The Russian military has again mediocrely declassified itself, unable to overcome its dependence on social networks. In addition, they lack the basic technical literacy to disable geolocation in their mobile phones. As a result, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki are filled with photos of Russian army personnel posing against the backdrop of streets, landmarks and combat positions in warring Syria. Dozens of similar photosdiscovered Kyiv blogger Nikolay Makhno, simply by using Syrian geotags for automatic search.
Russian soldier in Syria. Photo from VKontakte
From the photographs published on their social media pages by the Russian military, “who are not in Syria,” one can draw conclusions not only about the geography of their penetration into this country, but also about their numerical strength. If previously it was possible to talk only about Russian instructors and military specialists who trained the army of the local dictator Bashar al-Assad, now soldiers from the Russian Federation are arriving in Syria in entire units, fully equipped with military equipment and weapons.
As for the geography of infiltration into the country, from the photos published by soldiers and sailors it is easy to understand that this is happening mainly by sea and partly by air. Thus, marine units arrive in Syria on Russian Navy ships through the port of Tartus, where most of the “selfies” are posted. Further, the paths of the Russian soldiers diverge: their photos end up on Odnoklassniki and VKontakte from the cities of Latakia, Ain As-Soda, Hama and Homs, where active hostilities are currently taking place between rebels and government troops. It is on the side of the latter, as can be seen from the photographs, that the Russian military is fighting.
It is absolutely obvious that it is with the unofficial arrival of regular units of the Russian army in Syria that one should associate the unprecedented intensification of hostilities there, from which it is mainly the civilian population that is suffering. Immediately after the boots of the Russian military set foot on the Syrian shore, the flow of refugees from Syria to the countries of the European Union increased many times over.
The fact that the Russian army is fighting on the side of dictator Bashar al-Assad is well known to the American and European media, which have already published this information. Yesterday, September 4, I tried to officially refute it Dmitry Peskov- press secretary of the Russian president Vladimir Putin. However, by simply searching for photos using VKontakte geotags, it is absolutely not difficult to understand that he was lying. Actually, there is nothing new in this: the Russian military has repeatedly exposed itself by publishing photographs from Ukraine on social networks, but the Kremlin continues to stubbornly pretend that “they are not there.”
December 11 V.V. Putin, during a meeting with Assad Bashar at the Khmeimim airbase, announced the beginning of the withdrawal of the Russian group of troops from the Syrian Arab Republic. However, our compatriots will still be in the hot spot for some time. First of all, these are medical workers, sappers, security soldiers, pilots, repair technicians, etc.
Despite the almost complete liberation of the state from the troops of ISIS and other groups, Syria continues to remain a hot spot, therefore the salaries of contract military personnel stationed in the country are significantly higher than what they would receive in the same positions in the Russian Federation.
What factors influence wages (how much do they pay)
The presence of a group of Russian troops in Syria is regulated by Federal Law No. 93 of June 23, 1995, and monetary payments to contract military personnel performing their duty outside the Russian Federation are regulated by Government Decree No. 812. The salaries of military personnel in Syria cannot be averaged and depend on many factors:
- specialties;
- military rank;
- duration of the contract;
- the role of a soldier in combat operations;
- for pilots - the number of combat sorties;
- availability of awards and distinctions.
In 2016-2017, the amount of payments for ordinary personnel was in the range of 150-200 thousand rubles per month; for officers - 250-300 thousand; pilots received up to 400 thousand.
These amounts are made up of 2 main components: daily allowance and the soldier’s salary. Daily allowance for sergeants and privates - $43 US; officers - 62 US dollars. In accordance with the current exchange rate, this is over 2500 - 3600 rubles per day. The basic salary of contract soldiers in Syria is calculated in accordance with the staffing table and amounts to 50-150 thousand rubles. In addition, various additional payments are expected, which are included in the total amount.
Important! Salaries and additional payments of Russian military personnel in Syria are paid into the bank account of military personnel. The total amount includes pension contributions and personal income tax.
All military personnel who have been in Syria on a business trip since September 30, 2015 are combat veterans and are entitled to benefits in accordance with the Veterans Law.
Life insurance for military personnel and other forms of social protection
Military service is a job of increased responsibility and increased danger, and being in a combat zone significantly increases the risk of injury, injury, and in the most tragic cases, loss of life. The state has provided social protection for contract workers, in particular, through insurance of military personnel by the SOGAZ company. Payment amounts are strictly regulated:
- RUB 584,338 – upon receipt of group III disability;
- 1,160 thousand rubles. - upon receipt of group II disability;
- 1,750 thousand rubles. - upon receipt of group I disability;
- RUB 2,340 thousand – payments to the family in the event of the death of a serviceman.
In addition, compensation is guaranteed to military personnel in case of injuries and injuries that do not lead to disability.
Living conditions and social security of Russian military personnel in the SAR
Russian military personnel in the Syrian Arab Republic live in specially equipped military bases located 300 km from the combat line. They are provided with food, clothing, and receive qualified medical care. Also on the territory of the camps there are household services: a hairdresser, a laundry, a communication point with the command. Newly arrived contract workers undergo special training before participating in hostilities.
Important! Living on the territory of military bases and tent camps is completely safe.
On December 11, President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin personally arrived at the Russian Khmeimim military base in Syria to give the order for the withdrawal of the Russian group. This decision is explained by the end of the military operation, the result of which was the liberation of Syria from the militants of the Islamic State (an organization banned in Russia), under whose control, according to the Ministry of Defense, not a single settlement remained.
However, talking about the withdrawal of troops should still be very conditional - there will still be a lot of Russian military personnel in Syria. “Our Version” found out who is not yet destined to return home.
It is noteworthy that nowhere in the news is it possible to find data on exactly how many military personnel will return to their homeland. The fact is that the total number of weapons and personnel involved in the operation was never officially announced. According to some reports, in the most active phase of the counter-terrorism operation in Syria, the Russian aviation group consisted of up to 70 planes and helicopters. As of November 2017, there were approximately 35 combat aircraft in Khmeimim (including Su-25SM attack aircraft, Su-24M and Su-34 front-line bombers, MiG-29SMT, Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters), army aviation, represented by transport helicopters and fire support helicopters Ka-52, Mi-35M and Mi-24P. According to official statements, 23 Russian aircraft of various modifications and 2 Ka-52 helicopters will be withdrawn from Syria. Ultimately, the group may be reduced to one aviation squadron. It is assumed that this will be enough to strike the scattered militant groups remaining in Syria. If the situation escalates, the military will be able to increase the size of the aviation group in just a few days. Therefore, the withdrawal of troops can again turn into deployment.
Will the ground group be replaced by PMCs?
However, in the event of an escalation of the conflict or attempts by Islamists to group, the Russian military will not limit itself to the assistance of aviation from Khmeimim. To support the Syrian army, high-precision weapons can be used at any time; the possibility of this was demonstrated by the missile ships of the Caspian Flotilla, which, if necessary, will strike with Caliber-NK cruise missiles. Within a short time, Long-Range Aviation aircraft, which have fully tested the use of modern missiles, will also be able to provide support to the troops fighting in Syria.
In Syria, two military facilities will continue to function fully: the Khmeimim airbase and the naval logistics center in Tartus.
The equipment and weapons used to cover them will not be withdrawn. In Syria, there will remain divisions of the S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems deployed in Khmeimim and Masyaf, a battery of the S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile system in Tartus and a number of Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems. Russian drones will also remain in Syria, with the help of which they monitor de-escalation zones. The military claims that this composition of the group is capable of successfully completing assigned tasks with the same efficiency.
The ground force will also be seriously reduced. Let us recall that until recently, according to various sources, there were about 2.5 thousand military personnel in Syria. Marine units, combined motorized rifle units, which were armed with armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, tanks and self-propelled artillery units, took part in the operation. Now their number will be significantly reduced. By now, a detachment of the International Mine Action Center of the Russian Armed Forces, which carried out tasks to clear mines in Syrian cities, has already arrived at its permanent deployment point in Nakhabino, near Moscow. In addition, a military police battalion of the Southern Military District returned to Makhachkala, which monitored the cessation of hostilities in de-escalation zones, as well as ensured the safety of civilians during humanitarian actions and escorted humanitarian convoys.
However, it has been previously reported more than once that the main combat missions on the ground were carried out by private military companies (PMCs). What will happen to them now is unknown. It is possible that in connection with the withdrawal of part of the ground group, the ranks of PMCs will even grow - someone needs to replace the retired military personnel.
Americans don't believe in troop withdrawal
The military started talking about withdrawing troops from Syria at the end of October. Then government troops took control of approximately 95% of the territory of the republic, after which it was stated that the Syrians no longer needed large-scale support. The Pentagon’s reaction to the withdrawal of the Russian group from Syria is curious: the US military stated that Russia’s plans “will not affect US priorities in Syria in any way.” Apparently, in this way the Americans show that they do not trust reports about the withdrawal of Russian troops. At the same time, hinting that Russia had previously announced a reduction in the size of its group, but then increased it again. Let us recall that in March 2016, the military already received an order to begin the withdrawal of the main part of Russian forces “in connection with the successful completion of tasks,” after which the air group was reduced from 69 to 25 units. By that time, Russian troops had practically liberated Palmyra, but the country's largest city, Aleppo, and large areas throughout the country remained under the control of the militants. The defense minister spoke about reducing the group for the second time in December 2016. So the current troop withdrawal is the third in a row. Will there be a fourth? Who knows. Last week, IS extremists tried to raise their heads again, so anything is possible. In the meantime, the situation is reminiscent of the story of 1996, when, on the eve of the elections, Boris Yeltsin arrived in Chechnya, where he declared victory over the terrorists and signed a decree on the withdrawal of federal troops. However, as we know, this did not bring peace and the Chechen campaign continued for several more years.
Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Colonel General:
“I believe that this time the decision on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria is final. Long-term, endless participation of troops of any country in armed conflicts negatively affects public opinion. Especially when there is no common unifying idea. Initially, successes in Syria were accepted pathetically and patriotically, but today, against the backdrop of the deteriorating economic situation of a significant part of the population, society is beginning to make complaints that the state is spending a lot on the Syrian conflict and little on pensions and salaries. Plus, the loss factor comes into play - according to the Ministry of Defense, they are minimal, but nevertheless they are perceived very painfully by citizens. Therefore, the decision to withdraw is correct and timely - it is necessary to leave on the wave of victory over the terrorists and the obvious strengthening of Russia’s position in this region.
The question remains whether Russia will subsequently participate in the Syrian conflict. I think that this cannot be ruled out. Two military bases remain in Syria - an air and naval base. This means a permanent Russian military presence in this region. And if necessary, the group will be expanded. If it is necessary to use greater military power, then our naval groups and Long-Range Aviation will be involved in the shortest possible time. Russia will not deploy additional military bases or participate in other military conflicts in this region; at most, these will be peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN.
I assume that Russia’s transition to a geopolitical offensive will continue. Besides Syria, there are other points on the map where Russia must be present to defend its interests. These are Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela and a number of other countries that invite us. Therefore, I believe that our episodic presence with the visits of ships and landings of strategic aircraft, as was the case in Indonesia, will increase. And this is not the aggressiveness of Russia or its Supreme Commander-in-Chief - this is a necessity to ensure its security.
The Russian Ministry of Defense published information about the clash, which could have ended sadly for our military personnel performing their professional duty in Syria. On September 19, as a result of a large-scale offensive by Jabhat al-Nusra militants (an organization banned in the Russian Federation), a platoon of Russian military police consisting of 29 people was surrounded in the area of the city of Hama.
Superior enemy forces
“The offensive was carried out with the support of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, and was preceded by powerful fire preparation. During the day, the militants managed to penetrate the defenses of government troops to a depth of 12 kilometers, at the front up to 20 kilometers,” the Ministry of Defense reports, clarifying that the clashes took place in the Idlib de-escalation zone.
According to the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Sergei Rudsky, the terrorist offensive was initiated by American intelligence services in order to stop the successfully developing advance of government troops east of Deir ez-Zor, to the garrison of which the Syrian army broke through in early September.
For several hours, Russian police, together with a detachment of the Muali tribe, which had previously joined the truce, repelled attacks from superior enemy forces. The emergency was reported to the commander of the Russian group of troops in the SAR, Colonel General Sergei Surovikin.
The military commander decided to form a military police platoon to clear the blockade. It included units of the Special Operations Forces (SSO), military police staffed by immigrants from the North Caucasus, and Syrian special forces. The group was headed by the deputy head of the Russian center for reconciliation of warring parties, Hero of Russia, Major General Viktor Shulyak.
Fire support for the military personnel was provided by two Su-25 attack aircraft, which struck enemy personnel and armored vehicles from extremely low altitudes. As a result of the attack by Russian troops, the encirclement ring was broken. It was not possible to recapture the territory occupied by the terrorists, however, a platoon of military police and the rest of the military personnel reached the area where government troops were located without losses.
During the relief operation, three special forces soldiers were injured (the severity was not specified). All participants in the battle were nominated for state awards. The onslaught of Jabhat al-Nusra was stopped. “During the day, aviation strikes and artillery fire damaged 187 targets, destroyed about 850 terrorists, 11 tanks, 4 infantry fighting vehicles, 46 pickup trucks, 5 mortars, 20 trucks, 38 weapons depots,” Rudskoy reported.
The successful work of the airborne forces and artillery crews allowed the 5th Syrian Airborne Assault Corps to launch a counteroffensive and almost completely restore the lost position.
Difficult choice
The information provided by the Ministry of Defense provides great food for the analysis of the characteristics of the Russian military presence in Syria. According to the current agreements, four battalions of Russian military police monitor compliance with the truce in four de-escalation zones, performing mainly security functions. From open data it follows that the red berets are armed with small arms, grenade launchers and a number of armored vehicles (in particular, Typhoon and Tiger).
In the absence of heavy weapons, it is extremely difficult to repel massive attacks by militants. Nevertheless, the police were able to hold out without casualties. This indicates either the high combat readiness of the Russians and the skillful organization of defense, or that the militants’ attack on the platoon’s location was not accompanied by the support of tanks and artillery pieces.
The strike group that carried out the operation to relieve the blockade consisted of SOF officers, colleagues who were surrounded by police officers, Syrian special forces and the crew of two Su-25s (although at low altitudes it was much more logical to use helicopters).
The composition of the relief group may indicate that the Russian command is faced with a difficult choice. There probably wasn’t much strength to save the red berets, and that’s why it was necessary to pull together such motley formations. In particular, according to a similar scenario, an operation was organized to rescue the crew of a Su-24M front-line bomber shot down by Turkey on November 24, 2015. Then the Russian military was supported by Hezbollah special forces.
The fact that the military police platoon was surrounded means at least weak intelligence in the de-escalation zone. The Ministry of Defense nods to the American intelligence services, but the bottom line is that we get a miscalculation of either the Syrian army or our military intelligence (if, of course, it operated in the Hama area).
Jabhat al-Nusra's offensive was "large-scale," meaning its preparations could be traced. Placing responsibility on the American intelligence services (probably referring to the CIA, which oversees several gangs in the Syrian Arab Republic) is more reminiscent of an attempt to justify the mistake of government forces or Russian intelligence.
If the situation of the military police platoon, for various reasons, turned out to be truly deplorable, then the incident in the Hama area can, without exaggeration, be called a feat of Russian military personnel, and the rescue operation is unique due to the lack of necessary military equipment. Military police officers and MTR personnel covered themselves with unfading military glory.
For courage and heroism
The display of extraordinary courage and professionalism has always been a hallmark of our army. The operation in Syria was no exception. In the first half of May, Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the title of Hero of Russia to four Russian SOF officers who, as part of a group of 16 people, repelled attacks by 300 Jabhat al-Nusra militants for two days. The encirclement became possible due to the chaotic retreat of the Syrian army.
On May 24, in the presence of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, Putin personally awarded the special forces. This is not the first time that awards have been given to Russian military personnel who fight both in the sky and on the ground, although there is extremely scant information about the ground operations of the Russian army
Thus, in March, in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin, 21 participants in the operation in Syria received state awards: four servicemen received the title of Hero of Russia, 17 people received the Order of St. George, Courage, “For Merit to the Fatherland,” and “For Military Merit.” It is possible that the Russians awarded by the head of state, like their colleagues from the MTR, became victims of the unprofessionalism of the Syrian army.
The history of exploits is not always made public. The Russian state is not often the first to report on the heroism and dedication of our military personnel who died in battle with terrorists. This was the case with the message about the death of special forces soldier Alexander Prokhorenko, who caused fire on himself during the liberation of Palmyra on March 17, 2016. The lieutenant's feat was first reported by Western media, and only then did it find a response in Russia.
Few people know the feat of the 35-year-old chief of intelligence at the headquarters of a howitzer self-propelled artillery division, Captain Marat Akhmetshin. The funeral and posthumous awards took place in secrecy on June 6 and August 31, 2016. A native of Kazan died near Palmyra; his family received notification of his death on June 3, 2016.
On June 23, 2016, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation was issued awarding Akhmetshin the title of Hero of Russia “for courage and heroism in performing special tasks.” The circumstances of the feat are classified, but the general picture of the battle in January 2017 was described by the father of the deceased captain. From his words it follows that Akhmetshin and other servicemen confronted 200 militants.
“When help arrived and the attack was repulsed, he was found still alive. He, all wounded, held a grenade without a pin in his hand, and the earth around him was burning. Apparently, he wanted to blow himself up if ISIS approached. Our people took the grenade and threw it to the side so that it exploded. Only then did the son lose consciousness and fall face first into the fire,” said the father of the Russian hero.
Presumably, at the end of December 2016 or the beginning of January 2017, by a closed decree of the President of the Russian Federation, MTR officers who eliminated the organizers of the shelling of a Russian field hospital in Aleppo were awarded. On December 5, 2016, medics - sergeants Nadezhda Durachenko and Galina Mikhailova - became victims of militant shells. In total, the Syrian campaign took the lives of 34 Russians.
journalistSaturday, September 30, marks two years since Russia entered the war in Syria. Since then, the Russian army has been drawn deeper and deeper into this war, which, according to official data alone, has claimed the lives of 38 Russian military personnel. However, the real losses are likely to be much greater. The situation allows us to assert that the Russian Federation has become involved in its Vietnam, from which it will be much more difficult to leave than to enter.
Two years ago, on September 30, 2015, Russia got involved in the Syrian war on the side of the government forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. By the time of the Russian intervention, the Assad regime was losing the civil war in its country, squeezed by ISIS militants and armed groups of the Syrian opposition. The Russian Federation deployed an air wing to Syria, which began supporting Assad’s troops from the air. According to official data, Russian aircraft bombed ISIS targets, but Syrian oppositionists stated that they were not occupied by ISIS militants.
Russian President Vladimir Putin explained his participation in the Syrian events by the need to fight terrorism on the side of the international coalition. In reality, one of the reasons was the desire of the Russian side to divert the attention of the world community from the problem of Donbass and the desire to “exchange” Syria for Crimea and Donbass, having achieved the lifting of sanctions for the invasion of Ukraine.
At first, Russia’s participation in Syria was limited only to the air force; the Russian leadership assured that it was not going to get involved in ground battles. The Russian army began to suffer losses almost immediately. Thus, on October 24, 2015, 19-year-old Russian contract soldier Vadim Kostenko died at the Khmeimim airbase, where Russian aviation is based. Exactly a month after this event, Turkish Air Force fighters shot down a Russian Su-24M front-line bomber that flew into Turkey. The crew of two pilots ejected, but the bomber commander, 45-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Peshkov, died as a result of fire from the ground.
It soon became clear that the Russian leadership, to put it mildly, was deceiving its citizens when they said that they would not get involved in ground combat. The presence of Russian “ground specialists” has become increasingly obvious and completely undeniable since the sudden retreat from Palmyra last December, when ISIS militants seized equipment and items belonging to Russian ground forces.
In recent days, in connection with the attempt to unblock the Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor, which the Syrian and Russian military are trying to carry out, reports of losses in the ranks of the Russian army are coming more and more often. The most high-profile event was, who at one time commanded the so-called first “army corps” of the illegal “DPR”, and in Syria was the commander of the 5th army corps of the Syrian army (further evidence of the active participation of Russian “ground forces” in the Syrian events).
According to official information, Asapov died during a mortar attack in Deir ez-Zor, but Russian blogger Anatoly Nesmiyan (el-murid), who closely monitors events in the Middle East, believes that the Russian Ministry of Defense hid the true information about the place and time of Asapov’s death. “I provided a link to the regional press from Bratsk, which reported on the funeral of a local resident, Sergeant Tarasyuk. He died on September 16. His sister said that a general and a colonel died with him. There are many generals in Russia, but it is logical to assume that there are not so many that they would die in such numbers in one place. It is quite possible that they were talking about General Asapov. But then the date of his death is different, perhaps the place and circumstances are also different. The sister of the deceased sergeant reported that he and the officers were ambushed while moving... The name of the colonel who was ambushed along with Tarasyuk and (presumably) Asapov is also known: Rustem Abzalov. In other words, the Ministry of Defense, having reported the death of the general, hid information about two more victims,” Nesmiyan said.
It turns out that by hiding the participation of the Russian military in ground operations in Syria, the Russian leadership is also hiding the true information about losses. According to the Russian publication Kommersant, the Russian Federation has officially recognized the death of 38 people in Syria. However, if you count the dead by name, you get about 50 people. Therefore, it is absolutely possible that the real losses of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria are even higher.
By invading Ukraine and getting involved in Syrian events, Russia got its Afghanistan and Vietnam at the same time.
This behavior is explained by very simple reasons. Russia got involved in the war in Syria to divert attention from its actions in Crimea and Donbass and “buy” the lifting of sanctions. This goal was not achieved, but now it will not be possible to simply leave the Middle East without “losing face.” The same applies to Donbass. However, it is impossible to admit one’s full participation in both wars, as well as to disclose full information about losses, since this could raise unwanted questions in society on the eve of the 2018 presidential elections. After all, then it will be necessary to explain what the goals of both wars are and the reasons why Russian servicemen are dying in them. By invading Ukraine and getting involved in Syrian events, Russia got its Afghanistan and Vietnam at the same time.
Denis Popovich, specially for “Word and Deed”
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