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Kodan S.V. — State Defense Committee in the system of party leadership and public administration in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: creation, nature, structure and organization of activities // Genesis: historical studies. - 2015. - No. 3. - P. 616 - 636. DOI: 10.7256/2409-868X.2015.3.15198 URL: https://nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=15198

State Defense Committee in the system of party leadership and public administration in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: creation, nature, structure and organization of activities

Kodan Sergey Vladimirovich Doctor of Law Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, member of the Expert Council on Law of the Higher Attestation Commission under the Ministry of Science and Education of the Russian Federation, professor of the Department of Theory of State and Law of the Ural State Law University, editor-in-chief of the journal "Genesis: Historical Research" 620137, Russia, Sverdlovsk region, Ekaterinburg, st. Komsomolskaya, 21, of. 210 Kodan Sergei Vladimirovich Doctor of Law Professor, the department of Theory of State and Law, Merited Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Ural State Law Academy; Editor-in-Chief of the Scientific Journal “Genesis: historical studies” 620137, Russia, Sverdlvskaya oblast", g. Ekaterinburg, st. Komsomol"skaya, 21, of. 210 10.7256/2409-868X.2015.3.15198 Date the article was sent to the editor: 07-05-2015 Publication date: 09-05-2015 Annotation. The creation and activities of the State Defense Committee reflected the peculiarities of public administration in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, in which conditions it was necessary to concentrate all resources to win the war. In the pre-war years, a system of governing the country finally took shape, in which the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks determined state policy and actually headed the party and state administration. The creation of the State Defense Committee on June 30, 1941 fully reflected this trend and, during the war, concentrated all power in the state as an emergency party-state body. Declassified archival documents about the activities of the State Defense Committee create new opportunities for studying its activities. The article presents a description of the creation, composition, areas of activity and an overview of the materials of the official record keeping of the State Defense Committee. The article describes the State Defense Committee, and the representation of publications of documents on activities in scientific research, and identifies the possibilities of attracting new materials. The latter is due to the fact that almost the entire array of documents on activities has been declassified and creates opportunities for further research into the history of the State Defense Committee. Keywords: history of the Soviet state, the Great Patriotic War, public administration, emergency governing bodies, party-state governing bodies, military governing bodies, State Defense Committee, composition of the State Defense Committee, organization of the activities of the State Defense Committee, resolutions of the State Defense Committee Abstract. The creation and activity of the State Defense Committee (SDC) reflected the peculiarities of the state administration in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945 during which the concentration of all the resources were needed to gain the victory. Before the war, the country’s system of administration were fully formed, and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks defined the state politics and headed the state administration. The creation of the SDC in June, 30, 1941 fully reflected this tendency and in the conditions of the war took all the state power as an emergency Party and State authorities. Unclassified archive documents about the SDC activity give new opportunities for studying its activity. The article tells about the characteristic features of creation, structure, directions of activity and a review of materials about the official paperwork of the State Defense Committee. The article characterizes the State Defense Committee, shows the documents about the activity of scientific research, defines the possibilities to use new materials. The latter comes out of the fact that all the documents are unclassified and gives many opportunities for the further studying of the SDC history. Keywords: The history of the Soviet state, The Great Patriotic War, public administration, emergency management agencies, party - government authorities, the military authorities, State Defense Committee, of the ICTs, organization of ICT activities, GKO order The publication was prepared as part of the implementation of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation project No. 15-03-00624 “Source studies of the history of state and law of Russia (1917 - 1990s) In the conditions of the Great Patriotic War in 1941 - 1945. a specially created management system was in effect, in which the State Defense Committee occupied a dominant position from June 30, 1945 to September 4, 1945. The history of the activities of the State Defense Committee is very interesting and indicative, since this body reflected the features and combined in its organization two principles - the party and the state, characteristic of management mechanisms in Soviet society. But, at the same time, this is a unique experience in creating, organizing and ensuring fairly effective management in wartime. Within the framework of this article, we will dwell on the issues of the creation and place of the State Defense Committee in the system of party and government administration during the Great Patriotic War, the features of its activities and the acts issued, as well as the state of research on the issue and the availability of those declassified in the early 2000s. GKO documents. Creation of the State Defense Committeewas due to the fact that the beginning of the Great Patriotic War showed clearly that the pre-war command and administrative control system, even in the conditions of the military-mobilization orientation of its orientation and activities, was not able to withstand the large-scale military aggression of Nazi Germany. What was required was a restructuring of the entire system of political and public administration of the USSR, the creation in the country of new emergency authorities capable of ensuring comprehensive and coordinated control of the front and rear and “transforming the country into a single military camp in the shortest possible time.” On the second day of the war, the body of the highest collective strategic leadership of the active army was created - the Headquarters of the High Command. And although the Headquarters “had all the powers in the strategic leadership of troops and naval forces, it did not have the opportunity to exercise power and administrative functions in the sphere of civil administration.” Headquarters also “could not act as a coordinating principle in the activities of civilian government and management structures in the interests of the active army, which, naturally, complicated the strategic leadership of troops and naval forces.” The situation at the front was rapidly deteriorating and this “pushed the highest party and state leadership of the USSR to form a power structure that could become higher in status not only than the Headquarters of the High Command, but also all leading party authorities, government bodies and administration.” The decision to create a new emergency body was considered and approved by its resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The creation of the State Defense Committee was formalized by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 30, 1941. It established two fundamentally important provisions: “To concentrate all power in the state in the hands of the State Defense Committee” (clause 2) and “Oblige all citizens and all party, Soviet, Komsomol and military bodies to unquestioningly implement the decisions and orders of the State Defense Committee” (clause 2). The composition of the State Defense Committee was represented by the leadership of the party and state - members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria. Subsequent changes in the composition of the State Defense Committee took place in the same personnel vein: in 1942, N.A. joined the committee. Voznesensky, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, and in 1944 N.A. Bulganin replaced K.E. Voroshilov. The State Defense Committee was abolished by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of September 4, 1945 with the wording - “In connection with the end of the war and the end of the state of emergency in the country, recognize that the continued existence of the State Defense Committee is not necessary, whereby the State Defense Committee and all its transfer the affairs to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR." It should be noted that the creation of GKOs was not an exceptional phenomenon in the national history of state and law. Its organization can be considered in the context of a certain continuity in the creation of similar emergency and special bodies in the history of our country. They existed in the Russian Empire, and then in the earlier stages of the existence of the RSFSR and the USSR. So, for example, in Russia the State Defense Council was created on June 8, 1905 and operated until August 12, 1909, and during the First World War a Special Meeting was created to discuss and consolidate measures for the defense of the state (1915-1918). . After the October Revolution of 1917, among the political and administrative structures of the Soviet government there were: the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense (1918-1920), the Council of Labor and Defense (1920-1937), the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (1937 - June 1941). The place of the State Defense Committee in the system of party and government administration of the USSRduring the Great Patriotic War, it was determined by its characteristics as a body that was complex in its political and managerial nature - it simultaneously combined party leadership and state administration of the country. At the same time, the main question is whether to maintain or abandon in war conditions the old system that had developed by the early 1940s. administrative-command system of party-Soviet governance in the country. She was actually represented by one person - V.I. Stalin, who relied on a narrow circle of party functionaries and at the same time the heads of the highest bodies of state power and administration that were part of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Studies of the activities of the State Defense Committee note and focus on one of its important features, namely that the previously existing Soviet emergency bodies, unlike the State Defense Committee, did not replace the activities of party bodies in war conditions. On this occasion N.Ya. Komarov emphasizes that “emergency authorities during the civil and Great Patriotic Wars differed very significantly, and primarily in their methods of activity. The main feature of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense was that it did not replace party, government and military bodies. Fundamental issues of conducting armed struggle were considered at that time at the Politburo and plenums of the Central Committee, at congresses of the RCP (b), at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars. During the Great Patriotic War, no plenums, much less party congresses, were held; all cardinal issues were resolved by the State Defense Committee. The tasks of strengthening the country's defense capability, which had become urgently on the agenda, were considered by Stalin in the closest unity of the political, economic and military spheres, which made it possible, from the point of view of the chairman of the State Defense Committee, to concentrate the country's political and military efforts on solving urgent problems of defense of our state, on increasing the combat effectiveness of the army and navy. This, finally, ensured the reality of implementing the unity of political, economic and military leadership of the entire system of socialist social relations.” The question posed is answered more convincingly by the team of authors of the newest study - “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.” (2015). Considering the place of the “Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the system of strategic leadership of the country and the armed forces” in the 11th volume of this publication, the team of authors who prepared it notes: “The Politburo transferred power functions to a new emergency authority - the State Defense Committee... I.V. Stalin and his closest associates, by placing all power on the State Defense Committee and becoming part of it, thereby radically changed the power structure in the country, the system of state and military administration. In fact, all decisions of the State Defense Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and draft decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were approved by a narrow circle of statesmen: V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, and then I.V. Stalin made a decision on behalf of which body it would be advisable to issue this or that administrative document.” It is also emphasized that in the new conditions of governing the country, “the leading role in both the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command belonged to members of the Politburo. Thus, the GKO included all members of the Politburo, with the exception of N.A. Voznesensky, and at Headquarters the Politburo was represented by three members of the highest party body: I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and K.E. Voroshilov. Accordingly, the resolutions of the State Defense Committee were actually also resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. ... Members of the Politburo, State Defense Committee and Headquarters, representing the unified state-political and strategic center of the country's leadership, possessed all available information about the state of affairs in the country and at the front, so they could quickly resolve urgent issues. Thanks to this, the process of making important decisions was significantly accelerated, which had a positive impact on the general situation at the front and in the rear. Despite the violation of the principles of internal party democracy, such an approach was justified by the specifics of wartime, when the issues of organizing the country’s defense and mobilizing all forces to repel the enemy came to the fore.” At the same time, “the decisive word in both the Politburo and the State Defense Committee remained with the head of the country.” This allows us to talk about the party-state nature of the State Defense Committee, the creation and activities of which reflected the final formation of the state in the 1930s. system of governing the country, in which the leading role was played by the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, represented by its General Secretary I.V. Stalin and members of the Politburo, and the Soviet state acted as a mechanism for legislative registration and implementation of the political decisions of the party. GKO was primarilyh emergency body of the party leadership in conditions of war and his activities fully corresponded to the principles of combining the general party leadership of the country and the use of the Soviet state apparatus to implement party decisions. This did not fundamentally change the previous style of leadership of the country - the State Defense Committee was primarily a body, albeit an emergency one, of the political, party leadership, committee discussed and made decisions on the main issues of governing the country in wartime conditions at the level of a very limited number of persons vested with the highest party power - “all officials of the newly formed body were members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.” GKO asemergency government body was characterized by the fact that in it, at the level of heads of the highest bodies of state power and management, who occupied key positions in them, areas of organizational and managerial activity were concentrated. This was also manifested in the organization of the activities of the State Defense Committee - the entire system of military and civilian administration was involved in the implementation of the decisions it made. At the same time, the State Defense Committee was “a center of emergency power and control, endowed with special powers” ​​and acted as “the main structure, including in the system of strategic management bodies of the country and its armed forces, whose decrees and orders were given the status of wartime laws, binding on everyone.” . At the same time, one should take into account the fair remark of military historians that “special emergency state bodies created in connection with the urgent need of wartime acted and were modified in connection with a perceived need. Then they were formalized according to the appropriate legislative procedure (GKO resolution), but without changing the Constitution of the USSR. Under them, new leadership positions, executive and technical apparatuses were established, and emergency management technology was developed in creative searches. With their help, it was possible to quickly solve the most pressing problems." Directions and organization of activities of State Defense Committeescombined the principles of collegiality when discussing issues and unity of command when making decisions, and the committee itself acted “as a think tank and a mechanism for restructuring the country on a war footing.” At the same time, “the main direction of the GKO’s activities was the work of transferring the Soviet state from peacetime to wartime.” The committee's activities covered a complex range of issues in almost all areas of political and public administration of the country in wartime conditions. In the organization and activities of the State Defense Committee, the leading role belonged to its chairman, I.V. Stalin, who during the war concentrated in his hands all the key party and state posts and at the same time was: Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Chairman of the Supreme Command Headquarters, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b), chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, chairman of the Transport Committee of the State Defense Committee. I.V. Stalin and his deputy V.M. Molotov “carried out not only leadership over the activities of this emergency body, but also strategic leadership of the country, the armed struggle and the war as a whole. All resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee were signed by them. At the same time, V.M. Molotov, also as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, led the country’s foreign policy activities.” Military historians also pay attention to the advantages of unity of command in war conditions and emphasize that “having received unlimited powers, J.V. Stalin was able to use them rationally: he not only united, but also implemented huge military-political, administrative and administrative potential of state power and management in the interests of achieving the strategic goal - victory over Nazi Germany and its allies." Members of the State Defense Committee were assigned to the most responsible areas of work. At the first meeting of the State Defense Committee - July 3, 1941 - “seven resolutions of the State Defense Committee were approved on the responsibility for the assigned area of ​​​​each member of the State Defense Committee. ... Members of the State Defense Committee G.M. Malenkov, K.E. Voroshilov and L.P. Beria, along with his main responsibilities in the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, the People’s Commissariats and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, through the State Defense Committee, received new permanent or temporary assignments.” Beria in the military-industrial bloc oversaw the people's commissariats (mortar weapons, ammunition for the tank industry), and also, in accordance with the GKO decree of August 29, 1941, was appointed GKO commissioner on armament issues and was responsible “for the implementation and overfulfillment by industry of production plans of all types weapons." G.M. Malenkov supervised the production of all types of tanks. Marshal K.E. Voroshilov was engaged in military mobilization work. As necessary, assignments were redistributed among committee members. Working groups and structural divisions were created and operated under the State Defense Committee. The working groups were the first structural elements of the State Defense Committee apparatus and comprised a team of qualified specialists - 20-50. More stable structural divisions of the State Defense Committee were committees, commissions, councils, groups, and bureaus created as needed. The committee included: Group of State Defense Authorities (July - December 1941), Evacuation Committee (July 16, 1941 - December 25, 1945), Committee for the evacuation of food and manufactured goods from front-line zones (from September 25, 1941), Trophy Commission (December 1941 - April 5, 1943), Committee for Unloading Railways (December 25, 1941 - February 14, 1942), Transport Committee (February 14, 1942 - May 19, 1944), GKO Operations Bureau (from 8 October 1942), Trophy Committee (from April 5, 1943), Radar Council (from July 4, 1943), Special Committee on Reparations (from February 25, 1945), Special Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy (since August 20, 1945). Of particular importance in the organizational structure of the State Defense Committee was the institution of its representatives, who, as representatives of the committee, were sent to enterprises, front-line areas, etc. Military historians note that “the establishment of the institution of State Defense Committee commissioners became a powerful lever for the implementation of not only its decisions. At large enterprises, in addition to those authorized by the State Defense Committee, there were party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Komsomol Organizers of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, authorized representatives of the NKVD, and authorized representatives of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In other words, there was a whole army of controllers on issues of performance discipline. It should be noted that most often, the authorized representatives of the State Defense Committee, who had incomparably greater rights and opportunities than the heads of enterprises, provided them with invaluable practical assistance. But there were also those who, without understanding the technological processes of production, using intimidation and threats, caused confusion. In such cases, a well-founded report to the chairman of the State Defense Committee quickly resolved the conflict situation.” The territorial structures of the State Defense Committee were the City Defense Committees - local emergency authorities, the decision to create which was made by the committee on October 22, 1941. City defense committees were created by decision of the State Defense Committee, were exclusively subordinate to it, and their most important decisions were approved by them. Researchers of the GKO activities note that “city defense committees had the right to declare the city in a state of siege, evacuate residents, give enterprises special tasks for the production of weapons, ammunition, equipment, form people’s militia and destruction battalions, organize the construction of defensive structures, mobilize the population and transport, create or abolish institutions and organizations. The police, formations of the NKVD troops and volunteer work detachments were placed at their disposal. In conditions of a critically difficult situation, local emergency authorities ensured unity of government, uniting civil and military power. They were guided by the resolutions of the State Defense Committee, decisions of local party and Soviet bodies, military councils of fronts and armies. Under them, there was also an institution of commissioners, operational groups were created to urgently resolve military issues, and public activists were widely involved.” Giving a general assessment of the organization of the activities of the State Defense Committee, military historians emphasize: “The most characteristic features of the development of the State Defense Committee were: the forced necessity and some spontaneity of the creation of its organizational and functional structures; lack of experience in the formation and structural development of such a government body; management of the structural development of the State Defense Committee by the first person of the party and state - I.V. Stalin; lack of directly subordinate bodies; leadership of the active army, society and the national economy through regulations that had the force of wartime laws, as well as through constitutional authorities; the use of the structures of the highest bodies of the party, state and executive power of the USSR as executive and technical apparatuses; lack of pre-officially approved tasks, functions and powers of the State Defense Committee and its apparatus.” Decrees and orders of the State Defense Committeedocumented his decisions. Their preparation was not specifically regulated: depending on the complexity of the issues under consideration, they were resolved as quickly as possible or the problem was studied and, if necessary, written reports, information, proposals and other documents submitted from the relevant civil or military authorities were requested and heard. Then the issues were discussed by committee members and decisions were made on them. At the same time, a number of decisions that primarily fell within the competence of the Council of People's Commissars were made individually by V.I. Stalin. The decisions made until the end of 1942 were formalized by A.N. Poskrebyshev (head of the Special Department of the Central Committee), and then - the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee. The resolutions of the State Defense Committee were signed by I.V. Stalin, and other members of the committee had the right to sign operational directive documents (orders). It should be noted that the Politburo did not previously review or approve the decisions of the State Defense Committee, although the Politburo retained preliminary consideration and approval of draft resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, joint resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as individual decisions of the Secretariat and the Organizing Bureau Party Central Committee. Resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee were not subject to publication - they were classified as “Top Secret”, and individual acts were supplemented with the label “Of Special Importance”. Only a few decisions of the State Defense Committee were brought to the attention of the population - published in the open press. In total, during the period of activity of the State Defense Committee from June 30, 1941 to September 4, 1945 (1629 days of work), 9971 resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee were followed. “They cover all aspects of state activity during the war. The content of the documents, as a rule, depended on the developing military-political situation on the Soviet-German front, in the country and in the world, the military-political and strategic goals of operations, campaigns and the war in general, as well as on the state of one’s own economy.” Resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee, after they were signed, were sent for execution to the people's commissars, first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics, regional committees, regional committees Study of the activities of State Defense Committeesuntil the beginning of the 2000s. limited by the availability of the source base - the secrecy of the committee's documents, which also limited the possibilities of research. But even at the same time, historians and legal historians, to one degree or another, turned to the history of the State Defense Committee and illuminated, within the limits available to them, certain aspects of the activities of the State Defense Committee. In this regard, the studies of N.Ya. are interesting. Komarov - in 1989, his article “The State Defense Committee resolves ... Some issues of organizational building and strengthening of the combat Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War” was published in the Military Historical Journal, which outlined a principled position and highlighted the main aspects of the activities of the State Defense Committee. In 1990, his documentary work “The State Defense Committee Resolves: Documents” was published. Memories. Comments". Carrying out work on declassifying documents in 1990 - early 2000. provided researchers with access to previously closed archival documents. The latter was reflected in an increase in research interest in the study of GKO - works devoted to its activities appeared, as well as publications of documents. Among them, the work of Yu.A. is of interest. Gorkova - “The State Defense Committee decides... (1941-1945). Figures, documents" (2002), based on previously closed materials from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, the personal archives of I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukova, A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Mikoyan and allowing us to understand the range of directions and content of the activities of the State Defense Committee. In 2015, the work of a team of military historians, unique in terms of its richness of material and level of analysis, was published - “The State Defense Committee in the system of emergency bodies for the strategic leadership of the country and the armed forces”, included Volume 11 (“Policy and strategy of Victory: strategic leadership of the country and the Armed Forces of the USSR during the war”) of a twelve-volumepublications "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" in (M., 2011-2015). Without dwelling on the characteristics of this publication, we note that the activities of the State Defense Committee for the first time received systematic scientific research in the context of the functioning of the entire mechanism of party, military, and civil governance in the country. The potential of researching documents on the activities of State Defense Committees is far from exhausted. Currently, the GKO materials are mostly open and are stored in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (formerly the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee) - fund 644. Only 98 resolutions and orders of the GKO and partially 3 more documents have not been declassified . The website of the Federal Archival Agency of the Russian Federation contains lists of GKO documents available to researchers. So, the State Defense Committee was formed as an emergency party-state body that headed the system of public administration of the USSR in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945. The study of his activities was reflected in the studies of historians and legal historians of the 1960-1990s, devoted to the organization of government in the country during the Great Patriotic War, but they were extremely limited in their sources - materials on the activities of the State Defense Committee were mostly classified. This limitation of research capabilities for working with documents on the activities of the State Defense Committee was overcome in the 2000s. with the removal of the classification of secrecy, which ensured the emergence of new works and created opportunities for recreating both the history of the activities of the State Defense Committee and the picture of governance in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. generally. Bibliography . USSR atomic project. Documents and materials in 3 volumes M.-Sarov, 2000. T. 1-3. . Arkhipova T.G. The state apparatus of the RSFSR during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). M., 1981. . Bulletin of declassified documents from federal state archives. M., 2005. Issue. 6. Electronic resource: http://www.rusarchives.ru/secret/bul6/pred.shtml . Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 In 12 vols. M., 2015. T. 11. Politics and strategy of Victory: strategic leadership of the country and the Armed Forces of the USSR during the war. Team of authors. . Golotik S.I. Council of State Defense // Higher and central government institutions of Russia. 1801 – 1917 St. Petersburg, 1998. T. 2. Higher government institutions. . Gorkov Yu.A. The State Defense Committee decides... (1941-1945). Figures, documents. M., 2002. . Danilov V.N. The Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War: the phenomenon of emergency authorities of 1941-1945. Saratov, 2002. . History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. M., 1960-1965. T. 1-6. . History of the Soviet state and law. T. 3. The Soviet state and law on the eve and years of the Great Patriotic War (1836-1945). M., 1985. . Komarov N. Ya. The State Defense Committee decides... (Some issues of organizational development and strengthening of the combat Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War) // Military Historical Journal. 1989.No. 3. . Komarov N.Ya. The State Defense Committee decides: Documents. Memories. Comments M., 1990. . Korneva N.M., Tyutyunnik L.I., Sayet L.Ya., Vitenberg B.M. Special meeting to discuss and combine measures for the defense of the state // Higher and central government institutions of Russia. 1801 – 1917 St. Petersburg, 1998. T. 2. Higher government institutions.

The State Defense Committee, created during the Great Patriotic War, was an emergency governing body that had full power in the USSR. The Chairman of the State Defense Committee was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin, his deputy was the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. The State Defense Committee included L.P. Beria. (People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR), Voroshilov K.E. (Chairman of the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR), Malenkov G.M. (Secretary, Head of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)). In February 1942, the following were introduced into the State Defense Committee: Voznesensky N.A. (1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars) and Mikoyan A.I. (Chairman of the Committee for Food and Clothing Supply of the Red Army), Kaganovich L.M. (Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars). In November 1944, N.A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO. (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), and Voroshilov K.E. was removed from the State Defense Committee.

The State Defense Committee was endowed with broad legislative, executive and administrative functions; it united the military, political and economic leadership of the country. The resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime laws and were subject to unquestioning execution by all party, state, military, economic and trade union bodies. However, the USSR Armed Forces, the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the People's Commissariats also continued to act, implementing the resolutions and decisions of the State Defense Committee. During the Great Patriotic War, the State Defense Committee adopted 9,971 resolutions, of which approximately two-thirds concerned the problems of the war economy and the organization of military production: the evacuation of the population and industry; mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition; handling captured weapons and ammunition; organization of combat operations, distribution of weapons; appointment of authorized representatives of State Defense Committees; structural changes in the State Defense Committee itself, etc. The remaining resolutions of the State Defense Committee concerned political, personnel, and other issues.

Functions of the State Defense Committee: 1) management of the activities of government departments and institutions, directing their efforts towards the full use of the material, spiritual and military capabilities of the country to achieve victory over the enemy; 2) mobilization of the country’s human resources for the needs of the front and the national economy; 3) organization of uninterrupted operation of the defense industry of the USSR; 4) resolving issues of restructuring the economy on a war footing; 5) evacuation of industrial facilities from threatened areas and transfer of enterprises to liberated areas; 6) training reserves and personnel for the Armed Forces and industry; 7) restoration of the economy destroyed by the war; 8) determining the volume and timing of industrial supplies of military products.

The State Defense Committee set military-political tasks for the military leadership, improved the structure of the Armed Forces, determined the general nature of their use in war, and appointed leading personnel. The working bodies of the State Defense Committee on military issues, as well as the direct organizers and executors of its decisions in this area, were the People's Commissariats of Defense (NKO USSR) and the Navy (NK Navy of the USSR).

From the jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the People's Commissariats of the defense industry were transferred to the jurisdiction of the State Defense Committee: People's Commissariats of the Defense Industry: People's Commissariats of Aviation Industry, People's Commissariat of Tankoprom, People's Commissariat of Ammunition, People's Commissariat of Armament, People's Commissariat of Armaments, People's Commissariat of Armaments, People's Commissariat of Sustainable Industry, People's Commissariat of Armaments, People's Commissariat of Sustainable Industry, People's Commissariat of Industry, etc. An important role in the implementation of a number of functions of the State Defense Committee was assigned to the corps of its authorized representatives, whose main task was local control over the implementation of GKO decrees on the production of military products. The commissioners had mandates signed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee, Stalin, which clearly defined the practical tasks that the State Defense Committee set for its commissioners. As a result of the efforts made, the output of military products in March 1942 only in the eastern regions of the country reached the pre-war level of its output throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union.

During the war, in order to achieve maximum management efficiency and adapt to current conditions, the structure of the State Defense Committee was changed several times. One of the important divisions of the State Defense Committee was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8, 1942. The Operations Bureau included L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan. and Molotov V.M. The tasks of this unit initially included coordinating and unifying the actions of all other GKO units. But in 1944, the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded.

It began to control the current work of all people's commissariats of the defense industry, as well as the preparation and execution of production and supply plans for industrial and transport sectors. The Operations Bureau became responsible for supplying the army; in addition, it was assigned the responsibilities of the previously abolished Transport Committee. “All members of the State Defense Committee were in charge of certain areas of work. Thus, Molotov was in charge of tanks, Mikoyan - matters of quartermaster supply, fuel supply, Lend-Lease issues, and sometimes carried out individual orders from Stalin for the delivery of shells to the front. Malenkov was in charge of aviation, Beria - ammunition and weapons. Everyone came to Stalin with their questions and said: I ask you to make such and such a decision on such and such an issue...”, recalled the head of the Logistics, Army General A.V. Khrulev.

To carry out the evacuation of industrial enterprises and the population from the front-line areas to the east, a Council for Evacuation Affairs was created under the State Defense Committee. In addition, in October 1941, the Committee for the Evacuation of Food Supplies, Industrial Goods and Industrial Enterprises was formed. However, in October 1941, these bodies were reorganized into the Directorate for Evacuation Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Other important divisions of the State Defense Committee were: the Trophy Commission, created in December 1941, and in April 1943 transformed into the Trophy Committee; A special committee that dealt with the development of nuclear weapons; A special committee dealt with issues of reparations, etc.

The State Defense Committee became the main link in the mechanism of centralized management of the mobilization of the country's human and material resources for defense and armed struggle against the enemy. Having fulfilled its functions, the State Defense Committee was disbanded by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 4, 1945.

Plan
Introduction
1 Formation of State Defense Committees
2 Composition of GKO
3 Decrees of the State Defense Committee
4 Structure of state bonds
5 Functions of State Bonds
6 Disbandment of the State Defense Committee
7 Additional information on Wikisource

Bibliography
State Defense Committee (USSR)

Introduction

State Defense Committee (abbreviated GKO) - an emergency governing body created during the Great Patriotic War that had full power in the USSR. The need for creation was obvious, because in wartime it was necessary to concentrate all power in the country, both executive and legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the decisions made formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, etc. In order to eliminate such a method of leadership, acceptable in peacetime, but not meeting the requirements of the country's military situation, a decision was made to create the State Defense Committee, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

1. Formation of state bonds

The State Defense Committee was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The need to create the State Defense Committee as the highest governing body was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which required that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent possible. The said resolution states that all orders of the State Defense Committee must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.

The idea of ​​​​creating the State Defense Committee was put forward by L.P. Beria at a meeting in Molotov’s office in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. opinion attribution needed It was decided to put Stalin at the head of the State Defense Committee, in view of his undeniable authority in the country. opinion attribution needed Having made this decision, the six in the afternoon (after 4 o’clock) went to the Near Dacha, where they persuaded Stalin to again assume the functions of head of state and distributed responsibilities in the newly created committee opinion attribution needed. . (for details see: Stalin June 29-30, 1941).

2. Composition of GKOs

Initially (based on the joint Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 30, 1941, see below) the composition of the State Defense Committee was as follows:

· Chairman of the State Defense Committee - I.V. Stalin.

· Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - V. M. Molotov.

GKO members:

· K. E. Voroshilov.

· On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan became members of the State Defense Committee;

· On November 22, 1944, N. A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO, and K. E. Voroshilov was removed from the GKO.

3. Decrees of the State Defense Committee

The first decree of the State Defense Committee (“On organizing the production of medium tanks T-34 at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant”) was issued on July 1, 1941, the last (No. 9971 “On payment for the remains of incomplete ammunition elements accepted from industry and located at the bases of the NKO USSR and NKVMF ") - September 4, 1945. The numbering of the resolutions remained continuous.

Of the 9,971 resolutions and orders adopted by the State Defense Committee during its work, 98 documents remain classified in full and three more partially (they relate mainly to the production of chemical weapons and the atomic problem).

Most of the GKO resolutions were signed by its chairman, Stalin, some also by his deputy Molotov and GKO members Mikoyan and Beria.

The State Defense Committee did not have its own apparatus; its decisions were prepared in the relevant people's commissariats and departments, and paperwork was carried out by the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

The overwhelming majority of GKO resolutions were classified as “Secret”, “Top Secret” or “Top Secret/Especially Important” (designation “s”, “ss” and “ss/s” after the number), but some resolutions were open and published in the press (an example of such a resolution is GKO Resolution No. 813 of October 19, 1941 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow).

The vast majority of GKO resolutions concerned topics related to the war:

· evacuation of population and industry (during the first period of the Great Patriotic War);

· mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;

· handling captured weapons and ammunition;

· study and export to the USSR of captured samples of technology, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);

· organization of combat operations, distribution of weapons, etc.;

· appointment of authorized State Defense Committees;

· about the beginning of “work on uranium” (creation of nuclear weapons);

· structural changes in the GKO itself.

4. Structure of state bonds

The State Defense Committee included several structural divisions. During its existence, the structure of the Committee has changed several times in order to maximize management efficiency and adapt to current conditions.

The most important unit was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8, 1942 by GKO resolution No. 2615c. The bureau included L.P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, A. I. Mikoyan and V. M. Molotov. The actual head of the Operations Bureau was Beria. The tasks of this unit initially included control and monitoring of the current work of all People's Commissariats of the defense industry, People's Commissariats of Railways, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, oil, coal and chemical industries, as well as the matter of drawing up and executing plans for production and supply of these industries and transport with everything you need. On May 19, 1944, Resolution No. 5931 was adopted, by which the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded - now its tasks included monitoring and control over the work of the people's commissariats of the defense industry, transport, metallurgy, people's commissariats of the most important areas of industry and power plants; Also, from that moment on, the Operations Bureau was responsible for supplying the army; finally, it was entrusted with the responsibilities of the Transport Committee, which was abolished by decision.

Other important divisions of the State Defense Committee were:

· Trophy Commission (created in December 1941, and on April 5, 1943, by Resolution No. 3123ss, transformed into the Trophy Committee);

· Special Committee - created on August 20, 1945 (GKO Resolution No. 9887ss/op). He was involved in the development of nuclear weapons.

· Special Committee (dealt with reparations issues).

· Evacuation Committee (created on June 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 834, disbanded on December 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 1066ss). On September 26, 1941, by GKO Resolution No. 715c, the Office for Evacuation of the Population was organized under this committee.

· Committee for Unloading Railways - formed on December 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 1066ss, on September 14, 1942 by GKO Resolution No. 1279 it was transformed into the Transport Committee under the GKO, which existed until May 19, 1944, after which, by GKO Resolution No. 5931, the Transport Committee was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the GKO Operations Bureau;

· Radar Council - created on July 4, 1943 by GKO Resolution No. 3686ss consisting of: Malenkov (chairman), Arkhipov, Berg, Golovanov, Gorokhov, Danilov, Kabanov, Kobzarev, Stogov, Terentyev, Ucher, Shakhurin, Shchukin.

· A group of permanent commissioners of the State Defense Committee and permanent commissions of the State Defense Committee at the fronts.

5. Functions of State Bonds

The State Defense Committee managed all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the military operations was carried out through Headquarters.

6. Dissolution of the State Defense Committee

The State Defense Committee was disbanded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 4, 1945.

7. Additional information in Wikisource

Bibliography:

1. R. A. Medvedev. J.V. Stalin in the first days of the Great Patriotic War. New and recent history, No. 2, 2002

2. Konstantin Pleshakov. Stalin's mistake. The first 10 days of the war. Per. from English A.K. Efremova. M., "Eksmo", 2006 ISBN 5-699-11788-1 pp. 293-304

3. Guslyarov E. (ed.) Stalin in life. M., Olma-Press, 2003 ISBN 5-94850-034-9

4. 1941 Documentation. in 2 vols. M., Democracy, 1998 p.498 ISBN 5-89511-003-7

5. Kumanev G. Near Stalin. Smolensk, Rusich, 2001, pp. 31-34. ISBN 5-8138-0191-X

6. Khrushchev N. S. Memoirs. Time, people, power. In 3 vols. M., Moscow News, 1999. T.1., p. 301

7. Jover V. Secrets of Stalin's life and death. - "Le Nouvel Observateur": 2006-06-28. (Interview with English historian Simon Seabeg Montefiore)

8. Scientific conference "N.A. Voznesensky: his era and modern times." Archives of Russia

9. Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 2615s dated 8.12.42

Creation of State Bonds

Stalin's actions in the first days of the war can be called feverish, chaotic and reactive. Not mastering the situation, not knowing how to lead troops, Stalin simply tried to do something, because doing nothing was impossible. Basically these were desperate and inadequate attempts to launch a counterattack, which often, if not in most cases, worsened the situation and caused new casualties.

Stalin, apparently, was fully aware of how great the threat looming over the country was. There is convincing evidence that already in the first days of the war, Stalin tried to come to an agreement with Hitler, ceding to him a number of Soviet territories in the western USSR in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. On Stalin's instructions, Beria organized a meeting between his representative and the envoy of Germany's ally Bulgaria. The diplomat, with the hope of transferring it to Hitler, was asked the question of peace conditions: what territories does Germany claim? The fate of this initiative is unknown. Most likely, the Bulgarian envoy simply did not get involved in mediation. However, such probing of the soil speaks volumes. Even if this was a maneuver aimed at weakening the German offensive impulse, it is obvious that Stalin was aware of the threat of defeat.

Other facts also testified to this. Along with widespread mobilization into the Red Army and the preparation of new lines of defense, mass evacuation began already in the first days of the war. Moreover, it was not only the population and material resources from front-line areas that were subject to removal. A secret but very demonstrative evacuation of the capital, which was still located at a considerable distance from the fighting, was carried out. On June 27, 1941, the Politburo approved a resolution on the urgent (within three days) removal from Moscow of state reserves of precious metals, precious stones, the Diamond Fund of the USSR and the valuables of the Kremlin Armory. On June 28, it was just as urgently decided to evacuate banknotes from the Moscow vaults of the State Bank and Gosznak. On June 29, a decision was made to transfer the apparatus of the people's commissariats and other governing institutions to the rear. On July 2, the Politburo decided to transport the sarcophagus with Lenin’s body to Siberia, and on July 5, the archives, primarily the archives of the government and the Central Committee of the Party.

One of the functionaries, summoned to Stalin on the afternoon of June 26, recalled: “Stalin looked unusual. He doesn't just look tired. The appearance of a man who has suffered a strong internal shock. Before meeting him, based on all sorts of indirect facts, I felt that it was very difficult for us there, in the border battles. Perhaps a rout is brewing. When I saw Stalin, I realized that the worst had already happened.” The next few days did not bring relief. Stalin became increasingly aware of the futility of his orders and the degree of uncontrollability of the army.

Just a week after the start of the war, alarming news began to arrive in Moscow about the dire situation of the Western Front and the surrender of the capital of Belarus, Minsk. Contact with the troops was largely lost. There was a heavy pause in the Kremlin. On June 29, for the first time since the beginning of the war, no meetings were recorded in Stalin’s Kremlin office. According to Mikoyan, in the evening Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria gathered at Stalin’s. Most likely, the meeting took place either in Stalin’s Kremlin apartment or at his dacha. Stalin called Timoshenko. Again to no avail. The military was not in control of the situation. Alarmed, Stalin broke his usual routine and invited members of the Politburo to go to the People's Commissariat of Defense. Here he was once again convinced that the disaster had acquired enormous proportions. Stalin attacked the generals with reproaches and accusations. Unable to withstand the tension, the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov burst into tears and ran into the next room. Molotov went to calm him down. This scene apparently sobered Stalin. He realized that putting pressure on the military was useless. Coming out of the building of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin, according to Mikoyan and Molotov, said: “Lenin left us a great legacy, we - his heirs - screwed it all up.”

Strong language and rudeness were not uncommon for Stalin. However, in this case they reflected a truly high degree of confusion. Stalin, apparently, left the People's Commissariat of Defense for his dacha.

The next day, June 30, Stalin did not appear not only in his Kremlin office, but in Moscow in general. In a situation of growing catastrophe, such self-isolation could have critical consequences. The huge administrative machine, built for Stalin, inevitably failed in his absence. Something had to be done. Molotov, senior in the informal hierarchy of Politburo members, took the initiative. According to Mikoyan, Molotov said: “Stalin has such prostration that he is not interested in anything, has lost the initiative, and is in poor condition.” This was indirectly confirmed many years later by Molotov himself in conversations with Chuev: “He didn’t show up for two or three days, he was at the dacha. He was worried, of course, he was a little depressed.” It is obvious that Molotov’s memory failed him in detail: Stalin remained at the dacha for a shorter period than two or three days. However, given the catastrophic start of the war, even a short absence of the leader was naturally perceived as critical.

Alarmed, Molotov decided to act. He summoned Beria, Malenkov and Voroshilov to a meeting. This, of course, was not about the formal or actual ousting of Stalin from power. His comrades were racking their brains over how to “lure” Stalin out of his dacha and force him to return to business. The task was not easy. The routine did not include visits to Stalin's dacha without an invitation. In an emergency situation, such an unauthorized visit could be perceived especially painfully by Stalin. It was no less difficult to formulate the reason for such a trip. No one would have dared to openly tell Stalin that his depression threatened the security of the state. However, members of the Politburo, skilled in political intrigue, came up with a brilliant move. They decided all together (definitely together!) to go to Stalin and offer him a project for creating the highest authority for the war period - the State Defense Committee, headed by Stalin himself. In addition to Stalin, it was proposed to include four project developers in the State Defense Committee. Molotov was appointed first deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee.

Now everything worked out smoothly and convincingly. There was a good reason for visiting Stalin, which had nothing to do with the fact that he did not show up at work. The proposal to create a State Defense Committee headed by Stalin demonstrated not only the determination to continue the struggle, but also the devotion of his comrades-in-arms to the leader. The collective trip made it possible to smooth out Stalin's possible indignation.

When the plan was agreed upon by Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria, Mikoyan and Voznesensky were called into Molotov’s office. They were two members of the steering group whom the Quartet decided not to include in the GKO. However, Mikoyan and Voznesensky were supposed to go to Stalin’s dacha, demonstrating the unity of their ranks.

The story of what happened at Stalin's dacha was left by Mikoyan. According to him, the delegation found Stalin in a small dining room, sitting in a chair. He looked questioningly at his comrades and asked why they had come. “He looked calm, but somehow strange,” Mikoyan recalled. After listening to the proposal to create the State Defense Committee, Stalin agreed. A slight controversy was caused by the Quartet’s draft on the personnel of the State Defense Committee, voiced by Beria. Stalin proposed including Mikoyan and Voznesensky in the GKO. However, Beria, authorized by the Quartet, outlined the arguments against - someone should remain in leadership of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin did not object.

The publication of Mikoyan’s memoirs in 1999, prepared by his son S. A. Mikoyan, in this fragment contains numerous changes and additions to the original text preserved in the archive. S. A. Mikoyan clearly tried to create the impression of Stalin’s fear. For this purpose, the following phrases were included in the original dictations of A.I. Mikoyan: “When he saw us, he (Stalin. - OH.) seemed to shrink into a chair”; “I have (Mikoyan. – OH.) there was no doubt: he decided that we had come to arrest him.” However, it is important to remember that these accents were added later and do not belong to Mikoyan.

Could Stalin have been scared? How to interpret the meeting at the dacha on June 30? Undoubtedly, this was a crisis moment in the development of Stalin's autocracy. No matter how carefully Stalin's comrades behaved, they violated important rules of the political protocol of the dictatorship. Members of the Politburo came to Stalin, having previously agreed among themselves and on their own initiative. They proposed to make the most important decision and insisted on its adoption in the form in which they agreed among themselves. Of fundamental importance was the formal confirmation of Molotov’s role as the second person in the state and the non-inclusion of Voznesensky, whom Stalin in May 1941 replaced Molotov as his first deputy in the Council of People’s Commissars, into the GKO. In fact, Stalin’s comrades made it clear to him that in the face of a mortal threat, it was necessary to consolidate the leadership that had emerged after the Great Terror, and that the new shake-ups at the top that Stalin started on the eve of the war must stop. This was a unique episode. It marked a temporary change in the character of the dictatorship, the emergence of a wartime political compromise that was somewhere between pre-war tyranny and the Stalinist loyalty of the early 1930s. The principle of compromise relations in the Politburo, forced by Stalin, operated throughout almost the entire war.

The decision to create the State Defense Committee, agreed upon at Stalin’s dacha, was published in the newspapers the next day. The inclusion of only Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov and Malenkov in the GKO did not mean at all that the remaining top leaders of the Politburo had lost their administrative influence. Mikoyan and Voznesensky performed the most important economic functions. Zhdanov concentrated entirely on the defense of Leningrad. Kaganovich, as People's Commissar of Railways, dealt with railways, the importance of which in conditions of war and evacuation was difficult to overestimate. In February 1942, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Kaganovich were included in the State Defense Committee.

The formation of the State Defense Committee gave impetus to the further concentration of the formal attributes of supreme power in the hands of Stalin. On July 10, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command, headed by People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command under the leadership of Stalin. On July 19, by decision of the Politburo, Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8 - Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Everything was falling into place. Stalin returned to the people and the army in his usual image of an autocratic leader, decisive and confident of victory. The most important role in this “return of Stalin” was played by his famous speech on the radio on July 3.

Unlike Molotov, who spoke on June 22 in the Central Telegraph building, located next to the Kremlin, Stalin demanded that his speech be broadcast directly from the Kremlin. Overloaded with business, the signalmen were forced to fulfill this senseless whim. Cables were urgently laid into the building of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin, sitting at a table with microphones and a bottle of Borjomi, read out the speech. This appeal of Stalin to the people was unique in many respects. “Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I am addressing you, my friends!” – this very beginning of the speech was unusual and not at all in the Stalinist style. It was specially noted and remembered by many contemporaries of the events. Clinging to the radios or reading the lines of a newspaper report, people looked in Stalin’s words for the answer to the main question: what will happen next, how soon will the war end? However, Stalin did not say anything encouraging. Having significantly exaggerated the losses of the German army (“the best divisions of the enemy and the best parts of his aviation have already been defeated”), Stalin was forced to admit that “it is a matter […] of the life and death of the Soviet state, of the life and death of the peoples of the USSR.” Stalin's calls to the people to realize “the full depth of the danger that threatens our country,” to organize partisan warfare behind German lines, to create militia units, and to remove or destroy all material resources from territories threatened by enemy capture sounded alarming. Stalin declared the outbreak a national and patriotic war. From all this the obvious conclusion followed - the war would be difficult and long.

In the meantime, the people and especially the army needed to at least somehow explain the causes of the disaster and point to the next “scapegoats.” I didn't have to search for long. Soon it was announced that the Western Front had completely collapsed and that its leadership, headed by General D. G. Pavlov, had made mistakes, which clearly indicated the direction of exemplary repression. Pavlov and a number of his subordinates were put on trial and shot. With orders signed by Stalin, the army was widely notified about this.

This text is an introductory fragment.

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State Defense Committee(abbreviated GKO) - an emergency governing body created during the Great Patriotic War, which had full power in the USSR. The need for creation was obvious, because in wartime it was necessary to concentrate all power in the country, both executive and legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the decisions made formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, etc. In order to eliminate such a method of leadership, acceptable in peacetime, but not meeting the requirements of the country's military situation, a decision was made to create the State Defense Committee, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Education GKO

Composition of GKOs

Initially (based on the joint Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 30, see below) the composition of the State Defense Committee was as follows:

• Chairman of the State Defense Committee - J.V. Stalin.

• Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - V. M. Molotov.

Most of the GKO resolutions were signed by its chairman, Stalin, some also by his deputy Molotov and GKO members Mikoyan and Beria.

The State Defense Committee did not have its own apparatus; its decisions were prepared in the relevant people's commissariats and departments, and paperwork was carried out by the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

The overwhelming majority of GKO resolutions were classified as “Secret”, “Top Secret” or “Top Secret/Especially Important” (designation “s”, “ss” and “ss/s” after the number), but some resolutions were open and published in the press (an example of such a resolution is).

The vast majority of GKO resolutions concerned topics related to the war:

• evacuation of population and industry (during the first period of the Great Patriotic War);
• mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;
• handling captured weapons and ammunition;
• studying and exporting to the USSR captured samples of technology, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);
• organization of combat operations, distribution of weapons, etc.;
• appointment of authorized representatives of State Defense Committees;
• about the beginning of “work on uranium” (the creation of nuclear weapons);
• structural changes in the GKO itself.

GKO structure

The State Defense Committee included several structural divisions. During its existence, the structure of the Committee has changed several times in order to maximize management efficiency and adapt to current conditions.

The most important unit was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8. The bureau included L.P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, A. I. Mikoyan and V. M. Molotov. The actual head of the Operations Bureau was Beria. The tasks of this unit initially included control and monitoring of the current work of all People's Commissariats of the defense industry, People's Commissariats of Railways, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, oil, coal and chemical industries, as well as the matter of drawing up and executing plans for production and supply of these industries and transport with everything you need. On May 19, it was adopted, by which the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded - now its tasks included monitoring and control over the work of the people's commissariats of the defense industry, transport, metallurgy, people's commissariats of the most important areas of industry and power plants; Also, from that moment on, the Operations Bureau was responsible for supplying the army; finally, it was entrusted with the responsibilities of the Transport Committee, which was abolished by decision.

Other important divisions of the State Defense Committee were:

• Trophy Commission (created in December 1941, and on April 5 by Resolution No. 3123ss transformed into the Trophy Committee);
• Special Committee - created on August 20, 1945 (GKO Resolution No. 9887ss/op). He was involved in the development of nuclear weapons.
• Special Committee (dealt with reparations issues).
• Evacuation Committee (created on June 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 834, disbanded on December 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 1066ss). On September 26, 1941, by GKO Resolution No. 715c, the Office for Evacuation of the Population was organized under this committee.
• Committee for Unloading Railways - formed on December 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 1066ss, on September 14, 1942 by GKO Resolution No. 1279 it was transformed into the Transport Committee under the GKO, which existed until May 19, 1944, after which, by GKO Resolution No. 5931, the Transport Committee was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the GKO Operations Bureau;
• Evacuation Commission - (formed on June 22, 1942 by GKO Resolution No. 1922);
• Radar Council - created on July 4, 1943 by GKO Resolution No. 3686ss consisting of: Malenkov (chairman), Arkhipov, Berg, Golovanov, Gorokhov, Danilov, Kabanov, Kobzarev, Stogov, Terentyev, Ucher, Shakhurin, Shchukin.
• A group of permanent commissioners of the State Defense Committee and permanent commissions of the State Defense Committee at the fronts.

Functions of State Bonds

The State Defense Committee managed all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the military operations was carried out through the Headquarters.

Disbandment of the State Defense Committee

More information on Wikisource

see also

Notes

Links

• Bulletin of declassified documents of federal state archives Issue 6
• List of documents of the State Defense Committee of the USSR (1941-1945)

Literature

Gorkov Yu.A. “The State Defense Committee decides (1941-1945)”, M.: Olma-Press, 2002. - 575 p.

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