Russia in zugzwang in the India-Pakistan confrontation. situation in Kashmir. The problem of the territorial belonging of Kashmir in relations between India and Pakistan - war and peace

The emergence of the Kashmir issue dates back to 1947, when the British colonialists hurriedly left India. The plan to grant her independence after a long and difficult political bargaining took the form of the formation of two dominions (later republics) - the Indian Union and Pakistan.

The creation of the latter as a country where the majority of the population is Muslim was carried out mainly by separating three provinces (Sindh, North-West Frontier, Balochistan) and dividing the other two - Punjab and Bengal.

Over a third of the territory of colonial Hindustan, where a fifth of its inhabitants lived, belonged to Indian principalities. In accordance with the plan for the independence of India, they were given time to choose which of the two dominions to join and on what terms.

The largest in terms of territory (more than 200 thousand square kilometers) and significant in terms of population (4 million people) was the highland principality of Jammu and Kashmir in the north of the subcontinent. Its ruler was a Hindu. Three quarters of the population were Muslims, but the leader of the most influential party - the National Conference - Sheikh Abdullah sought the independence of Kashmir within the framework of the Indian Union. Both of these circumstances predetermined the fate of the principality - its main part became part of India, forming there the only state with a predominantly Muslim population.

Pakistan, however, did not accept this situation. The local war, which he started in the autumn of 1947, was accompanied by the activity of international mediators in the person of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan. At the end of the conflict in early 1949, the UN tried to facilitate a referendum in the former principality. However, these efforts did not lead to anything, because by the mid-1950s. India refused to consider it as a tool for resolving the contentious issue.

The result of the first Kashmir conflict of 1947-1948. partition of Jammu and Kashmir. Under the control of Pakistan came its northwestern part, which is of strategic importance (at the junction of Badakhshan, Pamir and Xinjiang). The areas under the jurisdiction of Pakistan in political and administrative terms consist of "Azad (i.e. free) Kashmir", which has significant internal autonomy, and the "northern territories" with the center in Gilgit, administered from the federal center, with the recognition of a temporary one, from the international legal point of view, the status of both areas, as well as the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, has not been finally established.

In 1965, 12 years after the end of the first, the second Indo-Pakistan war took place over Kashmir. It was again initiated by Pakistan, whose leadership hoped for an uprising of the Kashmiris, who were supposed to be helped by groups of saboteurs transported across the ceasefire line. The conflict in Kashmir, unleashed in the early days of August, India moved beyond its borders in early September, crossing the border and attacking Pakistani forces on their territory. Three weeks later, hostilities ceased without revealing a significant advantage for either side.

In view of the fact that Pakistan's attempt to solve the Kashmir problem by military means failed, it had to abandon the use of force, which was reflected in the agreements reached with the mediation of the USSR in Tashkent in January 1966.

Six years later, during the war in December 1971, Pakistan was already defending itself from the advancing Indian units and lost some strategically important areas in Kashmir (the Haji Pir Pass, the heights in the Tirthal and Kargil sectors). The agreement signed by India and Pakistan at Simla in July 1972 established a new line of control. Another concession that Islamabad made when signing it was the agreement to resolve disputed issues on a bilateral basis, which, according to the Indian side, crossed out the UN resolutions adopted at the time on holding a referendum in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Pakistani side, however, left a loophole for itself by including in the text of the Agreement a clause on resolving disputes by any other means by mutual agreement. Until the early 1980s. she did not stir up discussion of the Kashmir theme on the international scene. Neither did the internal situation in the Indian state, where from 1975 to 1982 the government headed by the recognized leader Sheikh Abdullah, was in power. After his death, political tensions in the state intensified, and Pakistan again turned to the world community for support. Added to the friction with India on this issue since 1984 was the problem of controlling the Siachin Glacier, located north of the Line of Control in Kashmir. The lack of demarcation there caused disputes about the ownership of the approaches to the glacier, which periodically ended in skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani units.

The political crisis in Jammu and Kashmir intensified after the grossly flawed local elections of 1987. The 1989 all-India vote brought significant success to the forces of Hindu nationalism and complicated communal relations in Kashmir. The massive opposition demonstrations that had engulfed the Kashmir valley since the end of 1989 were severely suppressed by the state authorities and the regular troops brought into it.

Since the turn of the 1980-1990s. the second major stage in the Kashmiri drama began. It differs from the first one by the “burdened” factor of Islamic radicalism. The reasons for the changes are connected with the rise of Islamism in the Arab East, in Pakistan and Afghanistan. After 1989, thousands of participants in the “jihad” (holy war), mostly Kashmiris by origin, moved to Kashmir after 1989 , but also Pakistanis, Arabs, etc. They contributed to the toughening of the nature of anti-government actions, gave them the form of sabotage and terrorist activity.

The aggravation of the situation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, primarily in its central Kashmir Valley, had a negative impact on relations between India and Pakistan. Delhi accused Islamabad of sending extremists, and he made statements about the violation of human rights and the restriction of civil liberties.

The propaganda war could probably develop into an armed conflict as early as the spring of 1990, but the danger of such a development of events was then averted.

This crisis in bilateral relations was followed by others. In May-June 1999, an armed conflict broke out between the regular units of the two countries in northern Kashmir (the Indians discovered a Pakistani army grouping on their side of the line of control in the Kargil sector). During the fighting with the use of aircraft and heavy artillery, more than 1 thousand servicemen were killed on both sides. The counterattack of the Indian units forced the Pakistanis,

operating under the guise of arguments about helping the Kashmiri Mujahideen (fighters for the faith), to leave their positions.

Pakistan's joining the international anti-terrorist campaign after the September 11, 2001 attacks, its refusal to support the Islamist Afghan Taliban regime ("Taliban" - seeking true knowledge) did not help to improve Pakistani-Indian relations. Moreover, after the attack of Islamist militants on the parliament building in Delhi in December 2001, the Indian government decided to significantly strengthen the grouping of troops near the Pakistani border.

The situation did not change even after the ban on the activities of half a dozen extremist organizations, which was introduced by the President of Pakistan, General P. Musharraf, in January 2002. India continued to accuse the Pakistani authorities of secret complicity with terrorists, and in May-June, after a series of new terrorist attacks, relations between the two countries escalated to the limit . India has put more than half a million troops concentrated along the Pakistani borders on alert. Pakistan retaliated by preparing to fight back, but conflict was averted. This happened largely thanks to the efforts of members of the international community, in particular Russia.

Over the past 13 years, a fierce sabotage and terrorist struggle has continued in Kashmir, in which, according to Indian data, 37,000 people have died. Its main organizers are a number of groups that have camps and training bases in Pakistan, mainly in the part of the former Principality of Jammu and Kashmir that it controls. Among them are Hizb-ul-Mujahedin (Party of Fighters for Faith), Harkat-ul-Mujahedin (Movement of Fighters for Faith), Jayish-e-Muhammad (Army of the Prophet) and Lashkar-e-Tayiba (Militia of the Pure) All of them, as well as a number of other groups, are part of the United Front of Jihad.

The political opposition in the state is led by another association - the All-Party Free (Hurriyet) Conference. The Indian authorities allow it to function and try to find a compromise with its moderate representatives (especially actively since the end of 2000). The stumbling block is the demand of the Kashmiri opposition to involve Pakistan in the negotiation process.

Northwest India is a very complex ethnopolitical region. If in the north-east of the country, where conflicts between separatist movements of national minorities and government forces have been going on for decades, the interests of India and China clash, then the north-west is a point of collision of Indian and Pakistani interests. In fact, the clash of Indian and Pakistani interests in Northwest India is one of the fronts of the general confrontation between the Muslim and non-Muslim world. The most problematic area in the region is the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This mountainous region is notable for the fact that until 1947 there was a semi-independent principality of Jammu and Kashmir, headed by a Hindu Maharaja, while the bulk of the population belonged to Muslims.

Jammu and Kashmir is an ancient beautiful land that has been a bridge between India, China and the Iranian-Muslim world for centuries. Since ancient times, there have been cities with a highly developed culture and, until recently, followers of several religions - Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists - managed to coexist relatively peacefully. Of course, contradictions and wars, including on a religious basis, took place throughout Kashmir, but they took on the character of a global confrontation only after the liberation of India from British colonial rule.

In many respects, of course, the colonizers did their best here, drawing artificial borders for two post-colonial states - India and Pakistan. It is the British who bear the lion's share of responsibility for the ongoing geopolitical confrontation between India and Pakistan, in which, above all, the Western world is interested. For the United States and Great Britain, an independent strong India poses a significant threat, so from the very beginning it was decided, firstly, to divide it into two states (then a third was added - Bangladesh), and secondly - to pit the states of Hindustan in an ongoing confrontation. One of the instruments of this pitting is the Kashmir conflict.

Before the independence of India and Pakistan was proclaimed, the Muslim population of the principality of Jammu and Kashmir got along well with the Hindu Maharajas and the neighboring Muslim rulers did not express any special complaints about this. Recall that in Jammu and Kashmir, Hindus inhabit the southern territory - these are mainly representatives of the Indo-Aryan peoples.

A soldier patrols during a curfew on a deserted street. Behind him on the wall is the inscription: "Indian dogs, go home."

Muslims are concentrated in the north and include not only Indian peoples, but also Pashtuns, the Tibeto-Burmese Balti people and the unique Burishi people, who speak the isolated Burushaski language, over the mystery of the origin and kinship of which scientists all over the planet still puzzle over. In addition to Hindus and Muslims, a fairly large Buddhist community also lives in Jammu and Kashmir, represented primarily by the Tibetan-speaking population of the former principalities of Ladakh and Zaskar. Ladakh historically gravitates towards Tibet and, for obvious reasons, is a zone of increased interest from neighboring China.

In the modern Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, the ethno-confessional situation is as follows: the majority of the population (67%) professes Islam, 30% - Hinduism, 2% - Sikhism and 1% - Buddhism. At the same time, there are strong differences between individual territories of the state. So, in the northern part - Kashmir - Muslims make up to 97% of the population. In the south of the state - in Jammu, on the contrary, 65% of the population are Hindus, only 31% Muslims, and 4% Sikhs. In Ladakh, 46% are Buddhists. That is, we see that the ethno-confessional alignment in the state is characterized by an uneven distribution of ethnic and confessional groups across its territory, but at the same time there is an obvious predominance of the Muslim population.

As for the ethnic picture, the population of Kashmir is represented by the following groups: 1) Dardic peoples, intermediate between Indian and Iranian - Kashmiris, Shin, Kalash and other ethnic groups. 92% of Kashmiris are Muslims, the rest are Hindus; 2) Indo-Aryan peoples - Punjabis, Dogras, Hindustanis and other ethnic groups, predominantly inhabiting the southern part of the state and practicing Hinduism, Sikhism or Islam; 3) Tibeto-Burmese peoples - Ladakhs, Balti, Tibetans - inhabit the northeastern part of the state and profess mainly Lamaist Buddhism, as well as the Tibetan Bon religion (with the exception of the Balti, which are perhaps the only Tibeto-Burmese people who profess Shiite Islam ); 4) Burishis, who speak the Burushaski language and inhabit the Hunza region, currently controlled by Pakistan. This nation also professes Islam; 5) Pashtuns (Afghans), belonging to the Iranian peoples and maintaining close ties with fellow tribesmen in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

One of the Kashmiri teenagers throws stones at the military

The Maharajas of Jammu and Kashmir were Dogra by nationality. The Dogras trace their clan to people from Rajputana (the modern state of Rajasthan), are proud of their military exploits and for the most part retain the Hindu religion, although a small part of the Dogres also profess Sikhism and Islam. Formally, their state with the ruling Sikh dynasty, which was considered by the rest of the Sikhs as traitors to Sikhism, included the lands of Jammu and Kashmir proper, as well as the Buddhist principalities of Ladakh and Zaskar and the emirates of Hunza, Gilgit and Nagar. Gilgit-Baltistan and Hunza are currently controlled by Pakistan. The British authorities, in exchange for loyalty, allowed the Maharajas of Jammu and Kashmir to retain their throne and did not interfere much in the internal affairs of this region.

When India and Pakistan were partitioned in 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, who sought to maintain his sovereign rule in the territory under his control, did not want to become part of any of the newly formed states. However, the Muslims, dissatisfied with this decision and not striving to continue to remain under the rule of a Hindu, especially since their fellow tribesmen were nearby in their own sovereign Muslim state, raised an armed uprising. The Maharaja had no choice but to turn to India for help. So the territory of Jammu and Kashmir became part of the Indian state, while the heir to Hari Singh, Karan Singh, who holds the post of governor of the state, is still formally the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.

To help the Muslim population of the state, the Pashtun tribal militias of the Afridis and Yusufzais arrived - tribes living in the border regions of Pakistan and distinguished by great militancy and a zealous attitude towards religion. After the Indian army succeeded in repulsing their attacks, the Pakistani military intervened. Thus began the First Indo-Pakistani War, which lasted from October 21, 1947 to January 1, 1949. and ended with the division of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Approximately 60% of the territory of the principality turned out to be part of India, while the rest of the northern part, inhabited by Muslims, went in fact to Pakistan.

Resistance of Kashmiri protesters and Indian military on the streets of Srinagar

Since then, the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir has been virtually uninterrupted. For about seventy years, two neighboring states have not been able to resolve the issue of borders between them by peace. During this time, three more Indo-Pakistani wars followed - the Second - in August-September 1965, the Third - in December 1971, Kargil - in 1999, as well as countless small armed conflicts. Both India and Pakistan are forced to keep significant armed forces in the region, to invest huge amounts of money in improving the weapons and equipment of the army and police units.

In addition to using its own armed forces, Pakistan actively sponsors radical Muslim organizations based in the Kashmir region under its control and carrying out terrorist attacks against Indian government forces. The territory of Pakistani Kashmir over the past decades has become a de facto base for international terrorist organizations that use hard-to-reach mountainous areas as an excellent shelter for their training camps. These organizations actually exercise control over Pakistani Kashmir, establishing their own rules on its territory and preventing the penetration of not only Indians, but also any non-Muslim foreigners into the region.

The provinces of North and Azad Kashmir are formed on Pakistani-controlled territory of Kashmir, while Indian territory is part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, approximately 10% of the territory of Kashmir was occupied by Chinese troops in 1962 and this territory, called Aksai Chin, is still part of the PRC, as well as part of the Trans-Karakoram Highway, annexed to China in 1963 with the consent of the Pakistani side. .

Indian army soldiers during an exercise near the India-Pakistan border in the disputed territory of Indian Kashmir

However, the division of the territory of the former principality between India, Pakistan and China did not mean the end of armed conflicts in the region. Muslim organizations based in Pakistani Kashmir are not going to put up with the fact that a significant part of their fellow believers remains in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including in the Kashmir valley region, where Muslims make up about 97% of the population.
Naturally, the state of Jammu and Kashmir has become a constant target of terrorist attacks. A significant Indian military contingent is based in the state, designed to secure the region from the possible risk of a Pakistani or Chinese invasion. In 1990, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, in view of the constant threat of terrorist attacks from radical organizations, twenty Indian divisions were stationed.

They are opposed by militants of radical organizations, the total number of which is also in the thousands. At the same time, according to Indian sources, in recent years there has been a decrease in the proportion of Kashmiri Muslims themselves in the ranks of radical organizations - they are being replaced by people from neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan, the retreating Taliban, as well as Uighur separatists from neighboring China and radicals from the former Soviet Central Asian republics. All this multinational audience finds its refuge in training camps on the territory of Pakistani Kashmir.

The danger of radicalization of Indian Muslims is aggravated by the fact that in social terms, Muslims are significantly inferior to Hindus. As a rule, representatives of the Muslim community are less well educated, there are fewer entrepreneurs and intellectuals among them. This is due, among other things, to the fact that initially representatives of the lower castes converted to Islam, thereby striving to break out of the caste system. After the formation of sovereign Pakistan, a significant part of Muslims, primarily from the upper strata of society, left India, preferring to make a career in their own Muslim state. What remained in India was just the less well-to-do and less educated representatives of the urban lower classes, and in the case of Kashmir, representatives of local indigenous ethnic groups, also employed mainly in traditional areas of management.

That is, the radical Islamic organizations in India have quite ample opportunities in terms of replenishing and renewing their personnel resources, primarily at the expense of unemployed youth. Anti-American rhetoric, actively used by radical Islamic organizations, also helps to raise their authority. The role of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim states that provide financial and organizational assistance to Indian Muslim organizations is also important.

The huge outflow of funds to maintain troops in this region forced India and Pakistan to open a dialogue for a peaceful disengagement along Siachen, without prejudice to the loss of territory on both sides.

At present, the following religious and political organizations are the key actors in the military-political situation in Kashmir:

1. Jamiat ul-ulama-i Islam - Society of Islamic theologians. It is this Pakistani organization that recruits and trains militants for the Kashmiri militias.

2. Lashkar i-Jhangvi - The Jhangvi Army, the second most important religious and political organization that recruits and trains militants for armed groups and directly manages them.

3. Hizb-i Mujahideen - Party of Fighters for Faith. It is one of the most radical Islamic organizations in the region advocating the independence of Kashmir.

It should be noted that all of these organizations belong to the radical wing of orthodox Sunni Islam. This is explained by the fact that it is the Sunnis in the modern world that represent the most active Islamic force. Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban provide support specifically to Sunni organizations. However, a significant number of Shia Muslims also live in Kashmir, primarily Ismailis. For radical Sunnis, they are the second ideological enemies after Hindus and Buddhists; either their conversion to Sunnism, or the "cleansing" of the future Islamic Kashmir from the Ismailis is envisaged.

The positions of the Ismailis are strong in the mountainous regions, primarily among small ethnic groups like the Balti and Burish. The Ismailis consider Imam Aga Khan IV to be their head. This spiritual leader of the Ismaili communities in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and other countries resides in the UK, but enjoys great influence in the region. We can assume that, due to deep ties with the British crown, the Ismaili Imam is also the most important conductor of English influence in North-West India. After all, the Aga Khan not only lives and does business in the UK, he himself is half (by mother) an Englishman. Naturally, the solution of the Kashmir problem is impossible without taking into account the interests of the Ismaili community, which is also not satisfied with the growing influence of orthodox Sunni organizations that threaten the very existence of Shiite Islam in Northwestern India.

Indo-Pakistani conflicts and insurgent attacks by the beginning of the 21st century claimed the lives of at least 30 thousand military personnel and civilians. Pakistani sources claim that the number of Muslims killed in the fighting is much higher and reaches 70 thousand people. In fact, Jammu and Kashmir is an ongoing hotspot, the escalation of violence in which far surpasses other troubled Indian states, including Northeast India, where separatist armed organizations also operate.

An Indian soldier from the top of the mountain keeps order in the area entrusted to him. Thousands of military and paramilitary police stationed along Pilgrimage route as fight against Muslim separatists continues in Kashmir since 1990s

Since Kashmiri Muslims are actively supported by Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, they have no problems with propaganda literature and organizational support. And this greatly complicates the effect of the actions of government troops and special services, which are unable to overcome the armed resistance in Jammu and Kashmir. The situation is aggravated by the fact that India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, and in the event of an aggravation of the situation in the Kashmir region, the consequences not only for these countries, but for the whole of humanity, can be the most unpredictable.

For India, Kashmir remains one of the primary problems, and there are no plausible hopes for a solution to the situation in this region. The Indian government is left with two options - either to accept the territorial claims of Pakistan and get rid of the territory with a predominantly Muslim population, or to wage an ongoing war against radical organizations that are supported by Pakistan itself and, indirectly, by most of the Islamic world.

However, ceding the territory of Kashmir to Pakistan means not only being defeated and losing strategically important areas, but also agreeing that Kashmir will become an even greater hotbed of religious extremism and terrorism in South Asia. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Indian government will ever agree to grant sovereignty to Kashmir. And this means that the conflict in the region will continue to smolder, largely with the external support of the states concerned.

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Hosted at http://www.allbest.ru/

Kashmir conflict

The Kashmir issue remains the most significant knot of contradictions in relations between the two countries. The question of the ownership of the disputed territories is the main one on which almost all the political aspirations of Delhi and Islamabad in the region converged, and it is in the Kashmir refraction that most other bilateral events should be considered.

The conflict associated with these territories is one of the most enduring in all of modern history. The interstate confrontation in the South Asian subcontinent dates back as many years as the very independent existence of India and Pakistan, at the same time, the roots of the problem go back to ancient times, ultimately resting on interreligious and, in part, ethnic strife.

Immediately after the Second World War, when the imminent departure of the colonial administration from the then united British India became almost obvious, the question arose about the future coexistence of adherents of the two main religions of India - Hinduism and Islam. It should be noted that the sign of religion was one of the most effective instruments of British colonial administration, carried out in accordance with the old, well-known principle of "divide and rule." For example, in the 1930s and 1940s, elections to the legislative bodies of India were held according to curiae, formed depending on confessional affiliation.

This confessional principle, so supported by London, greatly fueled the historical contradictions that existed between Muslims and Hindus since medieval times. Even the national liberation movement, united in a common desire to achieve independence as soon as possible, was formalized within the framework of the two main political parties that stood on the anti-colonial platform - the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League (ML) - although the Congress, especially in the early days of its existence - since 1885 - consisted of many Muslims in its ranks. By the mid-1930s, a significant difference in their assessment of the future structure of an independent India became clearly visible in the positions of these two parties.

The Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, adhered to the so-called. the theory of two nations, believing that in India, Muslims and Hindus may well be called nations, taking into account their different cultural and historical heritage, and in this regard, it is necessary in the future to divide the country according to religious principle to ensure the separate existence of such different peoples. Indeed, this point of view was justified to a certain extent. Since the formation of the first Muslim states in North India in the 11th century, and then, with the approval of the rule of the Muslim dynasty of the Great Moghuls in India (ruling almost until 1857), the elite of society consisted in the majority of Muslims - even in the spoken language of the highest nobility until the middle of the 19th century. century was Persian. The spread of Islam led to the fact that Muslims began to make up almost a fifth of the population of India and began to feel like a rather isolated part of society.

In 1940, the ML openly raised the question of creating a separate Indian Muslim state in the future. The INC was, in the end, forced to agree with this concept, but the leadership of the party, primarily Jawaharlal Nehru, always opposed the partition of India. The plan for granting independence, worked out under the leadership of the last viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, provided for the creation of two states - dominions of the British crown (however, a few years later both dominions - India in 1950, and Pakistan in 1956 - abandoned this status). The territories inhabited predominantly by Muslims, according to this plan, went to Pakistan. British India then included 601 principalities, among which were both huge in territory and population, such as Hyderabad, Gwalior, Travankur, and very small ones. Each of the princes had to decide which of the states to give preference to, and in disputable cases, the will of the population was to be determined by a referendum. Principalities were to be united into provinces and unions of principalities.

The granting of independence to British India on the night of August 14-15, 1947 and the division of the country were accompanied by a monstrous massacre on religious and ethnic grounds. The death toll in a few weeks reached several hundred thousand people. The number of refugees was at least 15 million. In the end, the territories of the North-West, which formed the four provinces of West Pakistan, and East Bengal, later Bangladesh, went to Pakistan. In the Indian principalities of Junagadh, Manawadar and Hyderabad, there were some doubts about their ownership, but they were relatively calmly resolved in favor of India (out of 601 principalities, 555 were included in India). After the partition of the country, a significant part of the Muslim elite moved to Pakistan, although the majority of ordinary Muslims in India preferred to stay in their homeland. The memory of the tragic events of the summer of 1947 left a noticeable imprint on the subsequent development of Indo-Pakistani relations.

Pakistan as a nation was thus born out of pure idea and enthusiasm. Even the name of the country, composed of the letters included in the names of its provinces and meaning in the Urdu language "country of the pure", has never existed before, but was invented already in the 20th century. Such a lack of independent historical traditions has always had a very painful effect on the subconscious of the ruling elite of Pakistan. The very fact that Pakistan was created as a part, separated from the mother base, largely explains the desire of many Pakistani politicians to play on the Islamic factor. Indeed, as one of the Pakistani political scientists said, despite the fact that both India and Pakistan have the same historical heritage and speak the same language, nothing but religious differences can become the ideological basis of Pakistan's national independence.

The most acute dispute over territorial affiliation flared up in the principality of Jammu and Kashmir. The prince - Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu by faith, by the time independence was declared, could not yet finally determine which of the two dominions his possessions would include. 77 percent of his subjects were Muslims, so a vote would most likely have settled the issue in favor of Pakistan, but the prince, and indeed the entire Kashmiri elite - also mostly Hindus - were not eager to become his citizens.

In any case, the matter did not come to a referendum. In several districts of the principality, an uprising broke out against the power of the Maharaja. Then, on October 21, 1947, the militia of the Pashtun tribes from the territory of Pakistan, and after them the "Pakistani volunteers" invaded the principality with the intention of helping the rebels and by force to resolve the issue of belonging to Kashmir. On October 24, on the territory occupied by them, the creation of the sovereign formation of Azad Kashmir ("Free Kashmir") and the entry of the entire principality into Pakistan was proclaimed. This immediately interrupted all the hesitation of the prince and Hari Singh, announcing the accession of Kashmir to India, turned to Delhi for military assistance.

Indian troops hastily sent there stopped the aggressors not far from the capital of Kashmir - the city of Srinagar. Then, on October 28 - December 22, 1947, negotiations were held on the issue of ownership of Kashmir, at which the parties agreed in principle on the need for the free will of its people. However, hostilities were not suspended, regular military units of Pakistan were soon involved in them, the fighting took on a protracted character and lasted for almost a year. These events are considered the first Indo-Pakistani war. By January 1, 1949, hostilities were stopped, and in August, under the auspices of the UN, a ceasefire line was established and Kashmir was divided into two parts - controlled, respectively, by India and Pakistan. 77.5 thousand square meters fell under Pakistani control. km - almost half of the principality. Several UN resolutions (April 21 and August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949) called on the parties to withdraw troops and hold a plebiscite, but neither India nor Pakistan wanted to withdraw their units, declaring the occupation of part of Kashmir by the opposite side. Soon, Azad Kashmir actually became part of Pakistan and a government was formed there, although, of course, India does not recognize this and on all Indian maps this territory is depicted as Indian. (The USSR from the very beginning considered Azad Kashmir an illegally occupied territory of India, in contrast to the United States, which declared an "unresolved problem", in general, however, supporting Pakistan). In 1956, after the adoption of the law on the new administrative division of the country, India granted its Kashmir territories the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Srinagar remained the summer capital of the state, Jammu became the winter capital. The ceasefire line has become a de facto border.

The territories of Kashmir under Pakistani control were also reorganized. Most of the land was allocated to a special agency of the Northern Territories with the capital in the city of Gilgit, and only 2,169 square meters remained in Azad Kashmir. km. in the form of a narrow strip along the ceasefire line. The seat of the government of Azad Kashmir was the small town of Muzaffarabad. If the agency is a union territory within Pakistan under a resident commissioner, then Azad Kashmir formally retained its independence as an associated state of Pakistan, although de facto, of course, Islamabad rules it as its own province. So, at the end of July 2001, the government of Azad Kashmir was headed by the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. This quasi-state formation formally even has its own armed forces. The Kashmiri formations that formed the Azad Kashmir Regiment actively participated in the fighting against the Indians during the third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971. The fighters of the regiment, by the way, showed very high fighting qualities and stamina.

Thus, since the late 1940s, Kashmir has remained a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Relations between them have always remained tense and the Kashmir issue constantly disturbed the minds of politicians in both countries. The possession of at least a part of Kashmir becomes important for Pakistan for several reasons, in addition to maintaining national prestige. First, in this way India is cut off from direct access to the Central Asian region and Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan gets a common border with China, which is especially important for it. From the end of the 50s, Pakistan went to a rapid rapprochement with China, which had contradictions with Delhi (which soon, in the fall of 1962, resulted in a war that ended in a serious defeat for India). Soon, the Pakistani leadership began negotiations with the Chinese regarding the demarcation of the border with the PRC in Kashmir, which India considered its own. In 1963, after the signing of the Pakistani-Chinese border agreement, China had, as the Indians believe, part of the rightful Indian territory. Through the part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, the so-called. The Karakoram Highway, which made it possible to establish overland communication between Pakistan and China.

In April 1965, the second war between India and Pakistan broke out. This time, the main arena of battles was the deserted and deserted southern section of their border - the drying up salty estuary of the Kutch Rann, but there were major clashes in Kashmir. The war actually did not end in anything - as soon as the monsoon rains began and the Rann of Kutch became unsuitable for the movement of armored vehicles, the fighting subsided by itself and a ceasefire was reached through the mediation of Great Britain. (However, already at that time, the superiority of India was indicated, which suffered almost half the losses). Post-war negotiations were held in 1966 in the USSR, mainly in Tashkent.

Before the last volleys had time to die down, the smell of a new war began. In March 1971, unrest began in East Pakistan, which the Pakistani military began to suppress with the most cruel measures, starting a real massacre in this part of the country. The outbreak of civil conflict claimed more than a million lives of Bengalis in a few months. Nearly ten million refugees crossed into India, often followed across the border by Pakistani troops. Border clashes on the border of East Pakistan escalated into the third, largest, Indo-Pakistani war on December 3-17, which ended with the surrender of the 93,000th Pakistani contingent in East Pakistan, the separation of this province from Pakistan and the proclamation of the independent state of Bangladesh there. Fighting also took place on the western front, although there, despite the fierceness and high intensity of hostilities, neither side was able to achieve decisive success. In the summer of 1972, in the city of Simla in India, the heads of both states signed an agreement that consolidated the result of the war and according to which the parties pledged to continue to resolve all disputes by peaceful means. Under the agreement, a Line of Control was established in Kashmir, almost coinciding with the 1949 Ceasefire Line.

The Simla Agreement, however, is interpreted differently by each side. Pakistan, considering the problem of Kashmir unresolved, considers it an international dispute, reserving the right to bring this issue up for discussion in international forums and allowing the option of mediation of other states in its solution. India, on the other hand, considers this its internal affair, in which a third party cannot be involved. Completely rejects Delhi and any possibility of holding a plebiscite, on which Islamabad so insists, making references to UN resolutions. In addition, India advocates the need to negotiate on this issue without necessarily linking it to all other bilateral disputes and claims (and there are seven in total), while Pakistan claims that it is completely impossible to start negotiations on any other issues. without a primary solution to the Kashmir problem as a key and fundamental one. India's main demand is an end to "cross-border terrorism" - Islamabad's direct support for the subversive activities of separatist groups in Jammu and Kashmir. The events in the state are often characterized in India as a "hidden war", a "proxy war" which Pakistan, unable to defeat India in an open war, is waging with the help of separatist gangs created and equipped on its territory. .

Over time, groups gradually formed in Delhi and Islamabad, objectively interested in maintaining contradictions and advocating the further continuation of hostile relations. A whole range of politicians, skillfully using the "image of the enemy" - respectively, India, or Pakistan - earn good political capital, which is especially typical for politicians whose popularity is directly related to Kashmir. For a certain part of the military elite of both countries, the South Asian Cold War is often a way to prove their own importance, an excuse to increase military spending or simply try out new equipment and keep the military personnel busy in order to keep them away from thinking about political topics. Numerous religious fanatics - Hindu in India and Islamic in Pakistan - proclaiming the slogans of the fight against the infidels, noticeably stir up passions. (In fairness, it should be noted that in Pakistan, contrary to a fairly common belief, the leadership of the armed forces is perhaps the least of all sections of society is the bearer of religious ideology). The intensified propaganda of the "image of the enemy" in the mass media is shaping the public opinion of both countries in the spirit of intransigence and chauvinism. At the same time, the Kashmir problem begins to seem something familiar and ordinary, and interstate confrontation - a normal way of existence.

In the late 1980s, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, against the backdrop of a general socio-economic decline, greatly escalated. The activity of several terrorist organizations there at once intensified, demanding "the freedom of Indian-occupied Kashmir" under Islamic slogans. These aspirations found ardent support in the person of the Pakistani leadership, which began to generously supply the gangs of militants with weapons, provided them with camps on its territory and, in fact, took the separatists under their wing. The Afghan Mujahideen also took a prominent part in the actions of terrorist groups. Along with the subversive actions of bandits sent from Pakistan, skirmishes began on the Line of Control, which reached a particular intensity in 1987 on the high-altitude glacier Xiachen near Chinese territory. The Line of Control does not pass through this glacier, thus, it is actually a territory with an uncertain status (for example, according to the 1949 agreement, the Ceasefire Line was to be established "before the glaciers").

Operation Meghdut. Collisions in the glacier zone.

Fighting that has not subsided for 19 years on the high-altitude ice massif of Xiacheng near the border with China is another element of tension on the Line of Control.

Until 1983, in the region of the 76-kilometer glacier, India and Pakistan were limited to the presence of minimal military contingents. In those rare cases when groups of foreign climbers gained access to the glacier, they were usually accompanied by specially seconded officers, who, according to a number of data, carried out reconnaissance of the area. The reason for the start of hostilities on Xiachen was information about the imminent arrival in Pakistan of a Japanese group planning to climb Remo Peak in 1984, which is located in the most important area in terms of control over the entire glacier. The fact that the Japanese were to be accompanied by a group of Pakistani military, Delhi suspected an attempt by Islamabad to establish control over Xiachen. Both India and Pakistan, apparently, were planning to conduct an operation to master the glacier by that time. Indian emissaries sent to several European countries began to purchase climbing equipment and overalls. Soon it became known about similar purchases made by the Pakistanis.

Be that as it may, the Indian military launched the offensive first. On April 13, 1983, the implementation of Operation Meghdut, developed under the leadership of Lieutenant General M.L. Chibber, one of the most famous Indian military theorists. Within a few days, specially trained groups occupied two-thirds of the glacier, setting up frontier outposts along the Saltoro Ridge. The Pakistani units, which approached only a month and a half later, found themselves in a series of clashes, unable to dislodge the Indians from the positions they had captured. However, they did not allow the Indian units to advance further. After Pakistan also established a line of outposts about a kilometer from the Indian one, both states received another site of constant skirmishes and skirmishes.

A high degree of tension persisted in the Xiachen area until the mid-1990s, with 1987-88 being the time of the most violent clashes. Artillery has often been used in battles where terrain conditions permit, although small arms and light weapons and mortars have been used mostly in glacier skirmishes. Only in one of these skirmishes in the mountain pass of Bilafond-la in April 1987, up to 200 military personnel were killed on both sides. The intensity of the battles on the glacier has somewhat decreased over time, but clashes still occur to this day. The last major battles involving artillery took place on September 4, 1999 and December 3, 2001.

The fighting that India and Pakistan are conducting on the glacier is notable for the fact that this is the highest mountain battlefield in the world - border outposts are often located at an altitude of much more than 6000 m. 6450 m.), and the troops have to operate at temperatures down to -50 degrees and below. A contingent of 3-3.5 thousand people is constantly on the glacier on each side. Naturally, troops deployed in such difficult conditions must have the appropriate equipment and have the necessary skills. India and Pakistan attach great importance to equipping their units in Xiachen, which entails very significant financial costs. According to the Director General of the Intelligence Service of the Indian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General R.K. Sahni, the maintenance of troops in the region of the glacier cost India in the late 90s 350-500 thousand dollars a day.

Indeed, the Indian fighters on Xiachen can boast of both increased salaries and supplies that are completely inaccessible to most not only soldiers, but also officers (for example, for the usual 90-day stay on the glacier, each fighter receives 14 pairs of woolen socks, sometimes even having electric heating), so it is not surprising that the command does not lack volunteers. For living, hemispherical igloo-type houses made of heat-insulating material heated by kerosene stoves are often used. When sent to this area, candidates undergo a rigorous selection process, in which preference is given to people from high mountainous areas, and before being sent, the personnel undergo an enhanced training course, incl. under the guidance of experienced climbers. The outposts located in the highest places are supplied with oxygen in cylinders. However, despite all the measures, from frostbite, hypothermia and diseases associated with a lack of oxygen in the air, troops lose much more people than in battles. In total, from April 1983 to 1999, according to official Indian data, 616 Indian soldiers died in the battles for Xiachen (with Pakistani losses of 1344 people), the number of hospitalized during the same period exceeded 20 thousand. Pakistani figures give a figure of 2,000 Indian deaths from 1983 to 1997. In conditions of poor visibility and rarefied air on the glacier, aircraft accidents occur more often than in other areas of contact between Indian and Pakistani troops.

The supply of parts occurs mainly by air. For this purpose, An-32 military transport aircraft are actively involved, landing on the airfield of the Leh air base or dropping cargo by parachute, and Mi-17 helicopters, which turned out to be the only helicopter system of all that the Indian Air Force has, capable of operating in conditions of such low temperatures and heights over 5 km. Through some of the clefts, the Indians and Pakistanis built cable cars. In 2001, the Indians completed the construction of a pipeline, through which several outposts began to receive kerosene from the VVB in Leh. For Pakistani troops, the problem of supply is less acute, since their outposts are usually located at a lower altitude, and also because of the relatively good road leading to their positions, which allows extensive use of pack animals.

Clashes in the glacier zone give India and Pakistan the opportunity to work out in detail the tactics of combat in high mountains. It can be said that over the 19 years of hostilities in Xiachen, the ground forces of both states have accumulated unique experience in the use of troops at extremely low temperatures and, undoubtedly, have quite numerous units prepared to perform tasks in such a difficult environment.

Developments in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1990s.

Since 1990, in Jammu and Kashmir, in connection with a sharp escalation of the subversive activities of separatist gangs, direct presidential rule was introduced, troops numbering up to 20 divisions were introduced into the state. As a result of almost continuous clashes with terrorists and sabotage, to date, India has lost more than 30 thousand military personnel and civilians (Pakistan speaks of at least 70 thousand Kashmiris who died "at the hands of Indian barbarians" and "thousands" losses of Indian military personnel). Islamabad constantly denied any involvement in what was happening in the state, declaring only the moral support of the "freedom fighters of Kashmir" and speaking to the whole world about "violations of human rights" and "harassment of Muslims" in Kashmir in particular and throughout India as a whole. This situation, in principle, persisted from the late 1980s until very recently, with the exception of some thaw in relations in 1988-89, associated with the death of the military ruler of Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq, and the coming to power of a civilian leadership in Islamabad. Over the past 14 years, there has hardly been a day in Kashmir without shelling of the frontier posts of one side or another, often with the use of artillery, or an armed sortie of militants. Such incidents are mostly sporadic shelling with artillery and mortars or small arms. These skirmishes usually do not cause much damage to either side and the main problem for the Indians in Jammu and Kashmir is not them, but the fight against separatist gangs infiltrating from Pakistan through the Line of Control.

In 1995, the Indian government began to pay increased attention to the development of the state's economy, which did not take long to bring noticeable positive results. In September 1996, elections for the State Legislature were held for the first time. The social base of the militants began to shrink, and if earlier the majority of the separatists were local residents, then by the end of the 90s up to 70 percent of the militants were from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a rule, either fighting for pay or Muslim fanatics drugged by propaganda in the madrasah and special training camps in Pakistani territory.

In the February 1998 elections in India, a government led by the BJP (BJP, Bharatiya Janata Party, Bharatiya Janata Party, Indian People's Party) came to power, which is often accused of excessive propensity for great power and religious Hindu extremism. After both states demonstrated that they possessed nuclear weapons in May 1998, many analysts on both sides of the border began to talk about a possible nuclear war between them. Nevertheless, in late 1998 and early 1999, there was a well-marked "detente" of tension in India's relations with Pakistan. The Indian Cabinet, headed by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and their Pakistani colleagues headed by N. Sharif took a very constructive position. There was an active exchange of visits, and several high-level meetings took place. The culmination of the "thaw" was the trip of A.B. Vajpayee to the Pakistani city of Lahore by bus in connection with the opening of the Delhi-Lahore bus route in February 1999 and the achievement of a package of agreements at the highest level on the mutual reduction of tension (the so-called Lahore Declaration). Pakistan for the first time agreed to discuss the Kashmir problem without linking it with other contentious issues, and India, in turn, agreed to create a special working group to resolve this long-standing dispute.

Kargil conflict

All efforts to defuse the situation, undertaken in early 1999, suffered a complete fiasco when tensions in Kashmir, unprecedented since 1971, began in May. Up to a thousand militants infiltrated from Pakistan crossed the Line of Control in five sectors. Easily pushing back the small garrisons of frontier posts, they fortified themselves on the Indian side, taking control of a number of tactically important heights. The militants were covered by Pakistani artillery firing across the Line of Control. The fire of the Pakistani batteries greatly impeded the advance of the columns of Indian vehicles bringing reinforcements and ammunition, as the Pakistani artillery was shot at the only major road in the area (the Srinagar-Leh highway).

It is noteworthy that when large-scale battles began, the Indians quite unexpectedly discovered that the separatists had fortified themselves in well-equipped positions, had well-camouflaged and advantageously located firing points, often connected by underground passages, the construction of which had clearly taken more than one day. That is, somehow the Indian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the special services were not able to follow the infiltration of such large gangs, their collection and long stay on the Indian side, although increased activity on the Pakistani side in these places was noted from the autumn of 1998.

India, gradually throwing more and more new units into battle, by the end of May brought the number of troops to ten brigades of the ground forces. The main battles took place in the Kargil, Dras, Batalik and Turtok sectors and the Mushkokh valley on a front of 46 km. These events were called the Kargil conflict, however, many observers then preferred the word "war". The operation to recapture the captured heights was called "Vijay" ("Victory").

When it became clear that the militants could not be defeated without air support, for the first time since December 1971, front-line aviation forces were used in Kashmir. The Indians used the MiG-21, -23 and -27 aircraft under the cover of the MiG-29.

During the fighting, the Indian Air Force was not without losses. All of the downed aircraft were, according to most sources, hit by MANPADS, probably Pakistani-made Anza. According to Pakistani sources, the downed planes and helicopters were fired upon in Pakistani airspace, while the list of Indian casualties is as follows:

	Aircraft	Circumstances of death	The fate of the crew
There is no data		Probably fell on the Indian side	There is no data.
	"Canberra" from 35 Squadron	Produced photography. After a close explosion, the rocket began to smoke and began a sharp decline. Probably fell on the Indian side.	There is no data.
	MiG-27 from 9 Squadron	Twice within an hour he struck at the positions of Pakistani troops. Shot down at 11.15, fell on the Pakistani side.
	MiG-21 from 17 Squadron	Shot down in the same area 20 minutes later, crashed on the Pakistani side.	The commander of the 17th squadron A. Akhuja died.
		Shot down during an attack by NURS on the positions of Pakistani troops in the Mushkoh sector. Fell on the Indian side.	5 Air Force officers killed

kashmir agreement jammu meghdut

The Indians, however, do not officially acknowledge the loss of the first two cars. Indeed, Pakistani information about their fall is based on rather controversial evidence.

Obviously, not satisfied with the results of the air strikes, on May 28, the Indians began to use Mirage-2000 multipurpose fighters (in the Air Force - 2 squadrons, 40 aircraft), deployed from the city of Gwalior for 2 thousand km. At the same time, two Mirage-2000Ns performed the tasks of electronic countermeasures against Pakistani radars that tracked Indian flights along the entire line of battle.

The Mi-24 and Mi-35 helicopters, according to the Indian military, did not perform well during the conflict, being unable to perform a number of tasks due to too high a height (3-4 thousand meters and above). However, the Mi-17, several units of which were equipped with NURS launchers, again, as in the course of the battles on Xiachen, deserved the highest praise.

The main contribution to the successful completion of the campaign was made, quite naturally, by the ground forces. Indian soldiers demonstrated good fire training and high morale. Despite the fact that artillery and armored vehicles often turned out to be powerless or could not be used at all, a number of key points were captured as a result of a frontal attack on foot, and hand-to-hand fights were noted more than once. The Indians gained experience in fighting in these sectors in December 1971, when, with approximate numerical equality with the enemy and with virtually no air support, it took them only a few days to take the same heights. In 1999, however, the Indian troops, which had a multiple superiority in forces and means, suffered much greater losses than in 1971. This can probably be explained to a certain extent by the excellent training and equipment of the militants.

The negotiating process, which had barely begun between India and Pakistan, was suspended. The armed forces of both states were put on full combat readiness. India was ready to extend hostilities to adjacent territories in order to relieve tension in the Kargil region, but then still refrained from crossing the internationally recognized border in Punjab, where Pakistani troops were concentrated. In general, the actions of the Indian armed forces did not go beyond the Line of Control, although several times the aircraft of the Indian Air Force flew over it and even attacked objects on the other side of it. Islamabad, despite Indian accusations that the separatist gangs are based on the territory of Pakistan and are actually directed by the hands of its military leadership, in every possible way denied any involvement in the Kargil clashes, claiming, as before, only the moral support of "freedom fighters". Prime Minister N. Sharif himself and Foreign Minister G. Ayub Khan have repeatedly stated this, although, according to many sources, even regular units of the Pakistani ground forces took part in the battles. Soon, direct evidence of this was also received - several militants who had relevant documents were captured by the Indians. By mid-June, the Indians finally managed to recapture most of the heights, but the gangs finally left Indian territory only after N. Sharif nevertheless admitted on July 12 that they were controlled from Pakistan and authorized their withdrawal. From May 3 to July 26, the losses of Indian Ministry of Defense troops alone, according to the official report, were 474 killed and 1,109 wounded. Losses of units subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, such as border troops, were also significant. One of the heights captured by the separatists remained outside Indian control even after the completion of Operation Vijay (the so-called height 5353).

Some Indian analysts believe that the Kargil conflict was a rehearsal for a Pakistani strategic plan for full-scale war. It is generally accepted that in the event of a war under conditions of Indian superiority, it would be most expedient for Pakistan to immediately launch an offensive deep into Indian territory in order to capture and hold territory and then try to offer a truce with the captured lands as the most important argument (this can also prevent a large-scale Indian attack on Pakistan). Probably, the first stage of the plan for capturing strategically important heights and passes was worked out in Kargil for the subsequent transfer of units of the regular army to India for their subsequent dispersal and rapid advance in the direction of Srinagar. As a possible candidate for this role, the I and II Corps of the Pakistan Army, based in Mangle and Multan, are sometimes cited as one of the most highly mobile armored units. It is difficult to judge how successful the "exercises" in Kargil were, but, given that the partisan groups managed not only to take the Indians by surprise, but also to "saddle" the highway and hold the mountain passes for a month, this plan apparently has chances good luck.

The Kargil adventure of the Pakistani military was, according to the American researcher A. Lieven, "brilliant from a military point of view, but reckless from a political point of view." Indeed, the United States intervened in the course of events, putting serious pressure on Pakistan. The change in the position of the Pakistani prime minister occurred after his hasty trip to Washington and negotiations with President B. Clinton. After that, N. Sharif was criticized in his homeland by the military elite and "hawk" politicians for allegedly capitulatory behavior and softness. Such an end to the Kargil conflict cost him, ultimately, the post of prime minister and his entire political career. On October 12, 1999, he was overthrown by the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Ground Forces, General Pervez Musharraf (by the way, a native of Delhi, who moved to Lahore after the division of the country), who led the country. After an 11-year break, the military again came to power in Islamabad.

The new Pakistani leadership took an unequivocal position at first, declaring its unwillingness to continue the negotiation process in its present form. A number of Indian politicians also argued that it was impossible to conduct a dialogue with a government that came to power in such an illegal way.

Events after P. Musharraf came to power

Extremely high tension on the border between India and Pakistan persisted after the Kargil battles. The incident that took place on August 10, 1999 almost led to new clashes. Then, two Indian MiG-21s shot down a Pakistani aircraft of the Atlantic-2 base patrol aviation in the border zone near the Rann of Kutch, the entire crew of which - 17 people - died. After that, another MiG was fired upon by Pakistani anti-aircraft missiles. Until now, all the circumstances of this incident have not been clarified, and each side claims that the downed aircraft was in its airspace. At the end of December 1999, in connection with the hijacking of an Indian plane by Kashmiri terrorists, the leadership of India tried to lay responsibility on Pakistan, saying that it would seek to declare Pakistan a "terrorist state" by the world community. Since February 2000, skirmishes have resumed along the Line of Control, although India announced a moratorium on military operations against Islamic militants in Kashmir from November 2000 to the end of May 2001. Islamabad also initiated a moratorium on hostilities by one of the main separatist Kashmiri groups, Hizb-ul-Mujahedin.

After a short-term thaw in relations between India and Pakistan, by the beginning of the new millennium, they returned to the circles of confrontation, and observers unanimously noted the beginning of a new round of tension. According to A.B. Vajpayee, "after Kargil, relations between India and Pakistan practically did not exist." To this state of enmity and distrust, nuclear confrontation has also been added - although the parties apparently do not yet have nuclear weapons in service, the nuclear factor is widely used by them as a method of mutual political blackmail.

However, after the Kargil clash, there were periods of relaxation. In May 2001, P. Musharraf, in response to an invitation to visit India, agreed in principle to make such a visit. The meeting of the two leaders took place in the Indian city of Agra, 320 km from Delhi on July 14-16. The summit ended with virtually no results, as neither side was willing to move away from its long-known position on the Kashmir problem. The very fact of the meeting was already a noticeable step forward, because the parties recognized the opportunity to conduct a dialogue with each other and showed a desire to resume the interrupted negotiation process. But, as subsequent events showed, the potential for hostility accumulated in the relations between India and Pakistan did not allow even such a small success to take root. At the end of the summit, exchanges of fire between the regular units of both countries immediately resumed on the Line of Control, which had somewhat subsided after the end of the Kargil crisis.

Another outbreak of tension occurred at the end of 2001. In October, the situation in Kashmir became especially difficult as a result of several terrorist attacks, and after the December 13 attack by a group of militants on the Indian parliament building in Delhi, India, accusing Pakistan of aiding terrorists, began to hastily transfer troops to the border and the Line of Control. Throughout December 2001 and January 2002, both states again teetered on the brink of war.

In May 2002, the situation in Kashmir escalated again. Border tensions peaked in May-June when India and Pakistan were closer to war than at any time since Kargil. Three-quarters of the Indian ground forces and virtually all of the Pakistani ground forces were pulled up to the border. The situation was defuse largely thanks to the active position of the world community, primarily Russia and the United States.

One of the most important events in Jammu and Kashmir is the September-October 2002 elections to the State Legislative Assembly. In the elections, a coalition government of the INC and the People's Democratic Party came to power. The elections were held in a difficult environment, fraught with a campaign of terror and intimidation by the separatists.

At the end of 2001, approximately 6-10 thousand armed separatists were operating in Jammu and Kashmir. The average "salary" of militants is about 2-3 thousand rupees per month ($45-60, which is quite a good income by local standards). As a rule, the aggravation of the situation in the state occurs at the end of spring, since at this time of the year the mountain passes are cleared of snow, through which guerrilla groups usually penetrate through the Line of Control. Bandits usually penetrate in groups of 3-4 people, then uniting in larger units of 20-30 people.

The number of terrorist attacks, sabotage and shootings in the state makes the Kashmir conflict one of the most "hot" spots on the planet. Almost every day, as a result of the actions of separatist gangs, several people die, mostly civilians. There are frequent attacks on government offices, police stations and military installations, which sometimes escalate into fairly large clashes.

The use of military equipment in Jammu and Kashmir and the impact of the conflict on military planning.

Now, according to some sources, up to 300 thousand military personnel (almost a third of all ground forces), large police forces and paramilitaries are deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. Quite often, new equipment that enters service with the ground and air forces of India, including, of course, imported equipment, finds fairly wide application in the fight against militants.

Increasingly, the Indian ground forces are using their own-made INSAS assault rifle (INSAS - Indian Small Arms System, Indian Small Arms System) in Jammu and Kashmir. This model chambered in 5.56mm NATO caliber with a 20-round magazine is produced in several modifications at the factory in Ikchapur, West Bengal. INSAS includes a number of elements borrowed from the Russian AK-74 assault rifle and turned out to be in many ways even outwardly similar to it. The beginning of its development dates back to 1981-82, when it seemed that INSAS would be "the perfect answer to all the problems of the infantry." The first copy of the machine was released in 1986, and full-scale production began in late 1998 - early 1999 in the amount of about 80 thousand per year. In total, almost 200 thousand machine guns have been produced so far, while the need for ground forces and paramilitary formations is at least a million. In order to increase the production of automatic rifles, another line for the production of INSAS will be put into operation by the end of this year in the city of Tiruchchirappali, Tamil Nadu. It is assumed that over time, INSAS will replace the L1A1 assault rifles in service, but the main goal of the designers in this case is to finally find a replacement for the Lee-Enfield magazine rifles that are still very widely used in the troops and the L3 Sterling submachine guns as British-made 30 -50s, and local assembly. The nature of the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir just allows for comprehensive testing of various small arms systems, as the most frequently used in clashes with gangs. On the basis of the machine gun, the LMG light machine gun (LMG - Light Machine-Gun, Light Machine Gun), completely unified with it, was also created. So far, however, data on how well INSAS performed during the hostilities is rather limited, although a number of units and subunits have already received it into service on an ongoing basis, in particular, INSAS was adopted by the Rajputan Rifle Regiment, which took part in Kargil operation. According to some reviews, the machine in its present form turned out to be unsatisfactory due to the fact that it allows firing only bursts of three rounds, while the military after Kargil announced the need to get a machine gun with a continuous fire mode. The machine also turned out to be too heavy for use in mountainous conditions - 4.2 kg, although this is less than the weight of, for example, a Lee-Enfield rifle. Nevertheless, despite this, the release of the machine gun after the Kargil events was increased by 25 percent. Chief production manager of the Ikchapur factory S.B. Banerjee said that the design bureaus are working hard to eliminate the identified shortcomings and soon the armed forces will receive a modernized version of INSAS, which will meet all the requirements put forward.

The clashes in Kashmir, especially the Kargil conflict, have greatly influenced India's priorities in arms procurement. In Kargil, as in all previous battles, imported equipment showed itself. The MiG-27 aircraft, according to many reports, did not quite satisfy the Indians in terms of attacking ground targets in mountainous conditions. On the other hand, the best reviews were received about the Mirages-2000, the use of which made it possible to solve problems of this kind with high efficiency.

It was under the influence of the conclusions obtained on the basis of the battles of the summer of 1999, in the plan for the prospective development of the Indian Air Force for the period up to 2020, published in 2000 and outlining the main directions of their development at the beginning of the new century, that the intention to continue purchasing Mirage aircraft from France appeared. 2000". The opinion was also expressed about the need to modernize the MiG-21 aircraft, more than 300 of which India has in service, in order, among other things, to give them the ability to effectively hit ground targets. At least, according to the statements of the leadership of the armed forces, the MiG-21 during the fighting in Kargil showed their very low suitability in this capacity. The role of multi-purpose and transport helicopters during the Kargil conflict was very significant. It was due to the successful participation of the Mi-17 in the Kargil battles that the Indians decided to continue their purchases in Russia.

The 155-mm FH-77B towed howitzers of the Swedish company Bofors proved to be excellent, 410 units of which India purchased in the late 80s and which, before the Kargil conflict, had practically no opportunity to prove themselves in battle. These guns - the only 155-mm system in service in India - made it possible, according to Indian analyst Air Force Commodore N.K. Pant, to carry out many tasks in Kargil that even aviation was unable to solve (the Indian ground forces are armed with 2230 artillery pieces of a wide variety of systems, including D-30 howitzers and Soviet-style M-46 cannons). 60 FH-77B howitzers fired around the clock in those days, forcing the militants to disperse and proved to be, as the commodore stated, "the most effective land weapons system in punishing Pakistani aggressors and the most effective artillery system of the Indian army in general." The Swedish howitzers proved to be, according to the Indian military, extremely convenient in terms of loading, which led to a constant high rate of fire of the system and ease of maintenance, as well as towing. It is significant that they were able to place them at such a height (in off-road conditions) that guns of this caliber had never been placed before - 4200 meters. The military also unanimously noted the great power of their shells, which ensured reliable destruction of even heavily protected militant shelters. Howitzers were used in battles so intensively that most of the 155-mm shells in May - July 1999 were spent and India hastily began to look for a source of their new supplies.

The experience of using artillery in the battles of the summer of 1999 again forced the Indians to consider the problem of the lack of self-propelled artillery, if only because the use of towed guns once again confirmed the lack of protection for their crews. In addition, the question arose of acquiring radar systems for controlling artillery fire and detecting ground targets and artillery reconnaissance equipment. The same N.K. Pant stressed that "India is currently closely considering the Russian proposal for the supply of the Zoo-1 system ... determining the point of departure of enemy artillery shells, and this system should be purchased without delay."

The Indian leadership has repeatedly spoken about its intention to equip the Line of Control in Kashmir and a number of sections of the border with Pakistan with electronic equipment, which will make it possible to detect the penetration of gangs on the Indian side. According to a number of data, the installation of some systems has already begun.

Since May 2001, the Indians have been using the Nishant unmanned reconnaissance aircraft of their own production, developed by the Hindustan Aeronotics Limited concern, to conduct aerial reconnaissance in Kashmir. Indian unmanned reconnaissance aircraft attracted the attention of the Israelis during a visit to Delhi by a delegation of the leadership of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Navy in July 2001. Israeli officials have even expressed a desire to purchase such a Lakshya aircraft for the needs of their armed forces. In general, the experience of the Kargil clash revealed a number of shortcomings in the equipment of the country's ground forces, and not least - the lack of aerial reconnaissance equipment. As was emphasized in official sources, one of the main tasks of the Air Force is to increase the effectiveness of patrols in the zone adjacent to the Line of Control.

Often the supply of troops was poorly established. Thus, the Third Infantry Division received 6 thousand shells for 105-mm howitzers, which were not equipped with fuses. Because of this, there was a long delay in the conduct of artillery fire by the division. It took three days of work by 300 personnel to unscrew the fuses from shells of other calibers available in the division's warehouses and equip them with 105-mm shells. Such phenomena, according to the participants in the battles, were not uncommon. On the other hand, this conflict demonstrated the ability of the Indians to conduct combat operations in difficult conditions, showed the resilience of the Indian soldier, the good coordination of the military branches and the well-functioning of the command. By the way, British-style 105-mm howitzers turned out to be poorly suitable for destroying long-term firing structures.

Fighting in the highlands in Jammu and Kashmir constantly forces Delhi to pay attention to improving the tactics of war in the mountains, improving the mountaineering training of personnel and their appropriate equipment, using the experience of fighting in the Xiachen glacier zone. During the Kargil battles, there were many cases when units transferred to the high-mountain theater without preparation suffered significant losses from frostbite.

Russia in zugzwang in the India-Pakistan confrontation. situation in Kashmir. The problem of the territorial belonging of Kashmir in relations between India and Pakistan - war and peace

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Similar Documents