At the very end of last February, information about a new contract for the supply of weapons became public. As it turned out, back in December 2012, Finland and Russia signed an agreement involving the sale of a certain number of Russian-made machine guns. Our country will receive about 3.1 million euros for spare parts for it. The production of machine guns will be carried out by the Kovrov Degtyarev Plant.
In 2010, the Finnish military expressed a desire to purchase a thousand machine guns chambered for 7.62x54 mm, as well as a number of heavy machine guns. Later, the Russian PKM and Kord machine guns were chosen, which ultimately resulted in the signing of a supply contract. this agreement immediately became the subject of discussion, and a considerable part of the opinions clearly smacked of bewilderment. The fact that Finland began to order Russian weapons looks quite strange and unexpected to an ignorant person. However, Russia and Finland have been cooperating in the field of small arms for several years now. Moreover, the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle was at one time even produced in Finland under license, and also became the basis for a line of automatic weapons still used by the Finnish army. As for Kalashnikov machine guns, there is much less experience in using them.
The first samples of PKM reached Finland only in the early nineties of the last century, when Moscow and Helsinki agreed to partially repay Soviet debts through arms supplies. In the Finnish armed forces, the PKM machine gun was designated Konekivääri 7.62, which can be translated as “7.62 mm machine gun.” Along with the PKM, large-caliber machine guns NSV-12.7 “Utes” also came to Finland. In the Finnish army they received the new designation ITKK 96 and are still used in the mounted version and for arming various equipment. Apparently, twenty years of experience in operating the PKM and NSV-12.7 machine guns left an extremely positive impression, and the Finnish Ministry of Defense decided to purchase new weapons of these types.
For a normal understanding of the existing contract, it is necessary to consider several issues related to ammunition, moral and material obsolescence of weapons, etc. As for ammunition, the Finnish military will not have problems with them. The fact is that 7.62x54R and 12.7x108 mm cartridges are available in sufficient quantities in warehouses, and the production of the former is still ongoing. There is no exact information about the production of large-caliber cartridges, but from the very fact of ordering “Cordov” the appropriate conclusions can be drawn. Thus, new machine guns are guaranteed not to be left without cartridges, and their manufacture will not take much effort. It is noteworthy that the famous cartridge factory in the city of Lapua was once built specifically for the production of Russian 7.62x54R cartridges.
An interesting feature of 7.62mm rifle cartridges is also their characteristics. Several decades ago, gunsmiths from different countries, including Finland, created a large number of light machine guns chambered for intermediate cartridges. During recent military conflicts, it became clear that infantry units also need automatic weapons chambered for a rifle cartridge. It has certain advantages over machine guns or machine guns that use intermediate ammunition, and therefore in a number of situations it can not only help a unit, but even decide the outcome of a firefight. Therefore, in recent years, all the leading small arms developers have been working on their own versions of new light machine guns for “old” cartridges. If the command of the Finnish army agrees with the current increase in the priority of machine guns chambered for a rifle cartridge, then another argument appears in favor of the PKT.
The second issue to consider concerns the current state of machine guns in the Finnish army. Delivered in the nineties PKM machine guns A relatively small number of units were armed. In them, Soviet/Russian weapons replaced Finnish-made KvKK 62 machine guns, chambered for the Soviet intermediate cartridge 7.62x39 mm. However, the KvKK 62 remained the main Finnish machine gun for arming infantry. Half a century has passed since the adoption of this weapon and it cannot be called modern. Thus, urgent rearmament is required with the replacement of old machine guns with new ones.
In the case of heavy machine guns, the situation looks a little different. Behind last decades The Finnish army managed to use the Soviet DShK and NSV-12.7, as well as the American M2HB. The first ones have long been withdrawn from service and disposed of, but the other two types still remain in service. The thrifty Finns produced cartridges for both types of heavy machine guns in their factories. Therefore, we can say that the purchase of Russian Cordas is dictated not so much by the need to replace old weapons, but by the quality of new ones.
Finally, with regard to PKM machine guns, it is worth noting the rather interesting composition of tender participants. In fact, only two arms factories were the favorites of the competition: the Russian Degtyarev Plant (Kovrov) and the Bulgarian Arsenal Ltd. Back during the Warsaw Pact, a Bulgarian company received a license to produce PKM machine guns for its armed forces. Licensed Kalashnikov Upgraded Machine Guns are called MG-1M. They differ from the original PCM only in the name and some minor design details. As you can see, the Finnish army was not interested in Bulgarian licensed machine guns.
In general, the current situation with the supply of Russian machine guns to Finland, upon careful consideration, ceases to be incomprehensible and strange. The decision of the Finnish command is completely justified and is based on several objective facts. The prerequisites for the recent tender were problems with the current state of machine gun “equipment”, and the final decision was influenced by issues of production quality and ammunition supply. The deal itself ultimately turns out to be beneficial for both parties: Russia will receive money, and Finland will receive modern small arms. According to available data, the order for the supply of machine guns will be completed by the end of this year 2013.
Based on materials from sites:
http://bmpd.livejournal.com/
http://lenta.ru/
http://rus.ruvr.ru/
http://world.guns.ru/
Small arms of the USSR, Finland, Germany.
After the end of World War II, Soviet historians faced a rather difficult task. To serve the interests of the pariah, it was necessary to explain the reasons for the defeat in 1941 and tell the people about the enormous contribution of the CPSU to strengthening the country's defense. It is clear that when setting such a task, you cannot write a clear history and you cannot establish the real reasons for the failures. After the collapse of the USSR, many writers followed the inertia of Soviet “research”. Others decided that the communists would not criticize themselves in vain and added their own to their criticism. As a result, no one succeeded in conducting normal historical research. That is why you have to undertake the search for the truth yourself.
The results of the winter campaign of the war with the Finns in 1939–1940 became the reason for an incorrect assessment of the combat capability of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The fact that small Finland was able to resist the onslaught of Soviet troops for so long and effectively created a feeling of weakness of the Red Army. And to this day there are many historians who believe that Stalin deliberately waged a war with Finland with outdated weapons and the most unprepared troops, that he committed this gigantic bluff in order to mislead the whole world.” (Paul Karel “Eastern Front. Book One. “Hitler Goes to the East” 1941-1943”, p. 49)
A Finnish proverb says: there are many smart people on land when there is trouble at sea. While our army fought in the snows of Finland, everyone and everyone laughed at it. And when the Germans moved their armies to the West in May, no one was laughing. “The Wehrmacht campaign in the West and the defeat of the Anglo-French coalition in May-June 1940 were an even greater sensation for the world community, including the Soviet one, than the course and results of the “Winter War.” (VIZH, 1990, No. 7, quotation from Taras’s anthology “The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940” pp. 28-29). Before this, the French army was considered the strongest in Europe. And after the German blitzkrieg, everyone remembered its shortcomings in strategy, tactics and military equipment. And if the Germans had not struck France in May 1940, the French army would have continued to be considered the strongest in Europe.
Of all the armies that participated in World War II, the Red Army is the most criticized. The Red Army gets the most criticism from critics for the events of 1941 and the Finnish campaign. But in 1941, Hitler simply managed to suddenly attack the USSR at a time when the Soviet armed forces simply could not physically organize the defense of their country. A significant role in this was played by the fact that Hitler did not make proper preparations for the war with the USSR. Stalin's intelligence knew that the German army did not have the necessary supplies of warm clothing, equipment and means for waging war in winter conditions, as well as sufficient supplies of ammunition for such a large-scale war. But, as the proverb says: “before the smart man thinks about his business, the fool has already done his.” That's what Hitler did - he attacked without basic preparation for war with Russia. However, even after attacking her, he did not carry out the necessary preparations during the war. In his army, all the equipment froze in the winter and got stuck in the mud in the spring and fall.
In 1939, the Finnish infantry division had 250 light and 116 heavy machine guns. (Kozlov " Soviet-Finnish war". Data from Taras’s anthology: Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.” p. 279). This is less than in the Soviet rifle division reduced staff in 1935. After all, even then our division had 182 easel, more than 350 light and 18 anti-aircraft machine guns. (Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”, volume 1, p. 127). There were no special anti-aircraft machine guns in the Finnish division at all. And in our division, in addition to the machine guns listed, there were machine guns on tanks and armored vehicles. The Finnish infantry divisions had no tanks or armored vehicles at all.
“The heavy machine guns of the Finnish army were mainly Maxim systems of various modifications.” (Kozlov “The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. A look from the other side”, quotation from Taras’s anthology “The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940”. p. 230). This system was also used in our country. But the Finns, besides him, had a machine gun of their own design. "Lahti-Saloranta system light machine gun technical specifications was close to the Soviet DP, but was developed a year earlier, in 1926. The machine gun was equipped with a box or disk magazine with a capacity of 20 to 75 rounds and, in fact, was used as a single machine gun: manual, light heavy, anti-aircraft.” (Ibid., p. 230).
The number of machine guns in the Red Army was constantly increasing before the war; our strategists perfectly understood their role and importance for their own troops. “There is no need to talk much about the advisability of increasing the number of machine guns in the infantry and cavalry, which Conrad was concerned about.” (Shaposhnikov B.M. “Memoirs. Military - scientific works" 2nd edition, page 445).
In 1939, our rifle division had even more machine guns: “The number of machine guns was almost twice as large as in the Finnish division - 419 manual and 200 easel. It’s true that there were no submachine guns: at the end of the 30s, the People’s Commissariat of Defense considered them “police weapons,” and from February 1939, all 4173 PPD-34s manufactured by that time were removed from service with the Red Army and removed from the troops.” (Kozlov, ibid., pp. 232-333).
The Finnish infantry division has 250 submachine guns. If you add up the number of machine guns and the number of submachine guns, it turns out that the Finnish division has 616 units of automatic weapons. This is still less than we have only light and heavy machine guns. And this is not counting machine guns on tanks and armored vehicles, not counting anti-aircraft machine guns, not taking into account automatic and semi-automatic rifles. What if you add them together?
And now in more detail about the machines. In official documentation in the USSR and Russia, an assault rifle is called an assault rifle. The machine gun uses a rifle cartridge, usually with a slightly smaller cartridge case than a rifle. Abroad, in official documentation a submachine gun is called a machine gun. This weapon is designed to use a pistol cartridge. The firing range and accuracy of a submachine gun is less than that of a machine gun. In everyday life, both types of weapons are called machine guns.
The world's first machine gun was created in Russia in 1916. Its caliber was 6.5 mm and the magazine contained 25 rounds. It was created specifically to suppress machine gun points by advancing troops. For this purpose, special automatic units were created. It was manufactured until 1925 and was used even during the Second World War. “The Soviet troops were armed with a number of obsolete Fedorov assault rifles.” (Lipatov “Winter War”, quotation from Taras’s anthology “The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940” p. 151).
The Finns did not have machine guns (assault rifles) at all, but they had Suomi M-31 submachine guns, which were produced in small quantities. In the Red Army, in addition to machine guns, there were also submachine guns.
“The development of domestic submachine guns began in the mid-20s. First soviet pistol– the machine gun adopted by the command staff of the Red Army was the 7.62 mm submachine gun model 1934 by V.A. Degtyarev (PPD-34). It was recognized as the best example of a weapon out of 14 submachine guns submitted for field testing...However, at the beginning, all of them were not fully appreciated positive traits a new type of weapon, and therefore its production, organized at the Kovrov plant, was insignificant: in 1934-1939, 4 thousand submachine guns were produced. Only based on the results of its use in the war with the White Finns in 1939-1940 did the new type of weapon receive the deserved assessment.
At the beginning of 1940, the PPD-34 submachine gun was improved: a magazine of increased capacity for 71 rounds was developed for it. The modernized model (PPD-40) was called the 7.62-mm submachine gun of the 1940 model of the Degtyarev system
The production of submachine guns increased rapidly; in 1940, 81.1 thousand were manufactured.” (encyclopedia “Weapons of Victory”. pp. 251-252)
In 1939, a strange thing happened with the Soviet submachine gun. According to some sources, he was removed from the army in February 1939, and according to others, on the eve of the war with the Finns. According to Soviet historians, the submachine gun was recognized as a police weapon. Some sources write that it was even called “the weapon of American gangsters.” Pistol-machine guns were seized from army units. But they were not given to our police officers (NKVD officers). Naturally, they didn’t give it to the American gangsters either. At the same time, the development of new models of submachine guns continued at the same pace. And Fedorov’s assault rifle was not removed from the troops. After fighting in Finland, they decided that they had made a mistake and returned the PPD to the troops. And immediately having developed PPD-40, they began its mass production.
A lot of questions arise regarding this strange story. Firstly, since a submachine gun was recognized as a police weapon, why weren’t they given to our police? Our police, as well as the army, are preparing for the Sovietization of the whole world. A submachine gun will be useful to her. And it was not worth stopping the production of submachine guns because of this. On the contrary, it should have been increased and all submachine guns should have been transferred to NKVD units. Why did the pistols and machine guns withdrawn from the army remain in army warehouses?
Secondly, if the submachine gun was in fact recognized as an unpromising weapon, why did the development of new types of these weapons continue? The next submachine gun PPSh-41, which was put into service, had 25 competitors at the competition. Please note that not a single Soviet book says that simultaneously with the withdrawal of PPD-34, the design and testing of new models of submachine guns was stopped. This is because the development of new systems continued in full swing.
Thirdly, why wasn’t Fedorov’s assault rifle seized? Many historians, commenting on the decision to withdraw submachine guns, argue that the Red Army command underestimated the importance of hand-held automatic weapons in general. As if it believed that if you give a soldier an automatic weapon, he will not shoot accurately, without saving ammunition. But manual reloading will force him to shoot accurately, avoiding unnecessary consumption of ammunition. If the Soviet command really thought this way, it would have removed from the troops not only machine guns and submachine guns, but also automatic and semi-automatic rifles too. However, note that it did not do this.
Fourthly, why was the restarted production of PPD started without any delays? If PPD-34 was discontinued, then the production facilities and the workers employed in them had to switch to the production of other products. Shouldn't they stand idle? To restart the production of PPD, it was necessary to rebuild the production process again. This would take a lot of time. But the restarted production was started so quickly that I personally have doubts: whether it was stopped at all, and if it was stopped, then most likely the production lines were not switched to the production of other products. It is possible that the production of PPD-34 was stopped only in order to switch to the production of a new model PPD-40. After all, the PPD-40 model differed from PPD-34 in more than just one magazine. There were many differences.
There is only one reasonable reason why PPD-34 was withdrawn from the Soviet troops - this is a giveaway game. They were confiscated so that it would be easier for Finnish troops to fight the Red Army and so that the whole world would consider the Soviet leaders fools. When the giveaway games were over, the submachine guns were returned. And if the production of submachine guns was stopped, it was only in order to switch to new model. Perhaps by chance this transition coincided with the winter war.
The Finnish submachine gun "Suomi" had a caliber of 9 mm, a weight without magazine of 4650 grams (according to other sources - 4680 grams), a rate of fire of 800 rpm (according to other sources 900 rpm). The Soviet PPD-34 had a caliber of 7.62 mm, a weight without magazine of 3850 g, and a rate of fire of 800-1000 rpm. The Soviet PPD-34 was lighter than the Finnish Suomi due to more large caliber Suomi cartridges weighed more. The Suomi M-31 magazine for 71 rounds weighed 2.41 kg. The Soviet PPD -40 magazine for 71 rounds weighed only 0.79 kg. This allowed Soviet soldiers to take with them larger number cartridges. And the main advantage of PPD over Suomi is sighting range. For PPD it is 500 meters, for Suomi it is only 200.
There is an opinion that the Finnish infantry was abundantly armed with submachine guns and there were even entire units of machine gunners. There was simply nothing like this in the Finnish army. All this is a figment of the imagination of careless writers.
“There was simply no dominance of Suomi submachine guns in the Finnish army. The standard organization of the Finnish infantry regiment (2954) included 2325 rifles, 36 heavy machine guns, 72 light machine guns and 72 submachine guns. Submachine guns accounted for 3% (in words: three percent) of the number of rifles. There were slightly more submachine guns in the so-called sissi battalions. Semantic meaning of this term - a partisan battalion, or, if modernized, a battalion special purpose. They were intended for independent actions with envelopments and detours through the forests of the advancing divisions of the Red Army. Instead of two submachine guns in a regular army infantry platoon, sissi battalion platoons received four Suomi submachine guns. This was done due to the fact that the battalion did not have a company of heavy machine guns, which required compensation - a reduction* (*the author apparently made a typo and actually wanted to write “increase”) in the number of automatic weapons at the platoon level. Otherwise, the organization of partisan battalions coincided with regular ones. All stories about companies or battalions of Finns, all armed with Suomi machine guns, are pure fiction. At best, generated by eyes widened in fear. To some extent, this phenomenon can be explained by the absolutely terrifying situation with light machine guns. The Finnish light machine gun of the Lahti-Saloranta system was downright bad. Not only was the machine gun's magazine capacity only 20 rounds, but the weapon's reliability was extremely low. Under these conditions, the Suomi submachine gun with a large-capacity disk magazine was a real salvation, especially in short-range combat. Soviet infantry regiments were much better equipped with automatic weapons. Instead of 72 submachine guns and 72 light machine guns, the Finns had 142 light machine guns in the Soviet rifle regiment. This made it possible to create a dense front of fire both offensively and defensively at all real battle distances.” (A. Isaev “Antisuvorov. Ten myths of the Second World War.” pp. 107-108)
Whoever says that the Finnish campaign was for Soviet army that lesson that made us realize the importance of hand-held automatic weapons, which supposedly contributed to the further development of new types of automatic weapons. And without it, we would have had PPD-40, PPSh-41, PPS-43. Before the Finnish campaign, and even after it, the Soviet military leadership relied on light machine guns, automatic and semi-automatic rifles. These types of weapons had advantages over submachine guns in terms of range and shooting accuracy. But after the defeats in 1941, we had to rely on cheaper types of weapons. In 1942, the USSR no longer began producing automatic and semi-automatic rifles. The release of PPD was also abandoned, and PPSh began to be produced instead. The PPSh was easier to manufacture, but its effective range was only 200 m.
“According to documents of the Russian State Archive of Economics (RGEA), or rather, fund 79301 (People's Commissariat of Armaments), inventory 1, file 3219, l. 71 (“Report on the progress of the production of automatic small arms at the enterprises of the People’s Commissariat” for 1939), the reasons for the discontinuation of the “PPD” are described as follows: “On February 21, 1939, production of the “PPD” submachine guns will cease until the noted deficiencies are eliminated and simplifying the design." There were more than enough reasons for such a decision. The planned purchase price of “PPD-34” in 1936 was as much as 1,350 rubles. For comparison, the 7.62 mm rifle mod. 1891/1930 in the same year it was ordered by the army at a price of 90 rubles, a Nagant revolver - 50 rubles, and a Degtyarev “DP - 27” light machine gun - 787 rubles. In light of all this, the Degtyarev submachine gun seemed like a luxury with very dubious tactical capabilities.
However, there is no abandonment of submachine guns as a type of weapon, and further in the above-mentioned file (l. 78) it is written: “The development of a new type of automatic weapon chambered for a pistol cartridge will be continued for a possible replacement of the outdated PPD design.” Long before the Finnish war, the weapon was assessed as promising and having the right to exist: “Since submachine guns are in service with the Red Army and ... are very desirable for modern close combat ... oblige the department to eliminate the shortcomings noted in their design as soon as possible...” (ibid. .L 81) The result of work on a “new type of weapon chambered for a pistol cartridge” is well known. This is a submachine gun designed by G.S. Shpagin (“PPSh”), which was presented for factory testing on August 20, 1940. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the production of a series of Shpagin and Shpitalny submachine guns for comprehensive testing. Based on the results of these tests, on December 21, 1940. sample developed by G.S. Shpagin, put into service under the designation “PPSh-41”.
The history of “PPD” ended precisely at this moment, and not as a result of hesitation regarding the feasibility of its production. In this regard, it is quite interesting to look at the production statistics of “PPD” and “PPSh”.
The release of “PPD” by year was:
1934 – 44 pcs.
1935 – 23 pieces.
1937 -1291 pcs.
1938 - 1115 pcs.
1939 – 1700 pcs.
1940 – 81118 pcs.
1941 – 5868 units.
Finally, together “PPSh” and “PPD” in 1941 - 98,644 units.
Indeed, there was a fading of production in 1939, but then this lag was more than covered in 1940 and came to naught in 1941 due to the entry into service of the PPSh-41. (A. Isaev “Anti-Suvorov. Ten myths of the Second World War.” pp. 108-110)
According to Isaev, it turns out that the PPD-34 cost as much as fifteen Mosin rifles or two DP-27 machine guns. Maybe it is so. Personally, I do not have data on their prices. It is possible that it was precisely because of this that the USSR was in no hurry to begin mass production of submachine guns. But we cannot say that the production of PPD was stopped due to the appearance of PPSh-41. After all, both of these submachine guns were produced from 1940 to 1942. It’s just that the PPD was much more complex and more expensive than the PPSh-41, and in 1942, due to a shortage of weapons, the main task for the military industry was to saturate the troops with weapons. It was easier to do this by switching to the production of one model of submachine guns. In this situation, the choice naturally fell on the PPSh-41. Under other circumstances, the USSR would not have abandoned the production of PPD-40, but would have produced both models simultaneously. After all, although the PPD-40 cost much more than the PPSh-41, it had a much longer sighting range.
In general, the Soviet military leadership wanted to arm its entire army with automatic weapons. There was only one question before him: what kind of weapon should he arm it with? Which weapon should you choose? The release of the Fedorov assault rifle in the USSR was abandoned in 1925. Since I do not know for what reasons this was done, I will not comment or discuss this decision. Submachine gun suitable for mass weapons There was no army yet in the 20s and 30s. Automatic rifle too. Therefore, the only option for arming the Red Army was the light machine gun. Stalin personally put forward the requirement that such a machine gun be as close in weight as possible to a rifle. This machine gun was created in 1927. It was this that became the main automatic weapon of the Red Army until Soviet designers developed high-quality automatic rifles suitable for mass production. And until this happened, the Red Army was densely saturated with light machine guns. Even during the war with the Germans, the Soviet command created partisan detachments from the NKVD troops, where the fighters were all armed with light machine guns. The Soviet command understood perfectly well that it was impossible for all soldiers in the army to be given machine guns instead of rifles, but at the same time they tried to saturate the army with them as much as possible to a reasonable extent and created a lot of machine gun units.
The Red Army is criticized for having a Mosin self-loading rifle in its arsenal. Nobody criticizes the Finnish army for the same thing.
“The basis of all Finnish rifles and carbines was the famous Mosin rifle. Early samples (M-91 carbine, M-27, M-28 rifles) were alterations of Russian army rifles, shortened and with changes mainly in the muzzle: the front sight was equipped with a safety device against accidental impacts, a new upper stock ring was installed with a device for attaching a knife bayonet
Later rifles of Finnish production proper (M-29-30 “Shutskor”, M-30, M-39) were more significant alterations of the Mosin system, and the changes concerned mainly elements that ensure the convenience of the shooter when using the weapon. The design of the sighting device differed from the original model. A different device was used. The stock was made with a pistol-shaped neck.” (Kozlov “The Soviet-Finnish War. 1939-1940 A Look from the Other Side.” Riga Quoted from Taras’s anthology “The Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940” p. 229)
The five-shot Mosin rifle was produced since 1891. The Finnish army got it after the first collapse of Russia caused by the communists. Russian Tsar Nicholas II wanted to begin rearmament from the Mosin rifle to automatic rifles*, but the outbreak of the First World War did not allow these plans to be implemented. Nicholas II, of course, did not have such grandiose plans of conquest as Comrade Stalin had. But already in 1914 he wanted to begin rearmament with automatic rifles. Stalin planned to conquer the whole world. But he did not plan to completely arm his army with automatic rifles. This can be reproached to him. But at the same time, it is necessary to remember that in other armies things were no better. At the beginning of World War II, only the US Army had semi-automatic rifles in service. In addition, German troops used an insignificant number of semi-automatic rifles that they received after the capture of Czechoslovakia. Other armies, including the Finnish one, did not have automatic or semi-automatic rifles. So the seizure of the PPD-34 from the Soviet troops did not particularly harm them. Since the lack of submachine guns was compensated by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles.
“The trigger mechanism allowed firing both single shots and bursts. Thus, depending on the selected firing mode, the ABC-36 rifle could perform the functions of a repeating rifle and a light machine gun.” (Encyclopedia “Weapons of Victory”. Page 247)
“The production of ABC-36 rifles was organized at the Izhevsk Arms Plant and before the start of the Great Patriotic War, more than 65 thousand of them were manufactured.” (ibid. p.250)
“Based on their results (meaning tests of various models of automatic rifles), in 1936 the Simonov rifle was put into service under the name ABC-36. Planned purchase price automatic rifle Simonova in 1937 was 1393 rubles. It was this rifle that was the favorite child of the military department, and not a submachine gun, which had an insignificant firing range at the same cost
*At that time, automatic was any weapon that was reloaded without muscular force, that is, semi-automatic and automatic rifles
In specie. This is best demonstrated by the production statistics of Simonov rifles and Degtyarev submachine guns. In total, from 1934 to 1939, the pistol
A little more than 4,100 PPD machine guns were produced... At the same time, 106 Simonov automatic rifles were produced in 1934, 286 in 1935, and after the ABC-36 was put into service, tens of thousands poured off the production line things. In 1937, 10,280 ABC-36 rifles were produced, in 1938 - 24,401.” A. Isaev “Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II." pp.112-113).
In 1938, the SVT-38 self-loading rifle was created. On the basis of the latter, the AVT-40 automatic rifle was created. Based on the results of the use of the SVT-38 rifle in the winter war, its new model was developed - the SVT-40. Production of the SVT-40 began on July 1, 1940.
“Mass production of F.V. Tokarev’s rifles was mastered in 1939, and in 1941 1031.9 thousand were produced.” (encyclopedia “Weapons of Victory” p. 251)
“Gradually, however, the SVTs produced before the war were lost, and production (until 1943) was carried out in insignificant volumes. If in 1941 1,031,861 SVT-40 rifles were produced, then in 1942 only 264,148 units were produced. Due to their low cost and ease of production, PPSh submachine guns began to play an increasingly important role. Its price in 1941 was 500 rubles, which is already quite comparable to the price of a rifle of the 1891/30 model. in the same period 163 rubles. It was already noticeably cheaper than SVT. At the same time, "PPSh" was suitable for mass production at non-core enterprises. “SVT” consisted of 143 parts, “PPSh” - from 87. In addition, a significant part of the parts of the self-loading rifle required complex processing on metal-cutting machines, while on “PPSh” such parts as the bolt box and its cover were manufactured “according to - automobile" - by stamping from a steel sheet." (A. Isaev “Anti-Suvorov. Ten myths of the Second World War.” pp. 124-125)
When Hitler attacked the USSR, Red Army units were armed with two models of automatic and two models of semi-automatic rifles. According to some reports, on the morning of June 22, 1.5 million Tokarev rifles were in service with the Soviet troops. During the unsuccessful battles of 1941, most of the Soviet small arms fell into the hands of German troops and their allies. And since 1942, the Soviet military
the industry abandoned the production of difficult-to-produce automatic and semi-automatic rifles and switched to producing exclusively Mosin rifles and carbines. Therefore, the number of automatic and semi-automatic rifles in the Soviet troops quickly decreased with each passing day of the war. And only at the very end of the war, a tiny number of semi-automatic carbines of the Simonov system from the experimental batch were sent to the Soviet troops for front-line testing. Which in itself could not have any influence on the course of hostilities.
The German troops had the opposite. They started the war with the USSR without having non-automatic or semi-automatic rifles, except for the scanty number of Czechoslovak semi-automatic rifles ZH - 29. But during the war, they established their mass production. Over 400 thousand semi-automatic rifles of the Gever brand (G-41 and G-43) were manufactured with an aiming range of 1200 meters and a rate of fire of 20 and 40 rpm, respectively. 7 thousand VG-42 automatic rifles were made with an aiming range of 900 m and a rate of fire of 600 rpm. And finally, 425 thousand real Sturmgever - 44 (StG - 44) assault rifles were produced. It had an effective range of 800 m and a rate of fire of 500 rpm.
If you believe Soviet propaganda, you get the following picture of the war: at the beginning of the war, the Soviet infantry was poorly armed (that is, it was armed with almost only Mosin rifles), and the German infantry was well armed and had many automatic weapons. But if you look at the facts, the picture turns out to be different. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet infantry was well armed, and in addition to the old but reliable Mosin rifle, it had Fedorov assault rifles, albeit old, semi-automatic and automatic rifles, a large number of heavy and light machine guns. At the beginning of the war with the USSR, the German army had an old but quite reliable Mauser rifle (its performance characteristics are close to the Mosin rifle), a good light machine gun used as a universal and big variety captured weapons. Automatic rifles in German army were absent. Semi-automatic ones were available in negligible quantities; we can assume that they did not exist at all.
According to Soviet propaganda, by the end of the war small arms Soviet infantry has sharply improved in quality, but the German small arms
infantry has not improved much. But in reality, the opposite was true. By the end of the war, the Red Army was left without machine guns, automatic and semi-automatic rifles. In the German army, by the end of the war, all these weapons appeared in large quantities. Conclusion: the small arms of the Soviet infantry at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War were better than the German ones, but at the end they became worse. During the war, the weapons of the Soviet infantry generally deteriorated, while the German ones improved in all respects.
articles.
It is widely believed that the German army was well armed with submachine guns from the very beginning of World War II. This is not true. Even when she started the war against the USSR, her army experienced a great shortage of this species
weapons.
“During this inspection tour, soldiers and officers unanimously complained about
interruptions in their supply small arms. They especially lacked submachine guns; the soldiers had to use captured Soviet machine guns.
This reproach should have been addressed entirely to Hitler. How former soldier The First World War, he stubbornly did not want to give up the traditional carbine that was familiar to him. In the summer of 1942, with firm confidence, he decisively rejected our proposal to establish the production of already developed new-style machine guns and arm the Wehrmacht with them.” (Speer “Memoirs” p. 442)
After the war, Soviet film directors made many films in which almost all German soldiers were armed with submachine guns, and Soviet soldiers considered it lucky to take the German “Schmeisser” as trophies. But in reality it was the other way around.
The Nazi troops were armed with several models of submachine guns chambered for the 9x19 mm Parabellum cartridge. As a rule, German submachine guns had a rate of fire of 500 rpm, an effective range of 200 m, a weight of just over 4 kilograms, a magazine capacity of 32 rounds and could only fire automatic view fire, i.e. shoot in bursts. However, before the war, and even during it, submachine guns were produced in small quantities. And only towards the end of the war did German industry begin to increase the volume of production of this type of weapons.
The Wehrmacht troops used MR-18 submachine guns, which were created during the First World War. They differed from other German submachine guns in that, in addition to a magazine for 32 rounds, the MP-18 had a magazine for 20 rounds. Based on the MP-18, the MP-28 was created with magazines for 32 and 50 rounds. Both models had a wooden stock and a butt without a pistol grip.
Although the MP-41 was not officially adopted for service, it was nevertheless used in some units. Unlike other German submachine guns, the MP-41 had a wooden stock and a butt without a pistol grip. In total, no more than 20 thousand copies of this weapon were manufactured. The MP-41 had the ability to fire in bursts and single shots. He weighed 3870 g.
The Bergman MP-35/1 submachine gun has been produced since 1935. It differed from other German submachine guns in that it had a wooden stock and butt, magazines for 20, 24, 32 rounds, and a rate of fire of 540 rpm. Its sighting range was a record - 1000 m.
The main pistols for the German troops were the MP-38, MP-38/40 and MP-40 submachine guns. Structurally, they differed little from each other. In fact, each subsequent model was a slightly improved model of the previous one. They were often called pistols - Schmeiser machine guns (although Schmeiser was not the designer of these models). These submachine guns did not have wooden parts. They had pistol grips and folding shoulder rests. The basic performance characteristics (weight, rate of fire, sighting range, magazine capacity) were similar to those of other German submachine guns. It is only worth mentioning that there was a model MP-40 with a receiver for installing two standard magazines at once. According to some reports, 1 million submachine guns were produced in Germany before 1944.
“During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet industry produced 1515.9 thousand machine guns of all types. 12139.3 thousand rifles and carbines, 6173.9 thousand submachine guns.” (Encyclopedia “Weapons of Victory”, p. 278).
“In Germany, from mid-1941 to April 1945, 1048.5 thousand machine guns, 7845.7 thousand rifles and carbines, 935.4 thousand submachine guns were produced.” (Ibid., p. 279).
Our Soviet industry, of course, was ahead of Germany in the number of weapons manufactured, but we should not forget that Germany had allies who also produced various weapons, including submachine guns. They were made in Italy, Hungary, Romania, Austria and Finland. Very often, some of them were superior in their characteristics to Soviet submachine guns. For example, the Hungarian Geppistol models 39m and 43m had an effective range of 600 meters.
As for the machine gun armament of the German troops, at the time of the outbreak of the war with the USSR it was represented by only one single, so-called general purpose machine gun MG-34, which weighed 11500g, had a rate of fire of 800-900 rpm and an effective range of 3000 m The machine gun is powered by metal belts of 110 rounds or magazines with a capacity of 75 rounds. When heated, the barrel was replaced with a spare one (which was always available for every MG-34); for this, the shooter had to wear special gloves so as not to burn his hands. When mounted on a tripod, the MG-34 could perform the functions of a heavy machine gun. Firing from the MG-34 could be carried out relying on a special bipod. The MG-34 was too heavy to fire on the move, “from the belt,” while standing, that is, without support on the ground. And because of this, it was inconvenient for conducting offensive battles in populated areas and in enemy trenches, where it was necessary to quickly redirect it from one target to another.
In the German army in 1941 there were no anti-aircraft, mounted heavy machine guns. And no one criticizes it for this, but the Soviet one is criticized even for the lack of a so-called light machine gun. Despite the fact that there was no machine gun in the world lighter than our DP and DPM (both weigh 8400g) and the fact that in 1944 Degtyarev created an even lighter RPD machine gun (weight 7400g).
The Finnish LS-26 light machine gun weighed 9.6 kg without ammunition. Sokolov, in his book “Secrets of the Finnish War,” never once reproached the Finns for the lack of a light machine gun, but the Soviet army suffered from him for this. In his book there is a whole discussion on this topic.
The Soviet troops had a full set of machine gun weapons. The main heavy machine gun of the Maxim system had a caliber of 7.62 mm, weight - 20300g, sighting range 2700m, rate of fire - 250-300 rpm, feed - belt, belt capacity - 250 rounds. The barrel water cooling system made the machine gun heavier, but made it possible to do without a replaceable barrel.
To combat air targets, the Soviet troops used quad Maxim systems. These installations were mounted on cars. However, very often these installations fired at ground targets.
Before World War II, the Red Army also had in service the lighter DS-39 heavy machine gun (Degtyarev heavy machine gun model 1939) of rifle caliber with an air cooling system. The machine gun had a mass of 14300g, two firing rates of 600/1200 rpm, and an effective range of 2400m. Tape food. Belt capacity -250 rounds. DS-39 had a tripod instead of a wheeled machine. It provided for the possibility of replacing an overheated barrel with a spare one. True, in June 1941 the production of the DS-39 was stopped, and instead they began to be produced again with Maxim system machine guns.
The Soviet large-caliber heavy machine gun of the Degtyarev-Shpagin system of the 1938 model (DShK) had a caliber of 12.7 mm, a rate of fire of 80 rpm, an effective range of 3500 meters, a belt capacity of 50 rounds, and a weight of 34,000 g. The large caliber made it possible to use it to fight German light tanks and armored vehicles. The machine designed by Kolesnikov made it possible to fire at ground targets from wheels (when the three supports of the machine were folded together). To fire at air targets, the wheel drive was separated and the machine was unfolded in the form of a high tripod
Long before World War II, the Russian designer Degtyarev managed to create a light machine gun with a mass of only 8400 g. The DT machine gun of the 1927 model had a caliber of 7.62 mm, an effective range of 1500 m, and a rate of fire of -600 rpm. The disk magazine capacity is 47 rounds. Later, in 1944, a modernized version of the DPM appeared, which, however, did not differ in ballistic characteristics from the previous one.
During the war, Soviet machine gun armament was supplemented with new types of weapons. In 1943, the Goryunov system heavy machine gun entered service with the Red Army. It had a caliber of -7.62mm, weight without the machine -13800g, rate of fire - 250-300 rpm, sighting range - 2000m. Wheeled machine. Cooling is air. Therefore, each SG-43 machine gun had a spare barrel. During the war years, 74 thousand SG-43 and SGM (modernized version) machine guns were produced. These machine guns were supposed to replace the Maxim system machine guns, which the DS-39 machine guns did not do.
In 1944, a new manual RPD machine gun. It was lighter than the DP by exactly a kilogram and weighed 7400 g without cartridges. The RPD had a shorter barrel and a shorter sighting range of only 1000 m. Its rate of fire was higher than 650-670 rpm. Magazine capacity is 100 rounds. This machine gun was very convenient in offensive battles and for fighting in trenches and populated areas.
In addition, in 1944, a large-caliber machine gun of the Vladimirov system (KPV) was created. It had a caliber of 14.5 mm, a weight of 47,500 g, a rate of fire of 70-80 rpm, and an effective range of 2000 m. tape food. Tape capacity is 40 rounds. The KPV combined the rate of fire of a heavy machine gun and the armor-piercing power of an anti-tank rifle. This weapon allowed Soviet infantry to fight enemy armored vehicles and destroy other enemy equipment.
In Finland, during the Second World War, nothing changed in the production of small arms for its army. Changes in the armament of the army occurred only through the capture of captured weapons, the receipt of weapons from the allies and the wear and tear of existing weapons.
In the German army things were different. There they consistently modernized the MG-34 machine gun. And already during the Second World War, a new general purpose machine gun MG-42 was created. It had a rifle caliber of 7.92 mm. Its mass and target range were the same as those of the MG-34 - 11500g and 3000m, respectively. But the rate of fire increased to 1200 rpm.
Since 1944, MG-81 machine guns began to arrive at the front. These were converted manual aircraft machine guns from the onboard weapons of bombers. They had a caliber of 7.92 mm and a mass of 8000 g. But their rate of fire was only 100-200 rpm. And the target range is only 1000 m. In terms of weight, the MG-81 turned out to be lighter than our DP. But in 1944, we got an even lighter RPD (7400g), and its rate of fire was much higher than that of the MG-81.
In 1944, the MG.131 heavy machine gun was transferred from aviation to the German ground forces. Their caliber is 13 mm, weight is 16600, rate of fire is 100-200 rpm. Sighting range - 2000 m.
And finally, in 1944, the MG151/15 (15 mm caliber) and MG151/20 (20 mm caliber) were adapted for the needs of the infantry. MG151/20 had a weight without cartridges of 42,000 g, a rate of fire of 630-720 rpm, and an effective range of 2000 m. This machine gun was mounted on a two-wheeled carriage, which was equipped with a shield cover.
In fact, only towards the very end of the war did German troops receive light machine guns and heavy machine guns. But these instruments of war were vital to them from the very beginning of World War II. In contrast, the Soviet troops in 1941 had full machine gun armament, consisting of machine guns for various purposes.
As for the Finnish LS-26 light machine gun, which was used throughout World War II as a single general purpose machine gun, there was nothing outstanding in its characteristics.
“The 7.62mm light machine gun of the Lahti-Saloranta LS-26 system was close in its design and technical characteristics to the Soviet DP, but was developed a year earlier, in 1926.
The machine gun was equipped with a box or disk magazine with a capacity of 20 to 75 rounds and, in fact, was used as a single machine gun: manual, light easel, anti-aircraft. The automatic machine gun worked by using recoil with a short barrel stroke. The weight of the machine gun without magazine is 9.6 kg.” (A. Shirokorad " Northern Wars Russia" pp. 562-563)
“The Finnish light machine gun of the Lahti-Saloranta system was frankly bad. Not only was the machine gun’s magazine capacity only 20 rounds, but the weapon’s reliability was extremely low.” (A. Isaev “Anti-Suvorov. Ten myths of the Second World War.” P. 108)
The LS-26 weighed 1.2 kg more than our DP and 2.2 kg more than our RPD. In Finland, nothing was invented to replace this mediocre machine gun until the end of World War II. In Finland, nothing was created to replace the Maxim system machine gun.
The Finnish pistol Lahti L.-35 has established itself as a high-quality and reliable weapon. By the beginning of the winter war, only about 500 units were produced in Finland. With the beginning of the winter war, its production stopped altogether and was resumed only in 1941. Until 1944, the VKT plant produced only 4,500 pistols of this brand.
The Lahti L-35 pistol had a caliber of 9 mm, weight without cartridges - 1220g, sighting range - 50 m, magazine capacity - 8 rounds. The L-35 used 9;19 Parabellum cartridges. The disadvantages of the L-35 include the difficulty of disassembling, which was almost impossible without the use of special tools. The small volume of production of these weapons did not best characterize the Finnish military industry. The L-35 pistol was the heaviest pistol of World War II.
The Soviet TT pistol had a weight without cartridges of only 854 g, a caliber of 7.62 mm, an aiming range of 50 mm, and a magazine capacity of 7 rounds. The TT used a 7.62;38 cartridge. Its production began in 1933 and continued until the 50s of the 20th century. During this period, approximately 1.8 million units of Tokarev pistols were manufactured. Despite the ease of assembly, TT pistols were highly reliable.
In addition, during the Second World War, the Red Army was armed with pistols of the Korovin TK system (Tula Korovin system), despite the fact that the production of this pistol was discontinued back in 1935. The TK had a caliber of 6.35 mm, weight without cartridges of 395 g, sighting range of 50 m, magazine capacity of 8 rounds, cartridge of 6.35; 15.5 mm. The production volume of TK pistols was approximately 300 thousand units.
Despite the fact that the First World War revealed all the advantages of pistols over revolvers, in the USSR the production of Nagan system revolvers continued until 1943. Performance characteristics of the Nagan system revolver: caliber -7.62, weight without cartridges 795 grams, cartridge capacity -7 rounds, sighting range -40 m. Perhaps the production of revolvers in the USSR should be considered a mistake. It would be better if they produced pistols instead. After all, a pistol is more convenient to reload and has more cartridges in its clip than in the cylinder of a revolver. It was because of this that revolvers were abandoned in all armies. During the Second World War, revolvers for the army were produced only in the USSR and Britain.
I will not compare German pistols with Soviet and Finnish ones; that would take too much time, since the German troops used a large number of different models made in Germany and, in addition, a large number of models from other European countries. After all, during the war, Germany not only continued to produce pistols at factories in the occupied countries, but also purchased them abroad, for example, in Spain, the Germans purchased Astra pistols.
At the beginning of World War II great importance They had anti-tank rifles as weapons. The anti-tank gun could be made in the form of a large-caliber rifle, a regular-caliber rifle with an elongated barrel and cartridges with an increased case volume, a grenade launcher, light gun or a recoilless rifle. All types of these weapons were fully represented in the German army. Its troops were armed with anti-tank guns in the form of the RWrf 43 recoilless rifle with 88mm caliber, the PZB-41 light cannon with 28/20 caliber, armor-piercing rifles with 7.92 and 20mm caliber and numerous versions of the grenade launcher... By the beginning of the winter war, the Finnish army had only anti-tank rifles , made in the form of large-caliber rifles.
“During the Winter and Long Wars, the Finns used the Boyce (English), Solothurn (Swiss) and L-39 VKT (Finnish) anti-tank rifles.
The L-39 shotgun was developed by Lahti, it was mass-produced at the VKT factory from 1939 to 1944 (as in the text). The gun was self-loading, the automation worked by removing gases from the barrel. The bipod was equipped with skis and was separated from the gun during the hike. A total of 1,906 of these guns were produced.
All three guns had low armor penetration, which made them ineffective in the fight against the new Soviet and T-34, KV, and IS tanks. In addition, the Solothurn and L-39 guns were too heavy.” (And Shirokorad “Northern Wars of Russia”, pp. 563-564).
Table No. 3
Anti-tank rifle "Boys" "Solothurn" L-39
Year of creation 1935 1936 1936
Caliber mm 14 20 20
Gun weight, kg without cartridges
With 16.5 cartridges
17,7 ? 57,5
Initial bullet speed m/s 990 900 900
Armor penetration
Armor thickness, mm / distance m 21/300 31/200 30/175
Magazine capacity, cartridges 5 5 or 10 10
(Table No. 3 from the book “Northern Wars of Russia” by A. Shirokorad, p. 564).
The author of Mannerheim’s memoirs about equipping the Finnish army with anti-tank rifles wrote the following: “If our infantry had had semi-automatic 20-mm anti-tank rifles, the production of which was established a month after the signing of peace, Russian losses in tanks would have increased to such proportions that would have undermined the strength of this offensive weapons." (Mannerheim “Memoirs”. p. 290) Mannerheim himself could not write such a thing, being in his right mind. He, as the head of the Finnish army, could not help but know about the presence of this type of weapon in the Finnish army during the winter war. It would be most correct to assume that the person who wrote these “memoirs” for him was such a complete idiot that he did not deign to inquire about the presence of anti-tank rifles in the Finnish army at that time.
Anti-tank rifles were in service with the Red Army until August 1940, when the Soviet military leadership decided to remove them from service. Existing samples of anti-tank rifles were removed from the troops. After the German attack, the Soviet leadership gave the order to develop new types of anti-tank rifles. The PTR samples that were seized earlier were not returned to the unit; apparently, after they were seized, they were sent for melting down (note that the PPD-34 was a completely different story). Soviet designers quickly developed new types of anti-tank rifles. And already on August 29, 1941, it was decided to begin production of two models at once: PTRD-41 and PTRS-41. And at the beginning of 1945, the production of anti-tank rifles was stopped again.
The official Soviet version claims that the decision to remove anti-tank rifles from service with the Red Army was made in 1940 due to the fact that we assumed that the Germans would throw only modern tanks with thick armor, which PTRs will not be able to handle. At the same time, of course, Soviet propaganda could, in the same text on the same page, say that we were not expecting a German attack at all.
Obviously, this version was invented only to hide real reasons this decision. After all, the Soviet military leadership knew that the armor of most fascist tanks was too weak and could not even withstand fire from half-inch (12.7 mm) machine guns and, therefore, was quite capable of Soviet anti-tank rifles. In addition, it was no secret that the Nazis had many types of other lightly armored vehicles (armored cars, armored personnel carriers, wedges) against which anti-tank guns would be extremely effective.
An alternative version to the official one claims that the reason for the removal of anti-tank rifles from service lies in the fact that the Soviet military leadership, preparing for a sudden aggression in Europe, decided that Soviet troops would not need such a weapon of war, since it was only suitable for conducting defensive battles.
If, in fact, the Soviet military leadership removed anti-tank rifles from the troops precisely because of these considerations, then it must be admitted that this was a grave mistake. After all, anti-tank rifles could be used against other targets. A large-caliber PTR bullet can easily penetrate the wall of a house or a wall of sandbags (or earth) behind which enemy soldiers are hiding. Anti-tank guns are convenient for disabling any enemy equipment and heavy weapons, such as artillery pieces. Soviet infantrymen, using anti-tank rifles, even disabled heavy tanks the enemy, shooting through the barrels of their guns. PTRs were also used as long-range sniper rifles, with optical sights installed on them.
Supporters alternative version refer to the fact that at the beginning of 1945, the USSR stopped producing anti-tank rifles, allegedly due to the fact that the Red Army at that time had already completely switched to offensive actions and now it no longer needed anti-tank rifles. But here it should be noted that by this time there had been an overproduction of anti-tank rifles. There were so many of them that it no longer made sense to produce them. That's why they stopped producing them. And if anti-tank rifles were truly unnecessary in offensive battles, they would simply be removed from the troops. But that’s the point: they were needed and that’s why they were left. Soviet anti-tank rifles PTRD and PTRS were superior in combat characteristics to Finnish and German ones. The final Soviet anti-tank rifles were developed later than the Boys, Solothurn and L-39 used during the winter war in the Finnish army, but in Finland, during the war with the USSR, they could have invented new models if they had taken better care of their infantry. However, this was not done in Finland. In general, during the Second World War, the Finnish military industry did not produce new weapons for its army, and its military designers did not invent anything new.
If you look objectively at Finland’s preparation for war as a whole, it becomes obvious that there were some shortcomings in this preparation.
In service Finnish infantry there were 254,518 rifles, mainly 7.62-mm Russian rifles of the Mosin system of the 1891 model, as well as its Finnish modernized versions of the 1927 and 1928/30 models - the so-called Pystykorva, 4144 Suomi submachine guns of the 1931 model. 4062 light machine guns "Lahti-Saloranta" mod. 1926, 2405 heavy machine guns, mainly of the Maxim system.
The supply of ammunition to the troops was quite variable, but the obvious trend was a clear shortage, especially if the war dragged on. Although the infantry was
more or less well supplied with ammunition for small arms: there were 156 million
cartridges for rifles and 21,900 thousand cartridges for submachine guns.
Many domestic writers, describing the Soviet-Finnish war, look for the reasons for its failures in technical shortcomings. Sometimes it is criticized, for example, for the absence of some type of weapons, while arguing that if it had been there, the war would have gone differently. At the same time, no one remembers that other countries also did not have such weapons. It is these writers who criticize the Soviet armed forces for the lack of a light machine gun, a modern armored attack aircraft, a long-range fighter, etc. Such writers launch into lengthy arguments about the fact that the Soviet army had few units of modern equipment, emphasizing, for example, that it had few modern tanks with projectile-proof armor. At the same time, they, of course, do not remember that in other countries at that time such tanks were not produced at all. If the Soviet Union had just managed to start producing new tanks, of course there couldn’t be many of them. It is simply pointless to blame Soviet industry for this. And they write something like this: there were modern tanks in the Red Army, but there were few of them. Naturally, there will be few of them, because they have recently begun to be released. Soviet technology is often criticized for shortcomings inherent simply to the technical level of that era, in such a way that the reader gets the impression that these shortcomings were characteristic only of Soviet technology, while foreign technology did not have such shortcomings. Although in reality, foreign technology had the same shortcomings and got rid of them later than ours. Many of these writers simply slipped into outright inventing shortcomings in Soviet technology.
Today, the events of the Soviet-Finnish war remain little studied. The history of this war awaits new researchers who are capable and willing to understand everything objectively.
Finland is a young country in a historical sense; it became independent only after the second Russian revolution (or the October Revolution of 1917). Before this, the territory was more often called Chukhonia, and this province was not among the most developed. Having become a sovereign power, the country began to develop, and soon it had its own industry. Finnish weapons did not become particularly widespread, except for the famous knives, so beloved by hunters and robbers both in Russia and abroad, but they were also made not only by Finnish craftsmen. Despite the peaceful disposition of the inhabitants and short history, the country still had to fight. In both international conflicts in which the Finnish army took part, it was armed with designs created by self-taught designer Aimo Johannes Lahti. The Suomi submachine gun was not a masterpiece, but it couldn’t be called completely bad either. The guarantee for this is the popularity of this sample throughout the world, even if it did not lead to its mass production. More than a dozen countries have armed their police and military units with it.
A war that few people know about
In 1932, the bloodiest war in history began. Latin America war. It lasted three years, claimed the lives of tens (or even hundreds of thousands of people, no one was puzzled by the exact count of victims), and, in the end, turned out to be almost useless. The desert region of Chaco became the subject of a dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia, where it was supposed oil fields. In fact, Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil were in conflict, and it was these two companies that started a war for control of the fields. The armies of Bolivia and Paraguay were supplied with various types of weapons, including guns and aircraft. Even Finnish submachine guns were used in this carnage against an exotic backdrop. The war could not have happened without Russians, on both sides - these were tsarist and White Guard officers who showed themselves to be excellent military specialists. Oil was never found in Chaco, but there was still a result. Latin American soil became, along with Spain, a testing ground on which newest types weapons. In particular, in close combat (a feature of the Paraguayan-Bolivian theater of operations was precisely the short distances between opponents), the Finnish Suomi submachine gun perfectly demonstrated its deadly capabilities. This was his debut.
Inventor Lahti in his youth
Aimo Johannes did not receive a special technical education, which was partly manifested in some engineering naivety of the design of his brainchildren. But he was undoubtedly a talented man. The son of a peasant, after working for the first month at a glass factory (he had completed only six full years of school), Lahti spent five marks on an old Russian Berdan and immediately began tinkering with it, trying to improve it. Realizing that this was much more interesting than routine work, he asked the gunsmith Sateri to become an apprentice. By the time the young man was mobilized, he was already well versed in rifles and strived for more.
Dream of a rapid fire pistol
In 1922, Lahti came across a German MP-18 rapid-fire carbine and became fascinated by the ingenious mechanism. He served in the army at a weapons repair shop, but was creative in his work. He managed to improve the three-line, and a new model entered service with the Finnish army - the Lahti-Saloranta M-26 (the corporal had to perpetuate the name of his immediate superior, Captain Saloranta, who became a co-author). And at the same time he invented other types, including a pistol and a machine gun. They were not very successful, but looked like homemade products (which, in essence, were what they were). The Suomi M-26 submachine gun became a police weapon. By the way, the tradition of naming their samples in honor of their native country, Lahti, remained true in the future. He rose to the rank of general and resigned in 1944 after a scandalous incident involving missing weapons. It was not his fault, but the residue, as they say, remained, and this happens not only in the Finnish army. His Suomi M-31 submachine gun was put into service back in 1931.
Winter War
The end of the thirties of the 20th century is usually called the pre-war period. In fact, the process of redistributing spheres of influence in Europe had already begun, and stopping it was as impossible as avoiding a bullet flying out of the barrel after the firing pin hit the cartridge primer. According to the official version, 1939-1940 began with a provocation from the side adjacent to the USSR. The term “White Finns” was immediately coined, suggesting the presence of representatives of another, “red” part of this people, and a large one at that. There was no reason to assume any aspirations of the “military clique,” and there could not be any. Finland did not have strong aviation, and the tanks also could not be compared with the Soviet ones. Most of the military budget was spent not on offensive, but on exclusively defensive programs. The construction of the “Mannerheim Line” became a matter of national importance; attacks were expected and prepared for precisely this. The fortifications truly amazed the imagination with their scale and inaccessibility, which was also facilitated by the terrain. Nevertheless, the Red Army managed to overcome it, despite huge losses. In the conditions of the harsh polar winter, the Suomi submachine gun demonstrated its combat qualities. The use of weapons revealed both its strengths and weaknesses. The slightest contamination of the bolt mechanism led to failure; it was heavy, but, most importantly, the quantity did not satisfy the needs of the army.
Questions of tactics
The Latin American experience, despite the obvious difference in climate, became the reason for reconsidering the tactical aspects of the use of the Finnish Army field regulations established the presence of one unit in the platoon, with the commander. The industry simply could not produce a sufficient number of “barrels,” although by the beginning of 1940 it was possible to issue a “Suomi” submachine gun to each squad commander, bringing total number up to four. But this was also not enough. Then - in violation of the regulations - separate combined companies of machine gunners began to form, setting up ambushes and opening unexpected heavy fire, making maximum use of the total firepower. After the raid, this unit again dispersed to its companies and platoons.
It should be noted the ability of the commanders of the Red Army to adopt the experience of the enemy. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, companies of machine gunners became a regular structure in the Soviet armed forces. Thus, along with Molotov cocktails, the Finnish method of massive fire impact was used in the fight against fascism. In addition, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 became a catalyst for a significant increase in the production of automatic weapons in the USSR.
It is generally accepted that after the capture of the Mannerheim Line and the conclusion of a peace treaty, this international conflict ended. Some territories were taken away from Finland, the border from Leningrad moved away, and in return the Soviet side provided other lands of approximately the same area. However, the conditions of this world were imposed by force, and after the German attack on the USSR, Finland made an attempt to return what had been taken away. The second phase of the war began. The Finns strongly emphasized the absence of an alliance with Hitler and claimed that they were fighting on one's own. The Suomi submachine guns, however, somehow found their way into the Third Reich (just over three thousand units) - some units of the Waffen-SS were armed with them.
The Finnish venture failed.
Device
The submachine gun uses a blowback action. The loading handle is made separately; it remains motionless during firing. Another one design feature consists in the ability to regulate the rate of fire using a special membrane-spring pneumatic device with five holes of different diameters.
Protection against accidental shooting and switching to single fire is carried out by a switch located behind the magazine at the bottom.
There is no fore-end as such, so shooting in long bursts is problematic: you cannot grasp the casing with your left hand - it gets hot, and holding the weapon by the magazine is prohibited, so as not to loosen the articulation unit. However, the same situation was with the PPSh. “Bunker-Suomi” was also produced without butts (500 in total), which were used not only for firing from fortifications, but also for tanks.
TTX
Suomi is designed for a 9mm Parabellum cartridge.
Large weight (4600 g unloaded and up to 7000 g with a magazine), low initial bullet speed (200 m/s) and insufficient reliability - these are the three main drawbacks that the Suomi submachine gun suffered from. Its characteristics are inferior to those of both the Soviet and German ones. But the main flaw was not even technical, but technological in nature. It was almost impossible to launch the sample into mass production. The receiver was milled from a solid forging, which greatly increased the cost and lengthened the process. It is impossible to produce millions of machine guns without stamping; weapons technologists understood this long before the start of the war. Small batches of "Suomi", however, were distributed around the world in the 30s, and production continued until 1953, until the Soviet teaching staff was copied in Finland.
The quick-change barrel solution was considered successful; a similar technique was used in the Israeli Uzi.
Shop
The Suomi submachine gun and the PPSh look similar from afar. There are two reasons: firstly, the rifle butt without a pistol grip, and secondly, the disc clip, which can hold a lot of cartridges. Two options have been developed for Suomi (for 40 and 70 pieces). But, as practice has shown, this type of store, although it has a large capacity, does not justify itself. It is expensive due to the complexity of the device, but in terms of reliability it is inferior to conventional box-type ones. In the second half of the war, both PPSh and Suomi began to be equipped with them, which were simpler and more trouble-free. The same was done in other countries where this Finnish submachine gun was produced under license (Denmark, Sweden). In just 32 years, eighty thousand M-31s were produced.
Date: 2011-09-13
All collectors are a bit of historians, especially weapons collectors. And the history of weapons is the history of a country, and often in its most dramatic episodes. Readers will be able to see this from this article. Preliminarily, some historical realities are explained in more detail by the consultant of the magazine "Weapons" V.Ya. MINCHENKOV.
The article mentions the War of Liberation of 1918. This is what the Finns call the civil war, which began shortly after the declaration of state independence of Finland and divided the country into “red” and “white”. At this time, there were also units of the Russian expeditionary force here, which protected the coast of Finland from a possible landing of the German army during the First World War. Captivated by Bolshevik propaganda, the military personnel of this corps actively participated in demonstrations and demonstrations organized by the leftist forces of Finland in the second half of 1917. The fear of Bolshevization of the country determined the actions of K. G. Mannerheim’s army to defeat the “Reds”, as well as disarmament and ousting Russian troops. Then, after the military defeat of the revolution, in almost every locality Shutskors (“security squads”) were created as a permanent counterweight to left-wing organizations and a guarantor of stability. These paramilitary forces, in addition to professional officers, included hundreds of thousands of non-exempt armed vigilantes and junior commanders. Shyutskors performed police functions, performed security service, and during the war they also took part in hostilities.
In 1921, the women's units of the military guard "Lotta Svärd" arose, the number of which exceeded 220 thousand. Their members carried out propaganda work among the population, raised funds for military needs and also fought... The activities of the Shutskors, Lott and other paramilitary forces were suspended by the Armistice Agreement between the USSR and Finland in 1944.
Tero HASU
As you know, Finland became part of the Russian Empire as a result of the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-1809. After this a series of national movements of various persuasions, who advocated separation from Russia. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), when plans for an armed struggle for liberation were already being seriously developed, Swiss-made Vetterli rifles of 10.4 mm caliber began to arrive illegally in Finland. Here they are better known as "Grafton rifles" - after the ship "John Grafton" on which they were imported. But even in the War of Liberation, this technically outdated rifle was practically not used.
Back in the 1870s, the Berdan rifle appeared in service with Russian infantry units. Russia ordered the first batch - 30 thousand pieces of Berdan I - in 1868 from the Colt plant in the USA. There are only a few examples of them in museums and private collections in Finland. In 1870, Russian arms factories began producing the Berdan II model, which soon became a standard weapon. It differed from the Colt model in its shutter mechanism. Finnish museums and collectors have infantry, dragoon and Cossack models. It also did not receive real combat use, although there is information that in the “Winter War” with the USSR (1939-1940), due to a shortage of weapons, it was temporarily used by small units.
FIRST TROPHIES
In 1891, it was adopted in Russia infantry rifle Mosin-Nagant. It was this that was later equipped with the Defense Forces of independent Finland, where these “three-rulers” were marked with a special stamp SA (Suomen Armeija). At first they were purchased from the Russian expeditionary force or directly in Russia, later they were taken from military trains traveling from Petrograd to Finland to supply units of the Russian army, as well as from ships delivering rifles to Finnish ports from the United States for further transportation to Russia. In January 1918, the first cases of disarmament of soldiers of the expeditionary force were noted. At the same time, the Finns purchased about 100 thousand Mosin-Nagant rifles from Germany - from its war trophies. They had a straight sighting bar, and the rear end of the belt was attached not to the butt, but to the front of the magazine box. These original models are widely represented in the collections. There are also samples of rifles from the Westinghouse and Remington factories (USA). There are also models of carbines of the 1907 model - dragoon and Cossack; they were in service with Finnish cavalrymen until the early 30s. Many three-line "Winchester" models of 1895 have survived. Although, as noted, the Mosin-Nagant rifle was adopted in Finland, in the early 20s there was a tough discussion about whether the country's Defense Forces should be equipped with weapons of a different caliber. In the end, the “three-line” remained in the army, but underwent a number of modifications.
“THREE-LINE” IN FINNISH
Shutskor was one of the first (in 1924) to begin its modernization. The women from Lotta Svärd raised funds for this, so the new model began to be called “Lotta”. In general, all Shutskor weapons were marked S.K.Y. Using the funds raised, 7.62 mm caliber barrels with a larger outer diameter than Mosin rifles were ordered from Switzerland. In Finland, wooden parts were made for them from valuable species and for a nominal fee they transferred the weapon to Lotte as a sporting weapon. A characteristic feature This rifle of the 1891/24 model had a narrowing of the muzzle of the barrel for a Mosin bayonet.
The positive experience of using the model with a thicker barrel allowed us to continue its modernization. It was recognized that to improve combat qualities the barrel should be shortened to 1190 mm. The weapon has become much more convenient, especially when traveling on skis. The defensive forces were equipped with such rifles of the 1927 model, and the Shutskor - of the 1928 model, which had a minor difference: in the butt of the army model there was no hole for a belt; the latter was attached in the same way as a Tokarev rifle. The model for the Defense Forces was produced until 1941; in total, 60 thousand pieces were produced with serial numbers from 20000 to 81000. The version for the shutskor was produced in 1928-1930, during which time about 33 thousand pieces were made with serial numbers from 1 to 33016. Especially for cavalrymen, 2 thousand carbines were produced in 1933-1934 1120 mm long, with a shortened and downwardly curved bolt handle.
Soon the modernization of the Shyutskor rifle was continued, providing it with a fundamentally new rear sight. In 1933-1941, 40 thousand copies were produced with serial numbers from 33017 to 70000. Until 1937, they were equipped with a butt of the 1891 model made of valuable wood, then they launched the production of composite birch butts - in two parts with a tenon joint in the middle; this made it possible to compensate for torsional deformations and other loads occurring in the wood, which is especially important during sniper shooting. The gunstock symbol was burned into the butts - the letter S in a frame, and under it - the last two digits of the year of manufacture.
Some of these weapons went on sale freely, and anyone who was not a member of the Shutskor could buy them: from 1934 to 1940, 2 thousand rifles with serial numbers from 100001 to 102000 were sold. A small number of rifles of the 1927-28 model were produced in the sniper modification.
The rifles of the described models made in Finland, starting in 1927, received the common nickname “Spitz”, or “standing ears” - based on the shape of the protective parts of the front sight.
SPECIALLY FOR THE CHAMPIONSHIP
In 1937, the World Shooting Championships took place in Finland. At that time, according to the conditions of the competition, when shooting from an army rifle, the weapons of the organizing country were used. For the championship, 500 rifles of the 1928-30 model were produced; their serial numbers are from 48791 to 49467. The organizers carefully selected the barrels (440 out of 500), and for the butts they used blanks from 1891 from valuable species. The MM (“World Championship”) stamp was stamped on the left wall of the chamber, and on the butt on the right side there was a silver plate with the championship emblem - three flying swans and the number 1937. Two rifles were sent to each participating country for training. All world records were broken at the championship.
Emblem on the butt of a rifle made for the 1937 World Cup
Bayonets: from top to bottom -
model of the Defense Forces 1927,
Shutskor model 1928-30,
Shutskorovsky 1939
After the competition, rifles were awarded to the most distinguished shunkor shooters.
OLD PEKKA'S COMPETITORS
At the beginning of the “Winter War” with the USSR (November 1939), the Finns experienced a shortage of weapons; however, already in December the trophies received were enough to arm all front-line units. At the same time, to replace the 1927 model, a new modification of the Mosin-Nagant rifle was created in 1939, which had a weighted stock with a pistol grip. Its production began in 1941. In total, more than 60 thousand pieces were produced (serial numbers - from 200,000); however, the first 7 thousand did not yet have a pistol grip. Shutskor received 10,500 of these rifles with serial numbers 500001-510500.
The 1939 model rifle was nicknamed “Old Man Pekka” - after the country’s president Pekka Svinhuvud, who was exiled to Siberia in 1914, and in 1917-1918 led the movement for self-determination of Finland. This modification was used until the 60s, when it was replaced by an automatic rifle. The Defensive Forces rifles of the 1927, 28, 28-30 and 39 models were equipped with a bayonet 415 mm long, and the Shutskor rifles of the 1939 model were equipped with a bayonet 290 mm long. The cheeks of the bayonet handle of rifles of 1928-30 were made of Karelian birch. The "three-line" model of 1891/30, modified in the Soviet Union, was based on the dragoon version of 1891. It had a front sight with a protective ring, so in Finland it was called a “ring sight”. In the "Winter War" and then at the beginning of the war of 1941-1944, the Finns took many of these rifles as trophies. There were fewer carbines and rifles of the 1938 model and, of course, very few carbines of 1944.
A LITTLE ABOUT SOUVENIRS
Shutskor rifles: from top to bottom -
1937 model,
1928-1930 and
1939
Shutskor rifles: left -
1928 model,
in the middle - model 1928-30,
on the right is a model from 1928-30 for free sale
Among the captured weapons were many rifles with optical sights - model 1930, as well as semi-automatic Tokarev rifles model 1938 and automatic rifles - Simonov 1936. Finns have long been avid hunters and foresters. And when soldiers received weapons with optical sights, few could resist the temptation: they put the optics in a backpack and took a front-line souvenir home on the next vacation. As a result, the Defense Forces received very few sights, but today's collectors are well stocked with them. The same fate befell most of the Tokarev and Simonov rifles themselves, so now collectors also have plenty of them (there are even quite a few samples from the experimental batch of the Simonov rifle - much more than the copies of the Fedorov automatic rifle used in the war of 1939-1940) .
In conditions harsh winter 1940, these models turned out to be unreliable and were not used on the front line. But the semi-automatic Tokarev rifles of the 1940 model captured in the summer operation of 1941 were put into service, and a small number of them were used by the Defense Forces until the 50s. Naturally, bayonets for Tokarev and Simonov’s rifles also ended up in private homes. The long, “Tokarevsky” model of 1938 is more common in Finland than the short one of 1941. And the most desired exhibit among collectors is considered to be the Simonov bayonet.
EMMA AND OTHERS
At the beginning of the “Winter War”, more than 3 thousand Degtyarev light machine guns were captured, nicknamed “Emma”: their round magazine resembled a gramophone record, and in Finland at that time a record with the waltz of the same name was popular, which was especially loved at the front... The Finns had They also had their own Lahti-Saloranta light machine gun, but the soldiers considered the Degtyarevs more reliable. They were used by the Defense Forces until the 60s. They were made with magazines that differed from the Soviet ones by the VKT (State Rifle Factory) marking. The most effective weapon of the war turned out to be the Maxim heavy machine gun. Finland received a large number of them in the form of trophies back in 1918 - mainly the 1905 model on wheels and the 1910 Sokolov model on a circular machine. After this, machine guns were also purchased and modernized in large quantities, especially in the period 1930-1940. And in the last two wars with the USSR, so many Maxims were captured that they were the first line weapon throughout all hostilities.
At the beginning of the Second World War, captured DS-39 heavy machine guns appeared. They turned out to be insufficiently reliable and did not enter service with combat units. They were sent for modernization, after which they remained in arsenals until the end of the 80s, and then were sold to collectors.
"Colt" 1911 with the inscription "Angloorder"
AND FINALLY - RARITIES
Few Soviet machine guns were captured. These are mainly PPD models of 1934 and 1938, caliber 7.62 mm. Since the Finnish machine gun had a caliber of 9 mm, there was no question about the mutual use of cartridges. These machines, being especially rare, are in great demand among collectors. At the end of the war, captured PPS-41,42 and 43 appeared; They were considered a reliable weapon, but were rarely used - again due to the difference in calibers. Since 1890, the service weapons of Russian officers were mainly Nagan revolvers, as well as Smith and Wesson III ( latest model ), but the Smith and Wessons were not used in the 1918 war. The collections contain single copies of them, made in the USA, Germany and Russia; they are very valuable, especially the first, rarest models. The Nagans, produced in Russia in 1918, are also considered very rare. In the “Winter War” the Finns captured many Soviet revolvers, but among them the 1933-35 models are very rare. There are only a few dozen “commander” - shortened ones, as well as .22 caliber revolvers. Occasionally there are models with a groove on the back of the handle for attaching a holster-butt, and with a wooden handle in the shape of a hatchet - there is only one example. The author never had a chance to see Nagants with an extended barrel (300 and 200 mm). Nagants were used little in combat and mostly “went home” as souvenirs. There are many private collections in Finland, where dozens of revolvers are represented; some have examples of each year. A 1933 Tokarev pistol was also used in the Winter War. Finnish collectors have several pistols of this design from the 1930 trial series, called the “Star Pistol” because of the five-pointed star on the grip cheeks. In general, the TT-33 is much less common than the revolver. TT-33 caliber .22 - only one copy. The Tula-Korovin 6.35 mm caliber is also rare. Collectors are very interested in 9-mm Parabellums, manufactured by order of Russia in Germany in only 1000 copies. Their distinctive sign is crossed rifles on the chamber. More common is the American Colt .45 caliber commercial series, supplied to Russia in 1915-1917. On this weapon, the serial number is preceded by the letter C (“commercial”). Particular mention should be made of a batch of 14,700 Colts of this model, which were armed with the Entente troops who arrived in Russia in 1918 to help the “whites”. On the left side of their body is the inscription “Angloorder”. In total, more than 50 thousand Colts with serial numbers from 18,000 to 85,000 were delivered to Russia. The experience of using Russian and Soviet weapons in Finland is enormous and, of course, positive. They say here that without Soviet “assistance with weapons,” military operations against the USSR would have been extremely difficult and even impossible, especially in the winter of 1918 and in 1939-1940. To this day, this weapon has been well preserved and is in perfect condition. The Soviet Union did not demand the return of military property lost in the wars and did not award compensation for it. According to rumors, after the end of the war, Molotov said: “Why do we need it, we have warehouses full of weapons on the Karelian Isthmus.”
Translation by Victor MINCHENKOV
Finnish Armed Forces ( Suomen puolustusvoimat) were formed in 1917 - 1918 on the basis of detachments of the Finnish White Guard and the 27th Jaeger Battalion of the German Army, formed from Finns.For the period 1918 - 1939. The Finnish Armed Forces took part in the Finnish Civil War of 1918 and the Soviet-Finnish War of 1918 - 1920, and Finnish volunteers took part in the Soviet-Estonian War of 1918 - 1920, the uprising in Soviet Karelia of 1921 - 1922. and in the Spanish Civil War 1936 - 1939.
At the beginning of 1939, the Finnish Armed Forces numbered 37,000 people, including 2,400 officers.
Commander-in-Chief Peaceful time was the president of the country, Kyösti Kallio ( Kyösti Kallio), Chief of the General Staff - General Lenart Esch ( Lennart Karl Oesch), the position of Army Inspector was held by Lieutenant General Hugo Esterman ( Hugo Victor Ostermann). The Defense Council, which was an advisory body, was headed by Marshal Carl Gustav Emil von Mannerheim ( Carl Gustaf EmilvonMannerheim).
Marshal Karl Mannerheim and Chief of the General Staff Lenart Esch. August 1939
The ground forces consisted of three infantry divisions and one armored cavalry brigade.
The 4-regimental infantry division numbered 14,200 people. At three rifle regiments 3-battalion composition and separate battalion heavy weapons were armed with 250 submachine guns, 250 light and 116 heavy machine guns, 18 each of 37 mm and 47 mm anti-tank guns, 18 mortars of 81 mm caliber. The artillery regiment in two field divisions had 24 75 mm guns; the howitzer division had 12 howitzers of 105 or 122 mm caliber.
Finnish Shutskor. 1920s
The border guard corps, which was not part of the ground forces in peacetime, consisted of four brigades with a total number of about 6,000 riflemen.
As part of paramilitary militia units or shutskor ( Suojeluskunta) there were 111,000 people. Women's militia organization Lotta Svärd numbered another 105,000 people.
The Finnish armed forces were equipped with small arms mainly of their own production. Pistols were in service L-35 and Germanic Parabellumpistole, rifles M-29-30 Suojeluskunta, M-30 And M-39, 9 mm submachine guns Suomi, R light machine guns Lahti-Saloranta M-26 and heavy machine guns Maxim.
The armored cavalry brigade had 64 units of armored tracked vehicles - wedges Carden-Loyd Mk VI and light tanks VickersMkE.
Tank VickersMkE in the Finnish army. Summer 1939
The Finnish Air Force (153 combat and 156 training aircraft of English, French, Italian and Dutch production, 172 anti-aircraft guns) consisted of three air regiments and air defense batteries.
Dutch Fokker D.XXI in service with the Finnish Air Force. 1936
The air regiments included air groups, subdivided into squadrons. Air Force Commander Major General Jarl Lundqvist ( Jarl Frithiof Lundqvist) was subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation, and in operational terms to the command of the ground forces. Also, two air groups were operationally subordinate to the Finnish Navy.
Commander of the Finnish Air Force, Major General Jarl Lundqvist
The Finnish naval forces with a personnel of 4,250 people were located mainly in the Baltic (64 ships, including two battleships, eight minelayers, four gunboats, 11 patrol ships, 14 minesweepers, 20 torpedo boats, five submarines). The Ladoga flotilla included 10 boats. On 30 batteries coastal defense there were 100 guns with calibers ranging from 120 to 305 mm.
The Finnish Navy was led by Lieutenant General Vaino Valve ( Väinö Lahja Rikhard Valve).
Commander of the Finnish Navy in 1933 - 1944. Lieutenant General Vaino Valve
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line”, consisting of several fortified defensive strips with concrete and wood-earth firing points, communication passages, anti-tank barriers, and located along the border with the USSR for almost 140 km from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. There were 130 long-term fire installations on the line in a state of combat readiness.
By the beginning of the war with the USSR (“Winter War” - Talvisota) - by November 30, 1939, through general mobilization, the number Armed Forces Finland was brought to 300,000 people (14% of the country's population).
Arms and ammunition began to arrive in Finland from Sweden, Great Britain, France, the USA and other countries - 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6,000 machine guns, about 100,000 rifles, 650,000 hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges .
During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 - 1940. The Finnish army included 14,000 foreign volunteers - mainly citizens of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Hungary, and the USA. In total, volunteers came to the Finnish army from 26 countries.
Swedish volunteers during the Winter War 1939 - 1940.
At the beginning of February 1940, the formation of detachments of the Russian People's Army (RNA), commanded by Russian emigrant officers, began from captured Red Army soldiers. According to preliminary calculations, each RNA detachment was supposed to include two rifle companies (three rifle platoons and one machine gun platoon), an anti-tank company, one crew anti-aircraft gun, a platoon of heavy machine guns and a squad of anti-aircraft machine guns. At the end of February, out of 200 people recruited in the camps, only one detachment, consisting of 40 former prisoners of war, took part in hostilities against the Red Army.
The strategy of the Marshal of the Finnish command boiled down to concentrating the forces of the Karelian Army, consisting of the 2nd (4 divisions) and 3rd (2 divisions) corps, on the “Mannerheim Line”. The 4th Corps (2 divisions) was located north of Lake Ladoga, and the 5th Corps (2 divisions) was located in Lapland, covering the central and northern sections of the front.
During military operations, the Finnish infantry successfully used maneuver tactics, which consisted in the fact that individual battle groups on skis, in camouflage suits, armed with rifles, submachine guns Suomi, light machine guns and Molotov cocktails (the so-called “Molotov cocktail”) attacked the positions of Soviet troops, penetrated their rear, disrupting communications.
A squad of Finnish skiers. January 1940
By March 1940, the Red Army (760,000 people) broke through the Mannerheim Line. The Finnish government hastened to conclude a truce. The Finnish army suffered significant losses (during the fighting from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the Finnish army lost 25,904 people killed, died from wounds and went missing), but at the same time gained enormous combat experience.
In May 1940, the Finnish army underwent a reorganization, as a result of which 16 infantry divisions were formed. They retained the 1939 staff strength, but the infantry regiments were redistributed. Each division was assigned only one regular regiment (from the 1st to the 16th). After the mobilization of the division, it was planned to strengthen two more reserve regiments (numbered from 21st to 42nd).
13 divisions were deployed along the border with the USSR, and seven artillery brigades defended the coastline.
The mobile units formed during the “Winter War” included a cavalry brigade, which acted as a cavalry brigade in summer time and as a ski track in winter (in the future it was planned to reorganize it into a motorized one). In addition, the Finnish army had two jäger brigades, equipped with trucks or bicycles.
Field and anti-tank artillery was reinforced with captured Soviet guns and supplies from Germany.
The infantry is armed with the same types of small arms.
The tank forces were strengthened and deployed to three battalions thanks to captured Soviet tanks T-26, T-37 and T-38, which made up 80% of the tank fleet. At the beginning of 1941, the Finnish army had 120 tanks and 22 armored vehicles (Soviet BA and Swedish Landsverk).
Captured Soviet tank T-26 in service with the Finnish army. 1941
On January 24, 1941, the Finnish parliament passed a law on conscription, increasing the period of service in the regular troops from one year to two years.
By the summer of 1941, two Finnish armies were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - on the Karelian Isthmus, the Southeastern Army (six divisions, one brigade) under the command of General Axel Erik Heinrichs ( Axel Erik Heinrichs) and in Eastern Karelia the Karelian Army (five divisions, three brigades) under the command of General Lenart Esch.
Commander of the Finnish Southeastern Army Axel Erik Heinrichs. 1941
On June 9, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, ordered a partial mobilization of the reservists of the covering troops.
In response to the bombing of its cities and military installations by the Soviet Air Force on June 25, 1941, Finland declared war on the USSR on the same day, which was called the “continuation war” ( Jatkosota).
Finnish soldiers examine the dead Red Army soldiers. Summer 1941
June 28 Finnish troops went on the offensive, in which, in addition to Finnish units, a Swedish volunteer battalion (1,500 people) took part, led by Hans Berggren ( Hans Berggren). After the Swedish volunteer battalion returned to Sweden on December 18, 400 Swedish citizens remained to serve in the Finnish army.
Also, Estonian volunteers (2,500 people) served in the Finnish Armed Forces, of which on February 8, 1944, the 200th Regiment (1,700 people) was formed as part of the 10th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Eino Kuusela ( Eino Kuusela). The regiment fought on the Karelian Isthmus and near Vyborg. In addition, 250 Estonians served in the Finnish Navy.
Estonian volunteers in the Finnish army. 1944
By the beginning of October 1941, the Finnish army stopped at a line located only 30 km from Leningrad, not returning to Finland the territory lost during the “Winter War,” but also capturing most of the Karelo-Finnish SSR. During the battles, the Finns captured more than a hundred Soviet light, amphibious, flamethrower, medium (including T-34) and heavy (KV) tanks, which they included in their tank units.
From June 1941 to June 1943, a Finnish SS battalion (1000 people) participated in the fighting against the Red Army as part of the German SS troops.
In August 1943, from two tank brigades with a total of 150 tanks (mainly captured T-26s), a brigade of assault guns, equipped with Finnish Bt-42s and German Sturmgeschütz IIIs, the Jaeger brigade and support units were formed tank division (Panssaridivisoona), led by Major General Ernst Ruben Lagus.
In 1941 - 1944 Germany supplied the Finnish Air Force with new aircraft designs - 48 fighters Messerschmitt Bf 109G-2, 132 fighters Bf 109G-6, 15 bombers Dornier Do 17Z-2 and 15 bombers Ju 88A-4 who took part in the battles against the Red Army.
In June 1944, Germany supplied 15 tanks to the Finnish army Pz IVJ and 25,000 anti-tank grenade launchers Panzerfaust And Panzerschreck.
Finnish assault gun Bt-42s. 1944
Until June 1944, the front line remained stable, but on June 9, the Red Army launched a massive offensive and by the end of the month reached the Soviet-Finnish border of June 1941.
Finnish soldiers are fighting with Soviet tanks. Summer 1944
On September 4, 1944, military operations on the Soviet-Finnish front, during which about 58,000 Finnish military personnel had died since the summer of 1941, were stopped.
From 15 September 1944, four Finnish divisions (60,000 men) under the command of General Hjalmar Salisvuo ( Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo) in northern Finland fought against German troops (“Lapland War” - Lapin sota).
Finnish soldiers with a German grenade launcher Panzerschreck preparing for battle with German troops in Lapland. September 1944
During the fighting, which lasted until April 27, 1945, about 1,000 Finnish troops were killed and about 1,000 Finns were wounded.
After the end of World War II, the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 required Finland to significantly reduce its Armed Forces. Thus, the number of military personnel was to be determined at 34,000 people. Then the tank division was disbanded. Also, the Finnish Navy should not have included submarines, torpedo boats and specialized assault ships (the ban remains in place to this day), and the total tonnage of ships was reduced to 10,000 tons. Military aviation was reduced to 60 aircraft.
Finnish Army 1939 - 1945 // Magazine “Soldier at the Front”, 2005, No. 7.
Kozlov A.I. Soviet-Finnish War 1939 - 1940 Riga, 1995.
Abbott P., Thomas N., Chappell M. Germany's allies on the Eastern Front 1941 - 1945. M., 2001, SS. 10 - 17.
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