He was called "Stalin's donkey" and "ram of the revolution", he raised the industry of the USSR to unprecedented heights and opposed Beria.

Paramedic

Sergo Ordzhonikidze was the only one of the “old Lenin cohort” who worked as a doctor. He graduated from parochial and paramedic schools. At the same time, he performed his work in full accordance with the Hippocratic oath. Even during his Yakut exile, in the difficult conditions of the Far North, he honestly worked as a paramedic, but did not forget about his propaganda activities. Even at the beginning of his career, while being a paramedic in Georgia, Ordzhonikidze printed and distributed rather strange “recipes”. Instead of a list of medications and recommendations, the leaflets contained revolutionary slogans and calls for the overthrow of the tsar.

"Straight"

In gendarme reports, Sergo Ordzhonikidze received the nickname “straight”. His inflexibility is enviable. He went through exile and prison. Ordzhonikidze escaped from exile, and in the terrible Shlisselburg prison (where he seriously undermined his health) he independently learned German. He always got into trouble and was one of the most implacable opponents of tsarism. Wrestling was the most organic environment for him, in it he developed, in it his character was formed.

Crisis manager

Ordzhonikidze was, in modern terms, an effective crisis manager. He was always sent to the front line, to the hottest spots. He took part in the Iranian revolution, was extraordinary commissioner for Ukraine, and led the revolution in the Caucasus. When Ordzhonikidze was engaged in the deportation of the Terek Cossacks, Stalin warned his comrade: “Sergo, they will kill you.” They didn’t kill him, although Ordzhonikidze did not accept half measures in his methods. His faith in the cause of the revolution was unshakable. People saw this and followed Sergo.

Conflict with fellow countrymen

Ordzhonikidze was one of those who participated in the creation of the Soviet Union. The process of creating a new state was problematic. Lenin was afraid of chauvinism and national strife, and therefore was opposed to the formation of a new state under the auspices of Russia. On October 20, 1922, a scandal broke out between Ordzhonikidze and the Georgian leaders. A member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Kabakhidze, insulted Ordzhonikidze, calling him a “Stalinist donkey,” for which he received a slap in the face. The conflict had to be resolved by the Central Committee of the RCP(b). Lenin, who was ill in October 1922, could not intervene in the conflict, and Stalin appointed a commission to Georgia headed by Dzerzhinsky, who supported Ordzhonikidze and condemned the Georgian “nationalists.” In December 1922, Lenin nevertheless intervened in the Georgian conflict and even proposed expelling Ordzhonikidze from the party for assault, but Lenin was “no longer the same” and the order was not carried out.

Friend of Stalin

Ordzhonikidze was one of the few who communicated with Stalin on a first-name basis. They met in 1907 in cell No. 3 of the Bailov prison in Baku. Since then, they have established almost friendly relations. This is evidenced by the fact that after the suicide of Nadezhda Alliluyeva, it was Ordzhonikidze and Kirov, as closest friends, who spent the night in Stalin’s house. Ordzhonikidze was loyal to Stalin even when he had to confront Lenin, but their relationship seriously deteriorated in the early 30s. First, Stalin began to purge Ordzhonikidze’s henchmen, then Beria, whom Ordzhonikidze did not like (to put it mildly), began to claim the first role in the Transcaucasian party organization. The final stage of the conflict began in 1936, when Ordzhonikidze's older brother Papulia was arrested. Ordzhonikidze received news of his brother’s arrest in Kislovodsk in October 1936, on his 50th birthday. Strongly offended, he did not go to the celebrations organized on the occasion of the anniversary.

Mikoyan recalled how, a few days before his death, Ordzhonikidze shared his worries with him: “I don’t understand why Stalin doesn’t trust me. I’m absolutely loyal to him, I don’t want to fight with him, I want to support him, but he doesn’t trust me. There’s a big role here.” play the intrigues of Beria, who gives Stalin the wrong information, and Stalin believes him." Interesting fact: after the war, Stalin was given for approval a list of prominent party figures in whose honor it was planned to erect monuments in Moscow. The leader crossed out only one name from the entire list - Ordzhonikidze.

"Heavy Industry Commander"

Ordzhonikidze was the strongest organizer. He was called the commander of heavy industry. He quickly raised the industry of the Soviet Union, fought against bureaucracy, and stood at the head of “great construction projects.” In terms of gross industrial output, the USSR already in 1932 took second place in the world and first place in Europe. From fifteenth place in the world and from seventh in Europe in terms of electricity, the USSR in 1935 moved to third and second place, respectively. Ordzhonikidze did everything possible to ensure that the country stopped purchasing tractors and other equipment abroad. If they say that Stalin took over the country with a plow and left it with atomic weapons, then enormous credit for this belongs to Ordzhonikidze.

The mystery of death

The official cause of Ordzhonikidze’s death, presented by Stalin, was “the heart could not stand it.” According to this version, which has long been considered the main one, Ordzhonikidze suddenly died of cardiac paralysis during an afternoon nap. This version is confused by two facts: firstly, soon everyone who signed this statement was shot, and secondly, Ordzhonikidze’s wife told how Stalin, leaving the deceased’s apartment, rudely warned her: “Not a word to anyone about the details of Sergo’s death, nothing but an official message, you know me..." In addition to the official version, there are three more: poisoning, murder, suicide. All versions have the right to exist, but none has yet been recognized. Ordzhonikidze’s body was cremated, so “the autopsy will show” is not about the mystery of this death.

Master. Stalin and the establishment of the Stalinist dictatorship Khlevnyuk Oleg Vitalievich

Old and new comrades of Stalin

Although historians are unlikely to be able to penetrate the dark depths of Stalin's calculations and moods as he determined the fate of his comrades, some motives for Stalin's actions seem quite obvious. In general, it can be argued that Stalin gave sanction for the destruction of the most “guilty”, “useless” and “unprotected” members of the Politburo from his point of view. We now turn to a consideration of these three interconnected formulas of “accusation” that determined the fate of Stalin’s entourage during the years of terror.

The main “guilt” of any functionary, not to mention members of the Politburo, according to Stalin, was indiscriminate contacts with former oppositionists and other “suspicious elements.” This is where Postyshev, who was surrounded by “enemies” in Kiev and who at the initial stage even tried to protect them from attacks (it doesn’t matter that he was defending them not because of his political convictions, but as a patron protecting his clients, preventing the weakening of his own positions), was burned first of all. Stalin had great suspicions about Rudzutak's political loyalty and connections. The reputation of Kosior and Chubar in the eyes of Stalin was significantly undermined during the famine of 1932–1933. The attempts of these leaders to maneuver and somehow ensure the interests of the republic caused Stalin to have bouts of extreme irritation. In 1932, he even planned to remove Kosior and Chubar from Ukraine, although, on reflection, he limited himself to sending his commissar Postyshev to this republic in 1933. As the memoirs of Molotov and Kaganovich testify, Chubar had a reputation as a figure who had good relations with the “right-wingers” (in particular, with Rykov) and was inclined to “right-wingism.”

Stalin often combined suspicions of insufficient political loyalty with a low assessment of the business qualities of one or another functionary and accusations of unwillingness to work hard. Although the stigma of “uselessness” in itself, and without political accusations, could be sufficient grounds for destruction. The Soviet administrative system, clumsy and ineffective in its essence, constantly required extreme efforts from the heads of the apparatus. Therefore, Stalin sought to surround himself primarily with energetic workaholics, the so-called “organizers.” Accordingly, Stalin tried to get rid of those figures who either actually retired due to progressive illnesses or were assessed as insufficiently energetic and unpromising.

You can pay attention, for example, to the fact that in addition to his real or fictitious political “right-wingism,” Chubar was not very strong physically and, according to special decisions of the Politburo, spent a lot of time receiving treatment abroad. Eikhe suffered from serious illnesses that worsened sharply shortly before his arrest. Already several years before his arrest, Rudzutak actually ceased his active activities. He was often sick and, at the suggestion of doctors, constantly received long leaves from the Politburo. So, June 11, 1936. The Politburo decided to send Rudzutak and an escort to Paris for treatment followed by a three-month rest. A huge amount was allocated for this - 4 thousand dollars. The opinion about Rudzutak’s “uselessness” was so persistent that Molotov reproduced it in detail in the 1970s and 1980s: “Until a certain time, he was a good comrade [...] He behaved well in hard labor and this, so to speak, supported his authority. But towards the end of his life - I got this impression, when he was already my deputy, he was already a little engaged in self-gratification. As a revolutionary, he no longer led a real struggle. And during this period it was of great importance. I was inclined to rest. He was not particularly active and deep in his work [...] He was so on the sidelines, on the sidelines. With my people who also like to relax. And he didn’t give anything new that could help the party. They understood, he was in hard labor, he wanted to rest, they didn’t find fault with him, well, rest, please. He was fond of philistine things - sitting, having a snack with friends, being in company - a good companion. But all this is possible for the time being […] It’s difficult to say why he got burned, but I think it was because he had a company where there were non-party ends, God knows what. The security officers apparently observed all this and reported […].”

These explanations by Molotov echo some official assessments of the late 1930s. At the height of the repressions, on February 3, 1938, the Politburo approved, for example, a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, limiting the size of the dachas of responsible workers “due to the fact that […] a number of arrested conspirators (Rudzutak, Rosengolts, Antipov, Mezhlauk , Karakhan, Yagoda, etc.) built themselves grandiose dacha-palaces with 15–20 or more rooms, where they lived luxuriously and spent people’s money, thereby demonstrating their complete everyday decay and degeneration.”

It is not difficult, however, to notice that such formulas for explaining repression in the Politburo as “guilt” and “uselessness” are not universal. Given the scale of arrests in the Soviet “nomenklatura”, all members of the Politburo who inevitably had contact with “enemies” could be declared “guilty”. As for “uselessness,” for example, M. I. Kalinin, who was half-blind and actually removed from management, retained his post. All this allows us to assert that, under equal conditions of “guilt” and “usefulness,” different members of the Politburo had different degrees of “security.” Leaving aside the psychological attachments of Stalin himself, it can be argued that this “security” had significant institutional and political foundations.

Stalin's comrades-in-arms, at least the most famous and "honored" among them, were bearers (symbols) of the revolutionary legitimacy of power, the connection of the Stalinist dictatorship with the Leninist period, as well as collective responsibility for the policy of the "Great Leap Forward". For many years these people stood too close to Stalin for accusations against them to inevitably cast a shadow on the political reputation of the leader himself. In addition, performing the most important functions in the party-state apparatus, senior Soviet leaders had real levers of, if not political, then administrative influence, and were an important element of the management system. Stalin could not completely ignore these circumstances. In relation to the Politburo, he acted much more carefully than in relation to other power structures. Members of the Politburo, so to speak, of the “second echelon” were subjected to repression. But they were destroyed behind a veil of secrecy: not one was convicted in an open political trial, and some did not even go through the formal procedure of expulsion from the Politburo at the plenum of the Central Committee.

Did all this mean that the surviving members of the Politburo were capable of limiting Stalin's power in any significant way? Many years of searches in the archives did not reveal any facts confirming the exotic opinion about the relative weakening of Stalin’s power by the end of the “Great Terror.” And vice versa, all the documents known today have strengthened the traditional point of view that terror completed the formalization of Stalin’s dictatorial power and finally buried all previous traditions of “collective leadership.”

While maintaining the core of the old Politburo, Stalin did everything necessary to completely subjugate his comrades, intimidate them and deprive them of the slightest share of political independence. The main method of achieving this goal was repression against relatives and closest employees of old Politburo members. Stalin's options for choosing victims from among Stalin's comrades were unlimited. In a huge stream of denunciations and slander during interrogations at the NKVD, a variety of names surfaced, which Yezhov regularly reported to Stalin. It depended on the will of the latter to allow or not to proceed with the development of the next suspect.

To prevent unwanted conflicts in connection with such arrests, Stalin purposefully introduced into the Politburo a unique ideology of “priority of duty over personal attachments” and harshly rejected attempts by Politburo members to interfere in the affairs of the NKVD. Indicative in this regard was Stalin’s reaction to the negotiations between Yezhov and S.V. Kosior regarding the fate of Kosior’s native brother, Vladimir. V.V. Kosior, being a supporter of Trotsky, was in exile with his wife in Minusinsk. At the beginning of 1936, Vladimir Kosior’s wife, accused of involvement in a “counter-revolutionary organization,” went to prison. Vladimir sent his brother, a member of the Politburo, an angry letter in which he demanded intervention and the release of his wife. Otherwise, he threatened to commit suicide. S.V. Kosior trembled. On May 3, 1936, he turned to Yezhov with a request: “I am sending you a letter from my brother Vladimir, a Trotskyist, obviously he is not lying, in any case, it is clear that he has reached despair. In my opinion, this matter needs to be put in order. If he writes to me, it means he has reached the last point. Please intervene in this matter and decide for yourself what to do.”

Having received this neat letter, without direct requests, Yezhov decided not to ignore the request of the Politburo member and requested the file of V. Kosior from the NKVD. However, at the same time, as usual, he coordinated his actions with Stalin. Stalin, having received Yezhov's request, responded with a sharp refusal. “It is clear from everything,” he wrote, “that Vl. Kosior is a subject alien to the working class, an enemy of Soviet power and a blackmailer. The measure of everything - the party, the working class, power, legality - is for him the fate of his wife and only she. Apparently, Vl. Kosior is a decent tradesman and vulgar, and his wife was “caught” thoroughly, otherwise he would not have tried to blackmail his brother into committing suicide. It's amazing that St. Kosior finds it possible to interfere in this blackmail matter.” It is possible that Stalin resorted to similar unscrupulous demagoguery about the party, the working class, power, and the rule of law in his conversations with Ordzhonikidze. The refusal to release Sergo Ordzhonikidze's older brother Papulia was an important signal to members of the Politburo. As subsequent events showed, they came to terms with the futility of any appeals to Stalin regarding the fate of people close to them.

Since the end of 1936, L. M. Kaganovich found himself in a similar situation with Ordzhonikidze. First, mass arrests were carried out among Kaganovich’s closest employees and deputies in the People’s Commissariat of Railways. Then, as Kaganovich himself said in the 1980s, he was interrogated by Stalin about his friendship with one of the main “military conspirators” - Yakir. Kaganovich then learned that some of the arrested military men had testified about his involvement in their “counter-revolutionary organization.” The matter, however, did not stop there. Before the war, Kaganovich’s elder brother M. M. Kaganovich, who was removed from the post of People’s Commissar of the aviation industry and accused of “counter-revolutionary activities,” committed suicide.

A particular problem for Stalin was the relationship with Molotov. Molotov was his closest ally, with whom the most important and secret matters were resolved for almost two decades. In the country and the party, Molotov was perceived as the first person in Stalin’s entourage, as his unofficial heir. Even after the importance of the Politburo was reduced to a minimum, Molotov remained Stalin's chief adviser. “Molotov stood closest to Stalin, in terms of decisions made on this or that issue,” was how Khrushchev outlined his ideas about the situation in the pre-war Politburo. This statement is supported by numerous facts. It was with Molotov that Stalin before the war resolved all fundamental, primarily foreign policy, problems.

However, completely devoted to Stalin, Molotov in his relations with him at times allowed himself to be stubborn and intractable, especially noticeable against the background of the servility of other members of the Politburo. “At that time, he impressed me as an independent person who reasoned independently, had his own opinions on this or that issue, spoke out and told Stalin what he thought. It was clear that Stalin did not like this, but Molotov still insisted on his own. This, I would say, was an exception. We understood the reasons for Molotov's independent position. He was Stalin’s oldest friend,” Khrushchev wrote. G. K. Zhukov retained a similar impression about the relationship between Stalin and Molotov. “Having participated many times in the discussion of a number of issues with Stalin in the presence of his inner circle,” he told many years later to the writer K. M. Simonov, “I had the opportunity to see disputes and bickering, to see the persistence shown in some issues, especially by Molotov; sometimes it got to the point where Stalin raised his voice and even lost his temper, while Molotov, smiling, got up from the table and remained consistent with his point of view.”

Undoubtedly, burdened by such relations, Stalin did everything necessary to put Molotov in his place. One after another, Molotov's secretaries and assistants were destroyed (for example, on August 17, 1937, the Politburo dismissed the head of Molotov's secretariat, A. M. Mogilny, and on August 28, Molotov's assistant M. R. Khluser). In 1939, an attack was carried out against Molotov’s wife P.S. Zhemchuzhina, who held the post of People’s Commissar of the fishing industry. On August 10, 1939, the Politburo adopted a secret resolution (labeled “special folder”), which stated that Zhemchuzhina “showed imprudence and illegibility in relation to her connections, as a result of which, surrounded by comrade. The Pearl turned out to have quite a few hostile spy elements, which unwittingly made their espionage work easier.” The Politburo ordered “to carry out a thorough check of all materials relating to Comrade Zhemchuzhina” and predetermined her release from the post of People’s Commissar, carrying out “this measure in a gradual manner.”

Clouds were gathering over the Pearl. In the following weeks, the NKVD received testimony about her involvement in “sabotage and espionage work.” Now everything depended on whether Stalin wanted to give this testimony a go. For some reason, Stalin this time decided not to bring the matter to an arrest. On October 24, the Politburo was assembled to consider the issue of the Pearl (all members and candidates of the Politburo were present, with the exception of Khrushchev). Most likely, on Stalin’s initiative (in any case, it was with his hand that the corresponding Politburo resolution was written) Zhemchuzhina was partially acquitted. In the decision made (this time it was not classified as a “special folder”, but was intended for wider dissemination), the accusations against Zhemchuzhina were called “slanderous.” However, the resolution repeated the wording about Zhemchuzhina’s “imprudence and illegibility” given in the resolution of August 10. Based on this, a decision was made to relieve Zhemchuzhina from the post of People's Commissar of the fishing industry. In February 1941, at the XVIII Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Zhemchuzhina was deprived of the title of candidate member of the Central Committee. Later, after the war, Zhemchuzhina will still be arrested and will spend several years in exile.

Documents indicate that at the end of the 30s, Stalin put more noticeable pressure on Molotov through the official line, repeatedly reprimanding him regarding certain decisions of the Council of People's Commissars. For example, on January 28, 1937, Molotov turned to the Politburo with a request to approve additional capital investments for the NKVD. Stalin responded to this with a sharp resolution: “t. Molotov. Why couldn’t this matter be taken into account when considering title lists? Did you miss it? We need to discuss it in the PB.” The very next day, the Council of People's Commissars' proposal was accepted, and this also indicates that Stalin's irritation was most likely caused by non-business reasons.

On October 17, 1937, Molotov turned to the Politburo with a request to approve additional capital investments for two chemical industry enterprises. Stalin put a resolution on the letter: “t. Chubaryu. Who wrote this note? Who checked the numbers? It’s difficult to vote for Comrade Molotov’s proposal.” Such an appeal by Stalin to Chubar over the head of Molotov (who, judging by the Politburo protocols, was in Moscow at that time) was a demonstrative violation of the existing chain of command, an attack against Molotov. Chubar, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Finance, was a subordinate of Molotov, and the fact that the letter to the Politburo was signed by Molotov meant that the issue had been agreed upon at the level of the Council of People's Commissars. Despite this obvious circumstance, Stalin repeated his maneuver again a few days later. On October 20, 1937, Molotov turned to the Politburo with a request to approve the allocation of 40 million rubles from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars. to replenish the working capital of the trading system of the People's Commissariat of Domestic Trade, and Stalin again put a resolution on the letter: “What does Comrade Chubar think about this?” In both cases, a decision was eventually made. This meant that Stalin did not oppose the resolutions themselves, but rather organized some kind of political demonstrations. Examples of Stalin's attacks on Molotov regarding the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars can be continued. They were not as harsh and politicized as Stalin’s attacks on Rykov in 1929–1930, but clearly indicated Stalin’s dissatisfaction with Molotov as chairman of the government.

Molotov was placed in a rather humiliating position during the XVIII Congress of the CPSU(b). On March 14, 1939, he spoke at the congress with the traditional report for the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars on the next (third) five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR. The content of the report was nothing special, and its main provisions were agreed upon and approved in advance by the Politburo. However, the very next day, March 15, the Politburo, undoubtedly on Stalin’s initiative (Stalin’s edits were preserved on the original resolution), adopted a resolution “On the report of Comrade Molotov at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the third five-year plan.” It said: “1) It is wrong to admit that Comrade Molotov in his report […] did not dwell on the results of the discussion and on the analysis of the main amendments and additions to the theses. 2) Suggest to Comrade Molotov to correct this situation.” Fulfilling this decision of the Politburo, Molotov, in his concluding speech on March 17, outlined the main content of the pre-congress “discussion”, while acknowledging (naturally, without reference to the Politburo resolution of March 15) that he was correcting the omission made in the report.

In general, there was nothing unusual in the demand to supplement the report with materials from the pre-congress discussion. The formula for this demand was unusual: a demonstrative decision by the Politburo, an official statement of Molotov’s mistake. All this was strikingly different from similar situations that arose in the 1920s. and in the first half of the 1930s. On November 7, 1926, for example, Stalin wrote to Molotov about the publication of their speeches at the XV Conference: “I have only now realized the awkwardness of the fact that I did not show my report to anyone […] I already feel awkward after the controversy the day before yesterday. And now you want to kill me with your modesty, again insisting on watching the speech (Molotov’s speech. - O. X.). No, I’d better abstain. Print in the form in which you see fit." Surviving letters show that, at least until 1936, Stalin ostentatiously approved of the quality of Molotov's public appearances. “Today I read the international part. It turned out well,” he wrote in January 1933 regarding Molotov’s upcoming report at the session of the USSR Central Executive Committee. “I looked through it. It turned out well,” was how Stalin assessed the preliminary text of Molotov’s report on the Soviet constitution in February 1936. If Stalin had any comments during this period, he expressed them to Molotov privately. “The chapter on “forced” labor is incomplete and insufficient. See the text for comments and corrections,” Stalin wrote to Molotov regarding the latter’s draft report at the Congress of Soviets of the USSR in March 1931.

Another old ally of Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov, turned out to be discredited before the war. Having carried out a large-scale purge in the army on Stalin’s orders, Voroshilov, who was already not particularly capable as the head of the military department, was completely demoralized. “The further he went, the more he lost his face. Everyone knew that if the question came to Voroshilov, then he would have to spend many weeks in the preparation process until at least some decision was made,” recalled Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov. To top it all off, Voroshilov was held responsible for the defeats during the Soviet-Finnish war. In May 1940, he was replaced as People's Commissar of Defense by S.K. Timoshenko. During the transfer of affairs to the new leader, the People's Commissariat of Defense conducted an inspection by a commission that included A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov and N. A. Voznesensky. The report drawn up based on the results of the inspection contained sharp assessments of the state of affairs in the military department. Although Voroshilov’s resignation was carried out quite carefully and outwardly looked like a promotion (the day before, Voroshilov was appointed deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and chairman of the Defense Committee under the Council of People’s Commissars), the fact of a significant cooling of the leader towards his longtime friend was recorded in Stalin’s circle. “Stalin [...] in conversations criticized the military departments, the People's Commissariat of Defense, and especially Voroshilov. He sometimes focused everything on Voroshilov’s personality […] I remember how once, during our stay at his nearby dacha, Stalin, in the heat of anger, sharply criticized Voroshilov. He became very nervous, stood up, and attacked Voroshilov. He also boiled, blushed, stood up and, in response to Stalin’s criticism, accused him: “You are to blame for this, you destroyed the military personnel.” Stalin also responded. Then Voroshilov grabbed the plate […] and hit it on the table. Before my eyes, this was the only such case,” Khrushchev recalled.

At the end of the 1930s, other old members of the Politburo who survived the repressions also found themselves in a difficult situation. All of them lost one of their relatives or closest friends and collaborators in the pre-war period (the most famous fact is the imprisonment of M.I. Kalinin’s wife in the camps). Everyone was under constant threat of any political charges. Speaking at an extended meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 2, 1937, Stalin publicly recalled, for example, that the Secretary of the Central Committee A. A. Andreev “was a very active Trotskyist in 1921.” (meaning Andreev’s position during the discussion about trade unions at the Tenth Party Congress, when Andreev supported Trotsky’s position), although now he “fights well with the Trotskyists.” According to R. Medvedev, in the 1950s, Mikoyan said that soon after the death of Ordzhonikidze, Stalin also threatened Mikoyan: “The story of how 26 Baku commissars were shot and only one of them - Mikoyan - survived is dark and confusing . And you, Anastas, don’t force us to unravel this story.”

Known facts confirm the point of view about the complete dependence of the old members of the Politburo on Stalin. Moreover, this dependence of Stalin’s entourage, as M. Levin accurately noted, was of a slavish nature: “Stalin could remove, arrest and execute any of them, persecute their families, prohibit them from attending meetings of the bodies of which they were members, or simply attack them in a fit of uncontrollable rage." Although such formulations seem exaggerated to some historians, we have every reason to insist on them. Leaving aside many other considerations, let us once again emphasize the main thing - Stalin really could (and repeatedly did this) at any moment deprive not only the post, but also the life of any member of the Politburo.

An important part of the formation of a new system of supreme power was the promotion of young leaders who received their posts and power directly from the hands of Stalin. In March 1939, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, elected by the XVIII Party Congress, Zhdanov and Khrushchev were introduced into the full members of the Politburo, in addition to Andreev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Mikoyan, Molotov, Stalin. Beria and Shvernik became new candidates for membership in the Politburo. The tendency to dilute the Politburo with “youth” appeared again two years later. In February 1941, three nominees became candidates for membership in the Politburo: N.A. Voznesensky, G.M. Malenkov and A.S. Shcherbakov.

Appointments to the Politburo reflected changes in the position of Stalin's associates in the power hierarchy. During the years of terror, there was a further expansion of the functions of A. A. Zhdanov, who represented the middle generation of nominees in the Politburo. On April 16, 1937, the Politburo made a decision according to which Zhdanov, starting in May 1937, was to work alternately for a month in Moscow and a month in Leningrad. Let us recall that the previous decision of the Politburo of April 20, 1935 ordered Zhdanov to spend only one ten-day period a month in Moscow. In accordance with the resolution on the distribution of responsibilities between the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, adopted by the Politburo on November 27, 1938, Zhdanov was entrusted with “monitoring and control over the work of Komsomol bodies”, as well as “monitoring and control over press organs and providing editors with the necessary instructions." Thanks to his frequent stay in Moscow, Zhdanov took a more active part in the work of the Organizing Bureau and Politburo, and often visited Stalin’s office. Judging by the protocols, in Stalin’s absence, Zhdanov actually replaced him in the Politburo during this period. In any case, on many Politburo decisions taken without Stalin, Zhdanov’s signature appears first.

Stalin himself, as before, demonstrated his special affection for Zhdanov. It can be noted that, as a rule, the Politburo satisfied all the petitions that Zhdanov made as the leader of Leningrad. On April 4, 1939, the Politburo considered the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding agricultural leaders in the Leningrad region. Stalin personally added Zhdanov's name to the list of those awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. Shortly before the start of the war, on June 10, 1941, the Politburo considered a note from the head of the Kremlin’s medical department about the need to provide Zhdanov with a month’s leave in Sochi due to his painful condition and “general extreme fatigue.” There were many such notes concerning various high-ranking officials, and usually the Politburo followed the recommendations of doctors. However, this time Zhdanov received more than the doctors asked for. The Politburo decided on a one and a half month vacation according to Stalin’s resolution: “Give Comrade Zhdanov a vacation in Sochi for 1 1/2 months.”

In the group of the youngest nominees, from the first steps of the terror, Yezhov was in the lead, concentrating in his hands the control of several key party and state structures at once. As Yezhov’s influence weakened, in contrast to him, Stalin nominated L.P. Beria and G.M. Malenkov, who made a dizzying career in just a few years. Thirty-nine-year-old Beria, recalled from Georgia to Moscow to the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR only in August 1938, already at the end of that year became People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, and in March 1939 a candidate member of the Politburo. Judging by the protocols, he did not take a very active part in the work of the Politburo. However, he regularly visited Stalin’s office and submitted numerous decisions regarding reorganization and personnel changes in the NKVD for approval by the Politburo, and actively defended the interests of his department.

Stalin developed a favorable attitude towards Beria back in the early 1930s, when he contributed to the gradual promotion of Beria to the role of leader of the Transcaucasian Federation. Proposing to appoint Beria as the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b), Stalin wrote in a letter to Kaganovich on August 12, 1932: “Beria makes a good impression. A good organizer, businesslike, capable worker.” Beria himself skillfully used Stalin's increased interest in the situation in Transcaucasia, from time to time unobtrusively reminding him of the special importance of fellow countrymen, national ties. In letters to Stalin, Beria called him “dear comrade Koba.” A book compiled on the initiative of Beria about the history of the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia elevated Stalin to the rank of one of the main leaders of the revolutionary movement in the Russian Empire. Energetic and ruthless, Beria enthusiastically followed the “general line,” including succeeding in repressions in Transcaucasia.

Stalin was also satisfied with the fact that Beria was in acute conflict relations with the former leaders of Transcaucasia from the old party guard, who were grouped around Ordzhonikidze. Honored Transcaucasian Bolsheviks, who entered the houses of the Kremlin leaders, spread not the most favorable information about Beria and, in particular, constantly reminded of his connections with the intelligence service of the Musavat government, which was in power in Azerbaijan in 1918–1920. This is evidenced by Beria Ordzhonikidze’s letters from the 1930s, deposited in the Ordzhonikidze fund at RGASPI. Beria, as can be seen from these letters, had to demonstrate extreme respect for Ordzhonikidze and refute the slander of his enemies. “Levon Gogoberidze is resting in Sukhum. According to the stories of Comrade Lakoba and a number of other comrades, Comrade Gogoberidze is spreading the most vile things about me and the new Transcaucasian leadership in general. In particular, about my past work in the Musavat counterintelligence, he claims that the party allegedly did not know about this and does not know. Meanwhile, you are well aware that I was sent to Mussavat intelligence by the party and that the issue was examined by the Central Committee of the AKP(b) (Communist Party of Azerbaijan - O. Kh.) in 1920 in the presence of you […] and others. (In 1925, I gave you an official extract on the decision of the Central Committee of the AKP(b) on this issue, by which I was completely rehabilitated, since the fact of my work in counterintelligence with the knowledge of the party was confirmed by statements […] (followed by the names of witnesses . - O. X.) "- wrote, for example, Beria Ordzhonikidze on March 2, 1933. Stalin was undoubtedly satisfied that there were certain compromising materials on Beria. This story is about connections with enemy intelligence (specifically, by the way, it was never studied) will hang over Beria all his life. These facts acquired particular danger during the period of the “Great Terror”, when “compromising materials” were actively identified and used against Soviet functionaries and millions of ordinary citizens. Beria did not escape this fate. In June 1937 .at the plenum of the Central Committee, he was accused of having connections with the Musavatists by the People's Commissar of Health G. N. Kaminsky. Beria once again presented evidence of his innocence to Stalin. Stalin chose to believe Beria. Kaminsky was arrested (although it is unlikely only because he spoke out against Beria). The same compromising evidence was used against Beria in 1938 by Yezhov, who was extremely alarmed (and not without reason) by the appointment of Beria as his deputy in the NKVD. At the beginning of October 1938, Stalin demanded an explanation from Beria regarding the accusations made by Yezhov about Beria’s service in Musa-Vatist intelligence. Beria again presented the relevant evidence, which he always had ready. At the same time, Beria understood well that Stalin could either believe or not believe his excuses. And the point was not at all about the reliability of evidence and supporting documents. In the end, this happened, although not with Stalin. In 1953, the unproven facts about service with the Masavatists will be used by Khrushchev as one of the points of accusation on the basis of which Beria will be shot.

Another promoter of terror, G. M. Malenkov, was in a similar position of being potentially guilty. Having reached only 35 years of age in 1937, he managed to go through a large school of bureaucratic activity in various party authorities: in 1925–1930. - in the apparatus of the Central Committee, in 1930–1934. - in the Moscow Party Committee, then from 1934 - as head of the department of the leading party bodies of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The department of leading party bodies was created in 1934 as an instrument of direct control over the secretaries of republican, regional and regional party organizations. In conditions of terror and repeated changes of personnel, the department acquired special importance, recruiting new management personnel. In 1937–1938 Malenkov, not even formally a member of the Central Committee, had, thanks to his position, direct and regular access to Stalin. Carrying out his instructions on personnel issues, Malenkov constantly submitted proposals on the appointment of party and government officials for approval by the Politburo. In some cases, the initiative for personnel changes belonged to Malenkov himself, who sent relevant notes to Stalin.

Successfully coping with the task of cleansing the party apparatus, Malenkov received the growing support and favor of Stalin. It was Malenkov who Stalin instructed to make the main report at the January plenum of the Central Committee in 1938, despite the fact that Malenkov was not even a member of the Central Committee. Soon after the plenum, at the suggestion of Stalin, the staff of the department of leading party bodies was immediately increased by 93 units due to the creation of an apparatus of responsible organizers of ORPO, supervising each regional party organization. After the XVIII Party Congress, at which Malenkov made one of the reports, he became a member of the Central Committee, secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Organizing Bureau. At the very end of March 1939, Malenkov headed the new structure of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - the huge Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee, which consisted of 45 departments (by industry), an inspection group under the head of the department (Malenkov) and an archive of personal files. In the pre-war months, judging by the logs of visitors to Stalin’s office, Malenkov became one of the leader’s closest collaborators. For six months, until June 22, Malenkov visited Stalin 60 times, coming in second place after Molotov.

As with his other employees, Stalin had various incriminating materials on Malenkov. As follows from Malenkov’s letter to Stalin dated January 28, 1939, deposited in the Stalin Foundation, during this period some kind of investigation was carried out against ORPO and Malenkov himself. Malenkov, in particular, complained to Stalin about the bias of the Moscow party board leading the case. “I want to tell you, Comrade Stalin,” Malenkov also wrote, “that some of the facts known to you about me (concerning personal morality) date back to a time long before the period when I began to have access directly to you. Since the first time I personally visited you, I, like every party member, experienced this first reception well, and made a firm promise to myself to be an exemplary party member in all respects before you. I hold on to this firmly.” A new threat loomed over Malenkov after the arrest of Yezhov, with whom Malenkov had been closely associated in previous years due to his official position. Yezhov gave some evidence against Malenkov. And although Stalin did not give the matter any progress, Malenkov remembered this episode. In 1953, the interrogation protocol of Yezhov with testimony against Malenkov was discovered in the safe of the arrested Beria and sent to Malenkov. Malenkov destroyed him.

Another fast-growing nominee of Stalin was elected a member of the Central Committee at the XVIII Congress in 1939 - the new chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, thirty-six-year-old economist N. A. Voznesensky. Before being promoted to leadership positions in Moscow, Voznesensky in 1935–1937. worked in Leningrad under the leadership of Zhdanov. It is possible that it was Zhdanov who recommended Voznesensky to Stalin. Stalin, judging by many signs, highly valued Voznesensky as a specialist and dedicated leader. The entire appearance of Voznesensky corresponded to this image, who, however, judging by eyewitness accounts, was hardly a pleasant person. “Nikolai Alekseevich worked with exceptional energy, quickly and effectively solving problems that arose. But he did not know how to hide his mood, he was too hot-tempered. Moreover, a bad mood was manifested by extreme irritability, arrogance and arrogance. But when Voznesensky was in a good mood, he was witty, cheerful, cheerful, and amiable. His manner of demeanor and conversations revealed his education, erudition, and high culture. But such moments were quite rare. They slipped like sparks, and then Voznesensky again became gloomy, unrestrained and prickly,” this is how Ya. E. Chadaev, who held the post of manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, remembered Voznesensky. A.I. Mikoyan, who was sympathetic to Voznesensky and his tragic fate, nevertheless wrote: “[...] As a person, Voznesensky had noticeable shortcomings. For example, ambition, arrogance. In the close circle of the narrow Politburo, this was noticeable to everyone. Including his chauvinism.”

Malenkov and Voznesensky made the main presentations at the XVIII Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in January - February 1941. At the plenum of the Central Committee, which met shortly after the conference (February 21, 1941), Malenkov, Voznesensky and the new first secretary of the Moscow party organization A S. Shcherbakov (N. S. Khrushchev was sent to lead Ukraine) were elected as candidates for membership in the Politburo. Proposing these new candidates to the plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin repeated the argument presented at the February-March plenum of 1937: “We discussed here, members of the Politburo and some members of the Central Committee, and came to the conclusion that it would be good to expand the composition of at least candidates for members of the Politburo . Now there are a lot of old people in the Politburo, people leaving, but it is necessary that someone else younger be selected so that they can learn and be, if anything happens, ready to take their place. The point is that it is necessary to expand the circle of people working in the Politburo.

Specifically, this came down to the fact that we had this opinion - it would be nice to add now. There are now 2 candidates for the Politburo. The first candidate is Beria and the second is Shvernik. It would be good to increase it to five, add three more so that they would help the members of the Politburo work. Let's say it would be nice to comrade. Voznesensky should be nominated as a candidate member of the Politburo, he deserves it, Shcherbakov - the first secretary of the Moscow region and Malenkov - the third. I think it would be good to include them.”

Subsequent events showed that Stalin's statements were not a simple declaration. Beria, Voznesensky, and Malenkov, who emerged in the wake of the repressions, actually occupied key positions in the post-war period. After Stalin's death, it was between the promoters of the late 1930s, namely Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev, that the main struggle unfolded for the right to inherit the power of the leader.