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In accordance with the military-political goals of the further conduct of the war, in the early spring of 1942, when active armed struggle on the Soviet-German front almost ceased, both belligerents began to develop strategic plans for military operations.

The development by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the strategic plan of action of the Soviet Armed Forces for the next stage of the war and the implementation of measures to prepare a new military campaign had a number of characteristic features. They were determined by the unique conditions of the military-political and strategic situation that had developed by the spring of 1942. Firstly, there was no firm confidence that the second front would be opened in a time frame that met the general interests of the struggle of the anti-fascist coalition, that is, in 1942. At the same time, the Nazi leadership was aware that there would be no second front in the near future. Therefore, it could use maximum forces and means to launch new active operations on the Eastern Front. Secondly, the Allies did not fully fulfill their obligations to deliver military materials to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Therefore, the Soviet Union had to rely only on itself.

The Soviet command took into account measures for significant organizational restructuring and technical re-equipment of the Soviet Army, as well as the creation of large reserves, which could not be completed earlier than the summer of 1942. Meanwhile, numerous data indicated that a new major enemy offensive on the Soviet-German front would begin already in the spring of 1942

On March 18, 1942, military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “The preparation of the spring offensive is confirmed by the transfer of German troops and materials. During the period from 1.1 to 10.3, up to 35 divisions 1 were transferred, and manpower was continuously being added to the active armies. Intensive work is underway to restore the railway network in the occupied territory of the USSR, and there is an intensified delivery of military and transport vehicles, ammunition, and artillery. It is possible that a decisive German offensive on the Eastern Front will occur with a simultaneous Japanese offensive against the USSR and pressure from the Germans on Turkey in order to force it to allow German troops to enter the Caucasus... The Germans, not being able to carry out an appropriate regrouping of forces at the front, did not will be able to repeat the offensive on a wide front. They concentrate all their efforts on preparing successive operations: first with the goal of capturing the Caucasus and the Murmansk (Kirov - Ed.) Railway, then spreading operations to the north with the goal of capturing the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. By solving these problems, the main strategic goal would be achieved - isolating the USSR from its allies, depriving it of oil, and if not defeating it, then reducing it to the point where it loses all significance. This is the main plan of the German command.

1 In fact, fewer were transferred - about 20 divisions.

The center of gravity of the spring offensive will be transferred to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary attack in the north, with a simultaneous demonstration on the central front against Moscow...” 1 And as a conclusion, the report noted: “Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first on southern sector and will subsequently spread to the north. For the spring offensive, Germany, together with its allies, will field up to 65 new divisions... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.”

On March 23, 1942, state security agencies reported to the State Defense Committee: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. This way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil. If the operation with access to the Volga at Stalingrad was successful, the Germans planned to launch an offensive to the north along the Volga. This summer, the Germans will strive not only to reach the Volga and the Caspian Sea, but will also undertake major operations against Moscow and Leningrad, since their capture is a matter of prestige for the German command.”2

Such strategic intelligence forecasts could not but influence the assessment of the situation by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and its decision to further conduct armed struggle at the new stage of the war.

In the spring of 1942, the Headquarters did not have sufficient forces and means at its disposal to conduct an offensive on a large scale, but it was impossible to postpone active actions for a long period of time. In this situation, writes Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, “the fronts went on the defensive. We were faced with the question of a military action plan for the next six months. It was discussed in detail at the General Staff. None of us had any doubts that the enemy, no later than the summer, would again take serious active actions in order to again seize the initiative and inflict defeat on us. We critically analyzed the results of the winter. Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to define as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to play out. At the same time, we all understood perfectly well that the further development of the entire world war, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942.”3

1 IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5, pp. 296-297.

2 IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 6083, l. 6.

3 A. Vasilevskii. Life's work. M., 1975, p. 203.

The strategic action plan of the Soviet Armed Forces for a longer period was supposed to provide for the ultimate political goal of the war for 1942 - the defeat of the enemy and the liberation of all occupied Soviet territory. This was the basis for the development of a solution begun by Headquarters and the General Staff after the completion of the winter offensive campaign.

Assessing the situation that had developed by the spring of 1942, Supreme Commander-in-Chief II. V. Stalin assumed that the Nazi command in the summer of 1942 would be able to conduct large offensive operations simultaneously in two strategic directions - Moscow and the south of the country. He attached particular importance to the Moscow direction, where the enemy had more than 70 divisions.

J.V. Stalin believed that the Soviet Armed Forces did not yet have enough forces and means to launch large offensive operations in the spring of 1942 in the absence of a second front in Europe. Therefore, he considered it expedient for the near future to limit himself to active defense on the entire Soviet-German front, while at the same time conducting private front-line offensive operations in its individual sections 1.

The General Staff, in particular its chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov and his deputy, General A. M. Vasilevsky, basically held the same opinion as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov was firmly committed to limiting himself to only active defense at the first stage of strategic actions, withstanding the enemy’s blow, exhausting and bleeding him out at the beginning of the summer, and then, having accumulated reserves, moving on to broad counter-offensive actions 2.

The State Defense Committee envisaged the following as the main immediate task: to create powerful trained reserves by May - June 1942, to accumulate weapons, ammunition, tanks, aircraft and other military equipment, as well as the necessary material resources to support troops in the subsequent offensive. The General Staff completed all justifications and calculations for the strategic action plan for 1942 by mid-March. The main idea of ​​the plan: active defense, accumulation of reserves, and then transition to a decisive offensive. However, work on the plan continued in connection with the proposal of the command of the South-Western direction to conduct a large offensive operation in May with the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts.

The final version of the action plan of the Soviet Armed Forces was reviewed and approved at the end of March at a joint meeting of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At this meeting, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov once again outlined the opinion of the General Staff on the advisability of transitioning the entire army to temporary active defense and concentrating the main strategic reserves in the western direction and partly in the Voronezh region, where the main events could play out in the summer. This opinion was justified mainly by the numerical superiority of the enemy forces and the absence of a second front in Europe. B. M. Shaposhnikov did not agree with the proposal of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko about the possibility of carrying out a major offensive operation in the spring by forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts, citing the difficulties of organizing such an operation and the lack of necessary reserves. However, the arguments of the General Staff were not fully taken into account. The meeting ended with the instruction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to prepare and conduct offensive operations in the near future in the Kharkov region, in Crimea and in other areas.

1 See G. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. T. 2. M., 1974, pp. 64-65. See also there.

Thus, the strategic plan of the Headquarters for 1942 generally corresponded to the military-political goal of the Soviet state for the next stage of the war and was basically active in nature. The first part of this plan was developed in most detail, which concerned the planned actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the spring and early summer of 1942 (April - June). During this period, the Soviet Army was to remain in a temporary strategic defense with the task of completing the begun reorganization of troops and re-equipping them with new equipment, as well as accumulating reserves in order to launch a new offensive from the summer of 1942. In order to give the defense an active character, the plan also provided for a series of offensive operations on separate directions of the front from the Barents to the Black Sea with the common task of consolidating the success of the past winter campaign, improving the position of troops in certain areas and, with preemptive strikes, disrupting the enemy’s preparations for the summer offensive.

The second part of the plan outlined the transition of the Soviet Armed Forces from the summer of 1942 to a decisive offensive along most of the Soviet-German front with the main attack on the southern wing. It was developed in the most general terms, since detailed planning of major offensive operations could only be carried out taking into account the results of military operations in the spring of 1942.

In accordance with the decision made, the Headquarters assigned specific combat missions to the fronts of the active army in April - early May for the coming spring stage of the struggle.

On April 20, the troops of the Bryansk Front were ordered to carry out an operation in early May with the forces of two armies and a tank corps in the Kursk-Lgov direction with the goal of capturing Kursk and cutting the Kursk-Lgov 1 railway.

The Southwestern Front received permission to conduct the Kharkov operation with the assistance of part of the forces of the Southern Front. According to the plan approved by the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction on April 10, the goal of the operation was to forestall the enemy in launching offensive operations in the Kharkov direction and retain the initiative. The Southwestern Front was supposed to, using bridgeheads on the right bank of the Seversky Donets, northeast and southeast of Kharkov, deliver two attacks in converging directions on Kharkov, defeat the Kharkov enemy group and capture Kharkov, an important stronghold of enemy defense.

The southern front was supposed to defend the occupied lines, covering the Rostov and Voroshilovgrad directions and the Lozovaya, Barvenkovo, Izyum areas. It was assumed that the Southwestern and Southern Fronts would create the necessary conditions for the deployment of a large joint offensive operation in the summer in order to liberate Donbass and reach the Dnieper line.

In order to facilitate command and control of troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in the upcoming offensive in the summer of 1942, Headquarters considered it necessary to create the North Caucasus direction on April 21. It included the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol defensive region, the North Caucasus Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, Secretary of the Krasnodar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks P. I. Seleznev was appointed a member of the Military Council, Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the naval unit was Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral I. S. Isakov, Chief of Staff - General G.F. Zakharov.

1 This offensive was subsequently canceled by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

The troops of the North Caucasus direction were supposed to completely clear Crimea of ​​the enemy and prevent amphibious landings on the coast of the Azores and Black Seas in the Rostov-Tuapse area, as well as airborne assaults on the Kerch Peninsula and in the territory of the North Caucasus Military District. In the event of the enemy’s attempts to launch an offensive in the Rostov direction, these troops, in cooperation with the troops of the Southern Front, were to firmly hold the line of the Don River, not giving the enemy the opportunity to advance into the North Caucasus.

The fronts of the active army also received active offensive missions in other directions of the Soviet-German front.

The troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts were ordered to complete the operations begun in the winter to defeat the enemy's Rzhev-Vyazma grouping with the subsequent development of an offensive on Smolensk. At the same time, the commander of the Western Front received the task of carrying out an air transport operation in order to strengthen the cavalry group of General P. A. Belov, operating behind enemy lines, with personnel, weapons and logistical means. 1. These troops were supposed to hold and expand the area they occupied area, as well as strike at communications, railways and enemy bases in the areas of Smolensk, Yartsev, Vyazma, Pochinka 2. The duration of the operation was determined from May 10 to 25. According to the Headquarters directive, 120 aircraft were involved in the operation, which were to be allocated by the commander of the Air Force, the commander of long-range aviation and the commander of the Western Front. The commander of the country's Air Defense Forces was entrusted with the task of covering airfields for loading heavy aircraft. Return flights were supposed to evacuate the wounded from Belov's group.

The Headquarters demanded that the troops of the North-Western Front complete the liquidation of the Demyansk enemy group, which was deeply wedged into the location of Soviet troops at the junction of the North-Western and Kalinin fronts.

The troops of the Karelian Front were supposed to prepare and conduct private operations in the Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kestenga directions and reach the state border 3, and the troops of the 7th Separate Army were to completely clear the left bank of the Svir River from Finnish troops and seize bridgeheads on its right bank 4.

In the strategic plan of the Headquarters, the Navy was taken into account mainly as a force carrying out independent combat operations in the Northern and Black Sea maritime theaters. The Baltic Fleet was intended to be used on a limited basis, since it was blocked in Kronstadt and Leningrad. The Northern Fleet was tasked with protecting sea communications in the Barents and White Seas, as well as on the Northern Sea Route. He was also entrusted with the task of disrupting the enemy’s maritime communications, but especially important was the organization and conduct of special operations that were supposed to ensure the safety of convoys heading to the northern ports of the Soviet Union. In addition, the forces of this fleet were involved in joint actions with the 14th Army of the Karelian Front, which was conducting an operation in the Murmansk direction. The Black Sea Fleet, together with the Troops of the Primorsky Army, was supposed to not only actively participate in the defense of Sevastopol, but also to support the combat operations of the Crimean Front on the Kerch Peninsula, supply troops, strike enemy communications and repel attacks by torpedo boats and enemy aircraft on their bases and ships .

1 P. A. Belov’s group included the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and separate units of the 4th Airborne Corps.

2 Archives of the Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, no. 41 pp. 130-131

3 Archives of the Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, no. 31, no. 173-175.

4 Ibid., pp. 178-179.

Aiming the Navy at solving independent problems, the Headquarters also drew attention to the shortcomings in the use of fleet forces in joint actions with front-line troops in coastal areas. The directive of the Chief of the General Staff gave specific instructions on the use of naval artillery, improving the organization of interaction between ground forces and navies, reconnaissance organization and other issues.

Fronts operating in the western and southwestern directions simultaneously with offensive missions received instructions on the creation of reserves and the construction of military defensive lines: “In order to create reserves and form shock fists for us to use in the desired directions in offensive actions, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it advisable to hide behind in some sectors of our common front with smaller forces in order to group the released forces and assets in army and front-line reserves and prepare them for participation in our upcoming offensive operations, as well as for counterattacks in case of an unexpected enemy attack.

In these types of activities, the Headquarters considers it necessary that... the front urgently build a military defensive line along the entire front, which should make it possible to free up some troops for the formation of shock fists” 1.

In the instructions of the Headquarters on strengthening the defense of the fronts, it was ordered to bring the depth of the main defense line to 10-12 km. Along with this, the Headquarters carried out significant measures to strengthen old and build new rear defensive lines to a significant depth, reaching a total of 600 km (to the Volga River).

In the southwestern direction, the construction of a line was underway on the line Voronezh, Starobelsk, Rostov-on-Don; The old defensive lines along the Don River were improved and defensive lines were built around such large cities as Voronezh, Rostov, Saratov, and Stalingrad. In the western direction, the Mozhaisk defense line was erected and the defenses around Moscow and the old lines along the Oka and Volga rivers were strengthened. To defend the Caucasian direction, at the end of 1941, construction began on a field fortified line along the Lower Don from the village of Nizhnechirskaya to Azov with a total length of 700 km, as well as lines along the Kuma and Manych rivers. However, by the spring of 1942, all of them were poorly developed in depth in the main directions. In addition, due to an unsuccessfully chosen location for the defensive structures, some of them were flooded during the spring flood.

In May 1942, the construction of defensive lines began between the Don and Kuban, along the Terek River and contours around Tikhoretsk, Voroshilovsk, Grozny, Mineralnye Vody, Krasnodar.

The Headquarters also paid great attention to strengthening the defense of Leningrad. The evacuation of the city's population continued.

Navigation on Lake Ladoga was being prepared. A second route was created through the Shlisselburg Bay, about 30 km long. For this purpose, the Kobono-Koredzhi port was built on the eastern shore of the lake.

1 Moscow Region Archives, f. 132a, op. 2642, no. 32, no. 89-95, 185-187, 190-195.

The ship's crew was replenished: metal barges were built in Leningrad, wooden ones - at the shipyard on the Syas River. Small steamships and barges from the Volzhsky, North-Kama and other shipping companies were transferred to Ladoga.

By a resolution dated April 9, 1942, the State Defense Committee assigned responsibility for organizing transportation across the lake to the Ladoga Military Flotilla, commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. S. Cherokov. The North-Western River Shipping Company was operationally subordinate to the commander of the Ladoga Military Flotilla. Measures were taken to strengthen the air defense of the Ladoga highway.

The partisan movement was also taken into account as an important factor in the strategic plan of the Headquarters, the forces of which were to be used on a large scale to disorganize the enemy rear.

Thus, all fronts deployed from the Arctic to the Crimea received not only instructions to improve defense in their zones, but also offensive tasks with limited goals. They had to solve these tasks in conditions of temporary defense until the summer of 1942, that is, before the start of a new strategic offensive with decisive goals - the defeat of the main enemy groups and the liberation of Soviet territory. The general goal of all spring offensive actions was to improve the operational-strategic position of the Soviet Armed Forces in the main directions, to reveal the intentions of the opposing enemy, to defeat his groups, and with preemptive strikes to thwart the plan of the German command to launch a new major offensive on the Soviet-German front, thereby giving the strategic defense of the Soviet troops an active character. When launching preemptive strikes, the greatest importance was attached to the Kharkov region - the most important strategic facility in the southwestern direction. All this was supposed to create favorable conditions for the deployment in the summer of large offensive operations on a huge front from the Baltic to the Black Sea in order to defeat the main enemy groups and create a decisive turning point in the war in favor of the USSR, which began near Moscow in the winter of 1941/42.

Taking into account the timing of reserve readiness and the degree of reorganization of the Air Force and armored forces, the summer offensive of the Soviet Army could begin only in the second half of July 1942.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command positioned its reserves so that they could be used, depending on the prevailing situation, both in the southwestern direction - to repel the expected enemy attack and launch a decisive offensive, and in the western direction - to reliably provide the Moscow region. Therefore, the main forces of the reserves were concentrated in the areas of Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Saratov, from where they could quickly be advanced to one or another threatened direction. All marching reinforcements of the active army were distributed between these two directions.

The new offensive plan in 1942 was based on the Nazi leadership's desire to achieve the political goals of the war against the USSR, which Nazi Germany failed to achieve in 1941. The strategic concept of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command defined the Soviet-German front as the main front of the struggle. It is here, the leaders of fascist Germany believed, that lies the key to winning victory over the anti-fascist coalition, to solving the problem of gaining world domination. The overall strategic plan was to deliver a powerful strike with concentrated forces in one strategic direction - the southern wing of the front - and to consistently expand the offensive zone to the north.

In a conversation with Japanese Ambassador Oshima on January 3, 1942, after the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow, Hitler confidentially told him: “The Soviets will be defeated next summer... Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be thrown back so far that they will never be able to touch the cultural soil of Europe.” Developing and concretizing his adventurist plans, he continued: “I intend to no longer conduct offensive operations in the center of the front for now. My goal will be an offensive on the southern front. I decided, as soon as the weather improved, to attack again in the direction of the Caucasus.

This direction is the most important. We need to reach oil, Iran and Iraq. If we get there, then I hope the liberation movement of the Arab world 1 could also help our breakthrough. Of course, in addition, I will take care to destroy Moscow and Leningrad...

If England loses India, the whole world will collapse. India is the core of the British empire. It is necessary that Germany and Japan consult on joint plans for 1942 and 1943. Both allies must under no circumstances stop halfway. I am sure that England can be destroyed. I don’t yet know how to eliminate the USA” 2.

The question of draft plans for a new offensive campaign first arose in February 1942, when the situation on the Soviet-German front had somewhat stabilized. A new offensive in the East was planned to begin immediately after the spring thaw. On February 20, the head of the operational department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General A. Heusinger, had already presented the first draft of the offensive plan to General F. Halder. This plan provided for two stages of struggle: spring and summer-autumn. In the spring of 1942, the goal was to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol with the forces of Army Group South, as well as to eliminate Soviet troops in the front bulge in the Barvenkovo ​​area, which was supposed to create the necessary conditions for the deployment in the summer of that year of the main operation on the southern wing of the Soviet- German front. The plan for the summer offensive itself provided for a single strike by large Wehrmacht forces on the southern wing with the goal of breaking through to the Caucasus.

At the end of February 1942, Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Germany, said: “Plans for the campaign are now being developed by the General Staff. In general terms, the plan is the one outlined by Hitler at the end of January: in all operations against the USSR, the southern sector should have the greatest importance - the offensive will begin there, and the battles will gradually turn to the north... In any case, if it is possible to cut off the USSR from external assistance and expand the capture in the south, including the entire Donbass and the Caucasus, then even if it is not possible to completely break the Soviet regime, the USSR will still lose all significance and strength... Operations against the Middle East will follow operations against the Caucasus.”

During March, the General Staff of the Ground Forces was systematically developing a plan for a new offensive in the East under the code name Operation Siegfried. On March 28, 1942, at a meeting at Wehrmacht headquarters, a detailed plan for the summer offensive was discussed. General W. Varlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Operational Command, who was present at the meeting, subsequently wrote down:

1 This refers to anti-British elements in Arab countries, which the Nazis intended to rely on in the fight against the British.

2 N. Jacobsen. 1939-1945. Der zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Doku-menten. Darmstadt, 1961, S. 288.

“...Hitler, despite the failures that befell the Germans, again returned to his basic idea, which he adhered to in December 1940 and the summer of 1941. He again wanted to concentrate his main efforts on the extreme flanks of a widely extended front. The only difference was that the large losses suffered by the ground army and which could not be fully compensated forced him to set himself successively one goal after another, starting from the southern sector, from the Caucasus. Moscow as the target of the offensive... has so far completely disappeared” 1.

Noteworthy is the testimony of Keitel, who, during interrogation on June 17, 1945, testified: “As a result of the 1941 campaign, it became clear that a moment of a certain balance of power was emerging between German and Soviet troops. The Russian counter-offensive, which was completely unexpected for the high command, showed that we had grossly miscalculated our assessment of the reserves of the Red Army. Moreover, it was clear that the Red Army was making maximum use of the winter stabilization of the front to further strengthen, replenish and train new reserves. It was not possible to win the war with lightning speed. However, this in no way took away our hope of achieving a military victory with a new offensive.

When drawing up the plan for the 1942 campaign, we were guided by the following guidelines:

a) the troops of the Eastern Front are no longer able to advance along the entire length of the front, as was the case in 1941;
b) the offensive should be limited to one section of the front, namely the southern;
c) the goal of the offensive: to completely exclude Donbass from the military-economic balance of Russia, cut off the supply of oil along the Volga and capture the main oil supply bases, which, according to our assessment, were located in Maykop and Grozny. The exit to the Volga was not planned immediately over a wide area; it was planned to exit in one of the places in order to then capture the strategically important center - Stalingrad. In the future, it was planned, in case of success and isolation of Moscow from the south, to undertake a turn with large forces to the north (provided that our allies would take over the Don River). I find it difficult to name any time frame for this operation. The entire operation in the southern sector was supposed to end with a major encirclement of the entire southwestern and southern groups of the Red Army, which were covered by our army groups “A” and “B” ... "2

Historians have at their disposal documentary materials about the plans of the fascist political leadership and military command for the summer of 1942. In their final form, the goal and plan of the new offensive campaign in the East were formulated in OKW Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942, and then specified in Directives No. 44 and 45, signed in July.

The military-political goal of the new offensive of the fascist Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front was to regain the strategic initiative and destroy the “remaining” forces of the Soviet Army, to capture the maximum number of the most important political, economic and military centers of the Soviet Union.

The strategic plan of the Hitlerite command was to “... while maintaining the position in the central sector, take Leningrad in the north and establish contacts on land with the Finns, and on the southern flank of the front to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus” 3.

1 W. Warlimoit. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht. 1939-1945. Frankfurt a/M., 1962, S. 242.

2 Quote. from: "Military Historical Journal", 1961, No. 9, pp. 83-84.

3 Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfuhruug 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkom-mandos der Wehrmacht. Frankfurt a/M., 1962, S. 184.

The solution to these tasks was supposed to be carried out sequentially “taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities.” At first, Hitler’s command needed to create conditions for carrying out the so-called “main operation” in the south of the Eastern Front “with the goal of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.” For this, the fascist German troops needed to improve their operational situation, stabilize and strengthen the Eastern Front and rear front-line areas. Their specific tasks boiled down to capturing the Kerch Peninsula, Sevastopol during the spring, cutting off the Barvenkovo ​​ledge of Soviet troops, eliminating their bridgehead north-west of Novgorod, and leveling the front line in the Moscow direction.

By the end of May, the fascist German command expected to complete the concentration of the main forces of the strike forces to carry out the “main operation.” The immediate goal of this operation envisaged the delivery of a series of successive, complementary strikes, which were to develop “from north to south in such a way that in each of these strikes, in decisive directions, as many forces as possible would be concentrated, both of the ground army and, in particular, aviation."

The first strike was planned to be delivered from the area south of Orel to Voronezh. From here, the mobile formations were supposed to advance down the Don towards the group, which was delivering a second blow from the Kharkov area to the east. Then it was planned to unite in the area west of Stalingrad the troops advancing along the Don and the troops striking east from the Taganrog, Artemovsk region. After this, it was planned to quickly develop success directly to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus.

Operations in the north to capture Leningrad and the Kirov railway were planned to be carried out after the defeat of Soviet troops in the south and the capture of the oil regions of the Caucasus, the richest agricultural regions of the Middle and Lower Don and Kuban. In the western direction, where Soviet troops had significant forces, the enemy planned deterrent actions and private offensive operations to improve its operational position.

Thus, according to the plan of the fascist command, the German armed forces in the summer offensive of 1942 were supposed to achieve the achievement of political goals set by the Barbarossa plan. The enemy intended to deliver the main blow on the southern wing. The Wehrmacht was no longer capable of launching simultaneous attacks in other strategic directions, as was the case in 1941.

Having concentrated all their reserves in the south of the Eastern Front, the rulers of the “Third Reich” hoped that the loss of Donbass and Caucasian oil would weaken the Soviet Union and provide Germany with the opportunity to successfully continue the war, and the exit of German troops into Transcaucasia would disrupt the USSR’s communications with foreign countries through the Caucasus and Iran. Moreover, the Nazis, not without reason, hoped that the breakthrough of German troops in Transcaucasia would allow them to drag Turkey into the war against the USSR.

The implementation of the military-political goals of the entire offensive of the Nazi army in the East in the summer of 1942 largely depended on the successful solution of the initial tasks planned by German strategists for May - June 1942.

In order to ensure the secrecy of the summer offensive of 1942, the fascist leadership carried out a number of disinformation activities.

In order to keep the direction of the main attack secret, the General Staff of the German Ground Forces decided to create the impression that German troops would launch a powerful offensive in the western direction in order to defeat the central group of Soviet troops and capture Moscow. For this purpose, the headquarters of Army Group Center, at the direction of the OKH, developed a plan for a special operation under the code name “Kremlin”. The calculation was made that her plan would become known to the command of the Soviet Army and it would be misled. This plan provided for the implementation of a whole complex of various disinformation activities, which were closely linked in time to the preparation and implementation of the offensive in the south. However, Operation Kremlin did not achieve its goal.

So, in the spring of 1942, both warring parties developed strategic plans and were preparing for the next round of active operations on the Soviet-German front, which was caused by the urgent need to have a strategic initiative in their hands.

In accordance with the general plans for the upcoming actions, groupings of forces of the operating armies were created.

The Soviet active army included 9 front-line formations, a separate army and troops of the Moscow defense zone, 3 fleets with 3 flotillas operationally subordinate to them. By May 1942, three high commands of strategic directions still remained - Western, South-Western and North Caucasian, headed respectively by General G. K. Zhukov, Marshals S. K. Timoshenko and S. M. Budyonny. The forces of the active army included 10 strike aviation groups of Headquarters, formations and long-range aviation units, as well as the Moscow Air Defense Front and the Leningrad Air Defense Army. The strategic reserve of the Headquarters included 2 combined arms armies (1st reserve and 58th) and about 80 separate formations and units. In total, the troops of the Soviet active army (excluding the country's Air Defense Forces and the Navy) at that time numbered 5.1 million people, almost 3.9 thousand tanks, 44.9 thousand guns and mortars x, about 2.2 thousand .combat aircraft.

1 Without 50-mm mortars, of which there were 21.4 thousand.
2 IVI. Documents and materials, inventory No. 3, p. 364; f. 244, op. 287, no. 47, pp. 65-66.

The Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets had 140 warships of the main classes: 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 32 destroyers and 100 submarines 1.

The fascist German armed forces had 3 army groups on the Soviet-German front, which included 9 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups and 3 air fleets. The total number of enemy forces that opposed the Soviet army in May 1942 is shown in Table 11.

Thus, the ratio of forces and means of the parties was: in people - 1: 1.2, in guns and mortars - 1: 1.3, in combat aircraft - 1: 1 in favor of the enemy; in tanks - 1.2: 1 and in warships - 2.2 M in favor of the Soviet troops and navy 2. With such a ratio of forces and means, both sides entered a new stage of the Second World War in the spring of 1942, launching active operations in its main front.

IN In accordance with the military-political goals set by the Communist Party and the government for the Soviet people at the new stage of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command developed a strategic plan for the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the winter campaign of 1942/43. The Headquarters' realistic assessment of their capabilities by the end of 1942 led to conclusion about the need for a consistent defeat of the enemy. Therefore, the plan was based on the idea of ​​conducting a system of successive offensive operations on a huge front from Lake Ladoga to the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. Its implementation was supposed to lead to the defeat of the most powerful enemy groups, the seizure of strategic initiative and the achievement of a decisive turning point in the armed struggle on the main front of the Second World War.

Soviet troops had to first defeat the enemy group between the Volga and Don rivers, and then strike in the North Caucasus, Upper Don and near Leningrad. In order to pin down the enemy and deprive him of the ability to maneuver his forces, it was also planned to carry out offensive operations in the Velikiye Luki areas of Rzhev and Vyazma. If these tasks were successfully completed, it was planned to develop a strategic offensive in the Kursk, Kharkov directions and in the Donbass.

The main efforts in the winter campaign of 1942/43 were concentrated on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It was here that the largest and most active enemy groups were located, the defeat of which ensured the capture of the strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for launching an offensive in other important directions.

The situation that developed on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front contributed to the conduct of large-scale offensive operations there with decisive goals. The enemy strike groups operating near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus had not yet managed to create a strong defense and found themselves scattered along a huge front - from Voronezh to Elista and from Mozdok to Novorossiysk. As a result of the exceptionally stubborn and active defense of the Soviet troops in the summer and autumn of 1942, they suffered heavy losses. The Wehrmacht's strategic and operational reserves on the Soviet-German front were largely depleted, while the Soviet command was completing the accumulation of large reserves, fully equipped with all means of armed struggle.

According to the general plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the first stage of the campaign it was envisaged to concentrate large forces in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction and, having launched them into a decisive counter-offensive, encircle and destroy the main enemy grouping (about 40 divisions as of November 1, 1942) in the Stalingrad area. Subsequently, with the introduction of additional reserves into the battle, it was intended to expand the front of the strategic counteroffensive, defeat enemy troops in the Middle Don and, with a strike in the general direction of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov-on-Don, cut off the escape route to the Donbass for a large enemy group located in the North Caucasus 1. Thus, it was intended to create the preconditions for completing the defeat of the entire southern wing of the German eastern front.

Taking into account the experience of the previous period of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command refused to simultaneously conduct offensive operations in all strategic directions of the Soviet-German front. Initially, she concentrated her main efforts on the main operation of the campaign between the Volga and Don rivers. Therefore, the plan of action for the fronts that were to attack in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction was developed in most detail.

Based on the plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command, the most important strategic operation of the campaign was supposed to be the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. It was planned to begin a powerful winter offensive with it.

The fundamental decision to launch a counteroffensive at Stalingrad was made on September 13, 1942 after the Supreme Commander-in-Chief heard reports from Generals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. “Having gone through all the possible options,” recalled the former Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, “we decided to propose to I.V. Stalin the following plan of action: first, continue to wear down the enemy with active defense; the second is to begin preparing a counteroffensive in order to inflict such a blow on the enemy in the Stalingrad area that would dramatically change the strategic situation in the south of the country in our favor.”2 It was taken into account that a decisive defeat of the enemy in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction would put the Army Group in a difficult situation "A", operating in the North Caucasus, and will force it either to hastily retreat, or to fight, essentially, under conditions of encirclement. The date for the start of the counteroffensive was not established, but from the report of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief it followed that it could have been launched no earlier than the last ten days of October 19423.

When developing preliminary considerations for the counteroffensive plan at Stalingrad, the General Staff's comprehensive analysis of the situation on the Soviet-German front, and in particular on its southern wing, was taken into account. Based on this analysis, it was planned to use the advantageous position of the Soviet troops, covering the 6th and 4th German tank armies, and launch powerful concentric attacks on their flanks with the aim of encircling and defeating all the main forces of the enemy group operating in the area between the Volga and Don.

2 N. Voronov. In military service. M., 1963, p. 287.

3 G. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. T. 2. Ed. 2. M., 1974, p. 86. :; T. 1, p.

The operation was proposed to be carried out in two stages. At the first stage, break through the defenses and encircle the main forces of the 6th Field and 4th Tank Armies, as well as create a strong external encirclement front. The content of the second stage was supposed to be the reflection of attempts to relieve the blockade of the encircled troops and their destruction.

The ideas of the Headquarters representatives were approved in principle. After this, the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff left for the Stalingrad area to study on the spot all issues related to the counteroffensive and submit specific proposals to Headquarters on the plan for this decisive operation. Particular attention was paid to strict observance of secrecy in preparing for a counteroffensive.

The results of the work of representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the fronts of the Stalingrad direction were discussed at the end of September at a meeting with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It was then that the operational plan for the counteroffensive was basically approved, the directions of the main attacks of the fronts involved in the operation, the forces and means necessary for them, the areas for the deployment of reserves advanced to the front and the approximate dates for their concentration were determined. At the same time, decisions were made on organizing command and control of troops in the upcoming operation. In particular, the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts, which had previously been led by the commander of the South-Eastern Front, were renamed Donskoy and Stalingrad, respectively, with direct subordination to the Supreme High Command Headquarters. In the middle reaches of the Don, a new, Southwestern Front was created, which was entrusted with the main task of the operation - to deliver a powerful blow to the flank of the enemy’s Stalingrad group, to reach its rear and play a decisive role in its encirclement. Experienced military leaders were placed at the head of the fronts that were to launch a counteroffensive in the south: the commander of the Don Front was General K.K. Rokossovsky, who had previously been the commander of the Bryansk Front; the commander of the Southwestern Front was General N.F. Vatutin, who was the commander of the Voronezh Front in the summer and autumn of 1942; General A.I. Eremenko remained the commander of the Stalingrad Front.

After additional careful study on the ground of the real possibilities for carrying out a counteroffensive, the plan of operation was finally approved. The operation received the code name “Uranus”. The transition of troops to a counteroffensive was determined for the Southwestern and Don Fronts on November 9, and for the Stalingrad Front - on November 10. The difference in the timing of the fronts going on the offensive was due to the different depth of the tasks and the need to ensure the simultaneous exit of strike groups to the Kalach-on-Don, Sovetsky area, where their meeting was planned.

Taking into account the fact that the success of the strike against the enemy being prepared at Stalingrad was to have a decisive influence on the entire course of the winter campaign and therefore acquired not only military, but also important political significance, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Headquarters recognized it necessary to “consider the upcoming operation in the Stalingrad area will be the main event until the end of 1942 on the entire Soviet-German front, focusing on it the main attention and efforts of the party, government and the entire Soviet people" 1.

1 Quote from: The Stalingrad epic. M., 1968, p. 83.

The command of the fronts of the Stalingrad direction were involved in practical work on the counteroffensive plan in early October. During these days, representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters introduced in general terms the leadership of the fronts to the concept and plan of the Stalingrad operation to encircle the enemy. The fronts received instructions to develop specific proposals on the most appropriate use of forces and means in the operation1. On October 9, the front commanders presented their initial considerations to Headquarters.

In the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the headquarters of the military branches and branches of the Armed Forces, the fundamental issues of using aviation, artillery, armored forces and logistical support for the operation in the counteroffensive were developed. This work was headed by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, General N. N. Voronov, the commander of the Air Force, General A. A. Novikov, his deputy, General G. A. Vorozheikin, the commander of long-range aviation, General A. E. Golovanov, head of the Main Armored Directorate, General Ya. N. Fedorenko. The Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, General A.V. Khrulev, and the Chief of the Main Artillery Directorate, General N.D. Yakovlev, took part in the direct work on planning the logistics of the counteroffensive.

Thus, the creative work of a large team of military leaders, commanders and staffs was invested in the development of the concept and plan for the Stalingrad offensive operation. The main role in planning and supporting this operation belonged to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, its representatives and the General Staff.

Simultaneously with the deployment of preparations for a counteroffensive in the Stalingrad direction, the Headquarters ordered the command of a number of other fronts to prepare troops for active offensive operations.

The Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were ordered from now on, until further notice, not to carry out any private operations, but to prepare troops to break the blockade of Leningrad 2.

The North-Western, Kalinin and Western fronts were supposed to conduct a joint offensive operation in the Moscow direction in October - November 1942 with the aim of defeating the enemy in the areas of Rzhev and Novo-Sokolnikov. The operation was conventionally called “Mars”. Its initial readiness date was set for October 21, and the start of action was October 23, 3.

The Transcaucasian Front received orders to firmly defend the occupied lines, and the troops of Northern Group 4 were to be ready for an offensive in order to defeat the Mozdok enemy group. The deadline for the Northern Group of Forces to be ready for the operation was determined on November 3, and the start of action was by special order of Headquarters.

The successful creation of reserve formations allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-November to begin preparing a new operation, codenamed “Saturn.” The plan of this operation, which was an integral part of the strategic counter-offensive, was to launch a deep cutting blow from the Don line (in its middle course) through Millerovo to Rostov by the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh and right wing of the South-Western fronts two to three weeks after the start of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad. According to the plan for conducting operations “Uranus” and “Saturn,” up to 60 enemy divisions came under attack from Soviet troops. When

1 Moscow Region Archives, f. 48a, op. 1640, no. 27, pp. 240, 247.

2 Archives of the Moscow Region, f. 48a, op. 1640, no. 180, pp. 295, 302.

3 Ibid., l. 275.

4 The Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front included the 9th, 37th, 44th, 58th, 4th Air Armies, individual units and formations.

With the success of Saturn, Army Group A, operating in the North Caucasus, could also be surrounded. Specific planning of operations in other directions, provided for by the general plan of the winter campaign, was carried out during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. Subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of this method of planning strategic offensive operations.

Skillfully organized interaction between groups of fronts operating in various directions should have created favorable conditions for the implementation of the General Headquarters' plan. The foundations for interaction between groups of fronts were laid in the very idea of ​​conducting a strategic offensive.

When planning and organizing a counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the Headquarters provided for pinning down enemy forces through active military operations in the western, northwestern directions and in the North Caucasus. She took into account that as soon as the enemy found himself in a difficult situation at Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Wehrmacht high command would try to transfer some troops from other areas, in particular from the region of Rzhev and Vyazma, to help the southern group. It was then that the offensive Operation Mars was supposed to begin. Its goal was not only to pin down the enemy’s forces and defeat him in the area of ​​the Rzhev-Vyazma salient, but also to attract additional enemy reserves to this direction. During the Stalingrad offensive operation, the same role was assigned to counterattacks by the troops of the Transcaucasian Front in the Mozdok area.

In preparation for winter offensive operations, much attention was paid to the use of aviation. She had to continue the struggle to gain strategic air supremacy, as well as support the strike groups of the fronts until they completed their tasks. In one of the telegrams sent by Supreme Commander II. V. Stalin told General G.K. Zhukov, who was in the Stalingrad area, that based on the experience of the war with Germany, “an operation against the Germans can only be won if we have air superiority.” For success in the operation, three tasks had to be completed: “The first is to concentrate the actions of our aviation in the area of ​​​​the offensive of our strike units, suppress German aviation and firmly cover our troops. The second is to pave the way for our advancing units by systematically bombing the German troops facing them. The third is to pursue the retreating enemy troops through systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely disrupt them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest defense lines.” postpone the operation for a while and accumulate more aircraft. These directives from the Supreme Command Headquarters were directly related not only to Stalingrad, but also to all subsequent operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Navy had to assist front-line troops in offensive operations in coastal areas, continue to disrupt enemy communications and reliably protect its maritime communications. Particular importance was attached to the protection of northern communications, through which more than 40 percent of the supplies stipulated by the agreements arrived from the USA and England to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Great importance was attached to ensuring communications in the Caspian Sea.

1 Moscow Region Archives, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 32, l. 193.

The main tasks of the country's Air Defense Forces continued to be to reliably protect large economic, political centers and communications from enemy air strikes. They also had to solve new tasks: to defend objects in the liberated territory and to strengthen the cover of front-line communication routes.

The Supreme Command Headquarters attached great importance to the intensification of the nationwide struggle behind enemy lines. Back in September 1942, she demanded to intensify strikes against the enemy in occupied Soviet territory. Somewhat later, during the period of immediate preparation for the offensive campaign, many partisan formations received the task of carrying out raids from the Bryansk forests into the territory of Right Bank Ukraine in order to launch sabotage activities there on enemy communications, disable important railway junctions, and conduct reconnaissance.

Thus, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command most carefully developed the initial operation - the strategic counter-offensive at Stalingrad. In his interests, it was planned to carry out offensive operations with the goal of actively pinning down the enemy in the western direction and in the North Caucasus. All subsequent operations were to be planned in detail during the ongoing counteroffensive, when tendencies towards a decisive change in the general situation on the Soviet-German front should have clearly emerged.

The high military art of the Soviet Supreme High Command was clearly demonstrated in the strategic plan and methods of developing a counteroffensive plan.