North Korean submarine. DPRK Navy. Special Operations Forces

As of 2008, the strength of the DPRK Navy was 46,000 people, in 2012 it was 60,000. The conscription service life is 5-10 years.

The naval headquarters is located in Pyongyang. The majority of the Navy consists of Coast Guard forces. The Navy is capable of conducting border protection operations in the coastal zone, offensive and defensive operations, mining and conventional raid operations. At the same time, due to the unbalanced composition of the fleet, it has limited capabilities to control sea spaces, act as a deterrent, or fight against submarines. Over 60% of North Korean warships are located at forward bases.

The main task of the Navy is to support the combat operations of ground forces against the South Korean army. The Navy is capable of conducting missile and artillery attacks on coastal targets.

North Korea builds its own small and medium-sized submarines, mainly at the Nampo and Wonsan shipyards.

The Navy command has two fleets under its command, Eastern and Western, consisting of 16 battle groups. Due to the geographical location, there is no exchange of ships between fleets.

The Western Fleet, consisting of 6 squadrons of approximately 300 ships, operates in the Yellow Sea. The naval headquarters is located in Nampo, the main ports are Pipha-got and Sagot, and the smaller bases are Cho-do and Tasa-ni. The fleet includes a brigade of landing boats, two brigades for guarding the water area, four divisions of missile boats, four divisions of submarines, and a separate division for guarding the water area.

The Eastern Fleet, consisting of 10 squadrons of approximately 470 ships, operates in the Sea of ​​Japan. The naval headquarters is located in Taidong, the main ports are Najin and Wonsan, and the smaller bases are Chaho, Chongjin, Myang Do and Puam-ni. The fleet includes two brigades of landing boats, two brigades of water area protection, a brigade of boats, a division of URO frigates, three divisions of missile boats, a separate division of torpedo boats, three divisions of submarines, a separate division of midget submarines (sabotage and reconnaissance forces).

The submarine fleet is decentralized. Submarines are based in Chaho, Mayangdo and Pipha-got.

Najin-class frigate of the DPRK Navy

The fleet includes 3 guided missile frigates (2 Najin, 1 Soho), 2 destroyers, 18 small anti-submarine ships, 4 Soviet submarines of Project 613, 23 Chinese and domestic submarines of Project 033 (Project 633), 29 small submarines boats of the Sang-O project, more than 20 midget submarines, 34 missile boats (10 project 205 Osa, 4 Huangfeng class, 10 Sozhu, 12 project 183 Komar; the boats are armed with P-class anti-ship missiles 15 Termit or Chinese CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH), 150 torpedo boats (about half are domestically built), fire support boats (including 62 CHAHO class), 56 large (6 Hainan, 12 Taejong, 13 "Shanghai-2", 6 "Chonju", 19 "SO-1") and more than 100 small patrol boats, 10 small landing ships "Hante" (capable of carrying 3-4 light tanks), up to 120 landing boats (in including about 100 “Nampo”, created on the basis of the Soviet torpedo boat P-6, having a speed of up to 40 knots and a range of up to 335 km and capable of transporting up to 30 fully equipped paratroopers), up to 130 hovercraft, 24 minesweepers “Yukto” -1/2", 8 floating bases of ultra-small submarines, a submarine rescue vessel, 4 hydrographic vessels, minelayers.

DPRK Navy patrol vessel

The use of high-speed missile and torpedo boats allows for surprise attacks on enemy warships. Submarines can be used to block sea communications, lay minefields and land special operations troops. Approximately 60% of ships are based near the demilitarized zone.

The Navy has two sniper brigades on amphibious vessels.

The coastal forces include two regiments (thirteen anti-ship missile battalions) and sixteen separate coastal artillery battalions. Coastal batteries are armed with surface-to-sea missiles S-2 Sopka, CSSC-2 SILKWORM (a Chinese copy of the Soviet P-15M), and CSSC-3 SEERSUCKER with a range of up to 95 km, as well as coastal artillery caliber 122/130/152 mm.

The DPRK fleet has extensive experience in laying minefields. Its fleet has a significant number of surface vessels designed to lay mines against coastal landings from amphibious ships, protect strategic ports and provide sea protection for ground forces. The coastal defense system combines minefields with artillery and missile coastal batteries.

DPRK semi-submersible boat

The DPRK Navy operates semi-submerged vessels used by the Navy's 137th Squadron to disembark special forces soldiers from the sea. Due to their low profile, these vessels are poorly visible on radar. The speed on the surface of the water is 45 knots (83 km/h), the speed in a semi-submerged state is 4 knots (7.4 km/h).

In addition to combat ships, there are 10 cargo ships under the direct control of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.

Rozin Alexander.

Soviet Navy and North Korean Navy (DPRK).

Creation of the DPRK fleet.

The North Korean Navy was created on June 5, 1946. as the Maritime Security Force, the headquarters was based in the port of Wonsan and began operating in July. In December 1946, the naval forces were renamed the "Marine Patrols", the headquarters was moved to the capital - Pyongyang, for more effective management of naval forces. In June 1947 A Naval School (Marine Patrol Academy) was created in Wonsan to train officers for the fleet. Initially, the naval forces were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and from August 20, 1949. reporting to the Department of Homeland Security. After the division of torpedo boats was formed on August 29, the patrol force began to be called the Naval Forces, and this date was celebrated as Navy Day until it was changed to June 5 in 1993.

The USSR provided assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in creating its national fleet: ships and boats were transferred, and the institution of Soviet naval advisers was introduced. According to Admiral V.M. Grishanov, who in 1947-1950. was deputy chief and then chief of the political department of the 5th Navy, in 1949-1954. The Soviet Union transferred part of the warships and vessels to North Korea (a total of 68 units), including 37 torpedo boats, 9 minesweepers, 8 submarine hunters. Most of them, apparently, were transferred after the 1953 armistice. According to other more reliable data, before 1950 the DPRK fleet was transferred: 1 minesweeper (most likely BTShch pr.53 - T-3 “Provodnik” in March 1953), 4 patrol ships (there is information that one of them was an SKR Project 39 - “Zarnitsa” in 1950), 6 transports, 10 torpedo boats (at least five G-5 type), 3 small ones (OD-200 project) and 1 large hunter. In the naval schools of the USSR and Soviet teachers in educational institutions of North Korea trained personnel for the new fleet. On March 1, 1950. 612 naval officers and 640 sailors were trained for the Navy. In particular, in Pacific Naval Institute named after S.O. Makarov in Vladivostok North Korean crews of G-5 torpedo boats were trained. Among the Koreans was the future Hero of the DPRK Kim Gun Ok, who received the title of Hero for attacking the intervention cruisers on July 2, 1950.

All issues regarding the construction of the Korean fleet were discussed with Kim Il Sung and his assistants. From the Soviet side, the commander of the Soviet operational group, Admiral G.V. Zhukov and V.M. Grishanov, took part in their discussion. According to the latter’s recollections, “decisions were made quickly and then actively put into practice.” In 1948, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral A. S. Frolov, came to Seishin to discuss the creation of the DPRK Navy. He took part in resolving issues related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the transfer of a number of Soviet warships to the command of Korean naval officers. Soviet instructors remained in North Korea to assist the North Koreans in mastering Soviet technology.

In the formation of the fleet, the Koreans were helped by Soviet specialists, led by the senior naval adviser in the DPRK, Admiral Seid Avvakumovich Kapanadze. And many command positions in the DPRK Navy were occupied by so-called Soviet Koreans, these are persons of Korean nationality who were sent from the USSR in the period from August 1945. to January 1949 for the construction of a new state. Here are just some of the Soviet Koreans who were associated with the fleet. The commander-in-chief of the Navy was General Han Il Mu (born 1905), later the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, the chief of staff of the KPA Navy was Major General Kim Won Mu (1910), the head of the operations department of the naval headquarters was Park Din (1920), the head of the naval base in Nampo was Colonel Kim Woo Hyun (1917), the commander of the 25th Coast Guard Brigade was Major General O Gi Jong (1904), the head of the naval school was Kim Gwan Bin (1912) and Major General Lee Se Ho (1920), teacher The naval school was captain 1st rank Hwang Geum Cher (1924). A recognized authority in the Navy was the Hero of the DPRK, Rear Admiral Kim Chir Sung. At the end of the Korean War, some of the Soviet Koreans who remained in the DPRK were forced out of leadership positions, many of them were repressed. Only a few remained in power and were forced to faithfully serve the Kim Il Sung regime. The overwhelming majority returned to the USSR.

By the beginning of the Korean War, the DPRK Navy (Korean People's Navy - KPN) had (approximate data, since there is no exact data on the composition of the DPRK Navy) consisting of four divisions of ships:

1st division of patrol boats (1st Patrol boats Squadron) - three sea hunters of the OD-200 type;

2nd division of torpedo boats (2nd PT boats Squadron) - five boats of the G-5 type (including No. 21, No. 22, No. 23, No. 24), based on Wonsan;

3rd minesweepers division (3rd Minesweepers Squadron) - two former American YMS type minesweepers and one former Japanese;

Division of ships under construction - 7 ships with a displacement of 250 and 800 tons;

In addition, the fleet included one floating base, one military transport with a displacement of 2000 tons (formerly American, transferred from South Korea in 1949), six different boats and schooners (with a displacement of 60-80 tons). The total strength of the navy was 10,297, including 3,680 naval personnel, 5,483 marines and 1,134 coastal defense personnel. In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities, up to 100 ships with a displacement of 60 to 100 tons were mobilized.

At the first stage, the DPRK leadership actively used its small fleet. The main tasks performed by the DPRK fleet during the Korean War were tactical landings on the coast occupied by the enemy, occasional battles with enemy ships on the high seas, and laying minefields. By the beginning of September 1950, the DPRK fleet had lost almost all its ships as a result of air strikes and battles at sea; the remaining ships took refuge in Soviet and Chinese ports. In the third and fourth stages of the war, only available floating craft were used for operations at sea - fishing kungas and schooners. More details about the activities of the Korean fleet and Soviet sailors in the Korean War of 1950-1953 are described in the material “ »

Three post-war decades.

After the end of the Korean War, the USSR helped North Korea rebuild its naval forces. In September 1953, and then in March 1954, the staff of military, naval advisers and service personnel in the KPA was revised. According to the new list of positions in 1954, the total staffing level of the apparatus of military advisers in the KPA was determined at 164 people, including 12 naval advisers. The preservation of such a staff of advisers was caused by the need to solve the following tasks: “to ensure the organized deployment of combat training in the KPA and further strengthening the combat readiness of troops and military equipment; continue studying and summarizing the experience of the Korean War." Since the 1950s, the USSR has provided assistance in the training and education of Korean military personnel, including in its military educational institutions. In total, until 1992, 2,614 DPRK military personnel were trained in the USSR/Russia, including 175 people for the DPRK Navy. To replace those sunk, the DPRK Navy received minesweepers of Project 53 (Huges type): in December 1953. - “T-2” “Cable” and T-8 “Check”. Also in the 50s, they received a patrol ship of Project 39 - “Molniya”, and a number of boats - torpedo boats of Project 123K, anti-submarine boats - sea hunters of the OD-200 and MO-4 types. These ships were supposed to guard the coast. And soon our sailors got to know them closely.

March 5, 1955 The North Korean government unilaterally adopted a resolution in which, along with establishing the width of territorial waters, a significant part of the East Korean Gulf was declared internal waters of the DPRK. Many countries disagreed with this and considered them international waters under international law. Due to unresolved issues with world countries and neighbors about the width of the territorial waters, the DPRK authorities nervously reacted to any violation of their borders, as it seemed to them. Moreover, the North Korean Navy did not always adhere to the generally accepted rules of conduct for military ships at sea, since they were ordered to use weapons against “foreign ships”, acting on the principle of “shoot first, and sort it out later.” This is at the end of 1959. led to them literally shooting down a Soviet ship.

In December 1959 The reconnaissance ship of the Pacific Fleet "GS-34", which had the status of a hydrographic vessel for cover and the name "Ungo", under the command of Lieutenant Commander Alexander Borisovich Kozmin, was on a cruise in the Sea of ​​Japan off the eastern coast of Korea in the East Korean Gulf. RK "GS-34" - "Ungo", schooner, built in 1954. in the shipyards of the GDR. May 9, 1955 The national flag of the USSR was raised on the schooner and the name “Ungo” was given. In 1955 The ship, under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Lazarenko Akim Naumovich, crossed to the Pacific Ocean by the northern sea route and became part of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Service as a messenger ship. Since 1956 The schooner was classified as a subclass of messenger ships and received the name “GS-34”, and the name “Ungo” was left as legendary. In 1957 was classified as a 3rd rank special purpose ship. In 1958 Senior Lieutenant Alexander Borisovich Kozmin was appointed commander. This time the ship was carrying out a regular reconnaissance voyage, providing reconnaissance support for the safety of the return of repatriates from Japan to North Korea. On the evening of December 28, it was stormy and there was little visibility. At 19:00 the weather improved. The commander of the BC-1, Eduard Shchukin, on the orders of the ship’s commander, began to determine the location of the ship more often. It was quickly getting dark, visual surveillance on the ship was intensified, and a watch was kept at the radio and electronic intelligence posts. In order to ensure the secrecy of reconnaissance, the active radar station was not turned off. The ship was located in the area of ​​39° 07" N and 128° 35" E. It was 30 miles to the North Korean coast, and even more than 36 miles to the South Korean coast (the width of the territorial waters of the DPRK is 12 miles, South Korea - 3 miles). Suddenly, missiles appeared on the starboard side of the GS-34 - Ungo, and almost at the same instant a fiery path traced the sky, rushing towards the ship. The commander of the ship is captain-lieutenant Kozmin A.B. was firmly confident in the location of his ship and that the ship had not violated the territorial waters of a foreign state, and, therefore, this salvo could not even be of a warning nature. The GS-34, having no weapons on board, was forced to turn 90° and begin to move even further from the shore. One of the searchlights on the ship was turned on and the helmsman-signalman, sailor Grigory Kopanev, using the international code of signals, began to continuously signal towards the shore: “What caused the shelling?” Several tedious tense minutes passed, when suddenly our sailors saw the silhouettes of three ships without running lights or any other identifying marks. The ships were quickly approaching the GS-34. One of them walked straight towards the ship and after a few minutes was identified as a small anti-submarine ship - the “big hunter”. The commander of the “GS-34” ordered one of the searchlights to be directed at the hydrographic flag of the USSR, which was flying over the reconnaissance ship (the RK Pacific Fleet flew under this flag since August 3, 1959), and the second searchlight, on which Alexander Shesternin was on watch, to illuminate the foreign ship approaching it . At 20.40 on December 28, the “big hunter” approached the “GS-34” at a distance of 45-50 cables and, without any warning, fired four bursts of 40-mm automatic installations at the unarmed “GS-34”. The distance between the ships at that moment was so small that it was impossible not to see the hydrographic flag of the USSR on the GS-34. After that, the boat turned away and went into the darkness. As a result of the fire, the compass was broken, the radio antenna was damaged, the boat was damaged, the pipe and hull of the ship were damaged, the life raft was broken, and one of the shells hit the bow cockpit. The GS-34 slowed down and began to drift; the boat again approached the ship and opened fire. Shells exploded on the deck, one shell hit the wheelhouse, the ship's commander was thrown back by the blast wave, and the ship's assistant commander, Lieutenant-Commander Novomodny Alexander Pavlovich (secretary of the party organization, classmate of the commander at the Makarov TOVVMU) and helmsman-signalman Yuri Fedorov, who was picking up the flags for a signal to stop shelling, they were wounded at the same time. The shells continued to hit the ship. At the moment the shell exploded in the control room, the helmsman-signalman, sailor Alexander Sergeevich Kazhaev, who was standing watch at the helm, managed to rush in the direction where the ship’s commander was and shielded him with his body. At the same time, A.S. Kazhaev was killed on the spot, having received a direct hit in the stomach from a shell. Signalman Viktor Kazantsev and helmsman Anatoly Belkin were seriously injured, but neither one nor the other left their posts, continuing to carry out the orders of the ship’s commander. All this time, the wounded signalman Grigory Kopanev continued to illuminate the flag of his ship, when the “hunter” came close again, our sailors saw his number “205” and the Korean letter. The boat, holding the spotlight on the Soviet flag, slowly moved to the side and disappeared into the darkness. Two other ships, lying drifting at a distance, also went into the darkness. During the shelling, the entire crew behaved bravely. The helmsmen and signalmen did not leave their posts, radio operator Yuri Shadrin maintained continuous communication with Vladivostok, and in the engine crew, where at that time it was especially difficult to keep a watch, not knowing what was happening above and what was threatening the ship, not a single motorman for a minute did not leave his post. Nikolai Ivanovich Balandin and his subordinates provided the ship with the desired speed. The ship's boatswain Alexander Sherstinin and many others performed their duties flawlessly.

IL-28 planes flew to the area of ​​the incident; on alert, a destroyer on duty was sent from the naval base Strelok, which took on board the body of the killed sailor A.S. Kazhaev and wounded sailors to deliver them to the naval hospital. "GS-34" ("Ungo") was taken in tow and delivered to the base. The deceased sailor Alexander Sergeevich Kazhaev was buried in the naval cemetery in Vladivostok.

Regarding this incident, a note of protest was sent by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the government of South Korea. TASS stated that in future, during such actions, the “pirates” ships will be destroyed. The South Korean authorities declared their non-involvement in the incident and were ready to provide film documents documenting the attack by North Korean boats on the Soviet ship. Later, according to updated data, it was established that the pirate ship was the North Korean small anti-submarine ship “No. 205” of the “BO-1” type, received from the USSR in the early 50s. The Soviet press did not write anywhere about the involvement of North Korean ships in the incident. In addition to what was published in newspapers on December 31, 1959. there were several publications of protest notes about this incident, December 31, 1959. in the newspaper “Soviet Fleet” and in the magazine “Soviet Sailor” No. 2 for January 1959, but there all the blame was placed on South Korea. Subsequently, the repaired ship “GS-34” continued for another 13 years until 1972. carried out military service. Commander of the ship Alexander Borisovich Kozmin in 1960. received under his command the reconnaissance ship Izmeritel, then from 1971. - “Transbaikalia”. He served as a senior officer in the intelligence department of the Pacific Fleet and in 1982. completed his service with the rank of captain 1st rank as deputy head of the naval midshipman-technical school in Kyiv. Lived in Kyiv and died in 2001.

The incident did not affect our relationship. In the 50s, the leadership of the DPRK and Kim Il Sung personally pursued a foreign policy focused on an alliance with the USSR, China and other socialist countries. However, as the nationalist wing in the North Korean leadership gained strength, especially after the elimination of the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, the Juche ideology and the so-called independence in foreign policy were established, the DPRK moved further and further away from the USSR, although officially the leaders of North Korea had In total, Kim Il Sung himself, in conversations with Soviet officials, emphasized the “inviolability” of the course of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. At that time, Kim Il Sung’s group was not yet going to “completely” break away from the USSR. Moreover, she persistently sought the conclusion of an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union. In 1960 An agreement on trade and navigation was concluded between the USSR and the DPRK. Pyongyang played a complex game around the agreement. He, as it turned out later, planned to sign almost simultaneously the same document with Beijing. But then Moscow was not informed about this. Despite all the vicissitudes surrounding the treaty, Kim Il Sung went to Moscow to conclude a union treaty, which was signed on July 6, 1961. The military obligations assumed by the Soviet Union in accordance with the treaty, as subsequent events showed, were used by Kim Il Sung in his attempts to overthrow the South Korean regime.

In 1962 6 missile boats of Project 183E were transferred from the USSR, in addition, supplies of TKA Project 123K continued (40 units were transferred in 1951-1979), large torpedo boats and border patrol boats of Project 183 (in total 42 units were transferred - 27 from the USSR and 15 from China).In 1963 After training the North Korean crews, the Pacific Fleet handed over to the North Korean sailors two Project 613 diesel submarines “S-75” and “S-90”. Previously, these boats were brought to the DPRK, such as “S-90” under the command of captain 2nd rank Sukhachov B., in the fall of 1962. made the transition to a North Korean port. And already on March 25, 1963. expelled from the USSR Navy due to sale to a foreign customer.

The refusal of N.S. seriously complicated North Korean-Soviet relations. Khrushchev to visit the DPRK (it was assumed that the head of the Soviet government would pay a visit to Pyongyang and sign the Union Treaty). The repeatedly postponed trip of N.S. Khrushchev caused resentment and then indignation of Kim Il Sung. After N. S. Khrushchev was removed from all posts in 1964, in conversations with Soviet leaders, Kim Il Sung condemned the behavior of the former leader of the CPSU. A sharp reaction from the North Korean leader was also caused by N. S. Khrushchev’s refusal to supply Soviet weapons and military equipment to the DPRK free of charge. North Korean Defense Minister Kim Chang Bon held negotiations on this issue in Moscow in December 1962. However, when proposals for the purchase of Soviet weapons were presented to the North Korean side, the Korean military delegation broke off the negotiations and flew to Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung urgently convened a Plenum of the Central Committee of the WPK, at which a course for parallel economic and defense construction was approved. From that time on, the Juche doctrine was supplemented by the thesis of “self-defense in defense of the country.” At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Labor Party, N.S. Khrushchev personally and the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet Union were harshly criticized. There were even voices demanding that diplomatic relations with the USSR be broken.

After N.S. Khrushchev left the political arena, Soviet-North Korean relations normalized. In 1965, a Soviet delegation led by A. N. Kosygin visited Pyongyang. A number of economic and military agreements are signed between the USSR and the DPRK. Moscow provides Pyongyang with assistance in strengthening the defense capabilities of the DPRK. In 1966, two secret meetings between L. I. Brezhnev and Kim Il Sung took place. An intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation is being created. The USSR undertakes to construct large economic facilities in the DPRK and provides loans for these purposes. Later, the leadership of the DPRK, having established itself in the “inviolability of its independent” foreign policy, more than once raised the question of annulment of the union treaty with the USSR. However, these approaches by Kim Il Sung were rejected by Moscow. The Soviet Union viewed the 1961 Treaty as the most important means of maintaining peace and stability in and around the Korean Peninsula.

But this came at a price. By this time, with the help of the Soviet Union to protect the coast, North Korea had created a small coastal fleet, the main tasks of which were patrolling and covering the coast. In 1966 From the Pacific Fleet, 2 more submarines of Project 613 - “S-325” and “S-326” were transferred to the Koreans. On July 26, 1966. expelled from the USSR Navy in connection with the sale of the DPRK Navy. In addition, in 1968. 12 large missile boats of Project 205, 4 large torpedo boats of Project 206 were transferred. From the mid-60s, the DPRK began to independently build light naval forces, using Soviet ships as a basis; tact minesweepers of Project 53 (Fugas type) served as the prototype for the first North Korean escort ships of the Sariwon type, built in the DPRK in 1966-1967.

More than once the situation on the Korean Peninsula was on the brink of war - the crisis of 1968 with the seizure of the American ship Pueblo, the aggravation of the situation in 1969. after the DPRK shot down an American reconnaissance plane. More details about this in the publication “ " In 1968 The incident with the American vessel forced Pyongyang to officially confirm the 12-mile width of its territorial waters. But the North Korean authorities were not satisfied with this. In an interview with journalists from Peru on June 2, 1974, Kim Il Sung spoke in favor of developing countries expanding their territorial waters to 200 miles. On July 1, 1977, the DPRK established a 200-mile maritime economic zone, and from August 1, 1977, a coastal military guard zone.

Relations between our countries developed in 1969. Soviet merchant ships made 159 calls to the ports of the DPRK - Nampo, Songnim, Hungnam, Chongjin.

But in the seventies, North Korea in its policy was guided by China, with which, however, it fell out. But during our cooperation I gained a lot for myself, especially in the construction of my fleet. In the first half of the 70s, 7 Romeo-class submarines (Project 031, Chinese version of the Soviet Project 633) were built at the Wuhan Shipyard in China for the DPRK. Transferred 2 in 1973, 2 in 1974. and 3 in 1975 Since 1975 boats of this project, with the assistance of China, began to be built in the DPRK at the Sinpo u Mayang-do shipyard in the period from 1976. to 1995 16 submarines of this type were built. One submarine sank on February 20, 1985. 6 Chinese IPCs of Project 037 Hainan (“Hainan”, an analogue of the Soviet Project 201M) were supplied to the DPRK in 1975. - 2, 1976 - 2, 1978 - 2. In addition, the Chinese transferred 8 artillery boats of the Shantou type, 12 patrol boats of the Shanghai II type. In the 70s, the DPRK, using Chinese and Chinese-designed Soviet designs, began building warships, frigates and submarines, landing craft and various boats at its shipyards.

In the eighties, the DPRK tried to establish itself as the leader of the “third world” countries, but also without much success. During this period, cooperation with the USSR continued, although not in the same forms as before. At this time, the Soviet Union transferred a number of ships to the DPRK: in 1972, 2 RKA pr. 205 (plant No. 103, 104), in 1974. 4 TKA Project 123K, in the 70s 2 sea tugs Project 733 (used as border patrol ships), in January 1979 2 TKA pr.123K, in 1983 2 RKA pr.205.

A new round of naval cooperation.

Having tried himself as a “no alternative leader” of the “third world” countries and the non-aligned movement, Kim Il Sung and his entourage came to the realization that they needed to “rebuild” again. After all, leadership has to be paid for. “Juche” propaganda, all kinds of conferences, lectures and symposia in “third world” countries, circles for the study of “Kimirsenism” required money, and a lot of it. Only the Soviet Union could give them. Of course, Moscow did not allocate funds for the exaltation of the North Korean “leader”. It provided interest-free loans for the development of the DPRK economy, for the construction of industrial facilities, metallurgical plants, and for equipping the North Korean army with modern weapons.

For two years 1979-1980. North Korea allowed Soviet merchant ships and tankers to use the ice-free port of Najin year-round and from there transport oil and other cargo by rail to Vladivostok, whose harbor was closed by ice during the winter during these years. Senior South Korean officials point out that such actions would have been unthinkable just a few years ago and, although symbolic, are cause for concern.

Then the North Korean leaders moved towards closer rapprochement. Taking advantage of the change of power in the USSR (L. I. Brezhnev died) and the arrival of K. U. Chernenko to the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state, Kim Il Sung decided to begin the “next stage of friendship” with the USSR. The creation of a “favorable atmosphere” in bilateral relations begins. Positive assessments of some Soviet peace initiatives appear in North Korean publications. The DPRK media writes about the achievements of the “great Soviet people” in building socialism. Against this background, in May 1984, Kim Il Sung made a visit to Moscow. On May 23-25, negotiations took place with the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The parties noted “successes in important areas of socialist construction.” At the same time, K. U. Chernenko pointed out additional opportunities that exist in bilateral cooperation. This is not only the economic sphere, but also more “important areas - exchange of experience in party and government work, interaction in international politics.” After the visit to the USSR, Soviet-North Korean ties and cooperation again “went uphill.” In December 1985, the Prime Minister of the Administrative Council of the DPRK (head of government) Kang Sen San (the leader's nephew on his mother's side) arrived in Moscow. In development of the agreements that were reached at the negotiations between Kim Il Sung and Soviet leaders, Kang Sung San and N. A. Tikhonov signed a number of important agreements: on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, on the construction of a nuclear power plant in the DPRK, as well as a protocol on the results negotiations on the development of trade and economic cooperation for 1986-1990. The USSR provided loans for new industrial facilities. The nuclear agreement was especially important for the North Koreans. Pyongyang has long sought assistance from the USSR in the construction of a nuclear power plant. The Soviet side refused to build a nuclear power plant for a long time. The main reason is that North Korea was not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In December 1985, North Korea acceded to the NPT. This opened up the possibility of expanding cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy (nuclear power plant construction). Contacts between foreign policy departments have also expanded significantly. In January 1986, USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze paid his first visit to Pyongyang (before that, no head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry had visited North Korea). The foreign ministers of the USSR and the DPRK established regular contacts. Kim Yong Nam was in Moscow three times in the 80s, E. A. Shevardnadze also visited Pyongyang three times.

Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow intensified bilateral military cooperation. The USSR supplied military equipment and military equipment to the DPRK. Thanks to this, in the early 80s, the DPRK military aviation began a new stage of modernization: in addition to the previously available 150 MiG-21s, a batch of 60 MiG-23P fighter-interceptors and MiG-23ML front-line fighters was received from the USSR, and from the PRC - 150 Q-5 Phanlan attack aircraft. Army aviation, which had only a dozen Mi-4 helicopters, received 10 Mi-2s and 50 Mi-24s. In May-June 1988, the first six MiG-29s arrived in the DPRK; by the end of the year, the transfer of the entire batch of 30 aircraft of this type and another 20 Su-25K attack aircraft was completed.

In 1985 After the visit of the government delegation to Pyongyang, cooperation in the naval field intensified between our countries. February 20, 1985 sank in the Sea of ​​Japan the Romeo type submarine, Project 633, sunk by a fishing seiner. The rescue operation was led by the Deputy Commander of the KVF for military and military forces, Rear Admiral A.N. Lutsky. From February 20 to February 25, 1985 MTSH "Zapal" (captain - lieutenant Goncharov A.N.), together with MTSH "Paravan" as part of the KTG Primorsky Flotilla, took part in the search for a sunken submarine of the North Korean Navy in the territorial waters of the DPRK. The sunken submarine was discovered on the very first day of the search and covered.

August 13-18, 1985 A detachment under the command of the First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral N.Ya. Yasakov, consisting of the Tallinn BOD and 2 TFRs "Purivisty" and "Zealant" came to Wonsan (DPRK) on an official visit to participate in the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Korea. . Immediately after the ships were anchored, the detachment commander, Vice Admiral Yasakov, and a group of officers went ashore to visit officials. Thousands of workers in the city of Wonsan greeted them with a storm of applause. banners with words in Russian and Korean “Peace”, “Friendship”, Welcome!”, friendly smiles, flowers, handshakes accompanied them along the entire route. It was a meeting of good, good friends. Our sailors represented only part of the Soviet people who arrived for the anniversary celebrations. The envoys of the Country of Soviets - the party and state delegation led by a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Aliyev, members of other delegations of workers - representatives of our republics, territories and regions, veterans of the battles for the liberation of Korea - were warmly and cordially greeted in Pyongyang. On this day, all participants in the visit were awarded commemorative medals “40 Years of Liberation of Korea” in a solemn atmosphere on the decks of ships. At the Tallinn BOD, they were presented by the commander of the DPRK Navy, Senior Vice Admiral Kim Il Chor. Residents of the province and Korean sailors showed great interest in Soviet ships. They animatedly examined modern weapons and equipment, and became acquainted with the living conditions of the crews. Welcome guests on the ship were representatives of the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society and its chairman, Comrade Kin Kyung Ho. Members of the Society conduct active explanatory work, promote the ideals of socialism, and introduce the working people of the province to the achievements of the Soviet Union. There was an entry in the book of honorary visitors of the ship: “The Korean-Soviet Friendship Society, having visited Tallinn, felt even more warmth and friendship, cohesion between our peoples and fleets. May they be eternal and indestructible." Korean friends emphasized the idea that the visit of Soviet ships played a significant role in the further development and deepening of friendly good neighborly relations. They reminded us of the words of the head of state, Comrade Kim Il Sung, said during his visit to the USSR in May last year: “Korea and the Soviet Union are friendly neighbors connected by one river. The peoples of Korea and the Soviet Union are brothers in class, and close comrades in arms who fought together for a long time in the name of common ideals and ideas.”

July 4-8, 1986 A detachment under the command of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral V.V. Sidorov, consisting of the Minsk aircraft carrier, the Admiral Spiridonov BOD and the Zealous TFR, and the Argun tanker, came to Wonsan (DPRK) on an official visit. The visit took place within the framework of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK. When the Pacific Fleet ships were stationed in Wonsan, Korean officers were actively interested in Russian equipment, documentation, charters, and instructions. They later used their knowledge during joint military exercises. Among them there were many sailors who knew Russian.

A few weeks later, July 25-29, 1986. The first visit in the history of the two states by ships of the DPRK Navy to the USSR took place. Under the flag of the commander of the DPRK Navy, Admiral Kim Il Chol, a patrol ship and two patrol boats entered Vladivostok. The commander of the North Korean fleet, in addition to the leadership of the Pacific Fleet and the leaders of Primorye, met with the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral V. Chernavin. A group of Soviet officers and admirals were presented with state awards of the DPRK. Korean sailors took part in the celebration of USSR Navy Day. During these days, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, was in Vladivostok. On July 28, he gave a speech at the Gorky Theater in which he outlined new principles of foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The ceremonial meeting was attended by Charge d'Affaires of the DPRK in the USSR Lee Du Rel and Admiral Kim Il Chol.

From October 15 to October 17, 1986 The first joint Soviet-Korean exercises of the forces of the KTOF and the Eastern Fleet of the KPA Navy were held on the topic “Defeat of the landing force during a sea crossing” under the general leadership of the commander of the KTOF, Admiral V.V. Sidorov. The USSR represented the USSR in the exercises: the Tashkent (KU), Vasily Chapaev, five Molniya missile boats, three support vessels and 12 missile-carrying aircraft. The Soviet group was based at the port of Najin.

The second joint exercise of the Pacific Fleet and the KPA Navy on the topic “Deploying submarines in conditions of mine and anti-submarine danger and delivering joint strikes against enemy naval groups” was held from October 13 to 16, 1987. This exercise was already led by the commander of the KPA Navy, Vice Admiral Kwon Sang Ho, and the deputy head of the Pacific Fleet forces was Rear Admiral B.F. Prikhodko. The following participants from the Pacific Fleet took part in the exercise: SSGN pr. 675MK “K-23”, BOD “Tallinn” (KU), SKR pr. 1135 “Gordelivy”, “Zealous”, MTShchpr. 266M “Anchor”, “Tral”, one support vessel, 10 fleet aviation aircraft; from the KPA VF: 4 diesel submarines pr. 613 and 633; 3 MPK, 4 RKA pr. 183, 6 TKA, 3 boat technical control units, a patrol boat and 21 aircraft. During the exercise and at its completion, the Tallinn BOD and a number of other ships visited the port of Najin.

May 12-16, 1988 A detachment of ships came to Wonsans on an official visit under the flag of the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral G.A. Khvatov, consisting of the Novorossiysk aircraft carrier, the Admiral Zakharov BOD and the Boevoy EM. The visit was carried out in accordance with the plan for military-technical cooperation and exchange of visits between ships of the Navy of the USSR and the DPRK. Chief of the marching staff - commander of the 10th special detachment of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral R.L. Dymov, deputy detachment commander for political affairs - first deputy head of the political department of the Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank E.M. Chukhraev, flag navigator of the Pacific Fleet captain 1st rank V.M. Popov, flag signalman - captain 1st rank V.I. Shorin, deputy detachment commander for EMC - deputy commander of the 10th opesk for emc captain 1st rank E.V. Putov, deputy detachment commander for logistics - chief of logistics of the 10th opesk captain 1st rank M. M. Levtsov, head of the KGB department of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral N.V. Egorkin. At the pier, the ships of the detachment were met by: Commander of the DPRK Navy Kim Il Chol, Commander of the Eastern Fleet Vice Admiral Kwon Sang Ho, the leadership of Gangwon Province, the city of Wonsan and about 20 thousand residents, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the DPRK G. G. Bartoshevich. The official delegation of the detachment of ships was received in Pyongyang by Kim Il Sung. “The impressions from the visit to the DPRK were very vivid,” the sailors recalled when I met them, talking about the events of that visit. They were amazed by the grandeur of the sports facilities in Pyongyang, the powerful West Sea hydro complex, and the hotel, which was excellent by world standards. One day the members of the delegation were woken up at four o'clock in the morning. Each of them had a personal car waiting for them. An hour later, the cortege stopped, everyone was offered tea, coffee, and a light breakfast. We hit the road again after changing cars and drivers. The same procedure was repeated at the next stop: tea, coffee, cars and drivers were changed. A winding mountain road led to a beautiful residence. Kim Il Sung came down the steps to meet the arrivals. I shook hands with everyone. The sailors brought gifts: caps, vests, ship models. Kim Il Sung viewed everything with great interest. He offered to take a photo with everyone against the backdrop of a panel that depicted the picturesque nature of North Korea. All gifts from our sailors are carefully stored in the treasury of world culture in the Myohyangsan Mountains. And every day thousands of visitors to the International Gift Exhibition in the DPRK can look at them.

For the second time, Vladivostok received military sailors from the DPRK from July 29 to August 2, 1988. The detachment came under the flag of the commander of the DPRK Navy, Admiral Kim Il Chera, consisting of a destroyer (apparently meaning a frigate), two patrol ships and an auxiliary ship. Korean sailors visited the city's enterprises, and the detachment's leadership met with the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral G.A. Khvatov.

From October 25 to October 29, 1988, warships consisting of the Tallinn BOD, the Gordelivy, and Zealy missile boats and the R-76, R-83, R-229, and R-230 missile boats received participation in the third joint exercise with the forces of the North Korean Eastern Fleet under the leadership of the commander of the DPRK Navy, Admiral Kim Il Chol. During the exercise, the ships visited the port of Najin.

In September 1989, the fourth joint exercise of the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the KPA Military Fleet of the DPRK was held on the topic “Conducting joint military operations to defeat enemy naval groups while protecting sea communications.” The following from the Pacific Fleet were invited to participate in the exercise: BOD "Tallinn", EM pr. 956 "Ostratelny" and "Stoykiy", SKR pr. 1135 "Gordelivy" and "Purysty", RKA pr. 1241 "R-230" and "R- 261", 7 aircraft; from the KPA VF: 3 diesel submarines pr. 633, 1 SKR, 2 PKA, 8 RKA, 12 TKA, four support vessels. The port of Najin was visited by the BOD "Tallinn", the TFR "Gordelivy" and "Poryvisty", the RKA "R-230" and "R-261". This joint exercise with the North Korean Navy was the last.

In April 1990 China supplied North Korea with 4 RKA Project 021 “Huangfeng” (Huangfeng, a copy of the Soviet RKA Project 205).

Mutual contacts did not guarantee the parties against incidents; the North Korean side, as before, was jealous of the slightest attempts to violate its waters. June 7, 1990 A North Korean warship rammed the Soviet research vessel Professor Gagarinsky. The ship was supposed to be internted, but at the last moment the authorities changed their decision.

August 14-18, 1990 A detachment of ships under the command of the First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral A.G. Oleinika, consisting of the Marshal Shaposhnikov BOD and the Pyrivisty TFR, came to Wonsan (DPRK) on an official visit. The visit was timed to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the liberation of Korea.

August 24 - 28, 1990 A detachment of the DPRK Navy arrived in Vladivostok on an official visit under the flag of the commander of the Eastern Fleet of the DPRK Navy, Vice Admiral Gwon San Ho, consisting of a destroyer (apparently meaning a frigate), a patrol ship and a rescue ship. This concluded the naval cooperation between our countries.

Since 1986 to 1990 Exercises were held annually between the USSR Navy and the DPRK Navy, after which Soviet ships visited Wonsan and Najin. In total, 20 visits were made over 5 years.

As of mid-1992 The DPRK Navy consisted of 30 warships - 24 submarines (20 Romeo type Chinese and Korean, according to the Chinese project 031, an analogue of the Soviet 633, and 4 Soviet project 613), 3 frigates (1 Soho type, and 2 types "Najin"), 3 corvettes (MPK, "Sariwon" type), almost 600 boats, including 39 missile boats (11 "Sozhu" type, 12 Chinese project "Huangfen", an analogue of the Soviet project 205, 16 Soviet project 183R), 168 torpedo (15 Ywon type, 27 R-6 type, 125 Kusong - Sinhung type), 142 sentry (19 So-1 type, 6 Hainan type, 10 Taejong type, 13 "Shanghai", 52 "Chongjin" type, 80 "Sinpo" type), more than 180 landing craft (7 "Hangchon" type, 100 "Nampo" type) and 62 fire support boats ("Chaho" type) and 29 minesweeper boats ( 23 types "Yukto").

New Age .

Then came the era of the collapse of the Soviet Union and our country lost its position in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pacific Fleet has undergone cuts, and the remaining ships have been moored. Naturally, this could not but affect the attitude towards us, although throughout the 90s the main suppliers of arms and military equipment to North Korea were the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. This data is provided by the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI). Its experts claim that in 1992-1996, 35 Styx-type anti-ship missiles were sent from Russia to the DPRK. In 1993-2002, the DPRK imported weapons worth 308 million dollars, of which 176 million were imports from Kazakhstan, 103 million from Russia, 29 million from China. During the same period, the DPRK purchased 550 SAM anti-aircraft missiles and equipment for 15 Romeo-class submarines from China, Astana supplied Pyongyang with 34 MiG-21 fighters, 24 KS-19 anti-aircraft guns and 4 fire control radars. Until 2002, Russia sold the DPRK 4 reconnaissance radars, 6 fire control radars, and 32 armored vehicles. North Korea also independently produced a number of weapons under Russian license: 1,100 AT-4 anti-tank missiles, 550 SA-16 anti-aircraft missiles and 500 SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles.

In an effort to gain access to previously unattainable technologies, the North Koreans took unusual steps. At the end of 1993 The DPRK, through the Japanese company Ton-Trade Inc., entered into an agreement with Russia on the cutting into metal in North Korea of ​​12 decommissioned diesel submarines, Golf II class missile submarines - Project 629A and Foxtrot class torpedo submarines - Project 641, which were previously part of the Pacific Fleet . And although the submarines’ weapons and electronic fire control equipment were removed, the boats still had missile launch silos, stabilization subsystems, and much more that North Korean engineers had never encountered before. In addition, Soviet specialists were involved in the work. Jane's Defense Weekly notes that in 1992, one group of Russian missile specialists from Chelyabinsk was detained as it was about to fly to North Korea, but other groups later flew there. In August 1998, Pyongyang conducted flight tests of a missile "Taepodong-1", which flew over Japan. And in 2004, according to the authoritative weekly "Jane's Defense Weekly", North Korea is deploying new land- and sea-based ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and, possibly, having sufficient range to hit targets in the continental United States. An article in Jane's Defense Weekly, without citing sources, indicates that of the two new North Korean missile systems, the sea-launched missile is potentially more dangerous.

But cooperation, as before, did not guarantee Russia from incidents with the North Korean authorities. On the night of December 4-5, 2005. The river-sea class dry cargo ship "Terney" was sailing from Busan to Vladivostok with a cargo of buses. A strong storm and a threat to the safety of the ship and crew forced the captain to seek shelter at the nearest shore. The ship's captain, Peter Kostusev, requested permission from the North Korean coast guard to enter territorial waters. “Coastal border guards gave us permission, but the ship's guard ordered us to stop, and we were detained. We were in touch with the coast guard all the time and did not try to hide,” said captain Peter Kostusev upon his return. As it turned out, Terney entered a closed area in the north of the DPRK, where the Musan-ri missile range is located. It was from this test site that the Taepodong-2 rocket was launched in 1998. Since the area where the Terney ended up is closed even to North Korean citizens, Russian diplomats were not immediately able to get on board the ship. Russian Ambassador Andrei Karlov spent two days on the ship; he was even given a separate cabin. By allowing the DPRK to leave the territorial waters, the authorities of this country noted that they did this out of a “friendly disposition.” On December 21, the ship returned to Vladivostok. The shipowner of Terney, the Ardis company, decided not to aggravate the conflict and did not refute the version of the North Korean authorities. The shipowner still considers the vessel's detention for two weeks to be a misunderstanding. Deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the Primorsky Territory decided not to abandon the incident with Terney and at the next session will consider an appeal to the State Duma regarding the attitude towards the DPRK authorities. “This is complete disrespect for our country, its citizens,” says deputy Nikolai Markovtsev. If we now forgive the DPRK authorities for the detention of the ship, our neighbors in the region will not respect us. But the words of the deputies remained words.

As you can see, the North Korean authorities remained sensitive to any violations of their waters. At the same time, when in October 2006. a search was conducted for sailors from a shipwreck in the Sea of ​​Japan motor ship "Sinegorye". The North Korean authorities have given official permission to search for Russian sailors in their territorial waters.

In turn, Russian sailors have repeatedly rescued North Korean fishermen at sea. February 19, 2007 In the Sea of ​​Japan, the crew of the motor ship "Muostakh" boarded 4 North Korean citizens, removing them from a faulty motorboat, and delivered them to Vladivostok. January 2, 2008 The crew of the motor ship "Captain Kiriy" of the Sakhalin Shipping Company at 16.15 local time (9.15 Moscow time) noticed a boat with people 180 miles from Vladivostok. A North Korean fisherman and the bodies of two of his comrades who died from hypothermia were found alive in the boat. The rescued fisherman and the bodies of the dead were taken to the port of Wonsan (DPRK). On the same day, approximately seven hours earlier, at the same point in the Sea of ​​Japan, another Russian motor ship, the Pioneer of Russia, also discovered a boat with North Korean fishermen. There were two people in the boat. The rescued people feel normal. The ship delivered them to the port of Nakhodka, where the DPRK Consulate General is located.

Three years after the incident with the detention of the Terney motor ship, new ones followed. February 23, 2008 The Russian motor ship "Lydia Demesh", assigned to the Kamchatka Shipping Company, was traveling from the Japanese port of Hamata to Vladivostok with a cargo of cars. Near the Sea of ​​Japan near Cape Musudan, about three to five miles from the shores of the DPRK, a North Korean border ship detained a Russian ship. Border guards ordered to proceed to the port of North Korea. One of the crew members managed to barricade himself in the wheelhouse and transmit a message to the Vladivostok Rescue Coordination Center that an armed officer and two border guards had boarded the Russian ship and ordered the captain to head for the DPRK coast. The ship was brought to the port of Kimchek. As it turned out, on the way from Japan to Vladivostok, the ship encountered a strong storm and was forced to take shelter from the weather in an area closed to navigation. For several days, the ship was held by the DPRK authorities on charges of violating the state border. Until the morning of February 27, after persistent diplomatic negotiations, the ship was not released.

The next incident occurred on November 9, 2008, the Russian dredging vessel Stepan Demeshev, registered at the port of St. Petersburg and owned by Northern Dredging Company LLC, was detained by North Korean border guards 3.6 miles from the coast of the DPRK. Stepan Demeshev left Nakhodka and headed to the home port. The next port on the way home was supposed to be Phuket (Thailand), but not far from the Korean Peninsula, one of the main engines on the ship failed. The captain decided to approach the DPRK for repairs, but did not warn the North Korean authorities of his intentions. The Russian ship, with 14 sailors on board, was escorted to the port of Chongjin for investigation. However, a day later, after a trial, he was released.

The fourth incident with the detention of Russian ships by North Korean border guards occurred in February 2009. February 17, 2009 The motor ship "Omsky-122" belonging to the Amur Shipping Company was detained by the DPRK border service near Cape Musudan, in the area of ​​which the DPRK missile test site is located. "Omsky-122" was flying from the South Korean port of Busan to Vladivostok with a cargo of construction materials, automotive equipment, and food products. In stormy conditions, the captain of the ship, Vladimir Biryukov, decided to follow closer to the coastline, where the wave height is lower and navigation is safer, said Yuri Kudryavtsev, director of the maritime transportation department of the Amur Shipping Company. According to him, the captain managed to transmit a radiogram to the shipping company, in which he said that he was “forced to submit to the demands of the North Korean border guards.” A group of military personnel disembarked from a coast guard boat on board the Omsky-122 and, at gunpoint, demanded that they proceed to a North Korean port. The crew was prohibited from using communications equipment. On February 20, the DPRK authorities allowed Russian diplomats onto the ship. The Consul General of the Russian Federation in Chongjin, who arrived at the port where the ship is located, met with the crew members. On February 27, the ship was released and set sail for Vladivostok.

Literature:

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· “Sailors from Sinegorye will be looked for in the DPRK” 09:47 October 26, 2006 from the site http://www.trud.ru/article/26-10-2006/193188_morjakov_s_sinegorja_budut_iskat_v_kndr.html

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· "The People's Army in the Making"

hufden>> Another successful launch
TT> Why do they need it? They already have ICBMs that allow them to strike a potential enemy, why waste resources on the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces? It is wise to spend these expenses on something else more important. The DPR people are in a bad situation with aviation, if only they could correct the situation.

North Korean ICBMs can be intercepted by US/ROK ground or naval missile defense systems on takeoff. What kind of territory is there...

The Sinp'o diesel-electric submarine has an underwater displacement of 1,650 tons, a length of 68 m, a width of 6.5 m. The submarine's surface speed is 16 knots, and its underwater speed is about 10 knots. Its cruising range is 1,500 miles (2,800 km), autonomy is approximately 30 days. The boat's armament includes one launcher in the retractable device fence and in the hull underneath for the KN-11 SLBM, as well as 2-4 bow torpedo tubes. This is enough to get close to Guam or the Hawaiian Islands and strike them.
But, of course, Sinp’o is not a combat boat, but an experimental one, designed to test the KN-11 SLBM. In North Korea, according to foreign sources, the construction of six diesel-electric submarines based on Sinp’o is underway. Obviously, each of them will have two or three launchers for SLBMs. An indoor boathouse is being built at Sinpo Naval Base to assemble submarines. Two reinforced concrete shelters for missile submarines are also being built there. All these activities require time and considerable funds. Therefore, talking about the adoption of the KN-11-Sinp’o complex in just a year is hardly justified. But in two or three years he can go on combat duty.

Seoul is particularly concerned about North Korea's ability to use ballistic missile submarines to bypass the anti-missile “fence” that the United States and South Korea intend to build between the two parts of the country by the end of 2017. “It will be difficult for the THAAD missile defense system to intercept submarine-launched ballistic missiles, since they can be fired from anywhere near South Korea,” the South Korean Yonhap News agency points out in this regard. Indeed, this task becomes much more complicated.

And yet, it seems to us that Kim Jong-un’s main goal is not South Korea or Japan. For him, enemy number one is the United States of America. “In response to hostile US policies that threaten our sovereignty and right to life,” the DPRK statement emphasizes, “we will take multi-step measures to strengthen our nuclear offensive forces.” And if North Korean submarines are able to break into the Pacific Ocean, they will creep up on the shores of the United States. And then, keeping America at gunpoint, Marshal Kim will be able to talk with Washington on equal terms.

The navies of many states have rare ships. They will never go to sea again, but to exclude them from the lists of the fleet would mean tearing out the heroic pages of the past from memory and forever losing the continuity of traditions for future generations.

That’s why the cruiser Aurora stands eternally laid up near the Petrogradskaya embankment in St. Petersburg, and the masts of the 104-gun battleship Victory rise in the docks of Portsmouth. The country’s naval flag flies over each veteran, a reduced crew of military sailors is on duty on board, and a special column is allocated in the Navy budget for their maintenance (note: Aurora was expelled from the Navy in 2010 and transferred to the category of ships -museums).

Even the pragmatic United States has its own rare ship - USS Pueblo (AGER-2). Perhaps the most unusual of all warships in the world.

To remove the Pueblo from the US Navy list would be to raise the white flag and capitulate in the face of the enemy. The little reconnaissance aircraft is still listed on all Pentagon lists as an active combat unit. And it doesn’t matter that the Pueblo itself has been de facto moored at the embankment in North Korean Pyongyang for almost half a century, and its secret radio engineering “stuffing” was stolen piece by piece in the interests of the secret research institutes of the Soviet Union.

...The muzzles of uncovered 50-caliber Brownings stick out helplessly. On the walls of the Pueblo's superstructures there are black lacerations from shrapnel, and brown stains of the blood of American sailors are visible on the decks. But how did a Yankee warship end up in such a humiliating position?

Capture of Pueblo

According to official documents of the US Navy, the electronic intelligence ship Pueblo was designated as a Banner-class hydrographic ship (Auxiliary General Environmental Research - AGER). Former cargo and passenger ship FP-344, launched in 1944, and subsequently converted for special operations. Total displacement - 895 tons. The crew is about 80 people. Full speed - 12.5 knots. Armament - 2 machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber.

A typical Cold War spy, disguised as a harmless scientific vessel. But behind the modest appearance hid a wolfish grin. The interiors of the Pueblo's interior resembled a giant supercomputer - long rows of racks with radios, oscilloscopes, tape recorders, encryption machines and other specific equipment. The task is to monitor the USSR Navy, measure the electromagnetic fields of Soviet ships, intercept signals at all frequencies in the interests of the National Security Agency (NSA) and naval intelligence of the fleet.

On January 11, 1968, USS Pueblo (AGER-2) left the port of Sasebo and, having passed the Tsushima Strait, entered the Sea of ​​Japan with the task of monitoring the ships of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy. After hovering around Vladivostok for several days, the Pueblo moved south along the coast of the Korean Peninsula, simultaneously collecting information about sources of radio emission on the territory of the DPRK. The situation was alarming: on January 20, when the scout was 15 miles from the naval base on the island. Mayan-do watchmen discovered a warship on the horizon. Poor visibility prevented us from accurately establishing its nationality - the object, which turned out to be a small anti-submarine ship of the DPRK Navy, disappeared without a trace in the evening twilight.

On January 22, two North Korean trawlers appeared near the Pueblo, accompanying the American throughout the day. On the same day, a group of North Korean special forces attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee, but were killed in a shootout with the police.

The bad signs were ignored: the Pueblo calmly continued its journey along the coast of the DPRK.

On January 23, 1968, the hour struck - at 11:40 a small anti-submarine ship SC-35 of the DPRK Navy approached the Pueblo. Using a flag semaphore, the Koreans demanded to indicate the nationality of the ship. The Americans immediately raised the Stars and Stripes flag from the Pueblo's mast. This was supposed to cool down hotheads and exclude any provocation on the part of the enemy.

Soviet-made small anti-submarine ship

However, an order immediately followed from the SC-35 to immediately stop the move, otherwise the Koreans threatened to open fire. The Yankees were playing for time. At this time, three more torpedo boats appeared next to the Pueblo. The situation was taking a threatening turn. The US flag somehow did not particularly cool down the Korean fervor.

The commander of the Pueblo, Lloyd Butcher, once again checked the map and personally checked the navigation radar - everything is correct, the Pueblo is located 15 miles from the coast, outside the territorial waters of the DPRK. However, the Koreans did not even think of falling behind - the air was filled with the roar of jet fighters. North Korean aircraft and navy surrounded the lone American reconnaissance aircraft on all sides.

Now Commander Butcher understood what the enemy was planning - to encircle the unarmed Pueblo and force it to follow to one of the North Korean ports. When they left Sasebo, he was present at a meeting with officers from the crew of the Banner reconnaissance ship. Colleagues confirmed that the Soviet and Chinese navies regularly use similar tactics in an attempt to drive American reconnaissance ships into a trap. However, unlike the USSR Navy, the North Korean fleet acted more boldly and decisively. After 2 hours of fruitless pursuit, the first shell flew into the superstructure of the Pueblo, tearing off the leg of one of the American sailors. Following this, the sound of machine gun shots thundered across the reconnaissance aircraft's skin.

The Yankees screamed about the attack on all frequencies and rushed to destroy the secret equipment.

Tens of tons of radio electronics and encryption machines, mountains of secret documentation, reports, orders, magnetic tapes with recordings of negotiations between the North Korean and Soviet military - too much work for three fire axes and two electric paper shredders. Parts, documents and magnetic tapes should be dumped into bags for subsequent dumping overboard - having given the necessary orders, Butcher rushed headlong into the radio room. How does the command of the 7th Fleet promise to help him?

The signal about the attack on the US Navy ship was received by the ships of the carrier strike group, which was located 500 miles south of the Pueblo. The commander of Task Force 71, Rear Admiral Epes, ordered the duty group of Phantoms to be immediately scrambled into the air and the hell destroyed all North Korean cannons trying to approach the American reconnaissance ship. To which the commander of the super-aircraft carrier Enterprise simply shrugged his shoulders - he is unlikely to be able to help in this situation. The Enterprise's air wing has not yet recovered from a long transoceanic passage, half of the aircraft were damaged by a brutal typhoon, and the four combat-ready Phantoms on deck do not carry any weapons other than air-to-air missiles. It will take his guys at least an hour and a half to change weapons and form a full-fledged strike group - but, alas, by then it will probably be too late...

The destroyers USS Higbee, USS Collet and USS O'Bannon, stationed in Japanese ports, were too far away to provide any assistance to the attacked scout. The promised F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers also did not arrive...

At this time, the Koreans continued to methodically shoot the bridge and superstructure of the Pueblo with a 57 mm gun, hoping to kill the commander and senior officers of the ship. The “beheaded” ship must quickly raise the “white flag” and accept the terms of the Korean sailors.

Finally, Commander Butcher realized that help would not come to them, and the Koreans would shoot them all if the Yankees did not fulfill their conditions. The Pueblo stopped its progress and prepared to take on board the capture group. The Yankees did not even try to take the fight - the Brownings on the upper deck remained uncovered. Later, the commander justified that only one of the Pueblo’s crew knew how to use these weapons.

From an approaching torpedo boat, 8 Korean sailors, none of whom spoke English, landed on the deck of the Pueblo. Commander Butcher tried to explain that he was the senior man on the ship. The Korean officer, with signs, ordered the crew to line up along the side and fired a Kalashnikov burst over their heads, apparently showing the frightened Yankees that he was now in charge here. And he doesn't intend to joke with them.

Having gone down with the Koreans to the workrooms of the radio technicians and cryptographers, Commander Butcher was dumbfounded: the entire deck was littered with bags of documents, parts of secret equipment and scraps of magnetic years. They were collected in bags, but no one ever bothered to throw them overboard! No less surprise awaited them in the radio room: according to Butcher himself, the narrow eyes of the Koreans widened at the sight of how teletypes continued to knock out secret radiograms - the Yankees not only did not destroy the equipment, but did not even try to turn it off!

Consequences

The captured Pueblo was escorted to Wonsan. In total, in a skirmish with the DPRK Navy, the reconnaissance crew lost one person killed, the remaining 82 sailors were captured. 10 Americans were injured of varying severity.

The next day, negotiations between representatives of the United States and the DPRK began at the Panmunjeong checkpoint of the Korean militarized zone. Rear Admiral John Victor Smith read the American appeal: the Yankees demanded the immediate release of the hostages, the return of the confiscated hydrographic vessel and an apology. It was emphasized that the capture occurred at a distance of 15.6 miles from the coast of the Korean Peninsula, outside the territorial waters of the DPRK (according to international rules - 12 miles from the coast).

North Korean General Park Chung Guk simply laughed in the face of the Americans and stated that the border of territorial waters runs wherever Comrade Kim indicates. Currently, this distance is 50 miles from the coast of North Korea. He, on behalf of his country, expresses a strong protest against the grossly aggressive invasion of the DPRK's terrorist waters by an armed ship with spy equipment on board, and any conversation about the release of the Pueblo crew members can be held only after an official apology from the United States.

Negotiations have reached a dead end.

On January 28, with the help of the A-12 high-altitude supersonic reconnaissance aircraft (the predecessor of the SR-71), reliable confirmation was received that the Pueblo had been captured by the North Korean armed forces. The photographs clearly showed that the ship was located at the Wonsan naval base, surrounded by ships of the DPRK Navy.

i>"Pueblo" from a height of 20 km

At the same time, a letter of gratitude from Commander Butcher came from North Korea, in which he confessed to espionage and other sins. The text was compiled in accordance with the Juche ideology and could not possibly have been written by an American. But the signature was real. As it became known later, the Koreans beat the commander of the Pueblo, and when this did not help, they threatened that he would witness the execution of the entire crew and then die himself. Realizing who he was dealing with, Butcher wisely signed the confession.

At home, the sailors were greeted as real heroes. However, already in January 1969, a trial was opened - 200 hours of hearings, 140 witnesses. Pentagon officials were outraged that for the first time in 160 years, an American ship was surrendered to the enemy. With a full set of secret equipment!

Why did the commander, when threatened with the capture of the Pueblo, not decide to sink his ship? Or at least destroy the most valuable equipment? Encryption machines fell into the hands of the North Koreans - a direct threat to US national security, plus, the captured ship will probably be displayed somewhere in a prominent place, which will damage the image of America.

Lloyd Butcher justified himself by saying that a couple of months before the campaign he asked the naval command to install explosive devices to quickly detonate and destroy secret equipment. However, his request remained unsatisfied.

Finally, why didn’t the great and invincible American aviation come to the aid of Pueblo? Where was the super-aircraft carrier Enterprise clicking its beak at this time?

During the trial, more and more facts about the chaos in the US Navy were revealed. Finally, the Yankees decided to stop the tragicomedy and begin to constructively solve the identified problems. By decision of Navy Commander John Chaffee, the case was closed. Commander Butcher was completely acquitted.

The main mistake in the Pueblo incident was an incorrect calculation of the adequacy of the DPRK. The Yankees were confident that they were acting against an ally of the USSR, which meant there was no one to fear: Soviet sailors always complied with international maritime law and would never touch an American ship outside the 12-mile zone of territorial waters. Even in the open ocean, Soviet reconnaissance officers (communication vessels - SSV) and their American “colleagues” (GER/AGER) - the same pitiful unarmed “pelvises”, boldly approached the squadrons of the “probable enemy”, rightly believing that their safety was ensured by military and the political power of their countries, interpreted as a flag flying over them.

American fears about the seizure of secret equipment were not in vain: Soviet specialists immediately dismantled and transported to the USSR a number of secret equipment, incl. KW-7 class encryption machines. Using this equipment, coupled with tables, codes and descriptions of cryptographic schemes obtained by the KGB with the help of Warrant Officer Johnnie Walker, Soviet cryptographers were able to decipher about a million intercepted US Navy messages.

The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations, Declassified and release by NSA on 12-20-2006
Author Oleg Kaptsov

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” This ancient aphorism is becoming increasingly relevant to the situation surrounding North Korea.

Horror stories about North Korean submarines launching nuclear ballistic missiles, as recent events have shown, are not so fantastic. The threat of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack, which in the near future will threaten Japan, South Korea and American military installations in the Pacific Ocean, is one of the most realistic scenarios.

In recent years, Pyongyang has made impressive strides in developing submarine-launched missile technology and has demonstrated intentions to use its achievements to solve strategic problems. North Korea does not hide its military ambitions even in the conditions of American military-strategic superiority in the region and the hasty deployment of US Navy strike groups consisting of aircraft carriers, ships and submarines carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Korean Peninsula. The danger posed by Korean submarines only increases the growing tension in the region, since the military-political leadership of the DPRK shows no signs of abandoning the implementation of nuclear missile programs.

It should be especially noted that, taking into account the national military strategy, in April 2012, at the initiative of the leadership of the DPRK, amendments were made to the country’s Constitution establishing its nuclear status. At the same time, with Kim Jong-un coming to power in the DPRK, special attention began to be paid to the country’s submarine forces.

First of all, this concerns the construction of submarines that carry ballistic missiles and the creation of a naval component of the DPRK's strategic nuclear forces.

WHAT ARE THE DPRK SUBMARINE FORCES

The design, construction and operational use of submarines of various types in the DPRK began in the mid-1960s. According to foreign sources, since the 2000s, the DPRK Navy began to implement a number of programs to modernize the submarine fleet.

Currently, North Korean submarine forces are among the largest in the world. In terms of the number of non-nuclear submarines, the DPRK is in the top five along with Russia, China, Iran and India. The DPRK's submarine force includes more than 75 submarines.

The basis of the DPRK submarine fleet are diesel submarines of the 033 type, of which there are 20 units in the DPRK Navy. The 033 type submarine was produced by the DPRK under license from the USSR in the 60s of the 20th century. The Soviet submarine Project 633 (Romeo type according to NATO classification) was taken as the basis. Its greatest length is 76.6 m; maximum beam - 6.7 m, draft - 5.2 m, surface (underwater) displacement - 1475 (1830) tons, full speed in surface (underwater) position - 15 (13) knots, diving depth - 300 m. Armament The submarine is represented by eight 533-mm torpedo tubes (TA). Crew – 54 people.

In addition, the DPRK Navy includes more than 50 small and ultra-small submarines of various types.

Small submarines of the DPRK Navy (from top to bottom) Yogo type, P-4 type, Sang-O type

The small submarine “Sang-O” was developed in 1980–1990. In total, 40 of these boats were built in the DPRK, and their construction is still ongoing.

Its length is 34 m, width is 3.8 m, displacement when submerged is 370 tons, surface (underwater) speed is 7.2 (8.8) knots, range is 1500 miles, armament is two 533 mm TA (ammunition - 4 torpedoes).

The submarine "Sang-O" is designed for special operations, mine laying and actions against ships and vessels. The lightweight hull and fencing of the submarine's cabin are made of fiberglass. Construction of the Sang-O series of small submarines began in 1991. In the series, in addition to the main, torpedo version of the submarine (with Soviet torpedoes of type 53-56), two submarines were built for special operations, each carrying 16 mines on an external sling. In addition to laying mines, these submarines can also transport underwater carriers for light divers. The submarine's armament includes a 12.7 mm machine gun and a portable air defense system.

According to various sources, the DPRK has up to 10 ultra-small submarines (mini-submarines) of the Yugo type. The Yugo-class mini-submarine, developed in the DPRK, was originally built for export. Several Yugo-class boats were sold to Iran and Vietnam. Its length is 20 m, width – 2 m, displacement when submerged – 90 tons, surface (underwater) speed – 10 (4) knots, armament – ​​two 533-mm TA (ammunition – 2 torpedoes).

The most advanced submarine of the DPRK is a small submarine of the P-4 type. The DPRK Navy has about 10 of these boats. Its length is 29 m, displacement is 190 tons, armament is two 533 mm TA (ammunition - 2 torpedoes). It is noteworthy that the command of the South Korean Navy adopted the North Korean submarine “P-4”, captured in 1998, into service with the South Korean fleet.

Despite the successes in the construction of the submarine fleet, the technical condition of the DPRK submarines still leaves much to be desired. Over the past 10 years, North Korea has lost at least three submarines as a result of navigation accidents and incidents. Thus, on September 18, 1996, near the city of Gangneung near the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan, a navigation accident occurred and the subsequent capture of a North Korean Sang-O submarine by the South Korean military. The events of her capture developed as follows. On September 15, 1996, the boat landed several special forces groups on the South Korean coast to collect data on military installations in South Korea. There were 26 crew members and DPRK special forces soldiers on the boat. On September 18, while trying to pick up special forces groups, the boat ran aground, after which the crew decided to destroy all valuable equipment and make their way through enemy territory towards the DPRK. However, the North Korean sailors were discovered by South Korean military personnel. During the operation of South Korean units to seize the boat, one North Korean was captured, the rest were killed in a firefight or liquidated by colleagues.

Another submarine of the Sang-O type became entangled in fishing nets on June 8, 1998 near the South Korean city of Sakcho. The crew of the boat committed self-destruction.

On March 12, 2016, a North Korean small submarine was lost under unclear circumstances in the coastal waters of the Korean Peninsula.

At the same time, North Korean submarines have proven to be highly effective. Thus, according to information from a number of foreign sources, in 2010, as a result of an attack by a North Korean submarine, the South Korean corvette Cheonan was destroyed, killing 46 sailors. Some experts dismiss the threat of Pyongyang's submarines, arguing that they are "old and noisy vessels." However, in 2015, South Korean military experts reported the sudden departure of about 50 DPRK submarines from their bases and the loss of control over them by South Korean anti-submarine forces.

As emphasized in foreign sources, the North Korean authorities have been actively modernizing their submarine fleet in recent years, designing submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles. Against the backdrop of successes in testing nuclear and space technology, Pyongyang can create a full-fledged triad of nuclear forces.

According to American military experts, the decision of the DPRK leadership to create the basis for the naval component of the nuclear triad is based on the fact that, firstly, it is difficult to ensure the effective search and destruction of low-noise diesel submarines in the ocean and, secondly, there is the possibility of a guaranteed nuclear response regardless of the size of the already affected territory of the DPRK. This is a key component of the theory of nuclear deterrence.

According to foreign data, in July 2014, an experimental ballistic missile submarine was launched at the North Korean naval base of Sinpo (South Hamgyong Province), located on the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan of the DPRK. This is the first North Korean large diesel submarine of a new type capable of carrying ballistic missiles, which in the West is given the designation "Sinpo" (Sinp "o). The construction of the boat has been carried out since 2010 in the city of Sinpo at the South Shipyard, the main enterprise for the construction of submarines in North Korea .

A HORROR CALLED "SINPO"

The new submarine has a length of 67 m, a width of 6.7 m and a displacement of about 2500–3000 tons. The cabin of the Sinpo submarine is located in the middle between the bow and stern of the hull, the central part of the cabin is a rectangular section measuring 4.25 x 2.25 m , in which 1–2 launchers (shafts) of ballistic missiles are installed. The surface speed of the submarine is 16 knots, and the underwater speed is about 10 knots. Its cruising range is 1,500 miles.

The silhouette of the North Korean submarine, according to foreign sources, has some resemblance in appearance to the Project 629 submarine (Golf - according to NATO classification). At one time, in the period 1989–1990, the USSR transferred three submarines of this project to China. These submarines were used by the Chinese Navy for trial operation. In 1986, based on the technical solutions used in the construction of Soviet submarines of this type, China built its own submarine of this type with the aim of testing missile technologies and subsequent serial construction of Chinese submarines armed with nuclear ballistic missiles. Considering the level of relations between the PRC and the DPRK in the military sphere, taking into account the second article of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between China and North Korea of ​​1961, China can provide technological assistance in the implementation of the DPRK’s military programs, including the construction of the North Korean submarine fleet.

After completing a four-year construction phase in 2014, the new experimental North Korean submarine Sinpo began intensive sea trials.

The first launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from an experimental Sinpo-class submarine took place on November 28, 2015. According to foreign experts, the test launch was unsuccessful, since the South Korean military later found debris of the SLBM on the surface of the sea.

Less than a month later, North Korea conducted a second SLBM test. According to experts, it was produced not from a submarine, but from a barge test bench submerged in water. North Korean television released footage of the missile test in early January 2016, showing the country's leader Kim Jong-un, smiling, watching the missile take off from under the water and go beyond the clouds.

In August 2016, North Korean media showed a video of a KN-11 Pukkyuksong-1 (Polar Star) submarine ballistic missile launched from the coastal waters of North Korea. The missile fired from the submarine flew about 310 miles toward Japan, setting a new range record for Pyongyang's submarine-launched ballistic missile program. However, according to experts, the KN-11 Pukkykson-1 SLBM is capable of covering a distance of more than 600 miles. The KN-11 Pukkykson-1 SLBM is equipped with a two-stage solid propellant engine. Solid fuel has significant advantages over heptyl and kerosene, since it has higher energy levels and improves missile performance, which makes SLBMs more compact, hidden and allows them to be prepared for launch much faster.

According to foreign sources, the KN-11 Pukkykson-1 SLBM may have the following characteristics: number of stages - 2, diameter - up to 1.4 m, flight range - 900-1200 km.

It was reported that special testing grounds and stands have been created in the DPRK to test ballistic missiles launched from submarines.

According to the South Korean news agency YONHAP, even before the completion of the construction of the new Sinpo-class submarine, the North Korean Navy command carried out a number of tests simulating the launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine.

Currently, according to open sources, the DPRK has carried out at least five launches of the KN-11 Pukkyukson-1 SLBM. Of these, at least two launches carried out from the Sinpo submarine were successful. In general, to accept the new KN-11 missile into service with the Sinpo submarine, several dozen test launches will be required. In the 60s of the 20th century, in order to adopt the Project 629 submarine of the R-21 ballistic missile of the USSR Navy, it was necessary to carry out up to 30 launches, of which about 90% were successful.

SEOUL IS CONCERNED

The military-political leadership of South Korea is very concerned about the growth in the combat capabilities of the submarine forces of the DPRK Navy in general and the combat characteristics of the KN-11 SLBM in particular. The DPRK's submarine fleet in its development is ahead of the South Korean in terms of quantitative composition and is comparable to it in the qualitative aspect. The South Korean submarine fleet includes 9 Project 209 submarines (displacement 1200 tons) and 7 Project 214 submarines (1800 tons). The total number of South Korean submarines is four times less than the DPRK submarines! If North Korea has already created submarines with ballistic missiles, then South Korea is able to do this only in 10 years, by 2027-2030, having built up to six submarines with a displacement of up to 3000 tons.

Experts note that if the DPRK continues to build submarines with nuclear-capable SLBMs, South Korea, Japan and the United States will find themselves much more vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks, not being able to effectively intercept missiles launched from under water. In this regard, in April 2017, the United States hastily deployed the THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) anti-missile system in South Korea, a mobile ground-based anti-missile system for high-altitude, trans-atmospheric interception of medium-range missiles.

According to American experts, the THAAD missile defense system deployed by the United States in South Korea is aimed at neutralizing missile threats, mainly from the northern direction of the peninsula. But if a North Korean ballistic missile is launched from underwater from the east, south or west, it is unlikely to be detected by THAAD radar systems, and it will be able to successfully penetrate the defensive lines of the US missile defense system in the territory of the Republic of Korea. Seoul notes that their missile defense systems are unlikely to be able to intercept a North Korean missile launched from international waters. Similarly, missiles fired by North Korean submarines off the east coast of Japan can successfully penetrate the Patriot missile defense system deployed there. Therefore, at joint naval exercises between the United States and South Korea, special attention is paid to training for the simulated destruction of DPRK submarines.

A South Korean government source estimates that it will take North Korea no more than two years to actually commission the completed Sinpo-class submarine and put it on combat duty. However, the main question now is how quickly the DPRK will be able to create nuclear warheads for missiles. Nuclear powers such as the USSR, USA, China, Great Britain and France at one time took from two to seven years to do this after carrying out conventional nuclear explosions.

In general, the intensification of practical measures to develop the submarine forces of North Korea gives reason to believe that the military-political leadership of the DPRK will take further steps to create its nuclear triad, assigning a special role to submarines armed with nuclear-armed SLBMs, as the most hidden, formidable and effective weapons.