6. RUSSIAN ARTILLERY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THE CRISIS THAT DECIDED THE WAR (CRISIS #4)
"Our first failures in East Prussia - the catastrophe of the army of General Samsonov and the defeat suffered by General Rennenkampf - were entirely due to the overwhelming advantage of the Germans in the number of batteries" - with these words, General Golovin begins his analysis of the state of Russian artillery during the First World War. And this, unfortunately, is not an exaggeration. If we analyze the balance of forces in the battles in which the Russian army had to take part in 1914, then this state of affairs becomes quite obvious. Moreover, which is typical, with equality in artillery, the outcome of the battle, as a rule, was a draw (with rare exceptions). But whoever had an advantage in artillery (several times) and infantry (but this is not necessary), he won the battle. For example, consider several such battles in 1914.
1. The battle at Gumbinen (August 7-20) on the front of the Russian 28th Infantry Division: Russians ( 12 infantry battalions and 6 batteries), Germans ( 25 infantry battalions and 28 batteries
2. Battle at Bischofsburg ( August 13-26). Russians ( 14 infantry battalions and 8 batteries), Germans ( 40 infantry battalions and 40 batteries). The result is a decisive and swift German success.
3. Battle of Hohenstein - Soldau(August 13/26-15/28) in the area between vil. Muhlen and s. Uzdau. Russians ( 15.5 infantry battalions and 8 batteries), Germans ( 24 infantry battalions and 28 batteries). The result is a decisive and swift German success.
4. Battle of Hohenstein - Soldau(August 13/26-15/28). Uzdau region. Russians ( 24 infantry battalions and 11 batteries), Germans ( 29-35 infantry battalions and 40 batteries
5. Battle of Hohenstein - Soldau(August 13/26-15/28). Soldau area. Russians ( 20 infantry battalions and 6 batteries), Germans ( 20 infantry battalions and 39 batteries). The result is a decisive and swift German success.
The last example is especially significant. At the same time, I would like to note that the Russian artillery (in these battles) did not have heavy artillery at all, and the Germans had 25% of all artillery of just such artillery.
Looking ahead, I want to note that during the entire war by number of guns the Russian army was inferior to the Austro-Hungarians by 1.35 times (its main enemy!), And the Germans in general by 5.47 times! But that's not all! In terms of heavy guns, by the beginning of the war, Russia was 2.1 times inferior to the Austro-Hungarians, and 8.65 times to the Germans (!).
What this led to, the commander of the 29th Corps, General D.P. Zuev, wrote in the summer of 1915 to the Minister of War, General A.A. Polivanov:
“The Germans plow the battlefields with a hail of metal and level all sorts of trenches and structures with the ground, often flooding their defenders with earth. They waste metal, we waste human life. They go forward, inspired by success and therefore dare; we, at the cost of heavy losses and shed blood, only fight back and retreat ”(Golovin also cites this quote in his book)
About the reasons for such a depressing state of affairs with artillery, General Golovin writes: “Our Headquarters was made up of officers of the General Staff who still believed in the outdated Suvorov formula:“ A bullet is a fool, a bayonet is well done.
………………….
... the leaders of the Stavka did not want to understand the weakness of the Russian army in artillery. This stubbornness was, unfortunately, the result of one negative trait characteristic of the Russian military leaders: disbelief in technology. Figures like Sukhomlinov played a kind of demagogic game on this negative property, which was loved by everyone in whom the routine of thought, ignorance and simply laziness were strong.
That is why, in our highest General Staff, the realization of a shortage in artillery required a very long time. It was necessary to remove the Chief of Staff, General Yanushkevich and the Quartermaster General, General Danilov, from the Headquarters, and the removal of General Sukhomlinov from the post of Minister of War, so that at last a correct understanding of the supply of our army with artillery was born in our military leaders. But even after the change of these persons, a year passed until all the demands in this matter finally took shape. Only by the beginning of 1917, by the time of the meeting in Petrograd of the Inter-Allied Conference, the needs of the Russian army for artillery were finally formalized and brought into the system. Thus, for this clarification, it took almost 2.5 years of difficult events on the front of the war.
And what, before 1917, could the industry of the Russian Empire do to provide the army with artillery? Yes, in general, a lot when compared with pre-war production, but extremely small when compared with the actual needs of the army during the war years. I gave figures for comparison with the artillery of the Austro-Hungarians and Germans. Now let us dwell in more detail on the number of guns produced by Russian industry, and the number of guns purchased by the tsarist government abroad.
And I'll start with the needs of the Russian army in light 3-inch guns. Initially, according to the mobilization plan the productivity of artillery factories was planned to be only 75 guns of this caliber per month (which is 900 per year) . Their production (per year), indeed, grew at an accelerated pace (until 1917). Compare for yourself:
1914
. - 285
guns;
1915
. - 1654
guns;
1916
. - 7238
guns;
1917
. - 3538 guns.
In addition to this number of domestic guns, an additional 586 guns of this caliber were purchased from foreign factories. In this way, TOTAL during the years of the First World War, the Russian army received 13,301 3-inch caliber guns.
Is it a lot or a little? - you ask. The answer is simple - everything is determined by the needs of the army for each year of the war. What was this need? - again you ask. This question, as noted earlier, in the Russian army was able to get an answer only by 1917! Here are the numbers:
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 3-inch guns - 14620 units.
2. Actually received - 3538 units.
3. Shortage - 11082 units.
So, despite the truly titanic efforts of Russian industry, by 1917 the need of the Russian army for 3-inch guns was satisfied only by 24.2%!
Let's move on to the needs of the Russian army in light howitzers (4-5 inch caliber). Initially,according to mobilization assumptions, the productivity of gun factories was calculated at 6 howitzers per month (which is 72 per year).
Their production (per year):
1914
. - 70
howitzers;
1915
. - 361
howitzer;
1916
. - 818
howitzers;
1917
. - 445 howitzers.
In addition to this number of domestic light howitzers, an additional 400 such howitzers were purchased from foreign factories. In this way, TOTAL during the years of the First World War, the Russian army received 2094 light howitzers.
About the needs of the Russian army in these howitzers by 1917
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in light howitzers - 2300 units.
2. Received in reality - 445 units.
3. Shortage - 1855 units.
So, despite the truly titanic efforts of the Russian industry, by 1917 the need of the Russian army for light howitzers was satisfied only by 19.3%!
The situation was difficult for the Russian army in terms of its provision with heavy field artillery (4-inch long-range guns (4.2) and 6-inch howitzers). According to mobilization assumptions, the productivity of domestic enterprises in this category of artillery should have been equal to only 2 guns per month (!) (which is 24 per year). The possibilities of domestic industry here were generally extremely limited and could not even hypothetically satisfy the needs of the army in this type of artillery. The main role here was played by purchases made at foreign factories.
The statistics for 4-inch long-range guns of domestic production are as follows:
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 0
guns;
1916
. - 69
guns;
1917
. - 155
guns.
TOTAL: 224 guns.
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 12
guns;
1916
. - 206
guns;
1917
. - 181
a gun.
TOTAL: 399 guns.
The statistics are more than revealing! The main role here was played by foreign deliveries (64%). The domestic share of the production of these tools is about 36%.
The statistics for 6-inch howitzers of domestic production are as follows:
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 28
guns;
1916
. - 83
guns;
1917
. - 120
guns.
TOTAL: 231 guns.
At the same time, the same guns were purchased abroad:
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 0
guns;
1916
. - 8
guns;
1917
. - 104
guns.
TOTAL: 112 guns.
The share of foreign deliveries is 32%.
The total amount of all field heavy artillery guns received by the troops was 966 units. Of these, about 53% of the guns were purchased abroad.
On the needs of the Russian army in field heavy artillery by 1917in Petrograd at the Inter-Union Conference the following data were given:
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 4-inch guns - 384 units.
2. Actually received - 336 units.
3. Shortage - 48 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 4-inch guns was satisfied by 87.5%. At the same time, keep in mind that foreign deliveries of these guns accounted for 64%!
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 6-inch howitzers - 516 units.
2. Actually received - 224 units.
3. Shortage - 292 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 6-inch howitzers was satisfied by 43.4%. At the same time, keep in mind that foreign deliveries of these guns amounted to 32% .
We now turn to the consideration of the situation with the provision of the Russian army with heavy siege-type artillery (from 6 to 12 inches).
On this occasion, General Golovin writes: “... our mobilization assumptions did not at all foresee the needs of the army for special-purpose heavy artillery, all these requirements for large-caliber guns, while the requirements were extremely belated, turned out to be completely unexpected for our factories.”
That is why the main role in providing the Russian army was played by the purchase of this type of artillery from foreign factories.
The statistics (from 1914 to 1917) are as follows:
1. 5 and 6 inch long-range guns. Russian factories produced 102 such guns, 272 such guns were purchased from foreign factories!
6-inch long-range guns - 812 units.
2. Received in reality - 116 units.
3. Shortage - 696 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 6-inch long-range guns was satisfied by 14.3%. At the same time, 72.4% here are foreign purchases.
2. 8-inch howitzers. Russian factories did not produce a single such howitzer; 85 such guns were purchased from foreign factories!
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 8-inch howitzers - 211 units.
2. Received in reality - 51 units.
3. Shortage - 160 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 8-inch howitzers was satisfied by 24.2% and only through foreign purchases!
3. 9-inch howitzers. Russian factories did not produce a single such howitzer; 4 such guns were purchased from foreign factories.
4. 9 and 10 inch long-range guns. Russian factories did not produce a single such gun; 10 such guns were purchased from foreign factories (1915).
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 9-inch guns - 168 units.
2. Received in reality - 0 units.
3. Shortage - 168 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 9-inch long-range guns was not satisfied at all!
5. 11-inch howitzers. Russian factories did not produce a single such howitzer; 26 such guns were purchased from foreign factories.
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 11-inch howitzers - 156 units.
2. Actually received - 6 units.
3. Shortage - 150 units.
So, by 1917, the need for the Russian army in 11-inch howitzers was satisfied by 3.8% and only through foreign purchases! Fantastic result!
6. 12-inch howitzers. Russian factories produced 45 howitzers, 9 such guns were purchased from foreign factories.
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 12-inch howitzers - 67 units.
2. Actually received - 12 units.
3. Shortage - 55 units.
So, by 1917, the need for the Russian army in 12-inch howitzers was satisfied by 17.9%!
At the end of the consideration of the issue of artillery support for the Russian army during the First World War, it remains only to consider the issue of bomb throwers and mortars in the Russian army. This new (for that time) weapon was of great importance when the time came for a long trench warfare and the front line stabilized.
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in mortars and bombers - 13900 units.
2. Actually received - 1997 units.
3. Shortage - 11903 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for bombers and mortars was satisfied by 14.3% .
Summing up all the needs of the Russian army in artillery weapons by the beginning of 1917, i.e. by the time the Headquarters finally realized this need and brought it into a systematic form, one can draw an unambiguous conclusion, “... that the question was not so much about increasing the number of combat units of the army, but mainly about re-equipping the army, which went to war with insufficient artillery weapons "(quote by General Golovin).
And now I want you to clearly see how such a blatant provision of artillery to the Russian army was reflected in the ratios in the artillery of the opponents on the fronts by October 1, 1917.
1. Northern front. The length is 265 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.7, the enemy had 1.4; heavy guns: we have 1.1, the enemy has 2.4 (!)
2. Western front. The length is 415 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.4, the enemy had 0.6; heavy guns: we have 0.5, the enemy has 1.5 (!)
3. Southwestern front. The length is 480 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.5, the enemy had 1.2; heavy guns: we have 0.4, the enemy has 0.7.
4. Romanian front. The length is 600 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.9, the enemy had 0.8; heavy guns: we have 0.5, the enemy has 1.1.
5. Caucasian front. The length is 1000 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.07, the enemy had 0.04; heavy guns: we have 0.1, the enemy has 0.1.
From these data, we see that in October 1917, the Russian army, in terms of supplying it with heavy and heavy field artillery, was sufficiently equipped only on the Caucasian front, i.e. to fight the Turks.
For the rest of the fronts, General Golovin draws the following conclusion:
“Compared to the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, we were twice as weak. At the same time, the superiority of the enemy on the Northern and Western fronts, where we were opposed exclusively by German troops, was especially clearly noticeable. It is not without interest to note how richer the Romanian army was equipped with howitzer artillery than the Russian one.
And another quote from him:
“... The Russian army received in 1917 only some of the artillery weapons that were needed in order to reach at least the level of 1914 requirements. But since in 1917 the level of the requirements of life increased significantly, then, in comparison with its enemies and its allies, the Russian army turned out to be worse armed by the autumn of 1917 than in 1914 ».
That's it! Who else is ready to prove that the Russian army should have continued the First World War? Only one who does not know the deplorable state of her army in 1917, and her artillery support in particular. And this is a fact.
(To be continued...)
During the First World War in the Russian Empire, a tremendous leap was made in military production, and the pace of industrial development was so high that it was not repeated after that in Russian history, and was not repeated in any of the segments of the Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The basis of this leap was the rapid expansion of military production capacities in 1914-1917. due to four factors:
1) Expansion of the capacities of existing state military enterprises.
2) Massive involvement of private industry in military production.
3) A large-scale emergency construction program for new state-owned factories.
4) Extensive construction of new private military factories secured by state orders.
The Russian Empire entered the war with an unfinished military reform that was to be completed by 1917. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the planning authorities of absolutely all countries made a mistake with the forecasts of the course of the war. Nobody thought that it would last more than a year.
Accordingly, military stocks were designed for relatively short-term hostilities. Industry, including Russia, could not quickly compensate for the decline that a long war implies.
Therefore, the purchase of weapons and ammunition abroad were natural and justified. The tsarist government ordered 1.5 million rifles of the 1891-1910 model. from the American companies "Remington" and "Westinghouse", plus 300 thousand rifles under the Russian three-line cartridge from the "Winchester". But this order, for the most part, did not reach Russia - after the Bolshevik revolution, the US government confiscated the rifles and adopted them as US Rifle, Cal. .30, Model of 1916.
How great were the needs of the Russian army for weapons at the beginning of the First World War, and how they were subsequently satisfied by the domestic industry, can be judged by the figures that are now quite accessible. They were analyzed in his study by Mikhail Barabanov, former scientific editor of the Arms Export magazine, since 2008 a researcher at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, editor-in-chief of the Moscow Defense Brief magazine. The following are excerpts from his work.
Rifles. 
Rifles were produced at three state-owned arms factories - Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk. The military power of all of them for the summer of 1914 was estimated in total at 525 thousand rifles per year. In reality, during the first five months of the war from August to December 1914, these three factories produced 134,000 rifles.
Since 1915, accelerated work was undertaken to expand all three factories, as a result of which the monthly production of rifles for them from December 1914 to December 1916 was quadrupled - from 33.3 thousand to 127.2 thousand pieces . In 1916 alone, the productivity of each of the three plants was doubled, and the actual delivery was: the Tula plant 648.8 thousand rifles, Izhevsk - 504.9 thousand and Sestroretsky - 147.8 thousand, a total of 1301.4 thousand. rifles in 1916
In 1915, appropriations were approved for the construction of a second arms factory in Tula with an annual capacity of 500 thousand rifles per year, and in the future it was supposed to be merged with the Tula Arms Plant with a total total capacity of 3,500 rifles per day. In addition, money was allocated for the purchase of equipment from Remington (1691 machines) for the manufacture of another 2 thousand rifles per day! In total, the entire Tula weapons complex was supposed to produce 2 million rifles per year. The construction of the 2nd plant was started in the summer of 1916 and was to be completed by the beginning of 1918.
In 1916, the construction of a new state-owned Yekaterinoslav Arms Plant near Samara began, with a capacity of 800,000 rifles per year.
Thus, in 1918, the annual production capacity of the Russian industry for the production of rifles (without machine guns) should have been 3.8 million pieces, which meant an increase of 7.5 times in relation to the mobilization capacities of 1914 and a tripling in relation to the release of 1916. This overlapped the applications of the Headquarters (2.5 million rifles per year) by one and a half times.
Ammo.
In 1914, in Russia, three state-owned cartridge factories were engaged in the production of rifle cartridges - Petrograd, Tula and Lugansk. The maximum capacity of each of these plants was 150 million cartridges per year with one-shift operation (450 million in total). In fact, all three plants already in the peaceful 1914 should have produced a total of a third more - the state order amounted to 600 million cartridges.
From the beginning of 1915, great efforts were made to expand the capacities of all three factories, as a result of which the production of Russian three-line cartridges was tripled from December 1914 to November 1916 - from 53.8 million to 150 million pieces. In 1916 alone, the total output of Russian cartridges was increased one and a half times (up to 1.482 billion pieces). In 1917, while maintaining productivity, it was expected to supply 1.8 billion rounds of ammunition, plus the receipt of approximately the same number of Russian cartridges from imports. In 1915-1917. the number of pieces of equipment of all three cartridge factories doubled. Think about it, 3 billion rounds a year!
The rate in 1916 made clearly inflated demands on cartridges - for example, at the inter-allied conference in January 1917, the need was estimated at 500 million cartridges per month (including 325 million Russians), which gave an expense of 6 billion per year, or twice as high as the consumption of 1916, and this with sufficient supply of cartridges to the units by the beginning of 1917.
In July 1916, the construction of the Simbirsk Cartridge Plant began (with a capacity of 840 million cartridges per year). In general, the total expected capacity of the Russian cartridge industry for 1918 can be calculated up to 3 billion cartridges per year.
Machine guns.
In fact, until the coup of 1917, only the Tula Arms Plant was producing easel machine guns, which increased their production to 1200 units per month by January 1917. Thus, in relation to December 1915, the growth was 2.4 times, and in relation to December 1914 - seven times. During 1916, the production of machine guns almost tripled (from 4251 to 11072 pieces), and in 1917 the Tula plant was expected to supply 15 thousand machine guns.
Together with large import orders (in 1917, the delivery of up to 25 thousand imported heavy machine guns and up to 20 thousand light machine guns was expected), this should have satisfied the requests of the Stavka. In exaggerated hopes of imports, private industry proposals for the production of easel machine guns were rejected by the GAU (Main Artillery Directorate).
The production of Madsen light machine guns was organized at the Kovrov Machine Gun Plant, which was being built under an agreement with Madsen. An agreement on this with the issuance of an order to the syndicate in 15 thousand light machine guns was concluded in April 1916, the contract was signed in September, and the construction of the plant began in August 1916 and was carried out at a very fast pace. The assembly of the first batch of machine guns was made in August 1917. By the beginning of 1918, despite the "revolutionary" mess, the plant was ready. The production of machine guns was planned at 4,000 pieces in the first half of the year of work, followed by an output of 1,000 pieces per month and bringing up to 2.5-3 thousand light machine guns per month.
However, contrary to popular belief, the armies of the countries participating in the First World War were driven into fortifications not by machine guns, but by light field artillery and shrapnel.
A good example is the armament of the Russian infantry division in 1914, where there were only 32 Maxims in the machine gun teams of the regiments, but 48 Death Scythes in the artillery brigade of the division. In one Russian shrapnel projectile there were 260 bullets, in a Maxim machine-gun belt - 250 rounds. Artillery was definitely more effective than machine guns!
Light weapons. 
The production of light and mountain three-inch artillery was carried out at the Petrograd state and Perm gun factories. In 1915, the private Putilov Plant (which was eventually nationalized at the end of 1916), as well as the private "Tsaritsyn Group of Plants" (Sormovsky Plant, Lessner Plant, Petrogradsky Metallic and Kolomensky) were connected to production. As a result, the monthly production of guns of the 1902 model increased over 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) by more than 13 times (!!!) - from 35 to 472 systems.
To further expand artillery production, at the end of 1916, the construction of a powerful Saratov state-owned gun factory began. Due to the revolution of February 1917, the construction was stopped at the initial stage.
Thus, with a monthly requirement for 1917, declared by the Headquarters in January 1917, of 490 field and 70 mountain 3-inch guns, Russian industry had actually already reached its supply by that time, and in 1917-1918, apparently would greatly exceed this requirement. With the commissioning of the Saratov plant, it was possible to expect the production of more than 700 field guns and 100 mountain guns per month (assuming the retirement of 300 guns per month by execution without taking into account combat losses) ...
It should be added that in 1916 the Obukhov plant began mastering the 37-mm Rosenberg trench gun. Of the first order of 400 new systems from March 1916, 170 guns were delivered already in 1916, the rest were scheduled for delivery in 1917. There is no doubt that this would be followed by new mass orders for these guns.
Heavy weapons. 
By the beginning of the war, the production of 48-linear howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model was carried out at the Putilov factory, the Obukhov factory and the Petrograd gun factory, and the 6-inch howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model were carried out at the Putilov and Perm factories.
The release of heavy artillery increased very quickly. In the first half of 1915, only 128 heavy artillery pieces were manufactured, but in a year and a half the volume increased by 7 times! In total, in 1917, without a revolution, the GAU (without Morved) by industry should have been estimated to have delivered up to 2000 heavy Russian-made guns (against 900 in 1916).
The second new center for the production of heavy artillery was to be the Saratov State Gun Plant with an annual program for heavy guns: 42-lin guns - 300, 48-lin howitzers - 300, 6-inch howitzers - 300, 6-inch fortress guns - 190, 8 -dm howitzers - 48. Due to the revolution of February 1917, the construction was stopped at the initial stage. Among other measures considered by 1917 to increase the production of heavy artillery were the issuance of an order for 48-lin howitzers to the private "Tsaritsyn Group of Plants", as well as the development in 1917 of the production of 12-inch howitzers and new "light" 16-inch howitzers for built since 1913 with the participation of Vickers Tsaritsyno plant for the production of naval heavy artillery (RAOAZ), whose construction was carried out sluggishly during the WWI, but the first stage of which was expected in July 1916, and commissioning in the spring of 1917.
With the commissioning of the howitzer plant at the Putilov plant and the first stage of the Tsaritsyn plant, Russian industry in 1918 would have reached an annual output of at least 2600 heavy artillery systems, and more likely more. In fact, this meant that the applications of the 1916 Headquarters for heavy artillery could be covered by Russian industry by the end of 1917.
According to imports in 1917 - early 1918. about 1000 more heavy artillery systems were to be imported. In total, the total Russian heavy artillery, even minus losses, could reach the number of 5000 guns by the end of 1918, i.e. be comparable in number to the French.
Shells. 
The main role in shell production along the GAU line was played by the Perm plant, as well as the Putilov plant, which eventually united a number of other private enterprises around itself (Russian society, Russian-Baltic and Kolomenskoye). Thus, the Perm plant, with an annual estimated capacity of 3-dm shells of 500 thousand units, already in 1915 produced 1.5 million shells, and in 1916 - 2.31 million shells. The Putilov plant with its cooperation produced in 1914 only 75 thousand 3-dm shells, and in 1916 - 5.1 million shells.
If in 1914 the entire Russian industry produced 516 thousand 3-dm shells, then in 1915 - already 8.825 million according to Barsukov, and 10 million according to Manikovsky, and in 1916 - already 26.9 million. shots according to Barsukov. Reports from the War Ministry give even more significant figures for the supply of Russian-made 3-inch shells to the army - in 1915, 12.3 million shells, and in 1916 - 29.4 million rounds. Thus, the annual production of 3-dm shells in 1916 practically tripled, and the monthly production of 3-dm shells from January 1915 to December 1916 increased 12 times!
Barabanov writes that, according to all calculations, the requirements of the army for shells would have been more than satisfied in 1917 only by domestic production. “Most likely, by 1918, Russian light artillery would have come up with a frank overstocking of ammunition,” in particular, he believes, “and if the pace of production and deliveries were maintained and at least limitedly increased by the end of 1918, the warehouses would generally be bursting with huge stocks 3 dm shells".
The Russian Empire achieved a colossal and still underestimated jump in military production in 1914-1917. The growth of military production and the development of the defense industry in 1914-1917 were probably the most ambitious in Russian history, surpassing in relative numbers any jumps in military production during the Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The Russian Empire has demonstrated a high ability to invest in the military industry and the real possibility of a gigantic increase in the power and capabilities of the PKK in the shortest possible time.
The well-known organization of the authorized GAU Vankov attracted 442 (!) Private factories to cooperation in military production. The conversion was not invented under Yeltsin, but under him it was carried out in one direction. In the Russian Empire, it was considered normal that if your private factory did not receive a military order today, then you produce, for example, blanks for handicraftsmen, and "if there is war tomorrow", then instead of samovars, cartridges and shells begin to leave your production lines. And it was very honorable (and profitable!) to be among the firms trusted by the state.
In general, the same assessment of the pre-revolutionary defense industry is given by S.V. Volkov: "During 1915-16, a giant leap was made in arming and supplying the army. And it had great inertia - the production that was established led to the fact that by the spring of 1917 the Russian army was overwhelmed with weapons and ammunition" .
But the Bolshevik non-humans who captured the central warehouses, these reserves were enough for the entire war of 1917-1922.
Russia is the only country involved in the First World War that did not have food problems. None. Not only in 1917, but also in 1918.
The Russian Empire at the time of its exit from the First World War had a huge mobilization resource. Only 39% of men of the corresponding age were called up in our country, while, for example, in Germany and France - over 80%.
Russia has actually demonstrated the mobilization ability of the economy. By 1917-1918, the country almost completely provided itself with weapons and ammunition of domestic production (for a number of items - with a strong supply).
Russia was, as they say, in step with the times: a significant increase in armored forces was expected in the army and new capacities in the field of aircraft construction were being prepared.
By 1914, in most armies, it was assumed that the coming war would be fleeting. Accordingly, the nature of the future war was qualified as maneuverable, and the artillery of the warring armies, first of all, had to have such a quality as tactical mobility. In a mobile battle, the main goal of artillery is the manpower of the enemy, while there are no serious fortified positions. That is why the core of field artillery was represented by light field guns of 75-77 mm caliber. And the main ammunition is shrapnel. It was believed that the field gun, with its significant, both among the French and, especially, among the Russians, the initial velocity of the projectile, would fulfill all the tasks assigned to artillery in a field battle.
French 75 mm gun. Photo: Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W-wa, 1975.
In the conditions of a fleeting maneuver war, the French 75-mm cannon of the 1897 model took first place in terms of its tactical and technical characteristics. Although the initial speed of her projectile was inferior to the Russian three-inch, but this was compensated by a more profitable projectile, which spent its speed more economically in flight. In addition, the gun had greater stability (that is, the indestructibility of aiming) after firing, and, consequently, the rate of fire. The arrangement of the carriage of the French cannon allowed it to automatically conduct lateral horizontal shelling, which from a distance of 2.5-3 thousand meters made it possible to fire at a 400-500-meter front within a minute.
For the Russian three-inch, the same was possible only by five or six turns of the entire battery, spending at least five minutes of time. But during flank shelling, in some one and a half minutes, the Russian light battery, firing with shrapnel, covered with its fire an area up to 800 m deep and more than 100 m wide.
Russian 76 mm field gun in position 
In the struggle to destroy the manpower of the French and Russian field guns, there were no equals.
As a result, the 32-battalion Russian army corps was equipped with 108 guns - including 96 field 76-mm (three-inch) guns and 12 light 122-mm (48-line) howitzers. There was no heavy artillery in the corps. True, before the war there was a tendency to create heavy field artillery, but heavy field three-battery battalions (2 batteries of 152-mm (six-inch) howitzers and one - 107-mm (42-line) guns) existed, as it were, as an exception and an organic connection with did not have hulls.
The situation was little better in France, which had 120 75-mm field guns per 24-battalion army corps. Heavy artillery was absent in divisions and corps and was only in armies - a total of only 308 guns (120-mm long and short guns, 155-mm howitzers and the latest 105-mm long Schneider gun of the 1913 model).
Russian 122-mm field howitzer model 1910 in position 
The organization of the artillery of Russia and France was, first of all, the result of an underestimation of the power of rifle and machine-gun fire, as well as the fortification of the enemy. The charters of these powers at the beginning of the war required artillery not to prepare, but only to support an infantry attack.
Britain entered the First World War also with very few heavy guns. In service with the British army were: from 1907. - 15-lb (76.2 mm) BLC field guns; 4.5-inch (114-mm) howitzer QF, adopted in 1910; 60-lb (127-mm) gun Mk1 model 1905; 6-dm (152-mm) howitzer BL model 1896. New heavy guns began to enter the British troops already during the war.
In contrast to their opponents, the organization of the German artillery was based on a correct foresight of the nature of the coming military conflict. For the 24-battalion army corps, the Germans had 108 light 77-mm cannons, 36 light field 105-mm howitzers (divisional artillery) and 16 heavy field 150-mm howitzers (corps artillery). Accordingly, already in 1914, heavy artillery was present at the corps level. With the beginning of the positional war, the Germans also created divisional heavy artillery, equipping each division with two howitzer and one heavy cannon batteries.
German field 77 mm gun in position 
From this ratio it is clear that the Germans saw the main means for achieving tactical success even in field maneuvering combat in the power of their artillery (almost a third of all available guns were howitzers). In addition, the Germans reasonably took into account the increased muzzle velocity of the projectile, which was not always necessary during flat firing (in this regard, their 77-mm gun was inferior to the French and Russian guns) and adopted as a caliber for a light field howitzer not 122-120-mm, like their own. opponents, and 105 mm - that is, the optimal (in combination of relative power and mobility) caliber. If the 77-mm German, 75-mm French, 76-mm Russian light field guns approximately corresponded to each other (as well as the 105-107-mm heavy field guns of the opponents), then the Russian and French armies have no analogues of the German 105-mm divisional howitzer have had.
Thus, by the beginning of the World War, the basis for organizing the artillery assets of the leading military powers was the task of supporting the offensive of their infantry on the battlefield. The main qualities required for field guns are mobility in conditions of mobile warfare. This trend also determined the organization of the artillery of the major powers, its quantitative ratio with the infantry, as well as the proportionality of light and heavy artillery in relation to each other.
German 150 mm howitzer 
By the beginning of the war, Russia had about 6.9 thousand light guns and howitzers and 240 heavy guns (that is, the ratio of heavy to light artillery was 1 to 29); France possessed almost 8,000 light and 308 heavy guns (a ratio of 1 to 24); Germany had 6.5 thousand light guns and howitzers and almost 2 thousand heavy guns (ratio 1 to 3.75).
These figures clearly illustrate both the views on the use of artillery in 1914, and the resources with which each great power entered the world war. World War I was the first large-scale war during which most of the combat losses were caused by artillery. According to experts, three out of five died from shell explosions. Obviously, the German armed forces were closest to the requirements of the First World War even before it began.
Sources:
Oleinikov A. "Artillery 1914."
German artillery in the First World War.
As already noted, it was large-caliber artillery and the well-organized MANAGEMENT and ORGANIZATION of its firing that became a kind of "lifesaver" of the German army during the First World War.
The German artillery of large calibers played a particularly important role on the Eastern Front, against the Russian army. The Germans drew the right conclusions from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, realizing WHAT the strongest psychological impact on the combat capability of the enemy is the intensive shelling of his positions with heavy artillery fire.
Siege artillery.
The command of the Russian army knew that Germany and Austria-Hungary had powerful and numerous heavy artillery. Here is what our general E.I. wrote about this later. Badgers:
“... according to information received in 1913 from military agents and from other sources, in Germany and Austria-Hungary, artillery was armed with very powerful heavy siege-type guns.
The German 21-cm steel mortar was adopted by heavy field artillery and was intended to destroy strong fortifications, it worked well on earthen closures, on brick and even on concrete vaults, but if several shells hit one place, it was also intended to poison the enemy picric gases of the explosive charge of a projectile with an impressive weight of 119 kg.
The German 28-cm (11-inch) mortar was wheeled, transported by two cars, fired without a platform with a powerful projectile weighing 340 kg; the mortar was intended for the destruction of concrete vaulted and the latest armored buildings.
There was information that mortars with a caliber of 32-cm, 34.5-cm and 42-cm (16.5-dm) were also tested in the German army, but Artkom did not know detailed data on the properties of these guns.
In Austria-Hungary, a powerful 30.5-cm howitzer was introduced in 1913, transported on three vehicles (on one - a gun, on the other - a carriage, on the third - a platform). The projectile of this mortar (howitzer) weighing 390 kg had a strong bursting charge of 30 kg. The mortar was intended to equip the forward echelon of the siege park, following directly behind the field army, in order to support it in time when attacking heavily fortified positions. The firing range of a 30.5-cm mortar is, according to some sources, about 7 1/2 km, according to others - up to 9 1/2 km (according to the latest data - up to 11 km).
The Austrian 24-cm mortar was transported, like the 30.5-cm, on road trains ... "
The Germans conducted a thorough analysis of the combat use of their powerful siege weapons and, if necessary, upgraded them.
“The main striking force of the German fire hammer was the notorious Big Berts. These mortars with a caliber of 420 mm and a weight of 42.6 tons, produced in 1909, were one of the largest siege weapons at the beginning of the war. The length of their barrel was 12 calibers, the firing range was 14 km, the mass of the projectile was 900 kg. The best designers of Krupp sought to combine the impressive dimensions of the guns with their rather high mobility, which allowed the Germans to transfer them, if necessary, to different sectors of the front.
Due to the enormous gravity of the system, transportation was carried out by broad gauge railway to the very position, installation and bringing into position for battle required a lot of time, up to 36 hours. In order to facilitate and achieve faster readiness for combat, a different design of the gun was developed (42-cm mortar L-12 "); the length of the gun of the second design was 16 calibers, the reach did not exceed 9,300 m, i.e., it was reduced by almost 5 km ".
All these powerful guns, by the beginning of the First World War, had already been put into service and entered the TROOPS of the opponents of the Russian Empire. We didn't have anything like that.
Russian industry did not produce guns with a caliber of 42 cm (16.5 dm) at all (and was never able to do this during all the years of the world war). Guns of caliber 12 dm were produced in extremely limited quantities on orders from the naval department. We had quite numerous fortress guns with a caliber of 9 to 12 dm, but they were all inactive, requiring special machines and conditions for firing. For shooting in the field, most of them were unsuitable.
“In the Russian fortresses there were about 1,200 obsolete guns that came there from the disbanded siege artillery regiments. These guns are 42-lin. (107-mm) gun mod. 1877, 6-dm. (152 mm) guns of 120 and 190 pounds. also arr. 1877, 6-dm. (152-mm) guns in 200 pounds. arr. 1904, like some other guns of fortress artillery, for example, 11-dm. (280-mm) coastal mortars arr. 1877 - served during the war, due to the lack of guns of the latest models, in heavy field and siege artillery, ”said General E.I. Barsukov.
Of course, most of these guns by 1914 were outdated both morally and physically. When they tried (under the influence of the example of the German army) to use in the field, it turned out that neither the gunners nor the guns themselves were completely unprepared for this. It even came to refusals to use these guns at the front. Here is what E.I. Barsukov about this:
“Cases of refusal from field heavy batteries armed with 152-mm cannons 120 pounds. and 107-mm guns of 1877, have been repeatedly. So, for example, the commander-in-chief of the Western Front asked the leader (in April 1916) not to transfer the 12th field heavy artillery brigade to the front, since 152-mm guns weighed 120 pounds. and 107-mm cannons of 1877, with which this brigade was armed, “have limited shelling and a hard-to-replenish supply of shells, and 152-mm cannons are 120 pounds. generally unsuitable for offensive operations”
Coastal 11-dm. (280-mm) mortars were meant to be allocated with personnel for the siege of enemy fortresses ...
For the purpose of using 11-dm. coastal mortars arr. In 1877, as a siege member of the GAU Art Committee, Durlyakhov developed a special device in the carriage of this mortar (11-inch coastal mortars with carriages converted according to the Durlyakhov project were used during the second siege of Przemysl).
According to the armament sheet of Russian fortresses, it was supposed to have 4,998 fortress and coastal guns of 16 different newer systems, which included and ordered 2,813 guns by February 1913, that is, about 40% of the guns were missing; if we take into account that far from all of the ordered guns were made, then by the beginning of the war the real shortage of fortress and coastal guns was expressed in a much larger percentage.
The commandant of the Ivangorod fortress, General A.V. Schwartz:
““... the war found Ivangorod in the most miserable state - armament - 8 fortress cannons, four of which did not fire ...
There were two powder magazines in the citadel, both made of concrete, but with very thin vaults. When in 1911 the disarmament of the fortresses of Warsaw, Zegrze
and Dubno, it was ordered to send all the old black powder from there to Ivangorod, where it was loaded into these powder magazines. There were about 20 thousand poods of it.”
The fact is that some Russian guns were created for firing old black powder. It was ABSOLUTELY not needed in the conditions of modern warfare, but its huge stocks were stored in Ivangorod and could explode when fired upon by the enemy.
A. V. Schwartz writes:
“There was only one thing left: to destroy the gunpowder. So I did. He ordered to leave in one cellar a small amount needed for engineering work, and drown everything else in the Vistula. And so it was done. Already after the end of hostilities near Ivangorod, I was asked by the Main Artillery Directorate, on what basis was gunpowder sunk? I explained and that was the end of it."
Back in Port Arthur, Schwartz noticed how old samples of our fortress artillery were of little use for the successful defense of the fortress. The reason for this was their complete immobility.
“Then the enormous role of mobile fortress artillery, that is, guns that can fire without platforms, without requiring the construction of special batteries, and are easily moved from place to place, became completely clear. After Port Arthur, as a professor at the Nikolaev Engineering Academy and the Officers' Artillery School, I strongly promoted this idea.
In 1910, the Artillery Directorate developed an excellent example of such guns in the form of 6 dm. fortress howitzer, and by the beginning of the war in the warehouse of Brest there were already about sixty of these howitzers. That is why I used every effort in Ivangorod to get as many of these guns as possible for the fortress. I managed to get them - 36 pieces. To make them quite mobile, I ordered to form 9 batteries from them, 4 guns in each, I took horses for transportation from the convoys of infantry regiments, bought a harness, and appointed officers and soldiers from fortress artillery.
It is good that in the Ivangorod fortress during the war, such a highly trained artilleryman as General Schwartz turned out to be the commandant. He managed to “knock out” 36 new howitzers from the rear of Brest and ORGANIZE their effective use in the defense of the fortress.
Alas, this was a positive isolated example, against the background of the general deplorable state of affairs with Russian heavy artillery ...
However, this huge lag in the quantity and quality of siege artillery did not particularly concern our generals. It was assumed that the war would be maneuverable and transient. By the end of autumn it was supposed to be already in Berlin (which was only 300 versts across the plain). Many officers of the guard even took parade uniforms with them on a campaign in order to look proper there, at the victory ceremonies ...
The fact that before this parade of the Russian army would inevitably have to besiege and storm powerful German fortresses (Königsberg, Breslau, Pozern, etc.), our military leaders did not really think about it.
It is no coincidence that the 1st Army of Rennenkampf in August 1914 tried to begin the imposition of the Königsberg fortress simply without having ANY siege artillery in its composition.
The same thing happened with the attempted siege of our 2nd Army Corps on the small German fortress of Lötzen in East Prussia. On August 24, units of the 26th and 43rd Russian infantry. divisions surrounded Lötzen, in which there was a Bosse detachment consisting of 4.5 battalions. At 0540 hours, the commandant of the fortress was sent a proposal to surrender the fortress of Lötzen.
The commandant of the fortress, Colonel Bosse, responded to the offer to surrender that it was rejected. Fortress Lötzen will only surrender in the form of a pile of ruins...
The capitulation of Lötzen did not take place, as well as its destruction, which was threatened by the Russians. The fortress withstood the siege, having no effect on the course of the battle of Samsonov's 2nd Army, except for the fact that the Russians diverted the 1st brigade of the 43rd infantry to the blockade. divisions. The remaining troops of the 2nd arm. corps, having captured the area north of the Masurian Lakes and Johannisburg, from August 23 they attached themselves to the left flank of the 1st Army and from the same date were transferred to the 1st Army of the gene. Rennenkampf. The latter, having received this corps to reinforce the army, extended his entire decision to it, according to which two corps were to block Konigsberg, and the other troops of the army at that time were to contribute to the operation to tax the fortress.
As a result, these two of our divisions, during the death of Samsonov's 2nd Army, were engaged in a strange siege of the small German fortress of Lötzen, the alleged capture of which had absolutely NO significance for the outcome of the entire battle. At first, as many as TWO full-blooded Russian divisions (32 battalions) attracted 4.5 German battalions located in the fortress to the blockade. Then only one brigade (8 battalions) was left for this purpose. However, having no siege weapons, these troops only wasted their time on the outskirts of the fortress. Our troops failed to take it or destroy it.
And here is how the German troops, armed with the latest siege weapons, acted in the capture of powerful Belgian fortresses:
“... the Liege forts from August 6 to August 12 did not stop firing at German troops passing within the firing range of guns (12 cm, 15 cm cannon and 21 cm howitzer), but 12 On the 1st, around noon, the attacker began a fierce bombardment with large-caliber guns: 30.5 cm with Austrian howitzers and 42 cm with new German mortars, and thereby showed a clear intention to capture the fortress, which impeded the freedom of movement of the German masses, for Liège covered 10 bridges. On the forts of Liège, built according to the Brialmont type, this bombardment produced an all-destroying effect, which nothing prevented. The artillery of the Germans, who surrounded the forts with troops, each individually ... could even be located against the Gorge, very weakly armed, faces and act concentrically and concentrated. A small number of powerful guns made it necessary to bombard one fort after another, and only on August 17 did the last one, namely Fort Lonsin, fall due to the explosion of a powder magazine. Under the ruins of the fort, the entire garrison perished: out of 500 people. - 350 were killed, the rest were seriously wounded.
Fortress commander, Gen. Leman, crushed by debris and poisoned by asphyxiating gases, was taken prisoner. During the 2 days of the bombardment, the garrison behaved with selflessness and, despite losses and suffering from suffocating gases, was ready to repel the assault, but the indicated explosion decided the matter.
Thus, the complete capture of Liege required, from August 5 to August 17, only 12 days, however, German sources reduce this period to 6, i.e. they consider the 12th to have already decided the matter, and further bombardments to complete the destruction of the forts.
Under these conditions, this bombardment was more likely to be in the nature of firing ranges ”(Afonasenko I.M., Bakhurin Yu.A. Novogeorgievsk Fortress during the First World War).
Information about the total number of German heavy artillery is very contradictory and inaccurate (the data of Russian and French intelligence on this differ significantly).
General E.I. Barsukov noted:
“According to the information of the Russian General Staff, received by the beginning of 1914, the German heavy artillery consisted of 381 batteries with 1,396 guns, including 400 heavy field guns and 996 heavy siege guns.
According to the headquarters of the former Western Russian Front, during the mobilization of 1914, the German heavy artillery consisted, counting field, reserve, landwehr, spare, landshturmenny and supernumerary units, of a total of 815 batteries with 3,260 guns; including 100 field heavy batteries with 400 heavy 15 cm howitzers and 36 batteries with 144 heavy mortars of 21 cm (8.2 dm.) caliber.
According to French sources, German heavy artillery was available with corps - 16 heavy 150-mm howitzers per corps and with armies - a different number of groups armed with partly 210-mm mortars and 150-mm howitzers, partly with long 10-cm and 15-cm guns. In total, according to the French, the German army was armed with approximately 1,000 heavy 150-mm howitzers at the beginning of the war, up to 1,000 heavy 210-mm mortars and long guns suitable for field warfare, 1,500 light 105-mm howitzers with divisions, i.e., about 3,500 heavy guns and light howitzers. This number exceeds the number of guns according to the Russian General Staff: 1,396 heavy guns and 900 light howitzers, and comes closer to the number of 3,260 guns determined by the headquarters of the Western Russian Front.
Moreover, the Germans had a significant number of heavy siege guns, mostly obsolete.
Meanwhile, by the beginning of the war, the Russian army was armed with only 512 light 122-mm howitzers, that is, three times less than in the German army, and 240 heavy field guns (107-mm 76 guns and 152-mm howitzers 164), t That is, two or even four times less, and heavy siege-type artillery, which could have been used in a field war, was not at all provided for in the Russian army according to the 1910 mobilization schedule.
After the sensational fall of the powerful Belgian fortresses, a large number of reports appeared about the latest German guns and their combat use.
E.I. Barsukov gives the following example:
“... the answer of the GUGSH about 42-cm guns. The GUGSH reports that, according to information received from military agents, during the siege of Antwerp, the Germans had three 42-cm guns and, in addition, 21-cm, 28-cm, 30.5-cm Austrian guns, in total from 200 to 400 guns. The firing distance is 9 - 12 km, but a 28-cm projectile tube was found, placed at 15 km 200 m. The newest forts withstood no more than 7 - 8 hours. until complete destruction, but after one successful hit, the 42-cm projectile was half destroyed.
According to the GUGSH, the tactics of the Germans are: the simultaneous concentration of all fire on one fort; after its destruction, the fire is transferred to another fort. In the first line, 7 forts were destroyed and all the gaps were bombarded with shells, so that the wire and land mines had no effect. According to all reports, the Germans had little infantry, and the fortress was taken by one artillery ...
According to reports, the German and Austrian batteries were out of range of fire from the forts. The forts were destroyed by 28-cm German and 30.5-cm Austrian howitzers from a distance of 10-12 versts (about 12 km). The main reason for the rapid fall of the fortifications is the device of the German heavy grenade with a slowdown, which explodes only after penetrating into the concrete and causes widespread destruction.
Here, the considerable nervousness of the compiler of this information and its presumptive nature are obvious. Agree that the data that the Germans used "from 200 to 400 guns" during the siege of Antwerp can hardly be considered even approximate in terms of their reliability.
In fact, the fate of Liege - one of the strongest fortresses in Europe - was decided by only two 420-mm mortars of the Krupp group and several 305-mm guns of the Austrian company Skoda; they appeared under the walls of the fortress on August 12, and already on August 16 the last two forts, Ollon and Flemal, surrendered.
A year later, in the summer of 1915, to capture the most powerful Russian fortress of Novogeorgievsk, the Germans created a siege army under the command of General Bezeler.
This siege army had only 84 heavy artillery pieces - 6 420 mm, 9 305 mm howitzers, 1 long-barreled 150 mm cannon, 2 210 mm mortar batteries, 11 batteries of heavy field howitzers, 2 batteries of 100 mm caliber and 1 120 and 150 millimeters.
However, even such a powerful shelling did not cause significant harm to the casemated fortifications of Novogeorgievsk. The fortress was surrendered to the Germans due to the betrayal of its commandant (General Bobyr) and the general demoralization of the garrison.
Significantly exaggerated in this document is the damaging effect of heavy shells on concrete fortifications.
In August 1914, the German army tried to capture the small Russian fortress of Osovets by bombarding it with large caliber guns.
“The opinion of one of the officers of the General Staff, who was sent in September 1914 from the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to the fortress of Osovets, is interesting to clarify the action of the German artillery on the fortifications. He came to the following conclusion:
1. 8 in. (203-mm) and smaller calibers cause negligible material damage to fortifications.
2. The great morale effect of the artillery fire in the early days of the bombardment could only be exploited "only by an energetic" infantry offensive. Assault on the fortress, with a weak qualitatively and unfired garrison, under cover of 6-inch fire. (152 mm) and 8 in. (203-mm) howitzers, has a great chance of success. In Osovets, where the German infantry remained 5 versts from the fortress, on the last 4th day of the bombardment, signs of calming the garrison were already found, and the shells thrown by the Germans were wasted.
For 4 days, the Germans bombarded Osovets (16 152-mm howitzers, 8 203-mm mortars and 16 107-mm cannons, in total 40 heavy and several field guns) and fired, according to a conservative estimate, about 20,000 shells.
3. Dugouts of two rows of rails and two rows of sand-filled logs withstood hits of 152-mm bombs. The four-foot concrete barracks withstood heavy shells without damage. With a direct hit on concrete by a 203-mm projectile, only in one place did a recess of half an arshin (about 36 cm) remain ...
The small Osovets fortress withstood the German artillery bombardment twice.
During the second bombardment of Osovets, the Germans already had 74 heavy guns: 4 42-cm howitzers, up to 20 275-305-mm guns, 16 203-mm guns, 34 152-mm and 107-mm guns. Within 10 days, the Germans fired up to 200,000 shells, but only about 30,000 shells from hits were counted in the fortress. As a result of the bombardment, many earthen ramparts, brick buildings, iron bars, wire networks, etc. were destroyed; concrete buildings of small thickness (no more than 2.5 m for concrete and less than 1.75 m for reinforced concrete) were destroyed quite easily; large concrete masses, armored towers and domes resisted well. In general, the forts more or less survived. The relative safety of the Osovets forts was explained by: a) insufficient use by the Germans of the strength of their siege artillery - only 30 large 42-cm shells were fired and only one "Central" fort of the fortress (mainly one of its gorge barracks); b) firing by the enemy with breaks in the dark and at night, using which the defenders at night (with 1,000 workers) managed to repair almost all the damage caused by enemy fire during the past day.
The war confirmed the conclusion of the Russian artillery commission, which tested large-caliber shells on the island of Berezan in 1912, about the insufficient power of 11-dm. and 12-dm. (280-mm and 305-mm) calibers for the destruction of fortifications of that time from concrete and reinforced concrete, as a result of which at the same time it was ordered from the Schneider plant in France 16-dm. (400 mm) howitzer (see Part I) which was not delivered to Russia. During the war, Russian artillery had to limit itself to 12-inch. (305 mm) caliber. However, she did not have to bombard the German fortresses, against which a caliber larger than 305 mm was needed.
The experience of the bombing of Verdun showed, as Schwarte writes, that even the 42-cm caliber does not have the necessary power to destroy modern fortifications built from special grades of concrete with thickened reinforced concrete mattresses.
The Germans used large-caliber guns (up to 300 mm) even in maneuver warfare. For the first time, shells of such calibers appeared on the Russian front in the autumn of 1914, and then in the spring of 1915 they were widely used by the Austro-Germans in Galicia during the Mackensen offensive and the Russian withdrawal from the Carpathians. The moral effect during the flight of 30-cm bombs and a strong high-explosive effect (craters up to 3 m deep and up to 10 m in diameter) made a very strong impression; but the damage from a 30-cm bomb due to the steepness of the walls of the funnel, low accuracy and slowness of fire (5 - 10 minutes per shot), was much less than. from 152 mm caliber.
It is about her, the German field artillery of large calibers, that will be discussed further.
Artillery is called the "god of war". It was created and still exists at the crossroads of many sciences. It has long been customary that the high rank of "artilleryman" implies awareness of the exact sciences, the ability to quickly and accurately make decisions. The book traces the path of development of world and Russian artillery, tells about the outstanding achievements of Russian designers who created formidable military equipment.
Before the shots of the Russo-Japanese War had yet been fired, menacing signs of a new armed clash between the largest states of the world began to appear. The empires of Europe persistently strove for a redivision of the world; each demanded a place of honor among the other, most powerful capitalist states.
Two warring coalitions were formed: Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and England, France and Russia, on the other. All the major countries of Europe were intensively preparing for a bloody massacre, unprecedented in its scale and cruelty. It broke out in 1914, turning almost half the world into a blazing fire. It was the First World War 1914-1918.
On the eve of it, most military theorists believed that the war would be extremely maneuverable and short-lived. It was assumed that offensive operations would have to be carried out in a situation where the enemy himself would also be in constant motion, he would certainly attack without resorting to shelters. So thought the tops of the Russian army, contrary to the experience of the war with Japan. And this experience showed that the troops are increasingly taking advantage of various terrain conditions in order to become invisible, in order to more reliably hide, even during oncoming combat clashes.
Preparations for war were carried out on the basis of the idea of decisive offensive actions. Defense was considered something reprehensible, even shameful. Only the so-called active defense was recognized, the purpose of which was to upset the advancing enemy with fire, undermine his forces, in order to then himself go on a decisive offensive and defeat him.
These views on the nature of the coming war left a deep imprint on the development of Russian artillery before the World War. Just as the tsarist government was in bondage to French banks, so the highest military bodies of tsarist Russia were captive to the theoretical views of the French general staff. Mainly from the French military experts, the high command of the Russian army borrowed the doctrine of maneuverable and short-term warfare, contrary to the lessons of past wars with Turkey and Japan. From the French, the desire for "unity of caliber and projectile" passed into the Russian artillery. The famous French artilleryman Langlois suggested that the army should be armed mainly with one type of gun. Since it was believed that an exceptionally mobile, maneuverable war was ahead, Langlois concluded that all combat missions in such a war could be perfectly solved by a relatively small-caliber rapid-fire cannon, easily moved and firing shells of great lethal force at the advancing enemy. As such a universal weapon, the French offered a 75-mm cannon.
Such views were very to the taste of the Russian military ministry. Such a “unity of caliber and projectile”, firstly, reduced the cost of the production of artillery materiel and, secondly, greatly simplified the training in shooting and the use of artillery in battle. And in the War Department, considerations of financial savings were often considered much more important than technical and tactical expediency.
The Russian artillery already had such a cannon, which, according to Langlois, could become a universal weapon. It was a 76-mm rapid-fire cannon of the 1902 model. Created by talented Russian artillerymen-inventors, this cannon was of very high quality. At that time, she was one of the best among this type and with honor passed the combat test in the Russo-Japanese War.
The 76mm gun fired its projectiles at high muzzle velocity along a very shallow trajectory. Thanks to this, she inflicted serious damage when firing shrapnel at targets located in open areas. The strength of shrapnel fire was so great that one Russian battery could literally destroy an inadvertently opened infantry battalion or even an entire cavalry regiment in a few minutes. The 76-mm cannon was also distinguished by its high rate of fire - up to twenty rounds per minute.
Blind admiration for foreign military thought, excessive enthusiasm for the undoubtedly excellent qualities of the 76-mm cannon and considerations of financial savings led to the fact that the military leaders of tsarist Russia remained deaf to the warning voice of individual experts who referred to the experience of previous wars - the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Japanese . During these wars, in practice, on the battlefields, it has already been proved more than once that it is impossible to get by with only one type of artillery gun, that, in addition to a quick-firing field gun, it is also necessary to have a sufficient number of mounted fire guns - howitzers and heavy artillery. And yet, on the eve of World War II, the Russian War Ministry was still chasing a illusory ideal: to equip field artillery with a single caliber gun with a single projectile.
Meanwhile, the 76-millimeter field gun, so powerful at hitting open targets, was exceptionally weak at firing at hidden targets. Her shrapnel fire was completely powerless to destroy field shelters. As soon as people who fell under the shrapnel of a 76-mm cannon lay down and sketched a head trench 60–70 centimeters high in front of them, they were already almost safe. The fire of the 76-mm cannon could not sweep away artificial obstacles, since the shock and destructive effect of its shrapnel projectile is small.
There was another drawback to the 76 mm gun, which prevented its full use in the new conditions of field warfare. The very large flatness of the fire limited the possibility of firing over the heads of their infantry. Batteries of 76-millimeter guns had to be placed far behind the infantry - no closer than one kilometer - and firing at the front lines of the enemy had to be stopped when the attacking infantry still had 300-400 meters to go.
The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that the most effective means to defeat a hidden enemy is a howitzer. The steep trajectory of its projectiles makes it possible to hit the enemy with mounted fire even when he is not shown from behind cover. And the powerful shells of large-caliber howitzers make it possible to destroy very strong field fortifications.
Before the World War, the Russian artillery adopted the 122-mm howitzer of the 1909 model. It was in many respects superior to the similar howitzer in service with the Austro-German artillery. The shrapnel bullets of the Russian howitzer hit the hiding enemy quite well. In addition, the howitzer could also fire grenades with a powerful bursting charge. Thanks to this, the fire of the 122-mm howitzer acted very destructively on the field fortifications. But there were very few 122mm howitzers. Here, the neglect of the military leaders to the guns of mounted fire clearly affected.
The Russian army also had a 76-mm mountain gun of the 1909 model, produced by the Putilov factory. This gun fired its projectiles at first along a rather flat trajectory, and towards the end of its flight, its projectiles fell in a very steep line. Such shooting is necessary in conditions of mountain warfare, when shells must be thrown over steep slopes.
The 76mm gun was essentially a howitzer. In addition, she was extremely light and therefore could move faster. The mountain gun could be successfully used in ordinary field combat, as it was quite suitable for maneuvering and joint operations with infantry. Thus, the mountain gun could compensate to some extent for the lack of mounted fire guns and replace the 76-mm field rapid-fire gun in cases where it would have to hit a well-hidden enemy. This was all the more easy since both guns fired the same projectile. However, even in this case, the highest military circles underestimated the entire significance of mounted fire guns in the upcoming war: by the beginning of the world war, the Russian army had even fewer mountain guns than 122-mm howitzers.
However, one should not think that such an attitude of the War Ministry and the General Staff to the problems of arming the army was shared by all gunners. In fact, there was a tragic gap between the creative aspirations of the best gunners and the officially accepted opinion. There were many outstanding and talented specialists in the army who understood perfectly well what new tasks modern war poses for artillery. They made every effort to improve technical equipment. But often all their energy was spent on a fruitless struggle with the inertia, slowness and rottenness of the state and military machine.
The improvement of the designs of guns, shells and materiel, the immediate consideration of inventions, the management of research and experiments in the field of artillery - all this was entrusted to the Artillery Committee under the Main Artillery Directorate. Among the members of this committee there were a large number of scientists and specialists who gained fame not only in Russia, but also far beyond its borders. Many members of the Artillery Committee were professors at the Artillery Academy and other institutions of higher education. Some had the title of academicians - and not only of the Russian Academy of Sciences, but also of the academies of Paris and London. The technical level of the Russian gunners was very high, especially in a theoretical sense.
To resolve certain complex issues, the Artillery Committee invited the most prominent experts of that time - scientists, researchers, production workers. This made it possible to use the latest achievements of science and technology for the development of artillery.
However, despite all this, the initiative for new inventions rarely came from the bowels of the Artillery Committee. And the proposals put forward by the committee were often either not carried out at all, or they were carried out in a perverted form.
Representatives of the authorities, and first of all the Minister of War Sukhomlinov, clearly patronized large foreign firms that own powerful military factories - Schneider in France, Krupp in Germany, Vickers in England. They were given preference even in those cases when some proposal coming from a Russian factory or artillery inventor was clearly better and more expedient than a foreign one. Of course, all this put heavy obstacles to the development of Russian artillery and stifled the inventive initiative.
In what working conditions the Russian gunners were placed by the tsarist authorities, it can be seen at least from the following example. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, a special commission arose at the Main Artillery Directorate to study the experience of this war. The commission included very large and authoritative gunners of that time. They made a number of important proposals for the reorganization of Russian artillery on the basis of combat experience. The question of howitzers and heavy field artillery arose especially sharply. The commission insisted that it was necessary to equip the Russian army as soon as possible with long-range cannons and large-caliber howitzers firing projectiles of great destructive power. At the same time, it was emphasized that the combat effectiveness of the Russian army in the new conditions of war could be more or less satisfactory only if each corps had at least two batteries of 152-mm howitzers and one battery of 107-mm long-range guns. The War Ministry and the General Staff formally accepted the proposal of the commission. But even ten years later, that is, by the beginning of the World War, the planned program was carried out to an absolutely insignificant degree: there were so few heavy howitzers and long-range guns that they could only be attached to entire armies consisting of several corps.
An even more criminal attitude was shown by the military leaders towards heavy artillery of the siege type. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that not a single Russian siege weapon met the new requirements. But the general staff, clouded by spectacular ideas about the maneuverable, offensive nature of the upcoming war, did not attach serious importance to heavy siege-type artillery. It was believed that siege artillery, due to its heaviness and bulkiness, would only bind the maneuvering actions of troops. And for the destruction of enemy fortresses and strongholds, they considered it possible to take heavy artillery from their fortresses, which, during the offensive, would remain in the rear, out of the threat from the enemy. Therefore, in the mobilization schedule, the General Staff did not even provide for siege artillery at all.
The installation of the General Staff was strongly supported by the Minister of War Sukhomlinov and, of course, pleased the Ministry of Finance, since there was no need for special appropriations for the creation of heavy siege-type artillery.
During the First World War, it became clear why Sukhomlinov supported such ridiculous views. Sukhomlinov betrayed his homeland. He was connected with German spies and, where he could, carried out with impunity the policy of "disarmament" of Russia in the interests of its future enemy - Germany. Sukhomlinov suppressed military inventive thought in every possible way and deliberately made the weapons of the Russian army dependent on foreign factories, in particular on the German breeder Krupp. Sukhomlinov achieved that just on the eve of the World War, Russian fortresses began to be abolished, which were supposed to restrain the pressure of the German troops if they entered the territory of Russia. The destruction of the fortresses took place under the pretext of obsolescence, but it was no accident that such first-class fortresses as Novogeorgievsk and others were among the "obsolete". Many fortresses had to be hastily restored already during the war.
By the beginning of the World War, Russian artillery was technically armed much weaker than the artillery of its opponents.
Many legends circulated about the German heavy howitzer called "Fat Bertha", which appeared with the Germans during the World War and for a long time was the subject of their pride. Its caliber is 420 millimeters; a powerful projectile weighed 800 kilograms. This is a tool of strong destructive action, before which the most durable field and fortress structures could not resist.
Many people know about this, but few know about the following fact. In 1912, experimental firing of Russian artillery took place on the island of Berezan in the Black Sea. The newest heavy Schneider howitzer with a caliber of 280 millimeters was tested. Experimental shooting showed that this howitzer cannot destroy strong reinforced concrete fortifications.
The gunners were convinced that for this purpose a gun of a larger caliber was needed. In early 1913, such a howitzer was designed by a member of the Artillery Committee, Durlyakhov, together with a group of engineers from the Metal Plant in St. Petersburg. It was a powerful howitzer with a caliber of 420 millimeters. All calculations convinced that its effect even on the most powerful fortifications would be unusually strong. However, there was no plant in Russia that would undertake to manufacture such weapons. The War Department, of course, was in no hurry to implement this invention. It transferred an order for one prototype howitzer to the French Schneider factory. And they weren't in too much of a hurry to get it done. A prototype howitzer was already made during the war, but it was never received by the Russian army.
Meanwhile, in Germany it became known about the experiments at Berezan and about the design of a powerful howitzer by Russian artillerymen. And there is every reason to think that the Germans hurried to draw the appropriate conclusions from this ... Thus, there can be no question of the originality of the invention of the German "Fat Berta"; it is obvious that the German artillerymen do not have to brag and be especially proud of this howitzer.
Only the suspicious slowness of the War Ministry prevented the Russian gunners from fielding the siege howitzer, which proved so necessary during the World War, on the battlefield.
The fate of the invention of the talented Russian artilleryman V. Tarnovsky was a little better. He foresaw the enormous role that military aviation would later play, and long before the war he proposed the original design of a special anti-aircraft gun. But even this proposal was not taken seriously. Tarnovsky eventually ceded his idea to the Putilov factory, where he belatedly started designing the gun together with the factory engineer Lender. The first four anti-aircraft guns of Tarnovsky and Lender were made only in March 1915.
Every major war brings something new to the art of war. But no war has brought as many surprises as the world war. It overturned many assumptions and theories, it raised such questions in the face of which the bourgeois military art for a long time turned out to be completely powerless.
The hopes of all the belligerent countries for exceptional maneuverability and the short duration of the war were completely unjustified. The maneuvering period of the war ended rather quickly. The unusually increased strength of the fire forced the troops to dig deep into the ground, erect an uninterrupted line of the strongest fortifications in the field and go on to a long positional struggle.
The imperialist world war also introduced many new things into the development of artillery. Never before has the role of this type of troops been as great as on the battlefields of 1914–1918. Not a single operation, not a single offensive, not a single defensive battle could be successfully carried out without a sufficient concentration of artillery fire. The fate of many battles was decided exclusively by artillery. The power of artillery fire increased so much that often nothing could resist it - neither earthen fortifications, nor reinforced concrete shelters, nor steel armor, nor the will and endurance of the soldiers of the warring armies.
There have never been so many guns on the battlefield as in the First World War. During their offensive in Galicia, in the autumn of 1914, the Russians concentrated more than one and a half thousand guns for the general battle that decided the outcome of the operation. And during the unsuccessful attempt of the Germans, at the end of the same year, to break the Russian armies near Lodz, almost three thousand guns participated from both sides. The massing of artillery reached unprecedented proportions during the positional period of the war, especially in the Western European theater. Some battles in this war can be safely called artillery. In 1917, to break through the German positions at Malmaison, the French concentrated 1860 guns on a very small stretch. In the area of the main attack, the saturation with artillery was so great that for every four and a half meters there was one gun.
The consumption of shells during the war reached an unheard-of value. In the battles near Verdun, from August 13 to 27, 1917, 4 million shells were fired. Their total weight reached 120 thousand tons. For every meter of the front, there were 6 tons of metal! There were battles in the World War in which the consumption of shells reached one million in just one day - this is about the same amount of shells that Russia spent during the entire Russo-Japanese War.
From the very first months of the war, it became clear that the desire for "unity of caliber and projectile" was wrong. The rapid-firing 76-millimeter cannon was far from being able to solve all the new tasks that the World War posed for artillery. It took guns of a wide variety of types and calibers - and in large numbers. We needed both quick-firing guns, and field mounted fire guns - howitzers, and long-range guns, and heavy siege-type howitzers. Special melee weapons were also needed - for trench warfare, and anti-aircraft guns - for fighting an air enemy, as well as light assault guns - for direct escort of infantry in battle. The need for heavy artillery was especially acute, the shells of which could destroy artificial obstacles and strong earthen and reinforced concrete shelters.
Russian gunners did not have the abundance and variety of technical means that their main enemy, the Germans, had.
The guns of the Russian artillery were in no way inferior in their combat qualities to the guns of the same type in Germany and Austria, but in almost all battles the Austro-German artillery outnumbered the Russian. Each German corps had 160 guns, including 35 howitzers. And in the Russian corps, there were only 108 guns, including 12 howitzers. Russian corps did not have heavy artillery at all, and each German corps had four heavy batteries.
During the unsuccessful offensive of the Germans at the end of 1914 on the left bank of Poland, they had a quantitative superiority in artillery in all battles. In the battle near Vlatslavsk, the Russians had 106 guns, while the Germans had 324; in the battle at Kutno, the Russians had 131 guns, and the Germans - up to 400, etc. And so in almost all battles. This huge discrepancy in the saturation of military equipment had to be compensated by the artillerymen with the art of their shooting.
For all the belligerent states, the grandiose scope that the world imperialist war assumed was unexpected. It required the use of a colossal amount of a wide variety of technical means. The consumption of fire supplies exceeded to a large extent all pre-war calculations and showed the insignificance of peacetime mobilization stocks. It became obvious that the armies should be saturated with military equipment on an incomparably larger scale than planned on the eve of the war. Under these conditions, the work of the rear, industry, the state of the entire economy of the country, of course, played a decisive role. All states began hastily re-equipping their troops with more modern, powerful equipment.
In setting the size of stocks of artillery shells, the War Department proceeded from the following considerations. During the entire war with Japan, the Russians used up an average of 720 rounds for each 76-millimeter cannon. A new war must require more shells. And the War Department set an increased rate for a future war - 1,000 shots per cannon during the year. In addition, the general staff, carried away by the ideas of a short-term war, was going to fight for no more than six months. Therefore, the Ministry of War complacently believed that the artillery was provided with shells for the entire duration of the war with a large supply. This complacent mood was not disturbed by the fact that the set of shells for light howitzers was by no means completely ready by the beginning of the war, and for heavy field guns there were only half of the required stocks. The leaders of the army did not worry, convinced that the fate of the war would be decided by quick strikes in field maneuver battles, where 76-mm guns would play the main role.
Reality brutally shattered all these calculations and assumptions. Already at the end of the first month of the war, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed the Minister of War that the artillery was operating successfully, but that "the situation with regard to the supply of cannon cartridges was critical." And in early September 1914, the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front urgently telegraphed Nicholas II that he was forced to suspend military operations on the entire front until stocks of 76-mm cannon cartridges were replenished.
By the end of 1914, the supply of 76-mm shells had dried up. And it was not possible to replenish it, since the mobilization of Russian factories that manufactured shells was not prepared in advance and their productivity was extremely low. Sukhomlinov carried out the task of German intelligence - to disrupt the supply of shells to the front, not to give guns to the front, not to give rifles.
At the beginning of 1915, the lack of 76-mm shells was felt so acutely that their consumption on the day of the battle had to be limited to 5-10 shots per gun. Under the threat of court martial, the commanders of batteries and artillery battalions had to strictly comply with this order. Of course, under such conditions it was impossible to even think about an offensive.
The lack of shells in the Russian army decreased to some extent only by 1916, the third year of the war. By that time, the upper echelons of power were convinced of the subversive activities of Sukhomlinov. In addition, Russian patriotic entrepreneurs mobilized all the country's internal resources for military needs, and weapons ordered from foreign factories also began to arrive. However, we note that until the end of the war, Russia was not able to supply its army with a sufficient number of shells.
With the transition to positional warfare, there was an especially acute shortage of shells for howitzer and heavy artillery. Namely, in positional conditions, the fire of howitzers and heavy guns is especially important, since no advance is possible unless the enemy’s defensive fortifications are first destroyed and his firing points hidden in strong shelters are not suppressed.
Thus, during almost the entire war, Russian artillerymen had to reckon with the lack of shells and often limit their actions because of this. As a result, Russian artillery used up significantly fewer shells during the World War than the artillery of other countries. During all the years of the war, Russian gunners fired no more than 50 million shells of all calibers, including chemical shells. This expense was enormous, even unbearable for the state in which the economy of tsarist Russia was then. But if we compare this figure with the consumption of shells in other warring countries, then it will seem very small. During the war, British artillery fired 170 million shells, German - 272 million, and French artillery used up almost 200 million shells of only two calibers (75 mm and 150 mm).
The grandiose scale of the world war affected not only the number of expendable shells. A significant increase in the number of guns was also required. Artillery had to solve a variety of tasks. The artillery was supposed to stop the advance of the enemy infantry and put it to flight; artillery was to clear the path for its advancing infantry, suppress enemy artillery fire, destroy its barbed wire and all other artificial obstacles, destroy machine-gun nests, deprive the enemy infantry sitting in the trenches of its defense capability; smash the deep rear of the enemy, warehouses, stations, headquarters; artillery was supposed to fight enemy aircraft ... It is difficult to say what artillery was not supposed to do during the world war.
The total number of guns during the war increased in Russia one and a half times, and in France and Germany - three times.
In the Russian army, heavy artillery for special purposes consisted of more than 600 guns of various models and calibers. Among them were 120-mm long-range guns, and 152-mm howitzers, and guns of very large calibers, such as 280-mm Schneider howitzers, 305-mm howitzers of Vickers and the Obukhov plant, and others. The TAON also included several Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns and a large number of British and French mortars. In addition, TAON was attached to a sapper battalion, a railway company, aviation and aeronautical detachments.
The TAON included 152-mm Kane coastal guns, firing at a distance of more than thirteen kilometers, and 120-mm guns from the Obukhov plant with a firing range of 14.4 kilometers. Obukhov 305-mm howitzers fired shells weighing almost 400 kilograms at a distance of up to 13 kilometers. The shells of the 305 mm howitzers had a large bursting charge, and therefore their destructive effect was very impressive.
Canet guns and howitzers of the Obukhov factory were transported only by rail. Part of the TAON guns was moved with the help of tractors, and some of the guns were transported disassembled by horse traction, and then they were assembled directly at the position itself.
The most long-range in the Russian army was a 254-millimeter coastal gun. She shot for more than twenty kilometers. Several of these guns, taken from coastal fortresses, were on the Austro-German front. A special railway platform served as a carriage for each gun, from where it fired. Fire from the platform could only be fired in the direction of the railway track. Therefore, it was necessary to adjust branches to the main rail track in order to turn the gun in the direction of fire.
During the shooting, the rail track was strengthened with additional sleepers, as the track settled due to the enormous pressure during the shot.
World War II created a new type of artillery - the so-called trench artillery. It consisted of bombers, mortars and assault guns. Even during the Russo-Japanese War, when trenches and trenches began to be widely used, the troops themselves began to manufacture handicraft melee weapons. These were guns with a very short muzzle, sending shells of high explosive force along a very steep trajectory. They called them mortars.
The firing range of mortars is very short, but such guns are very convenient for hitting an enemy hiding in trenches and trenches.
During the World War, close combat trench guns became very widespread. Bomb throwers were intended mainly to destroy living targets. The infantry used them in cases where it was not possible for some reason to use light field artillery, and the fire of rifles or machine guns alone was not enough. Mortars, on the other hand, were put into action to destroy dugouts, trenches and various barriers. By the end of the war, the Russian army had 14 thousand mortar bombers, 4,500 light mortars and only 267 heavy mortars - the latter were clearly not enough, and there were already more light bombers than the army demanded.
Special guns were needed to accompany the infantry during the attack and subsequently secure it in the taken sections of the enemy position. The 76-mm field gun could not follow its infantry everywhere: it was too heavy for this, it required a team of six horses to transport it. We needed much lighter and more mobile tools that could be rolled by hand by two or three people. Such guns began to gradually appear in the Russian army. They were at the disposal of the infantry itself and served mainly to knock out and destroy enemy machine guns and light guns. If they were not put out of action in a timely manner, they inflicted huge losses on the attacking infantry and deprived it of an offensive impulse.
Russian assault artillery had a rather motley composition. There were guns taken from the navy, and the so-called "short mountain guns", and guns taken from the fortresses, and, finally, a number of small-caliber guns of 47 and 37 millimeters. Among the latter, the 37-mm cannon of the system of the Russian inventor Rosenberg was distinguished by high combat qualities.
In general, assault artillery was clearly not enough. Assault guns were about five times less than they were required. Technologically weak industry in Russia could not quickly master the production of new types of weapons.
During the World War, military aviation developed widely. Initially, aircraft served only for reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Then they were adapted for bombing and machine-gun fire on earthly targets.
The threat from the air became very serious.
Russia, like other states, turned out to be unprepared to fight an air enemy. I had to hastily find artillery that could repel enemy air raids. At first, at the front, they tried to fire on aircraft from field 76-mm cannons. To do this, a small ditch was dug under the trunk of their gun carriage in order to raise the muzzle of the gun as high as possible. But this gave a very weak effect, especially since the height and speed of the flight of airplanes continuously increased.
Then they began to adapt naval rapid-fire guns with a caliber of 75 millimeters for anti-aircraft fire. They were still more effective shooting at airplanes than simple field guns. Finally, in March 1915, with a great delay, the first Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns were made. But it was a drop in the ocean. The production of special anti-aircraft guns was very difficult. Therefore, it was not necessary to count on the rapid production of a large number of such guns. Most often, they resorted to the device of makeshift installations, with the help of which it would be possible to conduct anti-aircraft fire from conventional 76-mm field guns. Such installations were made by means of military units. And in this area, Russian artillerymen showed a lot of ingenuity. The simplest devices were all kinds of pedestals, on which the guns were mounted so that the muzzle of the gun looked as high as possible. And by the end of the war, even a special machine for anti-aircraft firing of the B.N. system was designed. Ivanova. This machine had a circular rail, which made it possible to rotate the gun in a circle during firing and follow the movement of the aircraft with the muzzle.
Most anti-aircraft installations moved disassembled with the help of horse traction. In the same places that were subjected to systematic enemy air raids, fixed anti-aircraft batteries of a more complex device were placed. Finally, vehicles were adapted for the rapid transfer of anti-aircraft guns to a particular area. Each such "car battery for firing at the air fleet" consisted of four Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns.
The guns were mounted on specially adapted armored vehicles. Steel armor protected the drivers, gunners and vital parts of the vehicle from shrapnel and long-range rifle fire. The cars also served as charging boxes. In addition, each battery was followed by 4 armored vehicles, exclusively for the transport of shells, gasoline and oil. Three passenger cars transported battery commanders and signalmen; scouts with such a battery traveled on motorcycles; and, finally, this whole cavalcade was closed by a kitchen-storehouse, also installed on the car.
Automobile anti-aircraft batteries were already quite perfect, for that time, military weapons for fighting an air enemy. However, for the entire duration of the war, only 9 automobile batteries were formed - a completely insignificant number in terms of the scale of the world war. And in total, by the end of the war, there were no more than 70 guns of the Tarnovsky system at the front.
Yes, Russian gunners during the World War were much worse equipped with the latest military equipment than their opponents, the Austro-Germans. But on the other hand, the Russian gunners fired very accurately. And there were often cases when the high art of shooting made up for the lack of guns and shells. Russian gunners were able to achieve great results with little means.
The war with Japan confirmed the absolute necessity of shooting from closed positions with the help of a goniometer. After the end of this war, Russian gunners began to improve in the art of such shooting. Soon, all battery commanders not only imbued with respect for the goniometer, but also completely mastered its use in a variety of conditions. By the beginning of World War II, Russian gunners were excellent at shooting from closed positions. In this respect, the Austro-Germans lagged far behind the Russian gunners. During the maneuverable period of the war, the Austro-German gunners occupied mainly half-open or completely open positions. They often tried to famously ride with their battery to the top of some hill or hillock, and for this they were just as often cruelly beaten by the skilful fire of Russian artillery. During the war, the Austro-German gunners had to retrain, borrowing Russian techniques for the closed location of batteries, and partly the rules of firing.
Artillerymen were the most educated and advanced part of the Russian army. Junior officers received very solid training in special schools. Most of the commanders not only knew their job well, but also had fairly extensive knowledge in other areas of science, especially in mathematics and chemistry.
Ordinary artillery personnel were recruited from the most literate and intelligent people. In addition, the common work of mastering complex equipment, where each gun is a kind of production unit, developed among ordinary artillerymen a collective spirit of comradely soldering and mutual support. No wonder among them it was widely believed that the origin of the word "artillery" is due to the fact that artillerymen work as an "artel".
Fireworks (junior officers) were prepared most thoroughly. They superbly managed the entire work of the gun crew and could, if necessary, replace the commander of an artillery platoon. The fireworkers not only knew their job perfectly as practitioners, but also understood the theoretical foundations of artillery firing.
Senior commanders received combat training at the officers' artillery school. This school played an important role in its time in educating the bulk of Russian artillerymen to the level of modern war requirements. Through the school, new ideas were put into practice in the field of artillery tactics, techniques and shooting rules. Any senior commander, before he received command of a battery, division or battalion of fortress artillery, took a course in an officer's school.
Education in this school was delivered very well. Much attention was paid to practical training and shooting. In this respect, the Russian officer school favorably differed from similar schools in other countries, where a purely theoretical, lecture method of teaching prevailed. The school had its own well-equipped training ground near the city of Luga. The range allowed firing from guns of any caliber, as well as performing a variety of maneuvers. The terrain at the training ground is very rugged and therefore very convenient for conducting a wide variety of combat exercises. The range was equipped with mechanical targets. Some of them made themselves felt with light or smoke flashes, others lowered and rose with the help of special cables, and still others could even move mechanically from one place to another. All this brought the situation of shooting practice closer to the conditions of a real battle.
Senior commanders who went through this school perfectly mastered the art of shooting from closed positions and were quite well versed in the tactical issues of using artillery in battle.
Unfortunately, such an assessment cannot be given to the combined arms commanders of the Russian army. For the most part, they did not understand the properties and tasks of artillery and therefore could not often use it properly. During the World War, there were frequent cases when artillerymen acted in battle at their own discretion and, on their own initiative, carried out certain combat missions.
The Russian gunners were preparing to wage the world war in a resolute offensive spirit. They were well aware that under modern conditions of combat, the situation is changing rapidly and there is not always time to wait for orders from above. The artillery commander must make independent decisions in these cases. In battle, it often happens that an opportunity for an advantageous action of artillery appears suddenly, the outcome of the case is decided in minutes, and the properties of artillery just make it possible to inflict defeat in the shortest possible time. Therefore, Russian gunners attached great importance to any manifestation of personal initiative, decisiveness and speed of action.
A striking example of such a decisive offensive action is the maneuvers of the Russian horse artillery. Great mobility and rapid firing were especially required from horse artillery. By all means they tried to develop dashing and unrestrained forward impulse among horse artillerymen.
During maneuvers, Russian horse artillerymen performed, for example, such a spectacular and bold trick. As soon as the cavalry reorganized into battle formation, the horse batteries jumped out at full quarry from some flank, ahead of their cavalry. Then the guns were quickly removed from the limbers and a sudden rapid fire was opened on the advancing enemy cavalry. To perform such a maneuver and open rapid fire, horse artillery took no more than two minutes. Their cavalry, going on the attack, quickly covered the enemy cavalry rushing towards them, and after that the fire of the horse batteries was transferred to the artillery and machine guns of the enemy.
The experience of the maneuvering period of the World War confirmed that, in general, the training of Russian artillerymen was quite correct. The World War on the Russian front began with oncoming battles on the borders of Russia with Germany and Austria. The wide frontier spaces, which did not hamper the actions of the troops, made it possible to carry out the most daring maneuvers. At that time, Russian artillerymen dealt mainly with open enemy manpower or with light field fortifications. There was still enough ammunition, and the gunners did not have to save. The fire of the Russian artillery was terrifying, and the art of shooting left nothing to be desired. No wonder the 76-mm cannon was nicknamed the "scythe of death."
At the very beginning of the war, Russian troops invaded Germany and captured part of East Prussia. During this offensive, the Battle of Gumbinen broke out.
On August 20, 1914, the strong units of the 17th German Corps under General Mackensen attacked two Russian divisions. Forces met unequal. Mackensen had much more infantry and more artillery, and he also had at his disposal heavy guns, which the Russians did not have at all in this sector of the front.
First, the German batteries opened heavy fire. They fired a huge number of shells of various calibers. Then the German infantry moved forward and cut into a wedge between two Russian divisions. The Russian gunners immediately took advantage of this: they opened flank-cross fire on the advancing Germans from two sides - two batteries from the north and two batteries from the south. Shrapnel from 76-millimeter cannons showered bullets on the advancing enemy lines. The German infantry suffered huge losses.
Three hours later, its miserable remnants rushed back in complete disarray, leaving the wounded and dead on the battlefield.
Following that, the Germans tried to outflank one of the divisions. The German infantry marched in thick chains, keeping the alignment, as in a parade. Some German officers even rode on horseback in the ranks of their units. The Russian gunners let the enemy in at a fairly close distance and suddenly immediately unleashed a hurricane of shrapnel fire on him. The German infantry began to thin out greatly, broke up into separate groups and, finally, lay down, continuing to suffer heavy losses. The enemy artillery tried in vain to put out the fire of the 76-mm cannons in order to save their infantry: the Russian batteries stood in well-hidden positions and were invulnerable.
In the same battle, the gunners severely reprimanded the Germans for their manner of riding into open positions. It was near the village of Matishkemen. Two German batteries, wanting to rescue their infantry, famously drove out to an open place 1,200 paces from the dug-in Russian infantry. But the Germans managed to fire only one shot. The gunners suddenly opened their lethal fire from their 76mm cannons. Literally in a few minutes, the German batteries were destroyed by well-aimed fire. The infantry, which went over to the attack, captured 12 German guns and 24 ammunition boxes.
In the battle on August 26, 1914, the German artillery was located east of the village of Tarnaaka. In the first line were three light batteries in a half-covered position. Behind them are three howitzer batteries. They occupied a position closed to the east, but half-closed to the northeast. The Russian batteries were five kilometers northeast of the German ones. On their right flank was a battery of 122mm howitzers. This howitzer battery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery. The task is not easy, given that the Germans had much more guns.
When it began to get dark in the evening, the commander of the howitzer battery saw the brilliance of the shots of the German guns, repulsing the attacks of the Russian infantry with rapid fire. From these flashes, he determined the exact sight for each of his howitzers and then moved on to defeat. They fired with combined fire: either grenades or shrapnel.
An hour has passed. The fire of the German artillery gradually subsided. And soon neither flashes of enemy guns, nor explosions of shrapnel over the Russian infantry, which rushed to the attack, became visible. After the capture of the German positions, it turned out that out of 34 guns, three were hit, one of the howitzers, thrown by a grenade explosion over a charging box, lay a few steps away from it. Nearby lay nine blown up and broken ammunition boxes, and almost all of the German gunners were killed or wounded.
So one battery, despite the extremely difficult firing conditions, destroyed six batteries of the Germans.
The desire of Russian gunners to shoot from closed positions, of course, does not give any reason to reproach them for lack of courage. Possessing quite the art of shooting from closed positions, they did not even think of going to an open position and steadfastly holding out under enemy fire when this was not necessary. But if there was one...
On the night of October 10, 1914, the vanguard units of the 25th Russian Corps crossed to the left bank of the Vistula River near New Alexandria. In the morning they were attacked by a superior Hungarian force supported by heavy artillery. The Hungarians, bypassing both flanks of the Russians and surrounding them in a tight half-ring, began to press against the Vistula. The only bridge along which the Russians could retreat beyond the Vistula was under heavy fire from enemy artillery. The situation has become extremely difficult. Withdrawal threatened with complete disaster. The situation was saved by artillerymen. They boldly rode out into the open and began to shower shrapnel on the attacking Hungarians. For almost six hours they were under the strongest rifle fire of the Hungarian infantry, which in some places approached already 400 meters. But the gunners held firm and repelled all enemy attacks.
And in April 1915, during the attack on Chernivtsi, such an incident occurred. Russian infantry captured the crest of the heights near the village of Rapanche. But behind the crest she was met by the destructive machine-gun fire of the enemy. Only artillery could suppress machine-gun fire. However, the gunners could not see from their observation posts what was happening behind the ridge. Then a platoon of a mountain battery rushed to the ridge on a quarry. When he reached it, the Russian infantry had already been almost completely knocked off the ridge by the Austrian counterattack. The gun teams that appeared were also killed. The commander of the mountain platoon was taken prisoner. But the surviving soldiers of the gun crew did not lose their heads. They managed to fire 4-5 shrapnels at buckshot right at point-blank range to the advancing Austrians. The enemy stopped in confusion and lay down. This made it possible for the Russian infantry to again take possession of an important ridge and hold on to it.
Russian gunners were also brought up in the spirit of quick and decisive action, which helped them seize the initiative and decide the outcome of the battle. This quality is especially important in an oncoming battle.
On August 26, 1914, in Galicia, a Russian division clashed with an Austrian division. At the forefront of the Russian division was an artillery battalion consisting of three light batteries of 76-millimeter cannons. In anticipation of an imminent clash, the Russians and Austrians began to deploy in advance into battle formation. The 24 guns of the Russian avant-garde quickly took up position, and the gunners prepared to open fire. The artillery of the Austrian avant-garde was very late, and this gave the Russians a great advantage. As soon as the firing lines of the Austrians appeared on the ridge in front of the lying hills, Russian batteries immediately fell upon them with rapid fire. The 44th Austrian Regiment, having fallen under a sudden shrapnel fire, was almost completely destroyed within fifteen to twenty minutes. An hour and a half later, the Austrian vanguard artillery finally opened fire. But too late: the Austrians lost their offensive initiative and had to go on the defensive. But they didn't succeed either. The Russian troops used their fire superiority and with an energetic attack finally defeated the Austrians.
Horse artillery was especially quick to maneuver. In a battle with the Austrians near the city of Tomashev, the Don Cossack batteries showed an example of a lightning strike. The vastly outnumbered Austrians forced the Russians to retreat to the Tomashevsky Forest. Behind the firing lines of the Austrians was a close reserve column of three battalions. At this time, two Cossack batteries at full quarry rushed, hiding behind the crest of a hill, to the flank of the advancing Austrians. Quickly removing the guns from the limbers, the horse artillerymen opened rapid flanking fire two minutes later: one battery on the reserve column, and the other on the advancing chains.
And those precious minutes decided the whole thing. After two or three minutes, the orderly advancing chains and the reserve column were literally swept away by hurricane fire.
The Austrian artillery, which came to the rescue of its infantry, tried to open fire, but quickly left its position and rushed back, seized by general panic. The battle ended with the complete annihilation of the 44th Austrian regiment - one of the best regiments, which was recruited from the inhabitants of the city of Vienna. The tragic death of this regiment at the very beginning of the war made a depressing impression on the inhabitants of the capital of Austria-Hungary.
During the First World War, anti-aircraft fire was so imperfect that to destroy one aircraft, even with the help of special anti-aircraft guns, it was required to fire from 3 to 11 thousand shells. However, Russian gunners sometimes showed examples of incomparably more accurate shooting at an air enemy.
In 1916, the 7th separate Russian light battery defended the Romanian city of Medzhidie from air raids. On October 1, six German bombers appeared in the area where the battery was located. The artillerymen opened fire. Fleeing from the projectile, two enemy planes immediately quickly left. The rest dispersed across the sky above the city and hastily dropped their bombs. Then the airplanes entered from different directions into the so-called "dead funnel" of the Russian battery, that is, into the zone where its shells could not hit. The aircraft descended and several bombs fell on the battery. Eight Russian anti-aircraft gunners were wounded and shell-shocked. But no one left for dressing until the end of the battle, everyone remained in place. The German planes were leaving. The 7th battery fired several volleys at them. The third volley covered one of the planes. He quickly went down, then caught fire and fell like a flaming torch into the location of the neighboring Romanian troops.
A short time later, from the observation posts, they reported by telephone that again five German aircraft rushed towards the city. But only two planes dared to go to the city itself. They flew with great apprehension, making sharp turns and turns all the time. The bombs they dropped were few and random. At the same time, the remaining three planes descended in turn to the dead funnel of the Russian battery and tried to hit the gunners with bombs and machine-gun fire. However, the German pilots did this so timidly and uncertainly that they could not cause any harm. Flying home, the German bombers rose very high at large intervals from each other. Russian anti-aircraft gunners chose one of the enemy aircraft and concentrated their fire on it. Soon, a large metal part separated from the aircraft and fell, which turned out to be the engine hood. The engine stopped, and the plane began to descend towards its positions. He flew over the trenches of the Serbian infantry, falling lower and lower. But he failed to pull through the wire fences, he buried his nose in them and helplessly froze in place.
An hour later, the German bombers reappeared. This time there were four. As they approached the city, they split into pairs. But the first pair immediately turned back under fire from the 7th battery without dropping a single bomb. The second pair also did not complete the task: after dropping only a few bombs, they followed the first.
The death of two German bombers and the flight of four others - such was the result of the firing of Russian anti-aircraft gunners that day. At the same time, only 364 shells were used up - a figure that at that time can be considered insignificant.
In the Russian theater of war, the maneuver period lasted until about the autumn of 1915, when both sides, having exhausted their forces and materiel, dug into the ground and switched to trench warfare. Under these conditions, everyone had to retrain and develop new tactics for the struggle for fortified zones. And the Russian gunners did not lag behind in this regard. They quickly learned that breaking through the enemy's fortified zone is not a field battle in which the situation is assessed on the move, almost at lightning speed, but a well-thought-out and strictly calculated operation. If during an attack in maneuverable conditions, especially in a meeting engagement, it is impossible to foresee all the actions of artillery in a rapidly changing situation, if under these conditions any attempt at an accurate timetable is doomed to failure in advance and even harmful, since it would only tie up the initiative of the artillerymen, then in a breakthrough Fortified zones, on the contrary, are the key to success - in a strictly thought-out plan, in the exact distribution of tasks for individual batteries, in the strict and methodical implementation of the combat schedule. The Russian gunners not only learned this basic principle well, but more than once carried it out very successfully. In cases where their actions were not paralyzed by a complete lack of guns and shells, they carried out breakthroughs of the fortified zone in a truly exemplary way. An example of this can be at least the work of artillerymen on the site of the 11th Army Corps during the famous Brusilov breakthrough in the summer of 1916.
Thanks to the power of their fire and the excellent training of their personnel, Russian artillery quickly achieved brilliant results. At the beginning of September 1914, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed the Minister of War: “The whole burden of modern battles is on artillery. She alone sweeps away the deadly machine guns of the enemy and destroys his artillery. Our infantry will not boast of its artillery. She shoots great."
Even the opponents had to recognize the high skill of shooting Russian gunners. The German generals Franus and Hindenburg wrote in their conclusions about the actions of the Russian army that Russian artillery "shoots well", takes exclusively closed positions "with great skill" and already from long distances often develops "such a strong and intense fire that misleads our troops in relation to their numerical superiority, which in fact does not exist.
Russian officers who had been in German captivity said that in August 1914, among numerous newspaper articles praising the “valor of German weapons”, a note appeared in which, despite all the chauvinistic frenzy, the author had to recognize the brilliant actions of Russian artillery. This note had a very significant title: "Hats off to the Russian gunners."
And Russian gunners during the World War more than once proved the correctness of this high assessment.
As you can see, the main value of Russian artillery was its people. The high art of shooting, the bold initiative and the courageous heroism of ordinary Russian gunners brought them many well-deserved victories. Many of these people subsequently formed the backbone of the artillery cadres of the Red Army.
Loading...
