The confrontation between Russia and Japan for control of Manchuria, Korea, and the ports of Port Arthur and Dalny was the main reason for the outbreak of the tragic war for Russia.
The fighting began with an attack by the Japanese fleet, which on the night of February 9, 1904, without declaring war, launched a surprise attack on the Russian squadron near the Port Arthur naval base.
In March 1904, the Japanese army landed in Korea, and in April - in southern Manchuria. Under the blows of superior enemy forces, Russian troops abandoned the Jinzhou position in May and blocked Port Arthur 3 by the Japanese army. In the battle of June 14-15 at Wafangou, the Russian army retreated.
In early August, the Japanese landed on the Liaodong Peninsula and besieged the Port Arthur fortress. On August 10, 1904, the Russian squadron made an unsuccessful attempt to break out from Port Arthur; as a result, individual ships that escaped were interned in neutral ports, and the cruiser Novik near Kamchatka was lost in an unequal battle.
The siege of Port Arthur lasted from May 1904 and fell on January 2, 1905. Japan's main goal was achieved. The battles in Northern Manchuria were of an auxiliary nature, because the Japanese did not have the strength and means to occupy it and the entire Russian Far East.
The first major land battle near Liaoyang (August 24 - September 3, 1904) led to the retreat of Russian troops to Mukden. The oncoming battle on October 5-17 on the Shahe River and the attempt of Russian troops to advance on January 24, 1905 in the Sandepu area were unsuccessful.
After the largest Battle of Mukden (February 19 - March 10, 1905), Russian troops retreated to Telin, and then to Sypingai positions 175 km north of Mukden. Here they met the end of the war.
Formed after the death of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, 2 Pacific made a six-month transition to the Far East. However, in the many-hour battle at Fr. Tsushima (May 27, 1905) it was fragmented and destroyed by superior enemy forces.
Russian military losses, according to official data, amounted to 31,630 killed, 5,514 died from wounds and 1,643 died in captivity. Russian sources estimated Japanese losses to be more significant: 47,387 people were killed, 173,425 were wounded, 11,425 died from wounds and 27,192 from disease. 
According to foreign sources, the losses in killed, wounded and sick in Japan and Russia are comparable, and there were several times more Russian prisoners than Japanese prisoners.
Results of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
For Russia . She ceded the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan along with a branch of the South Manchurian Railway and the southern half of the island. Sakhalin. Russian troops were withdrawn from Manchuria, and Korea was recognized as Japan's sphere of influence.
Russia's positions in China and throughout the Far East were undermined. The country lost its position as one of the largest maritime powers, abandoned the “oceanic” strategy and returned to the “continental” strategy. Russia has reduced international trade and tightened domestic policies.
The main reason for Russia's defeat in this war is the weakness of the fleet and poor logistics support.
Defeat in the war led to military reforms and a noticeable improvement in combat training. The troops, especially the command staff, gained combat experience, which later showed itself in the First World War.
Losing the war became the catalyst for the first Russian revolution. Despite its suppression by 1907, the Russian empire did not recover from this blow and ceased to exist.
For Japan . Psychologically and politically, Japan's victory demonstrated to Asia that it was possible to defeat the Europeans. Japan has become a great power at the European level of development. It became dominant in Korea and coastal China, began active naval construction, and by the end of the First World War had become the third naval power in the world.
Geopolitical. All of Russia's positions in the Pacific region were practically lost; it abandoned the eastern (southeastern) direction of expansion and turned its attention to Europe, the Middle East and the Straits zone.
Relations with England improved and an agreement was signed on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Afghanistan. The Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance “Entente” finally took shape. The balance of power in Europe temporarily shifted in favor of the Central Powers.
Anatoly Sokolov
Causes of the war:
Russia’s desire to gain a foothold on the “non-freezing seas” of China and Korea.
The desire of the leading powers to prevent Russia from strengthening in the Far East. Support for Japan from the USA and Great Britain.
Japan's desire to oust the Russian army from China and seize Korea.
Arms race in Japan. Raising taxes for the sake of military production.
Japan's plans were to seize Russian territory from the Primorsky Territory to the Urals.
Progress of the war:
January 27, 1904 - three Russian ships were hit by Japanese torpedoes near Port Arthur, but they did not sink thanks to the heroism of the crews. The feat of the Russian ships “Varyag” and “Koreets” near the port of Chemulpo (Incheon).
March 31, 1904 - the death of the battleship Petropavlovsk with the headquarters of Admiral Makarov and a crew of more than 630 people. The Pacific Fleet was decapitated.
May - December 1904 - heroic defense of the Port Arthur fortress. The 50,000-strong Russian garrison, with 646 guns and 62 machine guns, repelled the attacks of the 200,000-strong enemy army. After the surrender of the fortress, about 32 thousand Russian soldiers were captured by the Japanese. The Japanese lost more than 110 thousand (according to other sources 91 thousand) soldiers and officers, 15 warships sank, and 16 were destroyed.
August 1904 - Battle of Liaoyang. The Japanese lost more than 23 thousand soldiers, the Russians - more than 16 thousand. Uncertain outcome of the battle. General Kuropatkin gave the order to retreat, fearing encirclement.
September 1904 - Battle of the Shahe River. The Japanese lost more than 30 thousand soldiers, the Russians - more than 40 thousand. Uncertain outcome of the battle. After this, a positional war was fought in Manchuria. In January 1905, revolution raged in Russia, making it difficult to wage the war to victory.
February 1905 - The Battle of Mukden stretched over 100 km along the front and lasted 3 weeks. The Japanese launched their offensive earlier and confused the plans of the Russian command. Russian troops retreated, avoiding encirclement and losing more than 90 thousand. The Japanese lost more than 72 thousand.
The Russo-Japanese War in brief.
The Japanese command admitted underestimating the enemy's strength. Soldiers with weapons and provisions continued to arrive from Russia by rail. The war again took on a positional character.
May 1905 - tragedy of the Russian fleet near the Tsushima Islands. Admiral Rozhestvensky's ships (30 combat, 6 transport and 2 hospital) covered about 33 thousand km and immediately entered the battle. No one in the world could defeat 121 enemy ships with 38 ships! Only the cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny broke through to Vladivostok (according to other sources, 4 ships were saved), the crews of the rest died heroes or were captured. The Japanese suffered 10 severe damage and 3 sank.
Until now, Russians, passing by the Tsushima Islands, lay wreaths on the water in memory of the 5 thousand dead Russian sailors.
The war was ending. The Russian army in Manchuria was growing and could continue the war for a long time. Japan's human and financial resources were depleted (old people and children were already being drafted into the army). Russia, from a position of strength, signed the Treaty of Portsmouth in August 1905.
Results of the war:
Russia withdrew troops from Manchuria, transferred to Japan the Liaodong Peninsula, the southern part of Sakhalin Island and money for the maintenance of prisoners. This failure of Japanese diplomacy caused widespread unrest in Tokyo.
After the war, Japan's external public debt increased 4 times, and Russia's by 1/3.
Japan lost more than 85 thousand killed, Russia more than 50 thousand.
More than 38 thousand soldiers died from wounds in Japan, and more than 17 thousand in Russia.
Still, Russia lost this war. The reasons were economic and military backwardness, weakness of intelligence and command, the great remoteness and extension of the theater of military operations, poor supplies, and weak interaction between the army and navy. In addition, the Russian people did not understand why they needed to fight in distant Manchuria. The revolution of 1905 - 1907 weakened Russia even more.
The question of whether the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was inevitable, and 110 years after its outbreak, is still under debate. Without pretending to give an exhaustive answer to it, let us take advantage of the anniversary and remember the events that preceded the armed conflict and those decisions that played a role in starting the war.
The Sino-Japanese War and its consequences
Japan took the first step towards war with the Russian Empire in 1894 by attacking China. The turn of the 19th and 20th centuries turned out to be a difficult and dark period in the history of this country. The Celestial Empire came under the close and unselfish attention of several states seeking to grab their piece of the Chinese “pie.” Japan behaved most aggressively, whose population of more than 40 million was in need of food and resources (by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War it reached 46.3 million people).
The forecasts of observers who promised military cataclysms in the region came true in October 1894, when Japan attacked Korea, a protectorate of China. In addition, the Japanese landed near Port Arthur. The poorly prepared Chinese army tried to resist, but was unable to defend the fortress. The aggressors celebrated the capture of Port Arthur with a massacre. The Japanese did not take prisoners, but the wounded Chinese were mercilessly finished off.
Looking ahead, I note that if the numerous crimes of the Japanese military committed by them in China in 1931 - 1945 have long been of keen interest to researchers from different countries, then the crimes of the Japanese in China during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 - 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War the war of 1894–1895 cannot be said. But the attitude of Japanese soldiers towards the Chinese not as people, but as “elements” and “objects” arose even then. Anton Denikin, a participant in the Russo-Japanese War and later the leader of the White movement, wrote in his book “The Path of a Russian Officer”: “The relationship between the Chinese population and our troops was satisfactory. Of course, there were excesses, as in all armies, in all wars. But Russian people are sociable and not arrogant. The soldiers treated the Chinese good-naturedly and not at all as an inferior race. Since settlements often changed hands, it was possible to compare the two “regimes.” The careful Japanese, retreating, usually left the buildings in order, while our soldiers, and especially the Cossacks, reduced them to an uninhabitable state... In all other respects, the Japanese “regime” was without comparison more difficult. The contemptuous attitude of the Japanese towards the Chinese, literally as inanimate objects, and the cruelty of requisitions oppressed the population. Particularly outrageous were the requisitions... of women, which were carried out not arbitrarily, but according to an established procedure..."
However, let's go back to 1894. Then Japan captured not only Port Arthur, but also Formosa (now Taiwan), the port of Weihaiwei (now Weihai) and the Pescadores Islands (now Penghuledao). In 1895, Tokyo imposed a beneficial treaty on China, forcing Beijing to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula, Korea and agree to pay a large indemnity.
But as it turned out, the Japanese rejoiced early. Their success worried Germany, France and Russia, which in April 1895 issued an ultimatum to Japan to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula. Finding itself in political isolation, Tokyo was forced to leave the Liaodong Peninsula, content with paying an increased indemnity and Taiwan. “Russia should be considered the country that benefited from this war,” says South Korean historian Kim Jong-hon. “She completely achieved her goal without firing a single shot, only by organizing diplomatic pressure from the three European powers on Japan. By forcing Japan to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula, it thereby facilitated the implementation of its claims to it.”
The loss of Liaodong was perceived extremely painfully by the Land of the Rising Sun - as an insult. Moreover, the forced abandonment of the Liaodong Peninsula was appreciated not only by official Tokyo, but also by broad sections of the people who approved of the aggressive course of their government. “What strikes the student of the history of Japanese diplomacy... is that public opinion in Japan has always demanded a tough foreign policy, while the government’s policy has been very cautious,” argued the Japanese researcher Kiyosawa Kiyoshi. And if the assessment of the Japanese government’s policies raises serious doubts, then there is no need to argue with the first part of the statement. Indeed, even in our time, the Japanese are united in their desire to take away from Russia the Kuril Islands, received by the Soviet Union as a result of the Second World War, which was unleashed by Germany and Japan, bringing untold misfortunes and suffering to humanity.
After analyzing the events of 1895, Japanese historian Shumpei Okamoto stated: “The entire nation, including the emperor, felt humiliated. To contain the anger of the people, the government had to ask the emperor to issue a verdict warning against manifestations of rage. From this bitter experience a new nationalism grew. The slogan of the day was “gashin shotan” - “lack of retribution”... The importance of “gashin shotan” in the modern history of Japan is difficult to overestimate. It led to the rise of chauvinistic nationalism, which was directed only against one country - against Russia. The Japanese government began an active ten-year program to expand its armaments with the goal of rapidly developing land and naval forces, in parallel with the development of the basic types of industry necessary for this.
The rapidly growing military-industrial potential of the Land of the Rising Sun and its revanchist plans were calmly accepted by Nicholas II. General Pyotr Vannovsky, who was the Minister of War of the Russian Empire from 1882 to 1897, did not see a serious threat to Russia in the military preparations of its eastern neighbor. He assured: “If we talk about the degree of our vulnerability, the Japanese army does not pose a threat to us.” It is also noteworthy that Russia’s military agent in Tokyo was Vannovsky’s son, former horse artillery officer Boris Vannovsky. In 1902, he told the new Minister of War of Russia, General Alexei Kuropatkin: “The Japanese army has not emerged from a state of internal disorder... That is why, on the one hand, the Japanese army has not been an Asian horde for a long time... on the other hand, it is not a real European army at all...”
Kuropatkin himself later wrote: “We knew that the Japanese were skilled and persistent artists. We loved their products, their fine workmanship and amazing sense of color. Our people spoke with admiration of the country and its people and were full of pleasant memories of their trips there, especially to Nagasaki, where they were popular with the locals. As a military factor, Japan simply did not exist for us. Our sailors, travelers and diplomats have fully overlooked the awakening of this energetic, independent people».
The Russian Emperor, who visited Japan, also looked at it. However, Nicholas II’s memories of visiting the Land of the Rising Sun cannot be called pleasant. On April 29, 1891, when he was traveling through Japan as heir to the throne, in the town of Otsu he received a blow to the head with a saber from policeman Tsuda Satso. Nikolai’s life was saved by a bowler hat made of hard fabric. It is noteworthy that subsequently our tactful emperor did not disdain to call the Japanese “macaques.” Nicholas II did not even allow the thought that Tsuda Satso’s blow would be the first, but far from the last blow he received from the “macaques”.
Russia goes to China
The success of Russian diplomacy achieved in 1895, as well as participation together with other great powers in the suppression of the so-called “Boxer” uprising in China, raised by the Yihetuan society, played a cruel joke on Russia, giving rise to mischievous sentiments in Russian society. Of course, there were also sound judgments from military experts. However, they did not make the weather.
At the same time, Russia, as if deliberately, did everything to strengthen anti-Russian and revanchist sentiments in Japanese society. In 1895, the Russian-Chinese Bank was created. In May 1896, when the head of Chinese diplomacy Li Hongzhang came to the Mother See for the coronation of Nicholas II, the Moscow Treaty on a defensive alliance against Japan was concluded between Russia and China and a decision was made to build the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) through the territory of Manchuria. The CER made it possible to connect Chita with Vladivostok along a shorter route. The concession was issued to the Russian-Chinese Bank, which created the CER joint-stock company. It received the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway, manage lands in the right-of-way, conduct exploration for ore reserves, mine coal, etc. Under the terms of the agreement with China, Russian laws were in effect in the right-of-way. Soon the construction of the road began, and in 1901 the first train passed along the CER.
A new outburst of rage in Japan was caused by the agreement concluded in 1898 between Russia and China to lease the Liaodong Peninsula for a period of 25 years, as well as the decision to build a railway from the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur. The Japanese were also irritated by the fact that after the suppression of the Boxer uprising, Russia did not withdraw all its troops from Manchuria. In the fall of 1903, the deadline for the withdrawal of the remaining units was again missed.
A scam started by the emperor’s favorite, retired guards cavalry captain Alexander Bezobrazov and rear admiral Alexei Abaza, added fuel to the fire. The company they created bought a concession from the Vladivostok merchant Briner to exploit a huge forest area on the Yalu and Tumen rivers on the border of Manchuria and Korea. The region attracted the attention of “effective managers” with the possibility of unlimited forest harvesting, the quality of the forest and the availability of cheap labor.
For the Japanese, who viewed Korea as an object of their exploitation, Russia's activity in the region was like a bone in the throat. But the “Bezobrazovites” didn’t care at all. Anticipating big profits, they did not think about the consequences of their actions for the state.
It’s sad but true: the selfish undertaking of Bezobrazov and Abaza was patronized by Emperor Nicholas II, Minister of Internal Affairs Vyacheslav Pleve and the illegitimate son of Alexander II, Vice Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who headed the governorship established in the summer of 1903 in the Far East. Alekseev was faced with the task of uniting the work of all departments in the region. Port Arthur became the center of the governorship. “In foreign policy terms, this act testified to the intention of tsarism to gain a foothold in Manchuria seriously and for a long time. From the point of view of the internal government struggle, it meant another success for the “bezobrazovites.” In terms of the management mechanism, the governorship introduced parallelism and confusion, which were especially dangerous during the period when the war was brewing,” historian Anatoly Ignatiev rightly noted.
Provocation of British Russophobes
Having set a course for war with the Russian Empire, Tokyo approached preparations for it with all seriousness. To protect itself from isolation in the international arena, Japan entered into an agreement in 1902 with Russia’s longtime enemy, Great Britain. The two island states were united in their desire to stop Russian advances in Manchuria and Korea.
The patriarch of American politics, Henry Kissinger, noted in his book Diplomacy: “Great Britain and Japan agreed that if either of them became involved in a war with one by an outside power regarding China or Korea, then the other contracting party will remain neutral. If, however, any of the contracting parties is attacked two opponents, then the other contracting party will be obliged to assist its partner. It is clear that this alliance could only operate if Japan fought two opponents at the same time. Great Britain finally found an ally who was eager to contain Russia, without forcing its partner to take on obligations alien to it, and even one whose Far Eastern geographical location was of much greater strategic interest to Great Britain than the Russian-German border.”
"Mistress of the Seas" helped the Land of the Rising Sun to modernize and strengthen its navy. Historian Vladimir Krestyaninov notes: “Preparing for war with Russia, Japan ordered six armored cruisers abroad. Four - "Asama", "Tokiwa", "Iwate", "Izumo" - in England, "Yakumo" - in Germany and "Azuma" - in France. Differing in some details, they had identical weapons with a displacement of 9300 - 9900 tons. An armor belt along the waterline with a thickness of 178 mm allowed them to engage in battle with battleships. All this, combined with a high speed of 20–21 knots, made them dangerous opponents for Russian armored cruisers.”
By 1904, the Japanese army was modernized, trained by German instructors, and well armed. The troops received modern heavy and mountain artillery. For each Japanese division of 13,454 full-time combat personnel, there were 6 thousand porters (coolies), which significantly increased its mobility.
Preparing the people for war with Russia, the Japanese authorities launched powerful anti-Russian propaganda. The American ambassador in Tokyo, Lloyd Griscom, wrote: “The Japanese people have been brought to the highest excitement, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that if there is no war, every Japanese will be deeply disappointed.”
Brainwashing was carried out not only in newspapers, but also on the stage. British military agent Major General Ian Hamilton in Japan saw the play, which, in his words, “had an allegorical, political meaning.” In his notes, Hamilton conveyed the contents of this unique work:
“One old woman (her role was played surprisingly well) had a beautiful daughter, Geisha. Geisha meant Korea, old woman meant China. A young man who personified Japan came to woo noble Korea. Old Lady China, however, asked for more money than he agreed to give. Therefore, she opposed any formal betrothal, although the girl more than shared the feelings of her lover. Finally, young Mr. Japan lost his temper and, after a very lively argument, began to reward the old woman with very sensitive blows... At this time, another young man, namely Russia, also comes to woo, stands between Mr. Japan and Ms. Korea, and, jabbing Mr. Japan in the neck, throws him out of the house. There he stands for some time, inconsolable, listening through the thin paper walls to all their love speeches. Finally, the poor rejected lover, exhausted by his passionate feelings, turns for advice to his friend, the old man of England, who is famous for his fabulous wealth. He asks him to give him the money he needs to fight his rival and tries to prove that it is in his own interests to provide him with this help. The venerable Mr. England buttons his pockets very carefully and tightly, but takes the opportunity to make him a whole series of speeches full of nobility. He urges him not to sit here crying and listening to the advances of his rival, but to remember that he is a descendant of warriors and that steel will do its job no worse than gold. The audience applauds, and with this advice, Japan is transformed from a crying supplicant into a being full of fire and determination.”
Conveying the outline of events, Hamilton does not seem to notice that “The Honorable Mr. England” turns out to be a provocateur. However, this was the case in life. The deep essence of the attitude of official London towards Russia is accurately conveyed by the words attributed to British Prime Minister Henry John Temple Palmerston: “The world seems so unfair when no one is at war with Russia.” Whether the lord uttered this phrase or not is not so important. It is important that the Russophobe aristocrat acted in strict accordance with this thesis. And what’s even more important is that Great Britain has never experienced a shortage of Russophobic politicians and still does not.
As for Hamilton, at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, he immediately went to the Japanese First Army, which was preparing to go to Korea. He quickly found mutual understanding with the Japanese command. They discussed upcoming operations together. The words "ours" and "ours" in Hamilton's diary are addressed to units of the Japanese army. For example, on July 5, 1904, analyzing the situation at the front, an English general noted with alarm: “There are several data that make us fear for this, our weakest point.” In his notes and correspondence, the English general called the Japanese military “our Japanese friends,” “our allies,” and “our brave allies.”
Historian Anatoly Utkin in the book “Russian-Japanese War. At the Beginning of All Troubles” wrote about Great Britain that “having armed Japan with the most modern ships, no one has done more to push Tokyo to resolve contradictions by force than any other power. London provided loneliness Russia, since, according to the Treaty with Japan of 1902, it threatened to join Japan if Russia acquired military allies in the conflict with Japan. The Japanese privately asked the British ambassador in Beijing, Sir Ernst Satow, in December 1903, whether they should fight, and Sir Ernst left no room for doubt, hitting the table with his fist: “Yes.”
Such a frank reaction from the arrogant and prim British diplomat clearly demonstrated how great Great Britain’s desire was to see Russia and Japan at war. The dream of English sirs and lords became a fact on the night of February 9, 1904, when Japan attacked Russia without declaring war.
Oleg Nazarov, Doctor of Historical Sciences
Causes:
1). The rapid strengthening of Russia in the Far East (in 1898 the Chinese Eastern Railway was built in Manchuria, in 1903 - the through Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, Russia built naval bases on the Liaodun Peninsula. Russia's position in Korea was strengthened) worried Japan, the USA and England. They began to push Japan to start a war against Russia in order to limit its influence in the region;
2). The tsarist government was striving for a war with a seemingly weak and distant country - it needed a “small victorious war,” believed V.K. Plehve and others;
3). It was necessary to strengthen Russia's position in the international arena;
4). The desire of the Russian government to distract the people from revolutionary sentiments.
The main result of the war was that, contrary to hopes that the “victorious war” would delay the revolution, it, according to S. Yu. Witte, brought it closer “by decades.”
Progress: January 27, 1904 - A sudden attack by a Japanese squadron on Russian ships near Port Arthur. The heroic battle of the Varangian and the Korean. The attack was repulsed. Russian losses: Varyag is sunk. The Korean is blown up. Japan secured superiority at sea.
January 28 - Repeated bombing of the city and Port Arthur. The attack was repulsed.
February 24 - Arrival of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov, in Port Arthur. Makarov’s active actions in preparation for a general battle with Japan at sea (offensive tactics).
March 31 - Death of Makarov. Inaction of the fleet, refusal of offensive tactics.
April 1904 - Landing of Japanese armies in Korea, crossing the river. Yaly and entry into Manchuria. The initiative in actions on land belongs to the Japanese.
May 1904 - The Japanese began the siege of Port Arthur. Port Arthur found itself cut off from the Russian army. An attempt to unblock it in June 1904 was unsuccessful.
August 13-21 - Battle of Liaoyang. The forces are approximately equal (160 thousand each). The attacks of Japanese troops were repulsed. Kuropatkin's indecisiveness prevented him from developing his success. On August 24, Russian troops retreated to the river. Shahe.
October 5 - The battle on the Shahe River begins. Fog and mountainous terrain, as well as Kuropatkin’s lack of initiative (he acted only with part of the forces he had), were hindered.
December 2 - Death of General Kondratenko. R.I. Kondratenko led the defense of the fortress.
July 28 - December 20, 1904 - Besieged Port Arthur heroically defended himself. On December 20, Stesil gives the order to surrender the fortress. The defenders withstood 6 assaults on the fortress. The fall of Port Arthur was a turning point in the Russo-Japanese War.
February 1905 - Battle of Mukden. 550 thousand people participated on both sides. Passivity of Kuropatkin. Losses: Russians -90 thousand, Japanese - 70 thousand. The battle was lost by the Russians.
May 14-15, 1905 - Naval battle near the island. Tsushima in the Sea of Japan.
Tactical mistakes of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. Our losses - 19 ships were sunk, 5 thousand died, 5 thousand were captured. Defeat of the Russian fleet
5 August 1905 - Peace of Portsmouth
By the summer of 1905, Japan began to clearly feel a shortage of material and human resources and turned to the USA, Germany, and France for help. The USA stands for peace. Peace was signed in Portsmouth, our delegation was headed by S. Yu. Witte.
Results: Loss of the Kulil Islands. Complete destruction, unpreparedness for war, lack of discipline in the armies.
An attempt to get out of the crisis with a lightning (victorious) war.
The largest armed conflict of the late 19th - early 20th centuries. It was the result of the struggle of the great powers - the Russian Empire, Great Britain, Germany, France and Japan, which aspired to the role of the dominant regional power, for the colonial division of China and Korea.
Causes of the war
The reason for the Russo-Japanese War should be recognized as a clash of interests between Russia, which pursued an expansionist policy in the Far East, and Japan, which attempted to assert its influence in Asia. The Japanese Empire, which modernized the social system and armed forces during the Meiji Revolution, sought to turn economically backward Korea into its colony and take part in the division of China. As a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The Chinese army and navy were quickly defeated, Japan occupied the island of Taiwan (Formosa) and part of Southern Manchuria. Under the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan acquired the islands of Taiwan, Penghuledao (Pescadores) and the Liaodong Peninsula.
In response to Japan's aggressive actions in China, the Russian government, led by Emperor Nicholas II, who ascended the throne in 1894 and a supporter of expansion in this part of Asia, intensified its own Far Eastern policy. In May 1895, Russia forced Japan to reconsider the terms of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty and abandon the acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula. From that moment on, an armed confrontation between the Russian Empire and Japan became inevitable: the latter began to systematically prepare for a new war on the continent, adopting in 1896 a 7-year program for the reorganization of the ground army. With the participation of Great Britain, a modern navy began to be created. In 1902, Great Britain and Japan entered into a treaty of alliance.
With the goal of economic penetration into Manchuria, the Russian-Chinese Bank was established in 1895, and the following year construction began on the Chinese Eastern Railway, laid through the Chinese province of Heilongjiang and designed to connect Chita with Vladivostok along the shortest route. These measures were carried out to the detriment of the development of the poorly populated and economically developed Russian Amur region. In 1898, Russia received a 25-year lease from China for the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur, where it was decided to create a naval base and fortress. In 1900, under the pretext of suppressing the “Yihetuan uprising,” Russian troops occupied all of Manchuria.
Far Eastern policy of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century
Since the beginning of the twentieth century. The Far Eastern policy of the Russian Empire began to be determined by an adventuristic court group led by State Secretary A.M. Bezobrazov. She sought to expand Russian influence in Korea, using a logging concession on the Yalu River, and to prevent Japanese economic and political penetration into Manchuria. In the summer of 1903, a governorship headed by Admiral E.I. was established in the Far East. Alekseev. Negotiations held in the same year between Russia and Japan on delimiting spheres of interest in the region did not produce results. On January 24 (February 5), 1904, the Japanese side announced the termination of negotiations and broke off diplomatic relations with the Russian Empire, setting a course for starting a war.
Countries' readiness for war
By the start of hostilities, Japan had largely completed its armed forces modernization program. After mobilization, the Japanese army consisted of 13 infantry divisions and 13 reserve brigades (323 battalions, 99 squadrons, over 375 thousand people and 1140 field guns). The Japanese United Fleet consisted of 6 new and 1 old squadron battleship, 8 armored cruisers (two of them, acquired from Argentina, entered service after the start of the war), 12 light cruisers, 27 squadron and 19 small destroyers. Japan's war plan included a struggle for supremacy at sea, the landing of troops in Korea and Southern Manchuria, the capture of Port Arthur and the defeat of the main forces of the Russian army in the Liaoyang area. The general leadership of the Japanese troops was carried out by the Chief of the General Staff, later the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Marshal I. Oyama. The United Fleet was commanded by Admiral H. Togo.
At the beginning of the twentieth century. The Russian Empire had the largest land army in the world, but in the Far East, as part of the Amur Military District and the troops of the Kwantung Region, it had extremely insignificant forces scattered over a vast territory. They consisted of the I and II Siberian Army Corps, 8 East Siberian Rifle Brigades, deployed into divisions at the beginning of the war, 68 infantry battalions, 35 squadrons and hundreds of cavalry, a total of about 98 thousand people, 148 field guns. Russia was not ready for war with Japan. The low capacity of the Siberian and East China Railways (as of February 1904 - 5 and 4 pairs of military trains, respectively) did not allow us to count on a quick reinforcement of troops in Manchuria with reinforcements from European Russia. The Russian Navy in the Far East had 7 squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 2 mine cruisers, 37 destroyers. The main forces were the Pacific squadron and were based in Port Arthur, 4 cruisers and 10 destroyers were in Vladivostok.
War plan
The Russian war plan was prepared at the temporary headquarters of His Imperial Majesty's governor in the Far East, Admiral E.I. Alekseev in September-October 1903 on the basis of plans developed independently of each other at the headquarters of the Amur Military District and at the headquarters of the Kwantung Region, and approved by Nicholas II on January 14 (27), 1904. It assumed the concentration of the main forces of Russian troops on the Mukden line -Liaoyang-Haichen and the defense of Port Arthur. With the beginning of mobilization, it was planned to send large reinforcements from European Russia to help the armed forces in the Far East - the X and XVII army corps and four reserve infantry divisions. Until reinforcements arrived, Russian troops had to adhere to a defensive course of action and only after creating numerical superiority could they go on the offensive. The fleet was required to fight for supremacy at sea and prevent the landing of Japanese troops. At the beginning of the war, the command of the armed forces in the Far East was entrusted to the viceroy, Admiral E.I. Alekseeva. Subordinate to him was the commander of the Manchurian Army, who became the Minister of War, Infantry General A.N. Kuropatkin (appointed on February 8 (21), 1904), and the commander of the Pacific squadron, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov, who replaced the uninitiative Vice Admiral O.V. on February 24 (March 8). Stark.
The beginning of the war. Military operations at sea
Military operations opened on January 27 (February 9), 1904, with a sudden attack by Japanese destroyers on the Russian Pacific squadron, which was stationed without proper security measures on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of the attack, two squadron battleships and one cruiser were disabled. On the same day, the Japanese detachment of Rear Admiral S. Uriu (6 cruisers and 8 destroyers) attacked the Russian cruiser “Varyag” and the gunboat “Koreets”, which were stationed in the Korean port of Chemulpo. The Varyag, which received heavy damage, was scuttled by the crew, and the Koreets was blown up. January 28 (February 10) Japan declared war on Russia.
After the attack by Japanese destroyers, the weakened Pacific squadron limited itself to defensive actions. Arriving in Port Arthur, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov began to prepare the squadron for active operations, but on March 31 (April 13) he died on the squadron battleship Petropavlovsk, which was blown up by mines. Rear Admiral V.K., who took command of the naval forces. Vitgeft abandoned the struggle for supremacy at sea, focusing on the defense of Port Arthur and supporting ground forces. During the fighting near Port Arthur, the Japanese also suffered significant losses: on May 2 (15), the squadron battleships Hatsuse and Yashima were killed by mines.
Military operations on land
In February-March 1904, the 1st Japanese Army of General T. Kuroki landed in Korea (about 35 thousand bayonets and sabers, 128 guns), which by mid-April approached the border with China on the Yalu River. By early March, the Russian Manchurian Army had completed its deployment. It consisted of two vanguards - Southern (18 infantry battalions, 6 squadrons and 54 guns, Yingkou-Gaizhou-Senyuchen area) and Eastern (8 battalions, 38 guns, Yalu River) and a general reserve (28.5 infantry battalions, 10 hundreds, 60 guns, Liaoyang-Mukden area). A cavalry detachment operated in North Korea under the command of Major General P.I. Mishchenko (22 hundreds) with the task of conducting reconnaissance beyond the Yalu River. On February 28 (March 12), based on the Eastern Vanguard, reinforced by the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, the Eastern Detachment was formed, led by Lieutenant General M.I. Zasulich. He was faced with the task of making it difficult for the enemy to cross the Yala, but under no circumstances engaging in a decisive clash with the Japanese.
On April 18 (May 1), in the battle of Tyurencheng, the 1st Japanese Army defeated the Eastern Detachment, drove it back from Yalu and, having advanced to Fenghuangcheng, reached the flank of the Russian Manchurian Army. Thanks to the success at Tyurenchen, the enemy seized the strategic initiative and on April 22 (May 5) was able to begin the landing of the 2nd Army of General Y. Oku (about 35 thousand bayonets and sabers, 216 guns) on the Liaodong Peninsula near Bizivo. The southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, leading from Liaoyang to Port Arthur, was cut off by the enemy. Following the 2nd Army, the 3rd Army of General M. Nogi was supposed to land, intended for the siege of Port Arthur. From the north, its deployment was ensured by the 2nd Army. In the Dagushan area, preparations were made for the landing of the 4th Army of General M. Nozu. It had the task, together with the 1st and 2nd armies, to act against the main forces of the Manchurian Army and ensure the success of the 3rd Army in the fight for Port Arthur.
On May 12 (25), 1904, the Oku army reached the positions of the Russian 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment on the isthmus in the Jinzhou region, which covered the distant approaches to Port Arthur. The next day, at the cost of huge losses, the Japanese managed to push back the Russian troops from their positions, after which the path to the fortress was open. On May 14 (27), the enemy occupied the port of Dalniy without a fight, which became the base for further actions of the Japanese army and navy against Port Arthur. The landing of units of the 3rd Army immediately began in Dalny. The 4th Army began to land at the port of Takushan. Two divisions of the 2nd Army, which completed the assigned task, were sent north against the main forces of the Manchurian Army.
On May 23 (June 5), impressed by the results of the unsuccessful Jinzhou battle, E.I. Alekseev ordered A.N. Kuropatkin to send a detachment of at least four divisions to the rescue of Port Arthur. The commander of the Manchurian Army, who considered the transition to the offensive premature, sent only one reinforced I Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant General G.K., against the Oku army (48 battalions, 216 guns). von Stackelberg (32 battalions, 98 guns). On June 1-2 (14-15), 1904, in the battle of Wafangou, von Stackelberg’s troops were defeated and were forced to retreat north. After failures at Jinzhou and Wafangou, Port Arthur found itself cut off.
By May 17 (30), the Japanese broke the resistance of Russian troops occupying intermediate positions on the distant approaches to Port Arthur, and approached the walls of the fortress, beginning its siege. Before the start of the war, the fortress was only 50% complete. As of mid-July 1904, the land front of the fortress consisted of 5 forts, 3 fortifications and 5 separate batteries. In the intervals between long-term fortifications, the defenders of the fortress equipped rifle trenches. There were 22 long-term batteries on the coastal front. The garrison of the fortress numbered 42 thousand people with 646 guns (514 of them on the land front) and 62 machine guns (47 of them on the land front). The general management of the defense of Port Arthur was carried out by the head of the Kwantung fortified area, Lieutenant General A.M. Stessel. The ground defense of the fortress was headed by the head of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, Major General R.I. Kondratenko. The 3rd Japanese Army consisted of 80 thousand people, 474 guns, 72 machine guns.
In connection with the beginning of the siege of Port Arthur, the Russian command decided to save the Pacific squadron and take it to Vladivostok, but in the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28 (August 10), the Russian fleet failed and was forced to return. In this battle, the commander of the squadron, Rear Admiral V.K., was killed. Vitgeft. On August 6-11 (19-24), the Japanese carried out an assault on Port Arthur, which was repulsed with heavy losses for the attackers. An important role in the beginning of the defense of the fortress was played by the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, which operated on the enemy’s sea communications and destroyed 15 steamships, including 4 military transports.
At this time, the Russian Manchurian Army (149 thousand people, 673 guns), reinforced by troops of the X and XVII Army Corps, took up defensive positions on the distant approaches to Liaoyang in early August 1904. In the Battle of Liaoyang on August 13-21 (August 26 - September 3), the Russian command was unable to use its numerical superiority over the 1st, 2nd and 4th Japanese armies (109 thousand people, 484 guns) and, despite the fact that all enemy attacks were repulsed with heavy losses, he ordered the troops to be withdrawn to the north.
The fate of Port Arthur
On September 6-9 (19-22), the enemy made another attempt to capture Port Arthur, which again failed. In mid-September, in order to help the besieged fortress A.N. Kuropatkin decided to go on the offensive. From September 22 (October 5) to October 4 (17), 1904, the Manchurian Army (213 thousand people, 758 guns and 32 machine guns) carried out an operation against the Japanese armies (according to Russian intelligence - over 150 thousand people, 648 guns) on the Shahe River, which ended in vain. In October, instead of one Manchu Army, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Manchu armies were deployed. A.N. became the new commander-in-chief in the Far East. Kuropatkin, who replaced E.I. Alekseeva.
The fruitless attempts of Russian troops to defeat the Japanese in Southern Manchuria and break through to Port Arthur decided the fate of the fortress. On October 17-20 (October 30 - November 2) and November 13-23 (November 26 - December 6) the third and fourth assaults on Port Arthur took place, again repelled by the defenders. During the last assault, the enemy captured Mount Vysokaya dominating the area, thanks to which he was able to adjust the fire of siege artillery, including 11-inch howitzers, the shells of which accurately hit the ships of the Pacific squadron stationed in the inner roadstead and the defensive structures of Port Arthur. On December 2 (15), the chief of ground defense, Major General R.I., was killed during shelling. Kondratenko. With the fall of forts Nos. II and III, the position of the fortress became critical. December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905) Lieutenant General A.M. Stessel gave the order to surrender the fortress. By the time Port Arthur surrendered, its garrison included 32 thousand people (of which 6 thousand were wounded and sick), 610 serviceable guns and 9 machine guns.
Despite the fall of Port Arthur, the Russian command continued to try to defeat the enemy. In the battle of Sandepu January 12-15 (25-28), 1905 A.N. Kuropatkin carried out a second offensive with the forces of the 2nd Manchurian Army between the Honghe and Shahe rivers, which again ended in failure.
Battle of Mukden
On February 6 (19) - February 25 (March 10), 1905, the largest battle of the Russian-Japanese War took place, which predetermined the outcome of the struggle on land - Mukden. During its course, the Japanese (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th armies, 270 thousand people, 1062 guns, 200 machine guns) attempted to bypass both flanks of the Russian troops (1st , 2nd and 3rd Manchu armies, 300 thousand people, 1386 guns, 56 machine guns). Despite the fact that the plan of the Japanese command was thwarted, the Russian side suffered a heavy defeat. The Manchu armies retreated to the Sypingai positions (160 km north of Mukden), where they remained until peace was concluded. After the Battle of Mukden A.N. Kuropatkin was removed from the post of commander in chief and replaced by infantry general N.P. Linevich. By the end of the war, the number of Russian troops in the Far East reached 942 thousand people, and Japanese, according to Russian intelligence, 750 thousand. In July 1905, a Japanese landing captured the island of Sakhalin.
Tsushima battle
The last major event of the Russo-Japanese War was the Tsushima naval battle on May 14-15 (27-28), in which the Japanese fleet completely destroyed the united Russian 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons under the command of Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, sent from the Baltic Sea to help the Port Arthur squadron.
Treaty of Portsmouth
In the summer of 1905, in North American Portsmouth, through the mediation of US President T. Roosevelt, negotiations began between the Russian Empire and Japan. Both sides were interested in a speedy conclusion of peace: despite military successes, Japan had completely exhausted its financial, material and human resources and could no longer wage further struggle, and the Revolution of 1905-1907 began in Russia. On August 23 (September 5), 1905, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was signed, ending the Russo-Japanese War. According to its terms, Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese influence, transferred to Japan Russia's lease rights to the Kwantung region with Port Arthur and the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin.
Results
The Russo-Japanese War cost the participating countries great human and material losses. Russia lost about 52 thousand people killed, died from wounds and diseases, Japan - more than 80 thousand people. The conduct of military operations cost the Russian Empire 6.554 billion rubles, Japan - 1.7 billion yen. The defeat in the Far East undermined Russia's international authority and led to the end of Russian expansion in Asia. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which established the delimitation of spheres of interest in Persia (Iran), Afghanistan and Tibet, actually meant the defeat of the eastern policy of the government of Nicholas II. Japan, as a result of the war, established itself as the leading regional power in the Far East, strengthening itself in Northern China and annexing Korea in 1910.
The Russo-Japanese War had a great influence on the development of military art. It demonstrated the increased importance of artillery, rifle and machine gun fire. During the fighting, the struggle for fire dominance acquired a dominant role. Actions in close masses and the bayonet strike lost their former significance, and the main battle formation became the rifle chain. During the Russo-Japanese War, new positional forms of struggle arose. Compared to the wars of the 19th century. The duration and scale of battles increased, and they began to break up into separate army operations. Artillery firing from closed positions became widespread. Siege artillery began to be used not only for fighting under fortresses, but also in field battles. At sea during the Russo-Japanese War, torpedoes were widely used, and sea mines were also actively used. For the first time, the Russian command brought in submarines to defend Vladivostok. The experience of the war was actively used by the military-political leadership of the Russian Empire during the military reforms of 1905-1912.
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