On December 18, 1940, Hitler, in Directive No. 21, approved the final plan for the war against the USSR under the code name “Barbarossa”. To implement it, Germany and its allies in Europe - Finland, Romania and Hungary - created an invasion army unprecedented in history: 182 divisions and 20 brigades (up to 5 million people), 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, about 4.4 thousand ... combat aircraft, 4.4 thousand tanks and assault guns, and 250 ships. The group of Soviet troops resisting the aggressors included 186 divisions (3 million people), about 39.4 guns and mortars, 11 thousand tanks and more than 9.1 thousand aircraft. These forces were not put on alert in advance. The directive of the Red Army General Staff on a possible German attack on June 22-23 was received in the western border districts only on the night of June 22, and already at dawn on June 22 the invasion began. After lengthy artillery preparation, at 4.00 in the morning, German troops, treacherously violating the non-aggression pact concluded with the USSR, attacked the Soviet-German border along its entire length from the Barents to the Black Sea. Soviet troops were taken by surprise. The organization of powerful counterattacks against the enemy was hampered by the fact that they were relatively evenly distributed along the entire front along the entire border and dispersed on greater depth. With such a formation it was difficult to resist the enemy.

On June 22, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. addressed the citizens of the Soviet Union on the radio. Molotov. He said, in particular: “This unheard-of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized peoples. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany.”

On June 23, 1941, it was created in Moscow supreme body strategic leadership of the armed forces - Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. All power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee (GKO), formed on June 30. He was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The country began to implement a program of emergency measures under the motto: “Everything for the front! Everything for victory! The Red Army, however, continued to retreat. By mid-July 1941 German troops advanced 300-600 km deep into Soviet territory, capturing Lithuania, Latvia, almost all of Belarus, a significant part of Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova, creating a threat to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kyiv. A mortal danger loomed over the USSR.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 1 OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RKKA ARMY GENERAL G.K. ZHUKOVA. 10.00, June 22, 1941

At 4.00 on June 22, 1941, the Germans, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities and crossed the border with ground troops...

1. Northern Front: the enemy, with a flight of bomber-type aircraft, violated the border and entered Leningrad district and Kronstadt...

2. Northwestern Front. At 4.00 the enemy opened artillery fire and at the same time began to bomb airfields and cities: Vindava, Libava, Kovno, Vilno and Shulyai...

W. Western Front. At 4.20, up to 60 enemy aircraft bombed Grodno and Brest. At the same time, the enemy opened artillery fire along the entire border of the Western Front... With ground forces, the enemy is developing an attack from the Suwalki area in the direction of Golynka, Dąbrowa and from the Stokołów area along the railway to Wolkowysk. The advancing enemy forces are being clarified. ...

4. Southwestern Front. At 4.20 the enemy began shelling our borders with machine-gun fire. From 4.30, enemy planes bombed the cities of Lyuboml, Kovel, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volynsky... At 4.35, after artillery fire in the Vladimir-Volynsky, Lyuboml area, enemy ground forces crossed the border developing an attack in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky, Lyuboml and Krystynopol...

The front commanders have put into effect a cover plan and, through the active actions of mobile troops, are trying to destroy the enemy units that have crossed the border...

The enemy, having forestalled our troops in deployment, forced units of the Red Army to take battle in the process of occupying their initial position according to the cover plan. Using this advantage, the enemy managed to achieve partial success in certain areas.

Signature: Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov

The Great Patriotic War - day after day: based on materials from declassified operational reports of the General Staff of the Red Army. M., 2008 .

RADIO SPEECH BY THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE USSR and PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV June 22, 1941

Citizens and women of the Soviet Union!

The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims to the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy air raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territories.

This unheard of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire duration of this treaty the German government could never make a single claim against the USSR regarding the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the German fascist rulers (...)

The government calls on you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally your ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade. Stalin.

Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours.

Documentation foreign policy. T.24. M., 2000.

J. STALIN'S SPEECH ON RADIO, July 3, 1941

Comrades! Citizens!

Brothers and sisters!

Soldiers of our army and navy!

I am addressing you, my friends!

The treacherous military attack of Nazi Germany on our Motherland, which began on June 22, continues. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, despite the fact that the enemy’s best divisions and the best units of his aviation have already been defeated and found their grave on the battlefield, the enemy continues to push forward, throwing new forces to the front (...)

History shows that there are no invincible armies and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was defeated alternately by Russian, English, and German troops. Wilhelm's German army during the first imperialist war was also considered invincible army, but it was defeated several times by Russian and Anglo-French troops and was finally defeated by Anglo-French troops. The same needs to be said about the current Nazi German army of Hitler. This army has not yet encountered serious resistance on the continent of Europe. Only on our territory did it encounter serious resistance (...)

It may be asked: how could it happen that the Soviet government agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous people and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was there a mistake made here by the Soviet government? Of course not! A non-aggression pact is a peace pact between two states. This is exactly the kind of pact Germany offered us in 1939. Could the Soviet government refuse such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring power, if at the head of this power are even such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. And this, of course, is subject to one indispensable condition - if the peace agreement does not affect either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence and honor of the peace-loving state. As you know, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR is just such a pact(...)

In the event of a forced withdrawal of units of the Red Army, it is necessary to hijack all rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single locomotive, not a single carriage, not to leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel (...) In areas occupied by the enemy, it is necessary to create partisan detachments, horse and foot, create sabotage groups to fight units of the enemy army, to incite partisan warfare anywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to forests, warehouses, and carts. In occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities (...)

In this great war, we will have faithful allies in the people of Europe and America, including the German people, enslaved by Hitler’s bosses. Our war for the freedom of our Fatherland will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic freedoms (...)

In order to quickly mobilize all the forces of the peoples of the USSR, to repel the enemy who treacherously attacked our Motherland, the State Defense Committee was created, in whose hands all power in the state is now concentrated. The State Defense Committee has begun its work and calls on all the people to rally around the party of Lenin - Stalin, around the Soviet government for selfless support of the Red Army and Red Navy, for the defeat of the enemy, for victory.

All our strength is in support of our heroic Red Army, our glorious Red Navy!

All the forces of the people are to defeat the enemy!

Forward, for our victory!

Stalin I. About the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union. M., 1947.

Attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR began at 4 a.m. on June 22, 1941, when German military aircraft launched the first strikes on a number of Soviet cities and strategic military and infrastructure facilities. By attacking the USSR, Germany unilaterally broke the non-aggression pact between the countries, concluded two years earlier for a period of 10 years.

Prerequisites and preparation for the attack

In mid-1939, the USSR changed the course of its foreign policy: the collapse of the idea of ​​" collective security“and the impasse in negotiations with Great Britain and France forced Moscow to move closer to Nazi Germany. On August 23, the head of the German Foreign Ministry, J. von Ribbentrop, arrived in Moscow. On the same day, the parties signed a Non-Aggression Pact for a period of ten years, and in addition to it, a secret protocol that stipulated the delimitation of the spheres of interests of both states in Eastern Europe. Eight days after the treaty was signed, Germany attacked Poland and World War II began.

The rapid victories of German troops in Europe caused concern in Moscow. The first deterioration in Soviet-German relations occurred in August-September 1940, and was caused by Germany providing foreign policy guarantees to Romania after it was forced to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR (this was stipulated in the secret protocol). In September, Germany sent troops to Finland. By this time, the German command had been developing a plan for a lightning war (“blitzkrieg”) against the Soviet Union for more than a month.

In the spring of 1941, relations between Moscow and Berlin deteriorated sharply again: not even a day had passed since the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty when German troops invaded Yugoslavia. The USSR did not react to this, as well as to the attack on Greece. After the defeat of Greece and Yugoslavia, German troops began to concentrate near the borders of the USSR. Since the spring of 1941 from different sources Moscow received information about the threat of an attack from Germany. Thus, at the end of March, a letter to Stalin warning that the Germans were transferring tank divisions from Romania to southern Poland was sent by British Prime Minister W. Churchill. A number of Soviet intelligence officers and diplomats reported on Germany's intention to attack the USSR - Schulze-Boysen and Harnack from Germany, R. Sorge from Japan. However, some of their colleagues reported the opposite, so Moscow was in no hurry to draw conclusions. According to G.K. Zhukov, Stalin was confident that Hitler would not fight on two fronts and would not start a war with the USSR until the end of the war in the West. His point of view was shared by the head of the intelligence department, General F.I. Golikov: on March 20, 1941, he presented Stalin with a report in which he concluded that all data about the inevitability of the imminent outbreak of the Soviet-German war “must be regarded as disinformation coming from the British and even, maybe German intelligence."

In the face of the growing threat of conflict, Stalin took formal leadership of the government: on May 6, 1941, he took over as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. The day before, he spoke in the Kremlin at a reception in honor of graduates of military academies, in particular, saying that it was time for the country to move “from defense to offense.” On May 15, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the newly appointed Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov presented Stalin with “Considerations on the plan strategic deployment armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies." It was assumed that the Red Army would strike the enemy at a time when the enemy armies were in the process of deployment. According to Zhukov, Stalin did not even want to hear about a preventive strike on German troops. Fearing a provocation that could give Germany a pretext for attack, Stalin forbade opening fire on German reconnaissance aircraft, which had increasingly crossed the Soviet border since the spring of 1941. He was convinced that, by exercising extreme caution, the USSR would avoid war or at least delay it until a more favorable moment.

On June 14, 1941, by order of the Soviet government, TASS published a statement in which it was stated that rumors about Germany’s intention to break the non-aggression pact and start a war against the USSR were devoid of any basis, and the transfer of German troops from the Balkans to eastern Germany was probably associated with other motives . On June 17, 1941, Stalin was informed that the Soviet intelligence officer Schulze-Boysen, an employee of the German aviation headquarters, said: “All German military measures to prepare an armed attack against the USSR are completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time.” The Soviet leader imposed a resolution in which he called Schulze-Boysen a disinformer and advised him to be sent to hell.

On the evening of June 21, 1941, a message was received in Moscow: sergeant major German army, a convinced communist, crossed the Soviet-Romanian border at the risk of his life and announced that the offensive would begin in the morning. The information was urgently transferred to Stalin, and he gathered the military and members of the Politburo. People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, according to the latter, asked Stalin to accept a directive to put troops on combat readiness, but he doubted it, suggesting that the Germans could have planted the defector officer on purpose in order to provoke a conflict. Instead of the directive proposed by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, the head of state ordered another, short directive, indicating that the attack could begin with a provocation of German units. On June 22 at 0:30 am this order was transmitted to the military districts. At three o'clock in the morning everyone gathered at Stalin's left.

Start of hostilities

Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, German aircraft destroyed a significant part of the airfields in a surprise attack. Soviet aviation western districts. The bombing of Kyiv, Riga, Smolensk, Murmansk, Sevastopol and many other cities began. In a declaration read out on the radio that day, Hitler said that Moscow allegedly “treacherously violated” the treaty of friendship with Germany because it concentrated troops against it and violated German borders. Therefore, the Führer said, he decided “to oppose the Judeo-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and their assistants, as well as the Jews from the Moscow Bolshevik center” in the name of “the cause of peace” and “the security of Europe.”

The offensive was carried out according to the previously developed Barbarossa plan. As in previous military campaigns, the Germans hoped to use the tactics of “lightning war” (“blitzkrieg”): the defeat of the USSR was supposed to take only eight to ten weeks and be completed before Germany ended the war with Great Britain. Planning to end the war before winter, the German command did not even bother to prepare winter uniforms. The German armies, consisting of three groups, were to attack Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, having previously encircled and destroyed enemy troops in the western part of the USSR. The army groups were led by experienced military leaders: Army Group North was commanded by Field Marshal von Leeb, Army Group Center by Field Marshal von Bock, Army Group South by Field Marshal von Rundstedt. Each army group was assigned its own air fleet and tank army, the Center group had two of them. The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa was to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. The Germans hoped to paralyze the work of industrial enterprises located east of this line - in the Urals, Kazakhstan and Siberia - with the help of air strikes.

Giving instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Hitler emphasized that the war with the USSR should become a “conflict of two worldviews.” He demanded a “war of destruction”: “the carriers of the state political idea and political leaders” were ordered not to be captured and shot on the spot, which was contrary to the norms international law. Anyone who offered resistance was ordered to be shot.

By the time the war began, 190 divisions of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the Soviet borders, of which 153 were German. They included more than 90% armored forces German army. The total number of armed forces of Germany and its allies intended to attack the USSR was 5.5 million people. They had at their disposal more than 47 thousand guns and mortars, 4,300 tanks and assault guns, and about 6 thousand combat aircraft. They were opposed by the forces of five Soviet border military districts (at the beginning of the war they were deployed on five fronts). In total, there were over 4.8 million people in the Red Army, who had 76.5 thousand guns and mortars, 22.6 thousand tanks, and approximately 20 thousand aircraft. However, in the border districts of the above there were only 2.9 million soldiers, 32.9 thousand guns and mortars, 14.2 thousand tanks and more than 9 thousand aircraft.

After 4 o'clock in the morning Stalin was woken up phone call Zhukov - he reported that the war with Germany had begun. At 4:30 am, Tymoshenko and Zhukov again met with the head of state. Meanwhile, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, on Stalin's instructions, went to a meeting with the German Ambassador V. von der Schulenburg. Until Molotov returned, Stalin refused to order counterattacks against enemy units. The conversation between Molotov and Schulenburg began at 5:30 am. On instructions from the German government, the ambassador read out a note with the following content: “In view of the further intolerable threat created for the German eastern border as a result of the massive concentration and training of all the armed forces of the Red Army, the German government considers itself forced to take military countermeasures.” The head of the NKID tried in vain to dispute what the ambassador said and convince him of the innocence of the USSR. Already at 5 hours 45 minutes, Molotov was in Stalin’s office along with L. P. Beria, L. Z. Mehlis, as well as Timoshenko and Zhukov. Stalin agreed to give a directive to destroy the enemy, but emphasized that Soviet units should not violate the German border anywhere. At 7:15 a.m. the corresponding directive was sent to the troops.

Stalin's entourage believed that it was he who should speak on the radio with an appeal to the population, but he refused, and Molotov did it instead. In his address, the head of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs announced the beginning of the war, noted that German aggression was to blame, and expressed confidence in the victory of the USSR. At the end of his speech, he uttered the famous words: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!" In order to prevent possible doubts and rumors about the silence of Stalin himself, Molotov added several references to him in the original text of the address.

On the evening of June 22, British Prime Minister W. Churchill spoke on the radio. He stated that in the current situation, his anti-communist views are receding into the background, and the West must provide “Russia and the Russian people” with all the help it can. On June 24, F. Roosevelt, President of the United States, made a similar statement in support of the USSR.

Retreat of the Red Army

In total, on the first day of the war alone, the USSR lost at least 1,200 aircraft (according to German data - more than 1.5 thousand). Many nodes and lines of communication were rendered unusable - because of this, the General Staff lost contact with the troops. Due to the inability to fulfill the demands of the center, the commander of the aviation of the Western Front, I. I. Kopets, shot himself. On June 22, at 21:15, the General Staff sent a new directive to the troops with instructions to immediately launch a counteroffensive, “disregarding the border,” to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces within two days and to capture the areas of the cities of Suwalki and Lublin by the end of June 24. But the Soviet units failed not only to go on the offensive, but also to create a continuous defensive front. The Germans had a tactical advantage on all fronts. Despite great effort Despite the sacrifices and the colossal enthusiasm of the fighters, the Soviet troops failed to stop the enemy’s advance. Already on June 28, the Germans entered Minsk. Due to the loss of communication and panic at the fronts, the army became almost uncontrollable.

Stalin was in a state of shock for the first 10 days of the war. He often interfered in the course of events, summoning Timoshenko and Zhukov to the Kremlin several times. On June 28, after the surrender of Minsk, the head of state went to his dacha and for three days - from June 28 to 30 - stayed there continuously, not answering calls and not inviting anyone to his place. Only on the third day his closest associates came to him and persuaded him to return to work. On July 1, Stalin arrived in the Kremlin and on the same day became the head of the newly formed State Committee defense (GKO) - an emergency governing body that received full power in the state. In addition to Stalin, the GKO included V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria. Later, the composition of the committee changed several times. Ten days later, Stalin also headed the Supreme Command Headquarters.

To rectify the situation, Stalin ordered to send Marshals B.M. Shaposhnikov and G.I. Kulik to the Western Front, but the former fell ill, and the latter himself was surrounded and had difficulty getting out, disguised as a peasant. Stalin decided to shift responsibility for failures on the fronts to the local military command. The commander of the Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov, and several other military leaders were arrested and sent to a military tribunal. They were accused of an “anti-Soviet conspiracy”, of deliberately “opening the front to Germany”, and then of cowardice and alarmism, after which they were shot. In 1956, they were all rehabilitated.

By the beginning of July 1941, the armies of Germany and its allies occupied most Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Belarus, approached Smolensk and Kyiv. Army Group Center advanced the deepest into Soviet territory. The German command and Hitler believed that the main enemy forces had been defeated and the end of the war was near. Now Hitler was wondering how to quickly complete the defeat of the USSR: continue to advance on Moscow or encircle Soviet troops in Ukraine or Leningrad.

The version of Hitler's "preventive strike"

In the early 1990s, V. B. Rezun, a former Soviet intelligence officer who fled to the West, published several books under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov, in which he claimed that Moscow planned to be the first to strike Germany, and Hitler, having started the war, only forestalled an attack by Soviet troops. Rezun was later supported by some Russian historians. However, an analysis of all available sources shows that if Stalin was going to strike first, it would be in a more favorable situation. At the end of June and beginning of July 1941, he sought to delay the war with Germany and was not ready for an offensive.

So the Germans didn’t attack with their infantry? They attacked, but by attack they did not mean running with rifles at the ready in order to run up and stab the enemy with a bayonet or hit them with a shovel, but something else (more on that a little later), and such attacks, as the Red Army generals planned, remained in their history of the First World War.

To begin with, I suggest you simply remember all the documentaries and photographs of World War II. Soviet “documentary” films and photos, I think, in 95% of cases were filmed behind the lines during exercises, but this does not matter in this case. What does a Soviet offensive look like? The tanks are going on the attack, and behind them the Soviet infantry is running in chains or in a crowd towards the enemy who is shooting at them. Or this infantry runs to attack the enemy on its own. But now there are a lot of photographs and film footage of German newsreels, so, is there similar footage of the offensive of German troops in it? Completely absent!

It’s interesting, but even a glance at the infantryman showed the difference in tactics. In Russia and the USSR, the infantryman has always been called “private” - the one who goes on the attack along with his other comrades. That is, the fact that he is in service, from the position of Russian and Soviet generals, is the most important and valuable thing about him. And for the Germans it was a “schutze” - a shooter. That is, from the position of the German army, the most valuable thing in an infantryman was that he shoots. The Germans taught their infantrymen a lot, but they didn’t teach them bayonet fighting - those who knew how to shoot had no need for it.

A little about this. We have military theorists from Suvorov’s slogan “The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is great!” They made a fetish, thereby turning Suvorov into a cretin. Firstly, in Suvorov’s time the bayonet was still a real weapon, and secondly, Suvorov insistently demanded that soldiers learn to shoot, even persuaded them, assuring them that lead was cheap and that soldiers would Peaceful time will not incur large expenses for target practice. In addition, Suvorov taught the soldiers to shoot accurately and warned that although he expects to have 100 rounds of ammunition per soldier in a battle, he will flog the one who shoots all these cartridges, since such a number of cartridges in a real battle are shot only during aimless shooting.

Yes, of course, it’s not bad if a soldier can operate with a bayonet, but with the rate of fire of weapons of the 20th century, who will let him come within striking distance of a bayonet?

And I continue to be confident that it was, in fact, not a matter of the bayonet, but that the bayonet was, as it were, the meaning and justification for the tactics of manpower attacks on the enemy’s defenses. Tactics that dramatically simplify the service of officers and generals, tactics that do not require extensive knowledge from them and reduce their work to primitive commands at the level of the 18th century.

But let’s return to what exactly the Germans considered an attack and an offensive.

The intelligence directorate of the 16th German Army in September 1941 translated the article “Features of offensive actions of German infantry in maneuver warfare” from Volume 1 “West” of the Soviet reference book on the Armed Forces of border states. The book was captured in the zone of the German 39th Army Corps. Let's read this article, omitting the ideological introduction.

“The experience of the war that Germany is waging in Europe and Africa allows us to draw some conclusions about the features of offensive tactics, which are generally close to the truth. Until now, the Nazi troops had to deal with an enemy who could not resist them.

Fighting with Polish, French, and especially Yugoslav and Greek troops led to a decline in combat discipline in the Wehrmacht, inattention to the basic requirements for camouflage and self-entrenchment. Self-confidence, as a consequence of “victories,” results in inattention to what is happening on the battlefield.

Facts indicate that the “victories” of the Wehrmacht were not achieved by the tenacity of the infantry in overcoming the obstacle zone or in breaking through the fortified positions of one or another enemy. These “victories” were achieved mainly due to the premature abandonment of the fortifications by the defenders due to massive (in comparison with individual Polish, French, Yugoslav or Greek army) use of artillery and aviation."

Let us note that the mocking quotation marks of the word “victory” by the Soviet military theorists who wrote this article are a massive action German artillery and aviation against the enemy - main principle victories in battle were attributed to the weakness of the German infantry, massive fire on the enemy was attributed to a lack of tactics!

“German infantry rarely launches into bayonet attacks. In many cases, she seeks to avoid actions of this kind. In the event of strong enemy resistance, German infantry, as a rule, avoids attacking such positions. In each such case, the commander of any German unit or unit (platoon, company, battalion or regiment) seeks a solution through maneuver. Groping the flanks and bypassing them are common tactics of German commanders.

A position that is firmly defended is subjected to artillery fire, bombardment and, depending on the situation, decoy tank attacks. At the same time, the infantry (subunits and units), leaving minimal forces to pin down the enemy, with the main forces and means of reinforcement, perform a maneuver aimed at striking the enemy’s flank.”

Let us note the described complexity of the work of a German officer. Instead of shouting “For the Reich, for the Fuhrer!” To send soldiers into a bayonet attack, the officer needs to study the terrain and intelligence data, and be able to change both the direction of the attack and the combat formation of the troops entrusted to him in the event that the enemy offers stronger resistance than expected. A German officer needs to organize communications with all branches of the military, know how and when they need to be used, be able to issue target designations for artillery and aviation, and be able to maneuver his units on the battlefield.

“Experience shows that such German tactics will be used in the future.

With careful observation of the battlefield, such a maneuver would be detected and used against the Germans.

If we read the introductory article of PU-36, we will see that it says: the outflanking or surrounding enemy is himself in danger of being surrounded. Therefore, one must strive to counter the enemy’s maneuver with one’s own counter-maneuver. Leaving at the front of a platoon, company or battalion the amount of firepower that is minimally necessary, the main forces attack the flank of the outflanking enemy.

This effective method in the fight against such an enemy as the Nazi troops", - the Soviet theorist did not miss the opportunity to say a clever banality, which looks especially wild against the backdrop of the tragedy of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

“Especially noteworthy is the rapid maneuver in the advance of motorized artillery, both individual guns and entire batteries. The battle waged by the Germans is distinguished by the roar created by artillery fire, machine guns, and the howl of airplanes. Fiery jets of flamethrowers and clouds of black smoke create the impression of an attack sweeping away everything in its path.

Undoubtedly, all this is aimed at undermining the enemy’s morale. Morality, the will to resist must be suppressed. Cowards and alarmists are morally crushed.

This appearance of clear superiority is created, first of all, by artillery fire (anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns), as well as tanks.”

Why "visibility"? When shells from all types of weapons that the Germans had are flying at you, when tanks are coming at you, to which you cannot inflict any damage with your weapons, is this “appearance”?

“When the infantry occupies initial positions, motorized artillery fires from guns of all calibers at all objects on the front line. Infantry support is carried out jointly with tanks, often with direct fire, without organizing reliable communications and adjustments, which are organized only if the scale of the battle expands.

Through the massive use of guns of all calibers, including 150-mm cannons, the Germans seek to assure the enemy of the numerical superiority of the attacking forces and the approaching artillery.

The Germans try to use such a rapid concentration of artillery, characteristic of oncoming battles, during the offensive in each case.

Another feature of offensive battles is the use of short artillery preparation, during which the infantry seeks to get closer to the enemy. During the war with Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, this method was widely used when attacking field fortified positions, and in exceptional cases when attacking long-term fortified lines.

As an example, we will give a typical attack of a German company.

The rifle company takes initial positions from 800 to 900 meters, depending on terrain conditions, after which it receives the direction of attack (sometimes the offensive line). The usual battle formation is two platoons in the first line, one platoon in reserve. In such a battle formation, the company, combining fire and maneuver, moves at a speed of 600–800 meters per hour to the concentration area.”

So, the German infantry advanced to the line (from which the Soviet infantry usually rises in a bayonet attack), maneuvering from cover to cover, and already at this distance firing at the enemy from its own heavy weapons. But since the Germans’ own fire had to be accurate, it also required time to detect the target, install weapons (machine gun, mortar, infantry or anti-tank guns), shooting and destroying targets. As a result, as you can see, the advance to the line of the attack itself proceeded at a speed of only 600–800 meters per hour (infantry in a marching column walks at a pace of 110 steps per minute, that is, about 5 kilometers per hour). The Germans, as you can see, were in no hurry to take a bullet from the defending enemy; at first they did everything to destroy him from afar.

“When the attack (of a battalion or regiment) begins, the artillery fires at the enemy’s front line for 15 minutes.” Note, not an hour, as in the per-hectare calculations of Soviet generals, but only 15 minutes.

“A company, as a rule, is reinforced by a machine-gun platoon, as well as a platoon of infantry guns (mortars). The latter are used from the beginning of the attack to the assault, changing positions if necessary. Here we are not talking about breaking through long-term fortifications, since the Germans in these cases create assault groups consisting of engineering, infantry and artillery units. Artillery preparation in this case is carried out according to a special plan. After a 15-minute artillery preparation, the fire is transferred to the flanks of the breakthrough and to the rear objects. At the same time, the front line is bombarded by aircraft and exposed to fire from infantry guns and mortars.”

In theory, there should be nothing left of the defending enemy. And only after this the infantry begins what the Germans call an assault.

“The attack continues with rolls of 15–20 meters.” That is, here, too, the Germans did not run into the enemy’s trenches with bayonets pointed forward, but moved in the direction of the enemy from cover to cover, or rather, from one firing position to the next. And from these positions, rifles and light machine guns continuously fired aimed fire at the enemy, not allowing him to lean out of the trench to fire at the attackers. And they approached the enemy’s positions until the distance was reduced to throwing a hand grenade, which they used to finish off the enemy in his hiding place if the enemy did not surrender.

“If the initial positions are reached, then the company opens fire on the enemy’s front line using all available firepower. At this point, as a rule, flamethrowers and hand grenades are used. Anti-tank guns receive special tasks, namely: shelling viewing slots and embrasures of fortifications, as well as identified firing positions. The task of escort guns and assault guns is to suppress machine gun nests and mortars.”

That's what the German attack was.

“Before the company goes on the attack, the decisive moment comes for the defenders. You need to carefully prepare for this moment; you need to bring down the full power of the fire system on the enemy. Fire maneuvers, the use of roaming guns and dagger machine guns (those machine guns that unexpectedly open fire at point-blank range) can turn the tide in favor of the defenders.

Experience shows that German infantry lies down under machine gun and mortar fire and awaits support from escort artillery. This favorable moment must be used. After the massive use of flamethrowers, mortars and hand grenades you should launch an unexpected bayonet attack on the flank of the attacking enemy with the forces of a squad, platoon or company, attacking individual enemy groups, especially at a time when artillery is not shelling the front line. This will reduce your own losses.

It often happens that a short bayonet attack, carried out decisively, develops into a general counter-offensive.”

While the Germans are in the open, approaching the defending enemy units, they are very vulnerable to fire from all types of artillery. There is a general conversation about the power of the “fire system”, but when it comes to clarifying what kind of “fire system” this is, it is clarified that this is the fire of nomadic (individual and constantly changing positions) guns and, unknown to us, machine guns advanced point-blank towards the approaching Germans . There are no demands to develop a system of barrage and concentrated artillery fire, there are not even demands to simply cover hectares with artillery. Where is the advice to call in regimental, divisional and corps artillery fire on the attacking Germans and those in the open? After all, she was! But no, as you can see, such advice for Soviet generals was prohibitive in its military complexity, and the favorite bayonet attack, at least by a squad, was their answer! Not fire, but a bayonet - that’s the main thing that will reflect German attack!

German General E. Middeldorf, in the book he wrote after the war, “The Russian Campaign: Tactics and Weapons,” compares Soviet and German infantry:

“There is no doubt that of the two largest land powers of the period last war– Russia and Germany – German ground army both at the beginning and at the end of the war it had the most combat-ready infantry. However, according to a number important issues In combat training and weapons, the Russian infantry, especially at the initial stage of the war, was superior to the German infantry. In particular, the Russians were superior to the Germans in the art of night fighting, fighting in wooded and swampy areas and fighting in winter, in training snipers and in engineering positions, as well as in equipping infantry with machine guns and mortars. However, the Germans were superior to the Russians in organizing the offensive and interaction between military branches, in training junior command personnel and in equipping the infantry with machine guns. During the war, the opponents learned from each other and managed to some extent eliminate their existing shortcomings.”.

Let us note that, in the opinion of this general of that war, our infantry was strong where it could hide from German fire. Even though he praised the equipment of our infantry with machine guns and mortars, he did not praise the fact that our infantry enjoyed this advantage. And he did not speak a single word of praise about our bayonet attack as our advantage.

And since Middeldorf mentioned snipers, I’ll digress a little more on the advantages of accurate fire and German tactics.

Vyacheslav Molotov, People's Commissar Foreign Affairs of the USSR:

“The advisor to the German ambassador, Hilger, shed tears when he handed over the note.”

Anastas Mikoyan, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee:

“Immediately members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin’s. We decided that we should make a radio appearance in connection with the outbreak of the war. Of course, they suggested that Stalin do this. But Stalin refused - let Molotov speak. Of course, this was a mistake. But Stalin was in such a depressed state that he did not know what to say to the people.”

Lazar Kaganovich, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee:

“At night we gathered at Stalin’s when Molotov received Schulenburg. Stalin gave each of us a task—me for transport, Mikoyan for supplies.”

Vasily Pronin, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council:

“On June 21, 1941, at ten o’clock in the evening, the secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, Shcherbakov, and I were summoned to the Kremlin. We had barely sat down when, turning to us, Stalin said: “According to intelligence and defectors, German troops intend to attack our borders tonight. Apparently, a war is starting. Do you have everything ready in urban air defense? Report!" At about 3 o'clock in the morning we were released. About twenty minutes later we arrived at the house. They were waiting for us at the gate. “They called from the Central Committee of the Party,” said the person who greeted us, “and instructed us to convey: the war has begun and we need to be on the spot.”

  • Georgy Zhukov, Pavel Batov and Konstantin Rokossovsky
  • RIA News

Georgy Zhukov, Army General:

“At 4:30 a.m. S.K. Timoshenko and I arrived at the Kremlin. All the summoned members of the Politburo were already assembled. The People's Commissar and I were invited into the office.

I.V. Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding an unfilled tobacco pipe in his hands.

We reported the situation. J.V. Stalin said in bewilderment:

“Isn’t this a provocation of the German generals?”

“The Germans are bombing our cities in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. What a provocation this is...” replied S.K. Timoshenko.

...After some time, V.M. Molotov quickly entered the office:

"The German government has declared war on us."

JV Stalin silently sat down on a chair and thought deeply.

There was a long, painful pause.”

Alexander Vasilevsky,Major General:

“At 4:00 a.m. we learned from the operational authorities of the district headquarters about the bombing of our airfields and cities by German aviation.”

Konstantin Rokossovsky,Lieutenant General:

“At about four o’clock in the morning on June 22, upon receiving a telephone message from headquarters, I was forced to open a special secret operational package. The directive indicated: immediately put the corps on combat readiness and move in the direction of Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel.”

Ivan Bagramyan, Colonel:

“...The first strike of German aviation, although it was unexpected for the troops, did not at all cause panic. In a difficult situation, when everything that could burn was engulfed in flames, when barracks, residential buildings, warehouses were collapsing before our eyes, communications were interrupted, the commanders made every effort to maintain leadership of the troops. They firmly followed the combat instructions that became known to them after opening the packages they kept.”

Semyon Budyonny, Marshal:

“At 4:01 on June 22, 1941, Comrade Timoshenko called me and said that the Germans were bombing Sevastopol and should I report this to Comrade Stalin? I told him that I needed to report immediately, but he said: “You’re calling!” I immediately called and reported not only about Sevastopol, but also about Riga, which the Germans were also bombing. Comrade Stalin asked: “Where is the People’s Commissar?” I answered: “Here next to me” (I was already in the People’s Commissar’s office). Comrade Stalin ordered the phone to be handed over to him...

Thus began the war!”

  • RIA News

Joseph Geibo, deputy regiment commander of the 46th IAP, Western Military District:

“...I felt a chill in my chest. In front of me are four twin-engine bombers with black crosses on the wings. I even bit my lip. But these are “Junkers”! German Ju-88 bombers! What to do?.. Another thought arose: “Today is Sunday, and the Germans don’t have training flights on Sundays.” So it's war? Yes, war!

Nikolai Osintsev, chief of staff of the division of the 188th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the Red Army:

“On the 22nd at 4 o’clock in the morning we heard sounds: boom-boom-boom-boom. It turned out that it was German aircraft that unexpectedly attacked our airfields. Our planes did not even have time to change their airfields and all remained in their places. Almost all of them were destroyed."

Vasily Chelombitko, head of the 7th department of the Academy of Armored and Mechanized Forces:

“On June 22, our regiment stopped to rest in the forest. Suddenly we saw planes flying, the commander announced a drill, but suddenly the planes began to bomb us. We realized that a war had begun. Here in the forest at 12 o’clock in the afternoon we listened to Comrade Molotov’s speech on the radio and on the same day at noon we received Chernyakhovsky’s first combat order for the division to move forward, towards Siauliai.”

Yakov Boyko, lieutenant:

“Today, that is. 06/22/41, day off. While I was writing a letter to you, I suddenly heard on the radio that the brutal Nazi fascism was bombing our cities... But this will cost them dearly, and Hitler will no longer live in Berlin... I have only one thing in my soul right now hatred and desire to destroy the enemy where he came from..."

Pyotr Kotelnikov, defender of the Brest Fortress:

“In the morning we were awakened by a strong blow. It broke through the roof. I was stunned. I saw the wounded and killed and realized: this is no longer a training exercise, but a war. Most of the soldiers in our barracks died in the first seconds. I followed the adults and rushed to arms, but they didn’t give me a rifle. Then I, along with one of the Red Army soldiers, rushed to put out the fire at the clothing warehouse.”

Timofey Dombrovsky, Red Army machine gunner:

“Planes poured fire on us from above, artillery - mortars, heavy and light guns - below, on the ground, all at once! We lay down on the bank of the Bug, from where we saw everything that was happening on the opposite bank. Everyone immediately understood what was happening. The Germans attacked - war!

Cultural figures of the USSR

  • All-Union Radio announcer Yuri Levitan

Yuri Levitan, announcer:

“When we, the announcers, were called to the radio early in the morning, the calls had already begun to ring out. They call from Minsk: “Enemy planes are over the city,” they call from Kaunas: “The city is burning, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”, “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” A woman’s crying, excitement: “Is it really war?”.. And then I remember - I turned on the microphone. In all cases, I remember that I was worried only internally, only internally worried. But here, when I uttered the words “Moscow speaks,” I feel that I can’t speak further - there’s a lump stuck in my throat. They’re already knocking from the control room: “Why are you silent? Continue!” He clenched his fists and continued: “Citizens and women of the Soviet Union...”

Georgy Knyazev, director of the Archive of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Leningrad:

V.M. Molotov’s speech about the attack on the Soviet Union by Germany was broadcast on the radio. The war began at 4 1/2 o'clock in the morning with an attack by German aircraft on Vitebsk, Kovno, Zhitomir, Kyiv, and Sevastopol. There are dead. Soviet troops the order was given to repel the enemy, to expel him from the borders of our country. And my heart trembled. Here it is, the moment we were afraid to even think about. Ahead... Who knows what's ahead!

Nikolai Mordvinov, actor:

“Makarenko’s rehearsal was going on... Anorov bursts in without permission... and in an alarming, dull voice announces: “War against fascism, comrades!”

So, the most terrible front has opened!

Woe! Woe!”

Marina Tsvetaeva, poet:

Nikolai Punin, art historian:

“I remembered my first impressions of the war... Molotov’s speech, which was said by A.A., who ran in with disheveled hair (grey) in a black silk Chinese robe . (Anna Andreevna Akhmatova)».

Konstantin Simonov, poet:

“I learned that the war had already begun only at two o’clock in the afternoon. The entire morning of June 22, he wrote poetry and did not answer the phone. And when I approached, the first thing I heard was war.”

Alexander Tvardovsky, poet:

“War with Germany. I’m going to Moscow.”

Olga Bergolts, poet:

Russian emigrants

  • Ivan Bunin
  • RIA News

Ivan Bunin, writer:

"22nd of June. WITH new page I am writing the continuation of this day - a great event - Germany this morning declared war on Russia - and the Finns and Romanians have already “invaded” its “limits.”

Pyotr Makhrov, Lieutenant General:

“The day the Germans declared war on Russia, June 22, 1941, had such a strong effect on my entire being that the next day, the 23rd (the 22nd was Sunday), I sent ordered letter Bogomolov [the Soviet ambassador to France], asking him to send me to Russia to enlist in the army, at least as a private.”

Citizens of the USSR

  • Residents of Leningrad listen to the message about the attack fascist Germany to the Soviet Union
  • RIA News

Lidia Shablova:

“We were tearing up shingles in the yard to cover the roof. The kitchen window was open and we heard the radio announce that war had begun. The father froze. His hands gave up: “Apparently we won’t finish the roof anymore...”.

Anastasia Nikitina-Arshinova:

“Early in the morning, the children and I were awakened by a terrible roar. Shells and bombs exploded, shrapnel screamed. I grabbed the children and ran out into the street barefoot. We barely had time to grab some clothes with us. There was horror on the street. Above the fortress (Brest) Planes were circling and dropping bombs on us. Women and children rushed around in panic, trying to escape. In front of me lay the wife of one lieutenant and her son - both were killed by a bomb.”

Anatoly Krivenko:

“We lived not far from Arbat, in Bolshoy Afanasyevsky Lane. There was no sun that day, the sky was overcast. I was walking in the yard with the boys, we were kicking a rag ball. And then my mother jumped out of the entrance in one slip, barefoot, running and shouting: “Home! Tolya, go home immediately! War!"

Nina Shinkareva:

“We lived in a village in the Smolensk region. That day, mom went to a neighboring village to get eggs and butter, and when she returned, dad and other men had already gone to war. On the same day, residents began to be evacuated. A big car arrived, and my mother put on my sister and me all the clothes we had, so that in winter we would also have something to wear.”

Anatoly Vokrosh:

“We lived in the village of Pokrov, Moscow region. That day, the guys and I were going to the river to catch crucian carp. My mother caught me on the street and told me to eat first. I went into the house and ate. When he began to spread honey on bread, Molotov’s message about the beginning of the war was heard. After eating, I ran with the boys to the river. We ran around in the bushes, shouting: “The war has begun! Hooray! We will defeat everyone! We absolutely did not understand what this all meant. The adults discussed the news, but I don’t remember there was panic or fear in the village. The villagers were doing their usual things, and on this day and in the following cities, summer residents came.”

Boris Vlasov:

“In June 1941, I arrived in Orel, where I was assigned immediately after graduating from the Hydrometeorological Institute. On the night of June 22, I spent the night in a hotel, since I had not yet managed to transport my things to the allocated apartment. In the morning I heard some fuss and commotion, but I slept through the alarm. The radio announced that an important government message would be broadcast at 12 o'clock. Then I realized that I had slept through not a training alarm, but a combat alarm—the war had begun.”

Alexandra Komarnitskaya:

“I was vacationing in a children’s camp near Moscow. There the camp leadership announced to us that war with Germany had begun. Everyone—the counselors and the children—started crying.”

Ninel Karpova:

“We listened to the message about the beginning of the war from the loudspeaker at the House of Defense. There were a lot of people crowding there. I wasn’t upset, on the contrary, I was proud: my father will defend the Motherland... In general, people were not afraid. Yes, the women, of course, were upset and cried. But there was no panic. Everyone was confident that we would quickly defeat the Germans. The men said: “Yes, the Germans will flee from us!”

Nikolay Chebykin:

“June 22 was Sunday. Such a sunny day! And my father and I were digging a potato cellar with shovels. About twelve o'clock. About five minutes before, my sister Shura opens the window and says: “They are broadcasting on the radio: “A very important government message will now be transmitted!” Well, we put down our shovels and went to listen. It was Molotov who spoke. And he said that German troops treacherously attacked our country without declaring war. We crossed the state border. The Red Army is fighting hard. And he ended with the words: “Our cause is just! The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours!".

German generals

  • RIA News

Guderian:

“On the fateful day of June 22, 1941, at 2:10 a.m., I went to command post group and climbed to the observation tower south of Bogukala. At 3:15 a.m. our artillery preparation began. At 3:40 a.m. - the first raid of our dive bombers. At 4:15 a.m. the forward units of the 17th and 18th began crossing the Bug tank divisions. At 6:50 a.m. near Kolodno I crossed the Bug in an assault boat.”

“On June 22, at three hours and minutes, four corps of a tank group, with the support of artillery and aviation, which was part of the 8th Aviation Corps, crossed the state border. Bomber aircraft attacked enemy airfields, with the task of paralyzing the actions of his aircraft.

On the first day, the offensive went completely according to plan.”

Manstein:

“Already on this first day we had to get acquainted with the methods by which the war was waged with Soviet side. One of our reconnaissance patrols, cut off by the enemy, was later found by our troops, he was cut out and brutally mutilated. My adjutant and I traveled a lot to areas where enemy units could still be located, and we decided not to surrender alive into the hands of this enemy.”

Blumentritt:

“The behavior of the Russians, even in the first battle, was strikingly different from the behavior of the Poles and allies who were defeated on the Western Front. Even when surrounded, the Russians steadfastly defended themselves.”

German soldiers and officers

  • www.nationaalarchief.nl.

Erich Mende, Chief Lieutenant:

“My commander was twice my age, and he had already fought with the Russians near Narva in 1917, when he was a lieutenant. “Here, in these vast expanses, we will find our death, like Napoleon...” he did not hide his pessimism. “Mende, remember this hour, it marks the end of the old Germany.”

Johann Danzer, artilleryman:

“On the very first day, as soon as we went on the attack, one of our men shot himself with his own weapon. Clutching the rifle between his knees, he inserted the barrel into his mouth and pulled the trigger. This is how the war and all the horrors associated with it ended for him.”

Alfred Durwanger, Lieutenant:

“When we entered the first battle with the Russians, they clearly did not expect us, but they could not be called unprepared either. Enthusiasm (we have) there was no sign of it! Rather, everyone was overcome by a sense of the enormity of the upcoming campaign. And then the question arose: where, from which settlement will this campaign end?!”

Hubert Becker, lieutenant:

“It was a hot summer day. We walked across the field, suspecting nothing. Suddenly artillery fire fell on us. That’s how my baptism of fire happened - a strange feeling.”

Helmut Pabst, non-commissioned officer

“The offensive continues. We are constantly moving forward through enemy territory, and we have to constantly change positions. I'm terribly thirsty. There is no time to swallow a piece. By 10 in the morning we were already experienced, shelled fighters who had seen a lot: positions abandoned by the enemy, damaged and burned tanks and vehicles, the first prisoners, the first killed Russians.”

Rudolf Gschöpf, chaplain:

“This artillery barrage, gigantic in its power and coverage of territory, was like an earthquake. Huge mushrooms of smoke were visible everywhere, instantly growing out of the ground. Since there was no talk of any return fire, it seemed to us that we had completely wiped this citadel off the face of the earth.”

Hans Becker, tanker:

“On the Eastern Front I met people who could be called a special race. Already the first attack turned into a battle for life and death.”

SO WHAT TIME IS IT 06.22.41
DID THE GERMANS ATTACK THE USSR?
(part 3)

(sometimes discharge bold in the text - zhistory)

After posting information about this topic on some forums, an interested discussion of the problem under consideration arose on them. In particular, many opinions were expressed at VIF-RZh. This included the following message:

From: Correct VI forum, 17.03 15:35
In response to: Re: So what time did the Germans attack on 06/22/41? – Zakoretsky

Everything has already been discussed in this thread: http://vif2ne.ru:2003/nvk/forum/archive/1135/1135829.htm

K. Zakoretsky. If you decide to post part 3 “What time did the Germans attack” on Z-History using materials from the VIF2NE forum, then please provide the appropriate link.

First of all, I do. Secondly, I would like to note that I did not create any messages on this topic on the VIF2NE forum. And I was pleased to know that VIF2NE also became interested in the problem of time. However, after reading most of the opinions there, I do not agree with what is there" IT'S ALL ALREADY discussed." Such a categorical statement arose due to the fact that one of the participants provided a link to a German website that posted a list of periods when summer time was introduced in Germany:

a) DST, Universal Time + 2 hours: (Summer Time, International Time +2 hours)

Clocks were advanced one hour with respect to CET: (Periods when 1 hour was added)

1916-04-30 23:00:00 CET to 1916-10-01 1:00:00 CEST
1917-04-16 2:00:00 CET to 1917-09-17 3:00:00 CEST
1918-04-15 2:00:00 CET to 1918-09-16 3:00:00 CEST

1919 to 1939: No DST (No Daylight Saving Time).

1940-04-01 2:00:00 CET to 1942-11-02 3:00:00 CEST
1943-03-29 2:00:00 CET to 1943-10-04 3:00:00 CEST
1944-04-03 2:00:00 CET to 1944-10-02 3:00:00 CEST

Abbreviations:

UT: Universal Time ("Greenwich-Time") - Universal Time ("Greenwich Time")
DST: Daylight Saving Time
CET= UT + 1 h: Central European Time - Central European Time
CEST= UT + 2 h: Central European Summer Time - Central European summer time
CEMT = UT + 3 h: Central European Midsummer Time - Central European Super Summer Time

And this explanation arose:

Madame and Monsieur

>From 2:00 04/01/1940 to 3:00 02/11/1942
That is, 2 a.m. on April 1, 1940 became 3 a.m. (GMT+1 became GMT+2),
On November 2, 1942, everything returned to its place again (GMT+2 => GMT+1).
The difference with Moscow during this period was 1 (“maternity”) hour (GMT+3),
and during “Uranus” it’s already 2 hours.

>So During the Battle of Kursk and Operation Typhoon, Berlin time differed from Moscow time by 1 hour. And on June 22, 1941, the difference was also 1 hour. The Germans write that they started the war at 3 o’clock, but according to Soviet data this happened at 4 o’clock.

If I understood all your data correctly, and if our “maternity” time then stood unshakable “like a rock,” then it should be so.

Happiness is when you have everything at home (not mine), Andrey.

So, is everything settled?
Was it summer time in Germany in June 1941?
And that’s why the difference with Moscow was 1 hour?
And everything fits? And can the topic be closed?

Perhaps... But it seems somehow strange that in the winters of 1940-1941 and 1941-1942 the Germans lived according to summer time! And secondly, there is one more remark: it is known that the Germans on the morning of June 22, 1941 started the war at 3:00 AM “WITH DAWN”! But this event can be verified. And if it turns out that on the western border of the USSR, according to German summer time, sunrise began at about 3-00, and according to Soviet maternity time, accordingly, at about 4-00, then everything really comes together and the topic can be closed. You can check this, for example, using the same astronomical shareware program "SKYGLOBE 3.6".

Here the green horizontal line is the horizon.
Letter " N" - direction north.
Letters " NE" - northeast.
Letter " E" - East (" East" - 90 degrees from the direction north).
Yellow circle of the Sun (" SUN") coincides with the direction to the northeast (" NE").
To the left below the horizon is the star "Castor", to the right and above are the positions of the planets of Jupiter ( JUP), Uranus ( URA), Saturn ( SAT), Moon ( MOO), as well as some stars, for example, Aldebaran.
Although, of course, they were no longer really visible, since they were overshadowed by the light of the Sun rising from the horizon.

But what is this time (3-43)?
Zone GMT+1? Or summer for this zone GMT+1+1?

In order to understand, it would first be useful to familiarize yourself with the general theory of sunrise on June 22 within any time zone at different latitudes. The fact is that the Earth is round and has been rotating at almost the same speeds for many thousands of years. And the meanings of these movements are not secret. For example, you can carry out calculations for the Greenwich meridian (0 degrees longitude), starting from the equator. The results can be summarized in the following table:

Sunrise on June 22 at the latitudes of the Earth’s northern hemisphere (values ​​+ - several minutes)

Latitude

Western border
(+7 degrees 30 min.)

Middle
time zone

Eastern border
(-7 degrees 30 min.)

00-00 (Equator)

5:55

10-00
20-00
30-00
40-00
50-00

4:15

55-00

3:47

60-00

2:32

62-00
66-33
(Arctic Circle)

0:00
(Polar day)

0:00
(Polar day)

0:00
(Polar day)

70-00

Polar day

Polar day

Polar day

What time are the values ​​indicated? Belt or summer?

This can be verified using known data for known coordinates.
For example, in Kyiv ( 50 deg. 25 min. northern latitude, 30 deg. 32 min. eastern longitude) June 22, 2006 The sun should rise at 4-46 summer time (or 3-46 , respectively, standard time).


But how to link its coordinates with the created table?

In terms of latitude, it’s simple - take the line for latitude 50-00.
And it remains to determine what Kyiv is closer to - to the borders of the belt or to its middle (for GMT+2).
This can be done according to the rule:

The Greenwich meridian is the midpoint of the zero time zone (GMT). After 7 deg. 30 min. to the east is its eastern border. Further, after 15 degrees, the boundaries of other belts are located. Well, the middle between the two borders is the middle of the time zone.

So: 0 deg. + 7.5 (eastern limit of GMT) + 15 (GMT+1) + 7.5 (half GMT+2) = 30 degrees.
Those. meridian 30 degrees east longitude is the middle of the 2nd time zone.
Those. Kyiv is practically located on it.
And we find in the table the value of sunrise for the middle of the belt in the line for 50-00: 3-45 , which practically coincided with the time indicated in the tear-off calendar (plus 1 hour for the summer).
CONCLUSION: in the created table the sunrise times for different latitudes are indicated WAIST.

And you can notice that the time of sunrise at the borders of any time zone differs from the middle by 30 minutes, which agrees with the theory: through each time zone, the time should change by 1 hour (and from the middle - by half an hour, i.e. by 30 minutes).

And another conclusion: the closer to the Equator, the later the Sun rises, and the closer to the North Pole, the earlier. And starting from a certain latitude (66 degrees 33 minutes - “Arctic Circle”) the Sun does not set beyond the horizon at all in summer.

TSB, 3rd ed., volume 20:

Arctic Circle, an earthly parallel spaced from the equator by 66°33" (the angle of inclination of the earth's axis to the ecliptic plane). The Arctic Circle, located in the Northern Hemisphere of the Earth, is called the Northern Arctic Circle, in the Southern Hemisphere - the Southern P. k. On the day of the summer solstice (June 21 or 22) to the north of the N. P. k. The sun does not set, and on the day of the winter solstice (December 21 or 22) it does not rise. -ry the Sun does not sink below the horizon or rise above it, it increases as it approaches the pole, where day and night last for six months (polar day and polar night). A similar phenomenon is observed in the Southern Hemisphere of the Earth. Refraction of light complicates this somewhat phenomenon, increasing the duration of the polar day at the expense of the night and increasing the number of days with the Sun not setting.Pcs are considered the boundaries of cold climatic zones.

Let's return to Berlin: its latitude is 52 degrees. 32 min. Longitude - 13 degrees. 25 min.
In longitude, this is approximately the middle of the time zone:
0 deg. + 7.5 (eastern limit of GMT) + 7.5 (half GMT+1) = 15 degrees.
We find in the table the lines of 50 and 55 degrees. and in the cells in the middle of the belt we read: 3-45 and 3-17.
Those. in Berlin, the time of sunrise in standard time can be estimated as 3-35 (but this is 2 degrees east). The program shows the time - 3-43. error - 8 minutes (quite acceptable). The main thing is that the hour is shown as one - 3 .

So, in Berlin, standard time on June 22, the Sun rises at 3:43,
and if they introduced daylight saving time, then at 4:43.
And on the eastern border of this time zone (near Brest) it should rise 30 minutes earlier
(i.e. at 3-10).

It remains to be seen in what latitudes the Germans attacked on 06/22/41.
As the map shows, they advanced in the geographical zone from 49 degrees. up to 55 degrees north latitude:
(Hereinafter information from the "ATLAS OF THE WORLD", Moscow, "State Geodesy of the USSR", 1991)

More information from Atalas, from the time zone map on page 14:

Mid GMT: Paris, London.
Mid GMT+1: Berlin, Rome.
Eastern border GMT+1: western border of the USSR.
Western border GMT+2: western border of the USSR.
Mid GMT+2: Leningrad, Kyiv, Ankara, Cairo.
Eastern border GMT+2: Moscow, Murmansk.
Mid GMT+3: Volgograd, Tbilisi.

Thus, in the German offensive zone on June 22, 1941, the Sun should have risen according to Berlin standard time at 2-47 - 3-20 . (Or in 3-47 - 4-20 according to summer, if there was one).

Those. rounded, dawn on the border of the USSR with Germany on June 22, 1941 according to German clocks should have been either 3 hours (zone time) or 4 (according to summer, if there was one).

Accordingly, on the Soviet side, the clock had to show or 4 by waist or 5 according to summer ("maternity leave").

MATERNITY TIME standard time plus one hour; Unlike summer time, this excess is constant throughout the year. Introduced by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 16, 1930 with the aim of more rational use of the daylight hours (cancelled in February 1991). In Russia maternity time adopted again in October 1991. Thus, the time of a given time zone in Russia differs from universal time by the number of the time zone (in hours) plus one hour (in summer period- an additional hour).

This is where the problem arises:

If the Germans attacked at 3:00 a.m. summer time, then it’s 2:00 a.m. time zone time. And there is still 1 hour left until dawn in the Brest area. Those. the Germans would have to use searchlights, car headlights, flashlights, flare bombs, mines, rocket launchers, and tracer bullets. But in this case, all the memoirs should clearly contain all this pandemonium.
But she's not there. Because everyone writes that the war has begun" HAPPY DAWN".

But according to geo-astronomical data, the dawn of June 22 at 2-00 on the eastern border of zones according to standard time (or at 3-00 according to summer time) occurs only in latitudes of at least 60-00 degrees north latitude ( Leningrad, Helsinki, Oslo, Magadan, Stockholm is a little further south - 59 degrees).
And at 2-00 in the middle of the time zone, the Sun rises even further north - at 62-00 degrees [this is exactly the latitude of the upper reaches (from where it flows) of the Kolyma, and the capitals of Karelia (Petrozavodsk) and Komi (Syktyvkar) are slightly to the south].
Well, almost the whole of Great Britain is south of not only 62-00, but also 60-00.

AND "SKYGLOBE 3.6" persistently shows...

Or maybe this program is all lying?
Is it possible to check it?

For example, it is known that on March 22, day is equal to night. Those. Sunrise in the middle of any time zone should begin at 6-00 standard time (daylight saving time is not yet used at this time!) or at 7-00 maternity time, if one was used (as now in Russia or as in 1941 in the USSR). And, accordingly, on the western border - in 6-30 by waist or in 7-30 according to summer.

For control in "SKYGLOBE 3.6" We take the coordinates of Moscow for 06/22/41 and shift them to Brest, setting the position of the Sun on the horizon. We get 7-28 :

IT CONVERGES!

Similarly, according to Berlin time for Brest (Berlin is in the middle of GMT+1, and in Brest sunrise should be 30 minutes earlier, i.e. somewhere at 5-30):

IT CONVERGES!

Well, in Berlin itself, sunrise should be around 6-00:

IT CONVERGES!

Yes, that means "SKYGLOBE 3.6" isn't he lying?

We open the tear-off calendar for Kyiv for March 22 (also the middle of the time zone and should be approximately 6-00). We read: "Sunrise - 5:57"

IT CONVERGES!

We reveal the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, "MEMORIES AND REFLECTIONS", 7th edition, 1986, volume 2, p. 8-9:
=====

On the morning of June 22, N.F. Vatutin and I were with the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko in his office in the People's Commissariat of Defense.

3 hours 07minutes, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, called me on HF and said: “The fleet VNOS system reports the approach of a large number of unknown aircraft from the sea, the fleet is in full combat readiness. I ask for instructions.”

I asked the admiral:
- Your choice?
“There is only one solution: meet the planes with naval air defense fire.”
After talking with S.K. Timoshenko, I answered Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky:
- Take action and report to your people's commissar.

At 3:30 a.m. The chief of staff of the Western District, General V.E. Klimovskikh, reported on a German air raid on the cities of Belarus. About three minutes later, the chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General M.A. Purkaev, reported on an air raid on the cities of Ukraine.At 3:40 called the commander of the Baltic Military District, General F.I. Kuznetsov, who reported on enemy air raids on Kaunas and other cities.

The People's Commissar ordered me to call I.V. Stalin. I'm calling. Nobody answers the phone. I'm calling continuously. Finally I hear the sleepy voice of the general on duty of the security department.

- Who is speaking?
– Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Please urgently connect me with Comrade Stalin.
- What? Now?! – the head of security was amazed. - Comrade Stalin is sleeping.
- Wake up immediately: the Germans are bombing our cities!

===============

Please clarify: what time are German planes in 3-30 - 3-40 bombed Soviet cities?
Presumably, according to Moscow maternity leave?
But then in Berlin it was 2-30 - 2-40 !
But German planes had to fly another 30-60 minutes to Soviet cities within a zone of 200-300 km from the western border, i.e. Should they have crossed the border at 1:30 - 2:00 Berlin summer time?
Or at 0-30 - 1-00 zone time?

But it is known that German planes flew over the western Soviet border at about 3:00 (most likely, after all, standard time or [let’s say] summer time - in any case, not at 2:00!).

Options: either at 3:30 Moscow time, Soviet cities were bombed on June 22, 1941 by someone else (not the Germans), or Zhukov is lying. And this entire text of Zhukov’s memoirs, along with his alleged call to Stalin, is a LIE!
Moreover, it makes no difference whether the Germans attacked during summer time or during zone time!

FUCKING LIES!

(Or, I repeat, we will have to assume that there were bombings, but not by German planes - judging by a number of data, this hypothesis cannot be excluded, however...)

One can argue about the veracity of Zhukov’s story about the period after 4:00 (presumably, Moscow time).

So the Germans attacked at 4:00 Moscow time (and at 3:00 according to their Berlin SUMMER time) and EVERYTHING COMES AWAY!...

Sorry... Something doesn't add up... What about illumination with spotlights, headlights, flare bombs, tracer bullets? Where is the description of this light dance? After all, in Moscow, dawn in Brest begins at 5-04!

Or at 3-03 Berlin Standard Time:

(Accordingly, at 4-03 SUMMER Berlin time).

So who's lying? German site about summer time?
Or all the German memoirs and other books in which the time of the attack is indicated everywhere as 3-00 - 3-30 at dawn? For example, quote from http://airforce.ru/history/.../chapter3.htm

What happened on June 22, 1941? Let's turn to the events of this day and start with the picture that is being painted for us German sources .

"June 22, 1941. 3.20 am. A little more - and rising Sun will dry the dew ...on the wings of fighters of the 23rd Air Force Division, lined up at the airfield near Rivne ... Suddenly the dull roar of engines broke the silence. ... three planes slipped out from the west, crossed the border of the airfield at low level and rushed towards the long lines of fighters. A second later... a shower of two-kilogram fragmentation bombs poured from their belly... A thick cloud of oily smoke swirled and grew over the airfield.

Three Heinkel-111s of the 53rd Bomber Squadron... turned around and walked over the airfield once again, spraying machine-gun fire on the flaming wreckage. Then, having completed their mission, they left for the west, while the stunned pilots jumped out of their beds. ..." (Military pilots, pp. 58-59).

Sorry, at 3:30 to dry the dew near Rovno on June 22 The sun can only be in German standard time! And nothing else! No summer time! In summer time this means 2:30 a.m. standard time. And at 2:30 a.m. on June 22, the Sun can dry the dew only near Leningrad or Helsinki...

Ooh! What confusion, however!...
By the way, if the Germans attacked at 3:00 a.m. summer time, can this be compared with someone else who attacked the USSR together with them? (At what time did they attack?)
For example, when did the Romanians start the war? Any data?

There is one site" CORNER OF THE SKY"(Aviation Encyclopedia), where the article by A. Gulyas is posted -
The first days of the war (June 22, 1941)

And it provides information about the combat work of Soviet pilots on June 22, 1941 in the Odessa Military District. In particular:
======================
Events unfolded completely differently in the Odessa Military District. The enemy attacked 11 airfields; but almost everywhere he received a decisive rebuff and suffered losses. The greatest success was achieved by the 67th IAP of Major Rudakov. ..... At 4 in the morning The regiment was alerted. Soon in the direction Bolgarika airfield a scout appeared. Lt Ermak took off from the interception and shot him down with two bursts. Some time later, 9 (according to other sources - 10) bombers appeared over the airfield. A group of Lieutenant A. Moklyak rose to meet them in I-16 fighters. ....

Having suffered two failures in a row and being convinced, that Bulgarian - a tough nut to crack, the German command launched a massive raid, which involved about 50 bombers and 30 fighters. The bombers came in waves at intervals of 2-3 minutes. Each nine was covered by six Bf-109s. The entire regiment - fifty I-16s - entered the battle with them. Dividing into groups, our pilots simultaneously attacked the bombers and their cover. The enemy's formation immediately broke down. 5 bombers and 2 fighters were shot down. Alexander Moklyak showed himself brilliantly in this battle. With well-aimed fire he shot down two He-111s (according to other sources - S.M.81), and the third rammed and died. All this happened between 5 and 6 a.m.. So at the end of the second hour of the war A. Moklyak became the leader among Soviet pilots by number of victories. ....

Failure befell the enemy during the raid on Grosulovo airfield. At 5 o'clock 10 minutes three nine Ju-88s, under the cover of nine Bf-109s, tried to bomb the SB and Pe-2 parking lots. The first group of attackers missed, and Afanasy Karmanov interfered with the second. He ended up in the Grosulovo area by accident, ferrying a MiG-3 from a field camp to main airfield in Chisinau. Captain A. Karmanov was not embarrassed by the enemy's multiple superiority. He shot down one Junkers on the move and scattered the rest. However, all nine covering fighters immediately fell on him. ... Surviving with the plane is a skill. .... A. Karmanov’s plane resembled a sieve, but landed at its airfield, but one of the Messerschmitts was burning out in the vicinity of Grosulovo. IN 4th IAP Other pilots also distinguished themselves. A.I. Pokryshkin writes that over Grigoriopol, Tiraspol and Chisinau The regiment's pilots shot down about 20 enemy aircraft.

55th IAP under the command of Mr. V.P. Ivanov was based in Balti. In April, as at many airfields on the western border, construction of a concrete runway began there, and three squadrons of the regiment flew to Mayaki. One of the experienced pilots was Art. l-t A.I. Pokryshkin. The war caught up with him at the airfield in Grigoriopol. He returned to Mayaki after the first enemy raids. Based in Balti The 1st squadron of Mr. F. Atrashkevich turned out to be understaffed - in addition to Pokryshkin’s unit, Figichev’s unit, which was on patrol at the very border, was missing near Ungheni. F. Atrashkevich was also summoned there. In Chisinau Third level commander K. Seliverstov was at the headquarters. The remaining 5 ordinary pilots, led by flight commander Mironov and squadron adjutant Ovchinnikov, did everything to repel the raid of a large group of bombers under the cover of Messerschmitts (more than 20 He-111s and 18 Bf-109s). But the forces were unequal, and it was not possible to prevent the raid. 2 people died at the airport, fuel warehouse burned down, Three MiGs were damaged. .... F. Atrashkevich especially distinguished himself by shooting down the Messerschmitt of the group commander - a major with the Iron Cross. Only absence accurate information about the location of the headquarters of the 27th Fighter Squadron (JG-27) does not allow us to say with complete certainty that the downed major was the commander of JG-27, Wolfgang Schelmann...

Along with the above 4th IAP over Chisinau pilots fought 69th IAP, where is the deputy The regiment commander was one of the most famous Soviet aces in Spain, Lev Shestakov. The regiment was part of the 21st SAD and based near Odessa. On the first day of the war he did not suffer any losses, and Major L. Shestakov and Mr. Astashkin shot down 3 aircraft: 2 Ju-88s were destroyed over Chisinau, and Astashkin shot down a Do-215 on the outskirts of the airfield, winning his second victory.

Moses Stepanovich Tokarev started the war in the 131st IAP. June 22, patrolling at the head of nine I-16 near Tiraspol, he met a group of 20 Ju-88s, covered by 12 Bf-109s. ....

The combat account of the pilots of the Black Sea Fleet was opened by Jr. Lt. M.S. Maksimov. Early in the morning of June 22, the 96th squadron consisting of 16 I-153 and I-16 under the command of A.I. Korobitsyn on the approaches to Izmail met 12 Romanian bombers . Our pilots shot down 5 planes. In addition to M.S. Maksimov, Senior Lieutenant A.P. Borisov and Prince A.I. Korobitsyn also won personal victories. Two planes were shot down by B.V. Maslov and A.A. Malinovsky.
==============

It turns out that AT THE SAME TIME (why wait?) military operations began in the south of the Soviet western border, which at that time ran between the USSR and ROMANIA! And it turns out that along with German planes, Romanian planes began to cross the Soviet guardrail. More precisely, not only at the same time as the German ones in the PribOVO, ZapOVO and KievOVO zones, but German planes also took off from Romanian airfields in the direction of Moldova. AND WITH them, Romanian planes went into battle. This is illustrated by the remark that a plane was shot down over a Soviet airfield in Bolgarika S.M.81- Whose production is this? German? Which troops were equipped with such aircraft? Romanian? And when describing the battles over Izmail, this article directly talks about Romanian airplanes.

So, it must be assumed that Romanian planes flew into battle at the same time as the Germans.
What time, may I know?

It turns out that you can...
By the way, if the Germans attacked in 3-00 supposedly summer time, then we must assume that in Romania, located in the same time zone, summer time should also show the same 3-00 . Logical?
But if the Germans attacked at 3:00 according to the waist, then if Romania used daylight saving time, then the Romanians should have started at 4-00. And if they didn’t use it, then like the Germans at 3:00.

All this can be clarified on another site: Kharina V.V. "Aviators of World War II", and on it in an article by M. Zhirokhov with the participation of A. Stratulat (Moldova) - Romanian squadrons in the skies of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, June 22, 1941

In the introduction, the authors note that " the actions of the Romanian Air Force during the Second World War represent a little-studied piece of the history of air warfare"and they wanted in this article" analyze the actions of Romanian aviation on the first day of the war". As for the start time, the information there is as follows:
========
On the night of June 21-22, 1941, in all Romanian aviation formations located at the front, the commanders gathered the pilots and read out to them a message from the State Undersecretary of Aviation Gheorghe Zhienescu. At the end of this message the following was said: “Young flyers! The booms are trumpeting and their echo is heard in the forests, the sky is rumbling in the song of engines, to arms, to the helm, forward with God!” At dawn on June 22 The Second World War began for the Romanian Royal Air Force.

The main striking force of Romania was the Combat Air Group, under the command of squadron general Constantin Celareanu, a large aviation formation that included 2 bomber flotillas (11 bomber squadrons - He-111, S.M.-79, Loos, Potez 63, Bloch 210, IAR-37), .....

The Red Army concentrated significant air force forces in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In Bessarabia, at the Bolgrad airfield there were 67 IAP, and at the airfields Bulgarica-Ialoveni there were 68 and 82 air regiments. In Chisinau there was 20 SAD, which included 55 IAP (Balti airfield), 45 BAP (Tiraspol airfield) and 2 parachute regiments. In Bukovina, at airfields in the area of ​​Chernivtsi there were 87, 187 and 149 IAP. Also in this area were 86 BAP, 224 PBB and 4 parachute regiments. In total, the Red Army had at its disposal 840 bombers and 960 fighters in Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Transnistria. To this can be added 240 reconnaissance aircraft and approximately 2,500 paratroopers.

"Ardyalul" at 4.00

The General Staff of the Air Combat Group received from General Ramiro Enescu, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, the following message: “The combat operations of our aviation on the Eastern Front, developed jointly with the German command, will begin at dawn on June 22 1941 Directive No. comes into force. 34. The operation must be organized in such a way that so that all bombers and reconnaissance aircraft at the same time, with the call sign "Ardyalul", crossed the border at 4 o'clock in the morning. Fighter aircraft will be on combat readiness at dawn to provide air cover. I wish you success and it is also necessary to contact the IV Army regarding the conduct of aerial reconnaissance, which must be carried out, taking into account the crossing of the border by the Combat Air Force and in accordance with the plan and instructions of the German Army Air Command. I expect an operational report tomorrow, or rather this morning, after completing the first task." General Constantin Celareanu immediately responded: "The air combat group is ready and able to carry out directive No. 34".

First wave

Zilistea-Buzau airfield, 0 hours 5 minutes.

“A terrible roar broke the silence of the night, and the walls of the hangars shook so that it seemed they were about to collapse,” recalled Lieutenant Mircea Nikolaou. All 200 German bombers He-111 German 4th Fleet and 27th Flotilla under the command of General Boelcke took off and headed East. There was an indescribable noise, a fantastic performance that cannot be forgotten. After the German planes took off, at 12.30[those. at 0-30 - zhistory], we began to prepare too..."

3 hours 50 minutes.

The 5th Bomber Group, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Paul Landmann, of 17 He-111H3 aircraft of the 78th, 79th and 80th squadrons took off to bomb airfields in the area of ​​Chisinau and Tiraspol, a station and a railway siding. Each aircraft carried 4,250 kg and 16 50 kg bombs. Accompanied by 27 He-112 and Bf-109E fighters of the 5th and 7th fighter groups, at 4 o'clock in the morning, Romanian He-111N3 bombers crossed the Prut. The aircraft, tail number 21, with a crew consisting of Lieutenant Mircea Nicolau - crew commander, Junior Lieutenant Ion Padureanu and Lieutenant Sorin Tulea - flight gunner (since he was assigned to duty, he could not fly, but volunteered), was the first Romanian aircraft , who dropped bombs on the Tiraspol airfield where the aircraft of the 45th BAP were based. “Tiraspol appeared in the distance,” recalled Lieutenant Sorin Tulya. Airfield structures, warehouses and hangars were visible. We dropped half the bombs, avoiding the runway we were planning to use soon. We headed towards Chisinau and, from a height of 500 meters, struck a railway siding where there were trains with ammunition and troops. The blast wave was so powerful that the plane was thrown up. We landed at 5.20 "The bombs dropped by Romanian planes destroyed 12 Soviet planes on the ground.

Pogoanele-Buzau airfield.

At 2.45 the engines of the S.M.-79 bombers start 1st Bomb Group. Plane No. takes off first. 5 of the 71st squadron (call sign Mihai), which is controlled by the group commander himself, Lieutenant Commander Komsha Liviu. Due to soft ground, plane No. crashes during takeoff. 13, but the crew was not injured. After a twenty minute delay, the planes take off 72 Squadron (call sign Romeo). Due to a sudden stop of the left engine, aircraft No. 12 is forced to return. The disgruntled chief adjutant, pilot Ioan Kirya, could not restrain himself and began to cry. The remaining 9 bombers crossed the Prut at 4.03 , heading towards enemy airfields in Bolgrad and Bulgerika. Over the target they were attacked by Soviet I-16s and a hot battle ensued over the airfield. The crew of Captain Constantin Stoenescu shot down 2 I-16 fighters in this battle....

Of the four aircraft of the 72nd Squadron (Romeo) that took off, only three bombed the airfield in Bulgerika: at 4.45 , when the planes were heading towards Bolgrad, the formation was attacked by several I-16s. ....

The bombers of the 1st Bomb Group landed between 5.05 and 5.30. Of the 9 aircraft participating in this raid, 2 were lost, as well as 10 flight personnel.

Fighter actions

Ramnicu Sarat airfield, 3 hours 35 minutes.

He-112 fighters of the 51st squadron under the command of squadron commander Virgil Trandafirescu take off to attack the Izmail Karaklia airfield. Above the target, the leader ordered by radio to attack the airfield from south to north, where a formation of Soviet aircraft could be seen . Some I-16s began to fly across the airfield, but were attacked by the trailing pair of He-112s. Junior Lieutenant Theodore Moscu, diving onto the taking off I-16s, shot down one Soviet fighter and announced two more shot down in the ensuing air battle. His plane was seriously damaged and Moscu was forced to withdraw from the battle. He landed in Ramnicu Sarat at 4.50 . Moscu's leader, adjutant Pavel Konstantin, confirmed two and one probable victory of his leader....

18 IAR-80 aircraft of the 8th Fighter Group took off at 3.45 to cover the S.M.-79 bombers of the 72nd squadron. ....

To cover the He-111 group sent to bomb an airfield in the Chisinau region, a flight of Bf-109Es was allocated, led by Captain Alexandru Manoliu, commander of the 57th squadron. ....

Second wave

At 10.50, 12 Potez 63 aircraft of the 2nd Bomber Group, accompanied by 12 He-112s, attacked the airfield in Bolgrad, railway and an airfield in the south and, accordingly, southeast of Bulgerik. As a result, at least 200 meters of the railway were destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb. The Romanian group met fierce opposition from the Soviet anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft...
===========

Thus, Romanian planes crossed the border with the USSR at approximately 4:00 and at that time the Sun was already illuminating targets on the ground, since some Romanian planes landed back at 4:45 having completed the task visually without illumination by spotlights visible Soviet planes (and not those in the dark). Question: what time of sunrise in the area of ​​the Soviet border along the Prut (say, in its northern part) can the program show "SKYGLOBE 3.6"? Theoretically - approximately 4-00 (Romanian summer time):

or 5-00 Moscow maternity leave:

IT CONVERGES!

Another question: where did the German He-111 bombers fly, which took off at 0-30 from the Zilistea-Buzau airfield? It can be assumed that to Sevastopol. Then the next question is: when could they reach it?

TTX Heinkel-111:

Takeoff weight - 14000 kg
Maximum speed - 400 km/h
Ceiling - 8400 m
Flight range - 2800 km

At a cruising speed of 370 km/h, the Germans could fly to Sevastopol in an hour and a half. Those. by 2-00 Romanian summer time or by 3-00 Moscow maternity leave - IT FITS! Conclusion: Zhukov used MOSCOW DECREE TIME when describing the morning of June 22, 1941! No objections?

Then whose planes bombed Soviet cities at 2:30 Berlin summer time or at 1:30 Berlin standard time? They haven't crossed the border yet! In 30 minutes (or 1-30) they were only supposed to fly up to the Soviet western border! Who's lying? Whose planes did Zhukov tell Stalin about when he woke him up at 3:45 Moscow maternity time? Or is this whole conversation the marshal’s invention?

And the question remains regarding the following words of Zhukov:

. . . . . . .
At 4 hours 10 minutes, the Western and Baltic special districts reported the start of hostilities by German troops on the ground sectors of the districts.
At 4:30 a.m. S.K. Timoshenko and I arrived at the Kremlin. All the summoned members of the Politburo were already assembled. The People's Commissar and I were invited into the office.
JV Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding a pipe filled with tobacco in his hands. He said:
– We urgently need to call the German embassy...

If the Germans attacked in the dark at 3-10 in their summer time (and at 4-10 in Moscow) under the light of searchlights, headlights, flashlights, illuminating them with light bombs, shells, tracer bullets and launching flare guns (did they have night vision devices? ), then we can agree that at 4:30 Moscow time a meeting in Stalin’s office could theoretically begin in Moscow (after all, 4:30 is later than 4:10 or 4:20 - not earlier, after all!).

But if you try to time it...
If Zhukov’s call to Stalin at 3:45 was a lie, then they could have woken him up no earlier than 4:20. Where was Stalin at this time? In the country? How long does it take him to get to the Kremlin? (Wake up the driver, start the car, drive out onto the highway, get there, go up to the office...) In 10 minutes? INCREDIBLE! It will take 10 minutes just to wake up the driver and start the car...

Thus, even if the Germans started at 4-10 Moscow maternity time, Zhukov’s meeting with Stalin at 4-30 in the Kremlin is a lie. And it’s even more of a lie that, judging by the log of visitors to Stalin’s office, this meeting has begun at... 5-45.("Robin", volume 2, p. 300):

And by this time, the German ambassador Count von der Schulenburg had already read out a statement from the German government (ibid. p. 432):

In view of the further intolerable threat created for the German eastern border as a result of the massive concentration and preparation of all armed forces of the Red Army, the German government considers itself forced to immediately take military countermeasures.

The corresponding note will be simultaneously transmitted to Dekanozov in Berlin.

WUA of the Russian Federation. F.06. Op.Z. P. 1. D.5. Ll. 12-15. \433\
===========

The next CONCLUSIONS:

1) The description of events given in Zhukov’s memoirs on the morning of June 22, 1941, before the phrase; " At 7:15 am on June 22, Directive N: 2 People's Commissars of Defense was transmitted to the districts" - LIES!

2) The Germans attacked at dawn at 3:00 a.m. Berlin summer time (or 4:00 a.m. Moscow maternity time).

3) The question (in 2006) remains: What time did the clock show? Soviet soldiers on the western border of the USSR, if at the SAME TIME it was 4-00? (And why?)
(in 2016 it was shown at 4-00)