The Afghan War is a military conflict on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). A limited contingent of Soviet troops took part in this conflict. The conflict took place between the Afghan government forces and the armed forces of the Afghan Mujahideen, which were supported by NATO, and primarily the United States, which actively armed the enemies of the Afghan regime.
Background to the Afghan War
The war itself, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, is defined in historiography by the presence of a limited contingent of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of Afghanistan. But the beginning of the entire conflict must be considered 1973, when King Zahir Shah was overthrown in Afghanistan. Power passed to the regime of Muhammad Daoud, and in 1978 the Saur (April) Revolution took place, and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, became the new government. Afghanistan began to build socialism, but all construction took place in an extremely unstable internal situation.
The leader of the PDPA was Nur Mohammad Taraki. His reforms were extremely unpopular in a country where traditionally the majority were rural residents. Any dissent was brutally suppressed. During his reign, he arrested thousands of people, some of whom were executed.
The main opponents of the socialist government were radical Islamists, who declared a holy war (jihad) against it. Mujahideen detachments were organized, which later became the main opposing force - and the Soviet army fought against it.
The majority of the Afghan population was illiterate, and it was easy for Islamist agitators to turn the population against the new government.
Beginning of the war
Immediately after coming to power, the government was faced with the outbreak of armed uprisings organized by Islamists. The Afghan leadership was unable to cope with the situation and turned to Moscow for help.
The issue of assistance to Afghanistan was considered in the Kremlin on March 19, 1979. Leonid Brezhnev and other members of the Politburo opposed armed intervention. But over time, the situation at the borders of the USSR worsened, and opinion changed radically.
On December 12, 1979, a resolution was adopted by the CPSU Central Committee on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Formally, the reason was repeated requests from the Afghan leadership, but in fact these actions were supposed to prevent threats of foreign military intervention.
It must be remembered that, in addition to tense relations with the Mujahideen, there was no unity in the government itself. The internal party struggle, which reached its climax in September 1979, became particularly irreconcilable. It was then that the leader of the PDPA, Nur Mohammad Taraki, was arrested and killed by Hafizullah Amin. Amin took Taraki's place and, while continuing to fight against the Islamists, intensified repression within the ruling party.
According to Soviet intelligence, Amin tried to come to an agreement with Pakistan and China, which our experts considered unacceptable. On December 27, 1979, a detachment of Soviet special forces captured the presidential palace, Amin and his sons were killed. Babrak Karmal became the new leader of the country.
Progress of the war
As a result, our soldiers found themselves drawn into the outbreak of a civil war and became its active participants.
The entire war can be divided into several stages:
1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980. Introduction of the 40th Soviet Army of General Boris Gromov into Afghanistan, placement in garrisons, organization of security of strategic objects and locations.
2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active large-scale combat operations. Reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. Reduction of active hostilities and transition to supporting the actions of Afghan government troops. Assistance was provided by aviation and sapper units. Organization of counteraction to the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Six regiments were withdrawn to their homeland.
4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Assisting the Afghan leadership in pursuing a policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for military operations carried out by government forces. Preparations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
In April 1988, an agreement was signed in Switzerland between Afghanistan and Pakistan to resolve the situation around the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its troops within nine months, and the United States and Pakistan were to stop supporting the mujahideen. In April 1988, in accordance with the agreement, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan.
Losses in the Afghan War
At the moment, it is known that the losses of the Soviet army amounted to 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people (dead and missing). There were 53 thousand people wounded and shell-shocked during the fighting.
The exact data on Afghans killed in the war is unknown. According to various sources, these losses could range from 1 to 2 million people. From 850 thousand to one and a half million people became refugees and settled mainly in Pakistan and Iran.
After the end of the war
The Mujahideen did not take part in the Geneva negotiations and did not support these decisions. As a result, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, hostilities did not stop, but even intensified.
The new leader of Afghanistan, Najibullah, could barely hold back the onslaught of the Mujahideen without Soviet help. There was a split in his government, many of his associates joined the ranks of the opposition. In March 1992, General Dostum and his Uzbek militia abandoned Najibullah. In April, the Mujahideen captured Kabul. Najibullah hid for a long time in the UN mission building, but was captured by the Taliban and hanged.
The United States of America provided great assistance in supporting the counter-revolution in Afghanistan. They were the initiators and organizers of many international protests against the Soviet Union.
Back in 1980, an Islamic conference was organized, at which 34 foreign ministers demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. At the instigation of the United States, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution protesting against Soviet intervention. American President D. Carter advocated a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
The United States and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf organized unprecedented assistance to Afghan militants. With their money, Mujahideen were trained in Pakistan and China. Actively participated in operations against Soviet CIA forces.
Throughout the entire period of hostilities, the United States supplied the Mujahideen with a variety of modern weapons (recoilless rifles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and others).
Goals:
- to find out the causes, course and results of the war in Afghanistan, showing the role of Soviet internationalist soldiers in this military event;
- draw attention to the consequences of the war for the USSR, emphasizing the heroism of our internationalist soldiers;
- to instill in students a sense of love for the Fatherland, loyalty to duty, and patriotism;
- promote the development of students’ skills in obtaining information from various sources, analyzing a historical source, systematizing information, and drawing conclusions.
Preparation for the lesson:
1. The student is given the advanced task “April Revolution in Afghanistan.”
2. If possible, you can use fragments of the feature film “The Ninth Company”, directed by F.S. Bondarchuk, 2005.
3. Handouts.
4. If possible, it is advisable to invite a participant in the war.
5. Map.
DURING THE CLASSES
Motivational talk:
On March 2, 2011, Russian President D.A. Medvedev signed a decree awarding M.S. Gorbachev the highest award of the Russian Federation, the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called Apostle. Historians assess the activities of the first president of the USSR differently, but one cannot deny the fact that under him our country emerged from the debilitating Afghan war. Today in class we will learn more about this event and try to answer the problematic question: “What are the consequences of the USSR’s participation in the Afghan war?”
Information block:
1. Student message: April Revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan On April 27 in Afghanistan, under the leadership of a group of officers, a top military coup was carried out, supported by the army and part of the petty bourgeoisie. The country's president, M. Daoud, was killed. Power passed into the hands of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (created in 1965). It was announced to the whole world that a socialist revolution had occurred. In terms of economic development, Afghanistan was in 108th place among 129 developing countries of the world, at the stage of feudalism with deep vestiges of tribal foundations and a communal-patriarchal way of life. The leaders of the revolution were N. Taraki and H. Amin.
2. Reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan
Teacher: On September 15, PDPA leader N.M. Taraki was removed from power. On October 8, on the orders of Amin, he was killed. Opposition protests began in Afghanistan. December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Brezhnev L.I., Suslov M.A., V.V. Grishin, A.P. Kirilenko, A.Ya. Pelshe, D.F. Ustinov, K.U. Chernenko , Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, N.A. Tikhonov, B.N. Ponomarenko) single-handedly made the decision: to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. A.N. Kosygin was not present at the meeting, whose position was negative.
On December 25 at 15:00 the entry of Soviet troops began. The first dead appeared two hours later. On December 27, the storming of Amin’s palace began with special forces from the “Muslim battalion”, KGB groups “Grom”, “Zenith” and its physical elimination.
Next, the teacher invites students to get acquainted with an excerpt from the work of the famous orientalist A.E. Snesarev. “Afghanistan” and try to answer the question: What are the reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan?
“Afghanistan itself has no value. It is a mountainous country, devoid of roads, lacking technical amenities, with a scattered, precarious population; And this population, moreover, is also freedom-loving, proud, and values its independence. The latter circumstance leads to the fact that even if this country can be captured, it is very difficult to keep it in your hands. Establishing an administration and establishing order will require so many resources that the country will never return these expenses; she has nothing to return from.
Therefore we must speak with all sincerity. that in the history of the hundred-year struggle between England and Russia, Afghanistan itself did not play any role, and its value was always indirect and conditional. If you think about the essence of its political value, then it mainly comes down to the fact that Afghanistan includes operational routes to India, and there is no other. This is confirmed by thousands of years of history and the conquerors of India, who always came through Afghanistan.”
“Taking into account the military-political situation in the Middle East, the latest appeal from the Afghan government was considered positively. A decision was made to introduce some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions on the part of neighboring states.”
After the discussion, a note is made in the notebook.
Reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
1) Instability in Afghanistan, which was considered a zone of Soviet influence.
2) The threat of loss of stability in the Central Asian regions of the USSR due to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
3) The desire to maintain the course taken by the Afghan regime towards building socialism.
4) Prevent American influence in Afghanistan.
5) The leaders of the USSR wanted to test the effectiveness of military equipment and the level of training of troops in a real, but local war.
3. Progress of hostilities
Students get acquainted with the stages of the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (the printed text is on the students’ desks)
First: December 1979-February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of security of deployment points.
Second: March 1980-April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, as, for example, in the province of Kunar in March 1983. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
Third: April 1985-January 1987. The transition from active operations primarily to supporting Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. The use of motorized rifle, airborne and tank units mainly as reserves and to increase the morale and combat stability of the Afghan troops. Special forces units continued to fight to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
Fourth: January 1987 – February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national example. Active activities to strengthen the position of the Afghan leadership, providing assistance in the formation of the armed forces of the DRA. Preparation of Soviet troops for withdrawal and their complete withdrawal.
Conversation with students
– What stages stand out in the Afghan war?
– What methods did the Soviet troops use?
Students briefly record the stages of the war.
Teacher: Everyone who fulfilled their international military duty with dignity and honor has earned national respect.
Students watch an excerpt from the film “The Ninth Company” or listen to the memories of a participant in those events.
The student reads K. Savelyev’s poem “And the world is not very fair...”
And the world is not very fair:
people come home
one brings checks from the war.
the other is jaundice or typhus.
And the third in stuffy silence
squeaks with prosthetic straps
and anger rolls in its nodules. when he hears about the war...
Taking train stations into circulation.
breathing army fuel industry,
The people are not old, coming back from the war.
not very affectionate people.
...I remember the fury of shame,
when the shiny warehouse manager
sitting on a suitcase next to him,
He whispered to me: “If only I could go there...”
And motorized riflemen walked by
in sun-burnt Panama hats -
fried veterans
walked into a world broken into pieces.
We went into a world tired of tirades.
not believing other people's crying,
no longer remembering what they mean
soldier chest patches...
Accustomed to hard work,
people come home
some only bring checks,
others - conscience and trouble.
In the twenty-year spring
the conscience came - a boy and a Skoda,
grown a little in two years...
Yes, aged during the war.
4. Results of the war
Teacher:“What are the results of the Afghan war?”
During the conversation and reading the text of the textbook on pp. 392-393 (Zagladin N.V., Kozlenko S.I.
History of Russia XX - early XXI centuries) students make notes in notebooks.
– political defeat of the USSR
– withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
– OKSV did not defeat the armed opposition of the Mujahideen
- The civil war in Afghanistan has resumed.
5. Mistakes of Soviet troops in Afghanistan(discussion with students)
– discrepancy between the existing organizational structure of combined arms formations and the conditions of the theater of military operations. The military formations were too cumbersome.
– an attempt to resolve the conflict with “small forces”, insufficient number of troops.
- Soviet troops were unable to cut off supplies to the rebels from abroad.
– underestimation of the opposing side (at the initial stage)
– insufficient effective use of the latest weapons, especially high-precision ones
6. Consequences of the Afghan War
Students review loss data and draw conclusions.
The losses of the limited contingent of Soviet troops were:
total - 138,333 people, of which 1979 were officers,
combat losses - 11381 people,
Sanitary losses amounted to 53,753 people,
Of these, 38,614 were returned. 6,669 people became disabled.
417 people went missing or were captured, of which 130 people returned as of January 1, 1999.
Losses of equipment and weapons:
tanks – 147
BTR, BMP, BRDM – 1314
guns and mortars - 233, mammoth aircraft - 114, helicopters - 322.
Students write down the following:
Consequences of the Afghan War for the USSR:
– great loss of life
– large material losses
– decline in the prestige of the Soviet armed forces
– the fall of the authority of the USSR in the Muslim world
– decline in the international authority of the USSR
– strengthening the US position
Final control
1. The Afghan war has begun
2. One of the reasons for the Afghan War was:
1) maintain a bridgehead beneficial for the USSR and prevent US influence in Afghanistan
2) raise the international authority of the USSR
3) fulfill the allied duty to the countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization
3. The leaders of the Afghan revolution were:
1) M. Gaddafi
2) A. Sadat
3) N. Taraki
4. The Afghan war led to:
1) new aggravation of international tension
2) allied relations with Muslim countries
3) reduction of strategic weapons
Reflection
1. How I learned the training material
a) very good, I remembered and understood everything
b) good, but need to be repeated
c) I didn’t understand the main questions of the topic well
2. How I worked in class
a) very active
b) actively
c) preferred not to raise his hand
Homework.§41 pp. 392-393. Write an answer to the question. Do you agree with the opinion of some historians that the Afghan War became “Soviet Vietnam” for our country?
Literature.
- N.V. Zagladin, S.I. Kozlenko. S.T.Minakov, Yu.A.Petrov History of Russia of the XX-XXI centuries. “Russian Word”, M., 2011.
- V. Andreev. Unexpected war. Voronezh, 2004.
- You are in my memory and in my heart, Afghanistan. Materials of the military-practical conference dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Voronezh, 2004.
- Encyclopedia for children Avanta. History of Russia, volume 3. Astrel Publishing House 2007.
The last Soviet decade was marked by the Afghan War (1979-1989). The course of the war, in short, today is not known to every resident of Russia and other countries. In the 90s, due to rapid reforms and economic crises, the Afghan campaign was almost crowded out of public consciousness. But today, when a lot of work has been done by historians and researchers, all ideological clichés have disappeared, and a good opportunity has arisen to take an impartial look at the events of those years.
Prerequisites
In Russia and throughout the post-Soviet space, the Afghan War, briefly speaking, is associated with a ten-year period (1979-1989) when the armed forces of the USSR were present in this country. In fact, this was only one part of a long civil conflict. The prerequisites for its emergence appeared in 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. The short-lived regime of Muhammad Daoud came to power. It ceased to exist in 1978, when the Saur (April) revolution took place. After her, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) began to rule the country, which proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
The organization was Marxist, which made it similar to the Soviet Union. Leftist ideology has become dominant in Afghanistan. Just like in the USSR, they began to build socialism there. However, by 1978 the country already existed in conditions of ongoing chaos. Two revolutions, a civil war - all this destroyed stability in the region.
The socialist government was opposed by various forces, but primarily by radical Islamists. They considered members of the PDPA to be enemies of the entire Afghan people and Islam. In essence, (jihad) was declared against the new political regime. Mujahideen detachments were created to fight the infidels. It was with them that the Soviet army fought, for which the Afghan War soon began. Briefly, the success of the Mujahideen can be explained by their skillful propaganda work in the country. For Islamist agitators, the task was made easier by the fact that the vast majority of the Afghan population (about 90%) was illiterate. In the state outside the big cities, tribal orders reigned with extremely patriarchal views of the world. Religion certainly played a significant role in such a society. These were the reasons for the Afghan War. They were briefly described in official Soviet newspapers as providing international assistance to the friendly people of a neighboring country.
No sooner had the PDPA come to power in Kabul than Islamist-fuelled attacks began in the rest of the country’s provinces. The Afghan leadership began to lose control of the situation. Under these conditions, in March 1979, it first turned to Moscow for help. Subsequently, such messages were repeated several more times. There was nowhere else to wait for help from the Marxist party, surrounded by nationalists and Islamists.
For the first time, the issue of providing assistance to Kabul “comrades” was considered in the Kremlin on March 19, 1979. Then Brezhnev spoke out against armed intervention. However, time passed, and the situation at the borders of the USSR became worse. Gradually, members of the Politburo and other senior government officials changed their minds. For example, the Minister of Defense believed that the Afghan war, in short, could cause danger to Soviet borders.
In September 1979, another coup took place in Afghanistan. This time the leadership in the ruling PDPA party has changed. He became the head of the party and state. Through the KGB, the Soviet Politburo began to receive reports that he was a CIA agent. These reports further influenced the Kremlin to intervene militarily. At the same time, preparations began for the overthrow of Amin. At the suggestion of Yuri Andropov, it was decided to replace Babrak Karmal, who was loyal to the Soviet Union, in his place. This member of the PDPA was at first an important person in the Revolutionary Council. During party purges, he was first sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and then declared a traitor and conspirator. Karmal, who was in exile at that moment, remained abroad. At the same time, he moved to the USSR, becoming a figure on whom the Soviet leadership put their bets.
Making a decision to send troops
On December 12, 1979, it became finally clear that the USSR would begin its own Afghan war. After briefly discussing the latest reservations in the documents, the Kremlin approved the operation to overthrow Amin.
Of course, hardly anyone in Moscow then realized how long this military campaign would drag on. But from the very beginning, the decision to send troops had its opponents. Firstly, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov did not want this. Secondly, he did not support the decision of the Politburo. This position of his became an additional and decisive reason for the final break with Leonid Brezhnev and his supporters.
Direct preparations for the transfer of the Soviet army to Afghanistan began the next day, December 13. The Soviet special services tried to organize an assassination attempt on Hafizzulu Amin, but the first pancake came out lumpy. The operation hung in the balance. Nevertheless, preparations continued.
Storming of Amin's Palace
The deployment of troops began on December 25. Two days later, Amin, while in his palace, felt ill and lost consciousness. The same thing happened to some of his close associates. The reason for this was poisoning, which was organized by Soviet agents who worked as cooks at the residence. Amin was given medical assistance, but the guards sensed something was wrong.
At seven o'clock in the evening, not far from the palace, a Soviet sabotage group stalled in its car, which stopped near the hatch that led to the distribution center of all Kabul communications. The mine was safely lowered there, and a few minutes later there was an explosion. Kabul was left without electricity.
Thus began the Afghan War (1979-1989). Briefly assessing the situation, the commander of the operation, Colonel Boyarintsev, ordered the assault on Amin’s palace. The Afghan leader himself, having learned about the attack by unknown military personnel, demanded that his entourage ask for help from the Soviet Union (formally, the authorities of the two countries continued to remain friendly to each other). When Amin was informed that USSR special forces were at his gate, he did not believe it. It is not known exactly under what circumstances the head of the PDPA died. Most eyewitnesses later claimed that Amin committed suicide even before Soviet soldiers appeared in his apartment.
One way or another, the operation was successfully carried out. Not only the palace was captured, but the whole of Kabul. On the night of December 28, Karmal arrived in the capital and was declared head of state. The USSR forces lost 20 people (among them were paratroopers and special forces). The commander of the assault, Grigory Boyarintsev, also died. In 1980, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Chronology of the conflict
According to the nature of the fighting and strategic objectives, a brief history of the Afghan War (1979-1989) can be divided into four periods. In the winter of 1979-1980. Soviet troops entered the country. Military personnel were sent to garrisons and important infrastructure facilities.
The second period (1980-1985) was the most active. The fighting took place throughout the country. They were offensive in nature. The Mujahideen were destroyed and the army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was improved.
The third period (1985-1987) is characterized by Soviet aviation and artillery operations. Activities using ground troops were carried out less and less, until they finally came to naught.
The fourth period (1987-1989) was the last. Soviet troops were preparing to withdraw. At the same time, the civil war in the country continued. The Islamists were never completely defeated. The withdrawal of troops was caused by the economic crisis in the USSR and a change in political course.
Continuation of the war
When the Soviet Union first sent its troops into Afghanistan, the country's leadership argued its decision by saying that it was only providing assistance, in accordance with numerous requests from the Afghan government. Following fresh developments, the UN Security Council was convened at the end of 1979. An anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States was presented at it. The document was not supported.
The American side, although it did not actually take part in the conflict, actively financed the Mujahideen. The Islamists had weapons purchased from the West. Thus, in fact, the cold confrontation between the two political systems received a new front, which became the Afghan war. The progress of the war was briefly covered in all world media.
The CIA organized several training and educational camps in neighboring Pakistan, in which Afghan Mujahideen (dushmans) were trained. The Islamists, in addition to American funding, received money from the drug trade. In the 80s, this country became the world leader in the production of heroin and opium. Often the goal of Soviet operations was precisely the destruction of these industries.
The causes of the Afghan War (1979-1989), in short, sent a huge mass of the population into confrontation, who had never before held a weapon in their hands. Recruitment into the ranks of dushmans was led by a wide network of agents throughout the country. The advantage of the Mujahideen was that they did not have a specific center. Throughout the armed conflict it was a collection of numerous heterogeneous groups. They were controlled by field commanders, but there was no “leader” among them.
The low effectiveness of guerrilla operations was fully demonstrated by the Afghan War (1979-1989). Brief summaries of many Soviet offensives were mentioned in the media. Many raids were nullified by the enemy’s effective propaganda work among the local population. For the Afghan majority (especially in deep provinces with a patriarchal structure), Soviet military personnel have always been occupiers. The common people did not feel any sympathy for the socialist ideology.
"Politics of National Reconciliation"
In 1987, the implementation of the “policy of national reconciliation” began. At its plenum, the PDPA renounced its monopoly on power. A law appeared that allowed opponents of the government to create their own parties. The country has a new Constitution and a new president, Mohammed Najibullah. All these measures were taken to end the war through compromise and concessions.
At the same time, the Soviet leadership, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, set a course to reduce its own weapons, which meant the withdrawal of troops from the neighboring country. The Afghan war (1979-1989), in short, could not be waged in the conditions of the economic crisis that began in the USSR. In addition, the Cold War was already on its last legs. The USSR and the USA began to agree among themselves by signing numerous documents on disarmament and ending the escalation of the conflict between the two political systems.
Mikhail Gorbachev first announced the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops in December 1987, while on an official visit to the United States. Soon after this, the Soviet, American and Afghan delegations sat down at the negotiating table in Geneva, Switzerland. On April 14, 1988, following the results of their work, program documents were signed. Thus the history of the Afghan War came to an end. Briefly, we can say that according to the Geneva agreements, the Soviet leadership promised to withdraw its troops, and the American leadership promised to stop funding opponents of the PDPA.
Half of the USSR military contingent left the country in August 1988. In the summer, important garrisons were left in Kandahar, Gradez, Faizabad, Kundduz and other cities and settlements. The last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan on February 15, 1989 was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. The whole world saw footage of how the military crossed and crossed the Friendship Bridge across the border river Amu Darya.
Losses
Many events of the Soviet years were subject to a one-sided communist assessment. Among them was the history of the Afghan war. Dry reports briefly appeared in newspapers, and television talked about the continued successes of internationalist soldiers. However, until the start of Perestroika and the announcement of the policy of glasnost, the USSR authorities tried to keep silent about the true scale of their irretrievable losses. Zinc coffins containing conscripts and privates returned to the Soviet Union semi-secretly. The soldiers were buried without publicity, and for a long time there was no mention of the place and cause of death on the monuments. A stable image of “cargo 200” appeared among the people.
Only in 1989, the Pravda newspaper published real data on losses - 13,835 people. By the end of the 20th century, this figure reached 15 thousand, since many military personnel died in their homeland for several years due to injuries and illnesses. These were the real consequences of the Afghan war. Briefly mentioning her losses only further intensified her conflict with society. By the end of the 80s, the demand to withdraw troops from the neighboring country became one of the main slogans of Perestroika. Even earlier (under Brezhnev) dissidents advocated this. For example, in 1980, the famous academician Andrei Sakharov was sent into exile in Gorky for his criticism of the “solution to the Afghan issue.”
Results
What are the results of the Afghan war? In short, Soviet intervention extended the life of the PDPA exactly for the period for which USSR troops remained in the country. After their withdrawal, the regime suffered agony. Mujahideen groups quickly regained their own control over Afghanistan. Islamists even appeared at the borders of the USSR. Soviet border guards had to endure enemy shelling after the troops left the country.
The status quo was broken. In April 1992, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was finally liquidated by Islamists. Complete chaos began in the country. It was divided by numerous factions. The war of all against all continued there until the invasion of NATO troops at the beginning of the 21st century. In the 90s, the Taliban movement appeared in the country, which became one of the leading forces of modern world terrorism.
In the mass post-Soviet consciousness, the Afghan war became one of the most important symbols of the 80s. Briefly for school, today they talk about it in history textbooks for grades 9 and 11. Numerous works of art are dedicated to the war - songs, films, books. Assessments of its results vary, although at the end of the USSR the majority of the population, according to sociological surveys, were in favor of withdrawing troops and ending the senseless war.
The fighting of the Mujahideen against Soviet soldiers was particularly brutal. For example, the authors of the book “Battles that Changed the Course of History: 1945-2004” make the following calculations. Since opponents considered the Russians to be “interventionists and occupiers,” when counting those killed, about 5 thousand per year—13 people died per day in the Afghan war. There were 180 military camps in Afghanistan, 788 battalion commanders took part in military operations. On average, one commander served in Afghanistan for 2 years, therefore, in less than 10 years, the number of commanders changed 5 times. If you divide the number of battalion commanders by 5, you get 157 combat battalions in 180 military camps.
1 battalion – no less than 500 people. If we multiply the number of towns by the number of one battalion, we get 78,500 thousand people. Troops fighting the enemy need a rear. The auxiliary units include those who transport ammunition, replenish provisions, guard roads, military camps, treat the wounded, and so on. The ratio is approximately three to one, meaning another 235,500 thousand people were in Afghanistan per year. Adding the two numbers, we get 314,000 people.
According to this calculation by the authors of “Battles that Changed the Course of History: 1945-2004”, over 9 years and 64 days, a total of at least 3 million people took part in military operations in Afghanistan! Which seems like absolute fantasy. Approximately 800 thousand participated in active hostilities. The losses of the USSR were at least 460,000 people, of which 50,000 were killed, 180,000 were wounded, 100,000 were blown up by mines, about 1,000 people are listed as missing, more than 200,000 people were infected with serious diseases (jaundice, typhoid fever). These numbers show that the data in the newspapers is underestimated by a factor of 10.
It must be admitted that both the official data on losses and the figures given by individual researchers (probably biased) are unlikely to correspond to reality.
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 dramatically changed the course of world history. About 15,000 Soviet soldiers died fighting the Afghan mujahideen, and the Soviet economy suffered huge losses. In fact, this invasion was the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union. But who lured the “red bear” into the Afghan trap? There are many different versions about this. The most common one is that the USSR was lured to Afghanistan by the insidious Americans. Former CIA Director Robert Gates wrote directly to
in his memoirs that American intelligence services began helping the Islamic Mujahideen in Afghanistan long before the entry of Soviet troops there.
The national security adviser to then US President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, claimed that the CIA allegedly carried out a secret operation to “lure the Russians into an Afghan trap and ... ensure the USSR had its own Vietnam War.”
Having provoked the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the Americans and their NATO allies began to supply the Mujahideen with the most modern weapons, including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Actively using them, Afghan rebels paralyzed the actions of Soviet aviation, and then blocked army garrisons at their bases. A classic situation developed in which neither side could inflict a decisive military defeat on the other.
Thus, the USSR had to wage a difficult war for almost ten years, which entailed the demoralization of the army, the collapse of the economy and, ultimately, the collapse of the USSR. Reasoning logically, it should be admitted that the special operation “Vietnam for the Soviets” could indeed have been staged by the Americans. However, the United States could not
they say, drag the USSR into Afghanistan by the collar. This required appropriate actions on the part of the Soviet leadership. And, as is known, at that time it was distinguished by excessive caution and conservatism.
The “Kremlin elders” led by Brezhnev categorically refused to carry out even the most modest reforms. And suddenly - the invasion of Afghanistan!
Many modern political scientists believe that this could only happen in one case - in the top leadership of the USSR there were people for whom the military invasion was very beneficial. And here the figure of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yuri Andropov comes to the fore. Already in the summer of 1978, Andropov’s subordinates sounded the alarm - the enemy was at the gates. Through the KGB, the Politburo constantly received alarming information about far-reaching US military plans for the use of “territories immediately adjacent to our southern border.”
Soviet intelligence reports stated that the US goal was undivided dominance in Afghanistan, which in turn would lead to the installation of American missiles
short and medium range on Afghan territory, in close proximity to the borders of the USSR. These missiles could easily destroy many important military installations, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome and the Balkhash training ground.
In addition, the Kabul station of the KGB constantly discredited the then leader of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin. It was noted that he is closely connected with the Americans, Pakistanis and Chinese, receives expensive gifts from them, and has bank accounts in Tokyo and Hong Kong. The flow of negative information eventually influenced Brezhnev, and he agreed to send a “limited contingent” of Soviet troops to Afghanistan.
On December 27, 1979, the KGB Alpha special forces produced . After which units of the Vitebsk Airborne Division, blocking parts of the Kabul garrison, captured key objects.
Instead of the odious dictator Amin, Babrak Karmel, “our man in Kabul,” hastily brought from Moscow, was placed in the chair of the country’s leader. Then, within two weeks, motorized rifle units took control of virtually the entire territory of Afghanistan. In general, the operation went brilliantly.
After the first successful and peaceful months in Afghanistan, bloody battles began, which involved virtually the entire hundred-thousand-strong Soviet army group. The Islamic Mujahideen, armed with modern Western weapons, began a guerrilla war. The losses of personnel of the Soviet army began to amount to hundreds and thousands of military personnel.
It became clear to anyone, even a non-military person, that troops had to be urgently withdrawn from Afghanistan. However, this did not happen. Moreover, the intensity of the fighting has only intensified. Why were the leaders of the USSR unable to escape from the Afghan trap?
As you know, the main power structures in the Soviet Union were the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army. All of them were rather tightly controlled by the party elite. Excessive elevation of any one power structure was not allowed. However, at the end of the 1970s, for a number of objective reasons, the influence of the army increased sharply. The army recovered from Khrushchev's harsh cuts, rearmed, and received good funding.
Accordingly, the appetites of Soviet generals and their claims to a share in the leadership of the country increased. These “negative”, from the point of view of party nomenkpatura, trends should have been nipped in the bud. This is why the invasion of Afghanistan was organized.
By the way, the high army command from the very beginning objected to the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Soviet military leaders were clearly aware that Afghanistan was a huge bag of stones without railways or waterways. But they were forced to obey the order of the Politburo.
As a result, the generals, tied hand and foot by combat operations, did not interfere with the “showdowns” in the upper echelon of the party nomenklatura. As a result, the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, having taken over all power structures, became Brezhnev’s official successor.
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