DATA FOR 2010 (in progress)
Complex S-25 "Berkut" / "Sosna", B-300 missile - SA-1 GUILD
Complex S-25M
The first domestic multi-channel air defense system / anti-aircraft missile system. Studying the possibility of creating an air defense system began by order of I.V. Stalin in the late 1940s. The Berkut air defense system was created specifically for the Moscow air defense system in KB-1 (formerly SB-1) of the 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers under the leadership of chief designers P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria (son of L.P. Beria ). Since 1953, the chief designer of the S-25 system is A.A. Raspletin (previously deputy chief designer). The rocket was created at OKB-301 of the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry under the leadership of chief designer S.A. Lavochkin. Ground equipment - GSKB MMP (future GSKB "Spetsmash" of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building) under the leadership of V.P. Barmin. Guidance and control means - NII-244 of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry.
The development of the complex began in accordance with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426 dated August 9, 1950. The task was set to create an air defense system capable of providing all-round defense of Moscow by simultaneously firing at targets detected at a distance of 200 km with the defeat of bombers flying at speeds of up to 1000 km/ h at altitudes up to 20-25 km with a probability close to 100%. The range of the project is 30-35 km. The resolution established the following deadlines for the readiness of prototypes of air defense systems:
- 4 prototypes of guidance radar - February 1952
- prototypes of missile equipment - July 1951
- 50 prototype missiles (surface-to-air and air-to-air 25 each) - February 1952
- experimental model of detection radar - July 1951
- 2 prototypes of detection radar - May 1952
- prototype of communication equipment for detection radar and air defense missile guidance and control radar - May 1952.
- development of technical projects of these systems - by March 1, 1951.
Composition of the air defense system according to the Decree of 08/09/1950:
- 56 air defense fire systems located in two rings, 45-50 and 85-90 kilometers from the center of Moscow;
- A-100 all-round radar, located at long-range (200-300 kilometers) and short-range (25-30 kilometers) and designed for early detection of targets;
- command posts;
- technical bases;
- road network;
- communication system
Each firing complex included a B-200 central guidance radar and a launch position for 60 B-300 missiles. In its sector, 20 missiles were simultaneously fired at up to 20 targets.
A target missile based on the "217M" missile of the S-25M air defense system and the antenna post of the B-200 radar (part) of the S-25 / SA-1 GUILD air defense system in the museum on Khodynka Field in Moscow (photo by Tadeusz Mikutel, http://pvo. guns.ru)
According to Resolution No. 3389-1426, one of the echelons of the air defense system was to be G-400 interceptor aircraft (Tu-4 carriers) with G-300 air-to-air missiles (product “210”) with a range of 12-15 km. Developer - OKB-301, chief designer of the complex A.I. Korchmar. The decree instructed to develop and manufacture 4 copies of an experimental aircraft missile guidance system by February 1952. Requirements for other characteristics:
- missile speed when hitting a target - at least 2150 km/h
- rocket mass - up to 600 kg
- overall dimensions of the missiles, allowing the suspension of 4 or more missiles under the carrier
Other characteristics are similar to the requirements for air defense missiles.
According to the Resolution, it was planned to prepare and present a full range of air defense systems for the Berkut system by November 1952, and large monetary bonuses were established for all creators of the components of the system and the complex as a whole.
Later adjusted requirements for the air defense system - the ability to destroy 20 targets flying at a speed of 1100-1250 km/h in a sector of 50-60 degrees at an altitude of 3000-25000 m with a distance of up to 35 km. The draft of the first version of the air defense system - "B" - with the B-200 control system was presented on March 1, 1951. Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1200-392 on the creation of an air defense system with approved parameters was adopted on March 5, 1952.
Tests. In 1951, on the basis of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 5, 1951 and the directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by order of the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army dated May 28, 1951, a training ground was created - special department No. 3 - military unit 29139 (next to the State Central Training Ground Kapustin Yar) - for testing air defense systems (in 1964 it was renamed into research test site No. 8 of the USSR Ministry of Defense). The first launch of the B-300 rocket was carried out on July 25, 1951 at the training ground of military unit 29139 (Kapustin Yar). In October 1951, tests of a prototype B-200 missile guidance radar began near Moscow. Testing of the radar continued at the LII airfield in Zhukovsky in June-September 1952, and testing of B-300 missiles in Kapustin Yar in the summer of 1952.
Ballistic tests of the V-300 missiles began in June 1951. Tests in a closed control loop began on October 20, 1952 with the launch of the V-300 model 205 missile controlled by the B-200 radar. By April 1953, tests of the complex for compliance with technical requirements were completely completed. April 25, 1953 () a target was shot down at an altitude of 7000 m with one missile with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead E-600. The complex was tested at the Kapustin Yar and Katov test sites. After the arrest of L.P. Beria, the air defense system was renamed S-25 Sosna, and A.A. Raspletin was appointed chief designer.
Tests of the complex during 1953 and in the first half of 1954 were carried out against target aircraft and with several missiles against a target aircraft. At the end of 1953, preparations began for state tests of the air defense system. State tests began according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated September 29, 1953 - the S-25 air defense systems were tested at the air defense positions of military unit 32396 (future air defense army), the B-200 guidance radar was tested in military units 61991 and 83545 (air defense regiments of the "B", see below). State tests were carried out from June 25, 1954. The first live firing on the 20-channel S-25 air defense system was carried out in the Moscow air defense zone by the test team of military unit 29139 and the crew of the 10th air defense training center (see below) on August 2, 1954. - a target aircraft was destroyed by a B-300 missile. State tests of the S-25 were completed on April 1, 1955. 69 launches of B-300 missiles were carried out, the air defense system was recommended for adoption. The complex was adopted by the Air Defense Forces by Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 893-533 of May 7, 1955 and Order No. 00100 of the USSR Minister of Defense of May 21, 1955.
Deployment. The selection of sites for the deployment of the Moscow air defense system began in June 1951. The location of parts of the Moscow air defense zone was approved in August 1951 - the far ring of the air defense system was located 85-90 km from the city center, the near ring at a distance of 45-50 km from the center . The construction of positions began according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated December 3, 1951. In 1951, the training and education of air defense officers also began with the aim of mastering new equipment. Based on the test results, on October 24, 1952, the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution “On the formation of the first anti-aircraft rocket regiments armed with the S-25 system” was adopted. The formation of air defense regiments began in 1952-1953. - letter "S" - air defense regiments, letter "T" - missile technical bases, letter "B" - radar units. In June 1953, directorates of 4 air defense sectors of Moscow were created as part of military unit 32396 (literally "US", corps-type directorate). The sector included: command, headquarters, political department, chief engineer service, radio engineering center for short-range reconnaissance, 14 air defense regiments with S-25 air defense systems, and a technical base. On December 1, 1953, military unit 32396 was actually transformed into a special purpose army (SPA) consisting of 4 air defense corps (air defense sector). The formation of air defense regiments was completed in mid-1955. By order of the Minister of Defense No. 0129 of July 15, 1955, military unit 32396 was renamed the 1st Special Purpose Air Defense Army. Combat duty of long-range and short-range radar posts began on September 1, 1955, the second echelon air defense system regiments began combat duty on July 7, and the first echelon on July 8, 1956.
On June 1, 1954, the 10th Training Center of the USSR Air Defense Forces was formed at the Kapustin Yar training ground as part of military unit 29139 (since August 8, 1955 it was included in military unit 29139). In 1954, construction of S-25 air defense missile systems was completed on the territory of the training center. The first live firing at the training center was carried out by the S-25 regiment on April 20, 1955.
The Moscow air defense system was actually deployed by 1956, consisting of 56 air defense regiments in two echelons (34 external echelon regiments, 22 internal echelon regiments), the total number of launch sites (complexes) is 56 (4 sectors of 14 air defense regiments each) with two large concrete ring roads. The regiment's territory occupied an area of 140 hectares; in total, the regiment included 60 air defense missile launchers (total - 3360 launchers). At the regiment's command post there were 20 workers, including operators of air defense systems, computers, and communications systems. The regiment's staff consists of about 30 officers and 450 privates. The infrastructure of the complex is stationary.
The creation of the Leningrad air defense zone began in 1955. The completion of the work was planned in 1958-1959, but was stopped by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated April 30, 1957.
Control system and guidance- radio command control, the complex can simultaneously fire up to 20 targets in a sector of up to 50-60 degrees. with guidance on each of up to 2 missiles. after improving the SAM equipment, it is possible that the complex could fire three missiles at one target simultaneously.
Long-range detection radar - stationary radar units A-100 with a 10 cm all-round radar of the "Kama" range (developed by NII-224, chief designer - L.V. Leonov). According to the original design of the air defense system, long-range radars were located in two echelons - 25-30 km and 200-250 km from Moscow.
Guidance radar - B-200 YO-YO (chief designers - P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria, leading radar designer - V.E. Magdesiev, since 1953 chief designer - A.A. Raspletin) - antennas A-11 and A-12; The guidance system (B-200) was finalized with the participation of German specialists. The radar tracked both the target and the missile and generated guidance commands for the missile. The radar antenna posts for the azimuthal and elevation planes were different.
Launcher- stationary launcher - launching table. The launch complex was developed by GSKB Spetsmash, chief designer - V.P. Barmin;
V-300 rocket:
Design The rocket consists of 7 compartments. Aerodynamic design "duck".
Engines- single-chamber liquid propellant engine, chief designer - A.M. Isaev.
Traction - 9000 kg
Fuel supply - displacement
Control - gas rudders (installed on a special truss in the tail of the rocket)
| according to Post. dated 08/09/1950 | adjusted TTZ | Real S-25 | |
| Rocket length | 12 m | ||
| Case diameter | 650 mm | ||
| Wingspan | 3600 mm | ||
| Starting weight | up to 1000 kg | 3500 kg | |
| Explosive mass | 70 kg | ||
| Range | 30-35 km | 35 km | 32-50 km |
| Damage height | 20000-25000 m | 3000-25000 m | |
| Missile speed at the moment of hitting the target | not less than 1980 km/h | ||
| Maximum target speed | 1000 km/h | 1100-1250 km/h | |
| Radio fuse response radius | 50-75 m | ||
| Probability of target hit | about 100% |
Warhead types: Ch. designers - Liquid, Sukhoi and K.N. Kozorezov
- high-explosive fragmentation E-600 (1953) - tested on the B-300 missile model 205;
Damage radius - up to 75 m
The V-196 cumulative warhead was tested according to the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of August 27, 1953 on the V-300 model 207 rocket.
Nuclear, with a radio fuse (chief designer - Rastorguev); In the mid-1950s, a modification with a nuclear warhead was tested (at the Kapustin Yar test site). The target was hit at an altitude of 10,000 m, the radius of destruction was 2,000 m. The regular composition of the Moscow air defense regiment included 3 missiles with nuclear warheads. Missiles with nuclear warheads were to be used in the event of a massive raid by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.
Power - 20 kt
Damage radius - 1-2 km
Modifications:
Rocket V-300 model 205- the first model of a missile defense system with a control system from the B-200 guidance radar; equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead E-600;
Rocket V-300 model 207- tested according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated August 27, 1953 with the V-196 cumulative warhead.
Status: THE USSR
- 1952-1953 - formation of air defense regiments armed with the S-25 system - letter "S" - air defense regiments, letter "T" - technical bases for missile maintenance, letter "B" - radar units. In the first stage of formation - military units 30574, 51850, 51860, 61977, 61991, 62847, 71548, 83545, 83566, 86646, 92585, in the second stage - military units 51846, 58858, 61996, 62841, 714 77, 71529, 77977 , 81857, 86613, 92576, 92897, 92929. The main regiments for the development of technology were the technical base of military unit 30574 "T", air defense regiments of military unit 61991 "S", 83545 "S", 92585 "S", 71548 " B".
1954 June 1 - the 10th training center of the USSR Air Defense Forces was formed at the Kapustin Yar training ground as part of military unit 29139 (from August 8, 1955 included in military unit 29139). In 1954, construction of S-25 air defense missile systems was completed on the territory of the training center.
1959 - according to Western data (?), the industry produced a total of 32,000 B-300 missiles. 3360 air defense missile launchers were deployed as part of the Moscow air defense system.
1960 November 07 - S-25 air defense missiles are shown for the first time at a parade on Red Square in Moscow.
1975 - removed from service. Used as a target.
1988 - according to Western data, in 1988 there were still 1,600 air defense missile launchers with 1,600 nuclear warheads in service.
1997 - possibly found in air defense training units. During the creation of the air defense system, a limitedly mobile version was also designed on the chassis of the KZU-16 anti-aircraft artillery carts (cabins “R” with antennas and “A” cabins with guidance radars and command transmission systems).
Sources:
Borodulin M. Test site for "Berkut", 2012 ().
History of air defense technology. Website http://historykpvo.narod2.ru, 2010
Kisunko G.V. Secret zone: confession of the general designer. M.: Contemporary. 1996
Korovin V., Fomichev A., Missiles for the protection of the northern capital. // Aerial panorama. November-December 1996
Litovkin V., A rocket “hundred” underground guards the capital around the clock. // News 08/25/1993
Popov B., Zhary O., Air target simulator... // Military parade. N 4 / 1997
Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426 of 08/09/1950, M., Kremlin.
Soviet armed forces 1988 Tomsk. 1988
Shunkov V.N. Rocket weapons. Mn., Potpourri, 2003
Janes weapon systems. 1987-1988 USA.
SIPRI Yearbook. 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981 Stockholm, Sweden.
Soviet military power: an assessment of the threat 1988. Washington, 1988 USA.
The director of SB-1, also the chief designer, Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko, used to work in his office until late at night, looking through foreign scientific and technical journals, scientific and technical reports and other literature. This routine was dictated by the fact that there was a Kremlin telephone in Pavel Nikolayevich’s office, and if Stalin called, it was always late at night and precisely through the Kremlin “turntable.” In such cases, the matter was not limited to a telephone conversation, and Pavel Nikolaevich had to go to the Kremlin, where he had a permanent pass. With this pass, he could always go to Stalin’s reception room, where Poskrebyshev sat as a faithful and permanent guard at the entrance to Stalin’s office.
But this time Pavel Nikolaevich, who arrived at Stalin’s call at two in the morning, was escorted to Stalin’s apartment by a security officer. The owner of the apartment received his guest, sitting on the sofa in pajamas, looking through some papers. He responded to Pavel Nikolaevich’s greeting
“Hello, Comrade Kuksenko,” and with a movement of his hand holding the receiver, he pointed to the chair that stood next to the sofa. Then, putting the papers aside, he said:
Do you know the last time an enemy plane flew over Moscow? - The tenth of July, one thousand nine hundred and forty-two. It was a single reconnaissance aircraft. Now imagine that a single plane will also appear over Moscow, but with an atomic bomb. What if several single planes break through from a massive raid, as happened on July 22, 1941, but now with atomic bombs? After a pause in which he seemed to be pondering the answer to this question, Stalin continued:
“But even without atomic bombs, what is left of Dresden after the massive air strikes of our yesterday’s allies? And now they have more planes, and enough atomic bombs, and they nest literally right next to us. And it turns out that we need a completely new air defense, capable of not allowing even a single aircraft to reach the defended object even during a massive raid.What can you say about this extremely important problem?
Sergo Lavrentievich Beria and I carefully studied the captured materials of the developments carried out by the Germans in Peenemünde on the Wasserfall, Reintocher, and Schmetterling guided anti-aircraft missiles. According to our assessments, carried out with the participation of German specialists working for us under a contract, promising air defense systems should be built on the basis of a combination of radar and surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles,” answered P.N. Kuksenko. After this, according to Pavel Nikolaevich, Stalin began asking him “educational” questions about something so unusual for him, related to radio electronics, which was the technology of radio-controlled missiles at that time. And Pavel Nikolayevich did not hide the fact that he himself did not understand much about the emerging new branch of defense technology, where rocketry, radar, automation, precision instrumentation, electronics and much more, for which there is no name yet, should merge together.
He emphasized that the scientific and technical complexity and scale of the problems here are not inferior to the problems of creating atomic weapons. After listening to all this, Stalin said:
“There is an opinion, Comrade Kuksenko, that we need to immediately begin creating an air defense system for Moscow, designed to repel a massive enemy air raid from any direction. For this purpose, a special Main Directorate will be created under the USSR Council of Ministers, modeled on the First Main Directorate for Nuclear Issues.
The new central administration under the Council of Ministers will have the right to involve any organizations of any ministries and departments in carrying out work, providing these works with material funds and financing as needed without any restrictions. In this case, the head office will need to have a powerful research and design organization - the lead organization for the entire problem, and we propose to create this organization on the basis of SB-1, reorganizing it into the Design Bureau * 1. But in order to set all this out in a resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, you, as the future Chief Designer of the Moscow air defense system, are tasked with clarifying the structure of this system, the composition of its means and proposals for the developers of these means in accordance with the technical specifications of KB-1. Prepare a personal list of specialists for about sixty people, wherever they are, for transfer to KB-1. In addition, KB-1 personnel officers will be given the right to select employees for transfer from any other organizations to KB-1. All this work on preparing the draft resolution, as Pavel Nikolaevich later recalled, began to spin with incomprehensible speed.
During this period and even after the decree was issued, Stalin summoned P.N. several more times. Kuksenko, mainly trying to understand a number of “educational” questions that interested him, but he was especially meticulous inquiring about the capabilities of the future system to repel a “star” (that is, simultaneously from different directions) massive raid and “ramming” massive raid.
However, the questions that Stalin asked Pavel Nikolayevich can only partially be called “educational.” It seems that Stalin personally wanted to make sure that Moscow’s future air defense system would really be able to repel massive raids by enemy aircraft, and having convinced himself of this, he no longer considered it necessary to call Pavel Nikolayevich for personal conversations, leaving Berkut in the full care of L.P. Beria.
In a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, the Moscow air defense system received a code name - the Berkut system. Its chief designers were appointed P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria.
The system was classified even from the Ministry of Defense. The draft resolution was signed by the Minister of Defense A.M. Vasilevsky, bypassing all the authorities subordinate to him. The customer of the created system was identified as the newly created TSU (Third Main Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers). For this purpose, TSU created its own military acceptance facility, its own anti-aircraft missile range in the Kapustin Yar area, and as system objects were created, military formations subordinate to TSU for the combat operation of these objects. In short, the Berkut system was supposed to be transferred to the Ministry of Defense ready for combat duty, with equipment, troops and even residential camps.
As I promised, I am posting a document on the creation of the Berkut air defense system (it is exactly 60 years old).
As you read the resolution, pay attention to the methodology for setting tasks, assigning responsibility, deadlines, incentives, etc.
From archival documents of the Almaz-Antey concern
Commentary on a document marked “Top Secret” (from the material concern).
BY J. STALIN'S DECISION
60 years ago, classified as “top secret,” a Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued on the creation of the country’s first air defense system.
On August 9, 1950, the (only recently declassified) Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426, signed by J.V. Stalin, was issued on the creation of an ultra-modern effective air defense system for cities and strategic facilities under the code “Berkut”.
It was supposed to be built on the basis of a fundamentally new class of weapons -
anti-aircraft guided missiles. But this was not the only thing that made the project unique. The text of the Resolution testifies to the foresight of the political and military leadership of the USSR, its ability to predict the development of events and anticipate them.
Just five years ago the Great Patriotic War ended. Some cities are still in ruins, and a new “cold” war is in full swing - the United States is blackmailing the Soviet Union with atomic bombings from the air. Under these conditions, the country finds the strength and means to create air defense weapons based on new radar controls.
The problem was also to find an organization capable of leading this gigantic project. A new powerful developer was needed, which became Design Bureau No. 1 (now GSKB Almaz-Antey named after Academician A. A. Raspletin). The management of the project was entrusted to the Special Committee created for this purpose under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and JI personally. P. Beria.
This Resolution attracted the best research and design organizations, enterprises of various ministries and departments to solve complex scientific and technical problems in radar, jet and aviation technology. Large material resources and bonus funds were pledged for this.
The team of Design Bureau No. 1 alone was allocated more than a million rubles for these purposes, and the main leaders in the development of the Berkut system were awarded the titles of Hero of Socialist Labor and Stalin Prize laureates. The time frame for the implementation of this daring project is impressive, which even by today’s standards seems simply incredible: 2 years and 4 months.
“It is considered necessary to have by November 1952, in order to provide the air defense of Moscow, a complete set of radar installations, guided missiles, launch devices and carrier aircraft included in the Berkut system,” stated the 5th paragraph of the Resolution.
These deadlines were met. And over the next two years, the construction of two air defense rings around Moscow was completed for the S-25 Berkut system. Each of the 56 anti-aircraft missile systems was ready to simultaneously hit 20 targets with 20 missiles. The production of components has been established, soldiers and officers have been trained.
All this is evidence of the extraordinary systems thinking of the scientific director - A. A. Raspletin, the highest professionalism of the development team, the managerial abilities of project leaders, and the ability to mobilize the best engineering forces to solve grandiose problems. The S-25 "Berkut" system, together with the S-75 (1957), S-125 (1961), S-200 (1967) systems, ultimately allowed the country to successfully solve geopolitical problems. And this cannot but arouse the admiration of modern Russia, which faces the need for a new technological breakthrough in the 21st century - the creation of a Russian aerospace defense system.
AND ANOTHER COMMENT FROM A VETERAN OF THE CONCERN:
The speed of decision-making at the level of the USSR Government commands respect. Having reached Stalin’s desk on August 3, he sent the draft document to L. Beria with the note “For, with amendments.” On August 8, the latter reported that the document had been finalized and all changes had been made. The very next day, August 9, 1950, all members of the Council of Ministers put their signatures, incl. Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Industry and Communications G.V. Alekseenko. The document bears the signatures of the developers who were entrusted with the creation of the Berkut system - the chief designers of Design Bureau No. 1 P.N. Kuksenko and S. Beria.
It is noteworthy that KB-1 made proposals for the development of anti-aircraft missiles and the latest radar controls for them in order to create a modern air defense system. These proposals resulted in this landmark Resolution of the 50th year of the last century.
THIS IS THE FIRST PAGE OF THE DOCUMENT WITH STALIN'S AUTOGRAPH AND BERIA'S NOTE.
THIS IS HOW THE FIRST PAGE LOOKED BEFORE STALIN SIGNED IT
In my memories of Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko, I will not touch on his difficult generally accepted biography or his impressive path in science, especially since G. Troshin’s book “Scientific Biography of G.V.” has just been published, deserving the closest attention on the eve of his 95th birthday. Kisunko" - I will try to talk in more detail about the situation that developed for Grigory Vasilyevich and around him during those unique developments in which I was lucky enough to participate as a tester and for which he is rightfully recognized as the founder of the domestic missile defense - "PROVIZER" according to the apt assessment of A. Tolkachev.
From RE to systems “A” and “A-35”
I am still surprised and amazed by the work of G. Kisunko with the experimental radars RE-1 - RE-4. After all, a “high” decision had already been made to create an experimental missile defense test site (Systems “A”), the development and production of hardware and equipment had been launched, in Moscow, development and testing of combat algorithms and programs were underway on a complex model of the system (KMS), and he, as if nothing had happened, I experimentally tested the possibility of detecting a BR warhead! Apparently there were doubts. And so, on June 7, 1957, the first work of RE-1 on an R-2 type ballistic missile launched from Baikonur took place - the radar detected (saw!) the target. And already on April 8, 1958, the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “Problems of Missile Defense” was issued, defining cooperation and entrusting each organization and enterprise with specific tasks to create the Moscow A-35 Missile Defense System. By the way, the 4th Central Research Institute of Moscow Region was tasked with developing technical specifications for this system. Titan-2 and Minuteman-2 (candy bar!) were identified as targets for the system. In my opinion, the leadership was under the impression of the S-25 - the main thing is to “see” the target and the task will be solved! G. Kisunko does not stop at the experiment with RE-1 - he changes the station to the RE-2 radar operating at the RTN frequency. At the beginning of the summer of 1958, another experiment was carried out - the ability to detect and track ballistic missile warheads was again confirmed! These works with RE yielded a lot: firstly, in addition to the warheads, housings were also discovered (the single-channel nature of the stations did not allow them to be taken to the AS), which was later taken into account in the Aldan RSC by introducing a second counter-reflector; secondly, during the launches of the SD ballistic missile to our test site and, especially, the DD ballistic missile to Kamchatka, where the RE-3 was installed, it was discovered that the ballistic missile body was located in front of the warhead! The question arose about the selection of signals reflected from the body and the warhead of the ballistic missile. There were other moments - everything had to be comprehended and overcome for the first time. Autonomous and factory tests of the experimental system “A” were still underway, and in November 1959, KB-1 had already completed the first version of the preliminary design of the “A-35” system. It is necessary to say something special about it: what was wrong with it, as it turned out, was that, similar to the “A” system, it was based on a triangulation method for determining the coordinates of the target and the anti-missile missile. But the “A” system, used for warheads using anti-missiles equipped with a conventional (high-explosive) warhead with a damage radius of 49 m (according to Grigory Vasilyevich’s proposal, rounded to 50 m), this was necessary to ensure the accuracy of coordinate measurements. In addition, at that time, work was carried out at the test site on a single target that was not equipped with means of overcoming missile defense, and the TTT (4th Central Research Institute of Moscow Region) assumed, if I’m not mistaken, 8 - 16 target elements. The formation, suitable for the training ground, turned out to be unsuitable for the combat system. In addition to identifying targets (and there were 48 RCCs and 96 RCTs planned in the system), there were questions of electromagnetic compatibility, project cost, etc. In a word, the proposed project was not without sin at the beginning - were they in a hurry or were they rushed by time? And, on the other hand, there are only 24 hours in a day - Grigory Vasilyevich was completely and completely absorbed in the affairs and problems of the “A” system.
So, by the fall of 1960, the autonomous tests of the range experimental complex System “A” were basically completed, 20 works were carried out and only two of them carried out the launch of the V-1000 PR to the meeting point, but also in them the PR warhead designed by Voronov did not ensure the defeat of the target and was subsequently declared unsuitable. We switched to the PR warhead designed by K. Kozorezov. At this moment (1960) a visit took place to the 2nd site of the training ground by “that other friend” G. Kisunko A. Raspletin, who was very skeptical in general about missile defense issues even after his proposal to the government to use the S-225 complex with the B- missile 825 to repel an attack by American missiles flying from the south along flat trajectories. So, A. Raspletin reported to the government that he was developing the S-225 system, which, apparently, would be able to intercept global missiles. After the report, in my opinion, to the CPSU Central Committee, he was recommended to speed up development. But no “forcing” took place - the S-125 (chief designer Figurnovsky) and S-200 (Bunkin) were on the agenda. A. Raspletin did not interfere with the development of these preliminary designs, listened to the intermediate results, and helped with external cooperation. It was here that V. Markov, feeling that the fate of the development of the S-225 was unstable, took a risky step and, without agreement with A. Raspletin, proposed to Grigory Vasilyevich to include the S-225 system in the Moscow missile defense system, but received a polite refusal. As a result, the A-35 system was left without close-range interception, and G. Kisunko made himself another worst enemy in the person of V. Markov (later Deputy of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry). To complete this story with the S-225 system, it should be said that the development of its preliminary design and its protection at the NTS KB-1 were completed in 1963. Next, technical documentation was developed and, based on it, an experimental and two prototypes were manufactured and delivered to the test site. One of them (Azov) was tested at the test site, including to test the possibility of intercepting a ballistic missile warhead in the near zone using the selection of passive false targets in the atmosphere, the other (5K17) was redeployed to the Kura test site (Peninsula Komchatka) to participate in work on ICBMs of the Strategic Missile Forces. Unfortunately, I don’t know the results of the selection work; this work in our 1st Directorate was carried out by the 2nd Department under the leadership of L. Belozersky.
In December 1960, Academician V. Chelomey came to the test site, accompanied by N. S. Khrushchev’s son Sergei Nikitovich, who worked as his chief engineer. For what purpose? A. Kulakov in his book “Balkhash Test Site” writes that this was most likely a study tour. Grigory Vasilyevich avoided the meeting and the conversation with Sergei Nikitovich was conducted by Alexander Fedorovich. There has not yet been a conflict around missile defense. And then “happened” on March 4, 1961 - a triumphant result with the “interception” of the BR warhead! After this work, G. Kisunko carries out a series of works to improve the efficiency of the system (work under conditions of various kinds of interference and nuclear explosions, carried out under the codes Verba, Kaktus, Mole and, finally, K1 - K5). They continued until 1964, when, based on the totality of the results obtained, it became clear that selection of warheads was needed (by the way, the Americans had recognition stations in all systems, starting with Nike-Zeus) and the use of a nuclear charge in the PR warhead (out of 100 after March 4, 1961, only 16 launches of the launch vehicle intended for testing the “A” system were carried out, in 11 of which the launch vehicle “arrived” at the planned meeting point, and the “defeat” of the warhead was recorded only in 6 cases ). The use of a nuclear charge was supposed to ensure reliable destruction of the target and made it possible to abandon the cumbersome and insufficiently accurate triangulation method of missile guidance, implemented in the A-35 system. So G. Kisunko, having switched to traditional radar (the range is measured by the radar, and the angular coordinates are “read” from angular sensors), overcame another “paradigm” (remember the preliminary design). What technical courage was needed to admit that the principles of hitting the target laid down in the experimental system “A” “did not work” and to start everything, in fact, “from scratch” on the “A-35” system! But Grigory Vasilyevich found such strength in himself, although the use of a nuclear charge in the missile warhead and a selective nuclear explosion (almost the only possible method of extra-atmospheric selection) led to a significant limitation in the capabilities of the missile defense system - even the Americans at that time never talked about the possibility of effective reflection massive BR raid! And then the military pushed the leadership: “Give us a territorial missile defense system!” Here we will have to remember the above-mentioned V. Chelomey with his “Taran” system also because the control center for his UR-100 missiles was undertaken to be provided by Grigory Vasilyevich’s “old friend” A. Mints. In a nutshell about “Taran”: this is the use of one’s ICBMs as a means of destroying enemy ICBMs without correcting the trajectories of one’s ICBMs with compensation for a large miss through the use of a powerful warhead. In addition, it was proposed to use the Danube-3 SDO of the A-35 system and the TsSO-S, located 500 km from Moscow towards Leningrad. They were supposed to be activated by signals from early warning nodes RO-1 (Murmansk) and RO-2 (Riga). But these units created by RTI (A. Mints) had limited technical capabilities and could only be used to solve specific problems, which turned out to be a key argument in rejecting the Taran, and the UR-100 ICBMs themselves turned out to be unsuitable for use as anti-missile missiles.
Returning to Grigory Vasilyevich, it must be said that at the end of the 70s he had to overcome not only and not so much technical as political difficulties - his “friends-opponents” and competitors talked a lot about the mistakes made by G. Kisunko (these, of course, were - he who does nothing is not mistaken) and they themselves prevented him from developing his ideas in the development and creation of missile defense, either by offering their own developments as a counterbalance to him, or by participating in alternative developments of other designers. First of all, the ill-wishers were in the Ministry of Radio Industry from SB-1 (KB-1) A. Raspletin. This is the “magnificent four”: A. Raspletin himself, A. Mints, A. Basistov and V. Markov - Grigory Vasilyevich was in conflict with them almost constantly after the completion of work on the S-25 system, on which, by the way, they all worked together together, solving a common problem (V. Markov - head of the thematic laboratory, then deputy chief designer, A. Basistov - complex specialist, A. Mints - radio receiving path, G. Kisunko - antenna-feeder devices). And it worked! On the instructions of I. Stalin in 1948, they managed to create a reliable air defense system for Moscow S-25, and on its basis - air defense for the entire territory of the USSR. A system capable of shooting down up to a thousand enemy aircraft in one massive raid. In the future, G. Baidukov, who was the chairman of the State Commission for the acceptance of the system, and Yu. Votintsev, who served on it as deputy commander for combat training, will be mentioned in connection with it. The S-25 system successfully passed state tests in 1955 and was put into service.
So G. Baidukov can be considered to have also taken a direct part in the creation of the S-25 system. But, despite this, he also turned out to be an opponent of Grigory Vasilyevich: shortly before his departure from the 4th GUMO, as E. Gavrilin recalls, after consultation with D. Ustinov, he wrote letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Military-Industrial Complex about the ugly attitude of the Ministry of Radio Industry to the problem of missile defense in in general and to its chief designer A. Basistov, in particular. Let me quote here a remark from the respected M. Mymrin. During a break in a regular meeting hearing missile defense developers in connection with the problems arising when creating the A-35 system, at a time when the “military side” was left alone, he expressed his opinion, hinting at a situation from a well-known joke: “We don’t need to move the furniture, but f... change it!” Couldn't say it any clearer.
From experimental and combat to super system
In his memoirs, A. Tolkachev notes that, despite being very busy with the problems of creating a test site sample of the A-35 SC system (Aldan), Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko very carefully monitored the fundamental issues related to the creation of the Argun radar and the SC on its basis. He was especially interested in polarization methods for recognizing objects and compensating for active interference, since he rightly believed that this was one of the effective ways to combat ballistic missile defense systems in the atmosphere-free part of the flight path, as well as problems of energy potential, bearing in mind some of the difficulties that had arisen in this regard when creating the RCC system “A”. It should be noted here that G. Kisunko (contrary to V. Markov’s statement that he, allegedly, after the successful interception of the ballistic missile on March 04, 1961, felt “dizzy with success” and did not take into account that the USA and our USSR were already developing active and passive interference with missile defense, took this issue seriously), since 1962 he was the scientific director of the complex research projects “Choice” and “Selection” on precisely these problems. As V. Repin, who at that time headed the scientific laboratory at the Central Research and Production Association “Vympel”, notes, these were two comprehensive research projects, which involved all the developers of missile defense systems and means of overcoming missile defense, military institutes and testing grounds, and a number of organizations of the Academy of Sciences THE USSR. The parent organization was the Central Research and Production Association “Vympel”. So, in this sense, V. Markov was wrong - G. Kisunko saw everything, knew and seriously dealt with these issues. The compiler of the book “Defense Frontiers - in Space and on Earth” N. Zavaliy rightly notes that “...at that time he (Kisunko) was unable to find a sufficiently effective solution to the problems of selection... In fairness, it must be said that such a solution has not been found even now, including abroad” (the book was published in 2004). At the same time, V. Repin notes that “... practically the only more or less effective and sustainable method of selection is the use of the natural selection properties of the atmosphere, which makes it possible to order the elements of the SBC in relation to their mass to surface area, or the equivalent selection properties of a high-altitude nuclear explosion. All other possible selection methods turned out to be ineffective - they gave some result only for imperfect camouflage means with a large difference in the characteristics of decoys from the characteristics of missile warheads and were completely unstable in relation to technological progress in improving camouflage means.” This is probably why Grigory Vasilyevich came up with the idea of a “second interception line” in the A-35 system using Azov. Yes, and V. Markov in his memoirs “kicks” the A-35 system in this part: “... tests at the test site to detect our ballistic missiles with less interference confirmed the ineffectiveness of the radar channel of the target in highlighting the head part of the ballistic missile against the background of interference.” But the RCC did not provide for any selection according to TTZ - it had to receive and received two different target designations even after the system was modernized to work according to the SBC! Again V. Markov is wrong.
It was probably not in vain that A. Basistov was interested in “non-global” missile defense systems. After all, the “Azov” intended for the second (closest) interception line was eventually removed from the “A-135” system and all issues regarding this stage of interception were assigned to the “Don-2N”. But then V. Repin (noting that the improvement of warhead camouflage means was and remains unlimited, and, speaking about the lack of real progress in creating an effective missile defense against missiles equipped with advanced means of penetration) writes that all this required a significant revision of the concept itself missile defense work. He means that the use of atmospheric selection requires short-range “low-altitude” atmospheric interception, i.e. the creation of a new generation of high-speed, highly maneuverable missiles, and that nuclear-dynamic selection at high altitudes with long-range interception entails the most difficult problems of the interfering effects of a nuclear explosion. High-precision multi-channel radars with high resolution and bandwidth, with phased array or lens antennas, were needed. Multi-band radars, high-precision correlation-basic and interferometric systems, etc. are extremely desirable. And here, according to V. Repin, Grigory Vasilyevich did not show his characteristic technical courage: he claims that, judging by the results of numerous conversations and meetings on issues of features and consequences of fundamental changes in the target situation during the transition from simple to complex targets, G. Kisunko understood the situation well and was aware that neither the A-35 missile defense system he was creating near Moscow, nor the territorial missile defense system being developed in the Aurora project defense systems, both in terms of construction principles and in the composition and characteristics of technical means, are not adequate to these changes. “It would probably be right,” says V. Repin, “for him, using his enormous and, of course, well-deserved technical authority, to stop for a while and ask for an extension of the deadline for the Aurora project to review both the requirements for the missile defense system in the direction of their feasibility, and the development of effective technical ways (system architecture, information and weapons, combat algorithms, etc.) to implement these requirements.”
MVK for three projects
However, this was not done and in the first half of 1967, the project of the territorial missile defense system “Aurora” was submitted for consideration to the interdepartmental commission (IMC) chaired by the newly appointed commander of the missile defense and anti-aircraft defense forces, Yu. Votintsev. According to the latter’s recollections, the work of the MVK took place at the 45th Central Research Institute of the Moscow Region for two months - August-September 1967. The composition of the MVK is 60 people. She was presented with three preliminary designs: the first - for the Aurora missile defense system (G. Kisunko), the second - for the Don-N radar (A. Mints), the third - for the Neman radar (Yu. Burlakov).
The first project for the Aurora missile defense system provided for the creation of 4 MKSKs near Moscow and Kuibyshev, each of which consisted of a detection radar (for the first time with phased array), capable of detecting and tracking a large number of targets and providing information about them to a multi-channel missile defense radar. It was planned to use two types of anti-missiles: the A-350R with a wide range of combat use in height and range, and the long-range A-900. It must be said that the proposal to use the “Grushinsky” PR A-350R was a “red rag” for the military due to, as I already said, their basing on open launch positions (chief designer Bermin), unprotected from vandalism by “bored” guard personnel.
The second project is a sectoral multifunctional radar designed to detect targets and target missiles at them. This Don-N radar with phased array was also developed for the first time.
The third project is the Neman broadband radar using Luneberg lenses. It could become a means of detecting and selecting warheads in conditions of interference.
At the beginning of September, they heard at the same time the General Designer of the A-35 System, G. Kisunko, and the Chief Designer of the Don-N MRLS, A. Mints - as Yu. Votintsev recalls, the commission witnessed their fierce fight, which reached the point of mutual insults. Then Yu. Burlakov was heard. As a result of the work of the International Water Committee, a decision was made to reject all three submitted projects, because they did not propose a solution with the required effectiveness to the following main missile defense problems:
— selection (selection) of ballistic missile warheads against the background of promising false targets, in conditions of intense interference and exposure to nuclear explosions;
— creation of a new generation of computing tools with speeds of hundreds of millions of operations per second;
— creation of effective means of destruction at various ranges and altitudes.
As for the choice of long-range detection radar (DL), either V. Sosulnikov (who later stepped aside along with the “departure” of G. Kisunko) or A. Mints (he subsequently did not participate in the work) were mentioned here. A legitimate question arose: why? The answer was found in the memoirs of V. Repin, who has been involved since the late 50s as an expert in solving complex problems in this area. It turned out that A. Mints “did not participate” in the radar station specifically for the Moscow A-35 missile defense system. And although the consideration of this issue took place under the auspices of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Ministry of Defense, the right of the final decision remained with Grigory Vasilyevich, as the General Designer of the system and the head of the work. Taking into account the positive experience of operating the test site experimental system “A”, a decision was made - to solve the long-range detection problem for the “A-35” on the basis of the radar of the Danube subsidiary (chief designer Vladimir Panteleimonovich Sosulnikov). In other words, A. Mints was “not taken” by Grigory Vasilyevich into the cooperation to create the Moscow Missile Defense System, and this is not forgotten - their confrontation did not end there, it was just beginning. True, A. Mints was asked to implement his project at site 54 (the village of Gulshat, Balkhash Island) and in the future to implement it for the peripheral nodes of early warning systems and early warning radars of the Dnestr and Dnepr type.
Who made the decision?
Here I will allow myself a slight digression and talk about the Customer’s representatives participating in the consideration of the preliminary design. E. Gavrilin in his book “Overcoming complexity - the RKO paradigm” with reference to Mikhail Pervov’s book “RKO systems were created like this” writes that K. Trusov (deputy head of the ordering Directorate) and N. Chervyakov (also deputy head, but already the Main Ordering Department). The latter, allegedly, in a conversation with K. Trusov said: “It’s impossible to master such a colossus without Lavrenty Pavlovich...”, and then Evgeny Vasilyevich writes: “And the latter’s reference to Lavrenty Pavlovich was far from harmless. N. Chervyakov knew this all-powerful official well.” I don’t know whether the head of the 4th GUMO had such a deputy as N. Chervyakov, or whether this is an “artistic image” of the author of the book. Oh, here was Nikolai Pavlovich Seleznev (in 1965 he was the first deputy head of the 4th GUMO, lieutenant general). If Evgeny Vasilyevich had him in mind, then I found the answer to how well he knew L. Beria in N. Karpov’s book “Marshal Zhukov”. “...J.V. Stalin,” writes Karpov, “did not trust, envied the popularity and authority of G.K. Zhukov (Georgy Konstantinovich signed the act of surrender, hosted the Victory Parade, etc.) and wanted to deal with him. For this, in March 1946, the commander of the SA Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov, was removed from his post and arrested (later used as the main witness against G. Zhukov), and before that the following were arrested: the Minister of Aviation Industry Shakhurin, generals Repin and Seleznev (from Air Force leadership), Shamanov, Budilov and Grigoryan (responsible employees of the Central Committee) - all of them were declared a “group of major pests.” The bottom line is this: the Ministry of Aviation Industry produced batches of low-quality aircraft, and the Air Force leadership accepted them and sent them to staff aviation units, which led to accidents and even the death of flight personnel. Everything, of course, was far-fetched and pursued the main goal - reprisal against G. Zhukov. This is what, according to N. Karpov, N. Seleznev, who was at that time the head of the Main Directorate for Arms Orders for the Air Force, said (at the age of 86 years old, in 1992, he remained the only living accused and actually served 6 years in that case) : “War is war. There is no time for subtleties of finishing, the main thing is the presence of combat qualities. Each time, as the person responsible for acceptance, I noted all the factory defects. But the same Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin and especially Malenkov, who oversaw aviation production, drove us “in the tail and in the mane,” demanding not to waste time on trifles and not delay the delivery of aircraft to the front. By the way, the number of aircraft accidents recorded during the war for technical reasons does not exceed the norm permissible for such a period, and even in wartime production conditions. We should have been rewarded, not punished for such indicators!”
And in order to clarify this judicial reprisal, one clarification must be made: Vasily Stalin “snitched” on them. This dropout, drunkard and troublemaker, who received the rank of lieutenant in 1940, was already a colonel in 1942 and served as an Air Force inspector, and, being removed from this position, he “served” further with Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov, who was on friendly terms with G. Zhukov. And so, when, at the end of the war, I. Stalin suggested that Novikov give his son the rank of general, he refused and called G. Zhukov with the question: “What to do?” He replied that this was an order from the Supreme Commander and must be carried out. But it was too late: I. Stalin gave the command not to issue an individual representation for his son, but to present him on the general list. Then he dealt with both of them - it’s good that he didn’t destroy them! In general, if you remember how he dealt with the command of the Air Force before the war itself (Smushkevich, Rychagov, etc.) and during the war (during June 1941, the aviation commanders of the North-Western, Western, South-Western and Southern Fronts were shot ), becomes uneasy. So, I do not rule out that the ominous shadow of Lavrenty Pavlovich hovered here over the work of the International Military Commission and its decisions.
However, the MVK, which rejected all three considered projects, recommended the creation of experimental samples of the Argun MKSK and the Neman radar at the test site. As we can see, the “Don” radar has not yet arrived here and “surfaced” only later after A. Mints retired with chief designer V. Sloka. Here it is appropriate to recall how V. Markov, “describing” the deplorable state of our early warning system by the end of the 60s, says that “... the situation with work in the field of missile defense was even more critical. In 1957, under the leadership of General Designer G. Kisunko, the Aurora project was developed for the missile defense of the European part of the USSR against a massive ICBM attack. General Designer G. Kisunko, with his previous statements, created confidence among the country's leadership in the possibility of creating an effective missile defense against a massive nuclear missile strike, but it turned out that this confidence was unfounded. Consideration of this project by the IMC (chaired by Yu. Votintsev) showed that the General Designer did not attach due importance to the already available data on the state of active and passive interference of the missile defense radar, the presence of which did not guarantee the defeat of not only dozens, but even single ICBMs. The Aurora project was rejected." These are the details of the consideration of the Aurora project at the IEC that V. Markov sets out and says nothing about either the Don or the Neman!
What did the General propose?
Thus, at least three designers led the development. True, Grigory Vasilyevich brought his work to the project of the territorial missile defense system "Aurora", and A. Mints and Yu. Burlakov - only to the projects of new radars (Don-2N and Neman, respectively).
The preliminary design for the Argun radar for the Aurora system was completed (developed, presented and protected) at the end of 1966. It provided detection, tracking and interception of 10 - 15 BCs. As I remember, according to the technical specifications, the Argun RCC was supposed to have 30 channels! The specified limitation in the preliminary design was introduced by a joint decision with the Customer, because there was no corresponding computer (for example, the Elbrus type) and it was planned to use five 5E92b type computers at the Argun MKSK. As A. Tolkachev notes, Grigory Vasilyevich well understood the current situation and the need to develop new technological solutions adequate to the looming problems, namely:
— ensuring detection and simultaneous tracking of all elements of the security system;
— creation of effective algorithms for selecting warheads (warheads) from other elements of the security system that do not carry a combat charge;
— the need to significantly improve the accuracy of measuring the difference in the angular coordinates of the warhead intended for destruction, in order to reduce the miss when using one firing radar;
— development and implementation of effective methods for combating active interference.
I will not list the new technological solutions introduced into the Argun radar, I will only refer to the opinion of its Chief Designer A. Tolkachev: “It seemed that the adopted technical solutions would make it possible to create radar equipment capable of providing solutions to information problems as part of the IC when repelling an SBC raid, equipped with radio-technical protection means.” I note that the SBC is spoken of in the singular - if Grigory Vasilyevich also understood (and this was exactly the case), then V. Markov’s statement that G. Kisunko guaranteed the country’s leadership to repulse a massive attack seems, at least, strange . I have never seen such criticism of Grigory Vasilyevich from anyone! It should be especially noted that Grigory Vasilyevich carefully monitored the fundamental issues related to the creation of the radar and MKSK "Argun", and especially polarization methods for recognizing objects and compensating for active interference, since he rightly believed that this is one of the most effective ways to combat electronic defense systems BR on the extra-atmospheric section of its trajectory. In other words, at that time he already represented the solution that A. Tolkachev is talking about now: “...a radar that has no close analogues either in our country or abroad...” and further, “... the Argun radar did not become the prototype of a combat Missile defense, as suggested by G. Kisunko and which would make it possible to create a system in a shorter time with lower costs and with greater technical capabilities than using the Don-2N radar. I think that Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor A. Tolkachev is absolutely right here. Unfortunately, he, saying that the work related to polarization methods of object recognition and polarization compensation of interference did not become available to the wider technical community, does not write anything additional about this in his memoirs. He does not say anything about the achieved achievements of the radar in terms of recognition and noise immunity, although the same V. Markov, speaking about successes in recognition, cites the examples of the Neman and Argun radars. But this will be much later, when the Argun MKSK and its radar, in the words of Alexey Alekseevich, “will be consigned to oblivion.” And then, as I already noted, after the MVK Don-2N “went into the shadows” for a long time, and the MKSK radar stations “Argun” and “Neman” were allowed to be “built” at the test site.
As missile defense veterans recall, the Neman radar could serve the missile defense system no worse than the Don-2N radar, but it turned out to be more complex in its technical design. It is surprising that A. Basistov in his A-135 missile defense system “did not see” not only a single element of the A-35 system (RCTs, SPD, SDO, KP, etc.), but also, in the words of Yu Votintsev, “I didn’t want to see the Neman either.” Later, as evidenced by today’s Chief Designer of the Neman radar, B. Panteleev, and a former employee of the military-industrial complex at the USSR Council of Ministers, V. Yakunin, ignoring the positive results of this radar (Neman) was completely unjustified. Moreover, it could significantly influence the structure of the missile defense system and the concept of its further development.
Remembering the Stalinist era and Stalin, five-year plans, industrialization with collectivization, the atomic bomb and even preparations for going into space immediately come to mind, but if you also mention missile defense (missile defense), everyone will immediately be surprised. Did he also start working on all these Buks, S-400s, S-500s and Iskanders that people are talking about today? Yes, I started. Back in 1945, along with everything that was happening in the country after the War, it began. But not the air defense systems and OTRK systems (anti-aircraft missile and operational-tactical missile systems) specifically, but missile defense in principle and closely related to it, practically by the same complexes, air defense (air defense).
And the reason for this was that in Germany, back in 1942, the development of the unmanned cruise (projectile aircraft) V-1 and the ballistic (ballista - uncontrollability) V-2 rocket began - long-range, up to 320 km, action in 2 parts . Giving speed and direction - accelerating, which then fell off. And then it flies uncontrollably and carries a lethal, weighing up to 1 ton, cargo - the head one. And in the second half of 1944, these missiles began to be actively used against England. And therefore, in July 1945, on the one hand, a special scientific and technical commission on jet technology was created with the task of making something similar to the V-2 ourselves. For this reason, in May 1946, a rocket science direction was created in the defense industry, and NII-88 was opened in the Moscow region of Kaliningrad, in which S. Korolev was appointed chief designer of long-range ballistic missiles.
But from the other side, at the Air Force Engineering Academy. N. Zhukovsky created the Research Bureau of Special Equipment (NIBS) headed by G. Mozharovsky, whose task was to develop the project “ Anti-Fau"on "possibility of counteraction missile vs missile with radar support." (True, we must pay tribute, similar work has begun to be carried out in the USA). And soon the Kuntsevo Research Institute-20 developed the Pluto radar consisting of two stationary pulse locators. One in the meter wavelength range for search and detection in the range from 500 to 2,000 km, and the second for precise location of targets in the centimeter wavelength range. And this should be a rotating structure of 4 parabolic antennas with a diameter of 12-15 m on a tower 30 m high.
However, industry was not ready for the production of such a system at that time, and therefore on February 14, 1948, the task of working out the parameters of a “system for combating long-range missiles and long-range bombers” with the creation missile defense PR was already assigned to NII-88. The idea of which, in contrast to the project of G. Mozharovsky, was the following: a group of detection radars, each in its own sector, was supposed to “look through” the space for 1,000 km, providing all-round visibility. Next, the target coordinates were transmitted to the command post, from where to the required group of precise bearing stations, which “guided” the target, starting from a range of 700 km. The calculating device of this defense sector determined the pointing angles of the launcher (PU) from the coordinates received from the precise bearing radar, and the “interceptor” was supposed to be brought to the target by the active homing head(GSN). The start was given from the ground at a distance of 1.5 - 2 km from the target; at a distance of 75 - 400 m from it, a detonation command was issued warhead(warhead) of the “interceptor”, and this was supposed to cause the detonation of the warhead of the intercepted missile, which would achieve its destruction. Thus, in a certain area, protection (i.e., missile defense) was provided from the attack of 20 ballistic missiles.
However, in the same 1948, missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km and detachable warheads appeared, the speed of which was much higher, and the reflective surface was many times smaller - and therefore the development of missile defense against such missiles was again entrusted to G. Mozharovsky's NIBS on February 6, 1949 . However, the difficulty here immediately manifested itself in this: if previously, in order to solve the problem of repelling an attack on a limited area by ballistic missiles carrying a total of 20 tons of explosives, it was necessary to have 17 long-range (up to 1,000 km) detection radars, and 16 for the near zone, now, since the missile and the warhead separated from it already represented two targets - which the radar of those years could not distinguish between, and both had to be shot down - the number of accurate bearing stations should be 40, and in total a minimum of 73 radars were required.
In December 1949, G. Mozharovsky’s group completed research to substantiate the tactical and technical requirements for missile defense, in principle. However, in the face of such technical difficulties, I. Stalin then decided to switch to a simpler missile defense modification - air defense, and on August 9, 1950, the Decree “On the deployment of work on the creation of an air defense system for Moscow and the Moscow industrial region” was issued. To do this under the supervision of L. Beria in KB-1 (now the Almaz Central Design Bureau), headed by Amo Sergeevich Elyan, rocket scientist Sergo Beria (son) and an outstanding radio engineer scientist, chief designer of the air-sea system, began to do this. Comet”, adopted for service in 1952, twice winner of the Stalin Prize Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko. They became the Chief Designers of the Moscow defense system based on a combination of radar and guided missiles - the S-25 Berkut air defense system, named after the first letters of their surnames (“Ber” - “Ku”).
For the timely detection of enemy aircraft, it was planned to deploy all-round radars, and then, 50 and 90 km from the center of the capital, there should be two “rings” - up to 1,000 anti-aircraft missile systems in each - for the simultaneous destruction of up to 20 targets in an area in 10 -15 km. In June 1951, the first test launches were carried out, on April 25, 1953, a Tu-4 target aircraft was shot down for the first time by a guided missile, but 1953 came. I. Stalin died, then, on a tip from Khrushchev, L. was killed in the struggle for power. Beria, and the “cleansing of his personnel” began. NIBS G. Mozharovsky was disbanded, the test results of the Berkut system were questioned, Sergo Beria was arrested and P. Kuksenko and A. Elyan were removed from their positions. Moreover, such injustice so shocked the latter, an outstanding organizer of the defense industry, that three strokes occurred one after another, he was completely paralyzed, and brain function was seriously impaired.
The line under the Stalinist development of missile defense (air defense) by Khrushchev seemed to have been drawn, however, realizing the detrimental nature of such acts for the defense of the country, seven Marshals immediately, in August, turned to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee with a note on the need to create, after all, a system missile defense. Therefore, in September a meeting was held to complete the state. tests of the S-25 Berkut air defense system, and then part of the KB-1 forces, including the restored P. Kuksenko, were redirected to solving new missile defense problems. They also connected the Radio Engineering Laboratory of the Academy of Sciences - RALAN (now the Radio Engineering Institute named after A. Mints). According to the “Barrier” project, along the missile flight path at a distance of 100 km from each other, it was necessary to place three stations with antennas pointing upward - and the warheads of the missiles sequentially crossed three narrow radar beams, making it possible to quite accurately calculate their trajectory from three points and falling point. In May 1955, the world's first anti-aircraft missile system S-25 "Berkut" was put into service (before its analogues were created in the USA and Great Britain). And then, within the framework of KB-1, SKB-30 was organized, which was headed by G. Kisunko from 1956 and headed all the work on developing further projects of the missile defense system. But this is a different, new story, but for now let’s just accept for ourselves that it was I. Stalin who started it, after all, back in 1945.
Gennady TURETSKY
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