Delta Force intelligence officer. The Rangers, according to the plan, were to be the last to leave Iran. On board the first aircraft were also 13 people from the army special forces. They were supposed to storm the Foreign Office building and free the US Charge d'Affaires Bruce Laingen and Victor Thomseth and Michael Howland, who were accompanying him. Air Force Major John Carney flew to Iran again. He commanded a small portable air force control tower that was supposed to coordinate the complex maneuvers of aircraft and helicopters of the rescue mission in Iranian airspace. The expedition consisted of 132 people.

Bekwith's first C-130 was followed by five more Hercules. One carried the remainder of the special forces that did not fit on the first plane, the other four carried in giant rubber tanks the aviation fuel needed for the return trip.
In Wadi Qena, Egypt, the CIA held a briefing for members of the expedition. New important details were reported - more hostages than previously thought were in the building of the embassy office.

Most of the Backwith commandos grew long hair, mustaches and beards. They were dressed in jeans, heavy boots, and paramilitary black jackets with many pockets. Outwardly, they were not much different from the students who took American diplomats hostage. One of the scenarios for the release of the hostages was their kidnapping” by a rival armed student faction. According to the Geneva Convention, soldiers (unlike spies) must wear military uniforms. In order to comply with this condition, each had an American flag on his sleeve, covered, however, with a strip of Velcro fabric.
Flying with the Delta on the Hercules were several Iranian volunteers (all American citizens), as well as two fugitive Iranian generals. One former agent SAVAK, who had been trained for many months “to shoot down several fanatics of Khomeini,” got scared at the last moment and did not fly. The task of the people who spoke Farsi was to drive trucks with Delta to Tehran and on the way to speak teeth to the guards of checkpoints. Iranian generals, in the event of unexpected difficulties, were to play the role of the regime's top intelligence officers, and, assuming their inherent importance, tell opponents that they were witnessing a covert training of Iranian elite units.

The Iranians did not spot the first Hercules with radar. They, however, noticed the flight of 4 "Hercules" with fuel, but decided that it was about Iranian aircraft. The nation was waiting for the American invasion, but obviously not on slow-moving turboprops.

Approaching Desert One, the pilots of the first aircraft noticed strange clouds milky. At first they were generally mistaken for a light haze. The pilots called John Carney, who was already considered an expert on Iran, into the cockpit. They asked him, "What is that thing over there?" Karney thought about it and answered: “Khabub”. The pilots laughed at the unknown and strange word. They did not know that haboob would bury their mission.

Carney had heard about haboob before, from CIA pilots with whom he had flown on reconnaissance missions. The changing atmospheric pressure in the desert causes the smallest particles of sand to rise into the air and hang in it, sometimes at a height of several thousand meters, forming a vertical cloud. Khaboob was unlikely to harm large aircraft, but could be a problem for helicopters. Carney, thinking about this, immediately reported to command post in Wadi Qena.

Carney was very surprised at how soft the landing was. The main reason was the smallest sand, but it could also cause further complications, when several dozen operating propellers could create (and created) a real sandstorm.

Dislocation Vehicle US Air Force after landing. April 25, 1980

As soon as the Hercules landed, Captain Ishimoto and his men immediately rolled out the jeep and motorcycles. They saw a tanker and a pickup truck scurrying down the deserted road. Apparently, the tanker was carrying stolen gasoline. Delta could not let the Iranians who saw her leave.

The troubles did not end there, but only began. The propellers of the Hercules were still spinning when one of the shocked commandos saw an Iranian bus coming straight at them. It was a big Mercedes, full of astonished Iranians, who once again confirmed the main law of warfare - the absolute certainty that the unpredictable and unexpected will happen at the most inopportune moment. And the moment was critical. One of the members of the Ishimoto group, realizing that the tank could not be overtaken, fired an anti-tank missile at it. Since he was a professional, the rocket exploded and the tank exploded too. One of the Iranians who were in the cab managed to jump out and climb into the accompanying pickup truck, on which he fled from his pursuers.

A secret American base in the heart of the Iranian desert was suddenly lit up like a Friday night football game in his native Texas. The soldiers took off their night vision devices - there was no longer any need for them.

The Mercedes bus, meanwhile, stopped - with a shot through the radiator and shot through tires. Delta Force, not without difficulty, led 40 stunned Iranians off the buses and searched them. They were ordinary people, the bus was traveling from Yazd to Tabas. They didn't have weapons. Only one of them spoke English, he immediately understood that they were talking about the Americans.

The question of what to do with the Iranians was discussed immediately and at the highest level - in the White House. Brzezinski told Carter everything, and he ruled that the only Possible Solution- to take the passengers of the bus with you on one of the "Hercules" and repatriate them to Iran only after the end of the operation.

Meanwhile, one of the Iranian generals, deciding that things had gone badly, threw his silver-plated revolver into the sand. Considerable time and effort went into finding the missing weapons - Backwith was afraid that one of the passengers could find the revolver and secretly carry it aboard the Hercules. The search turned up nothing.

The same tank with stolen gasoline.

The second C-130 with the remnants of the Delta Force, under the command of Captain Barras, landed right on schedule. One of the veterans, Fitch, greeted an officer shocked by gasoline fireworks with the words "Welcome to the third world war!"

Adapted from Mark Bowden Guests of Ayatollah. Translation postscriptum.org

Prerequisites

On November 4, 1979, a mob of students who called themselves "supporters of the line of Imam Khomeini" seized the building of the American embassy. As a result, 53 US citizens (embassy staff and Marines guarding the embassy) were taken hostage.

As a result, after all the diplomatic actions taken, the State Department. The United States has come under severe pressure from public opinion. There was no other way out but to give the order to begin preparations for an operation to resolve the conflict by force. In addition, the time frame for this operation was greatly narrowed, all under the same pressure of public opinion.

Initial planning

The first part of the operation was given the unpretentious name "Rice Pot". And the operation itself was called "Eagle Claw" - "Eagle Claw". Army Major General James Vot was appointed commander of the first part of Operation Rice Pot, and Major General Philip Gast of the Air Force was appointed his deputy.

The main difficulty in planning was that Tehran was located deep in Iranian territory, at a considerable distance from countries friendly to the United States, which, for obvious reasons, complicated the delivery of operatives and the necessary resources to the place of the operation. Also, due to the fact that the hostages were held not at the airport, but at the embassy within the city, it was difficult to evacuate them, since you can’t just land air transport in the city. The reconnaissance of the area and the operational situation was complicated not only by Tehran's crowded population (and taking into account the cultural peculiarities, we understand that all other parts of the city immediately knew about any stranger in one of the parts of the city), but also by a significant abundance of Islamic military and police in the area of ​​the US embassy.

Initially, the plan provided for penetration into the territory of Iran from the territory of Turkey on wheeled vehicles, but it had to be abandoned due to political difficulties and the risk of all kinds of accidents (mainly due to the abundant curiosity of the posts, which during the search could reveal the equipment of operatives). It was decided to use helicopters.

Based on preliminary data, given the increasing pressure, in December 1979, a special forces detachment was formed and practical training of operatives began. Practical training continued until March 1980. After the official break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran, which happened on April 8, 1980, on April 16, 1980, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the green light to the operation.

On April 19, the transfer of operatives and equipment to the territory of Southwest Asia began; by April 23, 1980, the transfer was completed.

Final plan, operation, difficulties

According to the final plan, on April 24, 1980, the rescue squad was supposed to secretly penetrate Iranian territory on six C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft. Three of them were to take on board the Delta fighters, and the other three were rubber containers with aviation kerosene for refueling helicopters at a gas station with the code name "Desert-1", which was located about 200 miles (370 km) southeast Tehran.

S-130 "Hercules"

On the same night, eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters were supposed to take off from the Nimitz aircraft carrier and, flying in a parallel course in four pairs, land at the Desert-1 point half an hour after the planes.

After the landing of the Delta fighters and the refueling of helicopters, the Hercules aircraft were to return to the departure airfield, about. Masirah off the coast of Oman, and helicopters to deliver the Delta fighters to a pre-designated shelter in the holding area near Tehran, which was a two-hour flight, and then fly to another point, 90 km from the shelter of the Delta fighters, and within stay there under camouflage nets for the next day.

RH-53D "Sea Stallion"

On the evening of April 25, US CIA operatives deployed in Iran ahead of time were to smuggle 118 Delta operatives (and two former Iranian generals) through the streets of Tehran in six Mercedes trucks and deliver them to the US embassy. Closer to midnight, the group was supposed to begin storming the embassy building: climbing the outer walls to the windows, getting inside, neutralizing the guards and freeing the hostages. Then it was planned to call helicopters over the radio to evacuate the participants in the operation and former hostages either directly from the territory of the embassy or from a nearby football field. Two AS-1 ZON fire support aircraft (arrived in Tehran from the Wadi Qena air base in Egypt), loitering over the embassy, ​​would support them with fire if the Iranians tried to prevent the helicopters from leaving.

AC-1 ZON

In the predawn haze of the early morning of April 26, helicopters with rescuers and rescued were supposed to fly 65 km south and land at the Manzariye airfield, which by that time would have been in the hands of a US Army Rangers company. From there, the hostages were supposed to be delivered home on two C-141 jet planes, and the Rangers were supposed to return on C-130 planes.

S-141

Fine-tuned in the following months, this plan gave the various elements of the Interim Combined Arms Task Force a clear purpose in which to prepare for the operation. But even before the appearance of the final version of the operation plan, the command of the temporary combined arms tactical group had to face a problem that, if not corrected in time, could have ended in only one thing - a sudden and decidedly unpleasant cessation of the combat operation. The problem was connected not so much with technology as with helicopter pilots, or rather with the fact that the principle of voluntariness was not observed in the selection of crews. The command of the temporary combined arms tactical group opted for the RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters of the Navy aviation, because this helicopter has a higher payload (2700 kg more than the HH-53 Air Force helicopter). It was also taken into account that the release of helicopters into the air from an aircraft carrier on the high seas would not attract unnecessary attention to the upcoming special operation from the Iranian military. But the crews of RH-53D marine helicopters are prepared to perform one specific combat mission: searching and sweeping sea mines only in the daytime with the help of a mine detector lowered on a towing cable - a trawl of impressive size. The crews of minesweepers at sea take their own risks, but this risk has little to do with the requirements that Operation Eagle Claw placed on them. By mid-December 1979, the issue came to a head, for it became clear that the crews of the Navy helicopters were mostly unsuitable for the tasks in the planned operation and should be replaced. Helicopters RH-53D, however, were left as part of a temporary combined arms tactical group. Soon, crews of HH-53 helicopters of the Marine Corps aviation arrived in the temporary combined arms tactical group to replace the helicopter pilots of the Navy aviation, who were trained and prepared for (mainly) daytime flights to land marines from ships to the shore. But the selected helicopter crews were faced with the need to prepare for a 1000-kilometer flight to the enemy’s location in close formation, at night, at extremely low altitude, in order to find the right point in the desert where there would be a gas station.

After the onset of twilight at hour "H", the forward S-130 took off in the direction of the site "Desert 1". On board were Colonels Attacking Charlie Beckwith, James H. Kyle, commander of the US Air Force C-130 aircraft unit, and Major Carney. An hour later, eight Sea Stallion helicopters took off from the deck of the Nimitz aircraft carrier. Thus ended the first part of the operation called "Pot of Rice", the operation "Eagle's Claw" entered the active phase.

Less than two hours later, unaccounted circumstances intervened for the first time in the course of the operation. About 450 kilometers into their 1,000-kilometer dash to the north, low-flying Marine helicopter pilots encountered an unreported phenomenon known in Iran as "Habub": fine dust particles rising into the air. Thus, a miscalculation in planning and taking into account the characteristics of the area made itself felt. Khabub reduced visibility to zero, and the pilots had no choice but to continue flying only according to the readings of the instruments. Even for experienced Special Forces pilots, low-altitude flights in poor visibility are challenging tasks.

Communication between helicopters would have made it easier for the pilots, but, unfortunately, this was impossible - the crews removed the blocks from the radio stations that ensured the secrecy of the communication. However, even if the helicopters had the means of ensuring stealth communications, an attempt by the advanced C-130 to warn them of the approach of a second dust cloud would still fail: the crew of the transporter did not know how to use long-range satellite communications, because the group received them only immediately before the start of the mission . But this also did not matter, since a later check showed that the satellite communications equipment installed on the S-130 and on the helicopters turned out to be incompatible! Had the Marines gained a little more altitude, they could have reduced the danger of flying through the dust cloud and gone undetected, as happened with the C-130s that had already passed overhead and were now waiting in Desert I for their arrival. . But in his latest briefing, the Marine Corps Helicopter Intelligence Officer on the USS Nimitz instructed the pilots to stay below 60m to avoid detection by Iranian radar, and this despite the fact that their course was almost identical to the course that aircraft flew at an altitude of up to 1000m US Air Force C-130. Obviously, none of the pilots had any questions about the dubiousness of the instructions, although some of them watched the 130s fly over them. Remembering the last briefing and fearing the disclosure of the mission, they kept at low altitude in a thick dust cloud.

Another critical mistake could have been prevented by holding a control commission before the start of the operation. When determining the flight time, an hourly miscalculation was made, as a result of which the C-130 transports with the Delta on board arrived in the Desert 1 area an hour earlier than they should. It was during this hour that a bus carrying 45 Iranian civilians appeared on the road, driving right into the center of the landing zone. All Iranians were captured. And a few minutes later, a tank truck loaded with fuel appeared from the opposite side, rolling with a roar about its business, until one of the "rangers" stopped it with an anti-tank missile. After that, the Americans no longer needed night vision goggles.

33 years have passed since the end of Operation Eagle Claw, but, alas, much is still unclear in this confusing story.
The drama in Tehran began on November 4, 1979. A mob of 400 people, claiming to be members of the Organization of Muslim Students following the course of Imam Khomeini, attacked the US diplomatic mission. The embassy staff turned to the Iranian police for help, which, by the way, did not post their usual guard detachment at the embassy that day. However, these requests remained unanswered. After a couple of hours, the attackers managed to crush 13 US Marines who were throwing tear gas grenades into the crowd. The embassy was seized, and the organizers of the attack publicly stated that this action was taken in protest against the United States providing asylum to the former Shah of Iran, and also to foil the plots of US imperialism and international Zionism against the "Islamic revolution" in Iran. The students demanded the extradition of the Shah to bring him to the revolutionary court.
Until late at night, numerous rallies and demonstrations took place in the area of ​​​​the American embassy, ​​at which the state flags of the United States and Israel were burned.
Iranian television and radio broadcast the assault on the embassy and the rallies that followed throughout the day. Statements of various religious, political and public organizations of Iran in support of the undertaken action, an endless stream of telegrams and messages from various groups population and individual citizens.
For propaganda purposes, the invaders released 14 people: non-US citizens, blacks and women. 52 people remained in captivity of students.
From the very beginning, it was clear to everyone that this was a well-thought-out multi-step action of the radical Iranian clergy.
In the mid-1950s, the Iranian government and the SAVAK secret service fell completely under the control of the Americans.
At the end of the 1970s, a paradoxical situation developed in Iran - there was a rapid economic growth, the country's army and navy ranked first in the Middle East, SAVAK provided the appearance of stability and popular love for the Shah, and, nevertheless, the regime was going to death.
On September 7, 1978, riots broke out in the streets of Tehran.
It is noteworthy that the fight against the Shah was led by the Shiite clergy. In October-November 1978, the strike movement engulfed both state and private enterprises. Strikes were well organized: they began simultaneously at all or almost all enterprises in one branch or industrial group. Thus, the workers of the Behshahr Industrial Group (forty production facilities) began to strike at the same time. The strike of oil workers in the province of Khuzestan was supported by the workers of all oil and gas enterprises in the country. And since the economy and finances of Iran by this time were mainly based on the "oil pipe", the strike led the country to chaos.
On January 16, 1979, Shah Mohammed Reze Pahlavi and Shahin Ferah went to Tehran's Mehrabad airport. "I'm going on vacation," the shah said to those who were seeing him off, "because I feel very tired."

Two weeks later, on February 1, 80,000 residents of the country came to an unprecedented mass worship service. The believers were waiting for the Messenger of Allah.
And the Boeing-747 airliner of the Air France airline, flying from Paris to Tehran, has already appeared in the air. On board was the great ayatollah with his retinue of 50 assistants and associates, accompanied by 150 journalists.
At the Mehrabad airport, the Ayatollah was greeted by a sea of ​​people chanting “Allah is great! The shah is gone, the imam has come!” From that moment on, Khomeini became the main political figure of the country.
On February 5, 1979, Khomeini announced the illegality of Sh. Bakhtiyar's government and appointed Mehdi Bazargan as head of the provisional revolutionary government. It was a tactically correct move by the ayatollah. Mehdi Bazargan, 73, received his engineering education in Paris. At one time he was an associate of Mossadegh and one of the prominent figures of the National Front. The Shah's secret police threw him into prison four times. Bazargan enjoyed the support of both liberals and leftists.
At the same time, supporters of Khomeini and activists of the left-wing radicals - the "People's Mujahideen" and Fedayeen - began to create armed detachments.
Needless to say, the government of Barghazan Khomeini considered transitional on the way to the transfer of power to the radical clergy.
One of important points in the disagreement of the government at the Revolutionary Council was the question of relations with the United States. President J. Carter and the US State Department were extremely dissatisfied with the fall of the Shah's regime, but at first they acted extremely cautiously. Thus, they managed to agree with the new Iranian authorities on the evacuation of 7 thousand US citizens remaining in Iran, and most importantly, the unimpeded removal of American electronic intelligence equipment installed under the Shah's regime along the Soviet border.
However, the Americans refused to supply the new batches of weapons requested by the Iranian government, including destroyers (in fact, missile-carrying cruisers) ordered under the Shah, without the invitation of military advisers and experts from the United States.
On October 21, the US administration informed the Iranian government that the Shah was being granted a temporary visa for hospitalization in the United States, and the following day, the Rockefeller concern arranged for the Shah to fly to New York, where he was placed in a clinic. This gave Khomeini's supporters a pretext for decisive action. They decided to kill two birds with one stone - to put pressure on the United States and remove the Bazargan government.

After the seizure of the embassy, ​​the US State Department expressed "concern", to which the Bazargan government replied that it would "make every effort to satisfactorily resolve the problem" and release the staff of the diplomatic mission.
However, Bazargan and his government were powerless to do anything to free the hostages, and on November 6 Tehran radio broadcast the prime minister's resignation letter addressed to Khomeini. The Ayatollah immediately granted Bazargan's request, and Khomeini's decree was broadcast over the radio to accept the resignation and transfer all state affairs to the Islamic Revolutionary Council, which was entrusted with the preparation of a referendum on the "Islamic constitution", the election of the president and the Majlis, as well as the "revolutionary, decisive purge" in the state apparatus. . The implementation of these measures was the main content of the "second revolution", the victory of which, according to Khomeini, was supposed to benefit "the inhabitants of huts, not palaces."
Thus, having organized the seizure of the embassy, ​​Khomeini's supporters, using the anti-American sentiments of the entire population of Iran, created new state structures.
In December 1979, a popular referendum was held, which approved the "Islamic constitution". In January 1980, presidential elections were held, and in March-May of the same year, a parliament was elected. In August-September, a new, permanent government was created.
In response to the seizure of the embassy, ​​President Carter froze Iranian accounts in American banks, announced an embargo on Iranian oil (despite the energy crisis), announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Iran, and the introduction of a complete economic embargo against Iran. All Iranian diplomats were ordered to leave the US within 24 hours.
Since both sides clearly did not intend to make concessions, Carter tried to resolve political crisis by other means. An American reconnaissance aircraft was sent to Iran, which penetrated Iranian airspace unnoticed and even flew over Tehran.
As a result, US President Jimmy Carter agreed to conduct a military operation to free the hostages in Tehran. According to media reports, the operation was originally called "Rice Pot", and later - "Eagle's Claw".
According to the plan, on April 24, the capture group was supposed to secretly penetrate Iranian territory on six C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft. Three of them were to take on board Delta fighters, and the other three were rubber containers with aviation kerosene to refuel helicopters at a gas station with the code name "Desert-1", which was located about 200 miles (370 km) southeast of Tehran. On the same night, eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters were supposed to take off from the Nimitz aircraft carrier and, flying in a parallel course in four pairs, land at the Desert-1 point half an hour after the planes.
After landing the Delta fighters and refueling the helicopters, the Hercules were supposed to return to the departure airfield on the island of Masirah off the coast of Oman, and the helicopters were to deliver the Delta fighters to a pre-designated shelter in the waiting area near Tehran, which was two hours away, and then fly to another point, 90 km from the shelter of the Delta fighters, and throughout the next day remain there under camouflage nets.

On the evening of April 25, the US CIA agents, who had been sent to Iran in advance, were to transport 118 Delta fighters, accompanied by two former Iranian generals, through the streets of Tehran in six Mercedes trucks and deliver them to the US embassy. Closer to midnight, the group was supposed to start storming the embassy building: climbing the outer walls to the windows, getting inside, "neutralizing" the guards and freeing the hostages. Then it was planned to call helicopters over the radio to evacuate the participants in the operation and former hostages either directly from the territory of the embassy or from a nearby football field. Two AS-1 ZON fire support aircraft loitering over the embassy would support them with fire if the Iranians tried to prevent the helicopters from leaving.
In the predawn mist of the early morning of April 26, helicopters with rescuers and rescued were supposed to fly 65 km south and land at the Manzariye airfield, which by that time would have been in the hands of a US Army ranger company. From there, the hostages were supposed to be flown home in two C-141 jet transport aircraft, while the Rangers were to return in C-130 aircraft.
Before proceeding to the course of the operation, I would like to dwell on three of its details. Well, firstly, what determined the choice of the Desert-1 landing site? The fact is that in 1941-1945. there was a British military airfield, later abandoned. This place was carefully chosen by the Yankees, and the later arguments of their military that they didn’t know that the highway was nearby were, to put it mildly, not serious.
A few days before the start of the operation, a Twin Otter twin-engine turboprop passenger plane landed at the Desert-1 airfield. Its flight range was 1705 km, capacity 19-20 passengers. CIA agents, led by Major John Cartney, investigated the airfield for the possibility of landing C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, and also installed light beacons. The beacons were supposed to be activated by radio signals from approaching American aircraft. I note that the details of the Twin Otter flight are still kept secret.
Not the most successful was the decision to use marine helicopters as "rescue helicopters". The command of the temporary combined arms tactical group opted for the RH-53D "Sea Stallion" helicopters because of their large payload - 2700 kg more than the HH-53 Air Force helicopter. It was also taken into account that the release of minesweeper helicopters from an aircraft carrier on the high seas would not draw attention to the special operation that was being prepared.
However, the crews of the RH-53D marine helicopters were trained to perform one combat mission: searching and sweeping sea mines only in the daytime using a large trawl lowered on a towing cable.
The most curious moment is the fire support of the landing. The AS-130N ("Gunship") had a relatively large firepower: one 105-mm M102 howitzer, one 40-mm Bofors automatic cannon and two 20-mm M61 Vulcan six-barreled guns. I note that the latter fired about 5 thousand (!) Rounds per minute.
The crew of the "Gunship" ("Gunboats") - 13 people. All guns fired on the same side. As you can see, two AC-130Ns could conduct effective fire on a crowd of Iranians, but the low-speed Gunship is easy prey for the oldest fighter.
As already mentioned, judging by some of the details leaked to the media, Eagle Claw should be part of a much larger operation involving the US Air Force and Navy. Photos of the Corsair-2 carrier-based attack aircraft of the Nimitz aircraft carrier appeared in the media with characteristic "quick identification" stripes, which were applied immediately before the start of Operation Eagle Claw. It is not difficult to guess that the "Corsairs" were supposed to cover the landing from the air. It goes without saying that carrier-based fighters were supposed to cover helicopters and Hercules. Let's not forget that most of Iranian Air Force personnel back in February 1979 supported the Islamists.
During Operation Eagle Claw, the attack aircraft carrier Coral Sea was also near the Nimitz aircraft carrier at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Apparently, a joint strike by attack aircraft of both aircraft carriers against Tehran or the Iranian Air Force bases was planned.
Before the start of Operation Eagle Claw, the C-130 squadron was deployed to Egypt under the pretext of participating in joint exercises. Then they flew to the island of Masirah (Oman). After refueling, the Hercules squadron crossed the Gulf of Oman in the dark.
The first landing site was chosen unsuccessfully. After landing the lead C-130, a bus passed along the sandy road. Its driver and about 40 passengers were detained until the Americans left. Following the bus, a tank truck loaded with fuel drove up, which the American special forces destroyed with grenade launchers. A pillar of flame shot up, visible from afar. In addition, two helicopters have already been lost, and one returned to the aircraft carrier. Colonel Beckwith, who commanded the operation, decided to stop the operation.
And then disaster struck. One of the helicopters, after refueling, did not calculate the maneuver and crashed into the Hercules tanker. There was a powerful explosion, and both cars turned into torches. Burned all the fuel for the operation. Ammunition exploded. The panic began. A nearby group of commandos thought it was an Iranian attack. They opened fire indiscriminately. The helicopter pilots, violating the charter, abandoned their cars and ran to a safe place. Secret cards, ciphers, tables remained in the cabins, latest equipment, thousands of dollars and reals. Colonels Beckwith and Kyle couldn't do anything. There was only one thing left - to get out of here as quickly as possible. Such an order followed. Colonel Beckwith gave the order to drop everything, board the Hercules, and retire. The chiefs also violated the charter by not eliminating the remaining helicopters. Later, these "Sea Stallions" served in the Iranian army for several years.

When the Yankees took to the air, five RH-53 D helicopters remained on the ground. Operation Eagle Claw cost $ 150 million and eight dead pilots.
Later, when the invasion of Iranian territory became public, the Sultan of Oman protested and terminated the agreement with the United States, which allowed their Air Force and Navy to use Masirah for their needs.
On May 6, 1980, President Carter ordered national mourning for the eight "dead boys."
In my opinion, Operation Eagle Claw was doomed to failure under the best of circumstances. Even if Delta Force managed to break through to the embassy, ​​the heavily armed students and nearby army units would put up fierce resistance.
As the American journalist Michael Haas wrote: “Overwhelmed by religious zeal, the Iranian, normally a polite person, turns into a distraught fanatic with little or no fear of death. How else can one explain the readiness of Iranian teenagers, driven by the mullahs to a frenzy, to act in the Iran-Iraq war as live mine detectors, groping for mines with their bare feet? It seems alien to a person of Western culture, but, nevertheless, it is one of the main components of Iranian culture.
The bombing of Tehran by American aircraft carriers would inevitably lead to heavy losses among the civilian population. Nevertheless, neither the paratroopers nor the hostages would be able to leave, but Tehran would have to make an alliance with Moscow.
Following the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned. The Carter administration immediately began preparations for a new military operation to free the hostages, called "Badger".
By August 1980, the Badger group was ready to act immediately upon receipt of full information from the CIA about the whereabouts of the hostages. However, neither the command of the operation nor the White House were satisfied with the incoming information due to its incompleteness, and the consequences of the release of only a part of the Americans were too obvious for everyone. Without wanting to be ambiguous, the head of the operation, Major General Secord, unequivocally explained to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff that the Badger was a hammer, not a needle; casualties among the Iranian population will be huge.
Operation Badger involved nothing less than the capture of Tehran International Airport by at least two Ranger battalions, the rescue of hostages by the Delta team from suspected holding sites in Tehran, and the evacuation of the involved troops and hostages by transport aircraft under the cover of carrier-based attack aircraft, which from the beginning and until the end of the operation they were supposed to circle over the city. Even higher above them, carrier-based F-14 fighters were to be on duty to intercept any Iranian aircraft.
As the historian Philip wrote?D. Chinnery in his book "Anytime, Anywhere", a blow to the heart of one of the largest cities in the world should have been struck by more than a hundred aircraft and 4,000 troops. By comparison, Operation Eagle Claw involved a total of 54 aircraft and helicopters, a Delta team of 118, and a ranger company stationed at the evacuation airfield.
There were no further attempts to rescue the hostages.
The State Department had to switch from a stick to a carrot - negotiations began with the Iranian authorities. By the end of January 1981, an Iranian delegation led by Bahzad Nabawi in Algiers reached an agreement with the United States regarding the release of 52 American hostages. Washington has unfrozen Iranian assets worth $12 billion. A huge part of this money ($4 billion) went to pay off the claims of 330 American companies and individuals. Iran agreed to return its debts to various foreign banks ($3.7 billion). So the Iranian government received "clean" only 2.3 billion dollars. 52 American hostages, having survived 444 days of captivity, were released on January 20, 1981, and flew from Mahabad to the American military base in Wiesbaden, Germany, on a Boeing 727.
The resolution of the US hostage crisis proves once again that the political rhetoric of the Iranian and US governments and their practical actions often lie in opposite areas. Since the beginning of the "Islamic revolution" in Iran and to this day, all political and clergy have been cursing Israel with great zeal and even calling for it to be wiped off the face of the earth. And on the sly in the early 1980s, Israel and "revolutionary" Iran entered into an agreement on the supply of spare parts for American weapons and new military equipment in exchange for granting exit visas to Iranian Jews traveling to Israel.

Further more. In 1985-1986 The United States concludes a secret agreement with the "nest of terrorism" Iran on the sale of large quantities of ultra-modern weapons - the latest versions of the Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles"TOU", etc. The Americans used the funds received from these transactions for military assistance to the "contras", who fought in Nicaragua against the legitimately elected government of the Sandinistas. The most curious thing is that the transshipment base for aircraft carrying weapons to Iran was ... Israel. It is clear that Israeli diplomats and intelligence officers played the most active role in the Iran-Contra scam.
American officials and the military did not like to talk about Operation Eagle Claw. But in 2012, the Americans managed to take revenge. The operation, shamefully lost by the Air Force, the Navy and the Delta group, was brilliantly won by ... Hollywood in the film Operation Argo. The fact is that on the day of the storming of the American embassy by Iranian students, six American diplomats took refuge in the Canadian embassy. To help them leave Iran, a CIA agent arrives in the country. Under the guise of a film crew from the sci-fi film Argo, the fugitives successfully bypass security checkpoints at the Tehran airport and leave the country.
Iran decided to sue Hollywood over Argo after it was viewed by cultural officials and film critics at a private screening in Tehran. They concluded that the film is a "product of the CIA", contains anti-Iranian propaganda and distorts historical facts. Masoumeh Ebtekar, a member of the Tehran city council and a participant in the 1979 US embassy siege, claims that the film's director Ben Affleck showed the fury of the Iranians, the thirst for blood and ignored the fact that most of the participants in the siege were peaceful students.
And so, in early 2013, Tehran decided to strike back and began shooting a feature film called "General Staff" with its own version of the events of 1979-1980.
In conclusion, I would like to note that in none of the dozens of foreign and domestic materials relating to this operation, I did not find a single trace of the "hand of Moscow." Nevertheless, our sailors were well aware of almost all the movements of American ships and especially aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. Then we were a great power. From 1971 to 1992, there was the 8th operational squadron, the operating zone of which was the Indian Ocean and especially the Persian Gulf.
In 1979-1980, our nuclear missiles were constantly in the Indian Ocean. submarines project 675 with P-6 missiles and projects 670 and 671 with Amethyst missiles. They tried to continuously keep American strike aircraft carriers in the missile range.
From the airfields in Aden and Ethiopia, our Il-38 anti-submarine aircraft and Tu-95 RTs cruise missile guidance aircraft conducted reconnaissance. I note that in 1980, for a month, only IL-38s, on average, carried out about 20 sorties over the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. By the way, after the overthrow of the Shah, the Iranian authorities allowed our Il-38 and Tu-95 RTs to fly from Central Asian airfields to the Indian Ocean.
Finally, we should not forget about our reconnaissance satellites and spacecraft US-A and US-P for maritime reconnaissance and cruise missile guidance. Our sailors and pilots tracked every attack aircraft carriers' trip to the borders of Russia to the range of carrier-based aircraft. And, of course, they were aware of all American inventions.

Alexander SHIROKORAD
Photo from the author's archive