The death of the battleship "Novorossiysk"
THE MYSTERY OF THE DESTROY OF THE BATTLESHIP "NOVOROSSIYSK".
After victory in World War II, the Allies divided the Italian fleet by decision of the Triple Commission in 1948. As a result of this, the Soviet Union received a light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 4 submarines and the battleship Julius Caesar, built before the First World War. On February 6, 1949, the flag of the USSR Navy was raised over the ship, and a little later, in March, the battleship was renamed Novorossiysk.
The condition of the Julius Caesar upon delivery was unimportant: for five years, almost scrapped, the ship rusted with a small crew on board, clearly insufficient for such a vessel, without proper maintenance. The minor repairs carried out immediately before the battleship was handed over to the Union did not save the situation.
However, already in July 1949, Novorossiysk took part in maneuvers as the flagship of the squadron. Subsequently, the battleship spent quite a lot of time in repair docks; it was repaired as many as eight times and achieved some success: combat and technical equipment was replaced, turbines were modernized, and even the inconvenient layout was sorted out. They planned to completely rearm the ship, but decided not to rush and leave the Italian guns. In the future, it was planned to equip the battleship with shells with tactical nuclear charges - and then, despite its venerable age of 35 years, it would begin to pose a real threat to the enemy. 
On October 28, 1955, the Novorossiysk returned from another voyage, mooring in the area of the Naval Hospital. on board, in addition to regular sailors, there were soldiers transferred from the army to the navy and completely unprepared for what happened a little later: at half past two in the morning a powerful explosion was heard under the ship’s hull (~ 1100-1800 kg of trinitrotoluene). Seeing that the flow of water could not be stopped, the acting commander, captain of the second rank G. Khorshudov, turned to the fleet commander, Vice Admiral Parkhomenko, with a proposal to evacuate part of the team, which, due to the flooding of the bow, began to gather on the poop and numbered several hundred people, but received refusal. At 4.15, the ship capsized after a roll, dragging hundreds of people on the deck and in the compartments underwater. At ten o'clock in the evening the battleship sank completely.
Despite the fact that there was enough time from the moment of the explosion to the moment of capsizing (not to mention the time of complete flooding, which occurred 20 hours after the accident), only 9 people were saved from the compartments: two were pulled out by divers, seven were taken out through the cut bottom of the ship by rescuers from Karabakh.
As a result of the disaster, more than 600 people died: not only the crew of the battleship, but also those who came to the rescue. No one knew about the tragedy at that time; it was destined to become a state secret. In connection with this situation, Admiral Kuznetsov was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy: he was removed from his post, stripped of his rank and sent into retirement. First of all, this decision was influenced by the fact that a lot of people died, and not suddenly, but after a poorly organized procedure for rescuing the ship, because only a little less than a day passed from the moment of the explosion to the time of sinking! It is also striking that the frankly outdated battleship continued to work on par with younger ships and even served as the flagship. Despite the long time it spent in repairs, Novorossiysk could not compete with modern combat ships and did not meet some technical requirements. And, nevertheless, it went on sea voyages, and did not stand as a museum in the port. Perhaps due to the fact that the USSR did not yet have its own large ships, but the need for powerful ocean-going vessels was felt.
The causes of the Novorossiysk disaster were considered by different people at different times to be the negligence of the fleet command, sabotage carried out either by the Italians or the British, and an exploding mine or even a couple of mines from the Second World War. Below we will consider in more detail two versions of what happened: candidate of technical sciences Oleg Leonidovich Sergeev and captain of the second rank Sergei Vasilyevich Elagin will share their opinions. The first researcher says that the sabotage could well have been carried out not by foreign special commands, but by Soviet professionals in order to discredit the high command of the fleet in the person of Admiral Kuznetsov and his entourage. The second author does not exclude the intervention of English combat swimmers, citing some examples from history. However, first things first...
Maxim Volchenkov
Evidence from the past - The death of Novorossiysk.
...Unexpected conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of the materials of the work of the USSR government commission (1955) on the tragic death of the battleship Novorossiysk and more than 600 sailors of its crew at the naval base of Sevastopol with the results and results of the work of the commission of British government officials (1956 g.), when only one sailor from the 12th Flotilla of the British Royal Navy, Lionel Crabb, died in Portsmouth.
...We can say with confidence that the attack on Novorossiysk was carried out by real professionals, specialists in their field. There were so few of them at that time that it was not difficult to name each one! These could only be combat swimmers from the Italian MAC flotilla, the British 12th flotilla or the German formation "K". There simply were no other specialists with practical combat experience in Europe and NATO. Why did the USSR government commission in 1955 only timidly pull and immediately break the thin thread of the version that stretched to the saboteurs from the 12th Flotilla of the British Navy in Portsmouth? There is a version, but there seem to be no indisputable facts to support it at the time of the work of the USSR government commission. Or was the commission simply not allowed to complete what it started for political reasons in light of the “Soviet-British friendship for eternity that was growing stronger every day”?
On April 18, 1956, a detachment of Soviet ships arrived in England on an official visit. On board one of them was the 1st Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. The ships moored at the pier of the British naval base of Portsmouth, which was guarded especially carefully. On the ships, the steam turbine main power plants were taken out of operation, the readiness of which to start running (the start of rotation of the ship's propellers) was more than 1 hour from a cold state.
The visit proceeded day after day in strict accordance with the official program. Suddenly, a whole series of interconnected “random” events occurs, at the center of which is the Soviet flagship cruiser Ordzhonikidze. “Accidentally” a diver found himself under the bottom of this particular ship, “accidentally” the steam turbine installation of the cruiser turned out to be warmed up and capable of immediate start-up, “accidentally” the mechanics of the cruiser received the order: “Turn the propellers!”, “accidentally” the diver was pulled under the spinning propellers cruisers. It is very likely that the cruiser’s crew knew in advance about the plan and time of the visit without inviting the “saboteur” diver, whom they demonstratively destroyed without the use of any weapons!
The Soviet side lodged an official protest with the British government. The British government apologized, insisting that it knew nothing about this provocation, organized by unknown third parties with the aim of breaking good neighborly relations between the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.
Journalists have reliably established that, tragically killed and unknown to anyone, this “saboteur” diver was one of the veterans of the super-secret 12th flotilla of the British Navy, had the rank of captain 2nd rank and his name was Lionel Crabb. During the Second World War, he successfully led the defense of the British naval base of Gibraltar from Italian combat swimmers and was rightfully considered one of the best divers in the British fleet. Lionel Crabb personally knew many of the Italians from the 10th MAS Flotilla. Captured Italian combat swimmers not only advised specialists from the 12th flotilla, but also carried out joint combat operations.
The newest Soviet cruisers of Project 68 bis repeatedly shocked the British Admiralty. In the first ten days of October 1955, the cruiser Sverdlov, as part of a detachment of Soviet ships, began moving to the British naval base of Portsmouth on a friendly visit. Navigating the Belt Strait, accompanied by 2 destroyers, in thick fog, he accomplished the impossible (by British standards). The ship briefly went out of order, deviated from the deep-water channel and at full speed crossed a sandbank with a depth of only about 4 m! Having performed such an amazing (for NATO radar observation posts) maneuver, the ship returned to the deep-sea channel and accurately took its place in the ranks of Soviet ships. NATO experts took a gross error in the actions of the crew of the Sverdlov's navigation bridge when making a turn as "secret tests" of the lead cruiser of Project 68-bis, which were as close as possible to the conditions of a combat breakthrough of Soviet cruiser-raiders into the Atlantic from the Baltic Sea and decided to inspect it at the first opportunity the bottom of the cruiser by a light diver (combat swimmer).
On October 12, 1955, during a friendly visit, the cruisers Sverdlov and Alexander Nevsky (both Project 68 bis) moored at the wall of the Portsmouth naval base. But no one even tries to carry out a diving inspection of their bottoms - at the base of the 12th flotilla in Portsmouth at this time there are no combat swimmers who can be entrusted with such a responsible task.
On April 18, 1956, the serial cruiser Ordzhonikidze docked in Portsmouth during an official visit. And it was at this moment that a veteran of the 12th flotilla, Captain 2nd Rank Crabbe, died while performing a secret mission!
If in October 1955 the best combat swimmers were not in Portsmouth, then we must look for “traces” of their professional activities quite far beyond its borders. One such “trace” exists - the sabotage explosion on October 29, 1955 of the Soviet battleship Novorossiysk in the bay of Sevastopol! All the past years, numerous authors of versions of the causes of the death of the battleship Novorossiysk attributed the blame for this sabotage exclusively to World War II professionals from the Italian combat swimmer unit - the 10th MAC flotilla! But who can seriously believe that in 1955 the command of the Italian Navy could independently plan and conduct special operations of such a scale and such a level of possible military-political consequences without the sanction of the NATO command? It can be assumed that a single team of British and Italian combat swimmers, serving jointly in the 12th flotilla of the Royal Navy, operated in Sevastopol Bay.
The question remains about the motives for the Novorossiysk bombing. The answer can be found in the history of the Suez Canal! In February 1955, Britain initiated the formation of a military alliance - the Baghdad Pact, which initially included Turkey and Iraq. England enters the Baghdad Pact on April 4, 1955, which allows it to establish dual military control (through NATO and the Baghdad Pact) over the Black Sea straits - the only way for the USSR Black Sea Fleet to enter the Mediterranean Sea. On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact Organization was created, which includes Albania, which creates the possibility of a naval presence of the USSR in the Mediterranean Sea, based on the Albanian port and naval base of Durres in close proximity to the strategic communication of the British Empire through the Suez Canal !
In September 1955, Egypt, in response to a real military threat from Great Britain, concluded “trade” agreements with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the supply of modern weapons. On October 29, 1955, a mysterious explosion occurs on the battleship Novorossiysk in Sevastopol, which could actually destroy the entire combat core of the Black Sea Fleet and disable its main naval base for a long period. On June 11, 1956, the last British soldier leaves the Suez Canal zone. In July 1956, the Egyptian government nationalized the Suez Canal. October 29, 1956 Great Britain, France and Israel take aggressive actions against Egypt in the Suez Canal zone. If you ask yourself what unites the dates October 29, 1955, October 29, 1956, then the answer lies in the plane of geopolitics - the Suez Canal!
Source: http://macbion.narod.ru, Sergey Elagin
Hidden facts
The information layer raised over the past years by historians and writers highlighted the refusal of the government commission in the report dated November 17, 1955 “On the death of the battleship Novorossiysk and part of its crew” to give an objective answer to three main questions: what exploded, why it was not possible to save battleship after the explosion and who could have carried out the sabotage.
From the available materials it follows that the commission sought to prevent an explanation of the facts of the double explosion and to link the disaster with the self-explosion of substandard artillery ammunition, and then, when this version was not confirmed, with an accidental explosion on an unswept mine, for which speculative models were built that were far from the real situation.
The key factor in organizing the fight for survivability was not considered - the absence at the time of the disaster of 80% of the combat officers, including the ship commander and the commander of the warhead-5, which should be considered the main reason for the death of the battleship after the explosion.
Speaking about the serious design flaws of the battleship, the commission belittles the courage and heroism of the sailors who managed to fight for 165 minutes for the survivability of the ship, which received fatal damage. On the contrary, the "Empress Maria" stayed afloat for only 54 minutes, when the crew, amid an ongoing series of explosions, was unable to withstand the onslaught of the elements and began to flee.
The fact that the battleship's unscheduled departure to sea on October 28, 1955, which was not provided by the command and headquarters of the squadron, also remained a mystery. The true reasons for the unsatisfactory organization of the rescue work (the entire fleet command was immediately incapacitated when the battleship capsized) and the possibility of preparing sabotage from the shore were not revealed.
There was more than enough evidence and facts of sabotage at that time; it was only necessary to dispose of them properly, accumulating information in accordance with a holistic concept - weapons, including means of destruction and delivery to the target, instruments and control and guidance devices. This approach required the involvement of specialists and scientists in explosive processes, who without much difficulty established the key cause of the death of the ship as a result of the simultaneous detonation of two bottom thousand-kilogram charges.
Failure to comply with these obvious requirements allowed the commission to ignore the significant differences in the seismograms of real and experimental explosions, where the amplitude of soil displacement during a real explosion is clearly seen to be twice as high as in the experimental explosion, as well as the difference in the duration of oscillatory processes and the characteristics of the damage caused to the ship.
About the damage to the bow of the Novorossiysk cruiser, the commander of the emergency party of the cruiser Kerch, Salamatin, said the following: “I noticed that where there was an explosion, it was as if a hole had been made with a boletus. Apparently, there was a directed explosion. Very strong. The sides are near the bow completely intact."
It is obvious that it is impossible to cause through-and-through damage to a ship with one ammunition, as indicated in the commission’s report.
The double explosion is confirmed by documentary evidence from participants in the events (also not taken into account during the investigation), who distinguished two shocks with a short time interval, as well as the discovery of two explosion craters in the anchorage area, analysis of the configuration and relative position of which could provide important information about the nature of the explosion. explosive processes, possible methods of delivery and placement of charges.
Consequently, in addition to the total power and number of charges, there are additional conditions necessary for concentrating the energy of underwater explosions. The conjecture of the head of the mine and torpedo department of the Black Sea Fleet, Markovsky, about the connection between the destruction of the ship and the formation of a “gas chamber” during the explosion of two German RMH-type mines seemed informative, but discussion of this topic was stopped by the commission.
The scientific data of those years in the field of explosion and cavitation theory made it possible to explain what happened as follows. The first explosion of the charge occurred under the ship without causing fatal damage, but the gas bubble created in the water column concentrated the energy of the explosion of the second charge, giving it a cumulative effect.
Accordingly, conclusions based on these facts could be as follows. 
The battleship "Novorossiysk" was blown up by two charges with a total TNT equivalent of within 1800 kg, installed on the ground in the area of the bow artillery magazines, at a small distance from the centerline of the ship and from each other. In terms of explosive power, the charges are close to German LBM mines or domestic AMD-1000 mines.
The explosions occurred with a short time interval, causing a cumulative effect and causing damage, as a result of which the ship sank.
The very statement of the problem refuted the commission’s conclusion that the Novorossiysk was detonated on a German mine left over from the war, installed without reference to a specific target, despite the fact that by 1955 the German mines were faulty due to aging power sources, and the presence of two min takes this event beyond reality.
In addition, the time interval between explosions, distinguishable by humans, is too long for the case of initiation of the second charge due to detonation or operation of a proximity fuse, which indicates the targeted orientation and detonation of charges at a given point in time.
A slight discrepancy in the time of explosions, amounting to tenths of a second, indicates the use of high-precision and shock-resistant clock mechanisms, since, due to the error, the domestic and German urgency devices used in mine weapons of those years were not suitable for this purpose.
Not only the choice of time of day, but also the half-hour frequency of installation of temporary fuze mechanisms can indicate advance elaboration of the sabotage plan.
By turning to historical analogies, the commission could establish that the accuracy of the clock mechanisms of the fuses is significantly inferior to those used by the British when the German battleship Tirpitz was blown up in 1943 and is more consistent with domestic devices of the AFC type.
Another analogy is a coincidence - as on the Empress Maria, the explosions began with a bypass of the artillery magazines. According to the testimony of the sailors, the explosion occurred exactly at the moment the hatch of the bow artillery grate was opened. Not otherwise, when preparing the sabotage, the facts of national history and the regulations for servicing ammunition were taken into account.
Based on this information, the commission would have to conclude that there was a single concept and plan for preparing and carrying out sabotage, and the detonation was carried out by simultaneous activation of the temporary (clock) mechanisms of the fuses of each charge, set for 1 hour 30 minutes. October 29, 1955.
The foregoing completely excludes the common versions of the use of weapon systems of Italian or English origin - combat swimmers, man-controlled torpedoes and Midget-type mini-submarines, the actions of which are limited by their operational and structural and technical elements.
Thus, the reaction time of the sabotage system ranged from several weeks to months, so frequent changes in the deployment of ships were an effective means of counteraction. The order to stand on anchor barrel No. 3 came when Novorossiysk, returning to base, had already laid down at the Inkerman sites, which excluded the possibility of retargeting and, especially, deployment of foreign sabotage forces and means.
And the delivery and installation of two tons of explosives by hundreds of underwater saboteurs to the battleship’s mooring site is absolutely fantastic.
Along with this, it should be said about the very dubious military-political expediency of carrying out such an operation during a period of nuclear confrontation by any state, the development and implementation of which requires the involvement of many government agencies with the inevitable leakage of information, which sooner or later becomes the property of foreign intelligence.
There is no need to say that the initiative and recklessness of the “patriots” was harshly suppressed by the state’s special services, which the former Italian underwater saboteurs themselves drew the attention of Russian historians to.
Preparing for the explosion
An analysis of the combat capabilities of foreign sabotage weapons should have led the commission to the idea of delivering charges equivalent to AMD-1000 mines by surface small-sized watercraft sunk at the battleship's mooring site. This is evidenced by the mysterious disappearance without a trace of the boat and longboat, which were under the right shot at the explosion site, while the watercraft near the symmetrical shot on the left side were preserved and were not damaged.
At the same time, divers noted that the depth of the craters was insignificant for the power of the charges and the smoothness of the craters, which is typical for the case when explosions occur not on the ground, but on a platform one and a half meters from the ground, which corresponds to the height of the side of the missing watercraft.
It should be noted that the objects found by divers at the site of the explosions were not examined by the commission to determine whether they belonged to the specified watercraft.
Taking into account the presence of up to 900 kg of gasoline in the tanks of the boat, the commission had to come to the following conclusions: the complete destruction of the wooden hulls of the boat and longboat occurred during underwater contact explosions of ammunition; Under the current conditions, a volumetric detonation of the gas-air mixture naturally occurs.
Signs of a volumetric explosion recorded by observers include a bright flash and a black cap of smoke on the forecastle of the battleship, the presence of an air wave, a sharp pressure drop, the smell of gasoline, which was the reason for the initial report of the explosion of a gasoline tank that was never on the ship, as well as the burning of fuel, raised to the surface.
The question arises: how and in what time frame could the secret delivery of ammunition and the sinking of watercraft be carried out? On the left side, in the last hours before the explosion, sailors discharged ashore were received.
The arrival of the last longboats was reported at 0.30. At this time, on the forecastle of the battleship, from where the deck was clearly visible to the first main caliber turret and both shots, along with the duty service there was a group of sailors who had arrived from leave.
Consequently, the “charged” boat and longboat were already under the right shot of the battleship at that time.
Final preparations for the explosion were thus carried out upon the battleship's arrival in the harbor and included the loading and delivery of ammunition for the starboard shot.
The saboteurs needed to sink the boat of the ship's senior assistant commander Khurshudov, who had gone ashore after a more than strange announcement to the crew about the upcoming early departure to sea, and a longboat with a special cargo prepared for explosion.
The direct executors of these operations solved the usual task of naval special forces to check the vigilance of the watch service and did not know about the “stuffing” of the boat and longboat.
In 1993, the perpetrators of this action were named: a senior lieutenant of special forces and two midshipmen - a support group.
Based on the totality of the data, the commission should have made, but never voiced, the fatal conclusion for itself:
The right shot of the battleship Novorossiysk moored to anchor barrel No. 3 was used to target the artillery magazines of the floating craft with charges. The bombing was prepared and carried out by domestic special services with the knowledge of the country's leadership exclusively for internal political purposes.
Provocation against the naval commander
Who needed this grandiose provocation and against whom was it directed? Khrushchev answered this question exactly two years after the death of Novorossiysk on October 29, 1957 at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: “We were offered to invest more than 100 billion rubles in the fleet and build old boats and destroyers armed with classical artillery. We fought a great fight, removed Kuznetsov... he turned out to be incapable of thinking, caring about the fleet, about defense. Everything needs to be assessed in a new way. We need to build a fleet, but first of all, build a submarine fleet armed with missiles."
In the continental state - Russia, the fleet plays an extremely important, but not decisive role in the country's defense capability and the choice of military development priorities. The naval commander, who had proven himself during the war years to be a master of organizing interaction between the army and navy, could not help but know this.
As a person with a scientific mindset, he could not help but understand that, in conditions of economic restrictions, the high capital intensity of military shipbuilding hampered the course of the nuclear and rocket and space industries towards the deployment of ground-based strategic missile systems.
As you know, in August 1945, by decree of the State Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, in order to speed up work on the creation of an atomic bomb, the 1st Main Directorate was formed, which required multibillion-dollar expenses.
Less than a year later, by resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of May 13, 1946 No. 1017-419ss “Issues of jet weapons,” the leading defense ministries were assigned tasks for the development and production of jet weapons.
In many ways, the fate of the ten-year Navy construction program, presented to the government in September 1945 and including the production of aircraft carriers - large and small, cruisers, new submarines and destroyers, as well as Kuznetsov personally, who was relieved of his post in 1947, was decided by the words of Stalin: " Sailors have always been distinguished by their ignorance and unwillingness to take into account the possibilities of industry."
This was the first warning from the military-industrial complex.
After being reinstated in 1951 as the Minister of Navy of the USSR, Kuznetsov prepared a report on the outdated fleet, on the construction of ships according to old designs, and on jet weapons. He opposed the abolition of the warranty period for newly built ships and weapons. These proposals did not cause applause in the USSR Ministry of Justice and Industry.
Being a supporter of a balanced fleet, in 1954-1955 Kuznetsov raised the question of a ten-year shipbuilding plan, sought the installation of the first prototypes of sea- and shore-based jet weapons, approved the design of a nuclear submarine, took measures to develop inertial systems and computers for submarines, equipped with long-range rocket weapons.
During the same period, the government of the USSR, after the successful testing of a thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb) in August 1953, decided to develop a ballistic missile with an intercontinental flight range capable of hitting strategic targets in any region of the globe and launching an artificial Earth satellite into outer space.
The priority of strategic nuclear forces for this period has been finally adopted, which requires the switching of most of the country's economic and intellectual resources to these purposes.
The ten-year shipbuilding plan, which did not reflect in the long term the priority of developing the most capital-intensive and beneficial naval strategic nuclear forces for the military-industrial complex, objectively could not be supported by the military-political leadership of the country, which for the second time decided the fate of Kuznetsov.
Of the entire arsenal of the Middle Ages, at the time of the events described, the main weapon remained the discrediting of those who disagreed with a single course by showing the inferiority of the ideas defended, for which it was not considered shameful to sacrifice the lives of innocent people.
After Kuznetsov filed a report on May 26, 1955 with a request to be relieved of his position for health reasons, the field of action to discredit narrowed, and the raised sword threatened to hit an empty place, negating the entire effect of the “great struggle” carried out by Khrushchev. The fact that the country's leadership was looking for a way out of this situation is confirmed in Kuznetsov's memoirs. About the events of those days, he writes: “In October of the same 1955, such conversations (about leaving office) acquired a real embodiment in the form of an official statement addressed to me that, of course, I needed to be released, but not due to illness, but for other reasons ".
In a letter to his wife Vera Nikolaevna from Yalta dated October 20, 1955, Nikolai Gerasimovich wrote: “... As far as I was able to understand, the minister wants to have his own new Commander-in-Chief, but he wants to explain this with something serious and therefore is hiding it from me.”
The basis for the removal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from his post could be a large-scale emergency, since it was impossible to further delay the satisfaction of Kuznetsov’s request.
The release of Kuznetsov from his post on December 8, 1955, which followed the death of Novorossiysk, and the appointment of Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, opened up ways to reduce the naval personnel and aviation of the Navy, and cut up unfinished ships for scrap.
Subsequently, the country's leadership, in order to achieve immediate political goals due to decisive superiority in the nuclear missile field, decided to sharply reduce the armed forces, destroy the Air Force aviation fleet and curtail knowledge-intensive industries.
The mobilization potential of the USSR military-industrial complex was supported by fierce competition between industry and intra-industry groupings for receiving government orders for the creation of weapons and military equipment.
At times this struggle was waged not for life, but for death.
The bargaining chip turned out to be the Novorossiysk cruise ship and other captured ships, which became a burden for the industry, then the turn came to the cruisers and aviation complexes under construction, including promising strategic ones, not to mention the thousands of fired specialists, whose training took many years and resources.
The Novorossiysk tragedy has its own optimistic component in the historical expediency of the priority development of productive forces, where the defense complex, with all its vices, plays the role of a locomotive and master generator.
The Navy plays an exceptional role in the implementation of nuclear and missile projects, the deployment of the Strategic Missile Forces and the country's Military Space Forces.
Russia still retains the status of a leading power in the field of space and nuclear technologies.
Janes is always right
From a short message from the directory about warships of the world "Janes Fighting Ships" for 1957-1958. It follows that the battleship "Novorossiysk" was sunk by a "drifting" mine, the number of victims was hundreds of people. Citing another report, it is claimed that the ship was used during "some experiments" in the Black Sea. The knowledge of the publishers of this most authoritative reference book, published since 1897, has never been questioned. It is hardly possible to ignore the presented version, which hides between the lines information obtained not only from the act of the government commission, but also from other, more objective sources of information.
The late publication of Jane's Fighting Ships about the Novorossiysk tragedy by two years, its brevity and the Aesopian language describing the situation (positioning and detonation of a mine for certain purposes) can be explained by the desire not to “expose” sources of information not only in the Main Command of the Navy, the KGB , but also in the party leadership and the USSR Council of Ministers. It is difficult to get rid of the feeling that the conclusions made by the government commission in record time were programmed, aimed not at establishing the cause of the disaster, but at accusing, sometimes far-fetched, the Navy command and attempts to remove responsibility from industry for the unfulfilled set of measures to ensure the survivability and unsinkability of the ship and equipping the fleet with modern hydroacoustic means to search for submarines.
In the traditions of the everlasting memory of the 30s. The chairman of the commission was appointed a man who in 1952 accused Nikolai Kuznetsov of an anti-state affair - “abusing the most modern ships.” The members of the commission included Sergei Gorshkov - acting. the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who is directly responsible for the state of affairs in this fleet, as well as representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB of the USSR.
A symptomatic decision made already at the beginning of 1956 was to destroy evidence materials and not to initiate criminal proceedings against the direct culprits of the disaster in order to prevent the investigation, which inevitably led to the disclosure of the true causes of the Novorossiysk disaster and the identification of its customers and perpetrators.
In conclusion, I would like to say that the established facts indicate a real opportunity to complete the investigation into the causes of the Novorossiysk disaster, to involve the prosecutor's office, which should initiate a criminal case into the death of the warship, to pay tribute to the heroism of the Black Sea sailors who completed their military duty, but did not receive well-deserved awards.
Source: http://nvo.ng.ru, Oleg Sergeev
The death of the battleship "Novorossiysk": five versions
On October 29, 1955, the flagship of the Black Sea squadron of the Soviet Navy, the battleship Novorossiysk, sank in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol. More than 600 sailors died. According to the official version, an old German bottom mine exploded under the bottom of the ship. But there are other versions, unofficial, but very popular - supposedly Italian, English and even Soviet saboteurs are responsible for the death of Novorossiysk.
Giulio Cesare
At the time of its death, the battleship Novorossiysk was 44 years old - a venerable period for a ship. For most of her life, the battleship bore a different name - "Giulio Cesare" ("Julius Caesar"), sailing under the flag of the Italian Navy. It was laid down in Genoa in the summer of 1910 and launched in 1915. The battleship did not take part in the First World War; in the 1920s it was used as a training ship for training naval gunners.
In the mid-1930s, Giulio Cesare underwent a major renovation. The ship's displacement reached 24,000 tons; it could reach a fairly high speed of 22 knots. The battleship was well armed: two three-barreled and three turret guns, three torpedo tubes, anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns. During World War II, the battleship was mainly engaged in escorting convoys, but in 1942, the Navy command declared it obsolete and transferred it to the category of training ships.
In 1943, Italy capitulated. Until 1948, Giulio Cesare was parked without being mothballed, with a minimum number of crew and without proper maintenance.
According to a special agreement, the Italian fleet was to be divided among the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition. The USSR had a battleship, a light cruiser, 9 destroyers and 4 submarines, not counting small ships. On January 10, 1947, an agreement was reached in the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers on the distribution of transferred Italian ships between the USSR, USA, Great Britain and other countries affected by Italian aggression. For example, France was allocated four cruisers, four destroyers and two submarines, and Greece - one cruiser. The battleships were included in groups "A", "B" and "C", intended for the three main powers.
The Soviet side laid claim to one of the two new battleships, which were even more powerful than the German Bismarck-class ships. But since by this time the Cold War had already begun between the recent allies, neither the USA nor England sought to strengthen the USSR Navy with powerful ships. We had to cast lots, and the USSR received group "C". New battleships went to the USA and England (these battleships were later returned to Italy as part of the NATO partnership). By decision of the Triple Commission of 1948, the USSR received the battleship "Giulio Cesare", the light cruiser "Emmanuele Filiberto Duca D'Aosta", the destroyers "Artilleri", "Fuciliere", the destroyers "Animoso", "Ardimentoso", "Fortunale" and submarines " Marea" and "Nicelio".
On December 9, 1948, Giulio Cesare left the port of Taranto and on December 15 arrived at the Albanian port of Vlora. On February 3, 1949, the transfer of the battleship to the Soviet commission headed by Rear Admiral Levchenko took place in this port. On February 6, the naval flag of the USSR was raised over the ship, and two weeks later it left for Sevastopol, arriving at its new base on February 26. By order of the Black Sea Fleet of March 5, 1949, the battleship was given the name "Novorossiysk".
As almost all researchers note, the ship was handed over by the Italians to Soviet sailors in a disrepair. The main part of the weapons, the main power plant and the main hull structures - plating, frame, main transverse bulkheads below the armored deck - were in relatively satisfactory condition. But the general ship systems: pipelines, fittings, service mechanisms - required serious repairs or replacement. There were no radar equipment on the ship at all, the fleet of radio communications equipment was meager, and there was a complete absence of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. It should be noted that immediately before the transfer to the USSR, the battleship underwent minor repairs, which mainly concerned the electromechanical part.
When Novorossiysk settled in Sevastopol, the command of the Black Sea Fleet gave the order to turn the ship into a full-fledged combat unit as soon as possible. The matter was complicated by the fact that some of the documentation was missing, and there were practically no naval specialists who spoke Italian in the USSR.
In August 1949, Novorossiysk took part in squadron maneuvers as a flagship. However, his participation was rather nominal, since in the three months allotted they did not have time to put the battleship in order (and they could not have time). However, the political situation required demonstrating the success of Soviet sailors in mastering Italian ships. As a result, the squadron went to sea, and NATO intelligence became convinced that the Novorossiysk was floating.
From 1949 to 1955, the battleship underwent factory repairs eight times. It was equipped with 24 twin installations of Soviet 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, new radar stations, radio communications and intra-ship communications. The Italian turbines were also replaced with new ones manufactured at the Kharkov plant. In May 1955, Novorossiysk entered service with the Black Sea Fleet and until the end of October went to sea several times, practicing combat training tasks.
On October 28, 1955, the battleship returned from its last voyage and took place in the Northern Bay on a “battleship barrel” in the area of the Naval Hospital, approximately 110 meters from the shore. The water depth there was 17 meters of water and another 30 meters of viscous silt.
Explosion
At the time of the explosion, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Kukhta, was on vacation. His duties were performed by senior mate captain 2nd rank Khurshudov. According to the staffing table, there were 68 officers, 243 petty officers, and 1,231 sailors on the battleship. After the Novorossiysk docked, part of the crew went on leave. More than one and a half thousand people remained on board: part of the crew and new reinforcements (200 people), cadets of naval schools and soldiers who had arrived on the battleship the day before.
On October 29 at 01:31 Moscow time, a powerful explosion was heard under the hull of the ship on the starboard side in the bow. According to experts, its force was equivalent to the explosion of 1000-1200 kilograms of trinitrotoluene. A hole with an area of more than 150 square meters appeared on the starboard side in the underwater part of the hull, and on the left side and along the keel there was a dent with a deflection arrow of 2 to 3 meters. The total area of damage to the underwater part of the hull was about 340 square meters over an area of 22 meters long. Sea water poured into the hole that formed, and after 3 minutes a trim of 3-4 degrees and a list of 1-2 degrees to starboard appeared.
At 01:40 the incident was reported to the fleet commander. By 02:00, when the list to starboard had reached 1.5 degrees, the head of the operational department of the fleet, Captain 1st Rank Ovcharov, ordered to “tow the ship to a shallow place,” and the approaching tugs turned it stern to the shore.
By this time, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V.A. Parkhomenko, the chief of the fleet staff, Vice Admiral S.E. Chursin, a member of the Military Council, Vice Admiral N.M. Kulakov, and the acting squadron commander, Rear Admiral N, had arrived on the battleship. .I.Nikolsky, chief of squadron staff Rear Admiral A.I.Zubkov, commander of the cruiser division Rear Admiral S.M.Lobov, head of the Fleet Political Directorate Rear Admiral B.T. Kalachev and 28 other senior staff officers.
At 02:32 a list to the left side was detected. By 03:30, about 800 unoccupied sailors lined up on the deck, and rescue ships stood alongside the battleship. Nikolsky offered to transfer sailors to them, but received a categorical refusal from Parkhomenko. At 03:50, the list to port reached 10-12 degrees, while the tugs continued to pull the battleship to the left. After 10 minutes, the list increased to 17 degrees, while the critical level was 20. Nikolsky again asked Parkhomenko and Kulakov for permission to evacuate the sailors not engaged in the fight for survivability and was again refused.
"Novorossiysk" began to tip upside down. Several dozen people managed to get into boats and onto neighboring ships, but hundreds of sailors fell from the deck into the water. Many remained inside the dying battleship. As Admiral Parkhomenko later explained, he “did not consider it possible to order the personnel to abandon the ship in advance, since until the last minutes he hoped that the ship would be saved, and there was no thought that it would die.” This hope cost the lives of hundreds of people who, having fallen into the water, were covered by the hull of the battleship.
By 04:14, "Novorossiysk", which had taken in more than 7 thousand tons of water, tilted to a fatal 20 degrees, swung to the right, just as unexpectedly fell to the left and lay on its side. He remained in this position for several hours, resting his masts on the hard ground. At 22:00 on October 29, the hull completely disappeared under water.
A total of 609 people died in the disaster, including emergency shipments from other ships of the squadron. As a direct result of the explosion and flooding of the bow compartments, between 50 and 100 people were killed. The rest died during the capsizing of the battleship and after it. No timely evacuation of personnel was organized. Most of the sailors remained inside the hull. Some of them were kept in the air cushions of the compartments for a long time, but only nine people were saved: seven came out through a neck cut in the aft part of the bottom five hours after capsizing, and two more were taken out 50 hours later by divers. According to the recollections of divers, the walled up and doomed sailors sang “Varyag”. Only by November 1 did divers stop hearing knocking sounds.
In the summer of 1956, the special-purpose expedition "EON-35" began lifting the battleship using the blowing method. Preparations for the ascent were fully completed by the end of April 1957. General purging began on the morning of May 4 and the ascent was completed on the same day. The ship floated up on its keel on May 4, 1957, and on May 14 it was taken to Cossack Bay, where it was capsized. When the ship was being lifted, the third main caliber turret fell out and had to be raised separately. The ship was dismantled for metal and transferred to the Zaporizhstal plant.
Commission conclusions
To find out the causes of the explosion, a government commission was created headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Minister of Shipbuilding Industry, Colonel General of the Engineering and Technical Service Vyacheslav Malyshev. According to the recollections of everyone who knew him, Malyshev was an engineer of the highest erudition. He knew his job perfectly and read theoretical drawings of any complexity, having an excellent understanding of the issues of unsinkability and stability of ships. Back in 1946, having familiarized himself with the drawings of Giulio Cesare, Malyshev recommended abandoning this acquisition. But he failed to convince Stalin.
The commission gave its conclusion two and a half weeks after the disaster. Strict deadlines were set in Moscow. On November 17, the commission’s conclusion was presented to the CPSU Central Committee, which accepted and approved the conclusions.
The cause of the disaster was called “an external underwater explosion (non-contact, bottom) of a charge with a TNT equivalent of 1000-1200 kg.” The most probable was the explosion of a German magnetic mine left on the ground after the Great Patriotic War.
As for responsibility, the direct culprits for the death of a significant number of people and the battleship Novorossiysk were named as the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Parkhomenko, acting. Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nikolsky and Acting commander of the battleship, captain 2nd rank Khurshudov. The commission noted that Vice Admiral Kulakov, a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, also bears direct responsibility for the disaster with the battleship Novorossiysk and especially for the loss of life.
But despite the harsh conclusions, the matter was limited to the fact that the commander of the battleship Kukhta was demoted in rank and sent to the reserve. Also removed from office and demoted in rank: commander of the water district security division, Rear Admiral Galitsky, acting. squadron commander Nikolsky and member of the Kulakov Military Council. A year and a half later they were restored to their ranks. The fleet commander, Vice Admiral Viktor Parkhomenko, was severely reprimanded, and on December 8, 1955, he was removed from his post. No legal action was taken against him. In 1956, the commander of the USSR Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, was removed from his post.
The commission also noted that “the sailors, foremen and officers, as well as the officers who led the direct fight to save the ship - the acting commander of the warhead-5, Comrade Matusevich, the commander of the survivability division, Comrade Gorodetsky, and the head of the technical department of the fleet, who helped them, Ivanov skillfully and selflessly fought against the water entering the ship, each knew his job well, showed initiative, showed examples of courage and true heroism. But all the efforts of the personnel were devalued and nullified by the criminally frivolous, unqualified and indecisive command.. "
The commission's documents spoke in detail about those who should have, but failed to organize the rescue of the crew and ship. However, none of these documents gave a direct answer to the main question: what caused the disaster?
Version number 1 - mine
The initial versions - the explosion of a gas warehouse or artillery magazines - were swept aside almost immediately. The gasoline storage tanks on the battleship were empty long before the disaster. As for the cellars, if they had exploded, there would have been little left of the battleship at all, and five cruisers standing nearby would also have been blown up into the air. In addition, this version was immediately overturned by the testimony of the sailors, whose place of combat service was the 2nd tower of the main artillery caliber, in the area of which the battleship received a hole. It was definitely established that the 320-mm shells remained intact.
There are still several versions left: a mine explosion, a torpedo attack by a submarine and sabotage. After studying the circumstances, the mine version received the most votes. Which was understandable - mines in the Sevastopol bays were not uncommon since the Civil War. The bays and roadstead were periodically cleared of mines with the help of minesweepers and diving teams. In 1941, during the attack of the German armies on Sevastopol, the German Air Force and Navy mined the water area both from the sea and from the air - they laid several hundred mines of different types and purposes. Some worked during the fighting, others were removed and neutralized after the liberation of Sevastopol in 1944. Later, Sevastopol bays and roadsteads were regularly trawled and inspected by diving teams. The last such comprehensive survey was carried out in 1951-1953. In 1956-1958, after the explosion of the battleship, another 19 German bottom mines were discovered in Sevastopol Bay, including three at a distance of less than 50 meters from the site of the death of the battleship.
The testimony of divers also spoke in favor of the mine version. As the squad leader Kravtsov testified: “The ends of the shell of the hole are bent inward. Due to the nature of the hole, the burrs from the shell, the explosion was from the outside of the ship.”
Version number 2 - torpedo attack
The next version was about the torpedoing of the battleship by an unknown submarine. However, when studying the nature of the damage received by the battleship, the commission did not find characteristic signs corresponding to the torpedo strike. But she discovered something else. At the time of the explosion, the ships of the water area security division, whose duty was to guard the entrance to the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, were in a completely different place. On the night of the disaster, the outer roadstead was not guarded by anyone; the network gates were wide open and the noise direction finders were inactive. Thus, Sevastopol was defenseless. And, theoretically, an alien submarine could easily enter the bay, choose a position and deliver a torpedo strike.
In practice, the boat would hardly have had enough depth for a full-fledged attack. However, the military knew that some Western fleets were already armed with small or dwarf submarines. So, theoretically, a dwarf submarine could penetrate the internal roadstead of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. This assumption, in turn, gave rise to another - were saboteurs involved in the explosion?
Version number 3 - Italian combat swimmers
This version was supported by the fact that before it flew the red flag, Novorossiysk was an Italian ship. And the most formidable underwater special forces during World War II, the “10th Assault Flotilla,” was owned by the Italians, and was commanded by Prince Giunio Valerio Borghese, a staunch anti-communist, who allegedly publicly vowed after the transfer of the battleship to the USSR to take revenge for such a humiliation to Italy.
A graduate of the Royal Naval College, Valerio Borghese had a brilliant career as a submarine officer, facilitated by his noble origin and excellent academic performance. The first submarine under the command of Borghese was part of the Italian Legion, which, as part of Franco's assistance, acted against the Spanish Republican fleet. After this, the prince received a new submarine under his command. Later, Valerio Borghese underwent special training in Germany on the Baltic Sea.
Upon his return to Italy, Borghese received under his command the most modern submarine "Shire". Thanks to the skillful actions of the commander, the submarine returned back to its base unharmed from each combat campaign. The operations of the Italian submariners aroused genuine interest among King Victor Emmanuel, who honored the submariner prince with a personal audience.
After this, Borghese was asked to create the world's first flotilla of submarine saboteurs. Ultra-small submarines, special guided torpedoes, and manned exploding boats were created for it. On December 18, 1941, the Italians secretly entered Alexandria harbor in midget submarines and attached magnetic explosive devices to the bottoms of the British battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth. The death of these ships allowed the Italian fleet to seize the initiative in the fighting in the Mediterranean for a long time. Also, the “10th Assault Flotilla” took part in the siege of Sevastopol, based in the ports of Crimea.
Theoretically, a foreign submarine cruiser could deliver combat swimmers as close as possible to Sevastopol so that they could carry out sabotage. Taking into account the combat potential of first-class Italian scuba divers, pilots of small submarines and guided torpedoes, as well as taking into account the carelessness in guarding the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, the version of underwater saboteurs looks convincing.
Version 4 - English saboteurs
The second unit in the world capable of such sabotage was the 12th Flotilla of the British Navy. It was commanded at that time by Captain 2nd Rank Lionel Crabbe, also a legend. During the Second World War, he led the defense of the British naval base of Gibraltar from Italian combat swimmers and was rightfully considered one of the best underwater saboteurs of the British fleet. Crabb knew many of the Italians from the 10th Flotilla personally. In addition, after the war, captured Italian combat swimmers advised specialists from the 12th flotilla.
The following argument is put forward in favor of this version - that the Soviet command wanted to equip Novorossiysk with nuclear weapons. The USSR had an atomic bomb since 1949, but there were no naval means of using nuclear weapons at that time. The solution could only be naval large-caliber guns, firing heavy projectiles over a long distance. The Italian battleship was ideal for this purpose. Great Britain, being an island, in this case turned out to be the most vulnerable target for the Soviet Navy. If atomic explosive devices were used near the west coast of England, taking into account the wind pattern that blows to the east all year round in those parts, the entire country would be exposed to radiation contamination.
And one more fact - at the end of October 1955, the British Mediterranean squadron conducted maneuvers in the Aegean and Marmara seas.
Version 5 - the work of the KGB
Already in our time, candidate of technical sciences Oleg Sergeev put forward another version. The battleship "Novorossiysk" was blown up by two charges with a total TNT equivalent of within 1800 kg, installed on the ground in the area of the bow artillery magazines, at a small distance from the centerline of the ship and from each other. The explosions occurred with a short time interval, causing a cumulative effect and causing damage, as a result of which the ship sank. The bombing was prepared and carried out by domestic special services with the knowledge of the country's leadership exclusively for internal political purposes. In 1993, the perpetrators of this action became known: a senior lieutenant of special forces and two midshipmen - a support group.
Who was this provocation directed against? According to Sergeev, first of all, against the leadership of the Navy. Nikita Khrushchev answered this question two years after the death of Novorossiysk, at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on October 29, 1957: “We were offered to invest more than 100 billion rubles in the fleet and build old boats and destroyers armed with classical artillery. We fought a great fight. ", they removed Kuznetsov... he turned out to be incapable of thinking, caring about the fleet, about defense. Everything needs to be assessed in a new way. We need to build a fleet, but first of all, build a submarine fleet armed with missiles."
The ten-year shipbuilding plan, which did not reflect in the future the priority of developing the most capital-intensive and profitable naval strategic nuclear forces for the military-industrial complex, objectively could not be supported by the military-political leadership of the country, which decided the fate of the Navy Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Kuznetsov.
The death of the Novorossiysk marked the beginning of a large-scale reduction of the USSR Navy. The obsolete battleships "Sevastopol" and "October Revolution", captured cruisers "Kerch" and "Admiral Makarov", many captured submarines, destroyers and ships of other classes of pre-war construction were used for scrap metal.
Criticism of versions
Critics of the mine version claim that by 1955, the power sources of all bottom mines would inevitably have run out and the fuses would have become completely unusable. Until now, there have not been and are no batteries that can not discharge for ten years or more. It is also noted that the explosion occurred after 8 hours of mooring the battleship, and all German mines had hourly intervals that were multiples of only 6 hours. Before the tragedy, the Novorossiysk (10 times) and the battleship Sevastopol (134 times) moored on barrel No. 3 at different times of the year - and nothing exploded. In addition, it turned out that there were actually two explosions, and such a force that two large deep craters appeared at the bottom, which the explosion of one mine could not leave.
As for the version about the work of saboteurs from Italy or England, in this case a number of questions arise. Firstly, an action of this scale is possible only with the participation of the state. And it would be very difficult to hide preparations for it, given the activity of Soviet intelligence in the Apennine Peninsula and the influence of the Italian Communist Party.
It would be impossible for private individuals to organize such an action - too many resources would be needed to support it, from several tons of explosives to means of transportation (again, let’s not forget about secrecy). This is acceptable in feature films like “Dogs of War,” but in real life it becomes known to the relevant services at the planning stage, as was the case, for example, with the unsuccessful coup in Equatorial Guinea. In addition, as the former Italian combat swimmers themselves admitted, their life after the war was strictly controlled by the state, and any attempt at amateur activity would be suppressed.
In addition, preparations for such an operation had to be kept secret from the allies, primarily from the United States. If the Americans had known about the impending sabotage of the Italian or British Navy, they would certainly have prevented it - if it failed, the United States would not have been able to wash off the accusations of warmongering for a long time. To carry out such an attack against a nuclear-armed country at the height of the Cold War would be madness.
Finally, in order to mine a ship of this class in a guarded harbor, it was necessary to collect complete information about the security regime, parking areas, ships going to sea, and so on. It is impossible to do this without a resident with a radio station in Sevastopol itself or somewhere nearby. All operations of Italian saboteurs during the war were carried out only after thorough reconnaissance and never “blindly”. But even after half a century, there is not a single evidence that in one of the most guarded cities of the USSR, thoroughly filtered by the KGB and counterintelligence, there was an English or Italian resident who regularly supplied information not only to Rome or London, but also to Prince Borghese personally.
Supporters of the Italian version claim that some time after the death of Novorossiysk, a message flashed in the Italian press about awarding orders to a group of Italian Navy officers “for completing a special task.” However, so far no one has published a single photocopy of this message. References to the Italian naval officers themselves, who once told someone about their participation in the sinking of the Novorossiysk, are unsubstantiated. There are a lot of “absolutely reliable” interviews floating around on the Internet with people who allegedly personally led midget submarines to Sevastopol. One problem is that it immediately turns out that these people have either already died or there is still no way to talk to them. And the descriptions of the sabotage attack vary greatly...
Yes, information about the Novorossiysk explosion appeared in the Western press very quickly. But comments from Italian newspapers (with vague hints) are a common journalistic technique when “reliable” evidence emerges after the fact. One should also take into account the fact that the Italians sent their “younger” battleships, received back from NATO allies, to be melted down. And if there had not been a disaster with the Novorossiysk, only Navy historians would have remembered the battleship Giulio Cesare in Italy.
Late rewards
Based on the report of the government commission, the command of the Black Sea Fleet in November 1955 sent proposals to the acting commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, to award orders and medals to all sailors who died along with the battleship. The awards also included 117 people from among those who survived the explosion, sailors from other ships who came to the aid of the Novorossiysk, as well as divers and doctors who distinguished themselves during rescue operations. The required number of awards were delivered to Sevastopol, to the fleet headquarters. But the award ceremony never took place. Only forty years later it turned out that on the presentation there was a note made in the hand of the head of the Navy personnel department at that time: “Admiral Comrade Gorshkov does not consider it possible to come up with such a proposal.”
Only in 1996, after repeated appeals from the ship’s veterans, the Russian government gave appropriate instructions to the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Russian State Maritime Historical and Cultural Center and other departments. The main military prosecutor's office began checking the materials of the investigation conducted in 1955. Classified award lists for the "Novorossiysk" soldiers were kept in the Central Naval Archive all this time. It turned out that 6 sailors were posthumously nominated for the highest award of the USSR - the Order of Lenin, 64 (53 of them posthumously) - for the Order of the Red Banner, 10 (9 posthumously) - for the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degree, 191 ( 143 posthumously) - to the Order of the Red Star, 448 sailors (391 posthumously) - to the medals "For Courage", "For Military Merit", Ushakov and Nakhimov.
Since by that time there was no longer either the state under whose naval flag the Novorossiysk died, or Soviet orders, all the Novorossiysk residents were awarded Orders of Courage.
Afterword
Will the answer to the question of what exactly destroyed Novorossysk ever be finally found? Most likely not anymore. If the raised battleship, along with the specialists who determined the degree of its further suitability, had been properly examined by specialists from the competent authorities and departments, they would have been able to find in the ship’s lower parts certain “traces” of a hitherto unknown “charge”. But the ship was quickly cut into metal, and the case was closed.
The following materials were used when writing this article:
website battleships.spb.ru.
S.V. Suliga. Battleship "Giulio Cesare" ("Novorossiysk").
N.I. Nikolsky, V.N. Nikolsky. “Why did the battleship Novorossiysk die?”
Sergeev O.L. Disaster of the battleship "Novorossiysk". Evidence. Judgments. Data.
Publication of the magazine of the FSB of the Russian Federation "Security Service" No. 3-4, 1996, materials of the investigation into the death of the battleship "Novorossiysk" from the archives of the FSB.
Material from the site: http://flot.com/history/events/novorosdeath.htm
To the begining
A sea eagle soared behind the clouds... The underwater pantheon is vast.
You can’t erect a gravestone here and plant a tree over it...
Rasul Gamzatov (1923-2003), Avar Soviet poet and public figure
It happened on October 29, 1955 at half past one in the morning. All seismic stations in Crimea recorded earth vibrations in the Sevastopol area with cold indifference. It was the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the battleship Novorossiysk, that exploded. After 2 hours 45 minutes it capsized and sank to the bottom. More than 600 people died. “The death of the battleship was and will remain the largest disaster of a warship in peacetime from the beginning of the century to the present day,” wrote B. A. Karzhavin in the book “The Mystery of the Sinking of the Battleship Novorossiysk” (P.6).
For almost half a century, participants in the events, writers, journalists, historians, and private researchers have been arguing, each defending their own version of the tragedy. They boil down mainly to areas: the blowing up of a ship by underwater saboteurs, a mine from the period of the second defense of Sevastopol, mining by the Italians before handing over the battleship to the Soviet side, and a number of others that are not worth remembering (for example, torpedoing an unknown submarine)... Each version has there are reasons. One looks absurd. In the latter case (author - Oleg Sergeev) we are talking about the fact that we did it ourselves (?!).
I can’t help but recall a phrase dropped by Johann Goethe: “They say the truth lies between two opposing opinions. Wrong! There is a problem between them."
Let's touch her.
In December 2010, something happened that made me think.
One of the former commanders of the anti-PDSS detachment, former assistant to the commander of the KChF for anti-underwater sabotage work, a veteran of naval special forces, smiled when I asked about the possible reasons for the death of the battleship. “There is another version,” he said slowly, wrinkling his brow, “it has not been discussed sufficiently by the public. There were three of them, they came from the shore. Two of them arrived in the city, and the third from Sevastopol. But it’s too early to talk about this. The documents are closed." The report of the Government Commission (10/17/1955), which investigated the reasons for the death of the ship, among other things, said: “... it cannot be completely excluded that the cause of the explosion of the battleship was sabotage.”
"The documents are closed." How often do researchers hear this ominous phrase and give up? And the Italians propose to declassify some of the materials of the special services of the period of interest to us only in the 30s of the current century.
Let's risk going back more than half a century. Let's try to take a different look at one of the major tragedies of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, and the entire Soviet Navy. We will do this without claiming exclusivity and without belittling the opinions of other researchers and specialists.
So - sabotage.
We know by what forces this was done, but we don’t know how it happened practically, and whether it was Italians. In order to come closer to understanding the process of the operation, let us turn to the history of the 10th MAS flotilla, commanded by the “black prince” Vitolio Borghese. His men trained in mining the battleship when it was still flying the Italian flag and was called "Giulio Cesare" ("Great Caesar"). A photograph has been preserved in which the pilots of human-controlled torpedoes are near the side of the ship. It is known that Borghese allegedly said (interpretation) that the battleship would not live under the Soviet flag. But words are not always deeds, and we will return to this remark below. Let us turn to the history of the elite unit of underwater saboteurs in Italy during the Second World War (1939-1945).
The Italians are at the origins of the professional use of underwater saboteurs in naval affairs. This happened during the First World War (Great, Second Patriotic War) (1914-1918). However, during the last war between Russia and Turkey (1877-1878), a Russian officer tried to swim to an enemy ship and blow it up with a mine.
During the conflict on the Danube, a powerful Turkish flotilla operated, consisting of 8 armored artillery monitors, 5 gunboats, 11 armed steamers and a number of ships of other classes. The Russians had at their disposal only 14 steam boats and 20 rowing ships. The forces are not equal, especially if we take into account the threat from the sea from the armored squadron of Gobart Pasha. In this situation, Lieutenant Mikhail Fedorovich Nikonov put forward the idea of using a swimming projectile invented by the Englishman Boyton for reconnaissance and blowing up enemy ships using a hand mine. Soon, for this purpose, he gathered about 15 like-minded people. The navy called them “hunter swimmers.”
The main task assigned to them is reconnaissance. But M.F. Nikonov decided to blow up the Turkish ship with a mine. Using a "swimming projectile" and attaching a hand mine to it, he went in search of the enemy. Nikonov managed to swim close to the shore occupied by the Turks and set a target near the city of Tulchi. It was an armored monitor. Having prepared the mine, Nikonov swam to the ship, but made a miscalculation in determining the distance of probable drift by the current. The latter turned out to be strong. Two tens of meters was not enough for the officer to reach his goal. It was carried away by the current several kilometers downstream. There he got out to the island, where he spent the rest of the night and the next day.
With the onset of darkness, Nikonov returned to the unit's location.
In 1918, engineer captain 3rd rank Raffaele Rossetti and medical lieutenant Raffaele Paolucci designed a human-controlled torpedo. It was managed by one person. To manufacture the product, a German 510 mm body was used. torpedoes (length - 8.2 m, displacement - 1.5 tons). The wearer could only move in a semi-submerged state. Its speed was no more than 2 knots, which was provided by a 40 hp engine. p., driven by compressed air. The explosive charge consisted of two cartridges weighing 170 kg each and was equipped with a clock mechanism with a time delay of up to 5 hours. The torpedo was equipped with powerful magnets for attaching ammunition to the ship's hull. Based on this feature of the torpedo, the authors named it “Minyatta” (“Leech”).
On October 31, 1918, R. Rossetti and R. Paolucci first used the carrier. With his help, they penetrated the Austrian naval base of Pola. In the morning, one charge was placed under the bottom of the battleship Viribus Unitis. The clock mechanism was set to operate for 1 hour. “The second charge with a time delay of the clock mechanism was left on the torpedo, which R. Paolucci set adrift with the current. “Mignatta” was carried towards the parking lot of the auxiliary cruiser “Vin” (7400 tons), which was seriously damaged after the explosion of the second ammunition...”
6:45 am. A powerful explosion under the hull of the battleship Viribus Unitis signed his death sentence. This is how the submarine war began...
Before the start of the Second World Conflict, the carrier was modified. By the mid-30s of the 20th century, engineers Sub-Lieutenant Teseo Tesei and Sub-Lieutenant Elio Toschi produced a modernized version of the Miniatta. It was called SLC (low-speed torpedo) or "Maiale" ("Little Pig").
With a maximum speed of about 5.5 km/h, the carrier allowed the transfer of two saboteur swimmers (pilots) to a distance of up to 19 km. The product could operate submerged up to 30 meters. Its autonomy (based on the supply of breathing gas in pilots' closed-circuit apparatus) was approximately 6 hours. During modernization, the weight of explosives was increased from 250 to 300 kg. The clock mechanism had a delay of up to 5 hours.
Thus, Italy is the only country among the participants in the global conflict that entered it with a new type of sabotage weapon with proven tactics of use. The Italians will have time to prepare personnel. In 1936, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Gonzago di Cirello, pilot training began for the new man-controlled torpedo "Maiale". These were brave, selfless, young and desperate people. They knew that the probability of survival in the whirlwind of future underwater death was unlikely to exceed 30%. But they were ready for this in the name of beloved Italy.
To deliver carriers and saboteur pilots to the place of operation, the following submarines were converted: “Iride”, “Ambra” - type “Perla”, “Gondar”, “Shire” - type “Adua”, “Grongo”, “Murena” - type “ Flutto." After the outbreak of war, coordination of actions and provision of underwater saboteurs was entrusted to a special flotilla of assault weapons - the 10th Flotilla MAS (created in 1938). It was armed with midget submarines, human-controlled torpedoes, and exploding boats. The first commander of the flotilla was Captain 2nd Rank V. Mokkagatta.
“A very capable and knowledgeable officer, persistent in achieving his goals,” wrote V. Borghese in the book “10th Flotilla MAS” (P.21). “Before that, he served mainly on large ships, and he lacked special technical knowledge in the field of new weapons. However, thanks to his inexhaustible energy and exceptional performance, he quickly got into the swing of things. An excellent organizer, he developed an organizational structure that would transform the assault force into a highly effective naval unit engaged in the research, development and use of weapons capable of “hitting the enemy wherever he is.”
After the death of V. Moccagatta, the unit was headed by Prince V. Borghese. He later stated: “Having a guided torpedo and an exploding boat, the Italian fleet, and it alone, possesses means that, if suddenly and massively used simultaneously in various ports, could bring Italy a very tangible victory at the very beginning of hostilities. This victory would equalize the potential capabilities of the opposing fleets..."
However, the coming clashes will bring significant losses to the Italian side. The British captured a sample of an Italian man-controlled torpedo. In 1941, representatives of Foggy Albion formed a unit to combat enemy underwater saboteurs. It was led by Lieutenants Bailey and Crabbe. But since 1941, the most successful actions were the actions of the Italian MTM exploding boat flotilla.
On July 25, 1941, a disaster occurred. The second creator of the human-controlled torpedo, Major T. Thesei, and almost the entire command of the 10th MAS flotilla died. After this, the Italians concentrated their main attention on the use of human-controlled torpedoes and exploding MTM boats. They went into battle, suffering losses, but... The following are lost or “heavily” damaged in a short time: the Norwegian tanker Pericles (8,324 tons displacement), the armed motor ship Durham (10,900 tons), the squadron tanker Denbydale, the tanker Fiona Shell (2,444 tons), the destroyer "Jervis."
A significant victory for the Italians was the destruction of English battleships. The end of 1941 will be a triumph for the men of the 10th MAC Flotilla (December 19). “Almost simultaneously at about 6.20 am two explosions were heard. Valiant will lose 167 sq. m. of the bow of the lower boules and will receive other serious damage (only in July 1942 will the repair of the ship be completed). The condition of another battleship, Queen Elizabeth, would be even worse. A huge explosion ripped out 502 square meters from him. m of double bottom, and the ship will sink heavily to the bottom (repairs will end in July 1943). Against the backdrop of this “catastrophe,” as the English Admiral Cunnigham will call the tragedy that occurred, the death of the tanker Sagona (7554 tons), mined and blown up on the same day by the crew of the third “Mayale” (captain V. Martelotta, non-commissioned officer M. Marino), as well as the incidental damage from the explosion of the destroyer Jervis, were no longer perceived so acutely... Of the three battleships blown up by underwater saboteurs during the military conflict, two were on the Italians’ account.”
And they improvise. In the Spanish port of Algeciras (opposite Gibraltar), on the Italian ship “0lterra”, the Italians created a secret base of human-controlled torpedoes and underwater saboteurs “Gamma Group”. “Under the guise of a major overhaul, part of the ship’s hold compartments were converted for the hidden exit and entry of carriers in a submerged position.” At the same time, 12 underwater saboteurs of the Gamma group acted independently, but in accordance with the general direction of operations.
Let's make a useful digression.
The special unit of underwater saboteurs “Gamma” was created by V. Borghese at the end of 1941. It was intended for joint operations with the crews of the Mayale man-controlled torpedoes. The saboteurs were armed with light diving equipment that allowed them to operate under water for about an hour. For the unit, small charges weighing 2-3 kg were developed, attached to the fighter’s belt in the amount of 4-5 pieces. They were called "Bugs". The ammunition was installed to the ship's hull using vacuum suction cups. A portable “Shell” charge weighing about 4.5 kg has been developed. It had a more reliable magnetic attachment device to the bottom of a ship or vessel.
The year 1942 brought a number of serious troubles for the flotilla. But on December 10, 1942, the Italians attacked Allied ships at the anchorage in the Algeria roadstead. Four ships with a total displacement of 22,300 tons were destroyed. From September 1942 to August 1943, the underwater saboteurs of the Gamma group and the crews of the Mayale man-guided torpedoes managed to sink or damage 11 transport ships and Allied ships with a total displacement of 54,200 tons!
But all this happened outside the Black Sea theater of operations in World War II.
Since the summer of 1942, a separate group of the 10th MAS flotilla operated on the Crimean Peninsula against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. They settled in the area of Cape Foros (not far from the modern government dacha “Zarya”). The unit's deployment area made it possible to optimally use assault boats on the communications of the Black Sea Fleet. Note that the Gamma sabotage group did not operate in Crimea, recalling the once popular feature film “They were known only by sight.”
To strike at Black Sea ships, they chose mainly night time. It was assumed that at this time of day up to 3 boats would go to sea. They will be able to sink several ships on the Sevastopol communications.
With the help of the Germans, a temporary base was equipped with devices for launching and raising boats, and anti-aircraft guns were installed in its vicinity. On May 19, 1943, an Italian special unit arrived from La Spezia in Simferopol. We reached the location by car. The unit was organizationally part of the “Moccagatta Column”, and the operational control of the Italian naval forces in the Black Sea was carried out by Captain 2nd Rank Mimbelli.”
The operations of Italian midget submarines (SMPL) in the Black Sea (6 SV type SMPL (side number 6) will be successful).
On January 14, 1942, Italian Admiral Ricciardi signed an agreement with Berlin, according to which, from the spring of 1942, the country’s “light national naval forces” would be involved in assisting the German Navy in combat operations against the Soviet fleet on Ladoga and the Black Sea. It was planned to send 4 MAS torpedo boats under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Bianchini to Ladoga. On the Black Sea it was planned to deploy 10 MAS boats, 5 MTVM torpedo boats and 5 MTM assault (exploding) boats of the mosquito fleet. The Germans spoke with delight about the actions of the latter. On the Sevastopol communications of the MTM: “... did not limit their tasks to attacks on enemy ships,” but also “collaborated widely with the coastal flank of the German army. These ships fired machine guns at Soviet troops and their fortifications on the coast, landed demolition teams, and fought with Soviet boats many times. Their actions received the highest praise from the Germans” (see MILITARY Crimea, No. 2.2005).
Italian SMPLs on railway platforms during the period 25.04. - 05/02/1942 were transported from La Spezia to Constanta (Romania). Within a month they were put into combat service. The boats were transferred under their own power to Crimea and were based in the port of Yalta. The first group of Italian SV-type SMPLs arrived in the city from Constanta on 06/05/1942 (SV-1 - Lieutenant-Commander Lezen d Asten, SV-2 - Lieutenant Russo, SV-3 - Lieutenant Sorrentino). On June 11, the second group of boats arrived in Yalta (SV-4 - Lieutenant Commander Suriano, SV-5 - Lieutenant Commander Faroroli, SV-6 - Lieutenant Galliano).
The boats took an active part in hostilities against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet on the approaches to Sevastopol and, according to Italian data, sank the submarines S-32 and Shch-203 (V-bis, built in 1935, commander captain 3rd rank V.I. Nemchinov) . The Italians themselves lost only one submarine, and not during combat operations (S-5). She was sunk in the Yalta port by Kochiev's torpedo boats. By the way, SMPL was qualified by boatmen as a small-tonnage barge.
On 10/09/1942, the Italian 4th flotilla, which included all SMPLs and boats on the Black Sea under the command of Captain 1st Rank Mimbelli, received an order to relocate to the Caspian Sea. On 09/01/1942, the Italians left the base at Cape Foros and moved to Yalta. On September 22, they left the city and arrived in Mariupol on their own. Makhachkala was chosen as the main location for the Italian unit. But the defeat of the German troops at Stalingrad will make the implementation of this order meaningless. On January 02, 1943, by order of Admiral Bartholdi, all Italian ships were recalled from the Black Sea theater of military operations. In March 1943, having overcome considerable difficulties, the “Moccagatta Column”, commanded by Romano, arrived in La Spezia. On 09/09/1943, all SV-type SMPLs that had ended up in Constanta by that time were transferred to the Romanian Navy.
We specifically dwelled in relatively detail on the actions of the Italian special forces MAS, so that the reader could form his own opinion about its capabilities.
The capitulation of Italy (09/03/1943) stopped the practical actions of the flotilla. However, the experience of its combat use, mechanisms for developing operations, and developments in the field of technical support have already been introduced into the training of special forces of the navies of Germany, England, and the USA. According to the laws of war, this was done quickly, without regard to the inevitably huge costs. The Italians were in Sevastopol.
In July 1942, they took part in a “very difficult” battle for the 35th battery and wrote that they would not soon forget it.
The boats were given the task of blocking the exits from the battery casemates towards the sea. For this purpose, four units were included in the case (they lasted 14 hours and 10 minutes at sea).
In addition, the Italians had to land on shore and enter the underground casemates of the battery.
The commander of the 10th flotilla MAS, Prince Vitolio Borghese, wrote: “the fort... after the fall of Sevastopol remained the last center of Russian resistance. Built on a high cliff, it consisted of a system of trenches and galleries cut into the rocks, some of them with access to the sea. Our patrol and torpedo boats received orders to take part in the assault, that is, to block the exits from the fort. Four of our boats went out to sea, the crews of which were armed with machine guns and hand grenades. A small group of... sailors entered the galleries from the sea. The noise they made, machine gun fire and grenade explosions misled the defenders, who were taken by surprise, about the number of attackers, which helped the Germans break the stubborn enemy defenses.”
As a result of the assault, about 80 prisoners of war were captured. These were the last defenders of the 35th battery. Exhausted, hungry, all wounded, poisoned by poisonous gases, they could no longer offer serious resistance to the enemy.
On July 6, 1942, the Italians visited Sevastopol. He made a huge impression on them. “The city was completely destroyed,” recalled one of the sailors. “A sunken cruiser and a destroyer were visible in the port: workshops, shipyards - everything was destroyed. The corpses floated in the water. In the courtyards of the houses, the wounded townspeople, abandoned by everyone, lay on the ground and silently awaited death. Not a single cry, not a single groan; the living lay among the dead, whom no one removed. Everywhere there is only dust, heat, flies, corpses, corpses and more corpses. On the streets, passers-by stepped over the dead...”
A photograph has been preserved where several SV-type SMPLs are moored near the Sevastopol pier.
War is over. The difficult 50s came, the Cold War was gaining momentum.
The development of torpedo-shaped underwater carriers continued. The Italians were again among the first to propose new solutions in the development of a proven type of underwater weapon. Their specialists created the Sea Horst (Ippocampo) or Seahorse transporter. In September 1955, tests of a new carrier took place in the Los Angeles area (USA). Let us remind you: in October 1955, Novorossiysk was lost.
Externally, the carrier had a torpedo-shaped body 2 meters long, which housed two swimmer-pilots. The total mass of the product was 1145 kg. A special feature of the design was that a gasoline engine was used as a power plant, operating according to the RDP scheme (i.e., with air supplied from the surface of the water through a flexible hose). During testing, Sea Horst traveled 21 miles underwater at a speed of 6 knots, diving to depths of 3 to 45 meters. According to the Sun newspaper (09/30/1955), the carrier’s autonomy in terms of range was 37 miles. This was a serious application regarding promising directions for the development of underwater transportation means for underwater saboteurs. But we remind you that its tests took place only in September 1955. In such a short period of time, entrust an operation that could cause an international scandal to an unfinished technical means. dangerous, but not impossible... Could the first CX models have been used in the attack on Novorossiysk? Knowing the state of the project - no.
Now there is another circumstance.
Let us remember “Olterra” and the desire of Italian saboteurs to leave “bookmarks” when leaving the naval base of a future potential enemy. Could this have happened in 1944?
It is known that in 1947 Italy was deprived of the right to have assault weapons in the Navy. The 10th MAS flotilla was disbanded. But the Italians participated in the training of German, English and Israeli underwater saboteurs. Soon, in Italy itself, despite the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1947, a specialized unit was recreated. It was located in the city of Varignano, and was commanded by Captain 1st Rank Birindelli, who had rich combat experience. During the reorganization process, the special unit had different names (modern “Comcubin”).
The death of the Novorossiysk is often associated with the iconic phrase of Valerio Borghese that the battleship will not sail under the Soviet flag. In 1955, there were underwater saboteurs left in Italy who could carry out this task. But if they came from the shore, then it would not have been real without the help of the agents mothballed in Sevastopol, left by the Germans. After the liberation of the city in May 1944, Smersh actively identified it.
B. A. Karzhavin in the book “The Mystery of the Death of the Battleship Novorossiysk” made a reservation that in the autumn of 1955 there was a suspicious influx of Italian tourists to Yalta. Why not before, why not after? These actions are a convenient cover for illegal agents to enter the country. There were two of them, two smiling Italians, who walked down the ramp of a cruise ship in the Yalta port. But they were not interested in the sights of Crimea. It was necessary to quickly penetrate Sevastopol and meet with someone who would help them solve the problem of destroying the battleship. Note that MAB was part of the 10th flotilla. Russian nobleman, one of the most experienced underwater saboteurs - Eugenio Volk. After the capitulation of Italy, he will train the British. And the wife of the commander of the 10th flotilla of the MAS V. Borghese was a Russian noblewoman, Countess Daria Vasilievna Olsufieva. This indicates a high probability of their connection with the Russian diaspora, which dreamed of overthrowing the Soviets at any cost.
Let us turn again to Boris Aleksandrovich Korzhavin. He wrote: “It was in Algeria at the end of 1964. We fulfilled our duty to train officers and midshipmen of the Algerian Navy on torpedo boats of the “183rd” project. When talking with an Algerian officer, I don’t remember his last name, he said that in Algeria several officers from Italy are training Algerian submariners and saboteurs, and one of them participated in the explosion of the battleship Novorossiysk (P.237).
According to the source, indeed, two Italian officers were awarded high awards shortly after the death of the battleship. Who are these people?
The fate of the traitor is also unknown.
Now the main thing.
They could have used the “bookmark” left before the Germans left Sevastopol. Therefore, the Italians or someone else arrived in the USSR “clean”. It is useful to remember that during the occupation of Sevastopol, the Germans with a “ruler” climbed the docks in the Admiralty (Aleksandrovsky and Alekseevsky), the largest in the theater. They carefully studied the 35th and 30th batteries and drew up their detailed diagrams. It’s hard to believe that the same was not done with the city’s coastline. It is especially important for sabotage work. It is curious, but after the death of the battleship, an order was received from Moscow to inspect all the grottoes and niches in the vicinity of the naval base. This was done by the combat swimmers of the fight against the PDSS of the Black Sea Fleet, and then the KChF. A similar operation was performed more than once (in Soviet times). The author has no information that “stashes” of special equipment or their traces were discovered. According to official information, they were not found.
And if we are talking about external sabotage, then ammunition of such power was delivered to the battleship using a carrier. It is impossible to do this on your hands.
For more than half a century after the tragedy in Sevastopol Bay, other versions of the death of the battleship have been put forward. For example, “... in the area of the explosion, as we remember, a “torn part of a barge with a winch 8-9 meters long, 4 meters wide, protruding from the ground by 2.5-4 meters” was discovered, i.e. to the bottom of the battleship . It was quite possible to place V.V. charges on the barge, with a total mass of 2-2.5 tons or more” (see http://flot.com).
No, that's not it. At the bottom of the Sevastopol Bay there is so much that lies after two defenses and the Civil War. Eyewitnesses testify that “some boats” were seen along the side of the battleship that fateful night. But this is normal. The fleet lives around the clock with the abstract concept of “weekends.” Longboats and boats constantly move around the bay, carrying personnel and cargo.
And there is no answer here.
One can hardly agree with the tempting version of sea captain Mikhail Lander from Odessa. He said that he allegedly met in Italy with a participant in the sabotage. “Then he showed me a photograph of eight submariners, where in the center he and the leader of the group, a famous Italian submarine specialist. He told me everything in such detail and drew it that it was impossible to doubt his veracity. When I asked why he was telling me, he replied that he was the only one still alive from this company and was bound by a vow of silence. And since he already has one foot “there,” I can write about it.”
He said: the carriers were delivered to the territorial waters of the USSR by a mother ship. After leaving it, the Italians settled in Kruglaya (Omega) Bay, creating a “base” there. From there, the saboteurs made two trips on carriers to the battleship, delivering the deadly cargo. Then they went out to sea, waited for the ship for a day and were evacuated. Verbatim.
“The performers are eight combat swimmers, each of them has a combat sabotage school on the Black Sea behind them. On October 21, 1955, at night, an ordinary cargo ship left an Italian port and headed to the Black Sea to one of the Dnieper ports for loading wheat (there was no such ship, it was confirmed documents. - A. Ch.). The course and speed were calculated so as to pass the traverse of the Khersones lighthouse at midnight on October 26, 15 miles away. Having arrived at the given point, the steamer released a mini-submarine from a special cutout in the bottom and went on its own course. “Picollo” (? - A. Ch.) went to the Omega Bay area, where they set up an underwater base (at that level - how is that? - A. Ch.) - they unloaded breathing cylinders (the saboteurs used devices with a closed breathing cycle. - A . Ch.), explosives, hydrotugs, etc. In the dark we went back to the sea, waiting for a signal. Finally we received the signal and returned to Omega Bay in exactly the right place. We changed into spacesuits (?, diving suits or wetsuits. - A. Ch.) and, having grabbed everything we needed, with the help of hydrotugs (?. - A. Ch.) sailed to the object. Visibility was terrible, they worked almost by touch. We returned to Omega twice for explosives in magnetic cylinders. When the sun set, everyone finished, sailed to Omega and quickly made their way to the Picollo. In our haste we forgot our bag with tools and a spare hydrotug propeller. In the dark we went out to sea, waited for our ship for two days, dived under the womb, slammed the bottom shut, and pumped out the water. Three long-awaited blows on the wheelhouse announced that the hatch could be opened.
All. The operation is completed. Ambition satisfied. This was according to an eyewitness” (The World Odessit Club, Odessa, Ukraine, 10.10).
I was forced to study the state of the coastline of the bay at that time and the depth data. According to contemporaries (survey), it turned out that there was a beach on the shore of this very shallow Sevastopol harbor. Sevastopol residents came to see it in buses and boats. To the west of the bay there was a guarded Dacha of the fleet commander. There was a rest house nearby. There was a pier on the shore for boats that traveled from Sevastopol Bay with vacationers. Nearby there was a guarded air defense facility (at one time it was armed with anti-aircraft artillery systems). Since the beginning of the 20th century, a seaplane aviation unit (currently an aircraft repair plant) has been based on the eastern shore. Finally, the border zone.
Could a group of saboteurs with carriers be in a given place (base) undetected for 2 days? In a bay where, according to the nautical map, the depth is 15 meters only at the entrance. In a bay where the overwhelming water area has its values of 2-5, and a small part - 8 meters, and even with SMPL, the name of which could not be found anywhere (judging by the source). Hardly.
And in general, there are a number of details in the text (see along the way) that indicate that the person who wrote it is not well acquainted with the terminology of diving. But the source of “information” to which the author is appealing could not have known this.
And the last one from the “Italian version”. Here are the words of former saboteurs of the 10th MAS flotilla. In the book “The Damned Secret” these interviews were published by A. N. Norchenko.
Article from the almanac “Maritime Archives”, No. 3 (4), 2012
Chairman of the Editorial Council Markov A.G.
Editor-in-Chief Maslov N.K.
L. Ferrari. He served as an underwater saboteur in the Gamma Squad. Participant in combat operations, holder of the Great Gold Medal “for military valor”.
E. Legnani. He began his service in the navy on the crew of the battleship Giulio Cesare, so he knew him well. In the 10th MAS flotilla - on attack boats. During the war he was in Crimea and Sevastopol. Since 1949 - commander of a detachment of ships.
E. Marcolini. Underwater saboteur of the 10th flotilla MAS. Awarded the Large Gold Medal “for military valor” based on the results of the operation against the British aircraft carrier Aquila.
The question about the lifespan of an airplane, ship or car, of course, does not have an exact answer. Some people have been driving their beloved Buick Roadmaster for three decades, others change cars every four years. This is a story about a warship with a complicated history, its two lives and its unexpected death.
Almost 60 years ago, on October 29, 1955, a disaster occurred, ending the long and difficult journey of one of the most famous ships in history. In the Northern Bay of Sevastopol, the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare (Julius Caesar) sank due to an explosion, which, however, by the time of its death had long since become the flagship of the Black Sea squadron of the Soviet Navy and was sailing under the new name Novorossiysk. More than six hundred sailors died. For a long time, the details of these events were not disclosed, versions of the tragedy were kept secret - not at all surprising, because the extremely strange events in the Sevastopol Bay led to reshuffles in the command of the USSR Navy.
"Giulio Cesare"
The battleship Novorossiysk was forty-four years old at the time of the disaster - a very respectable age for a warship. For most of his life he was known as "Giulio Cesare" - and for a long time sailed under the flag of the Italian Navy.
Dreadnought "Giulio Cesare" on the slipway, 1911.
The history of the Julius Caesar began on June 27, 1909, when Italy decided to modernize its battle fleet and approved a large-scale project to build three cruisers, twelve submarines, as well as a dozen destroyers, thirty-four destroyers and, finally, three dreadnought battleships according to the 1908 project of the year. So in 1910, the future “Leonardo da Vinci”, “Conte di Cavour” and “Giulio Cesare”, which was originally intended as the flagship, were laid down in Genoa.
The British loved to joke about the Italian fleet, saying that the Italians were much better at building ships than they were at fighting on them. Jokes aside, Italy seriously counted on its new battleships in the coming European conflict, and by the beginning of the First World War, Giulio Cesare was located at the main naval base of Taranto, constantly conducting exercises and firing. The doctrine of linear artillery combat meant that battleships should engage only with enemy battleships, and the most serious artillery training of the crew was carried out. In 1916, the ship was transferred to the shores of Corfu, in December 1917 - to the southern part of the Adriatic, and by the end of the war she returned to Taranto. The entire experience of "Caesar" during the First World War consisted of 31 hours on combat missions and 387 hours on exercises, without a single collision with the enemy.
Launching in Genoa, Ansaldo shipyard. October 15, 1911.
Source: Aizenberg B. A., Kostrichenko V. V., Talamanov P. N. “Epitaph to a great dream.” Kharkov, 2007
During the interwar period, Giulio Cesare, remaining the pride of the Italian fleet, was actively improved and refined. In 1922, the foremast was changed, in 1925, the fire control system was changed, and a catapult for seaplanes was installed. The ship underwent the greatest transformations in the 30s during a major overhaul - at that time it was already more than twenty years old! The battleship's displacement reached 24,000 tons, and its maximum speed was 22 knots. The initial armament included 13 305 mm guns, 18 120 mm guns, 13 76 mm guns, three torpedo tubes, anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns; as a result of modernization, the main caliber was drilled to 320 mm.
The Italian battleship fought its first serious battle after the start of World War II. On July 6, 1940, off Cape Punta Stilo, the Cesare entered into a firefight with the flagship of the British squadron, the battleship Warspite, but, unfortunately, could not show its best side: it was hit (most historians agree that it was accidental) 381 -mm shell caused a fire on the Cesare, killing 115 crew members, destroying the light guns and damaging four boilers. The ship had to retreat.
"Giulio Cesare" in 1917
In November 1940, British aircraft attacked Italian battleships in the harbor of Taranto, as a result of which the Cesare was transferred first to Naples, then to Sicily. The battleship had its second serious battle with an English convoy to Malta on November 27. The ships of the opposing sides received minor damage, the Italians retreated as enemy aircraft approached. In 1941, the Cesare was again unlucky: the ship was damaged by another British air raid and was sent for lengthy repairs. By 1942, it became clear that the 30-year-old ship was hopelessly outdated. Due to design flaws, it could have died from one torpedo hit, and was also unable to seriously resist enemy aircraft.
Until the end of hostilities, the battleship remained in the harbor, serving as a floating barracks.
"Giulio Cesare" in the battle of Punta Stilo. Photo taken from the battleship Conte di Cavour
"Novorossiysk"
Italy surrendered in 1943. According to the terms of the Allies, the Italian fleet was to be divided among the victorious countries. The USSR laid claim to new battleships, since only the pre-revolutionary dreadnoughts “Sevastopol” and “October Revolution” remained of the battleships in the Soviet Navy, but in the conditions of the brewing Cold War, neither the United States nor Britain sought to strengthen the fleet of a potential enemy, and instead of a battleship of the “ Littorio" built in the second half of the 30s of the USSR, only the old "Giulio Cesare" was transferred. Considering the age of the ship, the Soviet command decided to use it for crew training. As for the newer Italian battleships, they were returned to Italy as part of the NATO partnership.
On December 9, 1948, the former pride of the Italian fleet, the battleship Giulio Cesare left Taranto and 6 days later arrived at the Albanian port of Vlora. In February 1949, it was handed over to a Soviet commission under the command of Rear Admiral Levchenko. On February 26, the battleship moored in Sevastopol, and by order of March 5, 1949, it was renamed Novorossiysk. A new life for “Giulio Cesare” has begun.
Taranto, 1948. One of the last photographs of the battleship flying the Italian flag.
Source: Aizenberg B. A., Kostrichenko V. V., Talamanov P. N. “Epitaph to a great dream.” Kharkov, 2007
As the researchers note, the ship was received in extremely disrepair. Pipelines, fittings, service mechanisms, that is, everything that had not undergone a major overhaul in the 1930s, required serious repairs or replacement. Before handing over the ship, the Italians only repaired the electrical system so that the ship would at least reach its new home port. At the same time, the restoration of the Novorossiysk in Sevastopol was complicated by the fact that in the USSR there were practically no specialists who spoke Italian, in which all the documentation on the ship was compiled. Moreover, the technical documents were not provided in full, which further complicated the repair work.
Despite the difficulties with operating the ship, already in August 1949, Novorossiysk took part in squadron maneuvers as a flagship. It had not yet become a full-fledged combat unit, and was far from complete restoration, but the Soviet command wanted to demonstrate success in mastering the Italian ship. NATO intelligence was convinced that Novorossiysk entered service with the USSR Black Sea Fleet, and this was already a sufficient result.
Battleship "Novorossiysk" in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol, 1949
The battleship spent the next six years undergoing constant repairs. During this time, 24 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, new radar stations, communications equipment were installed on it, and Italian turbines were replaced. However, the operation of the ship was complicated by extremely uncomfortable conditions for the crew, constant breakdowns and worn-out systems.
October disaster
On October 28, 1955, the ship returned to the harbor and took place in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol, approximately 110 meters from the shore. The depth was 17 meters, plus about 30 meters of viscous silt.
The tragedy occurred a day later. There were more than one and a half thousand people on board the Novorossiysk: part of the crew (who were not on leave), new recruits, cadets and soldiers. A minute-by-minute reconstruction of what happened was subsequently created based on the testimony of surviving eyewitnesses.
On October 29 at 01:31 Moscow time, a powerful explosion occurred under the hull of the ship on the starboard side in the bow. A hole with an area of more than 150 square meters was formed in the underwater part of the hull, and a dent of more than two meters was formed on the left side and along the keel. The total area of damage to the underwater part was approximately 340 square meters in an area of 22 meters. Water immediately poured into the hole, causing a list to starboard.
At 01:40 the fleet commander was informed about the explosion, and at 02:00 the order was given to tow the ship aground. 02:32 – a strong list to the left side was recorded, by 03:30 unoccupied sailors lined up on the deck, rescue ships stood alongside the battleship, but the evacuation did not begin. As Admiral Parkhomenko later explained, he “did not consider it possible to order the personnel to abandon the ship in advance, since until the last minutes he hoped that the ship would be saved, and there was no thought that it would die.” The Novorossiysk began to capsize, the sailors escaped on boats, or simply jumped into the water, many remained inside the battleship.
By 04:14, the ship lay on the port side, and by 22:00 on October 29, it completely disappeared under water. Within a few hours, 609 people died: from the explosion, covered by the ship’s hull in the water, in flooded compartments. According to the recollections of divers, only by November 1, the walled up and doomed sailors stopped giving signals.
In May 1957, the ship was raised, taken to Cossack Bay, studied and dismantled for metal.
Not everything is so clear
To determine the causes of the explosion, a special government commission was created, headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Vyacheslav Malyshev. Contemporaries spoke of him as an engineer of the highest erudition, a highly qualified specialist in shipbuilding, who, characteristically, back in 1946 recommended against purchasing the Giulio Cesare. In accordance with the strict deadlines assigned, the commission issued its conclusion in two and a half weeks. The official version was that the explosion was caused by a German magnetic mine left over from World War II, with a force charge of 1000–1200 kg of TNT. The direct culprits of the deaths were declared to be Parkhomenko, acting. battleship commander Captain Khurshudov and member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Kulakov.
By the morning of November 13, the American squadron, having lost half of its ships and both admirals, left the Guadalcanal area. The Japanese squadron retreated to the north and prepared to carry out its main task - shelling the Henderson Field airfield. However, Admiral Abe's flagship, the battleship Hiei, was seriously damaged in a battle with American ships and was now slowly retreating north.
At dawn on November 13, the battleship Hiei with Admiral Abe on board was north of Savo Island. Only the light cruiser Nagara remained with him. The remaining Japanese ships, led by the battleship Kirishima, managed to move even further north.
Light cruiser Nagara.
tokkoro.com
Night shooting was carried out at extremely short distances in 15-20 cabs, and the Hiei was hit by more than 130 American shells with a caliber of 127 mm or more - including three dozen 203 mm from heavy cruisers. None of the shells managed to penetrate the armored citadel of the battleship, and only one 203-mm shell penetrated the 76-mm belt in the stern. But this hit turned out to be extremely successful, causing flooding of the tiller compartment and disabling the electric steering motors. As a result, control of the rudders was restored only using a manual drive.
Some sources claim that the battleship's rudder was jammed in the starboard position, and it was possible to steer the ship with difficulty and exclusively by machines. This is refuted by the Japanese scheme for maneuvering the battleship, which described large arcs to the right and to the left. In any case, the ship did not stay on course well and greatly reduced speed. The reasons for the decrease in speed are not entirely clear, since there is no evidence of damage to the power plant in a night battle; This may have been due to a general disruption of the ship's control systems, as well as the injury of most of the senior officers.
Battleship Hiei in 1940.
S. Breyer. Schlachtschiffe und Schlahtkreuzer 1905-1970. Munchen, 1993
A hail of small and medium caliber shells caused enormous damage to superstructures and fire control systems. Due to damage to electrical equipment, the main caliber turrets were immobilized for some time. The directors of the main caliber were smashed, the ship's radio station was out of order, and the bow tower-like superstructure of the battleship was engulfed in flames, so the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Nishida, was forced to move his control center to the third tower.
Theoretically, none of these damages threatened the survivability of the battleship; it also retained its combat effectiveness - the second and third towers had individual 8-m rangefinders and could control the fire of other towers. This was confirmed by an incident at dawn, when at about 6 a.m. American ships were discovered in the southeastern sector of the horizon. It was the destroyed destroyer Aaron Ward and the tugboat Bobolink that had just picked it up (later he also tried to save Atlanta). There were 140 cabs ahead of the enemy, at 6:07 the Hiei opened fire with its stern turrets and achieved coverage with the third salvo. Perhaps the destroyer would have been sunk - but then American planes appeared in the sky.
Bobolink tugboat.
ibiblio.org
Air attacks
Six (according to other sources - five) SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers from the 142nd Naval Reconnaissance and Bomber Squadron (VMSB-142) arrived from the Henderson Field airfield, which was only fifty kilometers away, to the aid of the American ships. The planes attacked at 6:15 and managed to hit one 450 kg bomb near the side of the battleship. The battleship's anti-aircraft gunners said they had shot down one plane.
An hour later, four TBF Avenger torpedo bombers from the 131st Squadron (VMSB-131) from Henderson Field appeared over the Hiei. They were attacked by three Zero fighters patrolling over the battleship from the aircraft carrier Zunyo - the Japanese managed to damage one bomber. The Americans reported that one torpedo hit the battleship (the Japanese deny this). There is no information about the damage received by the battleship at this time, but it can be assumed that the close gap affected its speed and controllability - otherwise it is not clear why the Hiei did not move north, but remained near Savo Island. Moreover, according to the Japanese report card, just at this time the Hiei sharply went to the left, described an almost complete circulation and set on a course to the west.
SBD-3 Dauntless dive bomber.
collections.naval.aviation.museum
Immediately after the air raid, the destroyer Yukikaze, the flagship of the 16th destroyer division, approached the battleship. Over the next two hours, the destroyer Teruzuki arrived here, as well as the 27th division of destroyers - Shigure, Shiratsuyu and Yugure, which did not participate in the night battle. At the same time, six more Zero fighters appeared above the battleship, hovering over it for a little over an hour.
Since the Hiei radio station did not work, at 8:15 Admiral Abe and his headquarters moved to the destroyer Yukikaze and transferred his flag to it. At the same time, he contacted the Kirishima via the destroyer's radio and ordered the battleship to return to Savo Island to take the damaged Hiei in tow. This was a belated decision - help needed to be provided much earlier, even at night.
At 9:15 a.m. a powerful raid began: the Hiei attacked nine Dauntlesses and three Avengers under the cover of seven F4F-4 Wildcat fighters. With the Japanese fighters already gone, Wildcats stormed the battleship, attempting to suppress its anti-aircraft guns. Nevertheless, the Americans did not achieve a single hit.
Admiral Abe's order
At 10:10, seven Avengers appeared over Hiei from the Henderson Field airfield, and a few minutes later another nine of the same aircraft appeared from the aircraft carrier Enterprise. One of the Enterprise's torpedo bombers managed to hit the bow of the battleship. The damage was minor, but it was at that moment that Admiral Abe lost his nerve. Apparently, he was also influenced by the message that the Kirishima was attacked by an unknown submarine and was hit by two torpedoes (later it turned out that they did not explode).
Abe decided not to tempt fate any longer and ordered the Kirishima to turn north again, and the commander of the Hiei, Captain 1st Rank Nishida, to direct the battleship to Guadalcanal and run ashore at Kamimbo. Nishida objected, saying that the damage to the battleship was not fatal, it was still floating and could be saved. This time Admiral Abe relented.
TBF Avenger torpedo bombers.
pacificeagles.net
At 11 o'clock, the battleship was unsuccessfully attacked by three Avengers from Henderson Field, and 10 minutes later 14 B-17 Flying Fortresses from the 11th Heavy Bomber Group from Espiritu Santo Island appeared over the Hiei. The planes flew at an altitude of over 4000 m - it was very difficult to get into the ship from there, but the “Flying Fortresses” had a lot of bombs, in addition, the battleship at low speed was a convenient target. One of the 56 bombs weighing 227 kg still hit the Hiei - it did not cause much damage, but water again began to flow into the aft compartments of the battleship.
At 11:20, the battleship was attacked by six Dauntlesses of the 132nd squadron, their pilots reported three hits with 453 kg bombs - however, the reliability of these reports is questionable. Another 10 minutes later, two Dauntless from the 132nd squadron and four Avengers from the 8th torpedo bomber squadron from the aircraft carrier Saratoga simultaneously appeared over the Hiei. It was the latter who achieved serious success, hitting the battleship with two torpedoes: one hit the middle part of the ship, another hit the bow on the port side. The torpedo bomber raid had to be repelled by fire from main caliber guns - the same Type 3 shells prepared for shelling the Henderson Field airfield and actually intended for firing at air targets.
Last chance
Around noon, six Zero fighters arrived at the Hiei - they patrolled the sky above the ship for an hour and a half. By this time, the battleship was finally able to correct the steering and for some time give a speed of 15 knots. Two-thirds of the water had been pumped out of the tiller compartment.
By half past two, the aft compartments had been drained almost completely, and the fire in the area of the bow tower-like superstructure began to go out. It seemed that now the ship could be saved. True, the upper deck of the battleship was seriously damaged, and three of the eight boilers were out of action due to the bombing.
Battleship Hiei before the war.
IJN Warship Album Battleships & Battle Cruisers. Tokyo, 2005
However, at about half past three, immediately after the Zero fighters left, the battleship was again attacked by a large group of aircraft. Descriptions of this attack are extremely contradictory. According to Japanese data, it took place after 14:30 - this time dates back to the entry in Admiral Abe’s journal that the fire was under control, the rudder control was established, and there was a chance to save the ship. According to this magazine, the battleship was attacked by 12 torpedo bombers, which managed to score two hits. One torpedo hit the central part of the hull on the starboard side, the other hit the stern.
According to American data, there were two raids. At 14:00, the Hiei was attacked by 14 aircraft from Henderson Field (eight Dauntless and six Avengers), under the cover of 14 Wildcat fighters. They claimed two accurate and two suspected torpedo hits. At 14:35, four more Avengers appeared from the aircraft carrier Enterprise - their pilots reported two torpedo hits.
F4F-4 Wildcat fighters.
airandspace.si.edu
One way or another, Hiei received at least two torpedoes. Captain Nishida gave maximum speed, trying to evade the attacks, but either from a sharp shift of the rudder, or from a torpedo hit, the newly corrected steering failed again. In addition, water began to flow into the engine room, the battleship tilted to starboard and sank noticeably to the stern. The chance to save the ship was lost.
The crew leaves the battleship
In eight hours, the Hiei was attacked by a total of about 70 aircraft. The battleship was still afloat, the engines were working, but the ship had completely lost control, and there was no one nearby who could take the 30,000-ton giant in tow. At 15:30, Vice Admiral Abe again ordered Captain Nishida to leave the ship. This time the order was given in writing and sent to the battleship by boat. Nishida obeyed and began transferring the battleship's crew to the destroyer Yukikaze. However, he was in no hurry - apparently hoping for a miracle and the approaching night.
Maneuvering the battleship Hiei at night and during the day on November 13, 1942.
Campaigns of the War in the Pacific. Materials of the commission to study the strategic bombing of United States aviation
No miracle happened. At 17:45, six Dauntlesses from Henderson Field reappeared over Hiei. This time the Americans did not hit the battleship, but placed one bomb next to the side of the Yukikaze, which they mistook for a light cruiser. At the same time, Nishida received news that the engine room was completely flooded. Only then did he give the final order to abandon ship. At 6 p.m., Nishida left his control post in the third tower and went down to the destroyer Teruzuki, having previously taken with him a portrait of the emperor. The rest of the crew was taken off by destroyers of the 27th Division. Abe ordered the destroyer Shigure to sink the empty battleship with torpedoes.
At 18:38, the Yukikaze received an order from Admiral Yamamoto: under no circumstances should the Hiei be sunk! Some historians interpret this order as a last attempt to save the battleship, others believe that Yamamoto simply wanted the ship remaining on the water to distract the enemy’s attention for some time.
At 19:00, the destroyers, having completed the reception and redistribution of the rescued, left the battleship and headed east. By this time, the Hiei had a list of 15° to starboard, and its stern sank into the water almost to the quarterdeck deck. Apparently, the seacocks were not open, and the ship sank only six hours later - at one in the morning on November 14th. This happened five miles north of Savo Island.
The destroyer Yukikaze after entering service in 1939. Admiral Abe transferred his flag to this ship.
Japanese Naval Warship Photo Album: Destroyers. Kure Maritime Museum
Hiei was the first Japanese battleship sunk in World War II. In total, 188 people died on it, and another 151 sailors were injured. The long “Friday the 13th” ended with the victory of the American fleet. This victory was very costly for the Americans: they lost two light cruisers and four destroyers, and two more heavy cruisers were seriously damaged. Approximately 1,560 American sailors were killed or drowned (the Japanese lost about 600 permanent casualties).
Investigation
Having received a message about the death of the Hiei, Admiral Yamamoto removed Abe from the post of commander of the 11th battleship division on November 14. Following this, Vice Admiral Abe Hiraoke and Captain 1st Rank Nishida Masatake were recalled to Japan, where they appeared before a special commission that investigated the reasons for the loss of the battleship Hiei. Both were found innocent, but were dismissed from their combat positions: 53-year-old Abe was transferred to clerical work at the Naval General Staff, and on March 10, 1943, he was dismissed. Nishida was first transferred to the reserve, but then called up again for service: he commanded aviation units, but never served on ships again.
The fighting on November 13 ended, but 12 Japanese transports with units of the 38th Division and 8th Marine Brigade were still heading towards Guadalcanal. Despite the loss of one of the battleships, Vice Admiral Kondo was determined to continue the operation and attack Henderson Field. Over the next two days, a new naval battle broke out northwest of Guadalcanal.
To be continued
Sources and literature:
- Campaigns of the War in the Pacific. Materials of the commission to study the strategic bombing of United States aviation. M.: Voenizdat, 1956
- Stephen Dull. The battle path of the Imperial Japanese fleet. Ekaterinburg: Mirror, 1997
- E. Tully. The sinking of the battleship Hiei: shelling or air raid? // FlotoMaster, 2003, No. 3
- Imperial Japanese Navy ship Hiei. Chronicle // FlotoMaster, 2003, No. 2
- https://www.history.navy.mil
- http://www.combinedfleet.com
- http://www.ibiblio.org
"Guilio Caesar" - Royal Italian Navy class battleship « » , participated in the First and Second World Wars. Named in honor of Gaius Julius Caesar, an ancient Roman statesman and politician, commander and writer.
Design
The stern of the battleships had a rounded shape with two rudders located in the longitudinal axis of the hull. The hull was made almost entirely of high-strength steel and had a double bottom throughout, and was also divided by 23 longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. The ships had three decks: armored, main, and upper. There were two masts forward and aft of the main caliber turret No. 3, then to the ends there were spaced pipes, a conning tower and a stern command post symmetrical to it. The bow buggies of the main caliber were located on the forecastle deck, which is one tier above the stern ones.
Since the foremast was located immediately behind the chimney, its top was constantly shrouded in smoke while moving. This deficiency was corrected during the 1922 repairs, when the foremast was cut off and moved forward from the chimney. The base of the old mast was used to attach the cargo boom. Later class battleships « » originally had a foremast in front of the chimney.
The ships had an extended forecastle, narrowed in the area of the bow turrets of the main caliber, and in the center of the hull turning into a wide casemate, diamond-shaped in plan, in which four groups of 120-mm guns were located. The living quarters of both the officers and the sailors' quarters were widely spaced along the length of the ship, quite large and comfortable by the standards of those years.
Waterline length of ships of the class « » was 168.9 meters, total length - 176 meters. The width of the corleys was 28 meters, and the draft was 9.3 meters. The normal load tonnage was 23,088 tons and the deep load tonnage was 25,086 tons. The ship's crew consisted of 31 officers and 969 sailors.
Engines
The original engine rooms for all three ships consisted of three Parsons turbine units, each housed in its own engine room. In each of the engine rooms, located on either side of the middle tower, there was an assembly of high and low pressure turbines connected in series and driving external mushroom shafts. The middle turbine unit stood in the engine room, located between the aft boiler group and the middle tower. It included high and low pressure turbines installed in parallel, rotating the left and right internal propeller shafts.
Steam for the turbines was produced by twenty-four Babcock & Wilcox water-tube boilers. The boilers were located in two groups in front and behind the engine room. "Guilio Caesar" had 12 pure oil heating boilers and 12 mixed boilers.
During development, it was planned that the ships would be able to reach a maximum speed of 22.5 knots, but during testing they were able to reach a maximum speed of 21.56 - 22.2 knots. The ships' fuel capacity was 1,450 tons of coal and 850 tons of oil, with a cruising range of 4,800 nautical miles at 10 knots and 1,000 nautical miles at 22 knots. Each ship was equipped with three turbogenerators that produced 150 kW at 110V.
Armament
From the time of construction, the ships' main armament consisted of thirteen 305 mm 46 caliber guns, developed by Armstrong Whitworth and Vickers, and housed in five gun turrets. Three of which were three-gun and two were two-gun. Two-gun turrets were located above three-gun turrets at the bow and stern. Three-gun turrets were located one at the bow and stern, the third was located in the middle part of the ship. All gun turrets were installed in the center line of the battleships so that five guns could be fired at the bow and stern, and all thirteen could be fired at either side. Moreover, the ships had one less gun than the Brazilian battleship "Rio de Janeiro", the most armed battleship in the world. It had seven main caliber two-gun turrets. These guns had vertical angles from -5 to +20 degrees and the ship could carry 100 shells for each gun, although with normal loading the norm was 70 units. Historians differ on the rate of fire of these guns and what shells they fired, but historian Giorgio Giorgerini believes that they fired 452 kg armor-piercing shells, with a rate of fire of one round per minute and with a maximum firing range of 24,000 meters. The towers had a hydraulic lift and elevator with an auxiliary electrical system.
Mine armament consisted of nineteen 120 mm 50 caliber guns, developed by the same company and located in casemates on the sides of the ship. The vertical angles of these guns ranged from -10 to +15 degrees and their firing rate was six rounds per minute. They could fire 22.1 kg high-explosive shells with a maximum firing range of 11,000 meters. The ammunition capacity of these guns was 3,600 shells. To protect against destroyers, the ships were armed with fourteen 76 mm 50 caliber guns. Thirteen of them could be installed at the top of the turrets, but they could also be installed in thirty different locations, including on the forecastle and on the upper deck. The vertical aiming angles corresponded to the auxiliary weapons and had a firing rate of ten rounds per minute. They could fire 6 kg armor-piercing shells with a maximum firing range of 9,100 meters. The ships were also armed with three 450 mm torpedo tubes, recessed by 45 centimeters. They were located along the sides and in the stern.
Booking
Ships of the class «
»
had a full armored belt along the waterline, its height was 2.8 meters, it protruded 1.2 meters above the waterline and dropped 1.6 meters below the waterline. In the middle part its thickness was 250 mm, towards the stern and bow the thickness decreased to 130 mm and to 80 mm. The thickness at the bottom edge was 170 mm. Above the main armor belt there was an armor belt with a thickness of 220 mm and a length of 2.3 meters. Between the main and upper decks there was an armor belt with a thickness of 130 mm and a length of 138 meters, from the bow to tower No. 4. The uppermost armor belt, which protected the casemates, had a thickness of 110 mm. The ships had two armored decks. The main deck was 24mm thick and had two layers. Its thickness on the bevels adjacent to the lower edge of the main armor belt was 40 mm. Between towers No. 1 and No. 4 there was an armor deck 30 mm thick, which ran at the level of the edge of the 220 mm armor belt and also had two layers. The upper deck was not armored, with the exception of a 30 mm thick section from the edge of the 170 mm armor belt to the wall of the casemate. The thickness of the forecastle deck above the casemates of the 120 mm guns was 44 mm.
The frontal armor of the main caliber turrets is 280 mm, 240 mm on the sides and 85 mm on the roof. Their barbettes had a thickness above the forecastle of 230 mm, from the forecastle to the upper deck it decreased to 180 mm, below the main deck the armor was 130 mm thick. The walls of the conning tower were 280 mm thick, and those of the reserve command post were 180 mm thick. The total weight of the ship's armor was 5,150 tons, and the total weight of the protective system was 6,122 tons.
Modernization
Until 1925, no serious work was carried out to improve battleships. In 1925 to ships «
»
And "Guilio Caesar" installed a catapult on the forecastle to launch the Macchi M.18 seaplane. Battleship "Leonardo da Vinci" did not undergo modernization, as it sank in 1916 and was dismantled for scrap in 1923. The foremast was also redesigned and moved forward from the chimney, becoming four-legged. By the beginning of 1930 both ships lost their combat value, and since France had equally outdated battleships in service, no modernization work was planned. However, the situation changed dramatically when work began in France on the construction of a fast battleship Dunkerque. Italy's response was quite quick, but instead of building new battleships, at the end of 1932 a decision was made to radically modernize the existing battleships.
In mid-1933, the Design Committee prepared a modernization plan. It provided for the dismantling and replacement of about 60% of the original structures: replacing mechanisms, changing weapons, redoing the hull and equipping torpedo protection.
The directive on the modernization of both ships was signed by Vice Admiral Francesco Rotundi in October 1933. At the same time, the ships began modernization - "Guilio Caesar" in Genoa, and « » in Trieste.
During the reconstruction, both ships completely changed their silhouette - instead of the typical dreadnought with two widely spaced chimneys and relatively small superstructures, in 1936 modern ships with closely spaced chimneys, a high streamlined superstructure and an elegant “yacht” stem left the shipyard. Their hulls were lengthened - the maximum length increased from 179.1 to 186.4 meters. An interesting feature: the new bow section was put on the old one like a stocking - the ram stem remained inside the hull along with part of the inclined keel. The forecastle was extended by approximately 3/5 of the hull. The central turret of the main caliber was removed, thanks to which more powerful mechanisms were placed. The turbines were replaced with new ones. If the old turbines previously developed a total power of 31,000 hp. s., dividing it into four shafts, now the power is 75,000 hp. With. was distributed only over two internal shafts, while the external ones were eliminated.
The new power plant consisted of 8 “Yarrow” boilers and two “Belluzzo” turbo-gear units, for which an echelon arrangement was adopted, with staggered elements. In relation to the starboard side, the first compartment ran from bow to stern, followed by four boiler rooms. For the left side, on the contrary, first there are four boiler rooms, and then the engine room.
During sea trials on December 12, 1936. "Guilio Caesar" reached a speed of 28.24 knots with a power of 93,430 hp.
The new 320 mm guns were obtained by drilling out the old 305 mm barrels and were designated "320 mm/44 gun model 1934". Since the thickness of the walls subsequently decreased and the weight of the projectile increased, the Italian designers reduced the initial velocity of the projectile. The turret installations were also modernized, as a result of which the elevation angle increased to 27 degrees and the firing range to 154 kbt.
Mine artillery now consisted of twelve 120 mm 55 caliber guns located in six two-gun turrets, providing a maximum elevation angle of 42 degrees.
The anti-aircraft armament consisted of eight 102 mm 47 caliber Minisini guns, they were paired and mounted with shields and could fire 13.8 kg shells at a firing rate of eight rounds per minute. Light anti-aircraft weapons included six coaxial 37 mm 54 caliber mounts with machine guns from the Breda company and the same number of coaxial 13.2 mm machine guns from the same company.
The main change in the armoring scheme of ships was the appearance of an internal citadel between the armored and main decks. Its thickness was 70 mm. The protection of all decks has been strengthened. On the flat area, on the sides of the citadel, the thickness of the deck armor was increased to 50 mm. The main deck within the inner citadel had a thickness of 80 mm above the mechanisms and 100 mm above the cellars, otherwise it remained unchanged. The upper deck received 43 mm reinforcement around the barbettes.
The anti-fragmentation armor of the bow superstructure outside the conning tower was 32-48 mm. The conning tower had a wall thickness of 240 mm, a roof of 120 mm, and a floor of 100 mm. The thickness of the frontal plates of the towers was reduced to 240 mm. The protection of the barbettes was increased by installing 50 mm thick plates with a small gap.
Anti-torpedo protection for ships was concentric, where the main element was a hollow pipe passing through a compartment filled with liquid. The pipe had thin walls and was “soft,” which allowed it to absorb most of the energy and reduce the impact on the torpedo bulkhead. The thickness of the anti-torpedo bulkhead was 40 mm. The displacement increased to 26,400 tons, which is why the main armor belt completely went under water.
In the second half of 1940, all 13.2 mm machine guns on battleships were replaced by 20 mm 65-caliber Breda machine guns.
In 1941 on the battleship "Guilio Cesare» the number of 20 mm and 37 mm machine guns was increased to 16 (8x2).
Service
At the beginning of the First World War "Giulio Caesar" was at the base in Taranto and was part of the 1st division of battleships. The Italian fleet was a formidable force at the time of the declaration of war, but it lacked modern light ships capable of countering the Austrian class cruisers Novara and class destroyers "Tatra". Also, the British officers believed that “the Italians build ships better than they know how to fight on them.” For these reasons, the Allies sent their formations of ships into Italian waters. May 27, 1915 on a battle cruiser «
»
In Taranto, a meeting was held between the commanders of the fleets - Gamble, Abrutzky and La Pereire (France), as well as the commander of the squadron of British battleships, Rear Admiral Turnsby.
Italian battleships, including "Giulio Caesar" were supposed to resist the Austro-Hungarian class dreadnoughts « » , otherwise they should not engage in battle. However, the threat of submarine attack, which sank three armored cruisers in the first week of July 1916, forced the commander of the Italian fleet to keep all battleships in the harbors.
The only operation in which they took part "Giulio Caesar", « » And « » , was the occupation of the Curzola base on the Sabbiontsela peninsula in Italy, it began on March 13, 1916. As part of the division he moved to Valona and then returned to Taranto. In December 1916 was stationed in the roadstead of the island of Corfu, but the threat of an underwater attack forced the battleship to return to the harbor.
In March 1917, all dreadnoughts were in the area of the southern Adriatic and Ionian Sea. At the end of the war, "Giulio Cesare" was in Taranto, without ever meeting the enemy and without firing a single shot. During the entire war, the battleship spent 31 hours at sea on combat missions and 387 hours on exercises.
In 1922, it underwent a minor modernization, during which the foremast was changed.
In 1923 « » , " ", "Guilio Cesare" And « » went on a military campaign to the island of Corfu, where there were battles with Greek troops. Battleships were sent to defeat the Greek troops as a sign of revenge for the massacre of the Italians in Ioannina. The Italian government demanded that Greece apologize and allow Italian ships into the port of Athens, but without waiting for an answer, it gave the order to send the Italian squadron to Corfu. On August 29, 1923, ships destroyed an ancient fort on the island of Corfu, and the Greeks soon immediately accepted the ships in the port of Phaleron near Athens.
During repairs in 1925, the fire control system was replaced and a catapult was installed on the forecastle to launch the Macchi M.18 seaplane. From 1928 - 1933 was a training artillery ship, and from 1933 - 1937. underwent a radical modernization in Genoa.
By the start of World War II, only two battleships in the Italian fleet were ready for battle: « » And "Guilio Caesar". They made up the 5th division of the 1st squadron.
July 9, 1940 "Guilio Caesar" As part of the 1st squadron, he was involved in battle with the main forces of the British Mediterranean Fleet. The British escorted the convoy from Malta to Alexandria, while the Italians escorted the convoy from Naples to Benghazi, Libya. The Mediterranean fleet tried to line up its ships between the Italian squadron and their base in Taranto. The crews of the ships visually saw each other in the middle of the day, at 15:53 the Italian battleships opened fire from a range of 27,000 meters. Britain's two leading battleships "HMS Warspite" And "Malaya" They opened fire a minute later. Three minutes later, when the battleships opened fire, shells "Guilio Caesar" started to fall on "HMS Warspite" which made a slight turn and increased its speed in order to leave the shelling zone of the Italian battleships at 16:00. At the same time, a 381 mm shell fired from "HMS Warspite" got into "Guilio Caesar" from a distance of 24,000 meters. The shell penetrated the armor near the rear chimney and exploded, leaving a hole 6.1 meters across. The shrapnel started several fires and four boilers had to be shut down because the operating personnel could not breathe. This reduced the battleship's speed to 18 knots. After this, the Italian squadron successfully left the zone of destruction of the British forces.
August 31, 1940 "Giulio Caesar" along with battleships: « » , « » and ten heavy cruisers set out to intercept British formations coming from Gibraltar and Alexandria for supplies. Due to poor reconnaissance performance, especially aerial reconnaissance, the interception failed. The British successfully brought the operation to an end. On September 1, the squadron departed for Taranto.
On November 11, 1940, during a night attack by British aircraft on Taranto, it was not damaged and the next day it moved to Naples. November 27 "Giulio Cesare" together with the battleship Vittorio Veneto and six heavy cruisers participated in the battle off Cape Spartivento (in the Italian classification Battle off Cape Teuland). During this time, the British Force H carried out a number of tasks, including escorting a convoy of three transports to Malta and meeting ships of the British Mediterranean Fleet. The Italian fleet launched an operation to intercept the British connection. After the connection of British forces, the Italian admiral decided to withdraw to his bases. As a result, the battle consisted of a short firefight between the cruiser fleets, during which the British cruiser was damaged "Bernwick" and an Italian destroyer.
During the reorganization of the Italian fleet in December 1940 "Giulio Caesar" And « » formed the 5th division of battleships, but practically did not participate in hostilities. On the night of January 9, 1941, during a British bomber raid on Naples, the battleship was damaged by close explosions of three aerial bombs. As a result, the repair took one month.
February 9-10, 1941 "Giulio Caesar" along with battleships « » And Vittorio Venetto, three heavy cruisers and ten destroyers searched in the Ligurian Sea for Force “H”, which included the battleship "HMS Malaya", battlecruiser "HMS Renown", aircraft carrier "HMS Ark Royal", a cruiser and 10 destroyers that shelled Genoa. However, due to bad weather and unclear communications, the Italian ships were unable to intercept the British. Due to the ban issued on March 31 on the actions of battleships outside fighter cover zones, he did not participate in combat operations for several months.
From December 13 to December 19, 1941 "Giulio Caesar" carried out long-range security of convoy M42 as part of battleships "Littorio", « » , 2 heavy cruisers and 10 destroyers. On December 17, an English convoy heading to Malta was discovered and the long-range guard entered the battle. However, due to the large distance between the enemy ships and the late discovery of the English convoy, neither side suffered losses. Participation "Giulio Caesar" was purely nominal, since due to the long distance the battleship did not open fire. This battle is known as the "First clash of the Gulf of Sirte."
From January 3 to January 5, 1942, the battleship made its last combat voyage, covering a convoy to North Africa, after which it was withdrawn from the fleet. In addition to the lack of fuel, it turned out that due to design flaws, the battleship could have been destroyed by one torpedo hit. Using it under the conditions of Allied air supremacy was risky. Since January 1943, it was located in Pola where it was used as a floating barracks. Throughout the war "Giulio Caesar" made 38 combat trips to sea, covering 16,947 miles in 912 sailing hours, using 12,697 tons of oil.
After the armistice was concluded, the battleship with an incomplete crew and without an escort moved to Malta, where it arrived on September 12. In conditions of constant threat of attack by German torpedo boats and aircraft, this transition can be considered the only heroic page in history "Giulio Caesar". At first, the Allied command decided to leave the Italian battleships in Malta under their direct control, but in June 1944 the three oldest, including "Giulio Caesar", was allowed to return to the Italian port of Augusta for training purposes. On June 18 he arrived in Augusta, and on June 28 he moved to Taranto, where he remained until the end of the war.
After Italy left the war, by decision of the Triple Commission, "Giulio Caesar" transferred as reparations to the USSR. The Soviet Union laid claim to new "class" battleships Littorio“, however, he only got an outdated battleship. At the end of the war, only two old battleships remained in service in the Soviet Union: « » And « » . But, despite this, the USSR had ambitious plans for the construction of battleships and it was planned to use "Giulio Caesar". Despite the decision of the triple commission, it was not possible to immediately receive the ship, so the British temporarily transferred their old dreadnought to the USSR "Royal Sovereign", which received the name in the Soviet Navy "Arkhangelsk". In 1948, after "Giulio Caesar" went to the Soviet port, "Arkhangelsk" was returned to England to be cut up for scrap.
The transfer of the battleship took place on February 3, 1949. in the port of Vlore (Valona). On February 6, the USSR naval flag was raised on the ship, and two weeks later it left for Sevastopol, arriving at the new base on February 26. On March 5, the battleship was renamed "Novorossiysk".
The resulting ship was in a very poor condition, since from 1943 to 1948. laid up and with a minimum crew, the lack of proper maintenance also affected it. Before handing over the ship to the USSR, the battleship underwent minor repairs to the electromechanical part. The main part of the weapons and the main power plant were in working order. There was no radio communication on the ship, radar and anti-aircraft weapons were completely absent. Emergency diesel generators were also inoperative. In addition, operational technical documentation and documentation on unsinkability were practically absent, and what was available was in Italian. The living conditions on the battleship did not correspond to the climatic features of the region and the organization of the service of the Soviet fleet. In this regard, in mid-May 1949 "Novorossiysk" put for repairs at the Northern dock of Sevmorzavod (Sevastopol).
In July 1949 "Novorossiysk" took part in the squadron's maneuvers as a flagship. At the same time, the weapons did not meet the requirements of the time, the mechanisms were in disrepair as a result of lack of care, and the life support systems had to be adapted to new standards.
The commander of the hold group, Yu. G. Lepekhova, recalled: “Under such conditions, the fleet command was given the task of putting the ship in order within three months, creating and working on a completely unfamiliar foreign ship (battleship!) combat and daily organization, passing the course tasks K-1 and K-2 and go to sea. Only those who had the opportunity to serve on large ships during the period of their construction and delivery can judge the possibility of fulfilling the prescribed task within the prescribed period. At the same time, the political situation required demonstrating the ability of Soviet sailors to quickly master the received Italian ships. As a result, after the next staff check, the commander of the squadron, Rear Admiral V. A. Parkhomenko, having become convinced of the impossibility of the task, gave the battleship’s officers a grand dressing down, declared an “organization period” for the ship, and then after a couple of weeks, without accepting the ship in fact, not a single course task; in early August, the battleship was literally “pushed” into the sea. As part of the squadron, we approached the Turkish shores, waited for a NATO plane to appear, making sure that Novorossiysk was floating, and returned to Sevastopol. And so began the service of a ship in the Black Sea Fleet, which, in fact, was unsuitable for normal operation.”
Over the next six years from 1950 - 1955. The battleship was under repair seven times. A significant amount of work was carried out on the ship to repair, partially replace and modernize combat and technical equipment.
During the restoration work, 24 37-mm twin V-11 anti-aircraft guns and 6 37-mm 70-K automatic cannons, as well as a Zalp-M radar station, were installed on the battleship. In addition, the foremast was rebuilt, the firing control devices for the main caliber guns were modernized, radio and intra-ship communication equipment was installed, emergency diesel generators were replaced, and the main and auxiliary mechanisms were partially repaired. Thanks to the replacement of turbines with domestic turbines from the Kharkov plant, the battleship showed a speed of 27 knots.
Due to work to modernize the ship, its mass increased by 130 tons and stability deteriorated. In May 1955 "Novorossiysk" became part of the Black Sea Fleet and until the end of October went to sea several times, practicing combat training tasks. Although "Novorossiysk" was a very outdated ship, at that time it was the most powerful warship in the Soviet Union.
On the evening of October 28, 1955, the battleship returned from a cruise to take part in celebrations in honor of the 100th anniversary of the defense of Sevastopol. The ship was moored on barrel No. 3 in the area of the Naval Hospital. The depth in this place was 17 meters of water and 30 meters of viscous silt. And the mooring itself went abnormally, as the battleship missed the required place by half a hull. After mooring, part of the crew went ashore.
On October 29 at 01:31, an explosion equivalent to 1000-1200 kg of TNT was heard under the ship’s hull on the starboard side of the bow, which pierced the ship’s hull, tore out part of the forecastle deck and punched a 150 m2 hole in the underwater part. The explosion immediately killed between 150 and 175 people. And after 30 seconds, a second explosion was heard on the left side, as a result of which a dent of 190 m2 was formed.
They tried to tow the battleship into shallow water, but the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V. A. Parkhomenko, who arrived on the ship, stopped the towing. The belated order to resume towing turned out to be meaningless: the bow had already sunk to the ground. The admiral did not immediately allow the evacuation of the sailors not engaged in rescue work, of whom up to 1,000 people had accumulated on the quarterdeck. When the decision to evacuate was made, the ship's roll began to rapidly increase. At 4 hours 14 minutes the battleship lay down on the port side and a moment later buried its masts in the ground. At 22:00 the hull completely disappeared under water.
614 people were killed in the disaster, including emergency shipments from other ships of the squadron. Many were locked in the compartments of the capsized ship - only 9 people were saved. Divers stopped hearing the sound of sailors locked in the hull of the battleship only on November 1st.
In the summer of 1956, the special-purpose underwater expedition EON-35 began lifting the battleship using the blowing method. When purging, 24 compressors with a total capacity of 120-150 m³ of free air per minute were used simultaneously. Preparatory work was completed in April 1957, and pre-purging began on April 30. General purging began on May 4, and on the same day the battleship floated up with its keel - first the bow end, and then the stern. The bottom rose above the water by about 4 m. When the ship was raised, the third main caliber tower remained at the bottom, which had to be raised separately. Many received awards for their participation in the rescue operation and were awarded certificates of honor from the Komsomol Central Committee, including Valentin Vasilyevich Murko.
On May 14 (according to other sources, May 28), the ship was towed to Cossack Bay and capsized. Subsequently, the ship was dismantled for metal and transferred to the Zaporizhstal plant. Until 1971, the barrels of 320 mm guns lay opposite the Naval School.
There are currently five versions of the death of the battleship "Novorossiysk":
Bottom mine.
The official version put forward by a commission headed by Vyacheslav Malyshev and subsequently proven by N.P. Moore in the book “Disaster on the Internal Roadstead” is the explosion of a German mine of the RMH or LMB type with an M-1 fuse, supplied during the Great Patriotic War. N.P. Muru considers the direct confirmation of the version of the mine explosion to be that after the disaster, 17 similar mines were discovered by trawling the bottom silt, of which 3 were located within a radius of 100 m from the site of the death of the battleship. However, the power sources of the bottom mines cleared in the 1950s turned out to be discharged, and the fuses were inoperative.
Detonation of ship's ammunition.
This version was dropped after examination of the building: the nature of the destruction indicated that the explosion occurred outside.
Deliberate undermining.
According to the conspiracy theory of NVO author Oleg Sergeev, the explosion of the ship was carried out by “domestic special services with the knowledge of the country’s leadership for internal political purposes” to discredit Admiral Kuznetsov’s costly program for the large-scale construction of surface ships.
Explosives on the ship.
According to Yuri Lepekhov, the cause of the explosion was German magnetic underwater mines. At the same time, he believes that the nature of the destruction of the battleship’s hull indicates that the mine explosion caused the detonation of a charge that was placed on the ship by the Italians even before its transfer to the Soviet side.
Sabotage.
The commission's conclusions did not rule out the possibility of sabotage. In Italy, on the eve of the transfer of the battleship to the USSR, there were open calls to prevent the pride of the Italian fleet from ending up under the Soviet flag. There were forces and means for sabotage in post-war Italy. During the war, Italian underwater saboteurs from Xª MAS, the 10th assault flotilla, commanded by the “black prince” Valerio Borghese, operated in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.
Historian-researcher Oktyabr Bar-Biryukov believes that Prince Valerio Borghese, the former commander of Xª MAS, is to blame for the death of the battleship. Allegedly, during the transfer of the battleship to the Soviet Union, the former commander of Xª MAS, Prince Valerio Borghese, vowed to avenge the dishonor and blow up the battleship Giulio Cesare at any cost. Preparations for sabotage continued throughout the year. Eight combat swimmers were hired as performers; each had a combat sabotage school on the Black Sea behind them. Each saboteur knew the location of the operation very well. The saboteurs entered the bay on the mini-submarine Picollo, which was delivered by an Italian transport ship. This steamer was equipped with a secret hatch in the bottom, which housed a mini-submarine. After the battleship was blown up, the saboteurs in a mini-submarine went out to the open sea, where they were picked up by a steamer.
In July 2013, a veteran of the Italian unit of combat swimmers "Gamma" as part of the Italian Xª MAS, a former employee of the Italian military intelligence service, the German SD and encrypted communications expert Ugo D'Esposito admitted that combat swimmers from the previously disbanded Italian Xª MAS were involved in the sinking of the Soviet battleship Novorossiysk in 1955, after eight combat swimmers, on behalf of the Italian services and acting on behalf of NATO, placed charges on the keel of the ship.
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