Organization of the task carried out by the commander of an engineer platoon to make passages in minefields in front of the front line of enemy defense
Moscow Order of Labor Red
Banner of the Mining University.
Military department.
COURSE WORK
on tactical and special training
topic: "Organizing the execution of a task by the commander of an engineering platoon
for making passages in
mine-explosive barriers in front of
the front line of the enemy's defense."
I've done the work:
student of platoon 343
Supervisor:
lieutenant colonel
Skorobogatov V. A.
Student of Platoon 343
to complete course work on tactical and special training.
Topic: "Organization of the execution of the task by the commander of an engineer platoon to make passages in mine-explosive barriers in front of the front line of enemy defense."
Option N6.
I. Initial situation.
Card 25000, sheets
U-32-108-V-g, U-32-108-G-v, U-32-108-G-g,
U-33-97-V-v, U-32-120-B-a, U-32-120-A-b,
U-32-120-B-b, U-33-109-A-a.
The commander of the 2nd isr 1st isb at 16.00 on 20.07 in the alignments of the passages assigned a task to the commander of the 1st isf.
commander of 2nd isr 1st isb to make platoon passages in minefields in front of the front line of defense.
1. 4 enemy infantry battalions take up defensive positions with the front line at:
eastern outskirts of Rosenhorst (83-04), eastern outskirts of Borstel (81-03).
2. 12 SMEs goes on the offensive immediately on the left flank of the defense sector of 45 SMEs (its 2 SMEs).
3. 2 isr 1 is ordered on the night of 20.07 to make 2 passes through enemy minefields.
4. Passages N 7,8 suit 1 isv, NN 9,10
5. I order: 1 IS on the night of 20.07 to make passages NN 7,8 in the enemy minefields. Readiness of completed passages by 5.00 21.07. On the completed passes, organize a commandant service with the help of one department. On the left, 2 ivum make passages. You can obtain the necessary tools for making passages at the VTI 45 SME warehouse in the area with mark 56.5 (81-06) and from the company sergeant major in the area where the company is located (mark 56.0 (81-06)).
I will be in the area where the company is located. Contact me - connected.
My deputy is you.
Directions
commander of the 2nd ISR on organizing interaction and various types of support.
1. The actions of the platoon in place and time should be coordinated with the commander of the defending 6th Motorized Rifle Division of the 45th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which is entrusted with combat cover for the platoon’s actions.
2. Along passages NN 7,8, units of 1 SME 12 SME will advance, with whom they will organize interaction on issues: place and time of making passages, their designation, designation of advance routes to the passages.
3. In the platoon, have an observer for the actions of the enemy and the signals of the senior commander.
Alarm signals installed in the shelf:
Chemical attack by the enemy and radioactive contamination of the area - two red rockets, in the voice "Atom";
The appearance of an air enemy - two green missiles, in the voice "Air".
4. Personnel have gas masks with them, OZK - at the sites of the task.
II. Additional data
The ISV is fully equipped with personnel, engineering weapons and transport. All cars have one
refueling.
III. Execute
The student will study the task and, in the role of commander of the military unit, organize the execution of the assigned task by the platoon.
In the explanatory note, state:
Clarification of the mission by the platoon commander;
Calculation and distribution of time;
Advance Directives;
Assessment of the situation with the necessary calculations;
Conclusions from situation assessment and reconnaissance;
Solution to complete the task;
Combat orders to subordinate units and crews, and instructions on various types of support.
On a separate sheet submit:
The initial situation from the map with a diagram of the organization of ISV actions when performing the task;
Scheme of actions of departments for making passages;
Scheme of organization of commandant service at the passages;
Designation of passages.
IV. Guides and manuals.
1. Guide to constructing and overcoming engineering barriers.
2. Tactical and special training. Textbook for cadets of military engineering schools.
3. Plyaskin V.Ya. and others. Engineering support for combined arms combat.
Deadline: 04/1/97.
Head of Coursework
lieutenant colonel
Skorobogatov V. A.
“___”_______________1997
Time of issuing the order: 16.00 20/07
Ready time: 5.00 21/07
I. Clarification of the task by the platoon commander.
Operating hours: 16.00 - 16.10
Location: aisle sections.
1. The enemy defends with the front line of defense along the line: the eastern outskirts of Rasenhorst, the eastern outskirts of Bortsel.
12 MRP goes on the offensive immediately on the left flank of the defense sector of 45 MRP. 2 Isr 1 Isb was ordered to make 2 passes through enemy minefields on the night of 20.07.
2. 1 isv the task was set to make passages 7.8 with a depth of up to 100 m by 5.00 July 21. The method of doing it is manually. Organize a curfew service at the aisles.
3. Obtain the necessary means to complete the assigned task from the company sergeant major.
4. Fire cover for the platoon’s actions is assigned to the commander of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division.
Organize interaction with the commander of the 6th MRR on the following issues:
What funds are allocated to cover the platoon’s actions;
Signals to call and cease fire by covering means;
The start and end times of the platoon's actions to make passages in enemy minefields. The commander of the 2nd ISR will be in the area where the company is located. Communication with him is connected. Deputy
commander of the 1st isr - Ya.
II. Calculation and distribution of time.
Operating hours: 16.10 - 16.15
It is now 16.00 20/07. Submit your report by 5.00 on 21/07.
Total time available to prepare and complete the task
13:00 min.
Daylight hours - 6 hours. 00min. from 16.00 to 22.00,
Dark time - 7 hours. 00 minutes. from 22.00 to 5.00
The task will take up to 4 hours to complete. Start completing the task at 21.40 20/07.
Available time to distribute:
1. Clarification of the task.......... 16.00 - 16.10
2. Calculation and distribution of time....... 16.10 - 16.15
3. Movement of the commander to the concentration area
platoon........................................................ 16.10 - 16.30
4. Advance directives........ 16.30 - 16.35
4.a Obtaining and checking technical information from
company sergeant-major........................16.35 -18.10
4.b Rest of personnel
and meals...................................10.18-19.10
4.c Preparing to complete the task......10.19-21.20
5. Advancement to the area to carry out the task of the command
ditch of squads and platoon commander...... 16.35 - 16.55
6. Assessment of the situation, taking into account the time spent on
organizing interaction with the commander of the 1st MSB
and reconnaissance................................16.55 -18.30
7. Movement of the commander to the platoon concentration area.................................................... ...............18.30-18.50
8. Making a decision to complete a task.................................................... ...............18.50 - 18.55
9. Statement of the task to commanders
branches......................................... 21.20 - 21.30
9. Issuing a combat order.................... 21.30 - 21.40
10. Advancement to the task area.......
21.40 - 22.00
11. Completion of the task by departments..... 22.00 - 02.30
12. Report on the completion of the task........... 04.55 - 05.00
III. Advance Directives.
Operating hours: 16.30 - 16.35
Our platoon was ordered to manually make passages 7.8 in enemy minefields up to 100m deep by 5.00 21.07. and organize a commandant service on the passages.
Before 21.40 on 20.07, the deputy platoon commander must receive from the company sergeant major and check the completeness and serviceability of 3 sets of KRI, 18 pointers and 18 lanterns to mark passages.
The platoon arrive at the mission area by 21.40.
All personnel must have weapons, personal protective equipment and gas masks.
At 16.55, the squad commanders will leave with me from the company area for reconnaissance.
IV. Issues resolved during reconnaissance.
Operating hours: 16.55 - 18.30
A. Reconnaissance plan.
During reconnaissance, determine:
Places, directions and landmarks of proposed passages.
Locations of mine barriers.
Organize interaction with the IMSB commander.
Ways to mark passages.
B. Organization of interaction.
In the course of organizing interaction with the SME commander, the following questions are clarified:
The procedure for marking and fencing passages.
Signals are set for interaction with IMSB.
B. Conclusions from the reconnaissance.
Conclusions from the enemy assessment:
In connection with the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, be prepared to act in conditions of radioactive contamination of the area, have anti-chemical protective equipment with you at the ready;
When performing a mission, have observers for air and ground enemy and warning signals;
Conclusions from assessing your strengths:
The platoon is staffed with personnel, engineering weapons, and transport, fuel and lubricants - one refueling, no losses;
The platoon is capable of completing the task in 7 hours;
Crews 1 and 2 make passages 7 and 8 respectively, then 1 and 2 ISO perform commandant duty;
Conclusions from the assessment of the area and time:
The area is open, allowing you to perform the task only at night;
The time of day contributes to the successful completion of a task;
V. Solution to complete the task
Operating hours: 18.50 - 18.55
1. Make the passages manually, moving on your bellies, with a ledge to the right.
2. Crews 1 and 2 make, respectively, passages 7 and 8 in enemy minefields up to 100 m deep; after completing this task, 1 and 2 ISOs perform commandant duty. While doing
passages of the 6th MSR provides fire cover for the platoon's actions. Start completing the task at 21.40 and finish at 4.30 on 21.07,
Until this time, prepare for the task.
3. Interaction with the commander of the 6th MRR is organized on the following issues:
The location of the passages to be made has been agreed upon;
The issues of fire cooperation in the event of an enemy appearance were agreed upon;
The start and end times of the assigned task have been agreed upon;
Communication with the commander of the 6th MRR by liaison officers;
4. I will be with 1 ISO, contact me personally and liaison officers.
VI. Battle order
Operating hours: 21.30-21.40
1. The enemy defends along the line: the eastern outskirts of Rasenhorst (8304), the eastern outskirts of Bortsel (8103).
2. 12 MRP goes on the offensive immediately on the left flank of the defense sector of 45 MRP. 2nd isr 1st isb was ordered to make 2 passes into enemy minefields up to 100 m deep on the night of 26.07.
3. Our platoon was ordered to make passages 7.8 in enemy minefields in front of the front line of defense by 5.00 21.07. Fire cover for the platoon's actions is assigned to the commander of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division.
4. On the left the passages are made by the 2nd ivum.
5. Perform the task manually at night, moving on your belly. When the area is illuminated, stop all movements. When performing the task, strictly observe camouflage.
I order:
At 21.40, the squads concentrate in the first trench of our positions and at 21.40 directly begin to carry out the assigned task, starting to do: 1st calculation - passage 7, 2nd calculation
Passage 8,1 and 2 iso after execution by a platoon
tasks organize commandant service on the completed passes.
Complete the task by 4.30 on 21.07, until this time prepare for the task.
At each passage, leave two people with mine barriers in readiness to close the passages if the enemy goes on the attack.
The removed mines and fuses should be concentrated at the regiment's ammunition supply point and placed under guard.
7. Prepare and check all necessary equipment.
Each department should have: 1 KRI and mine detectors for each.
8. I will be with 1 ISO, contact me personally and liaison officers.
9.My deputy is full-time.
10. Alert signals installed in the shelf:
Chemical attack by the enemy and radioactive contamination of the area - two red rockets, in the voice of "ATOM";
The appearance of an air enemy - two green missiles, in the voice "AIR";
Interaction signals with 6 msr:
Calling fire -
turn tracers in the direction of the target.
Feedback when returning to the trench -
Second essay on the military department.
1. Engineer troops, purpose
2. Tasks of combat engineering support
2.1 Engineering reconnaissance of the enemy and the area
2.2 Fortification equipment of positions, areas, control points
2.3 Construction and maintenance of engineering barriers, and destruction. Installation and maintenance of nuclear mines and landmines.
2.4 Destruction and neutralization of enemy nuclear mines. Making and maintaining passages in barriers and destruction. Arrangement of passages through obstacles. Demining of terrain and objects
2.5 Preparation and maintenance of routes for troop movement, transport and evacuation
2.6 Equipment and maintenance of crossings when crossing water barriers
2.7 Engineering measures to camouflage troops and objects
2.8 Engineering measures to restore the combat capability of troops and eliminate the consequences of enemy nuclear strikes
2.9 Extraction and purification of water, equipment of water supply points
2.10 Other tasks
3. Structure of engineering troops units
3.1 Staff of the engineer-sapper company of the tank regiment (ISRT TP)
3.2 Staff of the engineer-sapper company of the motorized rifle regiment (ISR MSP)
4. Military engineering terminology
Bibliography
Introduction
The Engineering Troops are a very remarkable branch of the military. First of all, engineering troops are frontline troops. Engineering units go into battle simultaneously with motorized rifle and tank units, and often before them. It is no coincidence that in Peter’s Table of Ranks, officers of the engineering troops stood one rank higher than the infantry and cavalry.
Few people know that it was the engineering troops who were the first to master the latest means of warfare and introduce them into the army’s arsenal. From the engineering troops, the railway troops, communications troops, automobile troops, and tank troops were separated into independent branches of the military. And it seems absolutely fantastic to say that aviation was born in the depths of the engineering troops. And yet this is so. The task of creating and combat use of first aeronautical and then airplane detachments was entrusted specifically to the engineering troops. Until the end of the First World War, aviation units remained under the jurisdiction of the Main Engineering Directorate.
Somehow unnoticed in the history of the Great Patriotic War is the fact that at the beginning of 1942 ten sapper armies were formed. One sapper army for each front. In 1943, the ranks of marshals and chief marshals were introduced not only for aviation, tank crews, artillery, but even for engineering troops.
The first military school in Russia for training officers was the Pushkarsky Prikaz school, opened in 1701. This school trained artillery and engineering officers. In the infantry and cavalry, the first military educational institutions will be cadet corps, which will open only 30 years later.
The engineering troops were born, based on the needs of the artillery, in the bowels of the artillery and until the beginning of the 19th century they were an integral part of them.
1. Engineer troops, purpose
Engineer troops are designed to solve combat engineering support tasks.
The Combat Manual of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces interprets the concept of “Engineer Troops” as follows:
“Engineering support is one of the types of combat support. Engineering support for combat operations of troops is organized and carried out with the aim of creating the necessary conditions for troops for timely and covert advance, deployment, maneuver, their successful execution of combat missions, increasing the protection of troops and facilities from all types of destruction, to inflict losses on the enemy, to hinder enemy actions.
Engineering support includes:
engineering reconnaissance of the enemy, terrain and objects;
fortification equipment of positions, lines, areas, control points;
installation and maintenance of engineering barriers, and destruction;
installation and maintenance of nuclear mines and landmines;
destruction and neutralization of enemy nuclear mines;
making and maintaining passages in barriers and destruction;
arrangement of passages through obstacles;
demining of terrain and objects;
preparation and maintenance of routes for troop movement, transportation and evacuation;
equipment and maintenance of crossings when crossing water barriers;
engineering measures to camouflage troops and objects;
engineering measures to restore the combat effectiveness of troops and eliminate the consequences of enemy nuclear strikes;
extraction and purification of water, equipment of water supply points.
Engineering support tasks are carried out by units and subunits of all branches of the military and special forces. They independently erect structures for firing, surveillance, sheltering personnel and equipment; cover with mine-explosive barriers and camouflage their positions and areas; lay and mark traffic routes; overcome barriers and obstacles; force water obstacles.
Engineering troops perform the most complex engineering support tasks, requiring special training of personnel, the use of engineering equipment and specific engineering ammunition. In addition, they defeat enemy equipment and personnel with mine-explosive and nuclear mine weapons."
2. Tasks of combat engineering support
2.1 Engineering reconnaissance of the enemy and the area
The expression “It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines” is well known. This is not a general aphorism, but a sad reminder to many commanders of times past and present. Historical fact - one of the reasons for Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Waterloo was the death of the cuirassier division in a ravine on the way to their brilliant attack on the British flank. Wellington covered the army's flank with a ravine. Napoleon could not see this ravine, and he decided to take advantage of the fact that the English commander “stupidly” left his flank open for attack. At full gallop, the French cuirassiers flew into this ravine, and most of them were maimed and killed. The attack was thwarted.
One can cite hundreds of examples when neglect of engineering intelligence thwarted the most beautiful plans of commanders and turned advancing troops into a target for the enemy.
Engineering reconnaissance of the area is carried out in various ways and methods (studying the area using a map, aerial photographs, military-geographical descriptions; observation, engineering reconnaissance patrols, etc.).
The result of engineering reconnaissance of the area is the answer to the question of the terrain's passability for personnel and equipment, and the possibility of camouflaging personnel and equipment (both friendly and foreign). To do this, you need to obtain information about the terrain (for example, the steepness of the hills); availability and capacity of roads; about the possibility of driving off roads (is the area swampy, is the snow deep, are there ravines); about the presence of water barriers (rivers, streams, lakes, flood zones); about the density of forests and their fire danger.
In general, the terrain in which combat operations are to take place should be carefully studied and understood how it can affect the solution of combat missions. Without this, any of the most cunning battle plans will turn out to be just searches and the troops will be defeated.
Naturally, the enemy is also studying the terrain and trying to complicate the actions of our troops. To achieve this, the enemy is carrying out a number of measures to worsen the movement capabilities of our troops. He destroys or prepares for destruction roads, bridges, dams, creates forest debris, tears off anti-tank ditches, sets up barricades, sets minefields, builds pillboxes, bunkers, armored caps, and tears off trenches. Engineering reconnaissance is required to detect these enemy activities and predict enemy actions.
The methods of conducting engineering reconnaissance depend on the type of battle or maneuver to be carried out (offensive, defense, retreat, march). To conduct engineering reconnaissance in units and subunits, engineering observation posts (IOP), engineering reconnaissance patrols (IRD), photographing posts (PF), engineering reconnaissance groups (IRG), deep reconnaissance groups (DRG), helicopter patrols (VD), can be organized in units and subunits. radar observation posts (RPN). To conduct engineering reconnaissance, vehicles specially created for this purpose are used, for example, the IRM engineering reconnaissance vehicle.
Typically, these posts and groups are created by engineering units of a motorized rifle (tank) division, corps, army, or front. In motorized rifle (tank) regiments and battalions, engineering reconnaissance tasks are usually assigned to ordinary reconnaissance posts and groups. For this purpose, soldiers or sergeants of the regiment's engineer company are included in the posts and groups.
A very simple example - on the path of the advance of a tank regiment there is a flat green field. The regiment commander is interested in whether the tanks will get through there. Engineering intelligence is obliged to give an accurate and unambiguous answer - yes or no. After all, under the green carpet of grass there may be anti-tank mines or an impenetrable swamp. It is not difficult to predict what will happen if intelligence makes a mistake. But how to reconnoiter if this field is under the gun of numerous enemy snipers and machine gunners, mortar and artillery fire? Sappers show ingenuity, risk their lives, suffer losses and, finally, give an accurate answer. Sappers, under enemy fire, make passages among enemy mines and lay a road through the swamp. The regiment is successful. All glory to the tankers. After all, they won the battle. What about the sappers? They were forgotten again, although the regiment largely owed its success to them.
2.2 Fortification equipment of positions, areas, control points
Fortification equipment is one of the most important elements of combat engineering support. This includes sections of trenches for riflemen, military equipment, equipment for shelters for equipment, shelters for personnel, communication passages (trenches), equipment for observation and command observation posts.
A significant part of the work on fortification equipment is carried out by personnel of motorized rifle (tank) units and units of other troops. The role of even the simplest fortifications in achieving victory in battle is very great. Suffice it to say that losses from enemy fire of covered infantry are 4-6 times lower compared to unsheltered infantry, and from nuclear weapons 10-15 times lower.
Work on fort equipment begins immediately after the unit occupies the given area and organizes the fire system. They continue as long as the unit occupies the area. These works are very labor-intensive and time-consuming. Suffice it to say that even a section of a machine gunner’s trench for prone shooting takes from 25 to 40 minutes. To open a trench for a tank, it is necessary to move up to 28 cubic meters. land. If we consider that the tank crew consists of three people, then each of the tankers must move 9 cubic meters. soil. One person per hour, working in average soil, can move up to 1 cubic meter. This means that manually digging out a trench for a tank will take from 10 to 30 hours. But it's worth it. A tank in a trench successfully deals with three or four advancing enemy tanks.
In a number of cases (hasty defense, proximity of a suitable enemy, etc.) there is no time for this. To reduce the time required to equip positions, engineering troops are brought in. Thus, the engineering company of a tank regiment has nine BTUs (bulldozer equipment mounted on a tank) for these purposes, i.e. one BTU per tank company. This equipment allows you to dig one tank trench in 30 minutes (plus another 5 man-hours of shoveling). In addition, the engineer-sapper company has a PZM (regimental earth-moving machine) machine for digging trenches, pits for dugouts, shelters, and shelter for equipment. It digs a trench at a speed of up to 300 meters per hour; when excavating pits, its productivity is 150 cubic meters. per hour (for comparison, an excavator is only 40). The capabilities of the division's engineer battalion are much higher. In addition, the front usually has one to three specialized battalions of fortification equipment. In particular, there are machines of the BTM type (Fig. 2), which tear off a trench at a speed of up to 900 meters per hour; MDK, which opens a trench for a tank in 8-10 minutes.
Fig.2 High-speed trench vehicle (HTM).
1- lifting winch; 2-buckets with teeth; 3-ground reflector; 4-conveyor;
5-tooth rack; 6- support roller; 7-stripping shoe (a device that clears the bottom of the trench); 8- rotor support roller; 9- slope former;
10- rotor; 11- gearbox.
To ensure the possibility of quickly constructing shelters for personnel, the engineering troops have not only earth-moving equipment, but also ready-made sets of elements for dugouts and shelters, as well as sawmills and forest processing tools for working at or near the front line. They also have the means and capabilities to construct these shelters and trenches directly under enemy fire. For example, a trench charge (OZ) allows, with the help of a directed explosion, in 2-3 minutes to explosively open a trench for a shooter to shoot while standing (1m.10cm deep).
In addition to trenches and shelters, a large number of other structures are being built in the defense area of motorized rifle, tank and artillery units. These are, first of all, observation and command observation posts, which differ slightly from shelters and trenches (for example, a sheltered observation post is a dugout with a periscope installed inside; an open command post for a regiment commander is a section of a trench with cells for staff officers, several shelters for radio stations, one shelter).
2.3 Construction and maintenance of engineering barriers, and destruction. Installation and maintenance of nuclear mines and landmines.
The construction and maintenance of engineering barriers is one of the main tasks of the engineering troops. Everyone is somewhat familiar with this part of the combat activities of the engineering troops. First of all, this is the installation of minefields. Minefields play a very significant role in covering troop positions from enemy attacks. Many years of experience in warfare shows that mine danger can greatly influence the actions of the enemy. Mines do not cause real harm to the enemy as much as they affect the psyche of personnel. Experience shows that the detonation of two or three tanks by mines is enough to completely disrupt the attack of a tank company. The experience of the war in Afghanistan shows that it was enough for one car to be blown up by a mine on the road to reduce the speed of a convoy of our troops to 1-2 kilometers per hour. Then the speed of movement was determined by the ability of sappers to check the road for mines. In the combat manuals of a number of countries, the term “mine warfare” exists. The massive use of mines can almost completely paralyze any combat activity of enemy troops in a particular territory.
Currently, the danger of mines is intensified by the fact that the development of technology and electronics makes it possible to create almost intelligent mines. It is a reality that a mine does not react to a soldier of its own army, a civilian, but is instantly triggered when an enemy soldier approaches and explodes at the most advantageous moment. In addition, today there is not a single sufficiently reliable method for detecting mines, and even if a mine is detected, there are no ways to reliably neutralize them. Mines can have sensors that recognize whether it is a target or a mine trawl, they can recognize the significance of the target, they can have a multiplicity device (miss a certain number of targets and explode under the next one). Mines can be transferred to a combat or safe position by radio signal, or self-destruct. To install minefields or individual mines, it is not at all necessary for a sapper to be present at the installation site. Mines can be placed remotely (throwing even non-enemy territory with the help of artillery or aviation). Mines can cover very large sections of the front in a very short time. If in the early sixties a sapper company could lay one kilometer of a minefield in one night, now it takes up to 10-15 kilometers in an hour.
In the recent past, to install mines in front of their front line, sappers had to crawl into no man's land at night and lay mines under enemy fire. Now this can be partially avoided through remote mining systems. However, these systems place mines on the ground, allowing the enemy to frequently detect and destroy the mines.
Minefields must not only be installed, but also maintained. The maintenance of a minefield includes monitoring its condition, installing new mines to replace the ones that exploded, protecting the field from being cleared by the enemy, fencing the field with signs so that mines do not blow up their vehicles or personnel, timely removal of these signs, converting the minefield into a combat zone. or a safe state (if the given minefield is set as controlled), opening and closing passages in the minefield, allowing friendly troops through the passages.
Motorized rifle and tank units can install some minefields themselves, but this type of combat operations is too specific, requires special knowledge, and therefore, as a rule, only engineering troops are engaged in minefields. To carry out this task, the engineer-sapper company of a motorized rifle (tank regiment) has a sapper platoon, which is armed with three trailed minelayers (PMZ) and three Ural or KAMAZ vehicles. A platoon is able to lay an anti-tank minefield one kilometer long in 15-20 minutes. The engineering troops are armed with anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, object mines (for mining buildings and other structures), automobile mines (for mining roads), railway mines, anti-landing mines (for mining water obstacles), anti-aircraft mines (mining airfield runways), booby traps, mines -surprises.
A special type of engineering mines are nuclear landmines. The engineering troops are armed with portable nuclear land mines weighing about 60 kg. and capacity from 500t. up to 2 thousand tons TNT equivalent. With the help of nuclear land mines, it is no longer tactical, but major operational-strategic tasks that are solved. With their help, continuous strips of nuclear mine barriers are created, very large bridges, dams, waterworks, and railway junctions are destroyed.
However, mines are not limited to the combat use of engineering troops. The engineering troops also construct non-explosive obstacles (barbed or cutting wire, anti-tank ditches, scarps and counter-scarps, barricades, road blockages, waterlogging and flooding areas), and carry out various destructions to impede the enemy’s advance (destruction of roads, bridges, blockages on roads); destroy infrastructure (destruction of buildings, railway and road structures, water supply systems, gas supply, electricity supply, fuel tanks, oil fields). To carry out these tasks, the engineering troops have various explosives and special engineering ammunition (charges of varying power and methods of activation).
The engineering troops solve the problems of destruction and mining not only on their own territory when preparing the area for defense, but also on the enemy’s territory in order to complicate the enemy’s combat operations, inflict losses on him, complicate or make it impossible for him to maneuver (withdrawal, transfer of units to threatened areas, transportation ammunition, approach of reserves).
Very often, the main task of subunits and units of airborne troops or special forces units is precisely to create conditions for the engineering troops to successfully carry out the tasks of causing harm to the enemy. For example, special forces capture and hold an important bridge for several hours so that sappers can blow it up.
2.4 Destruction and neutralization of enemy nuclear mines. Making and maintaining passages in barriers and destruction. Arrangement of passages through obstacles. Demining of terrain and objects
All these activities are the exact opposite of those mentioned above. Actually, this is what a direct clash of engineering troops of opposing armies consists of. Some mine, others clear mines; Some are blocking, others are looting.
In general, the idea of using nuclear mines was born within the walls of NATO in the late sixties and early seventies. The brilliant operation of the Soviet Army to occupy Czechoslovakia in August 1968 showed that the USSR was able to carry out a “blitzkrieg”; that NATO troops will not have time to react in the event of a strike by the Soviet Army, that it is capable of secretly concentrating a strike force in a very short time, and making a rapid advance to any point in Europe.
In order to be able to delay the advance of the Soviet Army and give NATO troops time to deploy, it was proposed to create a so-called nuclear mine belt along the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was meant that if all the charges of this belt were detonated simultaneously, a zone of radioactive contamination would be created, which would make it possible to delay the advance of Soviet troops for two to three days. This time is quite enough for the deployment of NATO strike groups.
The task of neutralizing or destroying enemy nuclear mines was assigned to the engineering troops. By the way, it was precisely in connection with this that the very rapid creation of special forces units in the Soviet Army began. They were originally created solely for the purpose of reconnaissance of nuclear mine installation sites, destroying the personnel of control posts, and providing the engineering troops with the opportunity to destroy or neutralize nuclear mines.
Currently, the task of both installing and destroying nuclear mines has lost its relevance. The use of nuclear mines by both sides is a big question. However, the engineering battalion of the tank (motorized rifle) division still includes a platoon for reconnaissance and destruction of nuclear land mines (VRUYAF).
The main task of the engineering troops in this area, as during the Second World War, is to make passages in enemy minefields and obstacles, clear debris and destruction to ensure the movement of friendly troops, clear mines from areas, buildings, roads, airfields, railway stations, streets and so on.
This is precisely the side of the combat activity of the engineering troops when they say: “For the engineering troops, the war never ends.” After the end of the war, a huge number of minefields, mined objects, unexploded artillery shells, and bombs remain. All this creates a threat to the lives of civilians and makes it impossible to use objects and terrain. In peacetime, one of the main tasks of the engineering troops is to eliminate this danger. Its implementation has been delayed for many decades.
In combat conditions, it is the engineering troops who begin the attack. They make passages through the enemy's obstacles in front of his front line and in the depths of the defense, providing motorized riflemen and tankers with forward movement. During the Great Patriotic War, perhaps the only way to make passages in minefields was to manually remove mines by sappers the night before the attack. It was the capture of a German sapper on the night of July 5, 1943 that allowed Marshal Zhukov to determine the exact hour of the start of the Nazi offensive on the Kursk Bulge.
Currently, there are a number of ways to make passages in enemy minefields. So, to make passages, the engineering company of a tank regiment has three KMT-5M (roller) trawls and 27 KMT-6 (knife) trawls. These trawls are hung on tanks, which can overcome minefields, and other tanks follow in their wake.
In addition, the division's engineering battalion has UR-67 and UR-77 mine clearing installations. They are lightly armored vehicles carrying missiles with attached hoses filled with explosives. Before launching an attack, these vehicles fire rockets that throw explosive hoses onto the minefields. When these hoses explode, the mines detonate and create passages. Next, the mine clearance installations advance in the battle formations of the tanks and, when minefields are detected in the depths of the enemy’s defense, they make passages into them.
To overcome anti-tank ditches and water obstacles up to 20 meters wide, the engineering troops have MT-55 tank bridgelayers. This is a vehicle based on a tank, which has a 20 m long metal bridge on top instead of a tank turret. In 2-3 minutes, the crew of the vehicle installs the bridge without leaving the vehicle.
For wider barriers, the engineering troops have a heavy mechanized TMM bridge (Fig. 3). These are 4 KRAZ-255 vehicles, with 10 meters of bridge with rigid supports placed on each of them. In 20 minutes, TMM can install a bridge 40 meters long.
Fig.3 Heavy mechanized bridge laying machine (TMM).
1 - initial position of the bridge layer; 2.3 - sequential opening of the folding bridge.
To make passages in the rubble, the regiment's engineering and sapper company has one powerful BAT-2 bulldozer. It is capable of laying a column track at a speed of up to 5 km/h.
2.5 Preparation and maintenance of routes for troop movement, transport and evacuation
The existing network of roads built in peacetime, as a rule, does not satisfy the needs of the troops. Firstly, this network is known to the enemy, which means it is under constant surveillance, targeted, and the structures on it are destroyed. Secondly, the directions of the roads often do not correspond to the location of the troops and their tasks. For example, according to the regulations, the regiment’s defense sector has a frontal length of 10-15 kilometers. To ensure the supply of food, ammunition, evacuation of the wounded, and maneuver of units, the regiment requires one rokada (road) along the front at a distance of 4-6 kilometers from the front edge, 15-18 km long, and a regimental frontal road (from the rear to the front edge) 10-10 km long. 15 km. In addition, roads to battalion defense areas and company strongholds are required.
These tracks are prepared and maintained by the engineering troops. Of course, these are not the roads that people are used to in peacetime. More often, these are simply directions of movement marked on the ground with arranged transitions through difficult-to-pass places (crossings through ravines, streams, smoothed steep ascents and descents, passages in rubble). The laying and maintenance of traffic routes becomes especially important in winter. Also, a great difficulty in solving the problem of maintaining traffic paths is the camouflage of these paths. The opening of the network of routes by the enemy means the opening of the entire defense system of our troops.
To solve this problem, the regiment's engineering and sapper company has a BAT-2 track-laying machine, chain saws and other tools.
It should be borne in mind that these works are carried out in the zone of artillery, mortar fire, and often small arms fire from the enemy. In cases of active enemy influence, IMR vehicles from the division's engineering battalion can be used to solve these problems. The base of this machine is a tank with powerful bulldozer equipment and a manipulator (mechanical arm) with a lifting capacity of 2 tons.
2.6 Equipment and maintenance of crossings when crossing water barriers
One of the most difficult tasks during an offensive is crossing (overcoming) water barriers (rivers, lakes, reservoirs). They are usually used by the enemy as the basis of a defensive line. Very often, the offensive of troops began by crossing water barriers, or it ended with access to the water barrier.
With the advent of amphibious armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles in our army's arsenal, the task of crossing water barriers, especially wide ones, has not become any easier. The troops have a lot of equipment that is not capable of swimming, but without which it is impossible to carry out a further offensive (tanks, artillery pieces, vehicles, etc.). And river banks do not always allow floating cars to go down to the water or drive out to the shore.
Engineering troops are involved in solving problems of equipment and maintenance of crossings. For these purposes, there are crossing and landing battalions, pontoon-bridge battalions and regiments, bridge-building battalions and regiments.
The transport and landing battalions are armed with PTS-2 tracked amphibious transporters. This vehicle is capable of transporting 72 infantrymen, or a gun with a caliber of up to 203 mm, or a Ural-type vehicle through a water obstacle of any width at a speed of 10 km/h. The carrying capacity of PTS-2 on water is 10 tons. This machine is also able to sail on seas with waves up to 4 points.
To cross water barriers of tanks, self-propelled guns and other tracked vehicles weighing up to 52 tons, there are GSP tracked self-propelled ferries (Fig. 5).
Fig.5 Crawler self-propelled ferry (GSP).
1- ramp of the right semi-ferry; 2- boat of the right semi-ferry; 3-driving engine of the right semi-ferry; 4- wave breaker shield; 5- transported equipment.
These vehicles march in a tank column and solve the problem of crossing heavy equipment. Speed afloat 10 km/hour. A tank on the ferry can fire.
To cross water obstacles up to 227 meters wide, the engineering troops have a PMP pontoon fleet. From the set of this fleet, transported on 32 Kraz vehicles, a floating bridge with a carrying capacity of 60 tons and a length of 227 meters or a floating bridge with a carrying capacity of 20 tons and a length of 382 meters is assembled in 15-30 minutes. To ferry troops across wider barriers, ferries of various carrying capacities (from 10 to 300 tons) can be assembled from these pontoons. To tow these ferries, the pontoon battalion has 12 boats.
For the construction of stationary crossings, crossings over obstacles where the use of floating equipment is impossible, USM bridge construction installations are used, which allow the construction of a wooden 60-m bridge. bridge on pile supports at speeds of up to 60 meters per hour.
There are pontoon parks (PPS) in the engineering troops, which make it possible to build pontoon railway bridges across rivers.
In peacetime, all these units of the engineering troops are constantly involved in rescuing people and material during floods.
2.7 Engineering measures to camouflage troops and objects
Camouflage is a set of measures designed to hide from the enemy the presence and location of our troops, the actions and intentions of our troops, or to mislead the enemy regarding the number, actions, location, and intentions of our troops. The purpose of camouflage measures is to force the enemy to position his troops in the most unfavorable way for him, in the most unfavorable places for him, to force the enemy to strike at empty places, to expose the enemy to the attacks of our troops.
Camouflage can often play a decisive role in achieving success in battle, in winning the entire battle. When the command of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War was able to fully appreciate the role of camouflage and widely deploy camouflage measures in preparation for combat operations, it was able to achieve decisive successes.
Thus, the measures taken managed to hide from the Germans the construction of a railway on the left bank of the Volga to Stalingrad, which made it possible to quickly transfer and concentrate a large number of troops near the city. The German command regarded the reports of their intelligence officers about the concentration of Soviet troops near the city as disinformation. They knew that the Red Army command had nothing to transfer many troops there, and the new railway along which the transfer took place was reliably hidden from German aerial reconnaissance.
When preparing the defense on the Kursk Bulge, the engineering troops created a huge number of false objects (trench lines, tank trenches, airfields, roads, places of concentration of troops, tanks, artillery). German intelligence officers and aerial reconnaissance, encountering these false objects along with genuine ones, reported to their command, and the Wehrmacht High Command decided that the Red Army, guessing that the Germans intended to strike near Kursk, was trying to mislead them and create the impression that the Soviets had a sufficient number of troops near Kursk. Meanwhile, the Red Army actually created a large group of troops there, but it was hidden among a huge number of false objects.
Therefore, camouflage is divided into strategic, operational and tactical. The engineering troops carry out only their part of camouflage measures. For this purpose, the RGK (main command reserve) has camouflage battalions. One such battalion, using the means available to them, can be deployed to a false tank corps.
For example, up to 20 inflatable rubber tanks are transported on one vehicle. Such a rubber tank is inflated in 5-7 minutes from a car compressor and becomes indistinguishable from a distance of 200-300m. from the real one, and the metallic paint gives exactly the same mark on the locator screen as from a real tank. The same vehicle can tow these inflated tanks behind itself, creating the impression of two tank companies moving forward. The simulator installed on the same vehicle creates the impression on air of a lively radio exchange of a tank column.
Camouflage networks are gradually becoming a thing of the past. The fact is that modern means of even optical reconnaissance make it possible to very clearly distinguish artificial greenery from the natural background and it is no longer possible to hide objects behind nets. Moreover, it is impossible to hide a pontoon bridge on the river. But it is relatively easy to deploy several false bridges and hide the real one among them. The enemy will be forced to disperse his forces to destroy all the bridges in a row, which will sharply reduce the effectiveness of the strikes.
The engineering troops are armed with various simulators of radio operation, simulators of infrared radiation from objects, radar reflectors, and easy-to-assemble sets of decoy objects (equipment, buildings, bridges). For example, a camouflage airfield platoon with its own resources in unprepared terrain in 1-2 days deploys a false military airfield with an imitation of basing a fighter air division on it. Moreover, not only ground objects and aircraft on the ground are simulated, but also aircraft flights near the airfield.
In general, combat is not only a confrontation between offensive and defensive means, but also a confrontation between reconnaissance and camouflage means. If you don’t know where to strike, and the enemy knows where your strength is, then you will probably lose the battle.
2.8 Engineering measures to restore the combat capability of troops and eliminate the consequences of enemy nuclear strikes
Fortunately, the engineering troops never had to perform this task. To some extent, its implementation can be compared with the work of rescuers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations in zones of earthquakes, floods, large fires, landslides, avalanches, man-made disasters plus radioactive contamination of the area. But for a more accurate comparison, you need to imagine all these events as happening simultaneously. But these tasks must be completed in combat conditions and under conditions of severe time pressure.
If we decompose these tasks into their components, then the implementation of these components includes: engineering reconnaissance of the enemy, terrain and objects; restoration and maintenance of engineering barriers; making and maintaining passages in barriers and destruction; arrangement of passages through obstacles; restoration and maintenance of troop movement, transport and evacuation routes; restoration and maintenance of crossings over water barriers; engineering measures to camouflage troops and objects; and so on. tasks.
2.9 Extraction and purification of water, equipment of water supply points
In fact, this is more likely the task of the rear services, but all attempts to transfer the solution of this task to them immediately led to a disruption in the supply of water to the troops. This happened in 1939 in the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1940, and this happened in 1945 during the movement of Soviet troops through the Gobi Desert. In the end, it was decided that supplying troops with drinking water was not a matter of logistical support, but of combat support, because the lack of water by the end of the third day led to large losses in personnel.
One should not think that the issue of water extraction and purification plays a significant role only in desert conditions in the summer or in Arctic conditions in winter. People who are accustomed to the fact that at any moment they can open a tap and clean drinking water will flow from it, or, at worst, take buckets and go with them to a well, it is difficult to imagine the problem of drinking water. But imagine a village with one well, into which a regiment entered. One soldier requires from 8 to 15 liters of drinking water per day. The regiment consumes about 8-10 tons of clean water per day. The well will be empty in the first half hour, but people need to drink, eat, and wash. Where can I get water? But we need not just water, but clean drinking water.
To solve this problem, the engineering troops have a large arsenal of technical means for extracting and purifying water. To extract water from underground, for small units there are manual drilling devices (MTD) for drilling wells up to 8 meters deep and pumping water out of them. There are mechanized devices for drilling wells up to 200 m deep, and various means (pumps) for raising water. To purify water, there are small-sized filters that can provide clean water to small units directly at their positions.
To provide the regiment with water, the engineering company includes a field water supply department, which is armed with a MAFS or VFS-2.5 vehicle. The MAFS machine is capable of purifying 5 tons of water in an hour, regardless of its initial contamination (it also purifies water from radioactive contamination). For areas where there is no dirty, but unsalted water, there is a POU machine capable of desalinating up to 400 liters of sea water in an hour.
2.10 Other tasks
In addition to solving the immediate tasks of combat engineering support, the engineering troops are entrusted with the task of providing other branches of the military with entrenching tools, electrical equipment (from flashlights and batteries to mobile nuclear power plants), and providing units with electricity. For this purpose, the engineering troops have mobile power plants with a capacity of 500 watts to 5 megawatts.
3. Structure of engineering troops units
Currently, the engineering troops of the Russian Army consist of subunits and units that are part of motorized rifle (tank) regiments and divisions; engineering units that are part of army corps, armies, districts, as well as engineering units and formations reporting directly to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.
A motorized rifle (tank) regiment has a combat engineer company (ISR).
The motorized rifle (tank) division has an engineer battalion (ISB). The army corps also has an engineer battalion, but its staff and capabilities are somewhat wider than those of the HMB division.
An army, depending on its composition and combat missions, depending on the theater of military operations, may have one or more HMB or an engineer regiment (ISR). In addition, the army may have a pontoon-bridge battalion (OPOMB), several specialized battalions.
However, most often specialized engineering battalions and regiments, as well as brigades, remain under district or central subordination, located on the territory of the districts. These engineering units are usually deployed in those areas where their use is most possible. These are pontoon regiments (OPOMP), airborne crossing battalions (ODESPB), engineering assault and barrage battalions (IBSHIR), engineering barrage battalions (OIZB), camouflage battalions (OMB), bridge-building battalions, road battalions, control point equipment battalions (OBOPU) ), engineering fortification battalions (OIFB), field water supply battalions and companies; platoons, companies and battalions of special mine clearance, units and units of mine clearance, units and units of special use.
In some cases, engineering units are combined into engineering teams. There are currently no formations larger than engineering brigades in the engineering troops, and their existence is inappropriate. For example, an engineering team for eliminating the consequences of nuclear accidents is stationed near each nuclear power plant.
3.1 Staff of the engineer-sapper company of the tank regiment (ISRT TP)
The engineering and sapper company of a tank regiment belongs to the combat support units and is designed to perform engineering support tasks for the regiment's combat (Diagram 1).
The direct commander of the company is the head of the regiment's engineering service, who in turn reports directly to the regiment commander. Fortification - a branch of military engineering that deals with the theory and practice of improving terrain for combat using engineering methods.
Military fortification - the main means of fortification equipment of the area.
Trench called an open earthen structure for firing. A trench can be used for a rifleman, a machine gun, a grenade launcher, a mortar, a gun, a tank, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), an armored personnel carrier (APC), an anti-aircraft gun, etc. A word for everything that can shoot. Very often, a tank trench is mistakenly called a caponier. This is completely wrong. This word came into literature from the times of forts and fortresses. A caponier is a concrete or brick structure adjacent to the fortress wall and intended for firing along the walls of the fortress to destroy enemy soldiers who broke through directly to the walls. If the caponier allows you to fire not in two directions, but in one direction, then it is called a semi-caponier.
For non-firing equipment (cars, communication vehicles, field kitchens, ambulance transport, etc.), personnel are being built shelters . Their difference from trenches is that it is impossible to fire from them. In some cases, covers may also come off for firing equipment. Thus, a shelter for a tank differs from a trench for a tank only in its depth (the tank is hidden in the shelter to its entire height).
Various shelters are also being built to shelter personnel. But, if all shelters for equipment are called “shelter”, then for personnel their names differ.
Gap used to cover a motorized rifle squad (and other small units). Outwardly, it looks like a short section of a trench. The gap can be open or covered (covered on top with thin logs (knurling) and sprinkled with a 30-60 cm layer of earth). The gap must accommodate at least 1/3 of the squad personnel.
Dugout It is a completely buried structure made of logs, panels, or corrugated iron elements, covered with earth. The dugout is covered from above with one or several rows of knurling and covered with a layer of earth of at least 1m.20cm. Inside, bunks are equipped for personnel to rest, a heating stove is installed, and electricity can be installed. Very often, a dugout is mistakenly called a dugout. This is fundamentally wrong. Dugouts, unlike dugouts, are a surface structure, located in the rear areas; they are not intended to shelter personnel from enemy fire. Dugouts are intended for long-term accommodation of personnel and are something like large huts made of logs, covered with a thick layer of turf. Dugouts can have a capacity of up to 100 or even 200 people, while a dugout can accommodate up to 13 people. According to the standards, one dugout is equipped per platoon and must accommodate 1/3 of the platoon's strength. The dugout is not intended for firing. Structures similar to a dugout, but equipped with one or more embrasures are called bunkers (wood-earth firing point) or DZOS (wood-earth firing structure). The same structure, but made of concrete, is called a bunker (long-term firing point) or DOS (long-term firing structure).
Asylum similar to a dugout, but larger, goes deeper into the ground than a dugout, has a thicker protective layer of earth and is completely sealed. Those. Poisonous substances and incendiary agents cannot penetrate inside the shelter. The shelter is equipped with a filter and ventilation unit; in a shelter you can be in a poisoned zone, a zone of radioactive contamination, without wearing gas masks. The shelter is equipped with one per company and must accommodate at least 1/3 of the company’s personnel.
Message moves - these are trenches connecting the trenches of units or trenches leading to the rear (for removing the wounded, delivering ammunition, food, replenishment). Also in the defense area, shelters are being built for the wounded, for medical stations, communications facilities, water supply points, field warehouses, food points, etc.
Engineering ammunition , explosive means, explosive charges (HE), mines, pyrotechnic devices and other items of engineering weapons filled with explosives and pyrotechnic compositions. The means of explosion are blasting caps, electric detonators, electric igniters, fuses, detonating and fire cords, incendiary tubes, fuses, etc. Explosive charges are used to cause destruction, construct obstacles and perform other tasks related to engineering support for military operations of troops. The main means for these purposes are mines, as well as projectiles from engineering cable launchers (devices for throwing cables), and in some armies - nuclear mines.
Soviet military miracle 1941-1943 [Revival of the Red Army] Glanz David M
ENGINEERING (SEPER) TROOPS
ENGINEERING (SEPER) TROOPS
Engineer and sapper regiments and battalions
Throughout the war, the engineering troops of the Red Army included sapper troops as part of the active fronts and sappers under the control of the leadership of the RGK or RVGK, who were allocated by the Headquarters to the active fronts and armies as needed. Both of them were supposed to be involved in the construction and renovation of defensive structures and providing various kinds of engineering support to field troops during offensive and defensive operations.
Engineering troops as part of the active troops of the Red Army included separate sapper battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, motorized engineer battalions in mechanized corps, sapper battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, pontoon-bridge battalions in tank divisions, light engineering battalions in motorized rifle divisions, engineer companies or platoons in rifle and cavalry regiments and in tank and motorized rifle regiments and brigades, as well as engineer platoons in regiments of the RVGK and corps artillery.
Sapper battalions of corps and divisions consisted of three sapper companies of three platoons and a technical company in battalions of a corps or technical platoon in battalions of divisional subordination, a bridge-building platoon and a platoon of secret weapons and a small rear service. The total strength of the corps engineer battalion was 901 people, the divisional one - 521 people. Depending on the division to which they belonged, these battalions moved either on foot or on horseback. On June 22, 1941, the field forces of the Red Army included over 200 sapper battalions, all of which retained their pre-war structure until December 1941, when the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) reduced the battalion's strength to two companies, mainly due to the creation within the RVGK larger and more efficient engineer troops.
The engineering troops of the RGK included 19 engineering and 15 pontoon-bridge regiments stationed in military districts, which the NKO formed in the first half of 1941 from 22 separate engineering battalions and 21 separate pontoon-bridge battalions. Of this number, ten engineer and eight pontoon-bridge regiments, seven engineer battalions and two sapper battalions were assigned to active fronts, two engineer and two sapper battalions were directly subordinate to the RGK, and the rest were located in military districts and inactive fronts.
The RGK engineering regiment consisted of a headquarters, two engineering battalions (one of them motorized), a technical battalion with electrical, electrical, defensive, hydraulic and camouflage companies, a light pontoon-bridge fleet (NPL), 35 engineering vehicles, 48 trucks and 21 tractors. The pontoon-bridge regiment included a headquarters, three pontoon-bridge battalions (but only one personnel), a technical company with platoons for road laying, bridge construction, lumberjacks, electrical and field water supply, the N2P pontoon-bridge park and an officer school equipped with pontoon bridges and technical equipment.
On the eve of the war, the military plans of the General Staff required the NCO to have in each field army at least one separate motorized engineer battalion, one motorized pontoon-bridge battalion and separate field water supply companies, camouflage, electrical and hydraulic technical support, a sapper training unit and a separate reserve pontoon-bridge park equipped with the N2P kit. In addition, each field army should have a reserve engineering regiment and a separate reserve technical company to perform special engineering tasks.
However, in addition to the general shortage of engineering troops, the engineering regiments and battalions of the RGK existing on June 22, 1941 were missing from 35 to 60 percent of the full-time command personnel, from 20 to 70 percent of the full-time sergeant majors. They were short on average 35 percent of their manpower and approximately 50 percent of their equipment.
In addition to the engineering troops, the People's Commissariat of Defense on the eve of the war also had 25 military construction departments. 23 of them were engaged in the construction of fortified areas and field defensive structures in the western military districts, along with the majority of engineer troops belonging to future fronts. As a result, with the outbreak of the war, most combat formations were deprived of the necessary engineering support.
When Wehrmacht troops brutally defeated the Red Army during Operation Barbarossa, the already fragile Soviet engineering forces suffered great damage. The NKO responded to this by hastily and practically from scratch starting the formation of new engineer battalions for the RGK (later RVGK) with their subsequent allocation to active fronts. For example, in July 1941, all engineer and pontoon-bridge regiments of the RGK were disbanded, and their remains were used to form 100 small sapper battalions, equipped only with rifles and other hand weapons, as well as entrenching tools, explosives and anti-tank mines. 25 such battalions were assigned to rifle corps, and another 75 to rifle divisions.
As a result, the total number of engineer-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army constantly grew - from 20 on July 1 to 178 on November 1, including 140 assigned to the active fronts. However, during the same period, engineering support for rifle divisions decreased markedly. For example, on July 29, the NKO disbanded the technical and pontoon platoons in the sapper battalions of the rifle divisions, and in July 1942, after the liquidation of the battalion's three sapper companies in December, he reduced the size of the battalion by 60 soldiers, also reducing the number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.
Starting from the first months of 1942, the NKO began to compensate for the shortage of engineering troops, giving the active fronts and armies one or two new engineer or sapper battalions, and the fronts - new pontoon-bridge battalions. Individual engineer battalions could be either foot or motorized, they consisted of three engineer companies with three engineer or motorized platoons and one technical platoon each (the latter had electrical, lumber and transport sections). The total strength of the battalion was 405 people. Individual sapper battalions had two or three sapper companies with a total strength of approximately 320 people.
While the number of separate engineer and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army increased during the period described from 82 and 46 on January 1, 1942 to, respectively, 184 and 68 on January 1, 1944, the number of separate engineer battalions decreased from 78 to three .
Sapper brigades and armies
Although during the initial stages of the German Operation Barbarossa the number of Red Army engineering troops was greatly reduced, the State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered
Headquarters to build new strategic defensive lines and positions to slow down the Wehrmacht’s advance, using newly created engineering and sapper units for this purpose. For example, on June 24, the State Defense Committee ordered the construction of a strategic defensive line along the Luga River south of Leningrad, on June 25 - a second line from Nevel through Vitebsk and Gomel along the Dnieper to Dnepropetrovsk, and on June 28 - a third line from Ostashkov through Olenino, Dorogobych and Yelnya along the Desna to Zhukovka, 50 kilometers west of Bryansk.
As the Wehrmacht advance accelerated, the GKO in mid-July ordered Stavka to erect two more large defensive lines, the first to protect Odessa, the Crimean Peninsula and Sevastopol, the second to protect the approaches to Moscow. The Moscow line, which blocked the Wehrmacht's offensive in the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets directions, began from Rzhev, went through Vyazma, south from the Moscow reservoir along the Lama River, then through Borodino and Kaluga to Tula.
Responsibility for the construction of these defensive lines was assigned by the Headquarters to Main Military Engineering Directorate NPOs and the Main Directorate of Hydraulic Construction ( Glavgidrostroy) under the NKVD. The first was to use military construction battalions subordinate to the front and army military field construction departments in the areas allocated to them for the construction of lines; in turn, the latter had to use its construction troops to build defensive lines in the deeper rear. When this organization of work turned out to be ineffective, the GKO on August 22 transformed Glavgidrostroy into the Main Directorate of Defense Works (GUOBR) under the NKVD and gave it responsibility for coordinating the construction of rear defensive lines.
Despite all the efforts of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters, the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht inflicted heavy damage on the engineering troops of the Red Army, preventing most of them from taking part in the construction of defensive lines. The Germans forestalled many of Stavka's attempts to build defensive lines. In August and September, German troops overcame the Vitebsk-Gomel and Luga lines of the Red Army, and in early October they broke through the strategic defenses in the Vyazma and Bryansk sectors, encircling and destroying large forces of Soviet troops. Alarmed by the possibility of the Germans reaching Moscow, the Headquarters formed the Moscow Defense Zone on October 12, which was to consist of a series of defensive belts around the city. The most important of them passed through Khlebnikovo, Skhodnya, Zvenigorod, Kubinka and Naro-Fominsk, along Pakhra and the Moscow River.
Since the Red Army lacked the engineering and construction troops needed to build these and other defensive lines, the GKO on October 13 ordered the NKO to form six engineer armies consisting of engineer brigades by November 1, 1941, and transferred all engineering and construction troops of the Red Army consisting of active fronts and in the rear under the command of the GUOBR (NKVD). Numbered 1st to 6th, these armies were formed in Vologda, Gorky, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Stalingrad and Armavir, their total strength was 300,000 people.
The GKO assigned responsibility to the GUOBR for the creation of all rear defensive lines and positions by December 10, especially west of Moscow, and ordered it to prepare all personnel assigned to the newly formed sapper armies and other engineering troops of the Red Army.
Each sapper army was supposed to have approximately 50,000 people, mostly reservists under the age of 45. It was supposed to involve in them the personnel of engineering and construction units from the zones of active fronts, as well as other specialists mobilized in the rear. The sapper brigades consisted of 19 sapper battalions, one motor-tractor battalion and one mechanized detachment. By order of the State Defense Committee, the engineer army was to have 3,000 trucks, 90 passenger cars, 1,350 tracked tractors and 2,350 tractor-trailers, 12,000 wagons of building materials and the full number of necessary construction tools. In addition, the departments of other commissariats and the civilian population were involved in the construction of defensive lines.
By order of the State Defense Committee, the local population was mobilized for construction. These were mostly women, old people, schoolchildren and teenagers of pre-conscription age. By order of the military councils of the fronts and military districts, as well as regional and district party and administrative bodies, working battalions [mobilized] were formed from them, which were then subordinated to the sapper armies.
Ultimately, nine sapper armies were formed, numbered 1st to 9th. These armies consisted of 30 engineer brigades and had a total of 570 engineer battalions, numbered 1200 to 1465 and 1543 to 1771. The total number of sapper armies as of November 1, 1941 was 299,730 people. However, an acute shortage of engineering and construction troops limited the size and capabilities of these armies and brigades.
Each of the first nine engineer armies consisted of a headquarters and two to four separate engineer brigades. The sapper brigade included a headquarters, 19 separate sapper battalions, divided into three companies with four platoons each and a total battalion strength of 497 people, a mechanized detachment with one road and one bridge platoon, a lumberjack platoon, a position construction platoon and an automobile and tractor platoon with four departments. Although each engineer brigade was supposed to have a strength of 9,979 soldiers, most brigades remained understrength. As a result, the personnel of the sapper battalions, who were supposed to spend 12 hours a day on construction work and another two hours on military training, were forced to work on the construction of defensive structures for 12-14 hours a day and did not undergo any military training at all. The tenth sapper army, number 1, which completed its deployment to the Western Front in January 1942, consisted of ten sapper brigades with eight sapper battalions each - a total of 80 sapper battalions and 45,160 soldiers.
Initially, the sapper armies were subordinate to the GUOBR under the NKVD, but worked under the direct leadership of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the NKO. However, this organization of command turned out to be not entirely effective, and on November 28, the Headquarters subordinated these armies to the chief of the engineering troops of the Red Army. In December 1942, the chief of engineering troops assigned nine sapper armies and 29 sapper brigades to military districts and active fronts (two to the Western Front and one to the Karelian Front). By mid-January 1942, the structure of the Red Army engineering troops had expanded, now there were ten sapper armies, 40 sapper brigades, three engineer regiments and 82 engineer-sapper, 78 sapper and 46 pontoon-bridge battalions.
These sapper armies and brigades were primarily responsible for the construction of strategic defensive lines deep in the rear of the Red Army. The first of these lines, located in the Moscow, Stalingrad, North Caucasus and Volga military districts, were permanent in nature and consisted of a complex system of fortified battalion defensive areas and company strong points located on the likely directions of the German offensive and around large cities. However, on December 27, 1941, after the Red Army's victory near Moscow, the GKO ordered the cessation of defensive work around Moscow so that more resources could be allocated to transport refugees, grain and bread for the needy population, and limited construction work on other defensive lines.
In addition to fulfilling their construction duties, the sapper armies also served as a training base for the engineering troops of the Red Army as a whole. For example, in November-December 1941, the NKO assigned two and then three battalions in each brigade the designation of training and ultimately transferred over 90 such battalions to the active fronts. Trained as ordinary engineering, pontoon-bridge or road-bridge battalions and staffed with the most experienced personnel, the units intended for transfer to the front immediately stopped all defensive work and engaged in intensive field training. After they left for the front, engineer brigades formed new battalions and companies to replace those who left. However, the chaos caused by the constant flow of personnel between the sapper armies and the active fronts negatively affected the effectiveness of the former's actions.
The ten sapper armies proved their worth during the Red Army's winter offensive of 1941-1942, helping to maintain security behind the lines while enhancing the engineering and sapper capabilities of the fronts. However, they turned out to be clumsy, ineffective and difficult to control, especially in a constantly changing combat situation. Therefore, in February 1942, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to disband half of the sapper armies and brigades, assign the rest to active fronts, and use the personnel of the disbanded troops to facilitate the formation of new rifle divisions and brigades.
In February-March, the NKO disbanded the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 9th and 10th sapper armies and six sapper brigades, increasing the number of the 7th and 8th sapper armies of the Southwestern Front, respectively, to five and ten brigades. In addition, he gave the active armies and the Moscow defense zone four sapper armies, three separate sapper brigades and many newly formed special engineering units.
At the same time, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Red Army Troops under the NPO removed the command staff from the engineer armies and brigades for transfer to the active forces, and also reduced the number and strength of engineer battalions in the engineer brigades. The NPO took the second step in April, reducing the number of engineer battalions from 497 to 405 people, replacing motor-tractor battalions with companies with four motor vehicles and one tractor platoon in each, and reducing the number of engineer brigades to seven battalions with one motor-tractor company for a total brigade strength of 3,138 people.
At the end of June, two months after the completion of this reorganization, the NKO was faced with the difficult task of stopping the Wehrmacht's new summer offensive, Operation Blau. In addition to providing support to the active fronts, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 8th engineer armies of the NKO were supposed to strengthen the defensive lines west of Moscow, build new lines to defend the approaches to Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and allocate manpower from their ranks to compensate for losses in the Red Army.
Five sapper armies built these defenses at an accelerated pace, but on July 26, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to extract 400,000 people from non-combat units by August 20, including 60,000 sappers to assign them to combat formations. The remaining sapper armies and brigades were supposed to be reduced, since they “too large and organizationally immobile and cannot effectively carry out their tasks of engineering support for the combat operations of our troops, especially in offensive operations”.
The GKO intended to create more flexible and effective engineering troops, which the Headquarters could use in defensive and offensive operations in the most critical areas in the late summer and autumn of 1942. As a result, it was decided to disband the remaining sapper armies and part of the sapper brigades, and transform another part of the brigades into specialized engineering brigades designed to support active fronts.
By order of August 17, 1942, the NKO began transforming the remaining five sapper armies and 27 sapper brigades into defensive structures directorates (see the “Construction Troops” section below). Six sapper brigades were reorganized into engineering brigades of the RVGK, subordinate to the active fronts, and another 8 were disbanded. 30,000 people from the former 1st, 7th and 8th engineer armies were transferred to staff the newly formed rifle divisions. Later, already in September, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 7th sapper armies were reorganized into the UOS (Defense Construction Administration), the 8th sapper army became the UOS in October. 12 sapper brigades became engineering brigades as part of the active fronts (see Table 9). The remaining 18 sapper brigades, assigned to the active fronts on October 15, now performed dual functions, providing the front troops with engineering support and serving as bases for the formation of new, more specialized engineering brigades and battalions.
Sapper armies and brigades made a significant contribution to the victories of the Red Army at Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, preparing defensive lines, providing engineering support to the active fronts, and serving as a base for the formation of other, more specialized engineering troops transferred to the active fronts. For example, in 1941, nine engineer armies organized, trained, and fielded more than 150 specialized engineer battalions; in 1942, engineer armies and brigades formed 27 specialized engineering brigades of the RVGK, 23 of which served until the end of the war, and five still exist today. Finally, the engineer armies contributed more than 150,000 men to man and form new rifle divisions.
Engineering teams
Disbanding its engineer armies in the spring of 1942, the NKO at the same time took into account the demands of the front commanders, who proposed the formation of specialized and flexible engineering brigades that would better meet their needs. Therefore, at the same time, the creation of a wide range of new engineering brigades and battalions began. For example, responding to the March demand of the chief of engineering troops of the Western Front, the NKO began forming special-purpose engineering brigades (IBON) from April 18. The first of these, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Western Front, formed in May from the 33rd Engineer Brigade of the 1st Engineer Army, consisted of six engineer barrage battalions, two electrical battalions, one searchlight battalion, an electrification detachment, an electric generator train, a special technical engineering company, a motor transport company and four electrical engineering companies (seconded), with a total brigade strength of 4,757 people. Ultimately, the NKO formed six special-purpose engineering brigades by July 1 and eight more by November 1, giving their field troops one brigade per active front.
Although the structure of these special purpose engineer brigades could vary, most consisted of a headquarters, a motor-tractor company, five to eight engineer barrage battalions, one of which was converted into a special mine battalion in October 1942, an electrical battalion and an electrification detachment, with a total number of 3097 people per 5-battalion brigade. The brigade's main mission was to perform specialized tasks such as laying and removing minefields, placing controlled minefields, and creating electrified and other obstacles, but they often had to carry out more dangerous combat missions. For example, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Volkhov Front used its engineer barrage battalions as assault groups during the breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad in January 1943.
In addition to these special purpose engineering brigades, the NKO also formed separate mine engineering battalions in April 1942. One such battalion was assigned to each of the anti-tank brigades of the Red Army with the task of erecting anti-tank barriers and destroying enemy tanks together with artillery troops.
The NKO continued this process at the end of the summer of 1942, when the formation of guards mine battalions began - the most interesting and most secret of all specialized types of engineering troops. In August, two Guards mine battalions were deployed to the Voronezh and North Caucasus fronts. By October 1, the field troops already had ten such battalions, as a rule, one battalion per active front. Formed specifically to carry out sabotage operations behind enemy lines, the battalions usually operated in small sabotage groups.
In addition to the Guards mine battalions, the NKO formed a Guards mine brigade in the Moscow Military District on August 17, subordinating it to the direct leadership of Headquarters. Formed from two engineer battalions of the 37th Engineer Brigade of the 1st Engineer Army, the 1st Guards Mine Brigade consisted of a headquarters group, a control company and five Guards mine battalions with a total brigade strength of 2,281 people. Like individual battalions, this brigade not only laid and removed mines, but also formed and deployed small groups to carry out sabotage operations (often in conjunction with partisans) against German communications and important rear objectives.
During the summer of 1942, the NKO also created a wide range of smaller specialized units, including five high-explosive flamethrower companies, several field water supply companies, and an artesian well drilling group to provide drinking water to active troops.
In preparing the Red Army for major counteroffensives and the subsequent winter campaign, the Stavka ordered the NKO to form larger and more specialized engineer troops to support these offensives. As a result, many of the existing engineer battalions were consolidated into engineer engineer brigades (Isbr) in October, each of which consisted of four to five engineer battalions, a light pontoon-bridge fleet of the NLP and a motorized engineer reconnaissance company. Several of these brigades were formed as mountain engineering brigades, subdivided into four mountain engineering battalions, capable of operating effectively in mountainous terrain.
On November 12, responding to the demand of the chief of the engineering troops of the Red Army, Major General M.P. Vorobyov, the NKO transformed part of the sapper brigades into 15 engineering mine brigades (IMB), numbered from 1st to 15th. These brigades, responsible for creating operational obstacle zones, consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company and seven mine engineering battalions with a total strength of 2,903 people.
In addition, on November 26, 1942, the NKO ordered the transformation of five sapper brigades of the Transcaucasian Front into mountain engineering and mine brigades of the RVGK (from 1st to 5th) in November-December. Each such brigade (gimbre) consisted of five mountain engineering mine battalions, the companies and platoons of which had horses and donkeys rather than tractors as vehicles; the total number of the brigade was 2,344 people.
In the fall of 1942, the NKO began to form larger and more efficient pontoon-bridge units - primarily because the Headquarters considered the consolidation of bridge-building units an important condition for achieving success in extended offensive operations. At the beginning of autumn, the NKO sent reinforcements to the active fronts and armies in the form of 11 separate pontoon-bridge parks of the RVGK, and in November 1942 formed two pontoon-bridge brigades and assigned them to the Stalingrad Front for use in the counter-offensive near Stalingrad. These brigades consisted of a headquarters company, three to seven (usually four) N2P motorized pontoon-bridge battalions, one DMP-42 pontoon-bridge battalion with a total bridge capacity of 50 tons, and several diving squads for underwater work. When the winter offensive unfolded, the NKO assigned the third pontoon-bridge brigade to the Leningrad Front in January 1943. In February, four new heavy pontoon-bridge regiments were added to these brigades, each consisting of two battalions equipped with the new 100-ton capacity TMP pontoon bridges.
During 1942, the NPO not only formed and transferred an impressive number of new engineering brigades to the active forces, but also strengthened the existing engineering forces, including new engineering units in existing structures. For example, engineer battalions were included in all the new guards rifle and mechanized corps, and mine engineering companies were included in the new tank corps.
Thus, by February 1, 1943, the structure of the Red Army engineering troops expanded and included 13 special-purpose engineering brigades, one sapper brigade, 17 engineer-sapper brigades (including five mountain), 15 engineer-mine brigades, 185 separate engineer battalions, ten separate Sapper battalions, one Guards mine brigade, 11 Guards mine battalions, three pontoon-bridge brigades, four pontoon-bridge regiments and 78 pontoon-bridge battalions.
All these special-purpose engineering brigades, engineer-sapper, engineer-mine, pontoon-bridge brigades and the Guards mine brigade, as well as pontoon-bridge regiments and mine-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions, together with the guards mine battalions, were created by NKO specifically to carry out specific combat missions during offensive operations, either as part of active fronts and armies, or under the direct control of Headquarters.
In 1943, the NKO continued to expand and improve the structure of its engineering troops. For example, in February, the formation of five rear barrage brigades began, consisting of five to seven engineer battalions each. The task of such brigades was to clear the liberated territory of mines and obstacles. After a long process of formation, the Headquarters in December 1943 transferred one of these brigades to the Moscow Military District, two to the newly formed Kharkov Military District, and one each to the North Caucasus and Ural Military Districts.
And more importantly, given the growing ferocity of ground battles and the increased strength of the Wehrmacht’s defenses, the NKO began on May 30 to create assault engineer brigades. Converted from existing engineer brigades, these new brigades consisted of a headquarters, five assault engineer battalions, one motorized engineer reconnaissance company, a light fleet for crossing rivers, a mine clearing company (including mine detection dogs), and a small logistics service. These new brigades were supposed to assist infantry and tank forces in overcoming well-prepared enemy defensive lines and fortified positions.
When the Red Army began new offensive operations in the late summer and early fall of 1943, clearing minefields became more important than laying mines. Therefore, the NPO began to replace the RVGK engineer-mine brigades with the RVGK engineer-sapper brigades, creating new and reorganizing existing engineer-sapper brigades to increase their efficiency. As a result, the number of mine engineering brigades in the structure of the RVGK decreased from 15 on February 1 to 12 on July 1, and by December 31 - to zero, but at the same time the number of engineering and sapper brigades increased from 12 on February 1 to 13 on July 1, and finally - until 22 on December 31, 1943. In addition, by July 1, 15 new assault engineering brigades were created, and by December 31 there were already 20 of them.
And finally, in June 1943, the NKO put into operation new tank regiments, equipped with 22 T-34 tanks and 18 PT-3 mine trawls. Formally, these regiments were not part of the structure of the engineering troops, but their main task was to clear passages through the numerous minefields installed by the Germans throughout their defenses.
Thanks to these NGO efforts, the size and diversity of the structure of the Red Army engineering troops increased sharply in two years - from 32 engineer brigades, three engineer regiments and 206 battalions of various types on January 1, 1942 to 68 brigades of various types, six pontoon-bridge regiments and 270 engineering and pontoon-bridge battalions on December 31, 1943. When the Red Army began the 1944 campaign, the structure of its engineering troops was already fully responsive to increased operational needs.
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Original taken from onepamop
in the Pro Guards Assault Unit of the Engineering Troops
On December 1, 2014, in the city of Murom (Vladimir Region), they began to form a centrally subordinated engineer brigade. The brigade was formed in order to increase the capabilities of engineering troops and the efficiency of their use, create a reserve to solve unexpected problems and strengthen troop groups in strategic directions. The brigade is in the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
As part of the brigade, for the first time since the Great Patriotic War, an assault and barrage battalion has been revived, designed to ensure the unimpeded advancement of general purpose forces in urban areas, which can significantly increase the efficiency of actions when storming buildings, while minimizing losses.
This time I was able to observe the work of the “stormtroopers” with a “watering can” and a notepad. From personal impressions: one of my most interesting army races.
By pressing buttons you help in the fight
Our and your questions are answered by Guard Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Anatolyevich F., commander of the assault and barrage company of the 1st Guards Engineer-Sapper Brest-Berlin Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Brigade.
It was not possible to squeeze all the questions into one interview, but there is an opportunity to leave questions in the comments and get answers to them!
1. Just a little bit about yourself
I have always wanted to serve in the army; I have been in military service since 2005. He graduated from a military school in St. Petersburg and, by the will of fate and his own, ended up in the ranks of the 1st Guards Engineer-Sapper Brest-Berlin Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Brigade. Our brigade of central subordination was formed on December 1, 2014 in the city of Murom (Vladimir region). I’m happy with my service in the brigade, this is exactly what I like to do.
2. Since time immemorial, there have been rumors that engineering troops are needed only for building bridges and installing/removing mines. They also say that you can involve them in digging everything. What else is included in the range of real tasks of modern engineers?
The Corps of Engineers, of course, not only builds bridges and places and removes mines. We are engaged in fortification, engineering reconnaissance of the area, we can equip approaches and lines for the convenience of our troops or make them unsuitable for the advance of enemy troops, make a passage through minefields or secure an entire direction for the maneuver of our troops. Building bridges and crossings over water barriers is also our area of responsibility. In addition, military engineers provide troops in the field with electricity and water, including drinking water. We can greatly complicate enemy reconnaissance operations: where necessary, military engineers use camouflage and concealment of important objects or, conversely, imitation and arrangement of false objects, for example, using inflatable models of military equipment. We operate on land and at sea; in addition to army engineering units, the engineering troops also have naval or marine engineering units.
3. What are the tasks of the assault unit of military engineers?
The immediate tasks of my unit are clearing and assault. Demolition, simply put, is the elimination of enemy barriers (including mines) using various methods, and assault is the destruction of the enemy at fortified points and entire areas. Plus ensuring the unhindered movement of infantry, artillery, tankers and other forces following us through enemy territory.
Units similar to ours were widely used in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, there is enough information on them. Modern military conflicts, of course, differ markedly from the situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, but there are also many common features. The creation of assault units is a call of the times and an adequate response to modern military realities.
4. What are the specifics of “stormtroopers”? Are there units with similar specifics in the RF Armed Forces?
It turns out that the specifics of assault engineers include part of the work performed by Special Forces units, some of the tasks are consonant with those assigned to airborne assault units, and in terms of work in urban conditions, rubble and buildings, we in some sense overlap with the specifics of police special forces (SOBR) and FSB special forces. In the modern RF Armed Forces there is nothing similar to us (and with similar tasks).
5. What kind of heavy equipment are the “stormtroopers” armed with?
The battalion has clearing and assault companies (of heavy equipment - BTR-82A armored personnel carriers and Typhoon-K armored vehicles) and companies of special heavy engineering equipment (engineering clearing vehicles - IMR-3, mine clearing installations - UR-77 "Meteor"). We are armed with robotic equipment (mine clearance and fire extinguishing robots); specially trained military personnel of the robotic equipment company work with robotics.
6. What small arms do assault units have?
As for small arms, we currently have access to AK-74 with under-barrel grenade launchers and AKS-74, PK, PKT (well, plus a 30-mm cannon on an armored personnel carrier). What you want is that you really need a sniper weapon. But the issue here is not so much about weapons; it is necessary to introduce snipers into our staffing table. A group that approaches a building or ruins, and especially during operations in urban environments, needs sniper support. This can prevent losses in the group and facilitate the advancement to the point of “work.”
As for small arms, I would like to replenish our arsenal with AK assault rifles of the “hundredth” series. And, of course, we need a replacement for the legendary PM. According to my staff, this is exactly what I am entitled to. But I would like to replace it with an APS (Stechkin automatic pistol).
7. If you had a choice not only of domestic pistols, but of any pistols in general, what would you like to have with you in battle as a short-barreled personal weapon?
APS.
8. And from heavier weapons?
Possibly flamethrowers. There are certain plans for them, we are an experienced unit, perhaps they will be implemented.
9. How are your communications?
We have all the new items appearing in the aircraft. I don’t see any problems with communication, including communication between the fighters of the assault group.
10. What are the “stormtroopers” equipped with?
I'll start with OVR-3Sh. The mine clearance suit (assault version) is comfortable and well thought out. Of course, it needs individual adjustment, but that's normal. About weight and convenience I will say this: all daylight hours today I was actively moving around the building in OVR-3Sh. I’m tired, of course, but, without exaggeration, I’m ready to pass the physical training standards right now. Feelings of comfort come with time, the suit must “get used to” the person, then he can work normally in it. The suit has three sizes in total, but this is not the most popular option. There is a natural limitation - the “attack aircraft” must be of average build. A big soldier is a big target and won’t be able to get through everywhere; a small soldier may not have enough physical strength in battle to do hard physical work.
The level of protection of the suit is determined by armor panels placed in special “pockets” on the chest, sides, groin, etc. Whatever protection class they have is the same as the suit. We have panels of the 6th protection class, they shot at a suit with such a panel from an SVD with an armor-piercing incendiary bullet from ten meters. No penetrations were recorded. The visor on the helmet holds a pistol bullet. And, of course, fragments.
The molle straps on the suit are comfortable. They allow you to place the necessary equipment exactly where it is most convenient for you.
"Warrior". I approve. Except, perhaps, for the location of the “unloading” on the chest. It must be moved to the hips, otherwise in fire contact it is not possible to minimize your own silhouette in the “lying” position, because you have to lie on the “armor” and compartments with magazines placed on top of the “armor”. In addition, if a unit is camping for the day or overnight, surveillance and security are ensured, the soldier can take off his “armor” for the duration of the rest, without parting with his ammunition. This won't work in Ratnik. First you need to remove the unloading with ammunition and then the “armor”. And one more detail: a well-loaded “unloading” with equipment and ammunition in its current form, when worn for a long time, leads to excessive back fatigue.
Multitools. There are regular and personal ones. It is not forbidden to have one purchased personally. I personally have just this one, I bought it before the regular ones arrived. In general, I would say that the standard multitool is normal and allows you to solve the whole range of problems, but there are better tools. Life can depend on such an item of equipment as a multitool in our work, so I personally consider it wrong to save on a compact tool.
Probably not everyone knows that once a sapper had only a knife from such tools. During the war years in the Red Army it was a Finnish-type universal knife, and they did everything with it. In the post-war Soviet Army it was already a folding knife “Demolition Man” with several blades. The “Demolition Man” made it possible to unscrew something, cut it off (for example, a fire cord), pierce something, expose and strip the wire. With a modern multitool, there is more room for maneuver. Generally speaking, today you can’t live without a multitool; it’s like a third hand.
Machete. Or the assault knife “Sapper”. Domestic. Chops, cuts, sharpens easily. I won't say anything bad about him.
For supplies in general. Let me note that we have no shortage of anything. Among the regular allowances there are many new products. It is not forbidden to somehow “upgrade” your personal property. This, by the way, again allows us to summarize personal practical experience and broadcast it to the entire department. One bought something, brought it, showed it, checked it in action - oh, you can take it! A reliable and functional item never hurts. Again, electrical tape, scope for improvements and personal modifications has not been canceled. One of the things that is already obvious is that we need hooks for machine gun magazines. This is especially important for the “Warrior”: if you put three magazines in each cell, it’s not very convenient to get it out without a hook, and it might fall out in a hurry.
The OVR has special fastening rubber bands for magazines, which prevent you from losing the magazine while moving. A small thing, but an important one. Other pouches don’t have this little detail, we modify them to suit ourselves because it’s proven and convenient. There is adopted third-party experience. The SOBR noticed that the “shield guard” had spare magazines attached to his pistol with a bandage or duct tape on his left hand. If you feel the urge to reload, you do it without taking your hands away from the shield. We also have two types of shields in service - light and heavy. You can combine three shields into one. The heavy shield is equipped with wheels, which can be very convenient in a building.
11. Who staffs the assault units of the engineering troops?
Both “contract soldiers” and “conscripts”. When recruiting our battalion, it is customary to pay close attention to contract servicemen who have served compulsory military service or who previously served as “contract soldiers” in reconnaissance units and special forces, in the Air Force. We highly value their previously acquired skills.
For me, as a company commander, a desirable candidate for a unit looks something like this: “contract soldier”, age - 20-25 years, athlete, physically developed, strong build. I'll pay attention to height and weight. Previously acquired sapper skills and a driver’s license will be an advantage for the candidate. It’s great if the candidate has previously received a military specialty, for example, a machine gunner or radio operator. And a very important aspect for me personally, as a commander, is the desire of the candidate to serve in our battalion. More than 30 such “selected contract soldiers” came to us in six months. There could have been noticeably more, but no one canceled our selection and elimination.
It is easier to teach something new to someone who wants to serve in an assault unit. Every “contractor” with us, at a minimum, knows how to shoot, drive an armored personnel carrier, handle explosives and provide first aid. And, of course, follow safety rules.
12. How are things going with shooting training?
We pay special attention to shooting training; our practice is constant and systematic. An assault unit that is not capable of shooting well cannot, in my opinion, be called an “assault” unit. An “attack aircraft” must be fluent in standard weapons. The same applies to mine-explosive specifics. In addition, you must, at a minimum, be able to handle foreign types of small arms. While we are forming, not all models have the opportunity to meet “live”; we make do with electronic documents and outline notes, but the command is working towards expanding and replenishing the material base specifically for us.
13. Is there a shortage of personnel or certain specialists?
At the moment, I cannot say that we have a shortage of personnel. Our own “cadres” are working, and there are many who want to join us. The same applies to conscript soldiers; immediately after the KMB (young soldier course), the majority strive to serve in our battalion. The motivation of the “conscripts” is different: some “by hearsay,” others see how and what we do during daily combat training. There's a lot of it. Some people are surprised that we also have drill training. What would it be like without her? This is the foundation of group combat. Whoever is good in the ranks is also good in battle, it has been a known fact since Suvorov’s times. To increase the level of coherence of a unit, combat troops are indispensable. Fire, sapper, special, physical training - we have something to do in the service. I personally observe how a set of measures turns yesterday’s boys into today’s men. Including through morning physical exercises.
14. Is physical training just a struggle for “good sports shape” or are there other super-useful aspects?
Our military personnel generally have increased physical activity. However, over time, this “increased” level is leveled out due to personal growth, people are constantly developing and at some point in time you begin to regard high loads as normal. You just become stronger and more resilient. This is also an observation from personal experience.
15. How much does the “average contract soldier” earn in an assault unit?
On average, a “contract worker” receives about 30 thousand rubles, and if he is successful and persistent in terms of individual physical training, has (and can confirm) sports “class”, then he receives the right to a cash bonus of 10-15 thousand rubles. Maintaining excellent personal fitness, as you can see, pays well. In something like working on oneself personally, I consider a financial incentive to be very useful.
16. Is there any equipment that is not yet available, but would like to have specifically for the commander of an assault company?
UAV. We don’t have these yet, but personally they make my job of making decisions based on operational intelligence much easier. I had experience interacting with UAVs.
Without touching on technology, I think that it would be very useful for us, as a young unit with unique specifics, to be able to attract outside experts and instructors. For learning. We are now actively forming a base of combat experience, and this is where the instructor experience of “narrow” specialists from other units is invaluable to us. For example, I would like to master the nuances of operations in the mountains, to study in practice the experience of the same police SOBR in working in a building, instructors from the Special Forces intelligence service would introduce them to their experience of operations in the forest. All this needs to be summarized, accumulated and adapted. We are now filming our classes followed by debriefing and analysis. We learn continuously. Again, let me remind you that our “contract soldiers” who come from special units also become sources of new knowledge and, to some extent, act as instructors. This is precisely part of my job as a commander: to highlight the main thing, summarize, adapt, accumulate and pass it on to subordinates.
In this vein, in the near future we have plans to cooperate with the Special Operations Forces (SSO). From what I can tell you about this, this will be a practical course of comprehensive training, conducted by MTR instructors at the MTR base for all our officers and “contract soldiers.” This training course awaits me, too. It’s great that we have such an opportunity and it’s very correct that cooperation with the MTR is intended to be permanent. After all, we were also created as a unit to perform special tasks within the framework of engineering and sapper topics.
17. If your unit were given the task “Take Konigsberg!” - how would you act?
It’s not right to plan an assault on Koenigsberg right away, “on your knees”, in a couple of minutes. But if we are given a similar task, we will complete it. Speaking in general: the personal armor protection of a soldier has advanced greatly since then, modern small arms, armored vehicles, mine clearance installations - in general, Keninsberg, modeled after the last years of the war, does not look absolutely impregnable from today. Moreover, our grandfathers took it without all of the above.
By the way, we studied the experience of both Chechen companies when they had to fight in low-rise urban areas. UR-77s were successfully used there. Why are human sacrifices needed when a fortified building with militants inside can be remotely bombarded with an UR-77 and only after that can be cleared by personnel. Although there was often nothing left to clear there after the UR.
Sometimes it happens that you need to break into a building through a hole in the wall. Which still remains to be done. Here it is important to have maximum information about the building and the enemy: what kind of building it is, what approaches it is, who is inside, how many there are, what they are armed with. Based on this data, we determine the tactics for a specific case: which of the groups in what composition works on the first floor, which on the second, who covers the central and emergency entrances and exits. Let's say, sometimes it is more convenient to enter simply through the door, and sometimes from above, breaking through the ceiling or roof. If the situation and the door allow, you can do without an explosion, using hydraulic shears or a circular saw. You can’t really tell it in a nutshell and without specifics. In the general case, one person, under the cover of a group, approaches a building, sets a charge (there are many different ones) and detonates an explosive in one of the following ways. Then the assault is through the breach or simultaneously through the breach and other entry points.
18. Suppose we are talking about a large one-story brick house, with up to 30 people inside, presumably these are militants of ISIS, banned in the Russian Federation, and, probably, all of them are armed. What should I do?
Adjust the UR-77. If such equipment is not available, then we will have specialists who can carefully “fold” the building. This is not the pinnacle of a demolitionist's qualifications; there are more difficult tasks.
19. Is it true that mine clearance is a thing of the past, and now everything that was mined is simply destroyed?
Yes, everything is correct if we are talking about “neutralizing” on site or evacuating an explosive device for subsequent destruction. A sapper is a highly qualified specialist; unnecessary risk is contraindicated for a specialist; he can still save someone’s life. Why bother with neutralization once again, when without danger to others you can destroy an explosive device with a water cannon, an overhead charge, destroy it on the spot with a directed explosion without subsequent detonation, and at least primitively and reliably pull it off with a “cat” or simply shoot it? It’s only in the movies that the wires are cut when the brilliant “good guy” has to outplay the brilliant “bad guy.”
But cases when it is necessary to neutralize on site or remove an explosive device for subsequent destruction are also in practice. This is exactly the job for a highly qualified sapper specialist, which involves risk to life. A huge amount of experience has been accumulated in this part of the world, including from the time of the Great Patriotic War. And in modern engineering troops there are plenty of real geniuses of mine-explosive work.
20. What useful things can you do in peacetime? Are engineering troops involved, say, in civil defense tasks?
Recruited as needed. We can conduct reconnaissance in the area of a natural disaster, accident or catastrophe. We can work as rescuers. We can work as firefighters. We can provide first aid and evacuate. We can build a bridge and create a crossing. We can work underwater, we have our own divers. In general, we can save the lives of people in distress or in an emergency zone.
21. What is considered a sign of professional excellence? Pilots, for example, perform complex aerobatics at low altitudes, snipers hit their wristwatches from 300 meters, but what about “attack aircraft”?
A good stormtrooper engineer returns alive after successfully completing a combat mission.
Part two, photographic
I arrived at the unit while it was still dark, before getting up.
Had breakfast in the soldiers' canteen.
For breakfast we were given millet porridge with gravy, chicken, lard, cow butter, bread, chicken egg, sweet tea, caramel, gingerbread, cookies, milk.
Lard and chicken on my plate in double size, I finally found the first vegetarian in the army! The whole lieutenant colonel turned out to be.
Cabbage, carrots, beans, peas for breakfast to choose from. I couldn’t eat everything, even though I was hungry. Breakfast, by the way, was enough for a whole day of running around the outskirts of Murom; the food was good, satisfying, although not the most delicious.
After breakfast we went to meet the military engineers from the clearing and assault company. By prior agreement, they were to demonstrate the process of putting on new protective equipment.
OVR-3Sh has three standard sizes.
Costumes are transported and stored in bags like these. The round compartment is for a helmet.
The main components of the OVR-3Sh are laid out on the table: on the left you can see fragments of the cooling system, a lightweight jacket, trousers, a sleeveless vest and a protective helmet.
The cooling system consists of two parts - a sweatshirt and a “underpants”.
Lightweight flexible plastic hoses are sewn along the entire inner surface of the sweatshirt and underpants.
Hoses drive water from such a tank using an electric motor. The battery lasts for about a day of operation. The coolant is supposed to be ordinary water with ice (with ice!?).
Generally speaking, I don’t really understand about ice: in winter there is a lot of it, but a cooling system is not needed, but in summer where can you get it? It was not possible to find out how effectively ordinary water (without ice) will cool the user.
In any case, a system filled with drinking water can serve as a portable water supply.
The cooling system is put on with tubes to the body directly on the thermal underwear. Connectors for connecting to a water tank are visible.
In winter, the cooling system is not required, was put on for demonstration purposes only.
On top of thermal underwear and a cooling system (or without the latter) such a lightweight jacket is put on; in fact, these are only sleeves, while the jacket serves as a forced load-bearing element.
A lightweight jacket is more convenient for two people to put on and adjust, but the task is quite feasible for anyone alone. Lacing on the back prevents the suit from moving around the body and regulates the “movement” of the arms and shoulders and overall comfort.
Following the jacket, trousers are put on.
The trousers are connected to the jacket with special straps on latches, they are visible on the left in the picture.
All that remains is to put on a “sleeveless vest” with shoulder pads.
There are special “pockets” for placing armor panels on the sides, chest and groin of the suit.
The panels can be different, in this case they have a 6th class of protection, they can withstand a point-blank shot from an SVD with an armor-piercing incendiary bullet.
Shoulder protection works on the same principle, only it is flexible and does not have such a high class of protection. But it reliably protects against splinters, cuts and burns.
Armored helmet "Warrior Kiver RSP" with visor. The visor holds a 9mm pistol bullet.
The visor on the helmet is removable. In the picture it just came out of the cold, so the room was fogged up. It fogged up much less outside, so I paid special attention.
The shield, made of three-layer plastic, is heavy, extremely transparent, but greatly changes the center of gravity of the helmet.
Helmet mounting points allow you to place a variety of items on the helmet, such as a flashlight.
Communications, hearing protection and connection point for a mine detector.
Attack engineer in OVR-3Sh. The visor has been removed from the helmet.
To demonstrate progress in individual armor protection for “stormtroopers,” they brought a pair of modern replicas of the CH-42 steel cuirass breastplates.
The cuirasses were specially made for demonstration purposes at one of the enterprises based on drawings and photographs, and the fastening elements and “damper” were sewn by one of the officers with his own hands.
The steel helmet, as you can see, is not the most authentic, but it’s a real deal. But an infantry shoulder blade with the stamp “1917”.
Layout of teaching staff. It’s strange to see such “new-made” inscriptions on weapons made in the USSR. This also applies to our domestic “layout designers”.
Or is there some special valor in the emasculation (sometimes simply barbaric) of an old but military weapon? Or is this some kind of legal requirement?
Based on numerous requests from interested parties, some photo details from the life of the NS-2 multitool and the “Sapper” assault knife.
The case with the standard multi-tool is visible on the left fighter’s left thigh.
Using the multitool for its intended purpose.
Multitool in a case. A table knife from a soldier's canteen for scale.
The case can be attached to a waist belt or equipment in several ways.
Assault knife "Sapper".
A sheath with an assault knife is visible on the stormtrooper's right thigh.
The assault knife “Sapper” immediately attracted my attention due to its fairly common grammatical errors.
Just in case, I inform you that in the phrase “Armed Forces of Russia” all words should be written with capital letters.
But in the phrase “Engineering Troops” the word “troops” would be correctly written with a small capital letter.
I talked with the users of Minesweeper, they expressed themselves in the spirit that such a knife is useful and necessary, and there are no complaints about this particular product yet.
But a secret doubt crept into my mind: I had amazing ownership experience and using a miracle survival knife, which proudly bore a similar “moose” brand.
The image of the anchor on the plastic of the handle became a complete mystery to me. Does anyone know what the anchor on the Minesweeper is for?
I tried to chop up an ancient log a little with the Minesweeper. It didn’t seem very comfortable with a bare hand; the handle was a bit narrow at the bottom where the fingers were.
It is much easier to operate with gloves.
At this point, it is proposed to calm down with the equipment and move on to examining photographs from the training of “stormtroopers” on the ground.
Instruction, formation. Two “stormtroopers” in OVR-3Sh, two in historical costumes from the Great Patriotic War (replicas of the “Ameba” camouflage and CH-42 breastplates), four in “Ratnik”.
BTR-82A are placed at all entrances and exits in the brigade. In case of preventing a possible terrorist threat.
We boarded an army Ural and arrived at the territory of the former Krasny Luch weaving factory.
The sappers received weapons, blank cartridges and screwed bushings onto the machine guns for blank firing.
The weaving mill, apparently, has long been abandoned by people and now serves as a training ground for “stormtroopers.”
It is convenient to practice the tactics of an assault group in city ruins.
The sergeant major counts the cartridges, pouring them from the packs into his hat. A very common picture in the army.
The buildings of the former LLC “UK “Muromsky KhBK”, or the “Krasny Luch” plant, which was part of the “Russian Textile” concern.
In 1900, paper weaving machines first started operating here, but today the plant turned out to be unprofitable and is now experiencing an unsurprising transformation from a classic “abandonment” into ruins.
Judging by the abundance of all kinds of inscriptions on the walls, Murom teenagers have already gone through a harsh school of life here.
While the sappers were discussing their plan of action, I walked around the building a little. All around are traces of active life activity in the past.
Having divided into combat “twos”, we began training to storm the building. The fighters in OVR-3Sh go first, followed by the core of the assault group.
A couple of times the guys kindly walked around with weapons without “blank” bushings, especially for photographs. The following are just photographs of the work process of storming the city ruins.
All the money, as they say, is on the screen!
An incentive prize is provided for those who watch everything to the very end. This is an individual army food ration, menu 2.
The box is signed by the commander of the assault company and will go to the author of the most interesting question about the service of the assault unit of the engineering troops.
Expert assessments, comments and recommendations are, as always, welcome.
I will send a link to determine the winner and receive explanatory answers to a comrade of the guard, senior lieutenant. The winner will be determined on March 1st of this year.
113. In positional defense The engineer-sapper company maintains the barriers installed during the preparation of the defense, including those transferred to it by the company of engineering barriers (other engineering units). When maintaining obstacles, a company usually operates as a platoon.
An engineer company (platoon, squad) builds up barriers during a defensive battle by installing minefields, primarily anti-tank ones, installing one or two nodes of obstacles, installing groups of anti-tank, anti-personnel, anti-vehicle and object mines and destroying road structures at the nodes barriers and on the roads between them.
114. A company (platoon) of engineering barriers, equipped with minelayers, during the course of defense operates in the POS in cooperation with the anti-tank reserve (ATR) or independently.
When assigning a mission to a company, the following are indicated: the combat strength of the POZ, the tasks to be prepared for, one or two directions of action, the main and reserve mining lines in each direction, the advance routes to the mining lines, the main and reserve concentration areas, the assembly area after the installation of obstacles , readiness dates, place and time of deployment of the command and observation post.
Barriers are set up at planned or newly designated mining lines that block the direction of the enemy’s attack (breakthrough).
After receiving the task to prepare for actions in the POS, the company moves to the designated concentration area and prepares to carry out the tasks. The company commander, together with the platoon commanders and together with the commander of the PTR (combined arms formation, unit, subdivision), conducts reconnaissance of mining lines, advance routes to them, objects to be destroyed (mined), passages left in the obstacles for the passage of departing units, the location of the charging point in the assembly area after the installation of barriers and the route of advance to the assembly area.
Upon receipt of a signal (command), the POS moves to the specified mining line together with the PTRez or independently. For reconnaissance of the enemy, advance routes and mining lines, an engineering reconnaissance patrol can be sent from the company. The company commander constantly maintains contact with the commander of the PTR (combined arms unit or subunit) and clarifies with them the mining line, the route to it, the order and signals of interaction at the mining line.
Upon reaching the mining line, the POZ commander clarifies with the commander of the PTRez or combined arms military unit (unit) the location of the minefields, objects for destruction and mining, the readiness time of barriers, the locations of passages, their designation and signals for closing, covering the POZ actions with fire from the PTRez or combined arms military units (units). After this, the company commander clarifies the tasks of the platoons, the order of deployment and the route of advancement to the charging point after the installation of barriers. At the mining line, minefields are installed by engineering platoons of obstacles and sections of roads, road structures and other objects are prepared for destruction (mined) by a platoon of controlled mining. The company commander directs the actions of the platoons, being at the head barrier. If it is necessary to temporarily maintain objects prepared for destruction and abandoned passages in barriers, crews are allocated from the mobile barrier detachment.
The POZ commander reports on the construction of barriers to the PTRez commander, the commander of his formation and the head of the engineering service. The activation of the prepared destruction is carried out by dedicated crews at the command of the commander of the PTRez (combined arms military unit), with whom the mobile obstacle detachment interacts. After the destruction is carried out and the passages are closed, the crews go to the charging point (assembly area) on their own. After loading the minelayers, the full company is located in the assembly area in readiness to perform the following tasks.
115. The obstacle engineering department, equipped with a minelayer, operates in the POS as part of a platoon. At the mining line, the squad sets a number of mines. The squad leader directs the actions of his subordinates, controls the correct movement of the minelayer, the size of the mining step and the quality of mine placement. After installing the mine ammunition, the platoon squad goes to the charging point, and after loading the minelayer, at the command of the platoon commander, to the collection point.
116. A company (platoon) of engineering barriers, equipped with engineering means of remote mining (destruction), sets minefields on identified directions of action of enemy troops in front of it, or directly on its battle formations. When mining, demolition shells can be used in conjunction with remotely deployed mines to create craters and render road and bridge structures on road routes inoperative.
117. The engineering positional company carries out tasks of fortifying positions, defensive lines in the depths of defense, operating in full force, where it prepares standard battalion defense areas and standard positional areas of missile and anti-aircraft missile divisions.
118. An engineering company (platoon) of control point equipment operates independently in full strength or as a platoon. In order to timely complete tasks related to fortification equipment in the areas where control points are deployed, the company, as a rule, is reinforced with personnel from control point maintenance units or from motorized rifle units.
Upon an established signal or upon receipt of a combat order, the company moves to a new mission area and begins engineering equipment for the control point deployment area in accordance with the instructions of the reconnaissance group officer.
The company (platoon) erects structures for the protection and work of the operational personnel in the combat command group, pits for shelters for command and staff vehicles before the operational personnel arrive in the area.
If there is time, the improvement of the fortification equipment in the area where the control point is deployed is carried out by digging out pits by a company (platoon) for shelter for communications vehicles and hardware vehicles, for transport equipment at the communications center and in the support group.
119. The road engineering company maintains the routes for advancing formations (units) to the lines of counterstrikes (counterattacks), and also prepares the routes for advancement to the unplanned line of counterstrikes (counterattacks).
To advance a motorized rifle (tank) battalion to the counterattack line (firing line), paths are prepared from the starting line to the line of deployment into platoon columns, then the directions of movement to the line of transition to the attack are designated.
120. When preparing the routes for the second echelon to launch a counterattack, the road engineering platoon operates as part of the road engineering department and the mechanized bridge department. The paths are prepared for one-way traffic. To overcome obstacles and damage on the tracks, bypasses are prepared, and if this is not possible, crossings are equipped using mechanized bridges, installing decking (gates) through weak areas of the terrain, or filling them in using track-laying machines.
121. During defense, a field water supply company (platoon, department) maintains and, if necessary, equips water extraction and purification points in new areas.
When a defense is broken through and the enemy penetrates, as well as when conducting maneuver defense, field water supply units move from the main areas of equipment for water production and purification points (areas) to reserve ones.
The commander of a company (platoon, squad) can receive an order to move by radio or in writing from the officer of the department of the chief of engineering troops (NIV) of the formation, the head of the engineering service (NIS) of the formation.
In the reserve area, the commander of the field water supply unit organizes the implementation of the task of equipping and maintaining water production and purification points (areas), as in the main areas.
122. During the defense, power supply units for troops operate as part of control point equipment units or independently. Maintain power supply points and cable networks, paying special attention to the supply of electricity to responsible consumers.
123. When conducting maneuver defense units of engineering troops carry out tasks to ensure the timely and covert deployment of units and their maneuver with the consistent conduct of defensive combat from line to line, firmly holding the final line, and inflicting losses on the enemy with engineering ammunition.
124. An engineering company (platoon, squad) lays minefields in front of maneuver defense lines, strong points, in the spaces between them and on the flanks, mines and prepares sections of roads and road structures for destruction. The first and final lines are most tightly covered with engineering barriers. In order to create a fire pocket, minefields are installed in front of cut-off positions (lines) and in front of fire ambush positions.
On the escape routes, controlled minefields or obstacles are installed in the second stage of readiness, passages are left, which are closed after the withdrawal of friendly troops.
125. An engineer company (platoon) of obstacles operates in POS. When units are maneuvering to the next line, the POZ, together with the PTRez or independently, covers their withdrawal from the rear or flanks with barriers.
A feature of the PZ's actions is the increased consumption of engineering ammunition due to the increase in the number of mining lines. This requires clear organization of the supply of engineering ammunition to replenish the ammunition loads of minelayers.
126. An engineering positional company (platoon) at positions (in defense areas) of units digs trenches and communication passages, pits for trenches for tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and other fire weapons, for dugouts and shelters, and erects structures at control points and medical posts.
Defensive positions are most fully equipped at the final line of defense, where battalion defense areas are connected by trenches and communication passages, and reserve and decoy defense areas are equipped.
Depending on the situation, the availability of forces, means and time, the fortification equipment of successively occupied lines (positions) is improved, the structures of industrial structures installed in the areas where control points are deployed at the previous line are removed from the ground, if necessary, repaired and installed in the new area where the point is deployed management.
Company strongholds prepared for all-round defense, as well as fire ambush positions, are set up at cut-off positions. Ambushes and positions for roaming units are set up for air defense units.
127. The road engineering company (platoon) prepares and maintains frontal routes throughout the entire depth of defense from the first brigade road route to the road route at the final position. In the brigade's area of responsibility, frontal routes are prepared for the withdrawal and maneuver of first and second echelon battalions, command posts and brigade subordinate units. In addition, to ensure the maneuver of the first echelon from line to line, routes to the final line of defense are prepared on the flanks of the brigade’s area of responsibility.
For the maneuver of brigade control points, artillery, air defense military units, and logistics units, a brigade frontal route and brigade road routes are prepared - one behind the first defensive position, the second at the final defensive position.
128. A pontoon, ferry-landing company (platoon), a company (platoon) of amphibious transporters equips and maintains crossings over water obstacles on the escape and maneuver routes. With the completion of the crossing, the crossing means are removed, and in the event of a threat of capture by the enemy, they are destroyed, the bridges existing on the water barrier are destroyed, and the fords are mined.
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