The Russian Ministry of Defense published information about the clash, which could have ended sadly for our military personnel performing their professional duty in Syria. On September 19, as a result of a large-scale offensive by Jabhat al-Nusra militants (an organization banned in the Russian Federation), a platoon of Russian military police consisting of 29 people was surrounded in the area of the city of Hama.
Superior enemy forces
“The offensive was carried out with the support of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, and was preceded by powerful fire preparation. During the day, the militants managed to penetrate the defenses of government troops to a depth of 12 kilometers, at the front up to 20 kilometers,” the Ministry of Defense reports, clarifying that the clashes took place in the Idlib de-escalation zone.
According to the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Sergei Rudsky, the terrorist offensive was initiated by American intelligence services in order to stop the successfully developing advance of government troops east of Deir ez-Zor, to the garrison of which the Syrian army broke through in early September.
For several hours, Russian police, together with a detachment of the Muali tribe, which had previously joined the truce, repelled attacks from superior enemy forces. The emergency was reported to the commander of the Russian group of troops in the SAR, Colonel General Sergei Surovikin.
The military commander decided to form a military police platoon to clear the blockade. It included units of the Special Operations Forces (SSO), military police staffed by immigrants from the North Caucasus, and Syrian special forces. The group was headed by the deputy head of the Russian center for reconciliation of warring parties, Hero of Russia, Major General Viktor Shulyak.
Fire support for the military personnel was provided by two Su-25 attack aircraft, which struck enemy personnel and armored vehicles from extremely low altitudes. As a result of the attack by Russian troops, the encirclement ring was broken. It was not possible to recapture the territory occupied by the terrorists, however, a platoon of military police and the rest of the military personnel reached the area where government troops were located without losses.
During the relief operation, three special forces soldiers were injured (the severity was not specified). All participants in the battle were nominated for state awards. The onslaught of Jabhat al-Nusra was stopped. “During the day, aviation strikes and artillery fire damaged 187 targets, destroyed about 850 terrorists, 11 tanks, 4 infantry fighting vehicles, 46 pickup trucks, 5 mortars, 20 trucks, 38 weapons depots,” Rudskoy reported.
The successful work of the airborne forces and artillery crews allowed the 5th Syrian Airborne Assault Corps to launch a counteroffensive and almost completely restore the lost position.
Difficult choice
The information provided by the Ministry of Defense provides great food for the analysis of the characteristics of the Russian military presence in Syria. According to the current agreements, four battalions of Russian military police monitor compliance with the truce in four de-escalation zones, performing mainly security functions. From open data it follows that the red berets are armed with small arms, grenade launchers and a number of armored vehicles (in particular, Typhoon and Tiger).
In the absence of heavy weapons, it is extremely difficult to repel massive attacks by militants. Nevertheless, the police were able to hold out without casualties. This indicates either the high combat readiness of the Russians and the skillful organization of defense, or that the militants’ attack on the platoon’s location was not accompanied by the support of tanks and artillery pieces.
The strike group that carried out the operation to relieve the blockade consisted of SOF officers, colleagues who were surrounded by police officers, Syrian special forces and the crew of two Su-25s (although at low altitudes it was much more logical to use helicopters).
The composition of the relief group may indicate that the Russian command is faced with a difficult choice. There probably wasn’t much strength to save the red berets, and that’s why it was necessary to pull together such motley formations. In particular, according to a similar scenario, an operation was organized to rescue the crew of a Su-24M front-line bomber shot down by Turkey on November 24, 2015. Then the Russian military was supported by Hezbollah special forces.
The fact that the military police platoon was surrounded means at least weak intelligence in the de-escalation zone. The Ministry of Defense nods to the American intelligence services, but the bottom line is that we get a miscalculation of either the Syrian army or our military intelligence (if, of course, it operated in the Hama area).
Jabhat al-Nusra's offensive was "large-scale," meaning its preparations could be traced. Placing responsibility on the American intelligence services (probably referring to the CIA, which oversees several gangs in the Syrian Arab Republic) is more reminiscent of an attempt to justify the mistake of government forces or Russian intelligence.
If the situation of the military police platoon, for various reasons, turned out to be truly deplorable, then the incident in the Hama area can, without exaggeration, be called a feat of Russian military personnel, and the rescue operation is unique due to the lack of necessary military equipment. Military police officers and MTR personnel covered themselves with unfading military glory.
For courage and heroism
The display of extraordinary courage and professionalism has always been a hallmark of our army. The operation in Syria was no exception. In the first half of May, Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the title of Hero of Russia to four Russian SOF officers who, as part of a group of 16 people, repelled attacks by 300 Jabhat al-Nusra militants for two days. The encirclement became possible due to the chaotic retreat of the Syrian army.
On May 24, in the presence of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, Putin personally awarded the special forces. This is not the first time that awards have been given to Russian military personnel who fight both in the sky and on the ground, although there is extremely scant information about the ground operations of the Russian army
Thus, in March, in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin, 21 participants in the operation in Syria received state awards: four servicemen received the title of Hero of Russia, 17 people received the Order of St. George, Courage, “For Merit to the Fatherland,” and “For Military Merit.” It is possible that the Russians awarded by the head of state, like their colleagues from the MTR, became victims of the unprofessionalism of the Syrian army.
The history of exploits is not always made public. The Russian state is not often the first to report on the heroism and dedication of our military personnel who died in battle with terrorists. This was the case with the message about the death of special forces soldier Alexander Prokhorenko, who caused fire on himself during the liberation of Palmyra on March 17, 2016. The lieutenant's feat was first reported by Western media, and only then did it find a response in Russia.
Few people know the feat of the 35-year-old chief of intelligence at the headquarters of a howitzer self-propelled artillery division, Captain Marat Akhmetshin. The funeral and posthumous awards took place in secrecy on June 6 and August 31, 2016. A native of Kazan died near Palmyra; his family received notification of his death on June 3, 2016.
On June 23, 2016, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation was issued awarding Akhmetshin the title of Hero of Russia “for courage and heroism in performing special tasks.” The circumstances of the feat are classified, but the general picture of the battle in January 2017 was described by the father of the deceased captain. From his words it follows that Akhmetshin and other servicemen confronted 200 militants.
“When help arrived and the attack was repulsed, he was found still alive. He, all wounded, held a grenade without a pin in his hand, and the earth around him was burning. Apparently, he wanted to blow himself up if ISIS approached. Our people took the grenade and threw it to the side so that it exploded. Only then did the son lose consciousness and fall face first into the fire,” said the father of the Russian hero.
Presumably, at the end of December 2016 or the beginning of January 2017, by a closed decree of the President of the Russian Federation, MTR officers who eliminated the organizers of the shelling of a Russian field hospital in Aleppo were awarded. On December 5, 2016, medics - sergeants Nadezhda Durachenko and Galina Mikhailova - became victims of militant shells. In total, the Syrian campaign took the lives of 34 Russians.
December 11 V.V. Putin, during a meeting with Assad Bashar at the Khmeimim airbase, announced the beginning of the withdrawal of the Russian group of troops from the Syrian Arab Republic. However, our compatriots will still be in the hot spot for some time. First of all, these are medical workers, sappers, security soldiers, pilots, repair technicians, etc.
Despite the almost complete liberation of the state from the troops of ISIS and other groups, Syria continues to remain a hot spot, therefore the salaries of contract military personnel stationed in the country are significantly higher than what they would receive in the same positions in the Russian Federation.
What factors influence wages (how much do they pay)
The presence of a group of Russian troops in Syria is regulated by Federal Law No. 93 of June 23, 1995, and monetary payments to contract military personnel performing their duty outside the Russian Federation are regulated by Government Decree No. 812. The salaries of military personnel in Syria cannot be averaged and depend on many factors:
- specialties;
- military rank;
- duration of the contract;
- the role of a soldier in combat operations;
- for pilots - the number of combat sorties;
- availability of awards and distinctions.
In 2016-2017, the amount of payments for ordinary personnel was in the range of 150-200 thousand rubles per month; for officers - 250-300 thousand; pilots received up to 400 thousand.
These amounts are made up of 2 main components: daily allowance and the soldier’s salary. Daily allowance for sergeants and privates - $43 US; officers - 62 US dollars. In accordance with the current exchange rate, this is over 2500 - 3600 rubles per day. The basic salary of contract soldiers in Syria is calculated in accordance with the staffing table and amounts to 50-150 thousand rubles. In addition, various additional payments are expected, which are included in the total amount.
Important! Salaries and additional payments of Russian military personnel in Syria are paid into the bank account of military personnel. The total amount includes pension contributions and personal income tax.
All military personnel who have been in Syria on a business trip since September 30, 2015 are combat veterans and are entitled to benefits in accordance with the Veterans Law.
Life insurance for military personnel and other forms of social protection
Military service is a job of increased responsibility and increased danger, and being in a combat zone significantly increases the risk of injury, injury, and in the most tragic cases, loss of life. The state has provided social protection for contract workers, in particular, through insurance of military personnel by the SOGAZ company. Payment amounts are strictly regulated:
- RUB 584,338 – upon receipt of group III disability;
- 1,160 thousand rubles. - upon receipt of group II disability;
- 1,750 thousand rubles. - upon receipt of group I disability;
- RUB 2,340 thousand – payments to the family in the event of the death of a serviceman.
In addition, compensation is guaranteed to military personnel in case of injuries and injuries that do not lead to disability.
Living conditions and social security of Russian military personnel in the SAR
Russian military personnel in the Syrian Arab Republic live in specially equipped military bases located 300 km from the combat line. They are provided with food, clothing, and receive qualified medical care. Also on the territory of the camps there are household services: a hairdresser, a laundry, a communication point with the command. Newly arrived contract workers undergo special training before participating in hostilities.
Important! Living on the territory of military bases and tent camps is completely safe.
This story, as another episode of the long-term Syrian massacre, passed through the information space last Thursday. The US command reported that it repelled an “unprovoked attack” from Syrian government forces: “Coalition troops were present as advisers, assistants and escorts with partners from the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) during the attack, which took place in the village of Husham, 8 km east of the agreed line of contact in the Euphrates River basin.” .
It was specified that the Kurds and Americans were attacked by up to 500 infantry, artillery and tanks. After the shells began landing 500 meters from the SDF headquarters, the Americans decided to act and used all calibers, including attack drones, helicopters and howitzers. As a result, according to Pentagon representatives, about 100 Syrian soldiers and their allies were killed.
The Russian Ministry of Defense acknowledged the fact of the clash. According to our defense department, on this day one of the militia detachments of pro-government forces was searching for “sleeping cells” of the Islamic State (a terrorist organization banned in Russia). And was attacked by the US coalition: “As a result of the shelling, 25 Syrian militiamen were injured. The cause of the incident was the actions of Syrian militias that were not coordinated with the command of the Russian operational group.”
And this episode would have remained just another “incident” - everyone had long ago become accustomed to the fact that the Syrians were being attacked either by the Turks, or by the Israelis, or by the Kurds... But a day later, reports began to surface that the “militias” were in fact not only Syrian. And the fighters of the Russian private military company - PMC - came under attack from US aircraft. Military formations that are not part of the official security forces are used by major powers around the world - to solve military problems, protect facilities, train foreign units...
Russian professional volunteers have been fighting in Syria since 2015, participating in the liberation of Palmyra, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor... They do not obey the Ministry of Defense, formally being “free artists”. Therefore, the defense department is not responsible for them.
These messages were given “credibility” by audio clips in which unknown people reported eerie details of the battle. These recordings were distributed via instant messengers at the speed of horror stories about pedophiles that periodically pop up in school parent chats. And judging by the enthusiasm with which they were replicated by Ukrainian bloggers (coupled with fake photos of the destroyed column and a video of its execution, which turned out to be a computer game), one could assume that this whole story is a big information sabotage. However, there is no smoke without fire.
According to KP sources in the mentioned PMC, there really was a battle on the night of February 8th. And you can’t count it among the military victories of the “private traders”. Considering that Kurdish forces had occupied a large oil plant on the left bank of the Euphrates without serious grounds, the command of the PMC decided to try to recapture it. The calculation was that, having seen impressive forces, the Kurds would not resist and would retreat.
However, the American officers in the SDF positions had a different opinion. US representatives (as stated by the headquarters of Operation Inherent Resolve) contacted the Russian side several times. And they confirmed that they are not conducting military operations in this area. After this, the Americans were not shy.
They just rolled us out,” a source told KP. - First artillery, then helicopters... The dead, of course, are not 600 or 200. But American statistics are very close to reality. Surely they saw that we were preparing for an assault on our bridgehead on the left bank (the main forces of government forces and their allies are on the right). It is no coincidence that the crossing of the Euphrates was flooded the other day through the release of water in the locks. Help would not have come to us even hypothetically. As a result, the 5th assault detachment was almost completely destroyed and burned along with its equipment.
Meanwhile, condolences from friends and relatives on the VKontakte pages of the victims have already begun to appear on social networks. Among them are certain Alexey Ladygin, Stas Matveev, Vladimir Loginov... Among the dead there are also citizens of Ukraine. According to KP, a native of Slavyansk, who took part in the battles for Donbass since 2014, has already been buried in Rostov. And in 2016 he signed a contract with PMC.
Obviously, the command of the private military company did not inform Khmeimim about their plans. And when US representatives reached the Russian headquarters via a special channel, our officers did not have the necessary information to prevent the massacre. However, no one will officially comment on this. Just as they would not do this in any other country that has private armies.
The scandal surrounding the attack by the American coalition on Syrian government forces, during which Russian fighters also died, continues.
This story has two main interconnected dimensions: military and informational. The Russian side suffered losses in both. But the whole scandal, as such, is associated primarily with the defeat of the Russian side in the information dimension - in the PR field.
Proxy War
In the battle for public opinion during this scandal, the parties used two polar statements:
The US openly attacks Russian troops;
those killed are not Russian forces and are acting on their own.
Neither one nor the other is true.
Why do you think powerful powers (including the irreverent USA) needed memorandums on incident prevention, agreements on coordination of actions and those same notorious PMCs?
The fact is that in the event of a full-scale military conflict, each side is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy (to the extent of mutual destruction). At least until strategic weapons reached a new level and the balance of power radically changed.
Therefore, both sides are forced to act against each other indirectly, through puppets and proxies, without moving on to open attacks on each other and disguising their participation in the forces that directly conduct hostilities.
Fatal military mistake
Most of the data discussed on the Internet and in the press about what happened, the number of deaths, circumstances, etc. belongs to the area of rumors, speculation and online folklore.
All we can say with a relative degree of certainty is that there was polite communication between the American and Russian sides before and during the incident (with conflicting responses from the Russian side), and there was a massive American strike that killed Russian assets on the ground as part of Syrian forces.
Apparently, Russia did not want to advertise that it had to do some of the dirty work for the locals, and that at least some of the fighters on the ground were Russian combatants disguised as local “dushmans.” Military manuals do not recommend this practice (it is better when the locals do all the thankless work themselves, and they are given all the necessary support). In addition, Russian troops were literally just solemnly, with pomp, once again completely “withdrawn” from Syria.
It should be noted that the American side also adheres to a similar practice of hidden participation in Syria. Western volunteers who joined the Kurds mentioned in interviews that, in fact, amateurs like them did not often have to take part in real battles, but in the front lines American and European professionals acted actively and secretly and did all the difficult work. Not everything can be entrusted to local allies if you expect returns within a reasonable time.
Also, at the end of September 2017, the Americans refused to officially expand the agreement on coordination operating over the Syrian skies to include ground actions of the parties (it was and is in force, but unofficially). The Russian side explained this by the fact that the Americans do not want to disclose the specific location of their assets in various areas. At the same time, Russian representatives made accusations that the United States supported ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, pointing to specific incidents (the conclusion suggests itself: that is why they did not want to “shine the light”). And the Western press was making noise about Russian airborne forces striking SDS assets in the area of the Deir ez-Zor gas fields. Regarding which Konashenkov was forced to explain that the strikes are being carried out not against American special forces and the SDF, but against ISIS (the only problem is that the SDF and the Americans, it seems, in the opinion of the Russian military, are acting together with ISIS, and explanations regarding the documented Russian Aerospace Forces did not show any evidence of mixing of orders).
In the case of the current American strike on Russian assets (in a way, a mirror response to the September airborne raids), the fatal mistake of the Russian side most likely was that at some level of command, just in case, they did not want to “shine” their assets to the Americans and did not expect that the Americans were preparing a full-scale attack. To the direct question of the Americans - “Yours?” - they automatically answered the template: “Of course not!” And then they regretted it. The Americans took advantage of the Russian oversight, “honestly” completing all the necessary formalities and thereby, as it were, absolving themselves of responsibility for what happened: formally, they crushed the Russian forces because the Russian coordinators misled them, and the Americans, as it were, did not know that These are Russian assets.
PR knockout in the information field
The inadequate reaction of Russian PR heavyweights to what happened is what gave rise to the current scandal with significant damage to the Russian side.
In themselves, combat losses in war are not surprising and do not cause much excitement. As a rule, behind major defeats there are always someone’s serious miscalculations and mistakes - this will not surprise anyone either.
However, the Americans, seeing the confusion and silence of the Russian side, used this incident for a successful information attack.
When a major disaster occurs with casualties, official PR, if you pay attention, always tries to present the overall picture of losses not immediately, but in doses, gradually increasing the degree (probably so as not to cause undesirable reactions from the public caused by shock and frustration). However, it never occurs to anyone to deny losses in general or pretend that what happened is indifferent to him.
But it was just such an inadequate reaction that came from Mr. Peskov, who, in his characteristic imposing manner, stated that he knew absolutely nothing about what happened (as if it were not interesting), and suggested contacting the Ministry of Defense and Sportloto for information. The reaction of other departments was approximately equally pointless. Officials thus sought to hush up the incident.
The sworn partners immediately took advantage of the gift and did not hesitate. The situation developed in exactly the same way as with the PR debacle in the field of sports doping, when unfriendly media intensively raised the temperature with the help of rumors and speculation, while Russian officials did the “moo-moo.” Apparently, Russian PR professionals are taught nothing about PR not only by textbooks compiled on the basis of other people’s experience, but also by their own sad experience.
While Russian officials remained proudly silent, the monopoly Western media began to circulate rumors about the mass deaths of Russian “mercenaries” (after all, the Russian authorities themselves refused to give them any recognition, right? Not career military personnel, not private advisers or military experts, but who then?). The number of casualties began to grow by leaps and bounds: 100, 200, 600... The wildest rumors were circulated, precisely supported by factual information on those who actually died in the incident, from what inevitably began to leak into the press (reports about the “funeral”, confirmations from family members, friends and colleagues).
By the time the guru of Russian PR, Mr. Peskov, came out of his trance and realized that something in his dusty work had gone wrong, when the PR services of Russian departments came out of their coma and began to try to adequately respond to the situation, admitting losses and independently voicing actual lists of dozens of dead, through the timely efforts of the enemy, the belief about hundreds of dead Russian soldiers, whom the Russian leadership treacherously abandoned, cowardly not wanting to admit their own mistakes, has already been cemented in the mass consciousness (it would be better to let all these dead soldiers burn in hell and perish into oblivion like garbage, than a stain on our impeccable reputation at such a crucial moment!). There was a persistent distrust of the words and actions of the Russian authorities.
What happened is another demonstration of the blatant incompetence of Russian PR and negligent attitude towards its own work.
Conclusion
Yes, a fatal tactical mistake led to painful military losses on the Russian side, which the Russian side did not want to officially recognize and advertise. But it was the negligent and unprofessional actions of Russian official representatives (primarily the infinitely cool Peskov) that caused significant image and reputational damage to Russian interests.
PR and information spin exist in order to mitigate, if possible, the negative information effect of unfavorable events. Russian PR and spin, on the contrary, aggravate in public perception what is already bad and sad.
On December 11, President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin personally arrived at the Russian Khmeimim military base in Syria to give the order for the withdrawal of the Russian group. This decision is explained by the end of the military operation, the result of which was the liberation of Syria from the militants of the Islamic State (an organization banned in Russia), under whose control, according to the Ministry of Defense, not a single settlement remained.
However, talking about the withdrawal of troops should still be very conditional - there will still be a lot of Russian military personnel in Syria. “Our Version” found out who is not yet destined to return home.
It is noteworthy that nowhere in the news is it possible to find data on exactly how many military personnel will return to their homeland. The fact is that the total number of weapons and personnel involved in the operation was never officially announced. According to some reports, in the most active phase of the counter-terrorism operation in Syria, the Russian aviation group consisted of up to 70 planes and helicopters. As of November 2017, there were approximately 35 combat aircraft in Khmeimim (including Su-25SM attack aircraft, Su-24M and Su-34 front-line bombers, MiG-29SMT, Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters), army aviation, represented by transport helicopters and fire support helicopters Ka-52, Mi-35M and Mi-24P. According to official statements, 23 Russian aircraft of various modifications and 2 Ka-52 helicopters will be withdrawn from Syria. Ultimately, the group may be reduced to one aviation squadron. It is assumed that this will be enough to strike the scattered militant groups remaining in Syria. If the situation escalates, the military will be able to increase the size of the aviation group in just a few days. Therefore, the withdrawal of troops can again turn into deployment.
Will the ground group be replaced by PMCs?
However, in the event of an escalation of the conflict or attempts by Islamists to group, the Russian military will not limit itself to the assistance of aviation from Khmeimim. To support the Syrian army, high-precision weapons can be used at any time; the possibility of this was demonstrated by the missile ships of the Caspian Flotilla, which, if necessary, will strike with Caliber-NK cruise missiles. Within a short time, Long-Range Aviation aircraft, which have fully tested the use of modern missiles, will also be able to provide support to the troops fighting in Syria.
In Syria, two military facilities will continue to function fully: the Khmeimim airbase and the naval logistics center in Tartus.
The equipment and weapons used to cover them will not be withdrawn. In Syria, there will remain divisions of the S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems deployed in Khmeimim and Masyaf, a battery of the S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile system in Tartus and a number of Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems. Russian drones will also remain in Syria, with the help of which they monitor de-escalation zones. The military claims that this composition of the group is capable of successfully completing assigned tasks with the same efficiency.
The ground force will also be seriously reduced. Let us recall that until recently, according to various sources, there were about 2.5 thousand military personnel in Syria. Marine units, combined motorized rifle units, which were armed with armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, tanks and self-propelled artillery units, took part in the operation. Now their number will be significantly reduced. By now, a detachment of the International Mine Action Center of the Russian Armed Forces, which carried out tasks to clear mines in Syrian cities, has already arrived at its permanent deployment point in Nakhabino, near Moscow. In addition, a military police battalion of the Southern Military District returned to Makhachkala, which monitored the cessation of hostilities in de-escalation zones, as well as ensured the safety of civilians during humanitarian actions and escorted humanitarian convoys.
However, it has been previously reported more than once that the main combat missions on the ground were carried out by private military companies (PMCs). What will happen to them now is unknown. It is possible that in connection with the withdrawal of part of the ground group, the ranks of PMCs will even grow - someone needs to replace the retired military personnel.
Americans don't believe in troop withdrawal
The military started talking about withdrawing troops from Syria at the end of October. Then government troops took control of approximately 95% of the territory of the republic, after which it was stated that the Syrians no longer needed large-scale support. The Pentagon’s reaction to the withdrawal of the Russian group from Syria is curious: the US military stated that Russia’s plans “will not affect US priorities in Syria in any way.” Apparently, in this way the Americans show that they do not trust reports about the withdrawal of Russian troops. At the same time, hinting that Russia had previously announced a reduction in the size of its group, but then increased it again. Let us recall that in March 2016, the military already received an order to begin the withdrawal of the main part of Russian forces “in connection with the successful completion of tasks,” after which the air group was reduced from 69 to 25 units. By that time, Russian troops had practically liberated Palmyra, but the country's largest city, Aleppo, and large areas throughout the country remained under the control of the militants. The defense minister spoke about reducing the group for the second time in December 2016. So the current troop withdrawal is the third in a row. Will there be a fourth? Who knows. Last week, IS extremists tried to raise their heads again, so anything is possible. In the meantime, the situation is reminiscent of the story of 1996, when, on the eve of the elections, Boris Yeltsin arrived in Chechnya, where he declared victory over the terrorists and signed a decree on the withdrawal of federal troops. However, as we know, this did not bring peace and the Chechen campaign continued for several more years.
Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Colonel General:
“I believe that this time the decision on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria is final. Long-term, endless participation of troops of any country in armed conflicts negatively affects public opinion. Especially when there is no common unifying idea. Initially, successes in Syria were accepted pathetically and patriotically, but today, against the backdrop of the deteriorating economic situation of a significant part of the population, society is beginning to make complaints that the state is spending a lot on the Syrian conflict and little on pensions and salaries. Plus, the loss factor comes into play - according to the Ministry of Defense, they are minimal, but nevertheless they are perceived very painfully by citizens. Therefore, the decision to withdraw is correct and timely - it is necessary to leave on the wave of victory over the terrorists and the obvious strengthening of Russia’s position in this region.
The question remains whether Russia will subsequently participate in the Syrian conflict. I think that this cannot be ruled out. Two military bases remain in Syria - an air and naval base. This means a permanent Russian military presence in this region. And if necessary, the group will be expanded. If it is necessary to use greater military power, then our naval groups and Long-Range Aviation will be involved in the shortest possible time. Russia will not deploy additional military bases or participate in other military conflicts in this region; at most, these will be peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN.
I assume that Russia’s transition to a geopolitical offensive will continue. Besides Syria, there are other points on the map where Russia must be present to defend its interests. These are Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela and a number of other countries that invite us. Therefore, I believe that our episodic presence with the visits of ships and landings of strategic aircraft, as was the case in Indonesia, will increase. And this is not the aggressiveness of Russia or its Supreme Commander-in-Chief - this is a necessity to ensure its security.
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