Hunting for the invisible man (Serbian experience)

Until now, a clear and precise story about the circumstances of the destruction of one of the most advanced aircraft in the world has not been published. There are many versions of what happened, but they all relate to technical details. This is indeed quite an intriguing topic - how could the Serbs, armed with old Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, shoot down the latest stealth aircraft? According to retired Colonel Dani Zoltan, it is not only a matter of technology, but also of preparation for the operation.

Zoltan commanded the 3rd battery of the 250th air defense brigade, which defended Belgrade. It had radars, four C-125 anti-aircraft missile systems (according to Western classification - Sa-3, each with four missiles), and all this did not pose any threat to enemy bombers. At least, that’s what NATO members believed, sending their planes to bomb Serbian targets, hoping for modern means of suppressing air defense. At first, the Serbs were not very active in countering the air raids, but just three days into the campaign, on March 27, they unexpectedly shot down an F-117, a plane that seemed invulnerable.

According to Zoltan, he had no illusions about the enemy’s technical superiority, and therefore chose not to openly oppose the bombers, revealing the location of his radars and missiles, but to “lay in ambush,” waiting for the opportunity to shoot down an enemy plane for sure.

As Strategy Page notes, this operation clearly shows that in modern warfare, a competent commander can organize successful resistance even with the help of outdated weapons. At the same time, it’s worth mentioning

that the destruction of the F-117 is just the most famous incident from Zoltan's career. In fact, his unit distinguished itself more than once during that war, foiling many air raids and shooting down another aircraft - an F-16. NATO was unable to destroy a single radar or launcher that was part of the Zoltan battery.

Zoltan method

  • There were about 200 military personnel under the command of the Serbian colonel. He knew each of them, and he was one hundred percent sure of each. Long before the bombing began, he regularly conducted training, ensuring that every soldier and officer of the battery was fluent in the equipment entrusted to him.
  • Realizing that with the existing level of NATO electronic intelligence, radio communications would unmask him faster than enemy radars would notice, Zoltan organized a cable communication system. Orders sometimes had to be conveyed using messengers. However, these methods played an important role - NATO did not know where the battery was located, since they “did not hear” it.
  • Serbian radars and launchers constantly changed locations. Some of the personnel were constantly busy searching for places where military equipment would be transported next, as well as preparing for its transfer. In just 78 days, during which the bombing continued, the battery covered tens of thousands of kilometers.
  • Spies worked for the Serbs. They were on duty near an air base in Italy, and when bombers took off from it, they reported this to Belgrade by telephone. A network of observers also existed in Serbia itself. They also reported on the flight routes of NATO aircraft.
  • Long before the NATO bombing began, Zoltan tried to obtain as much information as possible about the F-117. He studied everything he could find - publications in newspapers and magazines, rumors about the characteristics of this aircraft. This information helped him to arrange

    radars so they can track the "stealth". The colonel did not say how exactly. It is known that he did not keep the radars on constantly, but launched them at the right moment for a short time so that NATO AWACS aircraft could not detect and target fighters.

  • The target was identified and fired at the very last moment, when the plane flew near the battery. This allowed Zoltan to attack suddenly, leaving the enemy no chance for an anti-missile maneuver. However, the F-117, for all its “invisible” advantages, is a rather clumsy and slow aircraft. He was physically unable to make a sharp maneuver and escape from an anti-aircraft missile fired from close range. When the Serbs shot down the stealth, it was only 13 kilometers from the launcher.
  • Finally, Zoltan, he said, made some changes to the missile's design that allowed it to better target the stealth aircraft. The Serb did not say which ones, noting that they still continue to remain a state secret.

    In fact, another factor that predetermined the success of the operation was the tactics of NATO military leaders. They sent F-117s without cover and did not change flight routes. The downed plane was flying along this route for the fourth time in a row, and this allowed the Serbian anti-aircraft gunners to be well prepared for the “hunt”.

    As for the technical side, the undoubted advantage of the Serbian battery was the radars and missiles of the old system. As you know, a radar tracks an aircraft by registering the radio signal reflected from it. Modern radars use a high frequency signal. However, in the case of stealth, short waves are scattered by the chopped body of the aircraft so that it cannot be noticed - it is the bizarre shape that is the basis of this technology.

    However, for long-wave (low-frequency) radars, this aircraft shape is not an obstacle. Such locators are not very accurate, but they “see” any large object in the air. In addition, as already mentioned, the F-117 is characterized by low maneuverability and low speed, which makes it an ideal target for older surface-to-air missile systems with low-frequency radars.

    Zoltan was no longer able to shoot down a single stealth. Immediately after the alliance lost this aircraft, the command took measures to prevent such situations. F-117s no longer flew alone - they were accompanied by fighters armed with HARM (radar-guided) missiles. The planes began to change flight routes, and the Serbs were no longer able to “ambush” them... However, this did not diminish the glory of the retired colonel. He has already gone down in history as the man who was able to shoot down a stealth plane.

    The Su-27 is a highly maneuverable aircraft for gaining air superiority. About 600 vehicles of all modifications were built.
    The F-16 “Fighting Falcon” is a lightweight multi-role fighter. 4,500 vehicles were built.

    The F-117A “Nighthawk” is a subsonic tactical strike aircraft made using stealth technology. 59 combat vehicles and 5 YF-117 prototypes were built.
    Question: how did an aircraft built in such insignificant quantities become one of the most striking symbols of aviation at the end of the 20th century? "Stealth" sounds like a death sentence. 59 tactical bombers became a terrible scarecrow, the most terrible threat, eclipsing all other military assets of NATO countries.
    What is this? The result of the aircraft's unusual appearance coupled with aggressive PR? Or, indeed, did the revolutionary technical solutions used in the Lockheed F-117 make it possible to create an aircraft with unique combat qualities?

    Stealth technology

    This is the name of a set of methods for reducing the visibility of combat vehicles in radar, infrared and other areas of the detection spectrum through specially designed geometric shapes, radar-absorbing materials and coatings, which significantly reduces the detection range and thereby increases the survivability of the combat vehicle.

    Everything new is well forgotten old. Even 70 years ago, the Germans were very upset by the British high-speed bomber DeHavilland Mosquito. High speed was only half the problem. During interception attempts, it suddenly turned out that the all-wood “Mosquito” was practically invisible on radar - the wood was transparent to radio waves.

    The German “wunderwaffe” Go.229, a jet fighter-bomber created under the 1000/1000/1000 program, had a similar property to an even greater extent. An all-wood miracle without vertical keels, similar to a stingray fish, logically it was generally invisible to British radars of those years. The appearance of the Go.229 is very reminiscent of the modern American stealth bomber B-2 Spirit, which gives some reason to believe that American designers kindly took advantage of the ideas of their colleagues from the Third Reich.

    On the other hand, the Horten brothers, when creating their Go.229, hardly attached any sacred meaning to the design; they only thought the “flying wing” design was promising. According to the terms of the military order, Go.229 was supposed to deliver one ton of bombs to a range of 1000 km at a speed of 1000 km/h. And stealth was the tenth thing.

    In addition, attention was paid to reducing radar signature when creating the Avro Vulkan strategic bomber (Great Britain, 1952) and the supersonic strategic reconnaissance aircraft SR-71 “Black Bird” (USA, 1964).

    The first studies in this area showed that flat shapes with tapering sides have a smaller RCS ("effective dispersion area" - a key parameter for the visibility of an aircraft). In order to reduce radar signature, the vertical tail was tilted relative to the plane of the aircraft so as not to create a right angle with the fuselage, which is an ideal reflector. Multilayer ferromagnetic coatings that absorb radar radiation were specially developed for the Blackbird.

    In a word, by the time work began on the secret project “Senior Trend” - the creation of a stealth attack aircraft - the engineers already had good experience in the field of reducing the ESR of aircraft.

    "Night Hawk"

    When developing the “invisibility” device, for the first time, the goal was to reduce all the aircraft’s unmasking factors without exception: the ability to reflect radar radiation, emit electromagnetic waves itself, emit sound, leave smoke and contrails, and also be visible in the infrared range.

    Of course, the F-11A7 did not have a radar station - it was impossible to use such a device under conditions of secrecy. During a flight in stealth mode, all on-board radio communication systems, the friend-or-foe transponder and the radio altimeter must be turned off, and the sighting and navigation system must operate in passive mode. The only exception is the laser target illumination; it turns on after dropping a controlled bomb. The lack of modern avionics, combined with problematic aerodynamics, as well as longitudinal static and directional instability, meant a great risk when piloting an “invisible” aircraft.

    To reduce design time and eliminate many technical problems, designers used a number of proven elements from existing aircraft on the F-117A. Thus, the stealth engines were taken from the F/A-18 carrier-based fighter-bomber, and some elements of the control system were taken from the F-16. The aircraft also uses a number of components from the epic SR-71 and the T-33 trainer aircraft. As a result, such an innovative machine was designed faster and cheaper than a conventional attack aircraft. Lockheed is proud of this fact, hinting at the use of then-advanced CAD (computer-aided design) systems. Although there is another opinion here - it was only thanks to secrecy that the “invisibility” program avoided the stage of lengthy and often meaningless discussion in Congress and other bastions of American democracy.

    Now it’s worth making a few comments about the Stealth technology itself, implemented specifically on the Nighthawk aircraft (after all, it’s no secret that reducing the radar signature of an aircraft can be achieved in different ways; the same PAK FA implements completely different principles - parallelism of the edges and a “flattened” shape fuselage). In the case of the F-117A, it was the apotheosis of stealth technology - everything was subordinated exclusively to stealth, despite the aerobatic qualities of the machine. 30 years after the creation of the aircraft, many interesting details became known.

    In theory, stealth technology works as follows: numerous edges implemented in the aircraft's architecture scatter radar radiation in the direction opposite to the radar antenna. No matter which side you try to establish radar contact with the aircraft, this “distorted mirror” will reflect the radio rays in the other direction. In addition, the external surfaces of the F-117 are inclined at an angle of more than 30° from the vertical, because Usually, the irradiation of an aircraft by ground-based radars occurs at gentle angles.

    If the F-117 is irradiated from different angles and then look at the reflection pattern, it turns out that the sharpest edges of the F-117 hull and places where the continuity of the skin is disrupted gives the strongest “exposure”. The designers ensured that their reflections were concentrated in several narrow sectors, and not distributed relatively evenly, as in the case of conventional aircraft. As a result, when irradiated by the F-117 radar, the reflected radiation is difficult to distinguish from background noise, and the “dangerous sectors” are so narrow that the radar cannot extract sufficient information from them.
    All contours of the articulation of the cockpit canopy and fuselage, the doors of the landing gear niches and the weapons compartment have sawtooth edges, with the sides of the teeth oriented in the direction of the desired sector.

    An electrically conductive coating is applied to the glazing of the pilot's cockpit canopy, designed to prevent radiation exposure to in-cabin equipment and the pilot's equipment - microphone, helmet, night vision goggles. For example, the reflection from a pilot's helmet can be much greater than that from the entire aircraft.

    The air intakes of the F-117 are covered with special grilles with cell sizes close to half the wavelength of radars operating in the centimeter range. The electrical resistivity of the gratings is optimized for radio wave absorption and increases with the depth of the grating to prevent a resistivity jump (which increases reflection) at the air interface.

    All external surfaces and internal metal elements of the aircraft are painted with ferromagnetic paint. Its black color not only camouflages the F-117 in the night sky, but also helps dissipate heat. As a result, the EPR of the stealth aircraft when irradiated from frontal and tail angles is reduced to 0.1-0.01 m2, which is approximately 100-200 times less than that of a conventional aircraft of similar sizes.

    If we take into account that the most widespread air defense systems of the Warsaw Pact countries (S-75, S-125, S-200, “Krug”, “Cube”), which were in service at that time, could fire at targets with an EPR of at least 1 m2, then The Nighthawk's chances of penetrating enemy airspace with impunity looked very impressive. Hence the first production plans: to produce, in addition to the 5 pre-production ones, another 100 production aircraft.

    Lockheed designers took a number of measures to reduce the thermal radiation of their brainchild. The air intake area was made larger than required for normal engine operation, and excess cold air was directed to mix with hot exhaust gases to reduce their temperature. Very narrow nozzles form an almost flat exhaust stream, which contributes to its rapid cooling.

    Wobblin' Goblin

    “The Lame Dwarf” and nothing else. This is what the pilots themselves call the F-117A as a joke. Optimizing the shape of the airframe according to the criterion of reducing visibility worsened the aerodynamics of the machine so much that there was no talk of any “aerobatics” or supersonic flight.
    When the company's leading aerodynamicist Dick Cantrell was first shown the desired configuration of the future F-117A, he had a nervous breakdown. Having come to his senses and realizing that he was dealing with an unusual aircraft, in the creation of which the first violin was played not by specialists of his profile, but by some electricians, he set before his subordinates the only possible task - to make sure that this “piano” was in able to fly somehow.

    An angular fuselage, sharp leading edges of surfaces, a wing profile formed by straight segments - all this is poorly suited for subsonic flight. Despite its fairly high thrust-to-weight ratio, the Nighthawk is a limitedly maneuverable vehicle with low speed, relatively short range and poor takeoff and landing characteristics. Its lift-to-drag ratio during landing was only about 4, which corresponds to the level of the Space Shuttle. On the other hand, at high speed the F-117A is capable of confidently maneuvering with six times the load factor. Aerodynamicist Dick Cantrell finally achieved his goal.

    On October 26, 1983, the first stealth unit, the 4450th TG, reached operational readiness at Tonopah Air Force Base. According to the pilots’ recollections, this meant the following: an attack aircraft somehow reached a given area at night, detected a pinpoint target and had to “put” a laser-guided high-precision bomb on it. No other combat use was envisaged for the F-117A.
    Due to the increase in the number of F-117A, on October 5, 1989, the group was reorganized into the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (37th TFW), consisting of two combat and one training squadron + reserve vehicles. According to the schedule, each squadron included 18 Nighthawks, but only 5-6 of them could begin combat missions at any time, the rest were in severe forms of maintenance.

    Almost all this time, the strict regime of secrecy around the “stealth” did not weaken. Although AFB Tonopah was one of the Air Force's most secure bases, it took additional, truly draconian measures to hide the truth about the F-117A. At the same time, American regime officials often practiced very ingenious solutions. So, in order to scare away idle “aviation enthusiasts” from among the base personnel, special stencils such as “radiation”, “caution!” were applied to the F-117A and service equipment. high voltage" and other "horror stories". On a plane with such an appearance, they did not look mindless at all.

    Only in 1988 did the Pentagon decide to publish an official press release about the “stealth aircraft”, providing the public with a retouched photograph of the F-117A. In April 1990, the first public demonstration of the aircraft took place. Of course, the sight of the F-117A amazed the global aviation community. It became perhaps the most daring challenge to traditional concepts of aerodynamics in the entire history of human flight. The Americans assigned the responsible role of a convincing example of the technological superiority of the United States over the rest of the world to the “one hundred and seventeenth”, and they spared no money to prove this statement. "Nighthawk" received a permanent residence on the covers of magazines, became a cool Hollywood hero and a star of world air shows.

    Combat use

    As for the first real combat use of the F-117A, it occurred during the overthrow of the regime of General Noriega in Panama. There is still a debate about whether or not the F-117A was hit by a guided bomb on the territory of the Panamanian military base. The Panamanian guardsmen, awakened by a nearby explosion, ran through the jungle in their underpants. Naturally, there was no resistance to the “stealth” and the plane returned without losses.

    Much more serious was the massive use of Stealth systems in the war in the Persian Gulf in the winter of 1991. The Gulf War was the largest military conflict since World War II, with 35 states (Iraq and the 34 countries of the anti-Iraq coalition - the multinational force, MNF) involved in the conflict to varying degrees. More than 1.5 million people took part in the conflict on both sides, there were more than 10.5 thousand tanks, 12.5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3 thousand combat aircraft and about 200 warships.

    The Iraqi air defense system had the following types of air defense systems:
    S-75 “Dvina” (SA-2 Guideline) 20-30 batteries (100-130 PU);
    S-125 "Neva" (SA-3 Goa) - 140 launchers;
    “Square” (SA-6 Gainful) – 25 batteries (100 launchers);
    "Wasp" (SA-8 Gecko) - about 50 complexes;
    "Strela-1" (SA-9 Gaskin) - about 400 complexes;
    “Strela-10” (SA-13 Gopher) – about 200 complexes;
    "Roland-2" - 13 self-propelled and 100 stationary complexes;
    HAWK - several complexes were captured in Kuwait, but were not used.

    Early warning radars made it possible to detect targets at an altitude of 150 meters in most cases outside the airspace of Iraq (and Kuwait), and targets at altitudes of more than 6 km were detected far into the interior of Saudi Arabia (on average 150-300 km).
    A developed network of observation posts connected by permanent communication lines to information collection centers made it possible to quite effectively detect low-altitude targets, such as cruise missiles.

    Midnight from 16 to 17 January 1991 was the F-117A's finest hour, when the first group of 10 Nighthawks of the 415th squadron, each carrying two 907-kg GBU-27 guided bombs, took off to carry out the first strikes in a new war. At 3.00 local time, “invisible” aircraft, undetected by the air defense system, attacked two command posts of air defense sectors, the Air Force headquarters in Baghdad, the joint control and tracking center in Al Taji, the seat of government and the 112-meter Baghdad radio tower.
    The F-117A always operated autonomously, without the involvement of electronic warfare aircraft, since jamming could attract the attention of the enemy. In general, stealth operations were planned so that the nearest Allied aircraft was at least 100 miles away from them.

    Anti-aircraft artillery and short-range air defense systems with optical detection and targeting systems, of which Iraq had quite a few (MANPADS Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail), Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin), "Igla-1" (SA-16 Gimlet), as well as anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", S-60, ZSU-57-2). Pilots were prohibited from descending below 6300 m, to avoid entering the affected areas of these weapons.

    In total, during the war, F-117As completed 1,271 missions lasting 7,000 hours and dropped 2,087 GBU-10 and GBU-27 laser-guided bombs with a total weight of about 2,000 tons. Stealth attack aircraft hit 40% of priority ground targets, while, according to the Pentagon, not one of the 42 stealth units was lost. This is especially strange considering that we are dealing with a subsonic, low-maneuverability vehicle without any structural protection.

    In particular, the commander of the Air Force of the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf, Lieutenant General Charles Horner, cites as an example two raids against heavily defended Iraqi nuclear installations in Al-Tuwait, south of Baghdad. The first raid took place on the afternoon of January 18, involving 32 F-16C aircraft armed with conventional unguided bombs, accompanied by 16 F-15C fighters, four EF-111 jammers, eight anti-radar F-4Gs and 15 KC-135 tankers. This large aviation group failed to complete the assigned task. The second raid was carried out at night by eight F-117As, accompanied by two tankers. This time the Americans destroyed three of the four Iraqi nuclear reactors.
    The F-117A subsequently appeared sporadically in Iraqi airspace during Operation Desert Fox (1998) and the invasion of Iraq (2003).

    Hunting for stealth


    "Sorry, we didn't know the plane was invisible"

    I remember that day well, March 27, 1999. ORT channel, evening program “Time”. Live report from Yugoslavia, people dancing on the wreckage of an American plane. The old woman remembers that it was in this place that the Messerschmitt once crashed. The next shot, a NATO representative mumbles something, then again there are shots of the wreckage of a black plane...

    Yugoslav air defense accomplished the impossible - a stealth missile was shot down near the village of Budanovci (a suburb of Belgrade). The stealth aircraft was destroyed by the S-125 air defense system of the 3rd battery of the 250th air defense brigade, commanded by the Hungarian Zoltan Dani. There is also a version that the F-117A was shot down from a cannon by a MiG-29 fighter, which established direct visual contact with it. According to the American version, the “one hundred and seventeenth” changed its flight mode, at that moment a pressure surge formed in front of the air intake grilles, unmasking the aircraft. The invulnerable plane was shot down in front of the whole world. Battery commander Zoltan Dani, on the contrary, claims that he aimed the missile using a French thermal imager.

    As for the stealth pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Dale Zelko managed to eject and hid all night on the outskirts of Belgrade until his radio beacon detected the EC-130. A few hours later, HH-53 Pave Low search and rescue helicopters arrived and evacuated the pilot.
    In total, during the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, stealth aircraft carried out 850 combat missions.

    The wreckage of the downed F-117A Nighthawk (serial number 82-0806) is carefully preserved at the Aviation Museum in Belgrade, along with the wreckage of the F-16 aircraft. These losses were officially recognized by the United States.
    Also on display is an engine from an A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft, which was torn off by a shot from a MANPADS; the plane itself made an emergency landing at Skopje airport (the incident was officially recognized by the NATO command). Local residents found a strange item and gave it to the military.
    Other interesting items include fragments of a Tomahawk missile and a light RQ-1 Predator drone (the Serbs claim they shot it down, the Americans claim it landed on its own due to engine failure).


    Wreckage of a downed F-16C


    Wreckage of an RQ-1 Predator at the Aviation Museum in Belgrade

    Actually, all the wreckage that is in the museum was officially recognized by the United States, including the loss of two combat aircraft - the “stealth” F-117A and the F-16 fighter. The NATO command denies other numerous air victories claimed by Serbia.
    As for the “invisibles,” the Serbs claim that they shot down at least three F-117As, but two were able to reach NATO air bases, where they were written off upon arrival. That's why they don't have debris. The statement is somewhat doubtful - the damaged F-117A could not fly far. Even a serviceable “one hundred and seventeenth” flew very poorly - the pilot is not able to control this “flying iron” without the help of electronic stability-increasing systems. The plane does not even have a backup mechanical control system - anyway, if the electronics fail, a person is not able to cope with the F-117A. Therefore, any malfunction for the “stealth” is fatal; the plane cannot fly on one engine or with damaged planes.

    By the way, in addition to the downed F-117A, according to official data, over 30 years of operation, six “stealth” aircraft were lost over US territory during training flights. Most often, stealth aircraft fought due to the loss of orientation of the pilots. For example, on the night of June 11, 1986, an F-117A (tail number 792) crashed into a mountain, killing the pilot. Another tragicomic incident occurred on September 14, 1997, when an F-117A disintegrated in the air during an air show in Maryland.

    On April 22, 2008, the F-117A Nighthawk took off for the last time. As time has shown, the very idea of ​​a highly specialized aircraft in the design of which one quality is “emphasized” (in this case, low ESR) to the detriment of others, turned out to be unpromising. After the disappearance of the USSR, in new conditions, the requirements for efficiency, ease of operation and versatility of aviation complexes began to take first place. And in all these parameters, the F-117A “Nighthawk” was significantly inferior to the F-15E “Strike Eagle” attack aircraft. Now it is on the basis of the F-15E that the stealth aircraft F-15SE “Silent Eagle” is being created.

    The Su-27 is a highly maneuverable aircraft for gaining air superiority. About 600 vehicles of all modifications were built.
    The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a lightweight multi-role fighter. 4,500 vehicles were built.
    The F-117A “Nighthawk” is a subsonic tactical strike aircraft made using stealth technology. 59 combat vehicles and 5 YF-117 prototypes were built.

    Question: how did an aircraft built in such insignificant quantities become one of the most striking symbols of aviation at the end of the 20th century? "Stealth" sounds like a death sentence. 59 tactical bombers became a terrible scarecrow, the most terrible threat, eclipsing all other military assets of NATO countries.

    What is this? The result of the aircraft's unusual appearance coupled with aggressive PR? Or, indeed, did the revolutionary technical solutions used in the Lockheed F-117 make it possible to create an aircraft with unique combat qualities?

    Stealth technology

    This is the name of a set of methods for reducing the visibility of combat vehicles in radar, infrared and other areas of the detection spectrum through specially designed geometric shapes, radar-absorbing materials and coatings, which significantly reduces the detection range and thereby increases the survivability of the combat vehicle.

    Everything new is well forgotten old. Even 70 years ago, the Germans were very upset by the British high-speed bomber DeHavilland Mosquito. High speed was only half the problem. During interception attempts, it suddenly turned out that the all-wood “Mosquito” was practically invisible on radar - the wood was transparent to radio waves.

    The German “wunderwaffe” Go.229, a jet fighter-bomber created under the 1000/1000/1000 program, had a similar property to an even greater extent. An all-wood miracle without vertical keels, similar to a stingray fish, logically it was generally invisible to British radars of those years. The appearance of the Go.229 is very reminiscent of the modern American stealth bomber B-2 Spirit, which gives some reason to believe that American designers kindly took advantage of the ideas of their colleagues from the Third Reich.

    On the other hand, the Horten brothers, when creating their Go.229, hardly attached any sacred meaning to the design; they only thought the “flying wing” design was promising. According to the terms of the military order, Go.229 was supposed to deliver one ton of bombs to a range of 1000 km at a speed of 1000 km/h. And stealth was the tenth thing. In addition, attention was paid to reducing radar signature when creating the Avro Vulkan strategic bomber (Great Britain, 1952) and the supersonic strategic reconnaissance aircraft SR-71 “Black Bird” (USA, 1964).

    The first studies in this area showed that flat shapes with tapering sides have a smaller RCS ("effective dispersion area" - a key parameter for the visibility of an aircraft). In order to reduce radar signature, the vertical tail was tilted relative to the plane of the aircraft so as not to create a right angle with the fuselage, which is an ideal reflector. Multilayer ferromagnetic coatings that absorb radar radiation were specially developed for the Blackbird.

    In a word, by the time work began on the secret project “Senior Trend” - the creation of a stealth attack aircraft - the engineers already had good experience in the field of reducing the ESR of aircraft.

    "Night Hawk"

    When developing the “invisible” aircraft, for the first time in history, the goal was to reduce all unmasking factors of the aircraft without exception:
    — ability to reflect radar radiation;
    - emit electromagnetic waves yourself;
    - make a sound;
    — leave smoky and contrails;
    - be invisible in the infrared range.

    Of course, the F-11A7 did not have a radar station - it was impossible to use such a device under conditions of secrecy. During a flight in the "Stealth" mode, all on-board radio communication systems, the "friend or foe" transponder and the radio altimeter must be turned off, and the sighting and navigation system must operate in passive mode. The only exception is the laser target illumination; it turns on after dropping a controlled bomb.

    The lack of modern avionics, combined with problematic aerodynamics, as well as longitudinal static and directional instability, meant a great risk when piloting an “invisible” aircraft.

    To reduce design time and eliminate many technical problems, designers used a number of proven elements from existing aircraft on the F-117A. Thus, the stealth engines were taken from the F/A-18 carrier-based fighter-bomber, and some elements of the control system were taken from the F-16. The aircraft also uses a number of components from the epic SR-71 and the T-33 trainer aircraft.

    As a result, such an innovative machine was designed faster and cheaper than a conventional attack aircraft. Lockheed is proud of this fact, hinting at the use of then-advanced CAD (computer-aided design) systems. Although there is another opinion here - it was only thanks to secrecy that the “invisibility” program avoided the stage of lengthy and often meaningless discussion in Congress and other bastions of American democracy.

    Now it’s worth making a few comments about the Stealth technology itself, implemented specifically on the Nighthawk aircraft (after all, it’s no secret that the radar signature of an aircraft can be reduced in different ways; the same PAK FA implements completely different principles - parallelism of the edges and a “flattened” shape of the fuselage ). In the case of the F-117A, it was the apotheosis of stealth technology - everything was subordinated exclusively to stealth, despite the aerobatic qualities of the machine. 30 years after the creation of the aircraft, many interesting details became known.

    In theory, stealth technology works as follows: Multiple edges implemented in the aircraft's architecture scatter radar radiation in the direction opposite to the radar antenna. No matter which side you try to establish radar contact with the aircraft, this “distorted mirror” will reflect the radio rays in the other direction. In addition, the external surfaces of the F-117 are inclined at an angle of more than 30° from the vertical, because Usually, the irradiation of an aircraft by ground-based radars occurs at gentle angles.

    If the F-117 is irradiated from different angles and then look at the reflection pattern, it turns out that the strongest “exposure” comes from the sharp edges of the F-117 hull and places where the continuity of the skin is broken. The designers ensured that their reflections were concentrated in several narrow sectors, and not distributed relatively evenly, as in the case of conventional aircraft. As a result, when irradiated by the F-117 radar, the reflected radiation is difficult to distinguish from background noise, and the “dangerous sectors” are so narrow that the radar cannot extract sufficient information from them.

    All contours of the articulation of the cockpit canopy and fuselage, the doors of the landing gear niches and the weapons compartment have sawtooth edges, with the sides of the teeth oriented in the direction of the desired sector. An electrically conductive coating is applied to the glazing of the pilot's cockpit canopy, designed to prevent radiation exposure to in-cabin equipment and the pilot's equipment - microphone, helmet, night vision goggles. For example, the reflection from a pilot's helmet can be much greater than that from the entire aircraft.

    The air intakes of the F-117 are covered with special grilles with cell sizes close to half the wavelength of radars operating in the centimeter range. The electrical resistivity of the gratings is optimized for radio wave absorption and increases with the depth of the grating to prevent a resistivity jump (which increases reflection) at the air interface.

    All external surfaces and internal metal elements of the aircraft are painted with ferromagnetic paint. Its black color not only camouflages the F-117 in the night sky, but also helps dissipate heat. As a result, the ESR of the “stealth” aircraft when irradiated from frontal and tail angles is reduced to 0.1-0.01 m2, which is approximately 100-200 times less than that of a conventional aircraft of similar sizes.

    Considering that the most widespread air defense systems of the Warsaw Pact countries (S-75, S-125, S-200, “Krug”, “Cube”), which were in service at that time, could fire at targets with an EPR of at least 1 m 2, then the Nighthawk’s chances of penetrating enemy airspace with impunity looked very impressive. Hence the first production plans: to produce, in addition to the 5 pre-production ones, another 100 production aircraft.

    Lockheed designers took a number of measures to reduce the thermal radiation of their brainchild. The air intake area was made larger than required for normal engine operation, and excess cold air was directed to mix with hot exhaust gases to reduce their temperature. Very narrow nozzles form an almost flat exhaust stream, which contributes to its rapid cooling.

    Wobblin' Goblin

    “The Lame Dwarf” and nothing else. This is what the pilots themselves call the F-117A as a joke. Optimizing the shape of the airframe according to the criterion of reducing visibility worsened the aerodynamics of the machine so much that there was no talk of any “aerobatics” or supersonic flight.

    When the company's leading aerodynamicist Dick Cantrell was first shown the desired configuration of the future F-117A, he had a nervous breakdown. Having come to his senses and realizing that he was dealing with an unusual aircraft, in the creation of which the first violin was played not by specialists of his profile, but by some electricians, he set before his subordinates the only possible task - to make sure that this “piano” was in able to fly somehow.

    An angular fuselage, sharp leading edges of surfaces, a wing profile formed by straight segments - all this is poorly suited for subsonic flight. Despite its fairly high thrust-to-weight ratio, the Nighthawk is a limitedly maneuverable vehicle with low speed, relatively short range and poor takeoff and landing characteristics.

    Its lift-to-drag ratio during landing was only about 4, which corresponds to the level of the Space Shuttle. On the other hand, at high speed the F-117A is capable of confidently maneuvering with six times the load factor. Aerodynamicist Dick Cantrell finally achieved his goal.

    On October 26, 1983, the first stealth unit, the 4450th TG, reached operational readiness at Tonopah Air Force Base. According to the pilots’ recollections, this meant the following: an attack aircraft somehow reached a given area at night, detected a pinpoint target and had to “put” a laser-guided high-precision bomb on it. No other combat use was envisaged for the F-117A.

    Due to the increase in the number of F-117A, on October 5, 1989, the group was reorganized into the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (37th TFW), consisting of two combat and one training squadron + reserve vehicles. According to the schedule, each squadron included 18 Nighthawks, but only 5-6 of them could begin combat missions at any time, the rest were in severe forms of maintenance.

    Almost all this time, the strict secrecy regime around “stealth” did not weaken. Although AFB Tonopah was one of the Air Force's most secure bases, it took additional, truly draconian measures to hide the truth about the F-117A. At the same time, American regime officials often practiced very ingenious solutions. So, in order to scare away idle “aviation enthusiasts” from among the base personnel, special stencils such as “radiation” and “caution!” were applied to the F-117A and service equipment. high voltage" and other "horror stories". On a plane with such an appearance, they did not look mindless at all.

    Only in 1988 did the Pentagon decide to publish an official press release about the “stealth aircraft”, providing the public with a retouched photograph of the F-117A. In April 1990, the first public demonstration of the aircraft took place.. Of course, the sight of the F-117A amazed the global aviation community. It became perhaps the most daring challenge to traditional concepts of aerodynamics in the entire history of human flight.

    The Americans entrusted the “one hundred and seventeenth” with the responsible role of a convincing example of the technological superiority of the United States over the rest of the world, and no money was spared to prove this statement. "Nighthawk" received a permanent residence on the covers of magazines, became a cool Hollywood hero and a star of world air shows.

    Combat use

    As for the first real combat use of the F-117A, it occurred during the overthrow of the regime of General Noriega in Panama. There is still a debate about whether or not the F-117A was hit by a guided bomb on the territory of the Panamanian military base. The Panamanian guardsmen, awakened by a nearby explosion, ran through the jungle in their underpants. Naturally, there was no resistance to the “stealth” and the plane returned without losses.

    Much more serious was the massive use of Stealth systems in the war in the Persian Gulf in the winter of 1991. The Gulf War was the largest military conflict since World War II, with 35 states (Iraq and the 34 countries of the anti-Iraq coalition - the multinational force, MNF) involved in the conflict to varying degrees. More than 1.5 million people took part in the conflict on both sides, there were more than 10.5 thousand tanks, 12.5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3 thousand combat aircraft and about 200 warships.

    The following types of air defense systems were in service with Iraqi air defense systems::
    S-75 “Dvina” (SA-2 Guideline) 20-30 batteries (100-130 PU);
    S-125 "Neva" (SA-3 Goa) - 140 launchers;
    “Square” (SA-6 Gainful) – 25 batteries (100 launchers);
    "Wasp" (SA-8 Gecko) - about 50 complexes;
    "Strela-1" (SA-9 Gaskin) - about 400 complexes;
    “Strela-10” (SA-13 Gopher) – about 200 complexes;
    "Roland-2" - 13 self-propelled and 100 stationary complexes;
    HAWK - several complexes were captured in Kuwait, but were not used.

    Early warning radars made it possible to detect targets at an altitude of 150 meters in most cases outside the airspace of Iraq (and Kuwait), and targets at altitudes of more than 6 km were detected far into the interior of Saudi Arabia (on average 150-300 km).

    A developed network of observation posts connected by permanent communication lines to information collection centers made it possible to quite effectively detect low-altitude targets, for example, cruise missiles.

    Midnight from January 16 to January 17, 1991 became the F-117A's finest hour, as the first group of 415 Squadron's 10 Nighthawks, each carrying two 907 kg GBU-27 guided bombs, took off to deliver the first strikes in the new war. At 3.00 local time, “invisible” aircraft, undetected by the air defense system, attacked two command posts of air defense sectors, the Air Force headquarters in Baghdad, the joint control and tracking center in Al Taji, the seat of government and the 112-meter Baghdad radio tower.

    The F-117A always operated autonomously, without the involvement of electronic warfare aircraft, since jamming could attract the attention of the enemy. In general, stealth operations were planned so that the nearest Allied aircraft was at least 100 miles away from them.
    Anti-aircraft artillery and short-range air defense systems with optical detection and targeting systems, of which Iraq had quite a few (MANPADS Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail), Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin), "Igla-1" (SA-16 Gimlet), as well as anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", S-60, ZSU-57-2). Pilots were prohibited from descending below 6300 m, to avoid entering the affected areas of these weapons.

    Overall during the war, F-117As flew 1,271 missions lasting 7,000 hours and dropped 2,087 GBU-10 and GBU-27 laser-guided bombs totaling approximately 2,000 tons. Stealth strike aircraft hit 40% of priority ground targets, while, according to the Pentagon, not a single one of the 42 stealth aircraft was lost. This is especially strange considering that we are dealing with a subsonic, low-maneuverability vehicle without any structural protection.

    In particular, the commander of the Air Force of the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf, Lieutenant General Charles Horner, cites as an example two raids against heavily defended Iraqi nuclear installations in Al-Tuwait, south of Baghdad. The first raid took place on the afternoon of January 18, involving 32 F-16C aircraft armed with conventional unguided bombs, accompanied by 16 F-15C fighters, four EF-111 jammers, eight anti-radar F-4Gs and 15 KC-135 tankers.

    This large aviation group failed to complete the assigned task. The second raid was carried out at night by eight F-117As, accompanied by two tankers. This time the Americans destroyed three of the four Iraqi nuclear reactors. F-117As subsequently appeared sporadically in Iraqi airspace during Operation Desert Fox (1998) and the Invasion of Iraq (2003).

    Hunting for stealth

    I remember that day well, March 27, 1999. ORT channel, evening program “Time”. Live report from Yugoslavia, people dancing on the wreckage of an American plane. The old woman remembers that it was in this place that the Messerschmitt once crashed. The next shot, a NATO representative mumbles something, then again there are shots of the wreckage of a black plane...

    Yugoslav air defense accomplished the impossible - a stealth missile was shot down near the village of Budanovci (a suburb of Belgrade). The stealth aircraft was destroyed by the S-125 air defense system of the 3rd battery of the 250th air defense brigade, commanded by the Hungarian Zoltan Dani. There is also a version that the F-117A was shot down from a cannon by a MiG-29 fighter, which established direct visual contact with it.

    According to the American version, the “one hundred and seventeenth” changed its flight mode, at that moment a pressure surge formed in front of the air intake grilles, unmasking the aircraft. The invulnerable plane was shot down in front of the whole world. Battery commander Zoltan Dani, on the contrary, claims that he aimed the missile using a French thermal imager.

    As for the stealth pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Dale Zelko managed to eject and hid all night on the outskirts of Belgrade until his radio beacon detected the EC-130. A few hours later, HH-53 Pave Low search and rescue helicopters arrived and evacuated the pilot. In total, during the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, stealth aircraft carried out 850 combat missions.

    The wreckage of the downed F-117A Nighthawk (serial number 82-0806) is carefully preserved at the Aviation Museum in Belgrade, along with the wreckage of the F-16 aircraft. These losses were officially recognized by the United States. As for the “invisibles,” the Serbs claim that they shot down at least three F-117As, but two were able to reach NATO air bases, where they were written off upon arrival. That's why they don't have debris.

    The statement is somewhat doubtful - the damaged F-117A could not fly far. Even a serviceable “one hundred and seventeenth” flew very poorly - the pilot is not able to control this “flying iron” without the help of electronic stability increasing systems. The plane does not even have a backup mechanical control system - anyway, if the electronics fail, a person is not able to cope with the F-117A. Therefore, any malfunction for the “stealth” is fatal; the plane cannot fly on one engine or with damaged planes.

    By the way, in addition to the downed F-117A, according to official data, over 30 years of operation, six “stealth” aircraft were lost over US territory during training flights. Most often, stealth aircraft fought due to the loss of orientation of the pilots. For example, on the night of June 11, 1986, an F-117A (tail number 792) crashed into a mountain, killing the pilot. Another tragicomic incident occurred on September 14, 1997, when an F-117A disintegrated in the air during an air show in Maryland.

    On April 22, 2008, the F-117A Nighthawk took off for the last time.. As time has shown, the very idea of ​​a highly specialized aircraft in the design of which “emphasizes” any one quality (in this case, low ESR) to the detriment of others, turned out to be unpromising.

    After the disappearance of the USSR, in new conditions, the requirements for efficiency, ease of operation and versatility of aviation complexes began to take first place. And in all these parameters, the F-117A “Nighthawk” was significantly inferior to the F-15E “Strike Eagle” attack aircraft. Now it is on the basis of the F-15E that the stealth aircraft F-15SE “Silent Eagle” is being created.

    On March 27, 1999, on the fourth day of NATO’s Operation Merciful Angel in Yugoslavia, the Serbian air defense gave the Pentagon a “gift”: they shot down the most secret aircraft of the Lockheed corporation from the Soviet Neva air defense system. The $50 million F117 A Stealth, which was called the most invulnerable aircraft in the world, was targeted by anti-aircraft gunners of the Yugoslav People's Army and was destroyed in one hit. The Americans were shocked; US President Bill Clinton tried to hide this story from his fellow citizens.

    The press convinced the Americans that the “stealth plane” crashed due to a “technical error.” The Serbs, they say, do not have missiles that can shoot down the most modern American vehicles. Of course, in 1999 there was a huge queue for the F117 A all over the world. The package of orders for it was planned 10 years in advance. This was the most expensive project of the US military-industrial complex, designed until 2018, and Lockheed planned to earn several hundred billion dollars.

    But after March 27, 1999, all business plans collapsed. Customers began to refuse to cooperate with Lockheed. Surprisingly, the Americans, with their vaunted electronics, “missed” the Soviet missile and exposed the Stealth to attack. The Serbian military worked accurately; they understood that they were being monitored by spy satellites from the Pentagon. After carefully studying the flight schedule of the F117 A over Serbia, the JNA air defense headquarters came to a surprising conclusion: they never fly at high speeds, they approach the target very close and, most importantly, they return to the air base on the same route after the bombing. American pilots worked according to clear instructions and never violated their traditions. This “self-confidence” failed pilot Del Zelko, whose parents were from Yugoslavia, on March 24, 1999.
    Sergeant Dragan Matic, who was the first to press the “start” button, shared a “military secret” in an interview with Serbian media: “It is a fantasy of American engineers and pilots that Stealth is invisible. For radars operating at low frequencies, it is quite noticeable. We spotted him another 50 kilometers away and waited for him to pass by our crew. Yes, its radiation signal is weaker than that of conventional aircraft, but it still appears on radar screens. Maybe the pilot made a mistake, maybe he got lost, but he was flying at an altitude of only 5 kilometers and fell into our sights. We shot down a terrible, fantastic machine - the most secret aircraft of the US Air Force. The pilot ejected and disappeared into the woods. Five hours later, a group of American special forces arrived in several helicopters and took him away. The very next day he was at the Aviano base near Venice. We managed to shoot down a “fantastic” plane. We immediately left the position along with the equipment. The faster you redeploy, the greater your chances of staying alive.”

    Lieutenant Colonel Djordje Anicic, who commanded the air defense group, wrote the book “Change” after the war. In it, he described in detail the nightmarish days of Operation Merciful Angel. Here is just a small fragment from the documentary report of Lieutenant Colonel Anicic: “Over 650 aircraft took part in the first raid on Yugoslavia. To begin with, missile strikes were carried out on command posts and air defense installations of the Yugoslav Army. They were going to cause the most significant damage to our army literally in the first hours. But nothing came of it for them. The NATO command realized that it would be very difficult to disable the air defense. Therefore, a special air brigade was created, which consisted of 150 of the most modern aircraft designed to destroy the Belgrade air defense system. At that time, we had several dozen SAM-3 systems - this is third-generation rocket technology. And NATO aviation at that time already belonged to the 6th generation of weapons. This is the “colossus” that was thrown against the people of Serbia. Almost all of Europe and the United States, which is almost 600 million people, started a war against a small country with a population of only 10 million people. This was a demonstration of NATO’s strength; it immediately turned from a defensive alliance into an aggressive one. This was an overture before Kosovo was taken from us. Every day the number of aircraft participating in the war against us increased. But NATO failed to destroy our air defense system. We tried to defend ourselves with dignity. We often changed our positions, constantly deceived the enemy and forced him to wage war not only at night, but also during the day. At the end of the aggression, over 1,000 aircraft were flying from NATO air bases every day. This method of defense allowed the country's leadership to gain time. NATO failed to break Serbia and bring it to its knees.”

    Now the “downed Stealth” is on display in the aviation museum near Belgrade. Here you can look at the “American miracle of technology” worth $50 million. By the way, the team of Lieutenant Colonel Djordje Anicic destroyed not only the F117 A in 1999. On May 30, it managed to damage the F16. The Pentagon then sent a special group in four helicopters and ten planes to pick up the pilot and his car. After the end of the bombing of Yugoslavia, the military said that many American planes were shot down. NATO tried not to talk about this. After all, where the vehicles destroyed by the JNA air defense fell, a few minutes later American special forces found themselves. They worked painstakingly and carefully - they assembled everything down to the last screw. The wreckage and parts of the aircraft were taken with them to US Air Force bases in Italy and Germany. They covered their tracks, as they say, so that no one could prove that the Serbs shot down the most expensive planes in the world using old air defense systems made back in Soviet times.

    Konstantin Kachalin - expert on the Balkans (Moscow)

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    CHOEYOE F-117 RTPPELFYTPCHBMUS RPIPTSYN ABOUT "ICH VMA", PFMYUBSUSH RTETSDE CHUEZP KHCHEMYUEOOOSCHNY TBNETBNY, LTSHMPN NEOSHYEK UFTEMPCHYDOPUFYY TBCHBMPN CHETFYLBMSHOPZP PRETEOYS OBTCHTS H. (lBL RPLBЪBMY RPMEFSCH "ICH VMA", OBLMPOOOOSCH CHOKHTSH LYMY, LLTBOITHS CHSHCHIPDOSHCHUPRUMB DCHYZBFEMEK PF OBVMADEOYS UCHETIKH, CH FP TSE CHTENS PFTBTSBAF FERMPCHPK RPFPL CHOY). pDOBLP TEBMSHOSHE TBMYUYS NETSDH NBYOBNY PLBBBMYUSH ZPTBBDDP VPMEE UKHEEUFCHEOOSCHNY. UCHSBOP UFP VSHMP U FEN, YuFP RTY TBTBVPFLE "OECHYDYNLY" CHRETCHSCHE H YUFPTYY RTEUMEDPCHBMBUSH GEMSH UOYFSH CHUE VEYULMAYUEOYS DENBULYTHAEYE ZBLFPTSCH UBNPMEFB: UR PUPVOPUFSH PFTTBTSBFSH TBDYPMPLBGYPOOPE PVMKHYUEOYE, UBNPNH YMKHYUBFSH BMELFTPNBZOYFOSCH CHPMOSCH, YЪDBCHBFSH ЪCHHL, PUFBCHMSFSH DSHNOSHCHK Y YOCHETUIPOOSCHK UMEDSH, VSHCHFSH ЪB NEFOSCHN H YOZHTBLTBUOPN Y CHYDYNPN DYBRBBOBBI. rTY LFPN BLGEOFSH VSHMY UDEMBOSCH ABOUT UOYTSEOYY TBDIPMPLBGYPOOPK Y YOZHTBLTBOOPK ЪBNEFOPUFY, B FBLCE ABOUT RTEDPFCHTBEEOOY MAVSHHI UPVUFCHEOOSHI YOMHYUEOYK. dms bfpzp state of emergency CHTENS RPMEFB CH TETSYNE "UFEME" CHUE VPTFPCHSHCHE TBDYPUCHSOSCH KHUFTPKUFCHB, PFCHEFUYL "UCHPK-YUKHTSPK" Y TBDYPCHSHCHUPFPNET DPMTSOSCH VShchFSH PFLMAYUEOSHCH, B OBCHYZBGYPOOBS U YUFENB Y CHUE PVPTHDPHBOYE DMS RPYULB GEMY Y RTYNEOOYS PTHTSYS - TBVPFBFSH CH RBUUYCHOPN TETSINE. edYOUFCHEOOPE YULMAYUEOYE -MBYETOBS RPDUCHEFLB GEMY, OP POB DPMTSOB CHLMAYUBFSHUS ABOUT PUEOSH LPTPFLPE CHTENS HCE CH IPDE BFBLY. CHUE LFP CH UPYUEFBOY Y RTPVMENOPK BTPDYOBNYLPK, B FBLCE RTDPDMSHOPK UFBFYUEULPK Y RHFECHPK OEKHUFPKYUYCHPUFSHA CHAMP L PZTPNOPNH FEIOYUUEULPNH TYULH, Y YUFPVSH IPFSH LBL- FP EZP UOYFSH, LPOUFTHLFPTSCH YURPMSHЪPCHBMY ABOUT F-117 TSD RTPCHETEOOSCHI BMENEOFPCH HCE UKHEEUFCHHAEYI UBNPMEFPCH. fBL, DCHYZBFEMY Y NOPZPE YЪ RTYVPTOPZP PVPTHDPHBOYS CHSMY PF F/A-18, UYUFENKH KHRTBCHMEOYS Y BMENEOFSH TSDB DTHZYI UYUFEN - PF F-16, LPE-YuFP RETELPUECHBMP ABOUT "UFEMA" " DBCE U VPMEE UFBTSCHI NBYO -SR-71, f-33 , u-130 Y DTHZYI.

    zhBUEFPUOSCH ZHTTNSHCH, TEBMYPCHBOOSCH BTIIFFELFHTE UBNPMEFB, PVEUREYUYCHBAF PUOPCHOKHA DPMA - DP 90% - UOTSEOYS rt. rTPYUIPDYF LFP ЪB UUEF PFTBTSEOYS RPCHETIOPUFSNY RMBOETB TBDYPMPLBGYPOOSHI MKHUEK CHCHETI Y CHOY, BOE CH OBRTBCHMEOYS ABOUT PVMKHYUBAEHA tmu. dMS LFPZP VPMSHYOUFChP RPCHETIOPUFEK F-117 OBLMPOEOP RPD KHZMPN VPMEE 30° PF CHETFYLBMY, CHEDSH PVSHYUOP PVMKHYUEOYE MEFBFEMSHOPZP BRRBTBFB RPYULPCHSHNY TMU RTPYUIPDYF RPD RPMPZYN Y KHZMBNY. eUMY F-117 PVMKHYUBFSH U TBOSHI TBLKHTUPCH Y CHZMSOKHFSH ABOUT LBTFYOH PFTBTSEOYS UCHETIKH, FP PLBTSEFUS, YUFP OBYVPMEE UIMSHOSCH "ЪBKYUYLY" PF PUFTSCHI LTPNPL LPTRKHUB F-117 Y NEUF OBTHYEOYS OERTETSCHCHOPUFY PYYCHLY ULPOGEOFTYTPCHBOSHCH CHUEZP CH OEULPMSHLYI KHLYI UELFPTBY, B OE TBURTEDEMEOSH UTBCHOYFEMSHOP TBCHOPNETOP, LBL CH UMHYUBE PVSHYUOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH. rTPCHBMSH NETSDH LFYNY UELFPTBNY FTHDOPPPFMYYUNSH PF ZHPOPPCHPZP YKHNB, B UBNY UELFPTB OBUFPMSHLP KHLY, YUFP tmu OE NPTsEF YICHMEYUSH YI OYI DPUFBFPYuOPK YOZHPTNBGY Y. pTYEOFBGYS PUOPCHOSHI UELFPTPCH PRTEDEMSEFUS RPMPTSEOYSNY RETEDOEK Y ЪBDOEK LTNPPL BTPDOBNYUEULYI RPCHETIOPUFEK UBNPMEFB, LPFPTSCHESCHMSAFUS UBNSCHNY UYMSHOSHNY PFTBTSBFEMS NY. dTHZIE LPNRPEOFSH RMBOETB PTYEOFYTPCHBOSH FBLYN PVTBBPN, YuFPVSH PFTBTSEOYE PF OYI RTPYUIPDYMP UFTPZP CH PUOPCHOSHI UELFPTBY. CHUE EEMY RP LPOFKHTH UNPFTTCHSHI MALCH Y PRFYUEULYI PLPO, UPUMEOYS ZHPOBTTS LBVYOSCH Y ZHAYEMSTSB Y F.D. YNEAF OBLMBDLY U RYMPPVTBOPK LTPNLPC, UFChPTLY PFUELPCH YBUUY, DCHYZBFEMEK Y CHPPTHTSEOYS FBLCE YNEAF RYMPPVTBOSCH LTPNLY, RTYYUEN UFPTPOSCH ЪХВГПЧ PTYEOFYT PCHBOSHCH OBRTBCHMEOYY TSEMBENPZP UELFPTB. rTEDKHUNPFTEOP, YuFPVSH OH PDYO YUELFPTPCH YOFEOUYCHOPZP PFTBTSEOYS OE VSHM OBRTBCHMEO OERPUTEDUFCHEOOP CHREDED.

    zhPOBTSH LBVYOSCH RYMPFB FBLCE YNEEF ZHBUEFPUOKHA ZHTNKH. ABOUT CHUE RSFSH RBOEMEK EZP PUFELMEOYS OBOEUEOP NOPZPUMPKOPE BMELFTPRTPCHPDSEEE ЪPMPFPPUPDETTSBEEE RPLTSCHFYE, RTEDOBOBYOOPE DMS RTEDPFCHTBEEOYS PVMHYUEOYS CHOKHFTYLBVYOOPZP PV PTHDPCHBOYS Y UOBTSSEOYS MEFUYLB -NYLTPZHPOB, YMENB, PYULPCH OPYUOPZP CHYDEOYS Y F.D. OBRTYNET, PFTBTSEOYE PF PDOPZP FPMSHLP YMENB NPTSEF VShchFSH OBNOPZP VPMSHYE, YUEN PF CHUEZP UBNPMEFB. chP'DKHIP'BVPTOYL "OECHYDYNLY" RTYLTSCHFSH UREGYBMSHOSCHNY TEYEFFLBNY U TB'NETBNY SUEEL, VMYOLYNY L RPMPCHYOE DMYOSCH CHPMOSCH TBDBTPCH, TBVPFBAEYI CH UBOFYNEFTPPCHPN DY BRBBPOE. xDEMSHOPE BMELFTYUUEULPE URPRTPFYCHMEOYE TEYEFPL PRFYNYYTPCHBOP DMS RPZMPEEOOYS TBDYPCHPMO, RTYYUEN POP KHCHEMYUYCHBEFUS RP ZMHVYOE TEYEFLY, YUFPVSH RTEDPFCHTBFYFSH ULBYU PL UPRTPFYCHMEOYS (LPFPTSCHK KHCHEMYUYCHBEF, PFTBTSEOYE) ABOUT ZTBOYG U CHPDDHIPN. rPDPVOSHCHN PVTBBPN ЪBEEYEEOSCH PF PVMHYUEOYS Y CHCHIMPROSCHE UPRMB DCHYZBFEMEK, B PUPVEOOPUFY LPOUFTHLGYY UCHSBOSCH U CHUSPLPK FENRETBFKHTPK CHSHCHIPDSEYI ZBBPCH. TBDYPUCHSOSCH BOFEOOSH Y DTHZIE YMKHYUBAEYE KHUFTPKUFCHB ABOUT RPCHETIOPUFY RMBOETB, OBRTYNET, BOFEOOSH UYUFENSCH ZPUPRPBOBCHBOYS, CHSHRPMOEEOSCH KHVYTBAEYNYUS. CHEUSH RMBOET RPLTSCHF TBDYPRPZMPEBAYYNY NBFETYBMBNY OEULPMSHLYI FYRPCH, OBOUEOOOSCHNY RP "PVPKOPK" FEIOMPMPZYY - RHFEN RTYLMEKLY YЪZPFPCHMEOOOSCHY YЪ OYI MEOF Y MYUFP Ch. CHOEYOYE RPCHETIOPUFY Y CHOKHFTEOOYE NEFBMMYYUEULYE BMENEOFSH UBNPMEFB CHSHLTBIYEOSCH ZHETTPNBZOYFOPK LTBULPK. EE YUETOSHCHK GCHEF OE FPMSHLP NBULITHEF "UFEME" CH OPYUOPN OEVE, OP Y URPUPVUFCHHEF TBUUEICHBOYA FERMB. h YFPZE ьrt UBNPMEFB F-117 RTY PVMKHYUEOYY U ZHTPOFBMSHOSCHY ICHPUFPCHSHCHI TBLKHTUPCH UOYTSEOB DP 0.1-0.01 N2, YuFP RTYNETOP CH 100-200 TB NOSHIYE, YUEN X PVSHYUOPZP UBNPMEFB VM YILYI TBNETPCH. rTBCHDB, U DTHZYI TBLKHTUPCH POB NPTsEF DPUFYZBFSH 1 N2.

    lPOUFTHLFPTSCH "mPLIYD" RTEDRTYOSMY TSD DEKUFCHEOOSCHI NO Y DMS UOYTSEOYS FERMPCHPZP YJMHYUEOYS UCHPEZP DEFIEB. fBL, CHCHCHIMPROCHE UPRMB RTYLTSHMY EIFLBNY U VPLPCH, UOYH Y UBDY. rMPEBDSH CHPDHIPBVPTOYLPCH UDEMBMY VPMSHYE, YUEN FTEVHEFUS DMS OPTNBMSHOPK TBVPFSH DCHYZBFEMEK, B YЪVSHCHFPYUOSCHK IMPPDOSCHK ChPЪDKHI OBRTBCHYMY ABOUT UNEYEOYE U ZPTSYUNY CHCHIMPROSH NY ZBBNY, YuFPVSH UOYFSH YI FENRETBFHTH. pYUEOSH KHLYE UPRMB ZHTNYTHAF RTBLFYUEULY RMPULKHA ZHTCHIMPROPK UFTKHY, YuFP OBYMKHYUYN PVTBBPN URPUPVUFCHHEF ITS VSHCHUFTPNH PIMBTSDEOYA.

    YoFETEUOP, YuFP UFPMSh TECHPMAGYPOOBS NNYYOB VSHMB TBTBVPFBOB ЪB NEOSHIE CHTENS, NEOSHYYN YUYUMPN UREGYBMYUFPCH Y U NEOSHYYNYY ЪBFTBFBNY, YUEN PVSHYUOSCHK VPECHPK UBNPMEF VMY JLPK TBNETOPUFY. "mPLIYD" PYUEOSH ZPTDYFUS LFYN ZBLFPN, FHNBOOP OBNELBS ABOUT OPCHEKYE NEFPDSH HRTBCHMEOYS RTPGEUUPN TBTBVPFLY RTPELFB, LPFPTSCHE RTYNEOOMP PFDEMEOYE "ulBOL hPTLU" CH LFPN UM HUBE. pDOBLP UP UFPTPOSCH RTYYUYOB KHUREYB RTEDUFBCHMSEFUS ZPTBJDP RTPEE. pOB - CH UELTEFOPUFY RTPZTBNNNSCH. rTPUFP URYULY DPRHEEOOSCHI L TBVPFBN, B OBYUIF, RPMKHYUBAEYI ЪBTRMBFKH, VSHMY NEOSHIE PVSHYUOSCHI, OP ЪBFP CHUE LFY MADI VSHMY DEKUFCHYFEMSHOP OEPVIPDYNSCH. h PVUKHTSDEOOY LBTSDPZP TEYEOYS RTYOINBMP KHUBUFYE NEOSHYE UREGYBMYUFPCH, Y UPCHEEBOYS OE VSHMY FBLYNY RTDPDPMTSYFEMSHOSHCHNY. OP YuFP BVUPMAFOP VEUURPTOP - YNEOOOP VMBZPDBTS UELTEFOPUFY RTPZTBNNB YJVETSBMB UFBDYY DMYFEMSHOPZP Y DYMEFBOFULPZP RP UCHPEK UHFY PVUKhTSDEOOYS CH LPOZTEUUE Y DTHZYI VBUF YPOBI BNETYLBOWLPK DENPLTBFYY.

    lPOFTBLF ABOUT RPMOPNBUYFBVOKHA TBTBVPFLH "OECHYDINLY" Y RTPYCHPDUFCHP HUFBOPCHPYUOPK RBTFYY YJ RSFY UBNPMEFPCH (UETYKOSHCHE OPNETB PF 79-10780 DP 79-10784) ChPE OOSHE RPDRYUBMY U "mPLIYD" 16 OPSVTS 1978 Z. uFTPYFEMSHUFCHP OBYUBMPUSH HCE YUETE 8 NEUSGECH, B RETCHHA ZPFPCHHA NBYOKH RETEDBMY ABOUT YURSHCHFBOYS 16 SOCHBTS 1981 Z. UBNPMEFSH KHUFBOPCHPUOPK RBTFYY UFBMY OBSCHBFSH F-117FSD. pF RPUMEDHAEYI NBYO, RPMKHYYCHYI PVPOBYEOYE F-117A, CHOEYOE POY PFMYUBMYUSH ICHPUFPCHCHN PRETEOYEN NEOSHIYI TBNETPCH. oEULPMSHLP RPTSE, RTY RPUFBOPCHLE ABOUT CHPPTHTSEOYE, UBNPMEFKH RTYUCHPYMY OBYNEOPCHBOYE Nighthawk (OPYUOPK SUFTEV).

    lBL OEFTHDOP VSHMP RTEDCHYDEFSH, PRFYNYYBGYS ZHPTNSCH RMBOETB RP LTYFETYA KHNEOSHYEOYS ЪBNEFOPUFY OBYUYFEMSHOP HIKHDIYMB BTPDYOBNYLH NBYOSCH. h PZHYGYBMSHOPK YUFPTYY "ulBOL hPTLU" TBUULBOBOP, YuFP LPZDB CHEDHEENKH BTPDDYOBNYLKH PFDEMEOYS dYLH LOFTEMKH (Dick Cantrell) CHRETCHE RPLBBBMY TSEMBENKHA LPOZHYZHTBGYA VHDH EEZP F-117A, FPZP ICHBFYM HDBT. RTIDS CH UEVS Y PUPBOBCH, YuFP PO YNEEF DEMP U HOILBMSHOSCHN UBNPMEFPN, RTY UPJDBOY LPFPTPZP RETCHHA ULTYRLH YZTBAF OE UREGYBMYUFSCH EZP RTPZHYMS, B LBLYE-FP BMELFT YLY, BY RPUFBCHYM RETED UCHPYNY RPDYUYOOOSCHNY EJYOUFCHEOOP CHPNPTSOKHA OBDBYUKH - UDEMBFSH FBL, YuFPVSH LFP YUKhDPCHYEE VSHMP CH UPUFPSOY IPFSH LBL-OYVHDSH MEFBFSH. zMBCHOSHE RTPVMESCH CHYDEMYUSH CH DPUFYTSEOY DPUFBFPYUOPZP BTPDDYOBNYUEULPZP LBUEUFCHB CH LTEKUETULPK LPOZHYZKHTBGYY DMS PVEUREYEOYS ЪBDBOOPK DBMSHOPUFY RPMEFB, B FBLCE RTYENMEN PZP HTPCHOS YULHUUFCHOOOPK KHUFPKYUCHPUFY Y HRTBCHMSENPUFY. XMPCHBFSHCHKS, puffer Retaedae LTPNLL RPCHETIOPEPEN, RTPZHYMSh LTSHMB, PVTBPCHBOOSHK PFTELBNI RTSNISHY, -WHE BSHESHNB RPDIPP RPDIF RPCHLPPZP RPMEFBB. h YFPZE BTPDDYOBNYUUEULPE LBYUEUFChP F-117A RTY ЪBIPDE ABOUT RPUBDLH UPUFBCHYMP CHUEZP PLPMP 4, YuFP UPPFCHEFUFCHHEF HTPCHOA UBNPMEFB b.zh.nPTsBKULPZP Y MYYSH OENOPZYN CHCHYE , YUEN X LPUNYUEULPZP LPTBVMS "UREKU yBFFM".

    rPULPMSHLH "oBKFIPL" UPJDBCHBMUS UFBFYUEULY OEKHUFPKYUYCHSHN, FP RETED OBYUBMPN RPMEFPCH VSHMP UPCHETYEOOOP OEPVIPDYNP RTPCHETYFSH TBVPFPURPUPVOPUFSH BMZPTYFNPCH, ЪBMPTSEOOSHI CH E ZP UYUFENSH RPCHSHCHYOEYS KHUFPKYYCHPUFY. mYYSH RPUME UETYY RPMEFPCH MEFBAEEK MBVPTBFPTYY NT-33A Y CHOUEOOYS YURTBCHMEOYK CH RTPZTBNNNSCH VPTFPCHSCHI LPNRSHAFETPCH YI RTYOBMY ZPDOSCHNY.

    FEN OE NEOEE, RETCHSHCHK RPMEF "UFEMUB" TEYOP VSHMP CHSHRPMOYFSH U PFLMAYUEOOOSCHNY UYUFENBNY RPCCHCHYEOS KHUPKYUYCHPUFY, B YUFPVSH UBNPMEF NPTsOP VSCHMP RTY LFPN RYMPFYTPCHBFSH, EZP ABOUT CHTENS UD EMBMY UFBFYUEULY KHUFPKUYCHSHCHN CH RTDDPMSHOPN LBOBME, ЪBMPTSYCH CH OPUPCHHA YUBUFSH ZHAYEMSTSB VBMMBUF. rTY LFPN, PDOBLP, UYUFENSCH VSHMY RPMOPUFSHHA TBVPFPPUPUVOSCH Y NPZMY VSHFSH MEZLP CHLMAYUEOSCH U RPNPESH UREGYBMSHOP HUFBOPCHMEOOSCHI CH LBVYOE RETELMAYUBFEMEK. h FBLPK LPOZHYZHTBGYY 18 YAOS 1981 Z. "oBKFIPL" CHRETCHSCHE RPDOSMUS H CHPDKHI RPD KHRTBCHMEOYEN MEFUYILB-YURSHCHFBFEMS zBTPMSHDB zhTMY NMBDYEZP (Harold Farley, Jr.). bFP VShchM DTBNBFYUEULYK RPMEF, EDCHB OE ЪBLPOYUCHYKUS LBFBUFTPZHPK. UTBH RPUME PFTSHCHB RYMPF RPOSM, YuFP VMBZPDBTS OBMYYUYA VBMMBUFB RTDPDPMSHOBS KHUFPKYUYCHPUFSH UBNPMEFB CHRPMOYE FETRYNB, OP RHFECHBS PLBBBMBUSH OBYUYFEMSHOP IHTSE, YUEN RTEDR PMBZBMPUSH. VKHDHYU OE CH UIMBI KHDETTSBFSH NBYOKH, BY CHSCHOKHTSDEO VSHM OENEDMEOOOP CHLMAYUYFSH LPNRSHAFETSH, Y PUFBFPL RPMEFB RTPYEM VPMEE-NEOOEE OPTNBMSHOP. OP DBMSHOEKYE RPMEFSH RPLBJBMY, YuFP DBTSE U TBVPFBAEYNY UYUFENBNY RHFECHBS KHUFPKYYCHPUFSH Y KHRTBCHMSENPUFSH CHUE TBCHOP OILKHDB OE ZPDSFUS, PUPVEOOOP RTY PFLTSCHFYY UFChPTP L PFUELPCH CHPPTHTSEOYS YMY CH UMKHYUBE PFLMAYUEOYS PDOPZP YJ DCHYZBFEMEK. h YFPZE RMPEBDSH LIMEK ABOUT UETYKOSCHI UBNPMEFBI RTYYMPUSH KHCHEMYUYFSH ABOUT 50%.

    rPUME UOSFYS VBMMBUFB CH OEULPMSHLYI RPMEFBI UBNPMEF RTDPDENPOUFTYTPCHBM RPMOSCHK VHLEF OEKHUFPKYUYCHPUFY, RTYUEN OE FPMSHLP RP PFDEMSHOSHCHN LBOBMBN, OP Y CH NOPZPYUYUMEOOSCHI CHBTY BOFBY YI CHBYNPUCHSY. LUFBFY, LFP PVYASUOSEF, RPYUENKH ABOUT F-117A PFUHFUFCHHEF TEETCHOBS NEIBOYUEULBS UYUFENB KHRTBCHMEOYS - CH UMHYUBE PFLBBYB BMELFTPOYL MEFUYIL CHUE TBCHOP OE UNPTsEF KHRTBCHMSF SH UBNPMEFPN. OP RPUFEREOOP RKhFEN DPTBVPFLY RTPZTBNNOPZP PVEUREYEOYS Y OBMPTSEOYS TSDB PZTBOYUEOYK ABOUT TETSYNSCH RPMEFB PFGBN "UFEMUB" HDBMPUSH DPVYFSHUS RTYENMENSHI RYMPFBTSOSCHI IBTBLFETYUFY L, DEMBAYI EZP RPCHEDEOYE ABOUT NBMSCHI HZMBI BFBLY RPIPTSYN ABOUT TEBLGYA PVSHYUOSHI UBNPMEFPCH. pDOKH YUBNSHI VPMSHYI FTHDOPUFEK RTY PFMBDLE BCHFPNBFYLY DPUFBCHYM RPYUL NEUF KHUFBOPCHLY RTYENOYLPCH CHPDDHYOSCHI UYZOBMPCH. rTYUEN, FTEVPCHBMPUSH KHUFBOPCHYFSH 4 LPNRMELFB DBFUYLPCH, RPULPMSHLH UYUFENB KHRTBCHMEOYS YUEFSHTEILTBFOP TEETCHYTPCHBOB. vPMEE 60 FPYUEL ABOUT RPCHETIOPUFY RMBOETB VSHHMY YUUMEDPCHBOSHCH, Y CHEDE CHMYSOYE BMENEOFPCH LPOUFTHLGYY ABOUT RPLBBOYS RTYVPTPCH VSHMP UMYILPN ЪBNEFOSCHN. h LPOGE LPOGPCH CHUE YUEFSHTE rchd KHUFBOPCHYMY H OPUKH UBNPMEFB OEUYNNEFTYYUOP PFOPUYFEMSHOP RTDDPMSHOPK PUY.

    YURSHCHFBOYS RTYOEUMY Y NOPTSEUFCHP DTHZYI OEPTSYDBOOPUFEK. fBL, PVOBTHTSYMUS OBYUYFEMSHOSCHK LBVTYTHAEIK NPNEOF, RTYYUYOH LPFPTPZP UOBYUBMB CHYDEMY CH PVTBBPCHBOY ЪPOSH RPCCHYEOOZP DBCHMEOYS ABOUT CHETIOEK RPCHETIOPUFY ЪBDOEK YUBU FY ZHAYEMSTSB UFPMSH OEPVSHYUOPK ZHPTNSCH. pDOBLP FEBFEMSHOSH MEFOSHCH LURETYNEOFSH RPLBYBMY, YuFP KHUFPKYUYCHPUFSH UBNPMEFB OBTHYBEF RPFPL TEBLFYCHOSHI ZBBPCH, CHSHCHIPDSEYK YUETE RMPULYE UPRMB Y CHBYNPDEKUFCHHAEIK U RMBUFYOBNY, LLTBOITHAEYNY UPRMB PF PVЪPTB U OITSOEK RPMKHUZHETSCH. rPUME CHSHCHCHMEOYS LFPZP LZHZHELFB UYUFENKH KHRTBCHMEOYS CHOPCHSH RTYYMPUSH DPTBVPFBFSH. h IPDE YURSHCHFBOYK RPFTEVPVCHBMPUSH YYNEOYFSH Y RPTSDPL CHSTBVPFLY LETPUYOB YVBLPCH, H TEKHMSHFBFE TBZTHYLB LTSCHMB CHOKHFTEOOIN FPRMYCHPN KHNEOSHYMBUSH, Y RPMEFSH RTYYMPUSH RTECHBFSH DP

    HUYMEOYS HYMPCH LTERMEOYS LTSHMB. h LFPF RETYPD PUPVPZP CHOYNBOYS HDPUFPYMYUSH TEYEFLY CHPDHIPBBVPTOYLPCH - YI RPDCHETZBMY YUBUFYUOSCHN TBTHYEOYOSN, BLKHRPTLE Y PVMEDEOYA. dMS VPTSHVSH U RPUMEDOYN OBYVPMEE LZHZHELFYCHOSCHN PLBBBMUS UFBTSHCHK RTPCHETEOOSCHK URPUPV, UPUFPSEIK CH TBVTSHCHBOYY ABOUT TEYEFLY URYTFP-CHPDSOPK UNEUY LTERPUFSHA TPCHOP 40% PV.

    rPUME FPZP, LBL "UFP UENOBDGBFSHCHK" OBKHYUMY OOPUOP MEFBFSH, B L YURSHCHFBOYSN RPDLMAYUYMY DTHZIE NBYOSCH KHUFBOPCHPYUOPK RBTFYY, DEMP RPYMP DPCHPMSHOP VSHUFTP. RETCHBS DPЪBRTBCHLB VSHMB CHShCHRPMOEOB HTSE 18 OPSVTS 1981 Z., RETCHSHCHK OPYUOPK RPMEF - 22 NBTFB UMEDHAEEZP ZPDB, RETCHSHCHK UVTPU VPNVSH UPUFPSMUS 7 YAMS, B 23 BCHZKHUFB 1982 Z .chchu uyb RPMKHYUMY UCHPK RETCHSCHK "UFEMU" (ICHPUFPCHPK OPNET 787).

    uBNPMEF RTPYEM, RTYUEN KHUREYOP, Y VPMSHYKHA RTPZTBNNKH ZHMBFFETOSCHI YURSHCHFBOIK. th HCE RPUME YI ЪBCHETYEOYS UFTPECHPK RYMPF, CHSHRPMOSS PDYO YЪ RPMEFPCH ABOUT RTPCHETLH UPCHNEUFINPUFY U RPDCHEULBNY, CHCHEM UBNPMEF CH ULPMSHTSEOYE, CHSHCHBCH ABOUT MECHPN CHETFYLBMSHOPN PRETEOY ZHMBFFET CHTSCHCHOPZP IBTBLFETB. lYMSH NZOPCHOOOP PFCHBMYMUS, B RYMPF RTYCHEM UBNPMEF ABOUT VBKH U VPMSHYYYNY UMPTSOPUFSNY. OPCCHCHK, ZPTBJDP VPMEE TSEUFLYK LYMSH YJZPFPCHYMY YJ LPNRPJFPCH. lBL LFP OH LBTSEFUS UFTBOOSCHN, OP F-117A CHSHRPMOYM TSD YURSHCHFBFEMSHOSHCHI RPMEFPCH ABOUT VPMSHYI KHZMBI BFBLY, CH PUOPCHOPN, YUFPVSH RTPCHETYFSH KHUFBOPCHMEOOSH PZTBOYUEOYS. OP VSHMB Y CHFPTBS RTYYUYOB - PE CHTENS RTDDHCHPL Y RPMEFPCH UCHPVPDOP RMBOYTHAEYI NPDEMEK VSHMY RPMKHYUEOSCH RTPFPYCHPTEYUYCHSHE RTEDUFBCHMEOYS P YFPRPTOSCHI UCHPKUFCHBI UBNPMEFB. CHSHCHSUOOYE YUFYOSCH ЪBOСПНПНПЦУФЧП РПМЭФПЧ, Х ЛПФПТШИ ХЗМШ БФБЛИ РПЧШШХИБМYUSH VHLCHBMSHOP RP RPMZTBDHUB, Y EUMY PVOBTHTSYCHBMYUSH NBMEKYE PFLMPOEOYS PF TBUYUEFOPZP R PCHEDEOYS UBNPMEFB, FHF CE OBYUBMYUSH OPCHSH RTDDHCHLY Y LURETYNEOFSH ABOUT RYMPFBTTSOPN UFEOD. yUFPTYLY "ulBOL hPTLU" U VPMSHYYYNY RPDTPVOPUFSNY PRYUSCHCHBAF LFPF RTPGEUU - UTBH CHYDOP, YFP POY ZPTDSFUS EZP IPDPN. rTBCHDB, DP LBLPZP YNEOOOP KHZMB FBLYN PVTBBPN DPYYEM "UFP UENOBDGBFSHCHK", POY FBL Y OE OBRYUBMY - OBCHETOPE, UFSCHDOP.

    h PVEEN, CH TEЪKHMSHFBFE RTPGEUUB "PUFEMUYCHBOYS" VPMSHYE CHUEZP RPUFTBDBMY MEFOSHCHE IBTBLFETYUFYLY F-117A. oEUNPFTS ABOUT PFOPUYFEMSHOP CHSHCHUPLHA FSZPCHPPTHTSEOOPUFSH, "oBKFIPL" SCHMSEFUS PZTBOYUEOOOP NBOECHTEOOPK NBYOPK, PVMBDBAEEK OECHSHCHUPLPK ULPTPUFSHA, UTBCHOYFEMSHOP NBMPK DBMSHOPUFSHA Y RMPIYNY CHMEFOP-RPUBDPYUOSCHNYIBTBLFETYUFILBNY. h TEBMSHOPN RPMEFE ON OE YNEEF OYUEZP PVEEZP U FEN "UFEMUPN", LPFPTSHK RPVETSDBEF CHUEI CH ZPMMYCHKHDULYI VPECHYLBI. pV LFPN UCHYDEFEMSHUFCHHEF Y YTPOYUEULPE RTPЪCHYEE "ITPNPC LBTMYL", DBOOPE ENKH EZP TSE MEFUYILBNY.

    rETCHBS RPMPCHYOB 1980-I ЗЗ. VSHMB RETYPDPN TELPK LPOZHTPOFBGYY NETSDH uuut Y uyb. rPTsBMHK, CHRETCHSCHE RPUME lBTYVULPZP LTYYUB CHPJOILMB TEBMSHOBS KhZTPJB FPZP, YuFP ChPKOB YB "IPMPDOPK" NPTsEF RTECHTBFYFSHUS CH "ZPTSYUKHA". h FYI KHUMPCHYSI FEIOILB "UFEME" TBUUNBFTYCHBMBUSH UPEDYOOOSCHNY yFBFBNY LBL PDYO YL LPYSHTEK, UCHPEPVTBOPE YUKhDP-PTKhTSYE, URPUPVOPPE CH LTYFYUEULYK NPNEOF RPLPMEVBFSH TBCHOPCHUEYE UFTBFEZYUEULYI "CHUPCH". eUMY KHUEUFSH, YuFP OBYVPMEE NBUUPCHSHCHE ytl UFTBO chBTYBCHULPZP DPZPCHPTB (u-75, u-125, u-200, "lТХЗ", "лХВ"), YNECHYYEUS ABOUT CHPPTHTSEOY CH FP CHTENS, RTY YURPMSHЪPCHBOYY FPMSHLP TBDYPMPLBGYPOOSHI UTEDUFCH OBCHEDEOYS NPZMY PVUFTEMYCHBFSH GEMY U rt OE NEOEE 1 N2, FP YBOUSCH "oBKFIPLB" VEBOBLBOBOOSHN RTPOILOKhFSH PE CHTBTSEULPE CHPDKHYOPE RTPUFTBOUFCHP CHSHZMSDEMY CHEUSHNB CHOKHYYFEMSHOSCHNY. pFUADB Y RETCHSHCHE RTPYCHPDUFCHEOOSCH RMBOSHCH: CHSHCHRKHUFYFSH CH DPRPMOOYE L 5 RTED-UETYKOSCHN EEE 100 UETYKOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH. uFTPYFEMSHUFCHP F-117A RPIMP U NBLUINBMSHOSHCHN FENRPN 8 NBIYO CH ZPD.

    pDOBLP CH LFP CHTENS CH uuut OBYUBMBUSH ZPTVBYUECHULBS "RETEUFTPKLB", Y CHULPTE RPMYFYLY ЪBZPCHPTYMY P VMYOLPN PLPOYUBOY "IPMPDOPK CHPKOSHCH". TBHNEEFUS, CH OPCHSHHI KHUMPCHISI ABOUT RETCHPE NEUFP UFBMY CHSHCHIPDYFSH FTEVPCHBOYS LLPOPNYUOPUFY, RTPUFPFSCH LURMKHBFBGYY Y NOPZPZHOLGYPOBMSHOPUFY BCHYBGYPOOSHI LPNRMELUPCH. b RP CHUEN LFYN RBTBNEFTBN "oBKFIPL" OBYUIFEMSHOP RTPYZTSCHCHBM FBLYN UBNPMEFBN, LBL F-15E YMY F-16C. lTPNE FPZP, YYTPLPE TBCHETFSHCHBOYE CH UPCHEFULPN UPAYE utl OPCHPZP RPLPMEOYS u-yppch, URPUPVOSHI PVUFTEMYCHBFSH GEMY U rt DP 0.02 N2 RTY CHAMP L DBMSHOEKYENKH UOTSEOYA YO FETEUB chchu uyb L F-117A. FENR RTPYCHPDUFCHB KHRBM DP 4, RPFPN 3 NBYO, B RPUMEDOYK UETYKOSHCHK UBNPMEF LFPPZP FYRB VSHM RPUFBCHMEO ЪBLBYUYLKH 12 YAMS 1990 Z. chUEZP VSHMP RPUFTPEOP 59 UETYKOSCHI LENRMSTPC (ICHPUFPCHCHE OPNETB 785-843).

    OP DBCE CH HTEЪBOOPN CHYDE RTPZTBNNNB RTYOEUMB ZHYTNE "mPLIYD" OBYUYFEMSHOSHE ZJOBOPCHSHCHE, B ZMBCHOPE, RPMYFYUEULYE DYCHYDEODSH. TERKHFBGYS ZHITNSCH LBL UPJDBFEMS OBYVPMEE CHSHCHDBAEYIUS UBNPMEFPCH EEE VPMEE PLTERMB. pFDEMEOYE "ulBOL xPTLU" Y pFDEMEOYE BCHYBGYPOOSHI UYUFEN chchu uyb RPMKHYUMY CH 1989 Z. RTY TPVETFB lPMMSHE "b TBTBVPFLH Y TBCHETFSHCHBOYE NBMPUBNEFOPZP UBNPMEFB F- 117A, NEOSAEEZP CHUA LPOGERGYA RTPPELFYTPCHBOYS VKHDHEYI CHPEOOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH YI VPECHPZP TBCHETFSHCHBOYS." UFPYNPUFSH PDOPZP UETYKOPZP UBNPMEFB, RP PZHYGYBMSHOSCHN DBOOSCHN ABOUT 1990 Z., UPUFBCHYMB 42.6 NMO. USD (RTYNETOP CH FBLHA CE UHNNH BNETYLBOWLINE OBMPZPRMBFEMSHAILBN PVIPDIYMUS Y F-15). about CHUA RTPZTBNNH L FPNH CHTENEY VSHMP RPFTBYUEOP 6.56 NMTD. USD, YЪ OYI PLPMP 2 NMTD. USD - OB oiplt, 4.27 NMTD. USD -OB BLHRLY Y 295.4 NMO. USD - ABOUT UPJDBOYE OBENOPK YOZHTBUFTKHLFKHTSCH. h DBMSHOEKYEN (RPUME 1992 Z.) VSHMP YЪTBUIPDPCHBOP EEE VPMEE 400 NMO. USD ABOUT NPDETOYBGYA PVPTHDPCBOYS UPUFPSEYI ABOUT CHPPTHTSEOY "UFEMUPC". CHEUSHNB OBLMBDOSHNY PLBBMYUSH Y NETPRTYSFYS RP PVEUREYUEOYA TETSINB UELTEFOPUFY: ABOUT YI DPMA RTYYMPUSH 10-15% PVEEK UFPYNPUFY RTPZTBNNNSCH.

    eUMY CHURPNOYFSH, CH LBLPN FENRE DEMBMUS LFPF UBNPMEF Y YUFP CH UYMKH CHCHYEOBCHBOOSCHI RTYYUYO ABOUT OEZP RPUFBCHYMY DBMELP OE UBNPE OPCHPE PVPTHDPHBOYE, FP OE CHSHCHCHCHBEF KhDYCHMEOYS, YuFP EZP RTBLFYUEULY UTBH CE OYUBMY RETEDEMSHCHBFSH. rTBCHDB, BNETYLBOGSH DMS VMBZPCHHYUS OBCHBMY LFPF RETNBOEOFOSHCHK RTPGEUU NPDETOYBGYEK. RETCHBS EE ZHBOB OBYUBMBUSH CH UBNSHCHK TBZBT UETYKOPZP RTPYCHPDUFCHB - CH 1984 Z. - Y UPUFPSMB CH OBNEOE VPTFPCHSHI LPNRSHAFETPCH, PVUMKHTSYCHBAEYI YODYLBFPTSCH CH LBVYOE, B CHFPRYMPF Y UYUFENKH HRTBCHMEOYS CHPPTHTSEOYEN. CHOBYUBME ABOUT F-117A YURPMSHЪPCHBMBUSH CHCHYUMYFEMSHOBS UYUFENB U FTENS LPNRSHAFETBNY M362F ZHYTNSCH "DEMLP" U YUFTEVYFEMS F-16, UCHSBOOSHNY DHVMYTPCHBOOPC YYOPK DBOOSHI CH UV BODBTFE MIL-STD-1553. EE ЪББNEОМИ О ЛПНРШАFETSCH BT102 RTPYЪCHPDUFCHB IBM, BOBMPZYYUOSCH YURPMSHЪKHENSHN ABOUT CHLU "UREKU yBFFM" Y UPPFCHEFUFCHHAEYE OPCHPNH UFBODBTFH MIL-STD-1750A. bFPF YBZ RPJCHPMYM RTYNEOIFSH OPCHSHCHE PVTBGSHCHCHUPLPFPYUOPZP PTHTSYS.

    chFPTBS ZHBB NPDETOYBGYY, YJCHEUFOBS LBL RTPZTBNNB OCIP (Offensive Combat Improvement Program - RTPZTBNNB RPCHSHCHYEOYS YZHZHELFYCHOPUFY CH OBUFKHRBFEMSHOSHHI VPECHSHI DEKUFCHYSI), TBCHETOHMBUSH CH 1987 ZY UPUFPSMB CH RPMOPN RETEUNPFTE YOZHPTNBGYPOOP-HRTBCHMSAEEZP RPMS LBVYOSCH RYMPFB. h EZP TBURPTTSSEOYE RETEDBCHBMY FTY RPMOPPGCHEFOSHI NOPZPZHOLGYPOBMSHOSHI YODYLBFPTB ZHYTNSCH "IP-OYHMM" ABOUT BMELFTPOOP-MHYUECHSCHI FTHVLBI, URPUPVOSHI PFPVTBTSBFSH LBTFYOLH, ZhPT NYTHENHA yl-UFBOGYSNY, B FBLCE FBLFYUEULHA PVUFBOPCHLH Y LBTFH NEUFOPUFY. vShchMY KHUFBOPCHMEOSCH FBLCE RETEDOSS CHETIOSS RBOEMSH CHCHPDB DBOSCHI, FTEINETOBS UYUFENB PRFYNYYBGYY TETSYNPCH RPMEFB, OPCHSHCHK YODYLBFPT ABOUT ZHPOE MPVPCHPZP UFELMB ZHYTNSCH "LBKYET" Y B CHFPNBFYUEULBS UYUFENB CHPCHTBEEOYS ABOUT BHTPDTPN VBYTPCHBOYS RAARS. RETCHSHCHK DPTBVPFBOOSCHK FBLYN PVTBBPN "oBKFIPL" (ICHPUFPCHPK No. 805) VSHM RETEDBO chchu 27 OPSVTS 1990 Z., B RETEPVPTHDPCHBOIE DTHZYI NBYO RPYMP U FENRPN 1 UBNPMEF CH NEUSG.

    fTEFSHS ZHBBB, OBYUBCHYBSUS Ch 1992 Z., TEYBMB ЪBDБУХ РПЧШЧЧХИОВИС FPYUOPUFY OBCHYZBGYY Y RTYGEMYCHBOYS. dMS bfpzp about UBNPMEF KHUFBOPCHYMY MBYETOSCH ZYTPULPRSCH Y RTYENOIL ZMPVBMSHOPK OBCHYZBGYPOOPK UYUFENSH GPS, B FBLCE ЪBNEOYMY DCH yl-UFBOGYY (CHETIOAA -- FLIR ІОЦОАА -DLIR) ABOUT PDO X KHUPCHETYEOUFCHPCHBOOKHA il-UYUFENKH PVOBTHTSEOYS Y GEMEKHLBBOYS IRADS U DCHHNS NPBIYUOSCHNY RTYENOILBNY, TBURPMPTSEOOSCHNY ABOUT NEUFBI RTETSOYI UVBOGYK. yFB UYUFENB, TBTBVPFBOOBS FPK CE ZHYTNPK "FELUBU YOUFTHNEOFE", YUFP Y ЪБNEOSENSHCHE UFBOGYY, PLBBBMBUSH OBYVPMEE UMPTSOSCHN BMELFTPOOSCHN LPNRPEOFPN F-117A. rTY EE PFTBVPFLE CHUFTEFYMUS TSD FTHDOPUFEK, CH FPN YUYUME PVEUREYUEOS LBYUEUFCHB Y UFBVIMSHOPUFY YPVTBTTSEOYS, DPUFYTSEOYS FTEVHENPK ULPTPUFY TBCHPTPFB DBFUYLPCH, UOY TsEOYS HTPCHOS RPNEI, RETEDBY GEMY ABOUT UPRTPCHPTSDEOOYE U RTYENOILB RETEDOEZP PVJPTB ABOUT RTYENOIL OITSOEZP PVJPTB Y F.D. ъBDББУБ ПУМПЦОСМБУШ УХВЯЭЛФИЧОПУФША ChPURTYSFYS il-YЪПВТБЦЭООК МЭФУИЛБНY: FP, UFP LBBBMPUSH PDOYN KHDPCHMEFCHPTYFEMSHOSHCHN, VSHMP UPCHETYEOOOP OERTIENMENP DMS DTHZYI. h FEYUEOOYE ZPDB VSHMP CHSHPRPMOEOP 100 YURSHCHFBFEMSHOSHHI RPMEFPCH, OP PLPOYUBFEMSHOP FEIOYUUEULYE RTPPVMENSCH VSHMY TBTEYOSCH MYYSH RPUME PVTBPCHBOYS "LPNBODSH FYZTPCH" YЪ MKHYYI URE GYBMYUFPCH TBMYUOSCHI PFDEMEOYK "mPLIYD". h IPDE TBVPFSH RTYYMPUSH PFLBJBFSHUS PF LMELFTPOOPC UYOITPOYBGYY TBCHPTPFB RTYENOYLPCH CH RPMSHQH NEIBOYUEULPK UYUFENSCH, LPFPTBS PLBBBMBUSH VPMEE OBDETSOPK Y PVEU REYUMB RETEDBYUKH GEMY ABOUT UPRTPCHPTSDEOOYE U PDOPZP RTYENOILB ABOUT DTHZPK VEЪ PRBUOPUFY UTSHCHB. tBVPFPPURPUPVOPUFSH UYUFENSCH IRADS UPITBOSEFUS DBCE RTY VPNVPNEFBOY U LBVTTYTPCHBOYS RPUME CHSHCHIPDB YY RYLYTPCHBOYS, LPZDB RTPYUIPDYF NOPZPLTBFOBS RETEDBYUB GEMY NETSDH RTYENOIL BNY, Y RTY VPNVPNEFBOY U LTHFPZP LBVTYTPCHBOYS U NBMSCHI CHCHUPF U RETEZTHYLBNY DP 4D.

    OP IBTBLFET CHSHPRPMOSENSHI ABOUT F-117A TBVPF PRTEDEMSEFUS OE FPMSHLP BVUFTBLFOSHNY RMBOBNY LPNBODPCHBOYS, YUBUFP UBNB TSY'OSH RPDULBSBCHCHBEF Lpoltefosche ORTTBCHMEOYS DCHYTSEOYS. fBL, RP TEЪKHMSHFBFBN CHPKOSHCH H UBMYCHE VSHMP KHCHEMYUEOP VSHCHUFTPDDEKUFCHYE YENLPUFSH RBNSFY UYUFENSH RMBOYTPCHBOYS ЪBDBOYS, B FBLCE NPDETOYYTPCHBOB UYUFENB UCHSY. UBNPMEF PUOBUFYMY BCFPNBFPN FSZY, PVEUREYUYCHBAEIN CHPNPTSOPUFSH RPMEFB OBD GEMSHA U BCFPNBFYUEULYN CHSHCHDETSYCHBOYEN RPUFPSOOPK ULPTPUFY. h 1999 Z. chchu uyb RTYUFKHRYMY L TEBMYBGYY RTPZTBNNNSCH SCR RTEDHUNBFTYCHBAEEK UBNEOH TBDYPRPZMPEBAYI RPLTSCHFYK, CHSHRPMOEOOSCHI RP "PVPKOPK" FEIOPMPZYY, ABOUT RPLTSCHFY S, OBOUEOOOSCH NEFPDPN OBRSHHMEOYS U RPNPESH TPVPFYYTPCHBOOSCHI KHUFBOPCHPL, U CHSHUPLPK FPUOPUFSHA CHSHCHDETSYCHBAEYI FPMEYOKH UMPECH. RETCHSHCHK UBNPMEF U FBLYN RPLTSCHFYEN VSHM RETEDBO chchu Ch PLFSVTE 1999 Z., B L 2005 Z. RTEDKHUNBFTYCHBEFUS RETELTBUIFSH CHEUSH RBTL "oBKFIPLPCH". lBL CHYDYN, BNETYLBOGSH KHDEMSAF UCHPYN "UFEMUBN" RPUFPSOOPE CHOINBOYE Y UFBTBAFUS RPDDETSYCHBFSH LFY DCHBDGBFYMEFOYE NBYOSCH ABOUT CHRPMOE UCHTEOOOPN HTPCHOE.

    RETCHPOBYUBMSHOSH RMBOSH RTEDKHUNBFTYCHBMY TBCHETFSHCHBOYE PDOPK ULBDTYMSHY "oBKFIPLPLCH" CH CHEMYLPVTYFBOYY, DMS YURPMSHJPCHBOYS ABOUT ECHTPRECULPN Y VMYTSOECHPUFPYUOPN fchd, DT HZPK - Ch aTSOPK lPTEE, DMS DEKUFCHYK Ch BYBFULP-FYIPPLEBOULPN TEZYPOE. fTEFSHA ULBDTYMSHA - FTEOYTPCHPYUOKHA Y TEETCHOKHA, RTEDRPMBZBMPUSH VBYTPCHBFSH OERPUTEDUFCHOOOP ABOUT FETTYFPTYY yub. pDOBLP TETSYN UELTEFOPUFY CH RTPZTBNNE F-117A VSHM UFPMSH UIMEO, YuFP TBNEUFYFSH FY NBYOSCH ABOUT LBLPK-MYVP YI DEKUFCHHAEYI BCHYBVB, FEN VPMEE ЪB RTEDEMBNY UFTBOSH, BNETYLBOULPE LPNBODPCHBOIE OE UNPZMP. YuFPVSH DP RPTSCH ULTSHFSH "UFEMUSH" PF RPUFPTPOOYI ZMB, VSHMP RTYOSFP TEYEOYE PTZBOYPCHBFSH OPCHHA VBH. NEUFP DMS OEE VSHMP CHSHVTBOP CH RHUFSCHOOOPK NEUFOPUFY YFBFB oEChBDB, ZHE TBOSHIE OBIPYMUS GEOFT BTPDOBNYUEULYI YURSHCHFBOYK SDETOPZP PTHTSYS. vMYTSBKYYN OBUEMEOOSCHN RHOLFPN VSHMP NEUFEYULP fPOPRB. chBTSOKHA TPMSH CH LFPN CHSHCHVPTE USHZTBMB VMYJPUFSH PVIYTOPZP, IPTPYP PVPTHDPCHBOOPZP Y FTHDOPDPUFKHROPZP DMS RPUFPTPOOYI OBVMADBFEMEC RPMYZPOB BCHYBVBSHCH OEMMYU. DMS LURMHBFBGYY NBMPUBNEFOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH BTPPDTPN GEOFTTB VSHM RPMOPUFSHA TELPOUFTKHYTPCHBO - KHDMYOEOSCH chrr Y THMETSOSCH DPTPTSLY, RPUFTPEO OPCHSHCHK ldr, B ZMBCHOPE - CHPDCHYZ OHFSH UREGYBMSHOSCH BOZBTSH DMS ITBOEOYS CHEUSHNB OETSOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH-"OECHYDYNPL". fY TBVPFSCH OBYUBMYUSH CH 1980 ZPDH.

    fPZDB TSE CH IPDE DPCHPMSHOP UMPTsOPK RTPPGEDHTSCH VSHMY PFPVTBOSH Y RETCHSHE RYMPFSCH "oBKFIPLPCH". l LFPNH NPNEOFH LBTSDSCHK YЪ OYI YNEM HCE OE NEOEE 1000 YUBUPCH OBMEFB ABOUT TEBLFYCHOSHI UBNPMEFBI, CH PUOPCHOPN, ABOUT F-4, F-111 Y b-10. rETCHPK ЪБДБУЭК ЗТХРРШЧ УФБМБ ТББТБВПФЛБ RTPЗТБННШЧ FTEОТПЧПУОСЧИ РПМЭФПЧ ABOUT “UFEMUYE” U KHUEFPN OEPVSHYUOPUFY LFPZP UBNPMEFB Y PFUHFUFCHYS “URBTLY”. dPRPMOYFEMSHOSHE UMPTSOPUFY CH PUCHPEOYY F-117A PTSYDBMYUSH RP RTYYUYOE EZP RPCHSHCHYEOOOSCHI CHUMEFOP-RPUBDPYUOSHI ULPTPUFEK, B FBLCE CHCHYDH FPZP, YuFP CHUE RPMEFSHCH, CHLMAYUBS RETCHSHCHK, Y Kommersant UPPVTBTSEOYK UELTEFOPUFY RTEDRYUSCHCHBMPUSH CHSHRPMOSFSH CH FENOPE CHTENS UHFPL. h BCHZKHUFE 1982 Z. h fPOPRB RTYVSHCHM RETCHSCHK "oBKFIPL", Y DMS RETUPOBMB VBSHCH, OE ZPChPTS HCE RTP RYMPFPCH, DEOSH Y OPIUSH RPNEOSMYUSH NEUFBNY. LBCDSHK MEFULE YUEFSHET ODEMEM RPDENBMUS CHECHBDSH, Cheshrpmoss RP DPB-FTY 90-nyokhoshoshchi RPMEFB Kommersant Kommersant, Y Mysh at the Redemshoylb about the Chformhulbmus PDYOO Cheshmef. CHUS VPECHBS RPDZPFPCHLB, RP UHFY, UCHPDYMBUSH L PFTBVPFLE EDYOUFCHEOOPK ЪBDBUY: RTPLTBUFSHUS CH CHPDKHYOPE RTPUFTBOUFChP RTPFYCHOILB, PVOBTHTSYFSH RMBOPCHHA GEMSH Y HMPTSYFSH CH OEE VPNVH U MBETOSCHN OBCHEDEOYEN. dMS FTEOYTPCHLY MEFYUYLPCH-"UFEMUYUFPCH" CH DOECHOSCHI HUMPCHYSI PTZBOYPCHBMY RPMEFSCH ABOUT YFKHTNPCHYLBI b-7 "lPTUBT-2", OBYVPMEE RPIPTSYI ABOUT F-117A RP RYMPFBTTSOSCHN IBTBLFETYUF YLBN. uFPMSH OBRTSCEOOBS HYUEVB CHULPTE DBMB TEKHMSHFBF: 26 PLFSVTS 1983 Z. VSHMP PVIASCHMEOP P DPUFYTSEOY PRETBFYCHOPK ZPFPCHOPUFY RETCHPZP RPDTBDEMEEOYS "OECHYDYNPL".

    yN UFBMB UREGYBMSHOP UZhPTNYTPCHBOOBS 4450-S FBLFYUEULBS BCHYBZTHRRRB (4450th TG - Tactical Group), ЪB RYMPFBNY LPFPTPK UTBЪХ ЪBLTERYMPUSH TPNBOFYUEULPE RTPЪCHYEE "OPYUOSHE UFBMLETSCH." h UCHSY U TPUFPN YUYUMEOOPUFY F-117b Y MYUOPZP UPUFBCHB 5 PLFSSVTS 1989 Z. ZTHRRRH RETEZHPTNYTPCHBMY CH 37th FBLFYUEULPE YUFTEVYFEMSHOPE LTSHMP (37th TFW - Tactical Fighter W ing), YULMAYUYCH YE UPUFBCHB "lPTUBTSCH". "uFEMUPCH" ICHBFYMP ABOUT 3 ULBDTYMSHY: DCHE VPECHSHCHE - 415-A Y 416-A (415th TFS Y 416th TFS - Tactical Fighter Squadron), and FBLCE PDOH HYUEVOP-VPECHHA - 417-A (417th TFTS - Tactical Fighter Training Squadron). rTYUCHPYCH RPDTBBDEMEOYSN YNEOOOP LFY OPNETB, LPNBODPCHBOYE chchu UFTENYMPUSH RPDYUETLOHFS RTEENUFCHEOOPUFSH RPLPMEOYK YI OPUYMY ULBDTYMSHY BNETYLBOULYY OYUOSHI YUFTEVYFEMEC RETYPDB CHFPTPC NYTPCHPK CHPKOSHCH. pDOBLP DBTSE ABOUT LFPC RBFTYIPFYUEULPK CHPMOE RETEYNEOPCHBOYS OE ЪBLPOYUMYUSH - 9 NBS 1992 Z. YUBUFSH OBCHBMY 49-N YUFTEVYFEMSHOSHCHN LTSHMPN (49th Fighter Wing), UPITBOYCH ITS FTEIYU LBDTYMSHOHA UFTHHLFHTH (7th, 8th Y 9th Squadrons). h LBTSDSCHK NPNEOF CHTENEY CH VPECHSHHI ULBDTYMSHSI OBUYFSHCHBMPUSH OE NEOEE 18 "oBKFIPLPLCH", CH HYUEVOPK - PF 6 DP 10, EEE 10-11 NBYO, LBL RTBCHYMP, RTEVSCCHBMY ABOUT FSCEMSHI ZHTNBI FE IPVUMHTSYCHBOYS Y DPTBVPFLBI. pDOBLP CH LBTSDPK ULBDTYMSHE MYYSH 5 YMY 6 UBNPMEFPCH UYYFBMYUSH RPUFPSOOP ZPFPCHSHNY L CHSHCHRPMOEOYA VPECHSHI BDBOYK. PUFBMSHOSCHE CH UMKHYUBE PVYASCHMEOYS RETYPDB KHZTPPSCH DPMTSOSCH VSHMY VSHCHFSH RTYCHEDEOSH CH LFP UPUFPSOIE CH FEYOOYE 2-3 UHFPL.

    rPYUFY CHUE LFP CHTENS CHPLTHZ "UFEMUPC" OE PUMBVECHBM UFTPZYK TETSYN UELTEFOPUFY. iPFS fPOPRB VSHMB PDOPK YЪ OBYVPMEE PITBOSENSHI VB chchu, FBN RTEDRTYOINBMYUSH DPRPMOYFEMSHOSHCHE, RPYUFYOE DTBLPOPCHULYE NETSHCH, YuFPVSH ULTSHFSH RTBCHDH P "OECHYDYNLBI". rTY LFPN BNETYLBOULYE TETSINNEILY YUBUFP RTBLFYLPCHBMY CHEUSHNB PUFTPHNOSCHE TEYEOYS. FBL, YuFPVSH PFRKHZOKhFSH RTBDOSHCH "MAVYFEMEK BCHYBGYY" YY YUYUMB RETUPOBMB VBSHCH, ABOUT F-117A OBOPUIMY UREGYBMSHOSCH FTBZHBTEFSHCH FIRB "UYUFENB PIMBTSDEOOYS TEBLFPTB", ЪOB YULY "TBDYBGYS" Y DTHZYE "UFTBIYMLY". OBDP UPZMBUYFSHUS, YuFP ABOUT UBNPMEFE U FBLPK CHOEYOPUFSHHA SING CHCHUE OE CHSHZMSDEMY RTYFSOHFSHCHNY UB KHYY. pDOBLP OYUEZP CHEYUOPZP RPD mHOPK HCE DBCHOP OEF, Y REMEOB UELTEFOPUFY CHPLTHZ "UFEMUPC" RPUFEREOOP FPTSE UFBMB URBDBFSH. h BRTEME 1990 Z. UPUFPSMBUSH DBCE RHVMYUOBS DENPOUFTBGYS "oBKFIPLB", YuFP VSHMP UCHSBOP U OBYUBMPN EZP RPMEFPCH DOEN, LPZDB HCE CHUE TBCHOP OECHPNPTSOP VSCHMP ULTSHFSH EZP ZHTNSCH . OP ZMBCHOPK RTYYUYOPK CHOEBROZP RTYMYCHB PFLTPCHEOOPUFY UFBMP UFTENMEOYE BNETYLBOULPZP LPNBODPCHBOYS RTDPDENPOUFTYTPCHBFSH PVEEUFCHEOOPUFY TEKHMSHFBFSCH PDOPC UELTEFOPK RTP ZTBNNNSCH, YUFPVSH DPLBBBFSH OEPVIPDYNPUFSH ZHJOBOUYTPCHBOYS DTHZYI.

    rPUME CHSHCHIPDB CH UCHEF, F.E. U OBYUBMB DOECHOSCHI RPMEFPCH, RTPZTBNNB VPECHPK RPDZPFPCHLY "UFEMUYUFPCH" RTBLFYUEULY YYNEOYMBUSH NBMP. CHUE TBCHOP UCHPY ZMBCHOSCH ЪBDБУй ьФПНХ UBNNMEFKH RTEDUFPSMP TEYBFSH OPYUSHA. TBCHE YFP OEULPMSHLP NEOEE PUFTPK UFBMB RTPVMENB PFUKHFUFCHYS "URBTLY". Fersh Rhty Rhetchshchiki Cheshmefby Streobaezp Mephuilb ​​Yufthlfpt Mephem TSDPN h dchineufn Huevop-fluvopchpyuopn f-38, RPDDDETSICHBS at Oin RPufpsookh TBDYPUCHSHSHSH.

    lPOYUOP, CHYD F-117A RPTBYM NYTPCHPE BCHYBGYPOOPE UPPVEEUFChP. BY UFBM YUHFSH MY OE UBNSHCHN DETOLIN CHSHCHPCHPN FTBDYGYPOOSCHN RPOSFYSN BTPDDYOBNYLY UB CHUA YUFPTYA RPMEFPCH YUEMPCHELB. y BNETYLBOGSH OE VSHMY VSHCH UPVPK, EUMY VSH OE YURPMSHЪPCHBMY LFPF YPL "ABOUT CHUE UFP". sing ChPЪMPTSYMY ABOUT "UFP UENOBDGBFSHCHK" PFCHEFUFCHOOKHA TPMSH KHVEDYFEMSHOPZP RTYNETB FEIOMPMPZYUEULPZP RTECHPUIPDUFCHB yub OBD PUFBMSHOSCHN NYTPN, Y DMS DPLBBBFEMSHUFCHB LFPZP FEYUB DEOOZ OE CBMEMY. "oBKFIPL" RPMKHYUM RPUFPSOOOKHA RTPRYULKH ABOUT PVMPTSLBI TSKHTOBMPCH, UFBM ZETPEN LTHFSHI VPECHYLPCH Y ЪCHEDPK NOPZPYUYUMEOOSCHI BCHYBYPH.

    p RPFETSI "UFEMUPCH" CH IPDE LURMKHBFBGYY DPUFPCHETOSCHI DBOOSCHI NBMP, Y UCHSBOP LFP, RTETSDE CHUEZP, U PVEEK UELTEFOPUFSHHA RTPZTBNNNSCH. rTPCHEUFY CE RPMOSHCHK UPWUF CHOOOSCHK BOBMY RTBLFYUEULY OECHPNPTSOP, F.L. BNETYLBOGSH FEBFEMSHOP ULTSHCHCHBAF LPMYUEUFCHP PUFBCHYIUS CH UFTPA UBNPMEFPCH.

    FEN OE NEOEE, CHUE YUFPYUOILY UIPDSFUS CH FPN, YuFP RETCHBS NNYYOB TBVIMBUSH 20 BRTEMS 1982 Z., RTYYUEN, LFP VSHCHM RETCHSHCHK UETYKOSHCHK UBNPMEF (ICHPUFPCHPK OPNET 785), ABOUT LPFPTPN U FTPECHPK MEFUYL CHSHRPMOSM PDYO YЪ RPUMEDOYI RTYENPUOSHI RPMEFPCH. uPVUFCHEOOP, L FPNKH NPNEOFKH UBNPMEF RTYENLH HCE RTPYEM, OP LBL TB OBLBOKHOE EZP RETEDBYU chchu YOTSEOOETSH "mPLIYD" TEYMYMY CHOEUFY OELPFPTSHCHE YYNEOOOS H LPNRMELFBGYA PVPTHDP CHBOYS. h RTPGEUUE TBVPF LPNRSHAFET PVTBVPFLY ChPЪDKHYOSCHI UYZOBMPCH VSCHM RETENEEEO ABOUT OPCHPE NEUFP, RTY LFPN OPCHSHCHE BMELFTYUEULYE UPEDYOEOYS VSHCHMY CHSHRPMOESCH OERTBCHYMSHOP. UBNPMEF RPFETSM KHRTBCHMEOYE UTBH RPUME PFTSHCHB, RETECHETOKHMUS ABOUT URYOH, HRBM ABOUT YENMA Y UBZPTEMUS. rPDPURECHYE URBUBFEMY RPFKHYYMY PZPOSH Y YYCHMELMY RYMPFB, LPFPTSCHK RPUME bFPZP RTPCHEM CH ZPURYFBMSI CHPUENSH NEUSGECH. YoFETEUOSCHK OABOU - RPULPMSHLH CHYOB "mPLIDB" Y chchu Ch LFPN YOGYDEOFE VSHMB DPLBBOBOB, SING RPLTSCHMY TBUIPDSCH ABOUT MEYOOYE RYMPFB, B BFP 700 FSHUSYU USD!

    oPIUSHA 11 YAOS 1986 Z. ABOUT 32 NYOHFE RPMEFB CHTEUBMUS CH CHETYOKH ZPTSH CHPUSHNPK UETYKOSHCHK F-117A (ICHPUFPCHPK No. 792), RYMPF RPZYV. rTYYUYOB LBFBUFTPZHSH PUFBMBUSH OECHSCHSUOOOPK, YJCHEUFOP MYYSH, YUFP RETED RPMEFPN MEFUYL TsBMPCHBMUS ABOUT KHUFBMPUFSH. fTEFYK "UFEME" FBLCE VSHM RPFETSO CH TEKHMSHFBFE UFPMLOPCHEOYS U ENMEK. lFP RTPYPYMP U 31 UETYKOSCHN UBNPMEFPN (ICHPUFPCHPK No. 815) OPYUSHA 14 PLFSVTS 1987 Z. ABOUT RPMYZPOE BCHYBVBSCH OEMMYU. lBL Y CH RTEDSHDHEEN UMKHYUBE, MEFUYIL OE UDEMBM RPRSCHFLY LBFBRKHMSHFYTPCHBFSHUS, B UBNPMEF PLBBBMUS RPMOPUFSHA TBTHYEO. ABOUT LFPF TB ChPNPTSOPK RTYYUYOPK RTPYUYUEUFCHYS OBCHBMY RPFETA RYMPFPN PTYEOFYTPCHLY - OPYUSH VSHMB PUPVEOOOP FENOPK. 4 BCHZKHUFB 1992 Z. CH TEЪKHMSHFBFE RPTsBTTB VShchMB RPFETSOB 18-S UETYKOBS NBYOB (ICHPUFPChPK No. 802). 14 UEOFSVTS 1997 Z. CH IPDE BCHYBYPH OERPDBMELKH PF vBMFYNPTB, YFBF NTYMEOD, X PDOPZP YЪ F-117A CH RPMEFE TBTHYYMPUSH LTSHMP. uBNPMEF THIOKHM ABOUT YENMA, TBOYCH 6 YUEMPCHEL. rYMPF UKHNEM LBFBRHMSHFYTPCHBFSHUS. yNEAFUS DBOOSHCH, YuFP CHUEZP DP UETEDYOSCH 1999 Z. U MEFOPK LURMKHBFBGYY UOSMY DECHSFSH F-117A, CHLMAYUBS OUEULPMSHLP RP CHSTBVPFLE TEUKHTUB. lTPNE FPZP, RP PZHYYBMSHOSCHN DBOOSCHN - PDOB, RP DBOOSCHN OEBCHYUYNSHI YUFPYUOYLPCH - YUEFSHTE NBYOSCH VSHMY RPFETSOSH CH IPDE VECHSHHI DEKUFCHYK. dChB "oBKFIPLB" YY YUYUMB RTEDUETYKOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH KHUFBOPCHMEOSCH ABOUT RPUFBNEOFSH RTY CHYAEDBI ABOUT BCHYBVBSCH OEMMYU Y TBKF-rBFFETUPO.

    UMEDHEF RTYOBFSH, YuFP L NPNNEOFKH UCHPEZP UPJDBOYS "oBKFIPL" DEKUFCHYFEMSHOP SCHMSMUS ZTPOSHCHN UTEDUFCHPN, RTEDOBOBYOOOSCHN DMS TEYEOYS LPOLTEFOSCHI ЪBDBU CH LPOLTEF OPK PVUFBOPCHLE. bNETYLBOULYE BCHYBUFTPYFEMY UKHNEMY UPJDBFSH EZP CH LTBFYUBKYE UTPLY, UPITBOYCH RTY LFPN CHCHUPYUBKYKHA UELTEFOPUFSH TBVPF. h FEYOOYE OEULPMSHLYI MEF LFB "OECHYDYNLB" h UBNPN DEME PUFBCHBMBUSH OECHYDYNPK DMS UPCHEFULLPZP UPAB, lYFBS Y DTHZYI RPFEOGYBMSHOSHI RTPFPYCHOILPC yb. pDOBLP, LBL MAVPE KHLPUREGYBMYYTPCHBOOPE YDEMYE, F-117A VSHUFTP KHUFBTEM RPUME FPZP, LBL YYNEOMYUSH HUMPCHYS, DMS DEKUFCHYK CH LPFPTSCHI ON UPЪDBCHBMUS. TBCHYFYE UTEDUFCH PVOBTHTSEOYS MEFBFEMSHOSHHI BRRBTBFPCH, CH F.Yu. PUOPCHBOOSCHI ABOUT OPCHSHHI ZHYYYUEULYI RTYOGYRBI, UDEMBMP EZP OECHYDINPUFSH CHEUSHNB PFOPUIFEMSHOPK. b Private enterprise OEDPUFBFLY UBNPMEFB PLBUBMYUSH BVUPMAFOSHNY. lBL RPLBЪBMP CHTENS, UBNB YDES UBNPMEFB, CH LPOUFTHLGYY LPFPTPZP "CHSHCHRSYUCHBEFUS" LBLPE-MYVP PDOP LBYUEUFChP (CH DBOOPN UMHYUBE - NBMBS rt) CH HEETV DTHZYN, PLBJB MBUSH VEURETUREFYCHOPK. rPUFTPYCH CHUEZP 20 L'ENRMSTPCH "UFEMUPC" FTEFSHESP RPLPMEOYS - UFTBFEZYUEULYI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH ch-2 "URYTYF", BNETYLBOGSH CHSMY LHTU ABOUT TBTBVPFLH VPMEE ZBTNPOYUOSCHI NBYO (F-22, JSF) CH LPFPTSCHI FTEVPCHBOIE NBMPK ЪBNEFOPUFY HCE OE SCHMSEFUS DPNYOITHAEIN, IPFS Y PUFBEFUS PDOYN Y LMAYUECHSHI . ъBNEFYN, YuFP Y ABOUT TPUUYKULYI UBNPMEFBI RSFPZP RPLPMEOYS - nzhy, u-37 Y DT. - TEBMYHEFUS FPF CE RPDIPD.

    chPNPTSOP, YNEOOOP RP RTYYUYOYE "PDOPVPLPUFY" PUFBMYUSH OETEBMYYPCHBOOSCHNY NOPZPYUYUMEOOSCH RTPPELFSH NPDETOYBGYY "oBKFIPLB" CH YOFETEUBI chchu Y chnu uyb. fBL, Ch 1993 Z. RPUME ЪBLTSCHFYS RTPZTBNNNSCH NBMPЪBNEFOPZP RBMHVOPZP YFKhTNPCHYLB-VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLB b-12 "bCHEODTSET" ZHYTNB "mPLIID" CH YOYGYBFYCHOPN RPTSDLE RTPTB VPFBMB RTPPELF RBMKHVOPZP VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLB F-117N "uYIPL" CH LBYUEUFCHE "RETEIPDOPZP" UBNPMEFB, RTY'CHBOOPZP ЪBRPMOYFSH RTPVEM NETSDH VSCHUFTP UFBTEAEIN RBMKHVOSHCHN YFKHTNPCHYLPN b-6e "YOFTHDET" Y RETURELFYCHOSCHN JSF. rTPELF RTEDKHUNBFTYCHBM, CH YUBUFOPUFY, PUOBUFYFSH F-117 PVSHYUOSCHN ICHPUFPCHSHCHN PRETEOYEN, OPCHSHCHN ZHPOBTEN U KHMHYUYEOOOSCHN PVЪPTPN, ULMBDOSHCHN LTSHMPN, FPTNPЪOSCHN ZBLPN Y TSD PN DTHZYI KHUPCHETYEOUFCHPCHBOYK. pDOBLP bFB TBVPFB OE RPMKHYYMB RPDDETTSLY LPNBODPCHBOYS chnu uyub. OE YNEMY TBCHYFYS Y DTHZYE YOYGYBFYCHOSCH RTPELFSCH "mPLIYD" - RBMHVOSHK YFKHTNPCHYL-VPNVBTDYTPCHEYL A/F-117i, FBLFYUEULYK VPNVBTDYTPCHEYL F-117B. h WETEDYOE 1990-I ZZ. NPDB ABOUT FEIOPMPZYA "UFEME" CH uyb RPYMB ABOUT KhVShchMSH, Y REOFBZPO RTDPDPMTSYM ЪBLHRLY IPTPYP ЪBTELPNEODPCHYI UEVS PVSHYUOSHI FBLFYUEULYI UBNPMEFPCH F-15E, F-16C/D, F /A-18C/D.

    PRYUBOYE LPOUFTHLGYY.

    ZHAYEMSTS - RPMKHNPOPLLPCHPK LPOUFTHLGYY, UPUFPYF JFTEI UELGYK: OPUPCHPK, GEOFTBMSHOPK Y ICHPUFPCHPK. oUPCHBS UPDETTSYF RETEDOYK Y ЪBLBVIOOOSCHK PFUELY PVPTHDPCHBOYS, LBVYOH Y OYYKH RETEDOEK PRPTSH YBUUY. h RETEDOEN PFUELE HUFBOPCHMEOB BMELFTPOOBS BRRBTBFKHTB BMELFTPDYUFBOGYPOOPK UYUFENSCH KHRTBCHMEOYS RPMEFPN Y PRFILP-BMELFTPOOSHE UFBOGYY RTYGEMSHOP-OBCHYZBGYPOOPZP LPNRMELUB IRA D.S. CHRETEDY OPUPCHPK UELGYY TBURPMPTSEOSCH YUEFSHTE YFBOZY RTYENOYLPCH CHPDHYOPZP DBCHMEOYS.

    h TBKPOE RETEDOEK PRPTSH YBUUY YNEEFUS OYYB, ZDE TBNEEBEFUS FHTEMSH U DBFUILPN yl-UFBOGYY RETEDOEZP PVPTB OITSOEK RPMKHUZHETSCH (TBVPFBAEEK CH YOZHTBLTBOOPN DYBRB POE) Y MBETOSCHN DBMSHOPNETPN-GEMEHLBBFEMEN. OYYB ЪBLTSCHFB UEFEYUBFSHCHN RTPЪTBYUOSCHN BMELFTTPRPCHPDSEIN LBOPN, OE RTPRKHULBAEIN tm-YЪMKHYUEOYE, OP UCHPVPDOP RTPRKHULBAEIN YЪMKHYUEOYE CH yl-DYBRBPЪPOE.

    oLTBO LTERYFUS U RPNPESH OBLMBDLY RYMPPVTBOPK ZHPTNSCH RP RETYNEFTKH DMS TBUUYCHBOYS RTYIPDSEEZP TBDYPMPLBGYPOOPZP YJMKHYUEOYS TMU RTPPHYCHOILB.

    oERPUTEDUFCHEOOP RPD MPVPCHSHCHN UFELMPN ZHPOBTS OBIPDIFUS OYYB, CH LPFPTPK RPD FBLYN TSE EMELFTPRTPCHPDSEIN LTBOPN - FHTEMSH U DBFUYLPN yl-UYUFENSCH RETEDOEZP PVЪPTB CH CHETIOEK RPM WORSE Y U MBETOSCHN DBMSHOPNETPN-GEMEKHLBBFEMEN.

    zhPOBTSH LBVYOSCH - RPYUFY FTEIZTBOOPK ZHTNSCH, OP U CHLMAYUEOYEN PYUEOSH KHLPZP MPVPCHPZP UFELMB, KHUFBOPCHMEOOOPZP (U HYUEFPN CHPNPTSOSCHI PFTBTSEOYK) U VPMSHYYN OBLMPOPN. dMS KHNEOSHYEOYS UPUFBCHMSAEEK rt PF LBVYOSCH PUFELMEOYE ZHPOBTS YNEEF NOPZPUMPKOPE NEFBMMYYYTPCHBOOPE PFTBTSBAEE RPLTSCHFYE.

    h GEOFTBMSHOPK UELGYY TBURPMPTSEOSCH CHPDHIPBVPTOIL Y CHPDDHYOSCHN LBOBMPN, DCHYZBFEMY, PFUEL CHPPTHTSEOYS, ZHAYEMSTSOSHCH FPRMYCHOSCHESCH VBLY Y OYY ZMBCHOSCHI PRPT YBUUY. UYMPCHBS UIENB UELGYY CHLMAYUBEF OEULPMSHLP YYTPLYI GEMSHOPLPCHBOSCHI YRBOZPHFPCH.

    chP'DKHIP'BVPTOILY OBIPDSFUS RPBDY LBVYOSCH OBD LTSHMPN Y YNEAF RTSNPKHZPMSHOKHA ZHTNKH U LPUSHN UTEЪPN CHIPDB Y RPRETEUOSCHNY RETEZPTPDLBNY. rTY PVMHYUEOY UBNPMEFB UOYH CH RETEDOEK RPMKHUZHETE SING LTBOYTHAFUS LTSHMPN. chP'DKHIP'BVPTOILY RPUFPSOOP ЪBLTSCHFSH FPOLPUFEOOOSCHNY TEYEFFLBNY U NEMLYNYY SYUEKLBNY YY LPNRPYGYPOOPZP NBFETYBMB, PVMBDBAEEZP TBDYPRPZMPEBAYN UCHPKUFChPN. oBMYUYE FBLYI TEYEFPL PVEUREYUYCHBEF LTBOYTPCHBOYE MPRBFPL LPNRTEUUPTB DCHYZBFEMS, RTY LFPN YJMKHYUEOYE tmu YBUFYYUOP RPZMPEBEFUS, B YUBUFYYUOP TBUUEYCHBEFUS PE LTHZ TEYEFLY Y CHOKHFTY CHP'DKHYOPZP LBOMBMB.

    chP'DKHIP'BVPTOILY PVPTHDPCHBOSH DCHHNS UFChPTLBNY DPRPMOYFEMSHOPZP ЪBVPTB CHP'DHIB. sing TBURPMPTSEOSH CH CHETIOEK YUBUFY CHPDHYOPZP LBOBMB Y PFLTSCHCHBAFUS CHOKHTSH RTY NBMSCHI ULPTPUFSI RPMEFB, THMETSLE, B FBLCE RTY VPMSHYI KHZMBI BFBLY UBNPMEFB. ABOUT CHIPDE CH CHPDHIPBVPTOIL YUBUFSH RPFPLB IMPPDOPZP CHPDHIB PFDEMSEFUS. rTPIPDS YUETE LBOBMSH CHDPMSH DCHYZBFEMS, -ZHTNYTHAEYE TSELFPT, POB RPRBDBEF RTSNP CH YYTPLYE RMPULYE CHCHPIDOSHHE UPRMMB, WHERE UNEYYCHBEFUS U ZPTSUYYY ZBBINYY YUBUFYUOP PIMB CDBEF YI.

    iCHPUFPCHBS UELGYS CHLMAYUBEF CH UEVS YYTPLYE RMPULYE CHSCHIPDOSHE UPRMB, OYY FPTNPЪOPZP RBTBYAFB Y RPUBDPUOPZP LTALB. fBN CE TBNEEBEFUS PVPTHDPCBOYE TBDYPMELFTPOOPZP RTPFPYCHPDECUFCHYS Y LTERIFUS V-PVTBOBOPE ICHPUFPCHPE PRETEOYE.

    CHSHPIDOSH UPRMB YNEAF CH UEUEOOYY RETENEOOOSCHK RTPZHYMSH, YI ZHTNB YJNEOSEFUS PF GYMYODTYUUEULPK (UTBЪKH TSE ЪB DCHYZBFEMEN) DP YYTPLK EEMY, TBDEMOOOPK ABOUT 12 LBOBMPCH CHETF YLBMSHOSHNY RETEZPTPDLBNY CHSHUPFPK PLPMP 150 NN. fP "KHFLPOPUPCH" KHUFTPKUFChP ЪBLBOYUYCHBEFUS CHShCHDBAEEKUS OBBD Y RTYRPDOSFPK OITSOEK LTPNLPC YJ FYFBOPChPZP URMBCHB, PVMYGPCHBOOPC FETNPUFPKLYNYY LETBNYUEULYNYY RM YFLBNY (YURPMSH'HAFUS CH NOPZPTB'PCHPN LPUNYUUEULPN LPTBVME "yBFFM"). fBLBS LPOUFTHLGYS UPRMB PRFYNYYTPCHBOB DMS ZHTNYTPCHBOYS RMPULPK CHSHCHIMPROPK UFTHY Y KHULPTEOYS ITS UNEYYCHBOYS U PLTHTSBAEIN CHPDKHIPN.

    lTSCHMP YNEEF RPUFPSOOHA UFTEMPCHYDOPUFSH RP RETEDOEK LTPNLE (67.5°) Y OEFTBDYGYPOOSCHK RTPZHYMSH. RETEDOSS LTPNLB PUFTBS, VE NEIBOYBGYYY SCHMSEFUS RTDPDPMTSEOYEN ZHAYEMSTSB. lTSCHMP CHSHPRPMOEOP CH PUOPCHOPN YI BMANYOYECHSCHI URMBCHPCH. h TBKPOE ЪBLPOGPPCHPL, PVTBBPCHBOOSHI OUEULPMSHLYNY RMPULYNY RPCHETIOPUFSNY, KHUFBOPCHMEOSCH BTPOBCHYZBGYPOOSCH PZOY, MYOSH LPFPTSCHI UDEMBOSCH U KHUEFPN NYONYYBGYY TBDYP MPLBGYPOOPZP PFTBCEOYS.

    V-PVTBOPE ICHPUFPCHPE PRETEOYE LTERIFUS CH UBNPK ЪБДООК ФПУLe ЖАЪМЦБ ОЭРПУТДУФЧЭOOП RETED UPRMBNNY. xZPM TBCHBMB LPOUPMEK UPUFBCHMSEF 85°. PRETEOYE RPLTSHFP trn Y YNEEF RTPZHYMSH UDCPEOOOPZP TPNVB. lPOUPMY PRETEOYS GEMSHOPRPCHPTPFOSHE, U ZYDTBCHMYUUEULYN RTYCHPDPN, YURPMSH'HAFUS DMS KHRTBCHMEOYS RP OBRTBCHMEOYA OE UCHSBOSCH U KHRTBCHMEOYEN RP CHCHUPFE.

    chЪMEFOP-RPUBDPYUOSCHHUFTPKUFCHB CHLMAYUBAF PVSHYUOPE FTEYPRPTOPE YBUUY U NBUMSOP-CHPЪDKHYOSCHNY BNPTFIYBFPTBNY, FPTNPЪOPK RBTBIAF Y FPTNPЪOPK LTAL. YBUUY YNEEF PDOKH OPUPCHHA PRPTH U PDOYN HRTBCHMSENSHN LPMEUPN Y DCHE PUOPCHOSCHE (FPTSE PDOPLPMEUOSCH). Chue FTY PRPTSH HVYTBAFUS CHRED CH OYY ZHAYEMSTSB. UFChPTLY OYY PUOPCHOSHI PRPT UPUFPSF YI DCHHI YUBUFEK, RETEDOSS RTYNBFYUEULBS YUBUFSH RPUME CHSHCHRKHULB PRPTSH CHOOPCHSH ЪBLTSCHCHBEFUS.

    fPTNPЪB LPMEU PUOPCHOSHI PRPT - DYULPCHSHCHE, PUOBEEOSCH BCHFPNBFBNY RTPFYCHP ULPMSHTSEOYS. DMS UPLTBEEOYS DMYOSCH RTPVEZB RTY RPUBDL YURPMSH'HEFUS FPTNPЪOPK RBTBIAF, LPFPTSCHK TBBNEEBEFUS UCHETIKH UBNPMEFB CH OYYE NECDH LPTOECHSHNY YUBUFSNY V-PVTBOBZP PRETEOY S. ъBLTSCHCHBEFUS OYYB DCHHNS UFChPTLBNY.

    ABOUT OITSOEK RPCHETIOPUFY ICHPUFPCHPK UELGYY ZHAYEMSTSB CH ЪBLTSCHFPK OYYE TBURPMPTSEO FPTNPJOPK LTAL DMS RPUBDLY UBNPMEFB ABOUT BTPDTPNBI, PVPTHDPCHBOOSCHI UTEDUFCHBNY BCHBTYKOPZP FPTNP CEOYS.

    UYMPCHBS KHUFBOPCHLB UPUFPYF YJ DCHHI VEUZHPTUBTSOSHI DCHHILPOFHTOSHCHI FKHTVPTEBLFYCHOSHI DCHYZBFEMEK F404-GE-F1D2 ZHYTNSCH "dTSEOETBM UMELFTYL" U FSZPK RP 4890 LZ.

    ъBRBU FPRMYCHB (VPMEE 7000 M) OBIPDIFUS CH DCHHI ZHAYEMSTSOSCHY YUEFSHTEI LTSHMSHECHSHI VBLBI. rTY DMYFEMSHOSCHI RPMEFBI NPTSEF YURPMSHЪPCHBFSHUS DPRPMOYFEMSHOSCHK FPRMYCHOSCHK VBL, TBNEEBENSHCHK CH PFUELE CHPPTHTSEOYS. uBNPMEF PVPTHDPCBO UYUFENPK DPЪBRTBCHLY FPRMYCHPN CH RPMEFE. xVYTBAEYKUS FPRMYCHPRTYENOIL RPCHPTPFOPZP FYRB OBIPDIFUS CH CHETIOEK YUBUFY ZHAYEMSTSB, ЪB LBVYOPK.

    ABOUT UBNPMEFE F-117A YNEEFUS PFUEL CHPPTHTSEOYS, ZDE NPZHF VSHFSH RPDCHEYOSCH VPERTYRBUSCH PVEEK NBUUPK DP 2270 LZ. dMYOB PFUELB UPUFBCHMSEF 4.7 N, YYTYOB - 1.75 N. rTYNEOSMYUSH KHRTBCHMSENSHCHE (LPTTELFYTHENSHCHE) BCHYBVPNVSHCH (khbv) FYRB GBU-10, GBU-12 Y GBU-27 U MBETOSCHNY UYUFENBNY OBCHEDEOYS .

    UBNPMEF F-117A NPTSEF OEUFY FBLCE KHRTBCHMSENSHCHE TBLEFSCH (xt) AIM-9 "ubKDKHYODET" LMBUUB "CHPDKHI - CHPDKHI", AGM-65 "NKCHTYL" PVEEZP OBYUEOYS DMS BFBLY UNIONS GEMEK, RTPFPYCHPTBDYPMP-LBGYPOOSHE TBLEFSCH AGM-88 HARM, RTPFPYCHPLPTBVEMSHOSHE TBLEFSCH AGM -84 "zBTRKHO", B FBLCE OEVPMSHYPE UENEKUFChP PTKHTSYS, PVMBDBAEEZP RPCCHYEOOOPK FPYOOPUFSHY OELPFPTSCHNYIBTBLFETYUFYLBNY NBMPK ЪBNEFOPUFY. iPFS KHLBBOOSCHK RETEYOOSH CHSHZMSDYF DPCHPMSHOP KHVEDYFEMSHOSCHN DMS UBNPMEFB FBLLPZP OBYUEOYS, LBL F-117b, TEBMSHOSCH RPDFCHETSDEOOYS EZP CH OBUFPSEEE CHTENS PFUHFUFCHHAF.

    h UMHYUBE OEPVIPDYNPUFY UBNPMEF F-117b NPTsEF VShchFSH DPTBVPFBO RPD UFBODBTFOSH FBLFYUEULYE BCHYBGYPOOSCH SDETOSH VPNVSH ch61 YMY ch83.

    TBVPFSH RP KHUPCHETYOUFCHPCHBOYA RETCHPZP NBMPUBNEFOPZP VPECHPZP UBNPMEFB Y UPJDBOYA EZP CHBTYBOFPCH RTDPDPMTSBAFUS, TBUUNBFTYCHBEFUS Y ChPNPTSOPUFSH LURMHBFBGYY EZP U BCHYBOPUGECH.


    mfi:
    nPDYZHYLBGYS F-117A
    TBNBI LTSHMB, N 13.30
    dMYOB UBNPMEFB, N 20.30
    hShchUPFB UBNPMEFB, N 3.78
    rMPEBDSH LTSHMB, N 105.90
    hZPM UFTEMPCHYDOPUFY, ZTBD 67.30
    nBUUB, LZ
    RHUFPZP UBNPMEFB 13381
    CHMEFOBS NBUUB 23625
    FPRMYCHB 8255
    fYR DCHYZBFEMS 2 ftdd General Electric F404-GE-F1D2
    FSZB, LO 2 And 46.70
    nBLUINBMSHOBS ULPTPUFSH, LN/YU 970
    lTEKUETULBS ULPTPUFSH, LN/YU 306
    rPUBDPUOBS ULPTPUFSH 227
    retezpopuobs DBMSHOPUFSH, LN 2012
    vPECHBS DBMSHOPUFSH DEKUFCHYS, LN 917
    rTBLFYUEULYK RPFPMPPL, N 13716
    nBLU. LURMHBFBGYPOOBS RETEZTHLB 6
    ilyrbts, uem 1
    hPPTHCEOYE: VPECHBS OBZTHLB - 2268 LZ.
    kht CHPDHI-YENMS AGM-88 HARM, AGM-65 Maveric, AGM-137 TSSAM, AGM-154 JSOW, AGM-154 JASSM.
    2I 907ЛЗ ВПНВШУ У РФИУUEУЛНИ OBCHEDEOYEN GBU-10, GBU-12, GBU-27 Paveway YMY YMY BLU-109 with MBETOSCHN
    YMY SDETOSH VPNVSH B-61(100/500 LYMPFPOO) YMY
    2 VPNVSH Mk.84YMY Mk.61 YMY GBU-30 (31.32) JDAM
    2 VPERYRBUB WCMD