Firing from M4 cannons All the guns of the M4 family of tanks fired mechanically - the firing pin hit the shell's capsule, although the mechanism was driven by electricity. The gunner fired the cannon and the coaxial machine gun using buttons conveniently located either on the flywheel

Chapter Nine Leading Cao Cao's Troops: “Act according to your convenience.” Zhang Yu: “After knowing the changes in the nine types of terrain, you can act according to your convenience. Therefore, this chapter is placed after the “Nine Changes.” Zhang Juzheng: “What it says here is

XI. EQUIPMENT THAT SUPPORTS THE CONDUCT OF ARMED STRUGGLE The equipment that supports the conduct of armed struggle is named here somewhat arbitrarily, because the boundaries separating it from the types of military equipment discussed above are rather vague, and it itself is very

Sound metering is a good reconnaissance tool, but its range of action is limited. It cannot find those targets that are not visible from the ground and that do not give themselves away by the sounds of shots, for example, batteries that are not firing, headquarters, columns of troops in the rear and many other deeply located targets. (262)

In all these cases, aerial reconnaissance means - airplanes and tethered observation balloons - come to the aid of artillery.

Rice. 234 provides a clear picture of the comparative capabilities of ground-based observation, as well as observation from a balloon and from an airplane. What is inaccessible to one is available to another, what is inaccessible to another is available to a third.

A tethered balloon is essentially an ordinary observation post, but raised to a greater altitude. You can get quite comfortable in the balloon basket, taking with you all the instruments necessary for shooting and observation.

From a balloon it is possible to see much of what is hidden for a ground observer in the folds of the terrain and behind local objects. A very wide horizon opens up before an observer on a balloon. From the balloon you can determine not only the direction of the firing battery, but also its location quite accurately.

The balloon is convenient to use in calm weather. In strong winds it sways from side to side and this interferes with observation.

To ensure the successful operation of a balloon in battle, it is necessary to protect it from enemy aircraft and from long-range artillery fire, (263) for which it is a tempting and relatively easily destroyed target.

The aircraft is the most convenient and reliable aerial reconnaissance vehicle. With its help, you can observe from a very high altitude, you can go deep behind enemy lines and penetrate the secrets of their location. The aircraft has two ways of accomplishing this mission: surveillance reconnaissance and photography. Both the first and second methods solve essentially the same problem: to detect a target that is not visible from ground observation points and determine its position on a map or tablet. The most accurate solution to this problem is provided by photo reconnaissance. Therefore, surveillance reconnaissance from an aircraft is usually accompanied by photographing the area where targets are detected.

A photograph taken from an airplane (Fig. 235) makes it possible to find even those targets that, given the current state of camouflage, cannot be detected by observation. And most importantly, having such a photograph, you can determine the position of the target relative to local objects recorded in the photograph, and accurately plot this target on the map, which can only be done approximately during observation.

Films taken from an airplane are dropped by parachute onto designated artillery receiving points, from where they are transferred to special photo laboratories for immediate development. After this, they are decrypted, that is, they are carefully studied and all the objects photographed on them are identified - local objects and targets. (264)

One cannot, however, think that it is very easy to carry out aviation flights over territory occupied by the enemy. The enemy always uses numerous and strong air defense systems to prevent observation and photographing of the target directly from above. But from airplanes you can sometimes successfully observe targets while flying over your location under the protection of your air defense systems.

During the Great Patriotic War, all the reconnaissance methods we considered were widely used.

In connection with the development of technology and later research in the field of physics, other types of reconnaissance appeared on the battlefields during the last war, such as observation and photography in infrared rays, as well as target detection using radar.

The use of infrared rays for observation opens up great opportunities in this matter: a person acquires the ability to see through clouds, at night, in fog. Thus, observational reconnaissance becomes possible even under conditions in which conventional means cannot be used for this.

As is known from physics, infrared rays occupy a certain place in the spectrum of a solar ray (decomposed into its component parts) - outside the visible spectrum, next to red rays; they are depicted as a dark stripe. These invisible rays have the property of penetrating even through an atmosphere saturated with water vapor (through fog). Using a spotlight, infrared rays, invisible to the eye, can be directed at any object from which these rays are reflected. An optical device of a special device is used to capture invisible reflected rays. This device contains a lens, an eyepiece and a so-called electron-optical converter with a screen (Fig. 236). Having passed through the lens and the converter, (265) the rays fall on a luminous screen, on which a clear image of the object is obtained. This image is viewed through an eyepiece.

The use of radar makes it possible to use radio waves to detect unobservable targets in the air, on water and on the ground, and determine their location. You will learn how such reconnaissance is carried out when reading chapter thirteen.

So, you have become familiar with many reconnaissance methods that are used to find targets.

Which of these methods is the best?

It would be a mistake if, in answering this question, you chose one method of reconnaissance and said that it is the best.

It should be noted that none of the listed reconnaissance methods separately can provide comprehensive information about the enemy. In a combat situation, all methods of artillery reconnaissance that are applicable in the given conditions must be used, and, in addition, the data about the enemy that was obtained by reconnaissance of other branches of the military must always be taken into account. Only under this condition can one expect that the most important targets for artillery will be found.

In the general complex of measures aimed at preparing the armed forces for new aggressive wars, the commands of the armies of the main capitalist states assign a large place to the organization of tactical aerial reconnaissance in the theater of operations, on the results of which, in their opinion, the success of the military operations of the troops will largely depend. Aerial reconnaissance is carried out in the interests of all types of armed forces. In particular, it is designed to provide the Air Force command with the necessary data to solve problems of gaining air superiority, isolating the combat area and providing close air support to ground forces.

Tactical air reconnaissance efforts in gaining air superiority are planned to be directed primarily at identifying the airfield network, especially airfields and dispersal sites, as well as missile defense positions and control posts.

When isolating a combat area, the main targets of aerial reconnaissance include reserves in concentration areas and on the march, highway junctions and railway stations, bridges, crossings, command posts and communication centers of formations and formations, warehouses and supply bases.

Especially great stress, as foreign military experts believe, will be required from the crews of reconnaissance aircraft when providing direct air support to ground forces, since ground combat operations will be characterized by transience and be conducted over large spaces under any meteorological conditions. In this case, aviation must first of all identify troop positions, areas of their concentration, tactical missile launchers, command posts and radio control equipment located in the combat formations of troops.

The main task of aerial reconnaissance in a theater of operations, as foreign military experts note, is to timely detect the location of nuclear weapons carriers and nuclear ammunition depots.

It is believed that data obtained by aerial reconnaissance must be reliable and fully reflect the rapidly changing situation on the battlefield. Therefore, not only specially equipped, but also all combat aircraft are used to conduct it.

Tactical reconnaissance bears the greater burden of uncovering objects in the enemy’s tactical depths. For example, in the last years of the aggressive war in Vietnam, of the total number of sorties carried out by American aviation for the purpose of reconnaissance of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 97% were tactical reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4C, RF-101 and others), 1%. - for unmanned aircraft and 2% - for strategic aircraft (U-2, ). The reconnaissance crews had to not only find the object, identify it and establish coordinates, but also determine how and from what directions it would be safer and more convenient to approach it.

Depending on the tasks and on whose interests the aerial reconnaissance is being conducted, its depth will vary. The foreign press reported that the depth of tactical reconnaissance for a field army is 300-100 km, an army corps - 100 km, and a division - 40 km.

To conduct tactical air reconnaissance, the US and French Air Forces have reconnaissance aviation wings (squadrons), consisting of two or three aviation squadrons of 15-18 aircraft each, and in other countries - reconnaissance squadrons. The US Air Force has formed a squadron of unmanned reconnaissance and jammer aircraft launched from the DC-130 mother aircraft. Reconnaissance aviation squadrons can independently solve aerial reconnaissance missions in a theater of operations.

Organization of air reconnaissance control in the theater of operations

The management of the actions of reconnaissance aviation in the theater of operations in the US Air Force is carried out through the tactical aviation control system, the main bodies of which are the tactical aviation control center, which is part of the command post of the commander of the Air Force in the theater of operations, and the direct air support center, created at the combat operations control center of the army corps or field army. Aerial reconnaissance operations are carried out on the basis of planned or urgent requests.

At the tactical aviation control center are officers who plan actions and organize flights of reconnaissance aircraft. Here, on the basis of approved requests, detailed planning of reconnaissance aircraft sorties for the next day takes place according to planned requests that come from ground forces battalions through intelligence officers of divisions, corps and field armies. Each subsequent supervisor can approve or cancel the application. According to foreign press reports, during the Vietnam War, planned requests were implemented 4 hours or more after their receipt. They made up 3/4 of all applications.

Air intelligence officers at the close air support center are tasked with compiling urgent requests. The latter, without coordination with higher authorities, are transmitted over tactical aviation control radio networks by Air Force liaison officers located in tactical aviation control commands or by forward air gunners. Having examined the application, the direct aviation support center reports this to the tactical aviation control center, and then calls reconnaissance aircraft through the command post of aviation units and subunits. Based on the experience of combat operations in Southeast Asia, urgent requests were carried out within 2-2.5 hours when aircraft took off from airfields and after 15 minutes. when calling a scout from a duty position in the zone.

According to the foreign press, reconnaissance can be carried out by the following aircraft: single aircraft, part of strike groups, specially covered from the air. The first ones, as a rule, are sent to areas with weak air defense. They photograph the area from medium to high altitudes. The latter are intended for photographing objects after bomb attacks have been carried out on them. Reconnaissance aircraft, specially covered from the air, target objects with strong air defense.

The guidance of aircraft crews on routes is carried out through control and warning centers, observation and warning posts, as well as through forward aircraft gunners. The pilots are given information about the facility's air defense system, attacks by enemy fighters, weather changes, the location of the film release point, the actions of their aircraft in the reconnaissance area, etc.

Preparation for conducting aerial reconnaissance on the theater of operations

Preparation for conducting aerial reconnaissance in a squadron begins with receiving an order from the air wing command post. Based on it, the squadron commander gives appropriate instructions to the operational officer and photo reconnaissance officer.

The operational officer, who controls the calculation of the required fuel supply and the time of transmission of reconnaissance reports, determines the order of travel to the target, routes and time to reach the target, the conditions of radio exchange, those responsible for communication at the stages of the flight, and, if necessary, indicates the methods of interaction between reconnaissance officers and cover fighters.

Crews assigned to the mission begin preparing a flight plan. The route to the reconnaissance facility is selected taking into account covert access to it and bypassing areas covered by air defense systems. It is plotted on a map on which control landmarks are clearly visible. If necessary, the plan indicates the area for refueling aircraft in the air on the way back. If a reconnaissance aircraft must go on a mission together with a strike group, then the place, time and altitude of their meeting is recorded. When reconnaissance of targets with a strong air defense system, the plan reflects issues of interaction with the cover group.

The photo reconnaissance officer, together with specialists in electronic equipment, selects the type of AFA, the amount of film, filters and shooting intervals in accordance with the task and the weather.

During pre-flight preparation, which can last up to 1.5 hours, the crews are briefed. The squadron commander clarifies the task and explains it. The intelligence officer familiarizes the crews with target registration data (if they have not studied them during preliminary training), then informs the pilots about enemy air defense systems on the route and in the target area, recommends tactical methods for overcoming them, names particularly noticeable visual landmarks and explains the camouflage of objects enemy. He also brings to the attention of the crews (in case they find themselves on enemy territory for some reason) the possible attitude of the population towards them, how to avoid capture and what to do during rescue.

The photo reconnaissance officer instructs the crews on the procedure for using the AFA, indicating the number of photographs that can be taken with each device and the reference points for the start of photographing.

A radio intelligence officer from a maintenance squadron recalls the operating modes of the equipment, the moments of its switching on and off, and the features of identifying radiation sources on on-board indicators.

The meteorological officer familiarizes the crew with the weather forecast along the route and in the target area.

Crews who have previously flown in a given area are specially invited to attend the briefing.

At the end of the briefing, the crews clarify flight routes to and from targets, time to fly over control landmarks and approach targets, and alternate routes in case of weather changes or unexpectedly strong opposition from enemy air defense forces.

After completing the task, the plane is met by the duty team, which removes cassettes of film and delivers them to the darkroom. Here, the still wet film is reviewed by codebreakers for a preliminary assessment and preparation of an urgent report. In addition, the crew commander presents a report on the results of visual observation. When specified objects are detected on the film, it is sent to the photo reconnaissance technical squadron of the reconnaissance aviation wing. If objects are not detected, then the issue of a second flight is decided. In the photo reconnaissance technical squadron, the film is deciphered more carefully.

Foreign experts believe that the time spent on decoding the film is still long. Therefore, people abroad are trying to gain information about the enemy from an airplane. The value of such information lies in its timeliness and reliability, since the aircraft crew can transmit it within 3-5 minutes after detecting the object. All authorities interested in receiving them can simultaneously receive data about the target. During the Vietnam War, as the foreign press reported, the American command received more than 2/3 of the data on moving objects via radio from reconnaissance aircraft.

Rice. 1. RF-4C 2 reconnaissance aircraft

The capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft to survey terrain are determined visually by the tactical and technical characteristics of the onboard equipment.

Judging by foreign press reports, the main tactical reconnaissance aircraft in the air forces of the main capitalist countries is the RF-4C Phantom 2 (Fig. 1). Crew: two people. It is equipped with modern reconnaissance equipment. Its capabilities when shooting terrain from a height of 100 m are shown in Fig. 2. As you gain altitude, the area covered by photography increases.

Rice. 2. Strips of terrain captured by the reconnaissance equipment of the RF-4C aircraft during its flight at an altitude of 100 m: 1, 2 and 3 - AFA of forward, perspective and planned surveys; 4, 5 - IR and laser equipment; 6 - side-view radar, which films the terrain on both sides of the aircraft; 7 - range of electronic reconnaissance equipment

Television reconnaissance equipment is not installed on Phantom aircraft. This is explained by its poor noise immunity. However, it is used on unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. It was reported that it is planned to be used in conjunction with infrared surveillance equipment.

Thus, as can be judged by the data published in the foreign press, tactical aerial reconnaissance in the theater of operations is given paramount importance in the armed forces of NATO countries. It is organized taking into account the use of all combat aircraft and the fastest transfer of data about the enemy to commanders.

Aerial reconnaissance

Perhaps it should be considered natural that in the post-war period, in almost all cases when issues of military aviation were discussed, the main attention was paid to strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, jet fighters, guided and unguided rockets and anti-submarine warfare. Events such as the 1953 Korean War and the Dutch and British floods showed that helicopters were becoming important. The issue of transport aircraft came to the fore during the air supply of Berlin and during the first tense days of the Korean War, when vital supplies had to be airlifted to the small patch of South Korea that remained in the hands of United Nations troops. But in no significant work on air power written after the end of the Second World War, one can find information about reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance operations, except for occasional comments.

It is difficult to understand why, in the period between the two world wars, reconnaissance aircraft began to be assigned a secondary role in most air fleets and why, despite the experience of the Second World War, no changes occurred in this matter. During the first two years of World War I, airplanes and airships were used primarily for surveillance. Their main task was to be the eyes of the army and navy: detecting guns and troop movements on land and enemy ships at sea. Naturally, with the advent of new methods of bombing and air combat, the issues of conducting aerial reconnaissance began to be given correspondingly less attention. But each stage of the Second World War convinces us more and more that good or bad air patrols or reconnaissance must be the main factor in the air, land and sea conditions.

The most striking example of the development and activities of reconnaissance aviation was shown by the German Air Force. In 1939, at the very beginning of the Second World War, 20 percent of the total, approximately 3,750 combat aircraft, were long-range and short-range reconnaissance aircraft, seaplanes and flying boats designed for aerial reconnaissance and patrol. This large percentage of reconnaissance aircraft remained until about 1943, when fighter aircraft began to be deployed on a large scale. In the entire history of military aviation, no other country has devoted such a large proportion of its aviation resources to aerial reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol missions. During the first nine or ten months of the war, German reconnaissance aircraft successfully accomplished their mission of obtaining the information necessary for the effective and economical use of German air power. Coast Guard seaplanes successfully carried out surveillance tasks over the coasts of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea. Meteorological and general reconnaissance was carried out daily over the North Sea and Western Europe; these tasks were carried out by qualified crews of Heinkel twin-engine bombers assigned to each main air force. During the Norwegian campaign, they were assisted in these missions by long-range four-engine flying boats and Focke-Wulf 200 aircraft. Henschel aircraft performed important tactical reconnaissance missions in the interests of ground forces operating in Poland, the Scandinavian countries, France and Flanders. They quickly provided accurate information about the movements of enemy troops, making it possible to quickly use dive bombers on the most advantageous targets. Almost every German tank division had a squadron of Henschel tactical reconnaissance aircraft, which carried out tasks to detect tanks, as well as a flight of Fieseler aircraft, which provided communication communications in combat areas. Each unit of medium or dive bombers had a well-trained unit of reconnaissance aircraft, which performed special surveillance and aerial photographic reconnaissance tasks in the interests of its unit. Never before in the history of aviation has the Air Force had such first-class aerial reconnaissance, which would have been able to ensure the use of a minimum number of bombers with maximum efficiency.

But by the summer of 1940, even this number of German reconnaissance units was not enough. In the Battle of Britain and during the fighting in the Atlantic, German reconnaissance aircraft underwent their first severe tests and revealed the first signs indicating the weakness of the German air force in relation to aerial reconnaissance. During the Battle of Britain, it soon became clear that 300 Henschel aircraft, which had a low speed, would provide a good target for the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters, armed with eight machine guns and surpassing them in speed by almost 160 km/h, so these vehicles had to be excluded from active operations, although they were partly used for patrolling in the Bay of Biscay coastline. The remaining Dornier, Heinkel and Junkers long-range reconnaissance aircraft also proved vulnerable to Hurricane and Spitfire fighters as they attempted to fly reconnaissance missions over land. As a result, the Germans failed to conduct reconnaissance of many airfields and factories, which were important targets for Goering's bomber aircraft. German reconnaissance aircraft failed to obtain reliable information about the results of their raids on airfields, radar installations and factories. During the Battle of Britain, German naval reconnaissance aircraft also began to experience difficulties in the new Atlantic theater of operations. During operations against ships, mainly in the North Sea or in ports on the east coast of England, German reconnaissance aircraft carried out weather reconnaissance, aerial photographic reconnaissance and surveillance missions. When air combat operations spread further to the West and into the Bay of Biscay, German reconnaissance aircraft were not up to the task. From the end of 1940, it began to play more and more of a secondary role, and its actions became less effective. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, long-range reconnaissance in the interests of the German air force was often carried out by Italian aircraft. The position of German reconnaissance aircraft continued to deteriorate on all three major fronts because the Germans knew that they had the means to carry out only the most minimal tasks. In the West, during the period from January 1941 to September 1944, the Germans could not conduct a single sortie based on aerial photography of London. In the crucial period before the Allied invasion of France, a wealth of information about invasion plans could be obtained by aerial reconnaissance of the ports of the south coast of England, but British fighter patrols drove off most of the German reconnaissance aircraft, and the aerial photographs they received were of poor quality and gave very little information. In the East the situation was even worse, since after 1943 reconnaissance aircraft units were often involved in bombing missions. Of course, the German troops operating against the Soviet Army received little information from aerial reconnaissance that allowed them to judge the direction and strength of the attacks of the Soviet troops from the end of 1942. At that time, aviation support for the Suez Canal zone and the central Mediterranean Sea from the Germans and Italians was also insufficient. The position of German reconnaissance aircraft deteriorated at a time when it was especially necessary to strengthen the reconnaissance activities of the German Air Force. When the enemy is weak, the movements of his troops do not play a big role; but when it is strong, the importance of aerial reconnaissance increases.

Air reconnaissance issues have not yet been adequately reflected in modern doctrines of air strategy and air power. Well-organized aerial reconnaissance (or information) is the "first line" of air defense and the first important condition for successful air operations. If guided missiles and bombers are used as means of attack, then first of all it is necessary to know where the enemy is, what his means and numbers are. To ensure the protection of ships from attack by submarines, it is necessary to detect them in a timely manner. To evaluate the effects of wartime bombing, it is necessary to have up-to-date information about the destruction caused, the dispersal of industry, reconstruction efforts, and the construction of new factories. Aerial reconnaissance can completely change the outcome of ground combat operations. The German offensive in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944/45 began during a period of fog, as a result of which allied aerial reconnaissance was not carried out. Hardly in the entire Pacific theater of operations - from Pearl Harbor to Fr. Okinawa - naval battles were held in which aerial reconnaissance would not play an important role.

Yet the value of aerial reconnaissance is always underestimated. During a war, it is impossible to economically distribute forces and means and use them to the maximum without knowledge of the situation. What Clausewitz wrote about the war a hundred years ago is still being studied and has not lost its force: “Many reports received in war contradict one another; there are even more false reports, and the bulk of them are not very reliable.” It is difficult for a non-specialist to understand that the information available to the high command, which serves as the basis for decision-making, is often insufficient and incomplete. Troop commanders can direct combat operations for months without having any information about how many aircraft, ships, tanks or submarines the enemy is releasing. True, there are many sources of intelligence information: prisoners of war, documents captured from the enemy, agents and radio interception. But how do you find out what information a particular prisoner of war has? While it is possible to determine in advance which radiograms can be deciphered and what information they contain, it is not always possible to capture enemy documents containing important information. It is rare to rely on agents to deliver the necessary intelligence in the form required. The only source of obtaining reliable and up-to-date military information is aerial photo reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance activities can be planned and controlled. Almost always, aircraft performing aerial reconnaissance missions bring photographs that provide the most valuable information, since the objects, time and date of photographing are known. Even visual reconnaissance, although subject to human error, can provide rapid intelligence that can satisfy operational requirements. Moreover, knowing exactly the time and place of receiving intelligence information is already half of being confident in its reliability.

In Soviet military circles, the words “tactical (military) intelligence” (reconnaissance) and “strategic intelligence” (intelligence) are synonymous. Yet the USSR never attached as much importance to tactical intelligence as the Germans did between the two world wars. The Soviet Air Force always had (and still has) reconnaissance aviation regiments of 30–40 aircraft, but they were never enough to meet the army's intelligence needs. Has anyone ever heard of the existence of an air reconnaissance command in the air forces of the Western powers, equal in position to the bomber and fighter air commands and the coastal aviation command of the British air force? Position, dignity and popularity play as important a role in military life as in civilian life. It is rare to hear of a reconnaissance aircraft pilot or navigator becoming a national hero. At the time the Bruneval raid was reported, few had heard of the valuable low-altitude aerial photographs taken by Air Major Hill. Intelligence obtained from aerial photographs provided the input for the raid on Bruneval. He subsequently took many aerial photographs of radar stations during flights that required skill, courage and enterprise; but, as was the case with many other reconnaissance pilots who delivered valuable information both during the First and Second World Wars, his feat was soon forgotten. Apparently, fighter and bomber pilots are considered the aristocrats of the air and the exclusive bearers of the Victoria Cross and the Congressional Order of Honour. This opinion is erroneous, since every pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft must be a first-class specialist in order to cope with his tasks. With modern radio and radar equipment on bombers and fighters, a moderately qualified crew can often achieve good results. It is significant that in the British Air Force a navigator wears only half a wing on his uniform and rarely rises to the rank of colonel. Those who fly know how often the navigator is the most important and authoritative member of the aircraft crew. And yet, did at least one navigator who participated in the First World War become an aviation general or air marshal during the Second World War?

Modern air forces must consider organizing aerial reconnaissance on a completely new basis. At the beginning of the Second World War, only the German air force was able to provide intelligence data for bombing operations. In the US Army Air Forces! The lenses of many aerial cameras satisfied only the requirements of peacetime cartographic aerial photography. In many cases, their dimensions were insufficient to obtain aerial photographs at the scale required for detailed interpretation. There were very few trained code breakers and reconnaissance pilots.

During the Second World War, aerial reconnaissance of all types was widely developed, but the war did not teach the basic strategic lesson that the conduct of multi-role air operations on a large scale requires multi-role aerial reconnaissance of the appropriate scale. In modern warfare, aerial reconnaissance missions are very diverse. Coastal aviation conducts reconnaissance on sea communications, meteorological reconnaissance is carried out over land and sea, radar reconnaissance is carried out to detect enemy radar stations, and strategic aviation reconnaissance is carried out to determine the results of bombing and obtain intelligence data on targets. In addition, there is tactical reconnaissance, which includes adjusting artillery fire, identifying camouflaged objects and targets, and monitoring the movement of enemy troops along highways and railways. During the Second World War, reconnaissance activities for each of the above tasks hardly lasted more than a few months. During the first two years of the war, no aerial survey of Japan's growing aircraft industry was conducted in the Pacific theater. The British conducted insufficient meteorological reconnaissance over German territory. Captured battle logs revealed that what the Allies thought were bad weather days in important cities like Berlin and Leipzig were actually clear, sunny days. Winston Churchill wrote about the British air raids on Berlin, which began in November 1943: “We had to wait until March 1944 to obtain sufficiently clear aerial photographs necessary to evaluate the results of the bombing. This was partly due to poor meteorological conditions, but also insufficient number of Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft. American aircraft, which carried out raids on oil refineries in Romania in 1943, and subsequently did not have aerial photographic reconnaissance data both during the period of planning operations and during the period of assessing the results of bombing. Effective air patrols in coastal areas and good radio communications could have thwarted the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during their breakthrough across the English Channel were accidentally discovered by a Spitfire aircraft performing a combat air patrol mission, and not by reconnaissance aircraft One can cite many examples when, at the decisive stages of the Second World War, the organization of aerial reconnaissance was poorly organized.

The tactical lessons of World War II have been well learned. It is now clear that reconnaissance aircraft must be the best, and their crews must be the most qualified. Bombers and fighters intended for reconnaissance should be stripped of their weapons and replaced with additional fuel tanks in order to increase their range and flight speed. All the best aircraft of the Second World War: Mosquito, Mustang, Lightning, LaG and Messerschmitt jets were used for aerial reconnaissance. In the post-war period, aircraft such as the Canberra, a twin-engine jet design The Tupolev, Saber and other jet fighters, as well as the B-36 and B-52 strategic bombers, have all been specially adapted for aerial reconnaissance missions.There may also be a heavy bomber variant that will launch a supersonic fighter when approaching enemy territory -reconnaissance officer. It is clear that in aerial photography, precise maintaining of course, altitude and speed of flight is of great importance - which can only be accomplished by a few pilots; the choice of flight route and accurate timing of stay over the target are also important. Currently widely used cameras with lenses having focal lengths from 150 to more than 1500 mm; they provide a large photographic area with a large overlap, allowing detailed interpretation of aerial photographs taken from altitudes above 9000 m. All modern air forces use machines that provide fast and efficient interpretation. As soon as the plane lands, the 16- or 35-mm film is quickly transported to the local mobile processing center, where the first stage of processing is carried out within a few hours: developing, washing, drying, printing and initial decoding. Using these images, you can quickly estimate the damage caused by a bombing, or calculate the approximate number of cars, trains and troops on the move. In order to make maximum use of the aerial photographs obtained after the first processing for operational purposes, it is necessary to have a good file of intelligence information and military maps of the latest editions. In itself, information about the number of ships in the port, aircraft at the airfield or trains at the marshalling yard is of dubious value. It is necessary to know for what purpose certain funds are concentrated. This point can be illustrated with an example from the Second World War. At an airfield in central Norway, photographic reconnaissance discovered a large number of four-engine bombers designed to combat ships. This indicated that the Germans were preparing an attack on ships off the coast of Scotland or Ireland. There was turmoil on the ships. A decision was made to remove them to safety or take other measures. In fact, it turned out that the concentration of a large number of aircraft at one airfield was caused by bad weather in the area of ​​​​air bases in south-western France and south-western Norway, as well as due to the lack of spare parts at bases in central Norway, which caused the failure of several airplanes. What is often not taken into account is that aircraft photographed at the airfield may turn out to be faulty. A lot of information can be gleaned from each image, but in order for this information to be accepted as fact, it must be supplemented with other data.

At the second and third stages of deciphering aerial photographs, a more thorough study of them is carried out. The use of a stereoscope increases the accuracy of interpretation. The dim shadows on the hills and valleys become clear. Viewing aerial photographs through a stereoscope helps identify parked aircraft, camouflaged bridges and buildings by determining the difference in height of an object compared to surrounding objects. A stereoscope allows you to see the relief of an object by its shadow, which is often the last key for recognizing objects during deciphering. By studying the details of aerial photographs, it is possible to obtain a large amount of intelligence data, for example, comparative data on the development of a network of radar stations and anti-aircraft artillery firing positions, information on the construction and expansion of airfields with significant lengthening of runways. With the help of data obtained through aerial photographic reconnaissance, the preparation of the Axis countries for the failed airborne landing on the island was revealed. Malta from Sicily, where airfields and runways were specially built for this purpose. It was with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance that it was discovered that in Peenemünde the Germans were developing new weapons that in the future could play a decisive role in the war. The role of aerial reconnaissance of strategic targets cannot be overestimated. Accurate and reliable basic intelligence can be obtained from other intelligence sources. But only with the help of aerial reconnaissance can reliable information be obtained about the best flight route to the target, taking into account air defenses in the area, enemy camouflage, and important target areas that have recently undergone reconstruction or restoration.

However, one important issue in aerial photography is often misunderstood. Currently, it is still claimed that using aerial photographs it is possible to determine how long a particular object has been out of action. During the Second World War, aerial photographs were used to conclude something like this: "It is estimated that the facility's production capacity has been reduced by 50 percent for a period of two to three months." No one can calculate the percentage of destruction from aerial photographs with such accuracy. The pace of restoration work depends on many factors: the morale of the population, the order of work, the supply of electricity, the availability of labor and raw materials. In 1944, assessments of the destruction of German aircraft factories based on aerial photographs were optimistic because the enemy had dispersed industrial plants and used production space in unknown factories. Assessments of the destruction of Japanese aircraft factories in 1944–1945 have often been pessimistic, since the pace of reconstruction work in Japan was slow, and the overestimation of the destruction of German factories in 1944 is probably too well remembered.

One of the sad lessons of the Korean air war is that the experience of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War was lost. Firstly, there was a great shortage of qualified codebreakers. The work of interpreting aerial photographs requires a lot of preparation and skill. Many good codebreakers lost their skills while working in civilian institutions. In 1950, the US Air Force had only two air reconnaissance squadrons in Japan and Korea, one of which was dedicated to mapping. The second squadron could not be used effectively, as it suffered greatly from a lack of material and personnel. When these squadrons began to carry out their tasks, the tactical lessons of the forties were already forgotten. They received too many impossible requests for large-scale aerial photographs that needed to be taken from low altitudes and at high speed. There were various bodies which, despite limited resources, used aerial reconnaissance to meet their own needs; It happened that on the same day, at the request of various organizations, reconnaissance flights were made twice along the same route. The worst thing is that there were no codebreakers. But these initial difficulties were soon overcome. By the beginning of 1952, mobile photo laboratories were organized, equipped with vans, trailers with power units and water tanks. There were vans for printing photographs and developing photographic films, workshops for repairing photographic equipment, a film library - that is, everything necessary for processing aerial photographs in the field. The number of equipment, personnel and aircraft gradually increased. Requests for aerial reconnaissance were coordinated within the U.S. Air Forces Far East Intelligence Directorate, and the operations of United Nations forces in Korea became more economical and expedient.

Of the lessons of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War, one lesson has perhaps remained unlearned - the inadmissibility of underestimating the use of seaplanes and flying boats. During the war, American Catalina flying boats, British Sunderland, Soviet MR and German seaplanes and Heinkel and Dornier flying boats conducted coastal and meteorological reconnaissance, carried out anti-submarine patrols and performed other tasks in the interests of the naval forces. strength But after the war, seaplanes and flying boats fell out of fashion in the air forces of Western powers, although a few such squadrons remained in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Communists in Korea had a negligible bomber force; If the few airfields that the United Nations had at its disposal during the early period of the Korean War had been subjected to even mild air attack, their aircraft would have been forced to operate from air bases in Japan, losing much of their advantage. In many cases, only seaplanes and flying boats, dispersed at anchorages in case of air attack, can provide important information about enemy movements and changing weather conditions. The Germans came to appreciate flying boats and seaplanes in 1940 during the Norway Campaign, when they had few airfields at their disposal and meteorological and other intelligence was essential to the rapid success of the campaign. There is no doubt that in the future there may be conditions similar to those in the Pacific theater in which flying boats will play an important role. Flying boats are a convenient and economical means of passenger transportation on civil airlines; they are capable of carrying large payloads and can be quickly adapted for military purposes. Flying boats are more valuable than many realize.

The need for weather forecasts on a global scale is now greater than ever before, but the role of aerial reconnaissance in this regard is difficult to define. If it becomes necessary to move air squadrons across large bodies of water at speeds in excess of 1,100 km/h, as was the case in early 1954, then the weather service must provide weather forecasts on a global scale. Currently, thousands of land and sea weather stations have been established in all countries, delivering basic weather data. There is countless previously collected information about weather conditions and climate that can help establish relationships between current local weather data and possible long-term weather trends. Electronic equipment is increasingly being used to predict the weather. VHF radios are used to warn of impending storms that pose a danger to aircraft flights. With the help of radar stations, the nature of winds in the upper layers of the atmosphere is determined. It would be impractical to keep large numbers of aircraft busy with weather reconnaissance when these aircraft are needed for more important missions. It would be more expedient to increase the number of land-based mobile weather stations and ships for weather reconnaissance at sea, improve meteorological instruments and ensure reliable communications with central authorities that summarize information on weather conditions.

Of course, there is still a need to use a certain number of aircraft for meteorological reconnaissance, especially in conditions of increasing range of all types of aircraft, when bombers can encounter a variety of meteorological conditions during the flight to the target. It is difficult to anticipate the full scope of operational requirements in the field of meteorological reconnaissance, as well as in the field of military reconnaissance. As the ability to use expensive atomic weapons for close air support grows, tactical military reconnaissance becomes more and more important. We must not allow atomic weapons to be wasted on secondary purposes. In the era of atomic missiles and tactical atomic bombs that can be fired from fighter-bombers, timely and reliable information is extremely important. Expensive tactical guided projectiles also cannot be used against small objects. If ground forces operate in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East, where many areas have not yet been mapped, then the needs for aerial photography will be significant. This is evidenced by the experience of military operations in Malaya. The existing maps of Malaya turned out to be useless for military purposes. It was necessary to draw up new military maps, which required aerial photography of an area of ​​more than 10 thousand square meters. km. Much of this work was carried out using helicopters. These vehicles also proved extremely valuable for aerial reconnaissance during the Korean War. But the territories of Korea and Malaya cannot be compared, for example, with the vast expanses of Asia, where there are also no modern large-scale military maps and the compilation of which will require colossal efforts of aerial reconnaissance. It's safe to say that any future conflict that involves aerial reconnaissance will almost certainly involve the entire world. The number of reconnaissance aircraft will be very limited. What can be done in a relatively calm peacetime environment to best prepare for war with limited resources? The first and most important condition is the conduct of universal training of armed forces personnel in visual surveillance. Part of the time spent on physical training and lectures on current issues can be usefully used to study meteorology, camouflage, aerial observation techniques, geography, terrain features - that is, all issues that develop theoretical and practical skills among personnel of all branches of the armed forces for conducting reconnaissance. Activities such as showing special documentary films to all personnel, conducting practical checks after flights for the assignment of a special observer badge, which entitles them to a salary supplement, will increase the overall level of intelligence training. All Air Force bomber fighter and transport units must have more pilots specially trained for reconnaissance missions. If the initial training of observers is organized on a large scale in the armed forces, it will not be difficult to create reconnaissance detachments in combat air units and staff them with personnel. In addition, conditions must be created for a more flexible switching of aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance. Why not, for example, use an entire air wing of bombers and fighters to survey an entire area and thus obtain visual reconnaissance data for that area. But too often only two or three aircraft are allocated for aerial reconnaissance. Just as a good boxer reserves his signature punch until he knows his opponent's strengths and weaknesses, successful aerial offensive operations require detailed knowledge of enemy territory, and it is often advisable to delay the commencement of operations until necessary. information will not be received. Saving effort and money for aerial reconnaissance only leads to a waste of money during bombing.

If the vast spaces covered by modern warfare necessitate large-scale aerial reconnaissance, they also require special attention to issues of communications and centralized control. The USA, Great Britain and the USSR have created central intelligence departments, but they mainly perform strategic intelligence tasks. It is necessary to organize a unified intelligence service of the armed forces, which would include a unit of photo decipherers who process all intelligence materials received through all channels: this department should include both military and civilian specialists. Of course, in this department there should be specialized units: technical, scientific, industrial, etc., but these units should be general, without any preference to one of the branches of the armed forces. Intelligence information is valuable to all branches of the armed forces: intelligence about weather conditions, radar stations, enemy ships and almost all other information is rarely of interest to only one branch of the armed forces.

Likewise, reconnaissance aviation units and additionally created reconnaissance observer detachments should also serve the entire armed forces, and not just the aviation forces. Aerial reconnaissance, like strategic bombing, must be conducted in accordance with national military policy determined by the Departments of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The control of Soviet long-range bomber aircraft during the Second World War was carried out by the State Defense Committee, and reconnaissance aviation units were dispersed, being at the disposal of the commanders of the formations of the ground army and navy. The Anglo-American Strategic Bomber Force was temporarily subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it never sought the subordination of air reconnaissance, which was often the eyes of the Strategic Bomber Force and the assessor of the results of its actions. Of course, there is currently an increasing trend towards unification of the armed forces. Joint intelligence departments and joint committees have already been organized, and the joint development of many staff documents is underway. The time has now come for the abolition of the different uniforms of the separate branches of the armed forces and for the development of detailed plans for the closest possible unification of the army, navy and air force at all levels where possible. However, this is a big independent question, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter IX. Chapter 3. Reconnaissance Reconnaissance in the mountains is more difficult than on flat terrain. Mountainous, rugged terrain, the presence of mountain spurs and ridges, gorges and valleys between them contributes to the secrecy of enemy movements and the location of his units. In addition, folds