On Friday night, news appeared on the VKontakte social network that opposition leader Alexei Navalny was killed in the entrance of his own house. The news spread from a fake account of the Meduza publication and spread across many public pages. But soon the politician himself said that everything was fine with him - he was eating dumplings. But the Internet could no longer be stopped.

The fake story about Navalny’s murder instantly spread across the social network VKontakte due to the fact that it was published by official groups such as VK Music, VK Messenger, VK Mobile, VK Live, Live Express and so on. Afterwards, the news spread to other communities.

First, the message appeared in a fake public page copying the official group of the publication “Medusa.

After 10 minutes, the public was blocked, but during this time dozens of communities managed to repost the fake. What’s most interesting is that in many groups the repost appeared automatically. When a person clicked on viewing a news item, it automatically appeared in all communities that he administrated.

As he writes, a similar situation occurred in 2013, when one of the users found a vulnerability in the social network and started an epidemic of reposts. They also appeared in other people's groups without the knowledge of administrators. Then one of the former VK developers explained that the error was in the code of the video call service.

Representatives of the social network did not explain exactly what vulnerability was used this time. They only stated that the bug had been fixed and users should not worry about their data.

The vulnerability was promptly fixed and all posts were automatically deleted. At the same time, attackers could not gain access to user and community data.

Navalny, shortly after the fake news spread, wrote on his Twitter that there was no need to worry about him either.

After Navalny’s “resurrection,” people on Twitter were quite happy about this event. You can’t kill a person while he is eating dumplings that are so close to everyone, which have become a separate reason for jokes. By the way, this is the third time in a year that jokes about a politician are related to cooking: last time there was Doshirak and after the attack with sausages.

The dumplings, no less memetic than Doshirak, could not leave Twitter users indifferent.

One of the most popular was the tweet about Navalny’s death from the fake account of farmer German Sterligov.

Alexei Navalny is not at all the “leader of the Russian opposition,” as many Western media persistently call him. In fact, he is the current figurehead of the protest movement, who likes to make all sorts of benefits out of his troubles with the law.

First, let's clear something up. If you consider Alexei Navalny the leader of the Russian opposition, then the libertarian Gary Johnson should be considered a similar character in the United States. After all, both of them are the most popular figures of non-systemic movements with little support in their countries. Both have very limited access to mainstream media domestically, but boast loyal supporters who fiercely support their candidates online.

For example, in the 2016 US presidential election, Gary Johnson received 3.2%. Navalny’s rating in independent Russian opinion polls remains stable at two percent. Thus, according to a December survey on popularity among public figures, he received the same result as the Director of the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova. Which gives you an idea of ​​how slim Navalny’s chances are: after all, Zakharova has not demonstrated any presidential ambitions and is busy representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the media, often foreign ones.

To many, such a comparison will seem unnecessary, since in the American political environment the competitiveness is noticeably higher than in the Russian one. But if you dig deeper, it turns out that the two main American parties have fewer differences than the six parties currently represented in the Russian State Duma. And on foreign policy issues, both in the Duma and in the US Congress, there are currently no particular disagreements.

However, I believe that the Russian authorities would be better off getting rid of the nationalist by facilitating his participation in the elections in every possible way, since legal problems only give him legitimacy that he would not otherwise have, and also feed Western rhetoric that seeks harm genuine in Russia.

Not allowed before the elections

Last Monday, the Central Election Commission registered a candidate for the 2018 presidential election. As a reason, the Central Election Commission indicated that the politician had a criminal record: in 2013, Navalny was given a suspended sentence of five years on charges of theft of property of the state-owned enterprise Kirovles, and a year later received another suspended sentence in the case of the theft of 500 thousand dollars using a scheme with participation of the French company Yves Rocher. Navalny himself claims that the charges are politically motivated.

Whether this is true or not, the circus organized in connection with Navalny’s nomination distracts attention from the truly important events taking place in Russia.

For example, just the other day, the second most popular party in the country, the communist one, nominated its presidential candidate. And this candidate - for the first time in many years! - Gennady Zyuganov, not the permanent leader of the party, became a new person. However, the Western media barely paid attention to this. And no wonder: Navalny and his support group are more suitable for the purposes of the Western campaign to demonize the Russian authorities.

Meanwhile, the new candidate from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Pavel Grudinin, is an extremely interesting figure. To begin with, he is a very successful businessman, the head of the Lenin State Farm CJSC. This agricultural enterprise, located in the Moscow region, provides its workers with free housing, medical care and family benefits, and in addition, actively invests in the development of local infrastructure. Grudinin believes that Russia needs to leave the World Trade Organization and move towards market socialism with an emphasis on self-sufficiency. His program clearly challenges the hyper-capitalist model that was created in Russia under Yeltsin with the light hand of the United States and largely continues under Putin (although the latter has restored the social security system to some extent).

In addition, Grudinin is able to breathe new life into the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which over the many years of Zyuganov’s leadership has managed to turn into an extra on the Russian political arena. But the Communist Party in Russia is potentially a very powerful political force, capable of attracting the masses to its side. In contrast, Navalny’s movement is marginal: even the British The Guardian admits that it is supported mainly by teenagers who, by law, do not even have the right to vote.

Political mistake

In other words, the farce around Navalny overshadows real politics. At the same time, the opposition leader does not enjoy real support in society (this is partly due to his openly nationalistic views in the past, which he subsequently noticeably moderated, but refused to apologize for them in a recent interview), and his program on many important issues is at odds with the sentiments of many Russians

For example, the majority of Russian residents believe that Crimea is Russian land. And period. Navalny advocates privatization and liquidation of state-owned enterprises, which Russian society associates with the “roaring nineties.” And his proposal to reduce the size of the armed forces contradicts the popular idea in Russia that a strong state needs a large army.

At the same time, many in Russia respect the anti-corruption activities of Navalny and his organization.

I in no way want to say that the norms of Russian election legislation can be ignored in order to “do something nice for someone or bring elections into line with Western “democratic” standards,” as one Twitter user rightly wrote. However, I believe that Navalny’s absence from the list of candidates in future elections will be disadvantageous for the Kremlin. I am not proposing to make an exception to the rule for Navalny, but if his case were reviewed and his conviction (and with it the ban on participation in elections) were lifted, everyone would benefit from this except Navalny himself.

If, in the end, Navalny’s name does not appear on the ballot, he will diligently spoil the picture for the next six years and provide a reason for foreign criticism of the Russian electoral system. You can treat this as you like, but at a time when sanctions are used as a weapon, this gives other countries an excuse to introduce “punitive measures” against Russia. Is it worth the risk of getting Navalny’s list in addition to the dubious Magnitsky list, which will only worsen the situation?

But the Western media also need to face the truth: Navalny’s “election campaign” is, in fact, not even a second-order phenomenon, but some kind of fourth-order one. His movement failed to unite even a small clique of Moscow liberals, who sympathize with the West, but not with the Russian electorate. Two factors played a major role here. First, they are confused by Navalny’s nationalist bias. Secondly, in the liberal movement there are too many generals and not enough soldiers - everyone aspires to be a leader and no one wants to be supported by a “rival”.

In fact, this is excellent news for Navalny himself. He will not have to really participate in the election race and will remain far behind Putin, Grudinin and even the veteran of the political front Zhirinovsky. You can sit on the sidelines, organize more and more street protests and behave as destructively as possible. Of course, if he really wanted changes in the Russian system of power, he could support a candidate who does not have a criminal record that would prevent him from participating in elections, for example, Boris Titov, Ksenia Sobchak or anyone else. But then everything would stop revolving exclusively around the figure of Alexei Navalny.

The fact is that the vast majority of Russians support Putin, and he will easily win the election. But personally, I would prefer that Navalny’s name be on the ballot, which would allow him to immediately put an end to him as a politician, instead of listening for another six years as the media unreasonably title him “the leader of the Russian opposition” and endlessly talk about his body movements. But again, I’m not Russian, and it’s not for me to vote in elections.

ALL PHOTOS

According to Ekaterina Shulman, Navalny’s statement is “activity - when you, having fewer resources than your counterparties, act in such a way that they respond to your actions, and not you to theirs.”

Dmitry Oreshkin agrees with this. In his opinion, Navalny’s statement rather strengthens the oppositionist’s position than weakens it: at the trial in the “Kirovles case” he is now a much more serious figure than before.

Gleb Pavlovsky notes that “this statement is an independent political move,” with which Navalny “secured his leadership in the political period, which begins this year and will continue until the presidential elections.”

However, experts estimate Navalny’s chances of winning modestly. Dmitry Oreshkin recalls that the oppositionist performed well in the 2013 elections in Moscow, but at the federal level he is “much less known: he is not on TV and, therefore, not in the head of the country.” “Even the part that goes on the Internet is also not very interested in politics and Navalny. I think if they don’t interfere with him too much, it will be difficult to get even 10%,” the expert believes.

Gleb Pavlovsky notes that, of course, the opposition can support Navalny, but “this will all be a struggle within the 1%.” “They will be important, perhaps, if the authorities remove Navalny from the elections. But even in this case, the authorities will not be able to deprive him of his dominant position unless he himself makes some mistakes,” says Pavlovsky.

He started third, but may be the first to retire

Before Navalny, the leader of the LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the founder of the Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky, announced their intention to participate in the presidential elections in 2018. Their rivals are expected to be the permanent Gennady Zyuganov and Sergei Mironov. President Vladimir Putin has not yet announced his intention to run in the elections.

The 2018 elections with Navalny could be very beneficial for the Kremlin. He can show the world that this election is legitimate. And Putin, who won over Navalny, (even in the unequal struggle of the resources involved) is a democratic president.

A source in the leadership of Yabloko told RBC that it makes sense to discuss Navalny’s presidential ambitions after the end of the trial in the “Kirovles case,” the outcome of which will determine whether he can run. “It seems to us that in this way (by announcing presidential ambitions) he is protecting himself from the court. So that after the verdict he can say that he did not become president of Russia because of the court verdict,” the source said.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta also writes that the last word on Navalny’s election prospects will remain with the Kirov court.

Political scientist Ekaterina Shulman believes that Navalny’s statement puts the entire process in the “Kirovles case” in a completely different political context. “Now everything that happens there will be a response to this statement (about the desire to participate in the presidential elections). And the whole process will come down to whether the political authorities sanction or not sanction his participation in the presidential elections,” notes Shulman.

Her opinion is shared by Dmitry Oreshkin. “If a potential presidential candidate is suppressed, then the reaction of both the international community and within the country will be different, including in his court case. This will mean that a potential participant in the presidential race is being judged,” explains the political scientist.

According to political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky, if the legal proceedings interfere with Navalny, then only slightly. “Navalny takes advantage of the moment, a pause in the activities of others, and this somewhat changes his position even among numerous court cases and lawsuits. I believe that from a legal point of view, all these judicial vicissitudes do not significantly hinder Navalny until there is a final verdict,” Pavlovsky said.

Navalny himself believes that the new trial of the case is an illegal attempt to prevent him from reaching the elections. If there is a new guilty verdict, it will put an end to Navalny’s presidential ambitions: the charges in the “Kirovles case” are classified as serious, and the person convicted of them will be deprived of the right to run for office for a long time.

In mid-November, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation vacated Alexei Navalny's criminal conviction, restoring his ability to stand for election. Navalny was convicted in 2013 on charges of embezzling funds from the state-owned Kirovles company. The opposition leader appealed to higher courts in Russia, and his case was also heard by the European Court of Human Rights, which concluded that Russia had violated his right to a fair trial.

But since the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation sent the case for a new trial to the same court for consideration in a new composition of the court, in early December the Kirov court began reviewing the case. The next meeting is scheduled for December 19

If Navalny is allowed to participate in the elections, his chances are still not great

Director of the Center for Political Technologies Igor Bunin believes that Navalny’s chances depend on how much the authorities want to see him in the presidential race. According to him, the Kremlin may try to prevent the oppositionist from participating in the elections if it sees a big risk in the nomination.

If Navalny does put forward his candidacy, he will gain no more than 10%, accumulating the votes of dissatisfied citizens, an RBC expert said.

Political scientist Abbas Gallyamov suggests that the opposition’s chances in the elections depend on protest sentiments. “In public opinion, Navalny firmly occupies the place of one of the two - along with Mikhail Khodorkovsky - enemies of Putin. If dissatisfaction with Putin grows, then Navalny will receive a significant part of the votes of the dissatisfied, especially in the capitals,” he explained.

Of the oppositionists, only Mikhail Khodorkovsky has supported Navalny so far. “We will provide the assistance that we are asked for; now it is too early to talk about specifics,” Timur Valeev, executive director of Open Russia, told RBC.

PARNAS will support Navalny, but the candidate’s program must be agreed upon with the party, Konstantin Merzlikin, a member of the party’s political council bureau, told RBC.

"Proactivity" and "reactivity"

The term “proactive”, which comes from psychology, has long become popular in management. It is used to denote a person who takes responsibility for himself and his life, and does not look for reasons in the events, circumstances and actions of surrounding people.

A proactive person, reacting to external causes and circumstances, forms his reaction to them, realizing his free independent will. That is, he independently and consciously chooses how to act in certain conditions.

The antonym of “proactive activity” is “reactive activity,” meaning actions dictated by external circumstances or stimulation. As a rule, reactive people do not have strong internal beliefs; they are easily disturbed from a state of stability.

Proactive people predominantly choose their own response to external influences, trying to minimize the impact of external factors that influence the achievement of their goals.

For example, if for some reason you do not become a presidential candidate in 2018 or do not win the election, a proactive person will say to himself: “Well, well... So, we will work further and better!” and with a smile wishes good luck to the winning opponent.

I watched the battle between Milov and Chichvarkin here. Chichvarkin butchered Milov like a nut. However, it’s no wonder: A. Navalny’s economic adviser (V. Milov) wrote an absolutely helpless program that does not withstand the least serious criticism.

But I tell myself: this is nonsense. What program can we talk about now, by God? This is not the main thing. The main thing is that if Navalny wins, he will dismantle Putin’s state system, defeat corruption, the tyranny of the security forces, and restore democracy...

I watched how the Navalnovskys and the Gudkovskys had a fight. Hmm... It’s a shame when ideologically close people cannot unite, put aside personal ambitions, and forgive each other for some minor offenses.

But I tell myself: this is nonsense! Well, we had a fight with Dima Gudkov, it doesn’t matter now. This is not the main thing now. The main thing is that if Navalny wins, he will dismantle Putin’s state system, defeat corruption, the tyranny of the security forces, and restore democracy...

And once he restores it, there will be real elections, in which we will choose the one we consider the most worthy. Then we will analyze programs, etc. All this later, not now. Now the main thing is to choose someone who will dismantle, restore, etc.

I have been watching Navalny debate for a long time. With Chubais, with Lebedev, with Girkin. Somehow it doesn’t matter how he succeeds. He mumbles, he swallows arguments, his charisma is lost somewhere... This worries me. He’s some kind of, how can I say this... Not an eagle?

But I tell myself: this is nonsense! What does it matter now? That's right: none! The main thing is that if Navalny wins, he will dismantle and restore. And we will all be happy...

There is no feedback from Navalny's team. They are boiled in their own juice. Even people who sincerely want to help them cannot reach them.

The only help they are willing to accept: money. Give money and keep quiet. Or stupid volunteering: here are leaflets for you - go and post them up. Or maybe I want to discuss what to write in these leaflets? No, this is without you. We ourselves. Who are you? Where - yourself? Unknown. How they make decisions is unknown. It is unclear who their advisers are. It is obvious, for example, that in the economy they are not boom-boom...

This is not a democratic candidate, but some kind of cult leader. A closed, hermetic sect of Navalny's witnesses. He communicates with us through revealing videos. Or monologues from the rostrum of a rally. And the flock must listen silently...

But I tell myself: this is nonsense! What does it matter now? None! The main thing is that if Navalny wins, he will dismantle and restore... Freedom will shine... Enemies will be defeated...

Where did you get the idea that it would shine? Ass?

And why is Yavlinsky bad then? Is he against democracy, or what? If the main thing is to be for democracy, and the rest is nonsense, then how is Navalny different from Yavlinsky? Both are sectarians and profess leaderism. Grisha, by the way, is at least a good economist. Better than Milov for sure...

These are the seditious thoughts that come to me. And not just me, by the way. And the saddest thing is that Navalny is not trying to dispel these thoughts. But, on the contrary, the further into the forest, the more reasons he gives to think so...

But I still tell myself: this is all nonsense! The main thing is that if Navalny wins, he will dismantle, restore, shine...

But how long will my enthusiasm last?

https://www.site/2016-12-13/glava_associacii_politkonsultantov_navalnomu_dadut_pouchastvovat_v_vyborah_no_vyigraet_putin

Who will lose the most from the 2018 presidential elections?

Head of the Association of Political Consultants: Navalny will be allowed to participate in the elections, but Putin will win

Alexei Navalny has announced his readiness to run for president in the 2018 elections. At the same time, a third of Russians' attitude towards Vladimir Putin has worsened, Levada Center reports. Why will Putin win even if Navalny is allowed to take part in the elections? Does Putin intend to reform the economy and what will he do with the nomenklatura, which is accustomed to “taking its own” and is unlikely to dream of change? Igor Mintusov, President of the Russian Association of Political Consultants, Vice-President of the European Association of Political Consultants, Head of the Department of Advertising, Public Relations and Design at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, shares his opinions.

I. Mintusov's Facebook page

“Vladimir Vladimirovich has adequate information about what is happening in the country”

Igor Evgenievich, latest news: Alexei Navalny has announced his intention to participate in the presidential elections. In November, the Supreme Court overturned Navalny’s sentence in the “Kirovles case” and sent the case for a new trial. What is this - naked jurisprudence or politics?

In my opinion, this is a political decision. It is due to the fact that government officials understand that the full legitimacy of the 2018 elections can be ensured when everyone can take part. If Navalny and his ilk are deprived of this opportunity, it will harm Russia's democratic picture. So the reversal of this sentence indirectly indicates that Navalny will most likely be given the opportunity to take part in the elections in 2018.

- What if the slogan “who but Navalny” arises?

Navalny is the most popular figure in the Russian opposition today. Whether someone else will appear in six months or a year, more popular than Navalny, I don’t know. But I would not say that he is the only politician who has a chance of being popular in the opposition niche. There are many more people who want to become president in Russia than Navalny alone.

RIA Novosti/Andrey Stenin

Igor Evgenievich, there is a rumor: the Kremlin was thinking about early presidential elections, but in connection with the election of Trump, it abandoned this idea. Does this seem true?

I don't think it looks the same. These rumors started circulating a few months ago when someone saw the upcoming 2017 budget and discovered that there was a line item for elections. It turned out to be prohibitively large compared to the elections that took place earlier. This is how rumors appeared that the economic basis for holding early presidential elections was being laid. From my point of view, there is no reason to hold elections early. I am confident that the elections will be held on time, in 2018. Unless, of course, there are some external force majeure circumstances.

On the one hand, according to sociological polls, 86% indeed again approve of “Putin’s cause,” and 64% want to see him as president after 2018. On the other hand, according to Levada Center measurements, a third of the population’s attitude towards Putin has worsened; the leader of the Zaldostanovites in the Sverdlovsk region can afford to recommend that Peskov, before criticizing Zaldostanov, return his family from abroad; in November, the largest rally in the last 4 years took place in Astrakhan due to the regional Duma’s intention to abolish social benefits. Question: how stable are these 86%, 64% for Putin?

Firstly, I trust these data, I believe that they are representative. Secondly, if Vladimir Putin runs for another presidential term in 2018, he will have electoral success; I have virtually no doubts about this. It is obvious that he will again become head of state.

As for the socio-economic situation, its deterioration can easily be converted into an electoral resource for the president. Here Russia has extensive historical experience. Roughly speaking, the worse, the better. You can always call on people to unite around the leader and say that the crisis can only be overcome thanks to him. Particular emphasis can be placed on the international situation: sanctions have been imposed against us, there is an economic crisis in the world, and so on.

RIA Novosti/Dmitry Astakhov

At the same time, it is important that the leader himself remains in reality. And it is this: the import substitution program has failed, no conditions have been created for increasing exports. Businesses prefer to keep income in banks or send it abroad. More than half of employers are planning staff cuts for the New Year. At the same time, 40 billion rubles are missing for the program to support the poor... And so on. What do you think: Does Putin reflect the real picture of what is happening in the country or is he in an illusory world created by his immediate circle?

I believe that Vladimir Vladimirovich has adequate information regarding what is happening in the country. Where he worked before, the principle of using independent sources of information applies. Therefore, there is no doubt that in his current work he follows the same professional skill.

On the other hand, Vladimir Putin is a politician, and not just an expert economist, like, for example, Aleksashenko or Inozemtsev, who do not hold public office and can talk about the state of the economy without regard to anything else. Putin, unlike them, cannot afford such luxury and, accordingly, makes public statements from the height of his position. I am sure that he has all sorts of reports on the state of the economy on his desk, including the implementation of the import substitution program. But he, as a politician and president, naturally cannot voice everything that is written there in public. This could harm Russia's strategic interests.

We hear some things from him. For example, that sanctions imposed by Western countries lead to a deterioration in the lives of Russian citizens. This is obvious, there is no need to hide it somehow. But we are unlikely to hear first-hand that the anti-sanctions introduced in response are also worsening the lives of Russians. It's like making soup: you can add a lot of pepper or salt and cause a certain reaction in the client, or you can add less, but more vegetables. Pensioners, for example, love meatless dishes. This is normal political art, this is how the speech of any sane and competent politician is structured.

RIA Novosti/Alexander Vilf

That is, in fact, everything in the economy is very alarming, but “Russia’s strategic interests” oblige us to tell only part of the truth mixed with speculation?

If you answer this florid question in one word, then “yes.”

“Some officials will behave modestly, and some will have to leave”

In this case, what signal did Putin give in his Address to the Federal Assembly, speaking about the need for tax reform aimed at “stimulating business activity, economic growth and investment, creating competitive conditions for our enterprises”, about expanding entrepreneurial freedom, about “fighting corruption is not a show? Are these just ritual figures of speech or are there some real intentions behind these statements? Alexey Kudrin says that 70% of the economy has been nationalized, which is too much for sustainable development. Will denationalization and demonopolization with all the hardware that entails really follow?

The problem is that when the leader of a country gives a speech, then with the last phrase the stage of interpretation begins on the part of the listeners. For example, a politician says: “We must fight corruption.” And then journalists ask experts: “Does he really think so and will act, or did a speechwriter just write it to him?” This question always leaves me perplexed. Will any action follow what Putin said? There are two options. First: actions will follow. Second: no action will follow. I would suggest that political scientists think about this topic so as not to take away their bread.

I can only say: it’s clear why the president made these theses. They reflect his intentions and his vision of the direction of development of the Russian economy. By the way, this is a completely liberal view in the current conditions. But whether these intentions and vision will be realized depends on many factors, including the atmosphere in the political class.

“Officials with their selfish interests have no chance and only one way - to adapt to new political realities. Otherwise, at best, they will be dismissed, at worst, they will be imprisoned. I am confident that this trend will intensify" RIA Novosti/Evgeniy Biyatov

True, Vladimir Vladimirovich can influence this atmosphere: let us remember the recent dismissal of four high-ranking security officials who decided to simultaneously begin their scientific career by being elected corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences. On the one hand, no one forbade them to do this. On the other hand, they made it clear that it was undesirable. But they interpreted for themselves that “it’s possible” and there will be no consequences. But it turned out that it was “impossible”. Therefore, officials who work with “top officials” must carefully look at the facial expressions of their leaders, monitor the position of their eyes and eyebrows, and pay attention to the timbre of their voice in order to correctly interpret the text.

In the last period, Putin made several “attacks” at once: this is what you said - he fired high-ranking officials who became academicians; in addition, he criticized the Roldugin Foundation for ineffective use of public funds; promised “administrative and personnel solutions” to governors who hinder the development of entrepreneurship. How to interpret this “text”? What do these actions mean in official language?

These are hints. You must understand that running a state is like running a Boeing: when you sit at the controls of an airplane and turn it, the machine itself will turn only after many tens of kilometers, and not like, for example, a car - sharply. This is the whole problem for politicians. The politician turns the steering wheel, and then it’s up to the transmission mechanism, the role of which in this case is played by the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is inert, clumsy, riddled with its own interests, and from time to time the leader must give it a shake-up. And Vladimir Vladimirovich gives signals to the bureaucracy that, in addition to their interests, there are also the interests of the state. He makes it clear to officials: pursue your interests in your free time from work. If your interests are more important to you than state affairs, then please make room.

RIA Novosti/Alexey Filippov

In this case, how do you characterize the state of the nomenclature - federal, regional? On the one hand, she wants to continue to receive hundred-million-dollar “bonuses”, like the director of Russian Post Strashnov, that is, for her, apparently, it is desirable “for everything to be as before, as always.” At the same time, she is made a “scapegoat” when no one is guaranteed from responsibility. The conflict between the desired and the essential is obvious. How will the nomenclature behave? Will he give in and accept the rules of the game? Will he run away? Will he resist and set conditions?

On these issues, Vladimir Putin has a strong position because it is supported by public opinion. Therefore, if we are not talking about hardware fuss, not about the struggle of clans, but about broader social changes, then it is clear that officials with their selfish interests have no chance in this situation. They have only one way - to adapt to new political realities. Otherwise, at best, they will be dismissed, at worst, they will be imprisoned. I am sure that this trend will intensify, and society will be guaranteed to support it. And this will inevitably lead to the fact that some officials will behave modestly and will not violate certain rules. And some will have to leave, but this will contribute to the renewal and rejuvenation of personnel, which is also good for our political system.

Is it advisable to intensify this trend shortly before the presidential elections? As you said, there is no doubt that Putin will win. And yet, victory in the regions is ensured, among other things, by that same nomenklatura.

This is a key election issue. Especially in the new political realities. It's about the following. On the one hand, the ruling party won an unexpectedly landslide victory in the elections. On the other hand, the countdown of months until the day of the 2018 presidential elections has begun. On the one hand, mayors or governors faithfully look into the eyes of the president and the federal government in general and by all means, including illegal ones, achieve the desired election results. On the other hand, they demand certain preferences for their loyalty. It's always a dilemma. And there is no general answer to what to do.

RIA Novosti/Dmitry Astakhov

We know the President is taking some steps to address this dilemma. On the one hand, it is necessary to legitimize the election results so that society accepts them as honest and fair, on the other hand, not to heavily punish thieving officials who violate the election law in order to ensure the passage of this or that party and this or that politician. You know that after 2011, the electoral legislation changed towards liberalization, a new head of the Central Election Commission with a good public reputation, Ella Panfilova, was appointed. These steps are also clearly towards the liberal part of society, and they reduce the dependence of elections on administrative resources. I would compare this problem to the problem of a politician carrying jelly in his hands from point A to point B. This is a difficult task, but the president does not shy away from it.

“A critical mass has not yet accumulated for the introduction of state ideology”

Igor Evgenievich, they are also talking about a plan for constitutional reform, so that if something happens, Putin would remain in real power at the head of a certain State Council, and the president would become a nominal political figure. Are such ideas really floating around in the Kremlin offices?

But this is no longer a rumor. This idea actually has a basis in reality. But this topic will enter the active phase of discussion no earlier than 2020-22. Definitely not this year or next year. Since Putin has a good chance of being re-elected in 2018, there is no reason yet to push this idea into reality.

But some time ago, Ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova considered it appropriate to discuss the abolition of the constitutional ban on state ideology. It seems that the public is being conditioned to the idea that the Constitution can and should be rewritten.

Instead of “accustoming to thought,” I would use the word “testing” here. The fact that a respected politician voiced this thesis suggests that such an idea is being discussed in a certain group of the political spectrum. And this idea is being followed by certain interested parties. Another thing is how wide this circle is and whether it has the critical mass to make an appropriate decision. In my opinion, such a mass has not accumulated yet. But the fact that this is being discussed at the top is a fact. And it indicates that such a scenario is being considered by a number of political actors. This idea is sweet and close to them; they would like to legally consolidate the national idea that hovers somewhere in the atmosphere, in minds and moods.

“The main disadvantage in the law on the Russian nation is a certain legitimization of nationalism with all the ensuing consequences” RIA Novosti

- Is the national idea a necessary thing?

In a sense, the national idea is a relevant topic for any state, and every state is trying to resolve this issue. Each full-fledged state in one form or another has its own national idea. The national idea is the desire to have some kind of political identity, to understand who we are in this world, what unites us and who our enemy is. In particular, the same USA decided it 200 years ago, when a constitution was created in which democracy and freedom were proclaimed as the moral and ideological drive of the entire political class of America. Russia today is also trying to solve this problem.

After the collapse of the USSR, which was the flagship of the fight against capitalism, the place of the national idea in Russia was empty. And many believe that there must be something there. And they want not only to fill this space with some kind of ideology, but also to provide a legal basis for it. I remember how back in 1996, after his victory in the presidential elections, Boris Yeltsin instructed his staff of assistants to work on the issue of the national idea. This work was coordinated by Georgy Satarov, it lasted about a year. As a result, no political decisions were made on this issue. But the theme itself remains.

Naturally, it worries Vladimir Putin and his team. Here I would just note that in connection with this issue one can observe an increasing discrepancy between the letter of the Constitution and the spirit of the current political situation, which rises like steam over a river in winter and envelops the political class of Russia.

RIA Novosti/Vladimir Astapkovich

In this sense, the message that Putin approved the idea of ​​​​adopting a law on the Russian nation was significant. Probably the law will describe who we are, what we are uniting for and against before we get to the Constitution?

Your question tears me in two. On the one hand, I am trying to maintain the face of an expert who wants to objectively weigh the situation. On the other hand, I have certain convictions as a citizen of Russia. But let me answer as an expert on this issue. It must be admitted that there is an ideological demand for this law in society. If there was a vote on this topic, then at least about 20-30% of the country would support it. But there are other 80-70% who would hardly support him. And your humble servant belongs to these percentages. I see much more disadvantages here than advantages. The main disadvantage is a certain legitimization of nationalism with all the ensuing consequences.

By the way, in general I support the president’s policy on the national issue. It is balanced; the president manages to walk somewhere in the middle without going to extremes. I hope that ultimately, when adopted, the law will be the same.