In addition to the parachute of the landing parts and compounds, in the airborne troops, the land forces (SV) of the USSR, there were also arranged assault parts and compounds, but they were subordinate to the commander of military districts (groups of troops), armies or buildings. They did not differ in except for tasks, subordination and OUSH. Methods of combat use, combat training programs, weapons and uniforms of servicemen - was the same as parachute-intent parts and airborne compounds (central subordination). The array-assault formations were represented by separate assault-assault brigades (ODSBR), separate landing assault shelves (ODSP) and individual ardent assault battalions (ODESB).
The reason for the creation of arranged assault formations in the late 60s, served the revision of tactical techniques in the fight against the enemy in the event of a full-scale war. The rate was made on the concept of using massive assaults in the near rear of the enemy capable of disorganizing defense. The technical opportunity for such landing provided a significant fleet of transport helicopters in army aviation significantly increased by this time.
By the mid-80s, 14 separate brigades, two separate shelf and about 20 separate battalions, were listed as part of the USSR sun. The brigades were posted on the territory of the USSR on the principle - one brigade for one military district, having a land access to the state border of the USSR, one brigade in the inner Kiev Military District (23 ODSBR in Kremenchug, subordinate to the chief command of the South-Western direction) and two brigades for Groups of Soviet troops abroad (35 ODSBR in GSVG in Kotbus and 83 ODSBR in the SGV in the city of Bialogard). 56 GW. Oddzbr in Oxv, deployed in Gardes of the Republic of Afghanistan, was referred to the Turkestan Military District in which it was formed.
Separate landing assault shelves submitted to the commanders of individual army buildings.
The difference between the parachute, landing and ardent assaults of the Airborne Forces was as follows:
- In the presence of a regular paratable armor equipment (BMD, BTR-D, SAU "NON", etc.). In the arranged assault parts it was equipped with only a quarter from all units - unlike 100% staffing in the parachute units.
- In the subordination of the troops. The ardent assault parts, in operational, submitted to the command of military districts (groups of troops), armies, corps. Parachute-landing parts obeyed the command of the Airborne Forces, whose headquarters was in Moscow.
- In the tasks set. It was assumed that the array assault parts, in the event of the beginning of large-scale hostilities, will be used to land in the near rear of the enemy, mainly a landing method from helicopters. Parachute-landing parts were supposed to be used in a deeper enemy rear with disembarking by a parachute way from WTA aircraft. At the same time, airborne preparation with planned learning landing by a parachute method of personnel and military equipment - was mandatory for both species of airborne formations.
- Unlike the Guards Parachute Parachite Parts of the Airborne Forces Deployed at the full state, some arranged assault brigades were driving (special staff) and were not guards. The exception was three brigades that received the names of the Guards, created on the basis of the 105th Vienna Red Banner Guards Airborne Division disbanded in 1979 - 35th, 38th and 56th.
In the mid-80s, the following brigades and shelves were found in the mid-80s.
- 11 Oddshbr in Zabaykalskiy (Transbaikalsky Edge Mogocha and Amazar),
- 13 ODSBR in the Far Eastern Po (Amur Region Magdagachi and Zavitinsk),
- 21 ODSBR in Transcaucasian at (Georgian SSR, Kutaisi),
- 23 Odshbr southwestern direction (on the territory of Kiev, (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 35GV. Oddshbr in the group of Soviet troops in Germany (German Democratic Republic, Kotbus),
- 36 Oddshbr in Leningradsky (Leningrad region, PGT Garbolovo),
- 37 Oddshbr in the Baltic at (Kaliningrad region, Chernyakhovsk),
- 38 GW. Oddsbr in Belarusian at (Belarusian SSR, Brest),
- 39 ODSBR in the Carpathian in (Ukrainian SSR, Khyrov),
- 40 Oddsbr in Odessa in (Ukrainian SSR, Nikolaev),
- 56 GW. Oddshbr in Turkestan in (formed in the city of Chirchik Uzbek SSR and introduced into Afghanistan),
- 57 ODSBR in Central Asian at (Kazakh SSR, PGT Aktogai),
- 58 ODSBR in Kiev (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 83 ODSBR in the northern group of troops, (Polish People's Republic, Bialogard),
- 1318 ODSP in Belarusian at (Belarusian SSR, Polotsk) in subordination of the 5th separate army corps.
- 1319 ODSP in Zabaykalsky at (Chita region, Kyakhta) in submission of the 48th separate army corps.
The specified brigades had in their composition the management, 3 or 4 landing battalion, one artillery division and combat and rear collateral units. The personnel of unfolded brigades reached 2,500 servicemen. For example, the regular number of personnel is 56 gv. ODSBR on December 1, 1986 was 2,452 servicemen (261 officer, 109 ensigns, 416 sergeants, 1,666 soldiers).
The shelves differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: one parachute-landing and one asian assault (on BMD), as well as a somewhat reduced composition of the divisions of the regimental set.
In the Afghan war from the airborne and arranged assault formations of the USSR, the USSR participated in one airborne division (103rd of the VDD), one separate landing assault brigade (56th GW. ODSBR), one separate parachute regiment (345th GW. OPDP) and two landing assault battalions as part of individual motorized rifle brigades (66 OMSBR and 70 OMSBR). In total, in 1987, these were 18 "linear" battalions (13 parachute-landing and 5 amphibious assaults), which was the fifth of the total number of all "linear" OXVA battalions (including 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions) .
Preparation of officer composition for airborne troops.
Officers prepared the following military educational institutions in the following military accounting specialties (VUS):
- Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School - the commander of the parachute-landing (ardent assault) platoon, the commander of the intelligence platoon.
- The landing faculty of the Ryazan Higher Military Automobile Engineering School is the automobile / transport platoon commander.
- The landing faculty of the Ryazan Supreme Military Command Command Communication - Community of Communication.
- The landing faculty of the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political Command Medical School is the Deputy Commander of the Company for the Political Part (educational work).
- The landing faculty of the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School - the commander of the artillery platoon.
- The landing faculty of the Leningrad Higher Anti-Armed Force Command School - the commander of the anti-aircraft missile platoon.
- The landing faculty of Kamenets-Podolsky of the Supreme Military Engineering Command School is the engineering and imprisoned platoon commander.
In addition to graduates of these educational institutions, in the Airborne Forces, it was often appointed to the posts of commander of the platforms, graduates of the highest international schools (WCU) and military departments who were preparing for a motorized rifle platoon commander. This was due to the fact that the profile Ryazan Higher Airborne Team School (RVVVDKU), which issued about 300 lieutenants every year, was not able to fully ensure the needs of the Airborne Forces (at the end of the 80s there were about 60,000 personnel ) In the commander of the platforms. For example, a former commander of 247 GW. PDP, hero of the Russian Federation Em Yuri Pavlovich, who started the service in the Airborne Forces from the platoon commander, graduated from Alma-Ata Higher Communication Command School.
For a long time of servicemen of units and parts of the SPN (the so-called army special forces) mistakenly and deliberately called paratroopers. This is due to the fact that in the Soviet period, as now, in the Armed Forces of Russia there was no special purpose troops, and there were units and part of the special purpose (SPN) of the GRU General Staff of the USSR. In print and in the media, phrases "Special forces" or "Commands" were mentioned only in relation to the troops of the likely enemy ("green berets", "Rangers", "Commandos").
Starting from the occurrence of these parts in the USSR aircraft in 1950, until the end of the 80s, the existence of such units and parts was completely denied. Up to the fact that the servicemen of the urgent service was recognized only when adopting into the personnel of these divisions and parts. Officially, in the Soviet press and on television, the division and part of the SSR General Staff of the USSR Sun, the USSR was declared either parts of the Airborne Forces - as in the case of HSVG (officially in the GDR there were no parts of the SPN), or as in the case of OCSVA - separate motorized rifle battalions (OMSI). For example, the 173rd separate detachment of special purpose (173 ooshung), stationed near the city of Kandahar, was called the 3rd separate motorized rifle battalion (3 OMSI).
In everyday life, the servicemen of units and parts of the SPN carried the parade and field form accepted in the Airborne Forces, although neither submission nor in the tasks of intelligence and sabotage activities did not belong to the Airborne Forces. The only thing that united the Airborne Forces and the units and part of the SPN is most of the officer of graduates of the RVVDKU, airborne preparation and possible combat use in the enemy rear.
Options
To create and equip the "second wave" of the arranged assault parts, it was decided to disband the 105th GV.VDD and the 80s. PDP 104th VDD. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for dunklement. Thus, the 36th ODSBR was formed on the basis of the 237th GW.PDP (he was lentid) allocated the officer composition and parts of Leningrad in; The 38th Vienna - on the basis of officers of the headquarters of the 105th GV.VDD, as well as officers and soldiers of the Belarusian in Belarus.
In the arranged assault parts of military districts, most officers were with C / h of counties: for Odesb only the commanders were selected from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; In the Odosb groups of troops to the Kombat, and a clocombata, as well as, partially and commander of the mouth were added. For the staffing of newly created parts, in 1979 in military schools of preparing officers for the Airborne Forces, a set was increased, and from 1983-84. Already most of the officers went to the DShs being prepared under the Airborne Force. Basically, they were appointed in the Oddbras of the groups of troops, less often - in the Odshbr of the districts, and even less often in Odosb. In 1984-85 There was a shuffling of officers in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DSH. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were distributed in the Airborne Forces.
With regard to the acquisition by the urgent soldiership, the DShch was distributed by the following medical requirements and other selection rules as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent has highlighted. High selection requirements (growth - not lower than 173 cm; physical development is not lower than the average; education is not lower than the average, the absence of medical restrictions, etc.) caused sufficiently high possibilities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, in which there was one's own big "Gayzhunay school" - the 44th PVIDD; The DSHV was completed with the younger commander and specialists in the mainly ending the study divisions of the land forces and to a lesser extent from Gayzhuynai "textbook", in the array assault battalion 70 OMSBR, the replenishment was also the Fergana "LUNCH, V / h 52788
Team assault troops of the USSR
"... The nature of the war can have a significant impact on the ratio of various types of troops."
K. Clausevitz, "On War"
From the author
In this article, the author tried to sum up his knowledge of the landing-assistant parts of the Soviet Army and, briefly formulating, lay out them for universal review and study. Immediately make a reservation that this study is not final. First of all, this is due to the fact that there is still no official open (ie, not secret) publication on the history of the DSHV, their combat composition, not to mention their organizational and staff structures, methods and methods of combat use and T.P. All that you read here was collected naturally in grains, from a variety of different sources - in the overwhelming majority, work is based on the surveys of the DSE veterans, people with them in contact with them by the nature of the service, as well as a number of official documents.
Therefore, I ask me to judge me strictly, but in justice because "... in the book this rudeness is asked or negligent, I pray you: do not get sister to my eye, do not blocked, but correct, I wrote Bo not the Angel of God, but the man is sinner And the animals are famous ... "
The author expresses great appreciation to everyone who helped him by providing his memory, and spent time on answers.
The author will be grateful to everyone who will express their opinion on the article, will indicate inaccuracies, the wrongness, or vice versa, will be able to confirm the author's analysis (without which it was not).
On the essence of air assaults
The moment the appearance of the idea of \u200b\u200bair assaults, as references of military formations in the rear of the enemy by air, it does not know when. However, for a long time, she wore a strictly fantastic character and only during the First World War, she could have received at least some material basis in the form of the creation of an air vehicle - airplane-airplane. And first, the idea was exclusively a sabotage-intelligence character, it soon, in connection with the rapid development of aviation during the war years, with the creation of sufficiently reliable and spacious aircraft, began to acquire a larger view of the logical to the Mitchelovskaya idea of \u200b\u200blanding in the rear of the German troops first Division, and then a whole "airborne" army. However, we can only guess, this program would be implemented, the war was still on the year or not. In any case, after the end of the war, this idea, though he did not receive a serious material incarnation, but continued to turn the minds in the air. The "positional nightmare" of the Western Front was in sight, and many, who differ in passion for innovation, military theoretics (or considering themselves such) persistently looking for innovative ways capable of preventing such a situation in the future.
Thus, for airborne troops (airborne), the main determining goal was immediately revealed, the assistance of the upcoming groups of ground troops. Almost the entire subsequent history of the use of air assaults (VD), confirms this thesis *.
* Special position occupy the VV on the island. As a rule, they are held in the framework of promoting the maritime landing or in general in the framework of different-scale hostilities at sea. Those., The role of the ground forces in this case is played by the Navy.
Absolute exception is the scandalous CRT operation (diabetes) without having a rigid linking with actions neither land, no sea forces; Having thus having a strictly independent character. However, if the linking with the ground troops was not possible for quite understandable and objective reasons, then a weak connection with the fleet was forced.
In the frames of such a goal, the task concluded, as a rule, was put before the Airborne Forces, in the seizure of a certain area of \u200b\u200bthe terrain (usually behind the line of contact of the parties), followed by his holding for some time (for example, before the approach of the upcoming ground forces).
The specific combat task determines the methods and methods of airborne Action consisting in landing (discharge, disembarkation), offensive (attack, assault) and defense.
This leads to a general definition of the combat capacity of the formation of the formation, which are to:
1. In the ability to capture a certain territory (section of the terrain, object), incl. attack and destroy (knock out) opponent there;
2. In the ability to organize an effective defense of the seized territory (object) for some period;
3. But, all this is subject to the condition of having the ability to be deployed by air.
It took such a spare access to me so that the reader would (perhaps, a completely outsider, but interested in the question) immediately caught the essence of the combat use of air assaults.
Prehistory
The appearance of the DSHV toughly linked to the advent of helicopters, more precisely, with the creation of samples having the necessary complex of properties. So it was already in military history, when technical progress took a new kind and types of armed forces on the Arena battles. However, there was another forerunner in the peculiarities of the forms of combat use of the VD, expressed in their application as an integral part of operational-tactical scale operations.
... Alas, but apparently it is worth recognizing that the first landing assault operations (actions) related to disembarking relatively small landings were held by the Germans during the Second World War. Here are their list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Enamel (Belgium, 1940), Bridges through the Canal Albert (Belgium, 1940), complex of bridges through Maas (Holland, 1940), bridges through zap. Dvina and Berezin (USSR, 1941). All of them completely fall under the definition of landing assault operations, although they were carried out by the forces of the German Airborne Forces and special forces. All of them were held in the framework of the macrocel - to ensure the most rapid promotion of their ground troops, block the enemy's troops on their positions, etc. Methods of landing at the same time were very different: parachute, planting on glider, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of war, such landings were actually not used. The warring parties became interested in a large-scale dish, which are capable of affecting the overall operational and strategic environment at the front. In the same line the post-war development continued, incl. and Soviet, theory of the Airborne Forces.
The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical air assaults during the occurrence of 1944-45. Not clear. Most likely, three main factors are involved here.
FirstlyThe failures of the large-scale diagram somewhat undermined the faith in the effectiveness of the assaults in general (in any case, with the imported material and technical database and the general level of the organization).
Secondly, the very idea of \u200b\u200bsmall assaults was likely to be incorrect; Their possible results have not seen effective (although those such and provided for "Instructions for the combat use of the Airborne Forces" 1943 g *).
ThirdlyCommand simply did not consider it necessary to apply them - i.e. It believed that it would be better accounted for by worked out and attorney purely terrestrial methods.
But this is all only assumptions. Personally, the author seems to be quite possible to allocate many hundreds from the already 1944 (for 1945 more than 1000 units) of excellent Military transport aircraft Li-2 and C-47 several dozen cars and throw away the same paths on the parachute tental battalion Supply or to capture river bridgeheads - already this could in some cases significantly facilitate the actions of ground troops. But - what was, it was.
... In the late 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters are simply broken on the stage - a new class of aircraft. Helicopters (which this moment reaches sufficient to combat use of the level of technical perfection) with success, have proven itself in the Incheon Maritime Railway Operation (MDO) and in the following actions of American troops in Korea. Preceded domestic designers represent a fairly successful car - Mi-4 - which starts from 1953. Massly enter the troops.
Already in 1954, the first major experimental landing with 36 infantry helicopters with cars and artillery was conducted. A number of experienced teachings were also held (including with the real use of nuclear weapons) on landing in the rear of the enemy of the helicopter panels of battalion and regimental scale ... however, on the point and stalled. That is, there were no orgmer to create specialized formations.
The reasons for this see the following:
Firstly, a negative role was played by the "Khrushchev-rocket" factor.
Secondly, the originalness of the Airborne Forces - they are in the first half of the 1950s. Source as many as 15 divisions; And there are still some landing parts - this is already arrogance, especially since the "Khrushchevsky" overall reduction of the aircraft began.
Thirdly, finally struck by this time the world of nuclear paranoia did not leave space in combat order (without protecting armor BTR) shooters infantrymen; The helicopter also seen too "fragile" compared to the machine.
FourthIn addition to the parachute intent parts of the Airborne Forces in the abundance, it was used until 1957 and the Rifle divisions, divisions and those and others could, in the case of such a task, be ascended from helicopters in the rear of the enemy.
Well, finally, Fifthlought up on the relics of tank armored lines by Soviet warlods Alyapovatiy, slow and weakly precipitated flying Caracatians with a propeller on the top of the Makushka (this is the century of "jet velocities" and rapidly embarked aerodynamics!) Did not appear to be the means that the new unprecedented opportunities could give the troops.
Trial step
At the capitalists
In general, a similar situation was with the theory of a diather and the Americans. The best illustration of the General of the American Airborne Union of James Gaivina from his book "Airborne War" can serve as a better illustration of: "...<воздушно-десантные> The troops should be used for massive, and not small groups. And only where their actions can have a decisive influence, and not in many paragraphs, where they are able to achieve only local tactical success. "However, they had the experience of war on the fact that later it became known as" weakly equipped TVD ", t. e. On the Korean Peninsula, forced the American command to think about and do more flexibly. The helicopter showed itself a very promising means of transportation in the conditions of mining and forest terrain and the lack of roads. The number of helicopters strongly jumps - by the end of the war in the army aircraft there were already 1140 units., Then, only 56 units had an early 56 unit. The American command creates and a surprised connection - the 11th airborne division (Air Assault Division). At its base and on the basis of two more connections (10th air-transport brigade and the 2nd The infantry division) in July 1965 is created (more precisely, it is reorganized from the available) 1st Cavalry (Aeromobile) Division - Cavalry Division (AirMobile). Essential New The leading was the fact that helicopters were first introduced for the first time as a transport and combat agent to 434 (428 different data) to 434 (428 different data). Division was deployed in Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of proper theoretical study of aerobilic (helicate-landing) operations, not to mention the relevant practical classes, showed itself from the best side. Of course, not only this division had a helicopter. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters in their composition. So if in gray. 1967 was approx. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units.!
Generally speaking, if the helicopters only declared their existence and their prospects were quite vague, then the war in Vietnam elevated a helicopter into the Zenith of Glory and popularity. Until that time, they were still perceived as a kind of exotic for a purely auxiliary destination. Americans so fell in love with helicopters that some hot heads began to argue about the sunset parachute (from airplanes) landing as such.
We have
Such active and so successful use of helicopters made an impression on the Soviet command. The idea is reanimated - during the strategic teachings "Dnipro-67" mainly on the basis of the 51st GW. The PDP forms the experimental summary 1st airborne brigade under the command of the beginning. Department of Combat Training Office of the Airborne Forces Gen.-Major Kobzar. It is used to capture a bridgehead through the Dnieper, where the motorized rifle battalion is thrown by helicopters with self-propelled guns. In a specially created working group, theoretical developments and experiments are carried out at the General Staff. And here, according to the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. The decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate airborne brigades (ORSMBR). Based on the GS Directive of May 22, 1968. In June 1968, the formation of the 11th (sbvo) and the 13th (DVO) brigades begins. By mid-July, the brigades were already formed. (Dr. Data 13th Brigade was finally formed only by July-August 1970). In 1973, the third brigade is added to them - 21st in Kutaisi (CPO).
The brigades were formed, as they say, with a "pure sheet". Officers and soldiers from the district were sent to their staff, and the officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only for the posts for the airborne service (DVS) and for the post of teams Brigades (so, former commander 51 was appointed to the post of commander of the 11th OVSBR - GV.PDP \u200b\u200bColonel Reznikov).
But here, a number of subjective factors of the features of the Soviet military thought played a role. In connection with the distrust of the Soviet military leadership for infantry, the underestimation of its fighting, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were not strong enough for action to euro. Therefore, they were deployed in directions with a smaller, compared to Western, threat - was recognized as appropriate to have them only for action on difficult for land-based mountain and wooded (Taezhnaya) locality where the focal of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were designed not so much for holding the papers in the enemy rear by the usual scheme, how much to cover the large plot of the Soviet-Chinese border. (Even there was a poster of visual agitation with a somewhat surrealistic inscription: "The paratrooper-attack aircraft - an hour border.") The aviation component of each brigade was represented by the airgroup as part of two standard helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had various administrative subordinances: the ground component is the Commander-receiveing \u200b\u200bof the HR, and the air-commissioning of the Air Force; What inevitably created a number of serious problems in organizing interaction.
To implement the same air operational and tactical and tactical landings on euro, it was planned to attract conventional parachute or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions) by pulling them out of their airborne and general-military divisions.
Here I should say a little about the terminology. Do not be used by the terms of created capitalists and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were chosen; Brigades and their battalions; As well as methods of their combat use were renamed to the ardent assault. Thus, the American terms "Aircraft" and "aeromobile" gradually ceased to be applied to the Soviet DShch and began to be mentioned in official documents only with respect to foreign formations of this type.
By the end of 1971, all the brigades had been reorbed into arranged assaults with changes in the organizational and staff structure (OUSH).
The idea will make a way
"Compacts"
In the 70s Through the thick walls of the General Staff buildings, the Ministry of Defense and Research Institutions, it turned out clearly seriously by the heat and an extremely important scientific discussion in consequences in combination with the carpet and hollow struggle of opinions, calculations and ambitions ...
In 1975, the Working Group under the guidance of Lieutenant General I. Yurkovsky put forward the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a new type of surgery - so-called "Volume operation" instead, as they argued the thumbnail concept of a "deep operation". Its essence was to not "blame" the defendant of the enemy, and "jump over" after her bypassing the zone of infection and the defense nodes - thus the pace of occurrence has increased dramatically. The idea was supported by some warlords (Lieutenant General I.Gordzhadze and G. Temidkov) and in-depth. A question was raised about the global change of the whole theory of operations; creating a fundamental new "airway" from land forces.
The implementation of such an idea required a fundamental change of priorities in military construction and fundamentally close the positions of the supporters of armored Armad dominating in the military leadership. However, instead of an objective assessment of the military perspective, instead of understanding the dialectics of development, departmental and inflexibility prevailed, and the "volumes" were crushed ...
New wave
And yet, the "traditionalists" had to be tacked a little - it was painfully interesting arguments were represented by "volumes". In mid-1978. The new head of the GSH of the USSR Marshal N.V. Harkovov, it was decided to form in addition to the already existing three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st), a second wave of the ardent assault parts of two types.
Firstly, eight separate landing assault brigades of the district (group) submission:
11 Oddshbr July 1968 Zabaykalsky in GG. Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region) *
13 ODSBR July 1968 Far Eastern in Magdagachi (Amur region) *
21 ODSBR 1973 Transcaucasian in GG. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)
35 GW. Odshbr December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany Kotbus (GDR) **
36 ODSBR December 1979 Leningrad in PGT. Garbolovo (Leningrad region)
37 ODSBR DECEMBER 1979 Baltic in Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region)
38 GW. Vienna December 1979 Belarusian in Brest (Belarus)
odshbr
39 ODSBR DECEMBER 1979 Carpathian in Khyrov (Ukraine)
40 Odessa December 1979 Odessa in p. Great Korenich - Nikolaev (Ukraine)
56 GW. Oddshbr December 1979 Turkestan in the village. Azadbash (R. Chirchik, Uzbekistan) ***
57 ODSBR December 1979 Central Asian in PGT. Aktogai (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan)
Notes:
* The elements of the aircraft group of these brigades could be deployed separately.
** literally approx. The brigade months was originally called as the 14th Guard., And only in January 1980 received the 35th number.
*** Formally 56th GW. The brigade is considered to be formed in Chirchik on the basis of 351 GW. PDP. However, de facto, its deployment for input to Afghanistan was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Cappchagay, Fergana, Iolatan), and is reduced to a single whole before the input to Afghanistan in the thermosis. The headquarters of the brigade (or officer frame), as a formal frame, was stationed initially in Chirchik.
Secondlytwenty separate DSh battalions:
48 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Turkestan
1st AK / 40 I OA (*) Dislocation item unknown
139 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Baltic in,
11th GW. OA, Kalinigrad (Kaliningrad region)
145 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Far Eastern in,
5th OA Pos. Sergeevka (Primorsky Krai)
899 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
20th guv. OA G. Burg (GDR)
900 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
8th guv. OA G. Leipzig - Shinau (GDR)
901 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Central troops in R-N.P. Rychki (Czechoslovakia)
902 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Southern Group of Troops Kechkemet (Hungary)
903 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Belarusian in,
28th OA Brest (South), since 1986 - Grodno (Belarus)
904 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Carpathian in,
13th OA, Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine)
905 Odessa December 1979 Odessa in,
14th OA Bender (Moldova)
906 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Zabaykalsky in,
36 OA POS. Hada-Bulak (Chita region, Rr. G. Born)
907 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Far Eastern in,
43rd AK / 47th OA Birobidzhan (Jewish JSC)
908 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Kiev
1st gv. OA, Konotop, since 1984 - PGT. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region)
1011 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Belarusian in,
5th guv. TA Art. Maryina Gorka - Puhovichi (Belarus)
1044 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
1st gv. That city of Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the district of Konigsbruck)
1156 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Carpathian in,
8th T. Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region)
1179 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Leningrad
6th OA Petrozavodsk (Karelia)
1151 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Belarusian in,
7th T. Polotsk (Belarus)
1185 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
2nd guv. TA Ravensbrück (GDR)
1604 ODESB DECEMBER 1979 Zabaykalsky in,
29th OA G. Ulan-Ude (Buryat AO)
Notes:
* Literally a few months after the formation, 48 ODESB (or, allegedly, the 148th) was lied to the 66th OOBR (OMSBR) in Afghanistan. In general, in the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) in Afghanistan, there were two brigades of a special organization known "in the people" as the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle (and in reality, the name "Department Officer Brigade" - OSBR.) . Their composition had one ODESB.
During August-December 1979, these parts were mainly created.
In 1984, 83 ODSBR and two separate shelves are formed - 1318th and 1319th ODSP for regular operational maneuverable groups (OMG) - they are - so-called. Separate Army Corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades are formed - 23rd, 128th and 130s.
23 ODSBR 1986 Commander -comanding of the South-West Direction (GK YUZN) Kremenchug (Ukraine)
58 ODSBR 1986 (supposition.) Kiev in Kremenchug (Ukraine)
83 ODSBR 1984 Northern Group of Troops Bialogyard (Poland)
128 ODSBR 1986 (supposition.) Commander -comanding of the Southern Direction (GK Yun) Stavropol (Stavropol AK)
130 ODSBR 1986 (supposition.) Communication of the troops of the Far East (GK Airborne Forces), ABakan (Khakassaya AO)
1318 ODSP 1984 Belarusian in, 5th gv. Oak Borovuha-1 - Borolar (district Polotsk, Belarus)
1319 ODSP 1984 Zabaikalsky in, N-th OAK G. Kyakhta (Chita region)
Thus, at the end of 1986, 16 brigades were listed in the Soviet army, 2 shelf and 20 separates. battalions. The total regular number of DShch for wartime was 65-70 thousand people. However, in peacetime, the parts were kept in a strongly abbreviated composition - on average OK. 31-34 thousand people. At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only a frame for mobilization deployment.
The principle for which the numbering of the brigades and the regiments is not known to me. But, it is possible to argue with a certain accuracy that it was one for the ODSBR, OBRSPN and OMSBR - i.e. Within the framework of all sv. Differences in the numbering of Odosb - due to three consecutive orders for which they were formed. However, these explanations hearing with me look insufficient.
Subordination
Many are interested in the question - did the DShch part of the Airborne Forces? If briefly, it is not, not included. DShch was part of the Commanding of the SV (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the servicemen of DShch are not aerial paratroopers? Does not mean. Organizational, administrative belonging to DShch to the Civil Code, is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being in submission of the Civil Code of the HC DShch directly submitted to the command of the Communist Party associations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peaceful. Moreover, the same situation repeated with them as with parts of special purpose - there were such combat parts, but there were no troops. It was the management of the commander of tank troops, motorized rifle, but there was no control of the commander of the array of assault troops. Formally speaking, the troops themselves did not have such, as there were no special purpose troops. Such a situation has affected the DShs not favorable way. They became a stepmaker at once two stepmothers - on the one side of the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, HC. "Second-rate" (this was especially affected in the first years of existence) The situation in the unpleasant intra-articie hierarchy also led to the appropriate unpleasant consequences: degraded attention to problems, the worst supply, less attention to recruitment and training, etc. In the consciousness of officers and the Airborne Forces and the SV definition, they were often considered a "reference" (perhaps, in addition to parts in groups of troops - there all places, it was understood, was appreciated above).
In the operational plan (combat application), part of the DShv obeyed the command of the Communist Party associations - armies and fronts (counties, groups of troops). The development of methods and forms of their combat use of the DSHV units and their preparation are the management of combat training of the GC sv, coincided with the department of BP of the Airborne Forces. The general principles of the combat use of the DSHV lay on the conscience of the General Staff of the USSR Sun.
In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the DSh Parts to the administrative and operational submission of the Airborne Command.
It had two opposite effects on the significance of the investigation.
On the one hand, it affected positively in the sense that DShch thus found the "native father" instead of a suspicious stepfather and evil stepmother, and their status immediately rose and acquired a "legal" appearance.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of DShH with, previously superior, and now it is not known as relatives, the headquarters of the Communist Party associations. The DSHV, intended for the actions in the interests of the general public associations ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, sharply reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a scheme of submission: the administrative and commander of the Airborne Forces (picking, developing methods and forms of action, weapons and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operational (combat use) - commander of operational and operational and strategic associations in the interests of which this formation It is supposed to use.
However, when started in 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces All this has already played little role. But that is another story…
Differences between the Airborne Forces and the DSHV
If it is characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 landing divisions) in the form of large-scale (1-2 landing divisions) in the form of large-scale (1-2 landing divisions) with the objectives and objectives of an operational and operational and strategic nature to a large depth (up to 100-150 km or more) The idea of \u200b\u200bthe use of DSHV lies in the region more purely tactical or, maximum, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the question of organizing interaction with the ground troops (SV) is not worth it - they are thrown in the interests of not less than the front (groups of fronts), and even the Supreme Commanding (VGK), then for the DShv, it is very urgent. Actually, DShch does not even have their own purposes, but only the task. (They act within the framework of the goal of their senior chief - the general official commander. This "macrocel" and defines the "microcole" of the landing force, also determines the task, the composition of the forces, the method of use.) Thus, it is possible to allocate the main all-definition feature of DShch - their application It is performed in accordance with the objectives and objectives of the land general-official team institution, as a rule, the level of the army building, or, in some cases, even the division. The hierarchically under the command instance, as a rule, less and the scale of the attracted dsh strength. If the Airborne Forces acts by divisions, then the DShs are rotary and battalions, less often - a brigade / regiment.
Options
To create and staffing a "second wave", DShch decided to disband the 105th GW. VDD and 80th GW. PDP 104th VDD. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for dunklement. So, the 36th ODSBR was formed on the basis of the 237th GW. PDP (he was lesd) allocated the officer composition and parts of Leningrad in; 38th Vienna - based on officers of the headquarters of the 105th GW. VDD, as well as officers and soldiers of the Belarusian soldiers.
In the DShC of military districts, most officers were with C / h of districts: for Odosb only the commanders were chosen from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; In the Odosb groups of troops to the Kombat, and a clocombata, as well as, partially and commander of the mouth were added. For staffing newly created parts, in 1979 In military schools of preparing officers for the Airborne Forces, a set was increased, and from 1983-84. Already most of the officers went to the DShs being prepared under the Airborne Force. Basically, they were appointed in the Oddbras of the groups of troops, less often - in the Odshbr of the districts, and even less often in Odosb. In 1984-85. There was a shuffling of officers in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DSH. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were distributed in the Airborne Forces. True, it did not do without protection, but it concerned only the distribution in the group of troops - the war went to Afghanistan, the airborne officers went there on the second round, and the temptation to attain their way was great.
With regard to the acquisition by the urgent soldiership, the DShch was distributed by the following medical requirements and other selection rules as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent has highlighted. The high selection requirements (growth is not lower than 173cm; physical development is not lower than the average; education is not lower than the average, the absence of medical restrictions, etc.) caused sufficiently high possibilities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, in which there was one's own big "Gayzhunay school" - the 44th PVIDD; The DSHV was completed with the younger commander and specialists in the mainly ending the study divisions of land forces and to a lesser extent by Gayzhuynai pets.
Outfitting and equipment
Due to the fact that the DSHV included organizationally into the composition of the ground forces, initially their outfit, equipment and the ratios of satisfaction almost completely corresponded to that in motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the inconsistency of a number of elements of the combined-in-house and equipment of the landing specificity, it did not take into account the moral factor. In general, to gray. 1983, the entire L / s DSHV went in the usual form of motorized rollers - however, for a very reasonable inconsistency, standard-sideling storms were replaced by landparts of RD-54. However, at the same time, "non-stop" waste from this rule. So, it was possible to see twice the "birds" on the red petties, and those who fired from the actual service tried to get a "normal" landing form - with a vest and take it - and in this form to drive "on demob". To make parachute jumps, the so-called were issued. "Jump" WVDu jumpsuit.
In the summer of 1983, literally before the death secretary of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and translate the DSHV to the norms of supply and the form of the Airborne Forces, which was done by the spring of next year almost everywhere. And the soldiers and officers willingly handed over blue berets and vests quickly get rid of the apart and despised "red".
For a combat situation, it is possible to describe the standard kind of Soviet soldier-paratrooper so. Underwear incl. and the vest (T-shirt, long sleeve and dual mating vest, i.e. insulated); so-called "Jump" jumpsuit of greenish-olive color; Writing head with a cloth helmet (winter - warmed with lining), boots with side lacing (or, less likely, with belts); Finally - camouflaged KSS (protective net suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, wearing a warmed suit consisting of a short jacket and a sharovar; All khaki colors. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. It is necessary for all - the RD-54 paratrooper backpack. In addition to him, there could be: additional general-arms inserts for AK stores, sickness for sniper rifle stores SVD, portrales for carrying shots to RPG, etc. For parachute jumps, special covers for small arms and a cargo container GK-30 were used.
Also, in gray. 80s, for the supply of DSh, a transport and unloading vest of the BVD was developed constructively resembling the Giderair landing vest. However, he never entered the troops in a mass order.
Organization and arms
Speaking of organizational and staffing structure (OUSH) and configuration with weapons and equipment (IWT) of divisions and parties, the following reservations should be immediately made. First, the same rules and features that were peculiar to the entire Ca, namely, are some differences in the OSS and the configuration of the IWT from part to the part. Secondly, changes in time - OUSH and the equipment of the IWT gradually changed. It concerned both the low-voltage units and the overall structure of parts. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to install the OSS in line with 100% accuracy and local features; What is connected with the notorious secrecy regime in force in the USSR aircraft.
All this, makes the problem of restoring the historical OSHS of the DSHF enough problematic and requiring a separate serious study. Below, I only cite the principal structure of the ODSBR and ODOSB.
Unfortunately, in detail, the initial organization of airborne brigades is not known to me. Therefore, you will have to limit ourselves to the overall structure. Structurally brigade consisted of: Aviation group as part of two helicopter regiments - combat (BVP) and transport and combat (TBLP), only 80 mi-8t, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24a; Three parachute-landing (PBB standard for the Airborne Forces) and one airstorming (HDB had an original OSHS reinforced compared to the PB) battalion. Brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special divisions. It is believed that the brigades had a rather powerful composition, in general, not characteristic of the Soviet landing parts of that period. The brigade had the status of tactical association - i.e. There was an equal division.
Organization 11th, 13th and 21st ODSBR for the 1970s:
brigade Management
- Three landing assault companies (LNG-9D, AGS-17, PC, RPG-7D, RPS, AKMS)
- anti-tank battery (SPG-9MD)
- Platers: intelligence, anti-aircraft missile (CRKK Strela-2m), communication, security, medical center.
- Aviation group (until 1977, from this year - only a helicopter regiment), as part of:
- Battle helicopter regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8)
- Transport-combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6)
- a separate battalion of the airfield and technical support (two company companies and the RT of the provision, two tack, the company security)
- mortar battery (120-mm M PM-38)
- anti-tank battery (12 PRK "Baby", later - "Fagot")
- reactive battery (140 mm RSZO RPU-16) - Soon disbanded
- Intelligence Rota
- Rota Communication
- engineering and sapper company
- Repair Rota
- Commandant platoon
- Orchestra.
Notes:
1. Battalions, airgroups and helicopter shelves have their own rooms:
- In 11 Odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 separate. landing assault battalions; 211 AviaGroup consisting of 307 and 329 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 329 vertices. Regiment).
- In 13 Odshbr: ..., ... and ... Depth. Assault-assault battalions, ... airgroup as part of 825 and ... helicopter regiments (until 1977).
- In 21 Odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 separate. The ardent assault battalions, 1171 airgroups as part of 292 and 325 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 325 vertices. Regiment).
2. In addition to those specified in the brigade, the following units were also included: the company of young soldiers (RMS), the club, the special department of the KGB with a platoon of protection, economic structures.
Organization 23rd, 35th gv., 36th, 37th, 38th gv., 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th ODSBR for 1979-88. :
brigade Management
- Three Parachute Rotes (Metis FNRK, 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-16, PC, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- Platers: anti-aircraft missile (boom-2m / -3), communications, collateral, medical.
- One (4th) landing assault (on armored vehicles) Battalion:
- Three landing assault companies (BMD-1 / -1P, BTRD, 82-mm m, RPG-16, PC, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- Since 1981, a mortar battery is added (120-mm M PM-38), and from NC. 1983 it is replaced with self-propelled artbathare (120-mm SAO 2C9 NON) *
- Platers: Grenaderate (AGS-17), anti-aircraft missile (boom-2m / -3), communications, collateral, medical.
- reactive battery (122 mm RSZO BM-21B Grad-c)
- mortar battery (120-mm m)
- Anti-aircraft missile division (in some brigades since 1982) **:
- Two anti-aircraft missile batteries (SZRK Arrow-10m)
- anti-aircraft battery (PZRK Strela-3)
- Platers: management, security.
- anti-aircraft missile-artillery battery (PSU-23, Strela-3) - until 1982.
- anti-tank battery (BTR-RD, FAGOT)
- Intelligence Rota (BMD-1, BTRD, SBR-3)
- Rota Communication
- engineering and sapper company
- Rota landing
- Car Rota
- Medical Rota
- Repair Rota
- Transport and economic company (since 1986)
- Radiochemical intelligence platoon, and from 1984, in terms of brigades - Radiochemicobiological protection
- Place of management of the head of artillery
- Commandant platoon
- Orchestra.
Notes:
* Initially (1979-81), there was no money in LSB.
** The anti-aircraft division was most of the ODSBR since 1983. For some time in the 35th GW.Odshbrov were also ZSU-23-4 "Shilka".
The total number of brigade deployed in the states of wartime reached 2.8-3.0 thousand people.
Some brigades had a structure different from the above. Thus, the Organization of the 83rd Brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two parachute (1st and 2nd and 2nd) parachute (1st and 2nd) and one landing assault (3rd) battalions. And the Organization of the 56th GW. Brigades fought in 1980-89. In Afghanistan, he was distinguished by the presence of three landing assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one parachute (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization to the same changing over time.
Organization 11th, 13th and 21st ODSBR for 1979-88.:
brigade Management
- Three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) separate landing assault (hiking) battalion:
- Three landing assault companies (82-mm m, FAGOT, AGS-17, PC, RPG-7D, RPKS-74, AKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (FAGOTR, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82-mm m)
- Platers: intelligence, anti-aircraft missile (CRKK Strela-3), communication, security, medical.
- Transport-combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6) - until 1988.
- Gobichik artillery battery (122-mm d-30)
- mortar battery (120-mm m)
- Mining and cannonal battery (76-mm GP 2A2 arr. 1958)
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm Zu-23, CRKK Strela-2m)
- Intelligence Rota
- Rota Communication
- engineering and sapper company
- Rota landing
- Brigadier medical center
- Repair Rota
- Transport and economic company
- Radiochemical intelligence
- Place of management of the head of artillery
- Commandant platoon
- Orchestra.
Notes:
* Battalions and helicopter shelves have their own rooms:
in 11 Odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 separate. landing assault battalions; 329 Helicopter regiment (in the beginning. 1988 is derived from the team of the brigade).
in 13 Odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. The ardent assault battalions, ... a helicopter regiment (in the beginning. 1988 is derived from the team of the brigade).
in 21 Odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 separate. The ardent assault battalions, 325 helicopter regiment (in the beginning. 1988 is derived from the team of the brigade).
For some time, the sight in battalions was not - ZPRO was part of the DShR.
The 802th (1st) Odosb 21 Oddsbr had an excellent organization.
The ODSP Organization was different from the brigades of the presence of only two battalions: the 1st parachute-landing (hiking) and 2nd arranged assault (on BMD), as well as a somewhat reduced composition of the regimental set units. The total number of regiment deployed in the states of wartime reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.
The ODOSB Organization on the European TVD and the Far Eastern TWID was generally similar to the OSS of the PDB Brigades, but also had a fourth fourth company - an ardent assault (on BMD) and Rwwedavzvod (either with BMD, or on UAZ-469), and in a mortar battery The number of trunks increased to 8 units. The total number of battalion deployed in the states of wartime reached 650-670 people.
In the winter-spring 1988, organ estate transformations ended in the summer of 1990, i.e. By the time the brigades were renamed the airborne and reconnected by the command of the CVD of the USSR. The brigade was greatly alleviated by removing all armored vehicles from her composition an ariant assault battalion on BMD / BTRD.
Organization 11th, 13th, 21st, 23rd, 35th gv., 36th, 37th, 38th gv, 40th, 56th gv., 83th OWDBR For 1990-91:
brigade Management
- Three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) Parachute-landing (hiking) battalion:
- Three Parachute Rotes (Metis Pershesia, 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-7D, GP-25, PC, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (FAGOTR, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82-mm m)
- Platers: anti-aircraft missile (boom-3 / needle), communication, collateral, medical unit.
- Gobichic Artillery Division:
- Three warm-up batteries (122-mm g d-30)
- Platers: management, security.
- mortar battery (120-mm m)
- anti-aircraft missile-artillery battery (Zu-23, Strela-3 / needle)
- anti-tank battery (Fagot PRT)
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm Zu-23, CRKK Strela-2m)
- Intelligence Rota (UAZ-3151, PC, RPG-7D, GP-25, SBR-3)
- Rota Communication
- engineering and sapper company
- Rota landing
- Car Rota
- Medical Rota
- Repair Rota
- Rota material support
- Radiochemicobiological protection company
- Place of management of the head of artillery
- Commandant platoon
- Orchestra.
Organization 224 UC for 1990-91:
brigade Management
- 1st training parachute, landing battalion:
- Three training paratrooping companies (RPG-7D, GP-25, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- educational intelligence company (PC, AKS-74, SVD)
- 2nd educational parachute-landing battalion:
- 1st training car company (for Ural-4320)
- 2nd Training Car Rota (for GAZ-66)
- training medical company
- Communication Rota Communication
- Training Artillery Division:
- Educational Gabichic Battery (122-mm g d-30)
- training mortar battery (120-mm m)
- Training anti-tank battery (FAGOT PTRT, SPG-9MD)
- training anti-aircraft rocket-artillery battery (Zu-23, Strela-3 / needle)
- Rota training machines (Ural-4320, GAZ-66)
- Rota Communication
- Medical Rota
- Repair Rota
- Rota material support
- Taking the incomant provision
- Commandant platoon
- Orchestra.
Helicopters - Main problem
Domestic DSHV had many problems both internal and from the side. One of these third-party problems, directly and most strongly influencing the sensitiveness of the DSH, was to ensure their aviation component, simply speaking helicopters.
Massly formed in 1979 DShch "The second wave" consisted only from the ground component - i.e. Unlike their senior fellow, the Brigades "First Wave" - \u200b\u200bthe helicopter shelves were absent. This situation can be tried to explain to several theses.
FirstlyThis contradicted the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that the helicopter shelves are a means of an operational and operational-strategic association (army and fronts). And therefore, the organizational should consist in their composition for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts to use in the selected direction. Theoretically, apparently, the faithful desire to give every union the helicopter forces, he actually led to the spraying of helicopters according to a very numerous in view of the overall hostess of Ca associations. Here it was necessary to either eliminate unnecessary (or not extra?) Association, or deprive some of them a significant number of helicopters, or to force the release of helicopters in order to saturate the troops at the maximum.
SecondlyThe production of helicopters, as well as any other type of weapons, depends on the dominant doctrine at the moment. As mentioned above, the "volumes" of the ground forces ratified in the air, which means for a sharp increase in the number of air-vehicles necessary for this, were defeated in the fight against the supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the release of helicopters and increased to the beginning. The 80s, however, it was a consequence of the most objective prerequisites, the objective course of the development of the country, and not the doctrinal stage revolution.
ThirdlyThe very fact of combining in the tactical connection of the air and ground components caused, apparently, in many military leaders of objections - and not only subjective, but also well-founded. While in such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational association "Binding" exclusively to ensuring the actions of DShch. As the author of the article, the Higher Military Command is incorrectly evaluated the dependence of the DSH from the helicopter to consider it to similar to ensuring the Action Airborne by airplanes by the aircraft, not paying attention to the specifics expressing in a much closer and obligatory symbiosis of the temple with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the first falls. Especially since the operational calculations and experience of exercises, there was an order of 70% of the resource of transport helicopters in any case to use for landing tasks. And what could interfere with these helicopters if they do not participate in Dsho / DShD?
Finally, fourthAs it is customary, it was not enough for the number of helicopters themselves for what, such as Americans, to equip all connections to which they can come in handy, and even have a reserve. However, here, as it seems to me, much incomprehensible. Namely. Consider the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official data from 1962 to 1997, it was manufactured by 11,000 units. And the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the author's calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered in this period only counting transport and combat modifications. There are no official domestic data on the Park Mi-8 in open print. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of Mi-8 transport and combat modifications for 1990/91. Accordingly, 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and the catastrophs amounted to 400 units., Let them be disabled 1000 of the produced resource, but where is the remaining 2500 units then go.? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for his researcher.
So, the arranged assault brigades are theoretically, being an ideal means, with focal (nonlinear) character of hostilities due to the lack of incident maneuverability of the aviation component, sharply reduced its potential opportunities, becoming, in fact, parts of light infantry. A fundamental output from the current situation could be the creation of special operational and tactical compounds - the air-assault buildings of the brigade-shepherd composition - subordinate to the wartime time. This compound would include the ground component (DShh from the composition of SV or Airborne) and the air helicopter component (from the composition of the DC). Such a construction scheme would make it possible to achieve high combat efficiency and with all interested departments to "stay with their sheep".
Let's look at the example, it was assumed to distribute helicopters for the DSH. As initial, we accept typical conditions - the front offensive operation of the four armies. As part of the grouping, one transport and combat helicopter regiment (OTBWP), six combat helicopter regiment (purchased), as well as one dep. The ardent assault brigade (3 battalion) and three separates. The ardent assault battalion. In addition, in each of the general-purpose divisions, one motorized rifle battalion is trained in values \u200b\u200bin the composition of the TAVD. Analysis of the possible maintenance of the operation and tasks characteristic of air assaults during her, it is shown that within the framework of the DShD in 10 days it may be necessary to land the ODSBR as the annoyance and eight ten taks in the composition of ODOSB and enhanced SMEs.
The average standards for the selection of transport and landing helicopters are: allocated to four regimental departures (P / c) ObbVP *; TAVD in the composition of Odosb - one p / in ObbVP; Enhanced SME - one n / in ObbvP without squadron (VE). In addition, the outfit of combat accompaniment helicopters is needed.
Columnal composition: OSTBBP - 40 Mi-8T / MT, 20 Mi-6A; Proven - 40 Mi-24V / P and 20 Mi-8T / MT.
* Here it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions on the armored vehicle in the Oddbras sharply increased the necessary outfit of helicopters for transportation and primarily heavy Mi-6A. Transportation approx. 60 units. BTT occupied a lion's share in the total number of Mi-6A's helicopters and in Real Squadron Mi-6 would need to make more departures. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of taking on board 2 units. BTT class BMD / BTRD (for MI-6A only 1 unit.) I changed the situation for the better. In general, the author calls doubt the possibility of transferring the entire BTT DSHB helicopters MI-6A.
Needless to prove that the landing is cast in three flights, not to mention the four, is equivalent to suicide. It is necessary to transfer no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is not necessary without removal of transport and combat helicopters for the period of its actions (total per 1-2 p / c), i.e. will have to leave them without VE Mi-8T / MT.
The duration of the landing of the Alliance in two flights is usually 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent preparation of helicopters only after a day, it is possible to count on their repeated actions (in the same Afghanistan, the helicopters did and there are much more conclusions, but the calculations were made proceeding only from two departures per day). During the specified time, the purchase remains without VE Mi-8 and support troops without their participation. If during the same day it is necessary to land at least one or two tvs in the battalion, then almost all the purchase remains without transport helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and time for the restoration of combat capability ODSBR, the re-falling is practically not realized.
In the remaining nine days of the operation, another eight-nine tank falling in the ODOSB / Us. MSB is possible. However, modern experience shows: up to 30% of the flight resource of transport helicopters will have to spend on solving tasks not related to landing. Consequently, the use of landings will be able to only army in the direction of the main strike. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of the TAVD.
Although not quite. Nevertheless, it was also involved to land a DShV also transport aircraft of the Air Force - mostly An-12. This created additional inconvenience. So, DSHB on the BTT had to independently follow in such a source district of landing, where airfields were able to provide lifting aircraft with a landing on board.
Quality
The adaptability of the domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family of assault actions and wider, to aerial landing at all. In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.
RESULTS
As already commended earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of Dsh Parts, large changes were made to the composition of the Airborne Forces. Most of the landing assault brigades are reorbed into highly lightweight airborne brigades (the actual relief process has begun earlier); At the same time, several brigades are disbanded (57th and 58th), and the 39th is converted to the 224th CWRC. Separate landing assault battalions were decided to disband everything. In the summer of 1990, all major transformations were already committed. Brigades are reformed, and most of the battalions are disbanded. By November, the month of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former.
The overall picture of transformations can be traced according to the following data:
11 Odshbr Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region) * In 1988, a helicopter regiment was bred. And by 1 Aug. 1990 Translated to the states of RES. Brigades.
13 Odshbr G. Magdagachi (Amur region) * In 1988, a helicopter regiment was bred. In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states. Brigades.
21 Oddshbr G. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) In 1988, a helicopter regiment was bred. In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states. Brigades.
23 Oddshbr Kremenchug (Ukraine) in the summer of 1990 translated into the states of RES. Brigades.
35 GW. Oddbr G. Cottbus (GDR) ** in the summer of 1990 translated into the states of Recessed. Brigades.
36 Oddsbr PGT Garbolovo (Leningrad region) in the summer of 1990 translated into the states of Recessed. Brigades.
37 Oddshbr G. Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region) in the summer of 1990 translated into the states of Recessed. Brigades.
38 GW. Vienna Brest (Belarus) in the summer of 1990 translated into the states. - Des. Brigades.
odshbr
39 Oddshbr G. Khyrov (Ukraine) in the spring of 1990 was reorganized in 224 UTS ADVD.
40 Odshbr with. Great Korenich - Nikolaev (Ukraine) in the summer of 1990 translated on the state of Recessed. Brigades. And fully replicated in Nikolaev.
56 GW. Odshbrian pos. Azadbash (D. Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** in the winter of 1989 was removed from Afghanistan in Iolatan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990 translated into states
Rev.- Des. Brigades.
57 Oddshbr PGT. Aktogai (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan) translated into p. Georgiyevka Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) and there disbanded in 1989.
58 Oddsbr Kremenchug (Ukraine) was disbanded in December 1989.
83 ODSBR BYALOGYARD (POLAND) was transferred to Ussuriysk (Primorsky Krai) in 1989. In the summer of 1990 transferred to states
Rev.-DES. Brigades.
128 Oddshbr G. Stavropol (Stavropol AK) disbanded in the beginning. 1990.
130 Odshbr G. Abakan (Khakasskaya AO) was disbanded in the beginning. 1990.
1318 ODSP G. Borovuha-1 - Borolar (district Polotsk, Belarus) was disbanded in August 1989.
1319 ODSP Kyakhta (Chita region) disbanded in March 1988.
The individual battalions were accepted as follows: in 1989 (maximum beginning. 1990) disbanded all battalions with PPDs in the USSR simultaneously replicating in the USSR in groups of troops in Europe. Then, before the beginning. 1991 were disbanded and they. Only the 901th battalion survived.
139 ODESB G. Kalinigrad (Kaliningrad region) was disbanded no later than 1989.
145 Odosb pos. Sergeevka (Primorsky Krai) was disbanded no later than 1989.
899 Odesb G. Burg (GDR) in 1989 translated into PGT. Bear lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than the beginning of 1991.
900 Odshb G. Leipzig - Shinow (GDR) was removed into the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded.
901 ODESB in R-N.P. Rychki (Czechoslovakia) in 1989 translated into Alusken (Latvia). In the beginning. 1991 began to disband, but
Soon, the battalion was rearranged * and in May 1991 moved to Abkhazia (Gudauta).
902 Odesb G. Kechkemet (Hungary) in 1989 translated into Grodno (Belarus).
903 Odesb G. Grodno (Belarus) was disbanded no later than 1989.
904 Odessa Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) was disbanded no later than 1989.
905 Odesb G. Bender (Moldova) was disbanded no later than 1989.
906 Odosb pos. Hada-Bulak (Chita region, Rr. G. Borzya) disbanded no later than 1989.
907 Odesb G. Birobidzhan (Jewish JSC) was disbanded no later than 1989.
908 Odesb PGT. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) was disbanded no later than 1989.
1011 ODESB ST. Maryina Gorka - Puhovichi (Belarus) disbanded no later than 1989.
1044 Odesb G. Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the district of Königsbruck) translated in 1989 in Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1156 ODESB G. Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region) was disbanded no later than 1989.
1179 Odshb G. Petrozavodsk (Karelia) was disbanded no later than 1989.
1151 Odesb G. Polotsk (Belarus) was disbanded no later than 1989.
1185 Odessa Ravensbrück (GDR) was translated in 1989 in Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1604 Odesb G. Ulan-Ude (Buryat AO) disbanded no later than 1989
Notes:
* By this time, he was named already as a separate parachute battalion.
Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former landing and assault parts in the Airborne Forces were presented eleven separate airborne brigades.
In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of helicopters from the Air Force in the SV and, thus, to significantly improve the possibilities of ardent assault troops. However, after this, in early December 1989, there is an orders for re-charged with the command of airborne troops, levating, thereby positive for the School of Army Aviation. Coordination between ardent assault formations and command of combined-arms associations in the interests of which they had to act was disturbed. The reasons for the transfer of the DSH in administrative and operational submission of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the emerged similarity in the acquisition and learning of everything does not explain. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in not actually military matters. Inattention Commmand of the Airborne Forces to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landings in the early and middle stage (60-E-beginning. The 80s) resulted in some "envy" to "competitor"; Moreover, the success of the "helicate-landing" doctrine was on the face, both in our country and from NATOV. In principle, the logical (and theoretically faithful) solution to focus all airborne forces under one administrative command was unreasonably supplemented and their operational association. The command incorrectly estimated the dependence of the DSH from the helicopter to consider it to similar to ensuring the Action Airborne by airplanes and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of the deposit forces with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the landing falls sharply.
Abbreviations and abbreviations
Airborne Airborne Forces
SV ̵
11th Oddshbr (V / h 32364), Radio, Mogocha;
13th ODSBR (V / h 21463), DVO, Magdagachi, Amazar;
21st ODSBR (V / h 31571), Crowd, Kutaisi;
35th ODSBR (V / h 16407), HSVG, Cottbus;
36th ODSBR (V / h 74980), Lenvo, Garbolovo;
37th ODSBR (V / h 75193), Pribvo, Chernyakhovsk;
38th ODSBR (V / h 92616), Belyvo, Brest;
39th ODSBR (V / h 32351), horses, hyrov;
40th ODSBR (V / h 32461), ODO, Nikolaev;
56th ODSBR (V / h 74507), Turkway, Azadbash, Chirchik;
57th ODSBR (V / h 92618), Savo, Aktogai, Kazakhstan;
58th Oddshbr frame Quo, Kremenchug.
New brigades were formed as lightweight, 3-battalion composition, without helicopter regiments. Now it was ordinary "infantry" parts that have no aviation. In fact, these were tactical parts, whereas until this time three first brigades (11th, 13th and 21st stands) were tactical compounds. Since the beginning of the 80s, the Battalions of the 11th, 13th and 21st brigades ceased to be separate and lost their numbers - brigades from compounds became parts. However, the helicopter shelves remained subordinate to these brigades until 1988, after which they were derived from the subordination of the department of the Brigades in the subordination of the districts.
The structure of new brigades was as follows:
Management (headquarters) of the brigade;
Two parachute battalion;
One landing assault battalion;
Gobichic Artillery Division;
Anti-tank battery;
Anti-artistic battery;
Communication company;
Intelligence rating;
RTBZ company;
Engineering and spernaya company;
Rota material support;
Medical company;
Rota landing.
The number of personnel in the brigades was about 2800 people.
Since 1982-1983, airborne preparation has begun in arranged assault brigades, and therefore some organizational changes in the structure of the compounds occurred.
In addition to the Brigades in December 1979, separate landing assault battalions were formed, which were to act in the interests of the armies and solve tactical tasks in the near rear of the enemy. In the mid-80s, there was an additional formation of several other battalions. In total, more than twenty such battalions were formed, the full list of which could not be established for me - there were several rod battalions, whose numbers are not in open print. By the mid-1980s, the general and tank armies of the Armed Forces of the USSR were in their composition:
899th Odesb (V / h 61139), 20th GW OA, GSVG, Burg;
900th ODESB (V / h 60370), 8th GW OA, HSVG, Leipzig;
901th ODESB (V / h 49138), CGV, Riechki, then pribvo, Aluksne;
902th ODESB (V / h 61607), Yugv, Hungary, Kechkemet;
903th Odesb 28th OA, Bely, Brest (until 1986), then in Grodno;
904th Odosb (in / h 32352), 13th OA, and Pros, Vladimir-Volynsky;
905th Odosb (V / h 92617), 14th OA, ODO, Bender;
906th ODESB (V / h 75194), 36th OA, Rabbo, Borzya, Hada Bulak;
907th ODESB (V / h 74981), 43rd AK, DVO, Birobidzhan;
908th ODESB 1st GW OA, CVO, Konotop, since 1984 Chernigov, P. Goncharovskoe;
1011th Odesb 5th GW Ta, Bely, Maryina Gorka;
1039th ODESB 11th GV OA, Pribvo, Kaliningrad;
1044th ODESB (V / h 47596), 1st GW TA, GSVG, KOENIGSBRUK, after 1989 - Pribvo, Taurage;
1048th ODESB (in / h 45476), 40th OA, Turkvo, Termez;
1145th ODESB 5th OA, DVO, Sergeevna;
1151th ODESB 7th TA, Bely, Polotsk;
1154th Odessa of the 86th AK, Rasho, Shelekhov;
1156th Odessa 8th, and forged, Novograd-Volynsky;
1179th ODESB (V / h 73665), 6th OA, Lenvo, Petrozavodsk;
1185th ODESB (V / h 55342), 2nd GW TA, GSVG, Ravensbrüc, then pribvo, vyruh;
1603th Odesb 38th OA, and the first one;
1604th ODESB 29th OA, Rabbo, Ulan-Ude;
1605th Odesb 5th OA, DVO, Spassk-Far;
1609th Odesb 39th O Oa, Radio, Kyakhta.
Also in 1982, its landing assault battalions were created in the Navy of the USSR Navy. In particular, on the Pacific Fleet, such a battalion was created on the basis of the 1st battalion of the Marine Corps of the 165th division of the 55th division. Then, such battalions were created in other division shelves and individual brigades on other fleets. These landing and assault battalions of the marines passed airborne preparation and performed parachute jumps. That is why I put them in this narration. The landing assault battalions that are part of the 55th division, their own numbers were not named and were named only through pass-through numbering within their regiment. Battalions in brigades, as separate parts, received their own names:
876th ODESB (V / h 81285) 61st OBRMP, SF, satellite;
879th ODESB (V / h 81280) 336th GW OBRMP, BF, Baltiysk;
881th ODESB 810th OBRMP, ChF, Sevastopol;
1st DSHB of the 165th PMP 55th DMP, Tof, Vladivostok;
1st DSHB of the 390th PMP 55th DMP, Tof, Slavyanka.
Based on the composition of weapons, separate landing and assault battalions were divided into "light", which did not have armored vehicles, and "heavy", which were in service with up to 30 milk and landing machines. Both types of battalions also had in service with 6 mortars with a caliber of 120 mm, six AGS-17 and several PTRS.
Brigades have in its composition three parachute battalions on BMP, BMD or GAZ-66 cars, an artillery division (18 Gaubitz D-30), a anti-tank battery, an anti-aircraft battery, a mortar battery (six 120 mm mortar), intelligence Rota, Communication Communication, Sapper Road, Radiation Service Compass, Chemical Protection Complex, Material Match, Repair Company, Car Road and Medical Item. A separate parachute paratfactory battalion of the brigade consisted of three parachute mouth, mortar battery (4-6 82-mm mortars), grenaderate platoon (6 GRANOMETOMS AGS-17), a platoon of communication, anti-tank platoon (4 SPG-9 and 6 PTRS) and platoon provision.
When passing airborne preparation, the paratrooper service of the landing-assault battalions and the brigades were guided by the PDS DVS documents.
In addition to the brigades and battalions, the General Staff tried another organization of landing assault units. By the mid-1980s, two army corps of the new organization were formed in the USSR. These enclosures were created with the purpose of using them when expanding the operational breakthrough (it happens that to break through). The new buildings had a brigade structure and consisted of mechanized and tank brigades, and besides this, the buildings of the two-bedtone composition were included in the housing shelves. The shelves were called upon to become a "vertical coverage" tool, and in the case they were used together with a helicopter regiment.
In the Belarusian Military District, on the basis of the 120th Guards Motor Storelkaya Division, the 5th Guards Communist Party Army Corps was formed, and the 48th Guards Commercial Army Corps was formed in the Trans-Baikal Military District in Kyakhte on the basis of the 5th Guards Tank Division.
The 5th GW AK received in his composition of the 1318th landing assault regiment (in / h 33508) and the 276th helicopter regiment, and the 48th GW AK received in his composition of the 1319th landing-capacity regiment (V / h 33518) And the 373rd helicopter regiment. However, these parts have long been long. Already in 1989, the Guards Army Corps were again rolled in the division, and the assault assault regions were disbanded.
16.02.2018, 13:30
More than a quarter of a century, Magdagachi village was the assault capital of the Amur region. Thousands of Soviet, and later and Russian guys passed a difficult soldier school in the 13th landing assault brigade. At one time, such parts cooled the fervor from those who wish to unleash the Third World War in the Far East. The second August of the brigade veterans can be found not only on the streets of Blagoveshchensk, but also in many cities of the entire post-Soviet space. Even after decades, they say the name of Pavel Borisovich Gladstin with respect. It is he - the Stalingrad boy and the pupil of Vasily Marghelova himself - stood at the origins of the foundation of the famous military unit. Today he is 90, but he continues to live according to the laws of the chief maidency of the Airborne Forces: "No one except us!"
Stay in the ranks
Every day Pavel Borisovich Gladstin begins with an email check. Despite the honorable age, remains an active user of the Internet. Loves to communicate on Skype with colleagues from all over the former Soviet Union, and his account in Odnoklassniki is a page of memories. The veterans of the 13th landing assault brigade will learn each other after dozens of years, remember how each other came to Afghanistan and slept with weapons in the alarm days of Damansky.
In such a rhythm, he lives two decades. It was then that, in the year of the 70th anniversary, close to the computer presented him. They say, they noticed in the eyes of the father and grandfather some kind of sadness. They fell, what is called, in the apple - signs of boredom instantly evaporated. The active landing Natura Pavel Borisovich allowed not only to quickly understand the high technologies, but also to train the computer literacy of children and grandchildren. Stay in the ranks - his life credo, mixed under German bombing and service under the Flags of the Airborne Forces.
Childhood in kerosene solution
Stalingrad, a boiling Volga and tanks coming out for the Tractor Plant Gate. The 14-year-old Paul watched this picture from the workshop and clearly understood: already tomorrow the equipment, chopping and fed up, will be finished again. And he together with the same juvenile volunteers will restore it. They were instructed to bring to mind tank fuel pumps. It was necessary to customize every item, wash it in kerosene solution.
In 1994, the 13th Magdagachinsky archer assault brigade was replicated to Orenburg. A year later, its divisions entered into battle with the militants of Dudayev in Chechnya.
Fights walked on the most approaches to the city, and the boys raised by heavy labor received a cup of cereals, a glass of tea and by the end of a 12-hour shift literally rolled down. Bread in the city has long been issued by limited portions. Working received 800 grams per day, non-operating - two times less. After work, I resorted home, dinner dinner, together with my mother and sisters left to spend the night in the basement. The Germans regularly bombard the boiler room next to the house. The high smoke tube was taken for a landmark.
- incendiary bombs were constantly discharged on the roofs of houses. If you do not slide in time, then nothing will save anything. Therefore, adults were on duty on the roofs and attics. They picked up the German "lighters" with metal large nippers, threw in a barrel with water, "recalls Childhood Pavel Borisovich. - in the morning came out of the basement and did not know whether our apartment was County. Missed and again diverged on workplaces. I got to the plant directly from school bench. In May 1942 she ended the seventh class. The representative of the enterprise came and said directly - men on the front, work hands are missing. My friends and I went and went to joke victory.
Simple General Uncle Vasya
From Stalingrad, the Margelov family left the day before the arrival of the Germans. Father, head of a major trust, received the task at all cost to take the plant to the Urals. On the Baikal Amur highway, railways were accidentally disassembled, rails were taken to Stalingrad. Of these, they built the road that was straight from the shop to the Volga. There is a railway ferry. The last echelon enterprise crossed the safe bank, and the next day there were already fighting throughout the city.
At the Yurga station in the Kemerovo region, the machines were installed right in the open sky. The son of the Bolshoi Chief Pavel Gladestein worked as a mechanic. Two years after the victory he graduated from the technical school, became a specialist in the production of artillery systems. Returned to the native destroyed Stalingrad in order to literally flush out of it later.
The leadership of the Barricade plant, where Paul Gladestein headed the labor team, saw a promising specialist in it. When he was mentioned about the desire of a military career, the threats sprinkled immediately. He was told by the court for the unwillingness to restore the national economy - after the war, each specialist was on the weight of gold. Paul has escaped to Kiev, entered the military school of self-propelled artillery.
He dreamed of a volley gun, but, to his own surprise, he received an appointment into airborne troops. At first, really, it was possible to serve in the specialty: in the 125th Kostroma Guards Division of the Airborne Forces, there was self-propelled artdivizion. However, less than a year later, the artillery had to say goodbye. On April 1, 1952, Lieutenant gladstine was directed to the Far East. The joke was successful. Kuibyshevka-East, now Belogorsk Amur Region became the new service. The airborne building was deployed under the command of Vasily Marghelov himself.
- Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General, founder of the Airborne Forces ... A person who has deserved in all respects and at the same time completely simple in communication. I was worried about the conversation with him, and he meets every young officer, an accessible explains to him the specifics of the service in the Far East. Itself in a regular cap and a flying leather jacket without pursuit, "recalls the details of the historic meeting Pavel Borisovich.
Head
At the end of the sixties of the last century, the newspaper wrote small on the Soviet-Chinese border of the newspaper. Soviet citizens lived ordinary life, and only the military understood what is fraught with the complication of the situation. The summer of 1968 in the border areas of the Union was disturbed, to the main bloodshed on the island of Damansky remained less than a year.
Against the country, officers of paratroopers began to arrive in the Amur settlement of Magdagachi. They laid a major task - cover up 400 kilometers of the state border. The responsibility band is from the station Yerofe Pavlovich to Shimanovskaya station. The theater of possible hostilities of an unprecedented extent, even before the overall compounds of such tasks was never set.
The rate was made on high mobility and a completely new type of landing units. They had to disembark on small military transport helicopters and act in the near rear of the likely enemy. Simply put, falling the enemy right on the head.
- In July 1968, headquarters of the 98th Guards Svir Red Banner Airborne Division Reznikova Mikhail Timofeevich were summoned to the General Staff. Set the task - to form a separate assault assault brigade. Everything rested in the absence of time. The brigade had to be formed at an accelerated pace, "Pavel Gladshtein describes the events of the 1968 events.
He was among the first officers who arrived at Magdagachi Station. It did not even assume that his fate would be associated with the 13th ardent assault team for more than ten years. The paratroopers of the older generation perfectly remember this brave major, which two years later became the head of the headquarters, and then headed the brigade. It was a powerful mobile fist, which consisted of mortar, anti-aircraft, anti-tank and even warm divisions. Only people with rich everyday and military experiences could effectively command such compound.
We have nothing to be afraid
In March 1969, Damansky's snow was impregnated with the blood of soldiers and officers. However, before the third world case never reached. It was not necessary to jump on the head to the enemy. On the bank of the Amur knew perfectly, what method would be prepared in the case of full-scale aggression.
In Stalingrad, after work, Paul resorted home, dinner had dinner and, together with her mother and sisters, left the basement to sleep. The Germans regularly bombard the boiler room next to the house.
In July 1978, the Commander of the Far Eastern Military District, the Army General Tretyak conducted exercises with the troops of the 35th Army (Amur Region). The 13th Oddshbr was raised on the alarm and received an order to nominate to the area, which was 300 kilometers from the place of permanent deployment.
- Maritime paratroopers on Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters landed in these areas and occupied defense. On the analysis of the teachings, the commander noted that the brigade first participated in such exercises and coped with their tasks. Evaluation of the 13th Oddshbr - good. The remaining compounds of the 35th Army - satisfactory, - recalls Pavel Borisovich. - After parsing the teachings, the commander called me and said that my report on the dismissal, which I filed in connection with the 50th anniversary, he will not sign. I have to serve until the candidate for the post of commander of the Brigade will be defined. He was found only two years later.
OPINION
Clara Gladestein, wife Pavel Borisovich, famous Amur restaurant:
- Despite the honorable age, Pavel Borisovich remains continued authority for all family members. In addition to two children, he has six grandchildren and the same great-grandchildren. It is demanding to all, but first of all, to himself, therefore, it is always assembled and obligatory. Never goes anywhere in anywhere and teachs close to this. He is a real example of imitation, perfectly understands all the vital issues. You can talk to political topics and get a purely life advice.
Pavel Borisovich still leads the car, he has very strong confident hands, able to fix anything in the house. He lives without offense for life and claims to his own difficult fate. Watching all the events in the country and the world and knows exactly - while in Russia there are airborne troops, we have nothing to be afraid.
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