Romantic philosophy. Philosophy of Romanticism. Main ideas and representatives. The meaning of art. Need help studying a topic?

Ticket No. 12

2. Heidegger: “Basic Concepts of Metaphysics”

Romanticism is an artistic movement that emerged in early 19th century Europe and continued until the 40s of the 19th century.

The main one is the conflict between man and the world. The psychology of a rebellious personality emerges, which was most deeply reflected by Lord Byron in his work “Childe Harold’s Travels.”

Romantic heroes are united by a sense of their own exclusivity. “I” is recognized as the highest value, hence the egocentrism of the romantic hero. But by focusing on oneself, a person comes into conflict with reality.

The immediate cause of the emergence of romanticism was the Great French bourgeois revolution.

Before the revolution, the world was orderly, there was a clear hierarchy in it, each person took his place. The revolution overturned the “pyramid” of society; a new one had not yet been created, so the individual had a feeling of loneliness. Life is a flow, life is a game in which some are lucky and others are not.

The break that occurred at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries was so radical that it is difficult to find an analogy for it. The Great French Revolution aroused unprecedented enthusiasm among European intellectuals, however, its ending had a sobering effect. In 1792, the monarchy fell in France and a republic was proclaimed. In June 1793 the king was sentenced to death, and in August everyone learned what terror was: hundreds of innocent heads on the sacrificial altar of the revolution. Later, the Napoleonic Wars finally destroyed the ideals of enlightenment.

It is a thankless task to try to define what romanticism is. Someone counted over 150 definitions, F. Schlegel, the founder of the circle of romantics, refused to send by mail his definition of the word “romantic”, in view of the fact that he did not have 125 sheets. But, nevertheless, here are some essential features of this phenomenon: 1) the etymological genesis of the term from a lexico-philological point of view; 2) chronological and geographical framework of the phenomenon; 3) romanticism as a psychological and moral phenomenon; 4) conceptual content characteristic of romanticism; 5) characteristic art form; 6) finally, romantic philosophy.

The word “romantic” has a rich history. A.S. Baugh, a historian of English literature, writes that the adjective "romantic" appeared in England around the mid-17th century to denote something extravagant, fantastic and unreal (as in romances of chivalry, for example). A century later, they began to refer to especially pleasant situations described in “romantic” poetry and prose in our sense of the word. Gradually, it began to be used in the sense of reviving instincts or emotions that were not completely suppressed by rationalism. F. Schlegel associated romanticism with the epic, medieval, psychological and autobiographical novel. For him, the modern form of art, taken in its organic development from the Middle Ages to the present day, had a special essence, beauty and truth, different from the Greek.

From a historiographical and geographical point of view, romanticism is not only poetry and philosophy, but also music and the visual arts, the rapid flowering of which marked the end of the 17th and the first half of the 18th centuries. The movement spread to France, Italy, Spain, England, Germany, acquiring national characteristics in each of these countries.

Almost all representatives of romanticism went through a religious crisis of varying degrees of intensity: Schlegel, Novalis, Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Schelling. Religion was deeply revalued by the romantics. They saw in it the path from the finite to the infinite. The infinite is the meaning and source of everything finite.

Romanticism rediscovered nature as an omnipotent life-giving force at the dawn of a new century. The deistic concept of the divine as Intelligence, the highest Reason, is opposed by pantheism, and religiosity takes on new forms. Hatred of tyrants, exalted freedom, strong feelings, indomitable passions, integral and uncompromising characters - all this became fashionable in the romantic age.

Nature is a gigantic organism like a human being, a moving play of forces: its power is divine. Schelling stated that nature is a petrified mind. The maxims about the feeling of being as an organic moment of totality sound pantheistic. To be one with everything, said Hölderlin, means to live among the gods, to be with everything that is alive, experiencing happy self-forgetfulness. Romantics are characterized by a desire for freedom. To be everything, to be, of course, is a skill. The Master is the ruler of existence, his freedom is part of consciousness, individuality, holy and inviolable. Every movement of the master is a revelation of the higher world, the word of God. Both Fichte and Hegel would later begin with the same thesis.

As for romantic art, Schlegel pointed out the primacy of “content” over form in it, emphasizing the expressiveness of a formless sketch, a fragment, something unfinished, where form is secondary.

A lot has been said about the philosophy of romanticism, it is worth recalling one judgment of Benedetto Croce: “Philosophical romanticism raised the banner of what is sometimes not quite accurately called intuition and fantasy, in defiance of cold reason, abstract intellect.” Undoubtedly, philosophical systems that neglect the intuitive are doomed, just as those that ignore logical forms and the elementary order of thinking are fruitless. Long before romanticism, Vico clearly spoke out in defense of the intuitive principle against the extremes of Cartesian intellectualism; idealism in this sense is always romantic. Now, knowing the structure, methods and content of romanticism in general terms, we can separately talk about its major representatives.

"THE MOVEMENT OF STORM AND DRUG"

The German romantics brothers Schlegel, Goethe, Schiller, Nowlis, Hölderlin, Jacobi, Herder, later Schelling and Hegel made a significant contribution to culture. Romanticism in Germany began with the movement

"Sturm und Drang" - "Storm and Drang". This name of one of the dramas of Friedrich Maximilian Klinger (1752-1831) was used by A. Schlegel as the name of an entire movement. (This meant a “storm of feelings,” an avalanche-like flow of passions: after all, Klinger first called his drama “Wirrwarr” - “Tumult.”)

But it was not Klinger who made the glory of romanticism. Its symbols were Goethe, Schiller, Jacobi, Herder. They started talking about romanticism with the appearance of Goethe in Strasbourg and later in Frankfurt.

The Sturm und Drang movement is sometimes called a revolution in the German style, a rehearsal for the Great French Revolution. Other scientists, on the contrary, anticipated this revolution, a kind of allergy to the extremes of the Enlightenment, the culmination of which was the revolution. One way or another, it is clear that this was a prelude to romanticism. The “Sturmerians” were able to express the spirit of an entire people, the state of the German soul at the hour of historical turning point. Classicism is already a matured maturity of the German soul. “Sturm” is the youth of Herder and Goethe, a symbol of the youth of the nation; overcoming the crisis had not only a personal, but also a social context.

Here classicism acts as a corrective to the Sturm and Drang movement, but one cannot help but see in it an essential component and dialectical pole of romanticism. The cult of the classics was not at all alien to the Enlightenment, but it clearly lacked life and soul, which was already noted by Johann Winckelmann (1717-1768) in his works on ancient art, calling for overcoming the passive reproduction of the ancient ideals of classicism. “The only way for us to become great and, if possible, inimitable, is to imitate the ancients.” But we need such an imitation that will allow us to assimilate the ancient eye, as it was with Michelangelo and Raphael, who knew the “true taste of spring moisture” and the impeccable rules of painting first-hand. Therefore, it is natural for Winckelmann that such “imitation” leads not only to nature, but also leads beyond it, to the Idea of pure beauty created by the mind - this is the true sublime nature. If an artist takes the Greek canon of beauty as a basis, he will certainly find himself on the path of imitating nature. The concept of integrity and impeccability of nature in the ancient understanding purifies the idea of natural essence. Having recognized the beauty of our nature, he will not hesitate to associate it with the absolutely beautiful. With the help of the refined forms present in it, the artist will become a rule to himself.

The revival of the classics in the German spirit and from the German spirit, thanks to the eternal youth of nature and spirit - this inspired the best writers. From a mechanical imitation of Greek art to a breakthrough into a new, ingenious one fueled by the Greek spirit - this, according to the famous historian of German literature L. Mittner, is the organic evolution of the German spirit. To pour nature into form, and life into art, not repeating, but updating Greek models, became the goal of neoclassicism.

The best representatives of “Sturm” called moderation, extremes, and balance the classical ideal. It was this, at first glance strange, union of the immense element and the “limit” that gave birth to romanticism. And in philosophy we see a new appeal to the classics: Schleiermacher not only translated Plato’s dialogues, but made them part of philosophical discourse. Schelling confidently used Plato's theory of Ideas and the concept of the world soul. And the Hegelian system was born after a new reading of the classics, awareness of the meaning of “dialectics” and the role of the speculative element (Hegel widely uses fragments from Heraclitus in his “Logic”).

BASIC IDEAS OF BRIGHT REPRESENTATIVES

GERMAN ROMANTICISM

Jena became the birthplace of romanticism, here at the end of the 18th century. The Schlegel brothers found each other - August Wilhelm (1767-1845) and Friedrich (who will be discussed later). – Caroline Michaelis (1763-1809) (wife of Schlegel the elder, later wife of Schelling) and Schelling himself. Caroline was the inspirer of the circle: Schiller called her “Madame Lucifer.” Having quarreled with Schiller, in 1797 Friedrich Schlegel left for Berlin, where he began publishing the Athenaeum magazine, the first issue of which was published in May 1798. Having existed for only two years, the magazine became unusually popular. Thanks to the activity of both Schlegels, theoretical seminars took place in Dresden (1798) and in the winter of 1799 - 1800. in Jena. The poets Novalis, Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853), and Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773-1798) joined the movement. Schleiermacher became close to Schlegel in Berlin. The author of Hyperion, Hölderlin, although he kept aloof from the movement, did not escape romanticism in his thoughts and poems. Goethe and Schiller, who spoke out against the ideological excesses of the romantics, still belonged to the romantic age and breathed its air.

Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) moved away from Winckelmann's classicism and Schiller's theory, finding his way into philosophy after meeting Fichte and Schelling. As for any romantic, the main thing for him is the infinite, which can be reached either through expensive philosophy or through art. In both cases, only finite means are available. How to be? Schlegel attempted a parallel search. In the philosophical field, his theory of irony is worthy of attention, as for art, here his theoretical contribution is indisputable.

Speaking of irony, we immediately remember Socrates, who loved to play with his victim. He knew how to force his opponent to disarm. For Schlegel, the goal is the infinite, which can be reached using the inadequacy of thinking, since it is always something determined. To overcome this border, to move further and higher, beyond the inevitable contradiction of the conditional and the unconditional, under the power of irony, which Schlegel places on the other side of any building, action, science. He believed that it is impossible to understand the inadequacy of any action, a fact of the human spirit, without an element of joke, humor, and practical joke.

Despite the imitation of the classics, the concept of irony in the context of romanticism is closely related to the quite serious feeling of “Sehnsucht” (“passionate desire, desire of passion”). Nikolai Hartmann correctly appreciated the essence of the matter: “Schlegel was deeply tormented by the inexpressibility and mystical incomprehensibility of everything that is truly important for thinking. So thought, in the end, makes fun of itself about its own powerlessness... At the same time, this is also the rehabilitation of the irrational, repressed from thinking.” We are talking about a mental somersault into the void, where, of course, thought will never find solid support, the reward is only immediate awareness of the only real, achieved to the extent that thinking consciously abandons itself. The form of “jumping out of oneself” is irony, humor, ridicule of oneself (and not of another).

It is clear that this self-overcoming is important not only in philosophy, but also in ethics, art, and in any form of spiritual life. Art, according to Schlegel, is the creation of a genius; only he is capable of the synthesis of the finite and the infinite. The highest and most responsible mission of the artist is to become a conductor of the infinite. The religious aspect of art is also obvious, because any human relationship with the infinite is mystical, religious, for it is “life in God.” In 1808, Schlegel accepted the Catholic faith after a deep religious crisis, from which, it seems, he was able to find a way out.

Novalis, real name Friedrich von Hardenberg, was born in 1772. and died at less than twenty-nine years old from tuberculosis in 1801. He is called the poetic voice of romanticism, pure and true. Novalis's philosophy, reflected in the Fragments, can be called "magical idealism." Fichte, as we will see, contrasts realism with metaphysical-epistemological idealism. The realist makes the “prius” (“that which was before”) the object of knowledge, deducing the subject from it. For the idealist, “prius” is the I, the subject, from which the object is derived. So Novalis, following Fichte, transforms the magical realism of the ancient occultists into magical idealism, with which he associates the unconscious activity of the I, producing the non-I. Everything comes from the spirit, and therefore it dominates as the absolute ruling principle. “I am equal to not - I am the highest thesis of any science.”

In the novel “Disciples in Sais” we read: “Someone risked lifting the veil on the goddess Sais, and what did he see? I saw, amazingly, myself.” And in nature, and in the Divinity, and in the Self, there is one and the same force: the identical spirit. “The world is the result of the interaction of the Self and the Divine. Everything that exists is born from the contact of spirits.” We relate to parts of the universe, to what has been and what will be. All that matters is the direction and persistence of our attention, the preference for what is more important to us. Philosophy is magic, but it is also art. Poetry captures the absolute, moreover: “Poetry is real, and the real is truly absolute - this is the essence of my philosophy,” concludes Novalis.

The extremes of his position are now clear: “Everything is a fairy tale, everything is a dream,” or it should become a dream. A great magician is probably one who knows how to be fascinated by himself so that his own tricks seem to him to be external, autonomous phenomena. “It is only because of the weakness of our senses and self-contact that we cannot feel ourselves in the world of magic. All fairy tales are our dreams about our father’s house, which is everywhere and nowhere. Higher potencies, like genes dormant inside us, will one day awaken our will...”

This concept is clarified by the unfinished novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen, where dream is mixed with reality, like prose with poetry, and where the hero, through his own experience, comes to the magical substratum of reality. It contains a fairy tale, a dream and poetry - the truth itself, a kind of “blue flower”, alluring and never achievable in reality.

However, from magical idealism he turned to Christianity, radically reconsidering the meaning of the Catholic Middle Ages (in the essay “Christianity or Europe”), the happy unity of which was destroyed by Luther, the forerunner of emasculated Enlightenment intellectualism. Schelling would later develop this idea.

Novalis also saw the Greek spirit, the spirit of serenity and harmony, as close to Christianity. But only Christianity managed to fulfill this harmony by comprehending death. In one of the “Hymns for the Night,” he speaks in the words of a rhapsode who came from Greece: “From a distant shore, born under the benign sky of Hellas, a singer came to Palestine to give his heart to a miracle-working young man.” “Night” itself symbolizes, in defiance of the “light” of the Enlightenment, the Absolute (remember the shadow images of mystical philosophy). But the cross - “the fireproof triumphal banner of the human race” - is a symbol of victory over death. Only he, according to Novalis, can support us in suffering and the painful struggle with life’s adversities.

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born in Breslau in 1768. In 1797 he collaborates with F. Schlegel in the Athenaeum. Then he taught in Halle, and from 1810. - at the University of Berlin. His works “Discourse on Religion” (1799) and “Monologues” (1800) are widely known. In 1822 he published the Doctrine of Faith, dedicated to Protestant dogma. From 1804 to 1828 he translates Plato's dialogues, equipping them with prefaces and remarks, and publishes lectures on dialectics, ethics, aesthetics and, most importantly, hermeneutics. Let us dwell, firstly, on the romantic interpretation of religion, secondly, on the new reading of Plato and, thirdly, on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics.

1. Religion is a person’s relationship with the Universal. The whole correlates with metaphysics and morality, but it was precisely this connection that became the source of equivocations, which is why ideas alien to it penetrated into religion. Metaphysics refers to the idea of the totality of being. Ethics deals with the Universal (actions in the account of human nature, taken in the mode of the universe). But religion is not thinking or moral activity. What is she? Intuition and feeling are endless. “Religion seeks neither to explain nor to penetrate into intuitions and feelings. Remaining childishly passive, it places man at the center of any relationship as the condition of all being and the cause of everything that becomes... an expression of infinity.” All intuition comes from an object imprinted in a subject. The infinite, which has left its mark on a person, is intuition. A feeling is the response of the subject, his mood is the reaction of consciousness. The feeling that accompanies intuition testifies to the subject’s irreducible dependence on the infinite. Religious feeling, therefore, is a form of total dependence of the finite person on the universal as infinite.

After the publication of Fichte's Science, the Romantics felt the need to return to Plato. “I have always felt an inclination towards criticism,” wrote Schleiermacher, “an exercise very useful for myself... and so my “Plato” became something of a mediator between the old and new ideas about philosophy.” “Dialectics” had little influence on his contemporaries, since it was published later, but Schleiermacher was quite successful in translating Plato’s dialogues, and they are still being republished today as the best.

We can say that the modern philosophy of hermeneutics owes its birth to Schleiermacher. In addition to the simple technique of understanding and interpreting various works (for example, sacred texts), she masters the very interpretive structure that characterizes understanding as such. The whole must first be understood so that the parts and elements become clear. It is necessary that the text, the interpreted object and the interpreting subject belong to the same horizon and are in the same circle. Gianni Vattimo noted: Schleiermacher gave the first theorization of what is now called the “hermeneutic circle.” Fundamentally, the problem is to maintain the totality of the object of understanding, which embraces both the object and the subject. Schleiermacher identified two fundamental properties of this circle: a) the necessary foreknowledge of the integrity of the interpretative action; b) the need for action and understanding to belong to a wider horizon. The development of the second moment in the hermeneutic structure of the interpretation of human experience will be discussed below.

Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1842) did not belong to the romantic society), was friendly with Schelling and Hegel), but his poetry bears the stamp of romanticism. His fate was tragic: half of his life was in solitude, the other half in madness. After many years of misunderstanding, he was finally recognized as a genius of German poetry. This is a considerable merit of Heidegger, the most subtle interpreter of Hölderlin’s work.

Love for Greece, the spiritual superiority of beauty and poetry, which is commanded by the Infinite-One, the immediate feeling of belonging to the universal, the deification of Nature, which gives rise to both gods and people - we find all these typically romantic motives in Hölderlin. Christian themes are heard in his hymns “Bread and Wine”, “The Only One”, although in a strange mixture with the Greek pantheon. Hölderlin sees himself as nothing less than a new prophet, almost John with a new Apocalypse.

“Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece” is a novel, begun in 1792 and completed in 1799, the hero of which is formed as a person while traveling (the famous romantic “Wanderung”). Hyperion is a Greek from the 17th century, he is eager to defend the independence of his fatherland from the Turks, to revive the ancient glory of Greece, but disappointment awaits him. Nobody understands him, his beloved Diotima dies. Hyperion flees to Germany, but there he is pursued by indifferent misunderstanding. And only in the bosom of divine nature does he find peace. This hymn to nature contains all the romanticism with its focus on nature.

“I dreamed about nature, about humanity for a long time, in vain, but now I say: only you are alive, everything else, strained to think, melts like a piece of wax under your flame.... How long have I not noticed you! And how many times have the crowd teased you, but your gods are alive and happy in silence, peace... People, like rotten fruits, fall from you: let them die, return to your roots, and I, O tree of life, will turn green with you and a light breath I will touch your branches with young shoots! Tenderly and reverently, for we are all seeds and grains of one golden ear. You, the bowels of the earth! You flowers! You forests and you eagles! And you, sister of light! How old and always fresh our love is! We are free, why change our ways of life? Let us become like each other, deep down we are so similar... And we, O Diotima, are not separated, tears for you are in vain... who can separate those who love?.. how many meaningless words have these strange people come up with. Everything comes under the influence of desire, and everything ends in peace... Coming from the heart and veins returning to the heart, and everything is one, eternal, radiant life.”

In the life of Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), three periods are easily distinguished. The period is the “Sturmer” period, it is decorated with the dramas “The Robbers”, “The Fiesco Conspiracy in Genoa”, “Intrigue and Love”, “Don Carlos”. The second (since 1787 he has been studying Kant, philosophy and history) is associated with the department of history in Jena. The third phase of creativity is his theater: the trilogy “Wallenstein” (1799), “Mary Stuart” (1800) and “William Tell” (1804). From a philosophical point of view, his works “On Grace and Dignity” (1793), “Letters on Aesthetic Education” (1793-1795), “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry” (1795-1796) are interesting.

The love of freedom in all its forms - political, social and moral - shaped Schiller. The French Revolution and its consequences, however, convinced Schiller of the immaturity of a person for whom freedom is a misfortune, not a blessing, for true freedom is in conscience. How to achieve it? The highest school of freedom, Schiller is convinced, is in beauty, because only it is capable of harmonizing the inner world of a person.

In On Grace and Dignity we find Schiller's concept of the "beautiful soul" ("die schone Seele"), which became popular in the Romantic era. Overcoming the Kantian opposition between “sensual inclination and moral duty,” Schiller sees in the “beautiful soul” natural spontaneity, prompted by the spontaneity of beauty. This is a noble soul that harmonizes “instinct” and “moral law.”

In his Letters on Aesthetic Education, Schiller clarifies that man has two fundamental instincts: the material and the instinct of form. The first connects a person with sensuality, and therefore with the materiality and frailty of existence, the second, of course, is associated with rationality. The composition of two theses should not sacrifice the sensory principle, because then it would be a form outside of reality. The “play instinct” is preferable (remember the Kantian “free play of abilities”), mediating reality and form, chance and necessity. Play is freedom. For Schiller, the first instinct is life, the second is form, play is “living form,” which is also beauty. To evaluate a person in a rational sense, one must first evaluate him as an aesthetic being. To educate aesthetically means to educate free, because beauty is always free.

M. Heidegger. Basic concepts of metaphysics

Alex Bow

AMBIGUITY IN THE ESSENCE OF PHILOSOPHY (METAPHYSICS)

So the understanding of the name of the course and the description of our task, and together the principled position that we must adhere to in all our proceedings, have changed. It is clearer to say: if previously we knew nothing at all about some kind of principled position of philosophizing, but were simply indifferently waiting for some kind of acquaintance, now for the first time the feeling has emerged that such a thing as a principled position is required. At a first approximation, one might think: the basic concepts of metaphysics, the fundamental principles of linguistics - all this presupposes interest, but at the core it is still a certain indifferent expectation of something that we can more or less thoroughly apply to note. We declare: this is not so. The matter comes down to the essence and necessity of readiness. This principled position, perhaps - and at first inevitably - is acquired in tossing and groping, but it is precisely in this insecurity that it has its specific vitality and the strength that we need in order to understand anything here at all. If we do not put in this from ourselves: the desire to embark on the risky enterprise of human existence, the taste for all the mystery and completeness of being and the world, the unconstrainedness of schools and dogmatic opinions and, at the same time, a deep desire to learn and hear, then the university years are internally lost, no matter what pile of knowledge we pull from everywhere. Moreover, the coming years and times will then take a crooked and drawn-out course with grinning prosperity at the end. We only understand that some kind of listening is required here than when we take note and confirm the data of research or the course of scientific proof, or rather: we simply collect them in a large chest of memory. And yet, everything in the external structure is the same: the audience, the department, the associate professor, the listeners, only here it’s about mathematics, there it’s about the Greek tradition, and here it’s about philosophy. If the latter, however, is something completely different from science, and nevertheless that external form of science is preserved, then philosophy, as it were, hides, does not reveal itself directly. Even worse, she pretends to be something she is not. This is neither just her eccentricity, nor some kind of vice, but belongs to the positive essence of metaphysics. What exactly? Ambiguity. Our preliminary discussion regarding philosophy will end only when we point out this ambiguity, which positively characterizes the essence of metaphysics and philosophy.

We will examine three things regarding the essential ambiguity of metaphysics: 1) ambiguity in philosophizing in general; 2) ambiguity in our philosophizing here and now, in the behavior of listeners and in the behavior of the teacher; 3) the ambiguity of philosophical truth as such.

We will analyze this ambiguity of philosophy not to develop some kind of psychology of philosophizing, but to clarify the principled position required of us, so that in all future proceedings we conduct ourselves with greater clarity of view and discard false expectations, whether high or low.

Ambiguity in philosophizing in general: uncertainty whether or not philosophy is science and ideological preaching.

This ambiguity is already very familiar to us. Philosophy acts and looks like science without being one. Philosophy seems similar to ideological preaching without being it either. These two kinds of appearance, imaginary similarity, are combined, and the ambiguity therefore becomes especially intrusive. If philosophy appears in the form of science, then we cannot escape the worldview. Philosophy looks like a scientific justification and description of a worldview, being, however, something else.

This double appearance, scientific and worldview, gives philosophy a constant lack of authentication. Firstly, it seems that it can never be sufficiently supplied with scientific and experimental knowledge, and at the same time this never-sufficiency of scientific knowledge always turns out to be an excess at the decisive moment. On the other hand, philosophy requires—so it seems at first—to apply one’s knowledge, as it were, in practice, translating it into actual life. But it always turns out that these moral efforts remain outside of philosophizing. It seems that creative thought and ideological and moral efforts must be fused together to create philosophy. Since philosophy is known for the most part only in this ambiguous dual guise as science and as ideological preaching, people try to reproduce this dual guise, hoping to be completely at their best. Then those bisexual formations are born that, without brains, bones and blood, eke out a literary existence. Something like a scientific treatise appears with an appendage or insertions of moralizing instructions, or a more or less good sermon appears using scientific expressions and forms of thought. Both may look like something like philosophy without being anything like it. Or vice versa: a thing can look like a strictly scientific study, dry, difficult, without any moralizing overtones and ideological references, naked science - and yet carry a philosophical charge from beginning to end. Or else: face-to-face dialogue without a hint of scientific terminology and props, an ordinary conversation - and yet the strictest thinking in the utmost philosophical concepts from beginning to end.

So philosophy appears in the markets in various deceptive forms or even puts on masks. Everything looks like philosophy outwardly, but in reality it is not philosophy at all; there is no appearance of philosophy at all, but that is what is there. Only someone who has become intimately close to her can recognize her, that is, puts all his strength into her. The same, in a very special sense, is true of our own enterprise in this lecture course.

Ambiguity in our philosophizing here and now

In the position of listeners and teacher

The ambiguity of philosophy, however, always intensifies - and does not disappear, as one might think - where efforts are directed in an emphatic way towards it, as in our situation here and now: philosophy is an academic subject, an examination subject, a discipline in which, as in other disciplines, defend dissertations. For students and teachers, philosophy has all the appearance of one of the general courses on which lectures are given. We behave accordingly: we also listen to the course - or skip it. Nothing special happens, something just didn't happen. Do we have academic freedom for anything? We'll even buy something extra and save ten marks in lecture fees. This, however, is not enough for a pair of skis, but it gives just a pair of excellent ski poles, and, perhaps, they really are much more significant than lectures on philosophy. She may be just an empty appearance - who knows.

It is possible, however, that we will still miss some significant chance. The horror is that we don’t feel it at all and, perhaps, we will never feel it at all; that nothing will happen to us in the future if we miss the course; that we will still be able to say here, in university classrooms, things no less important than others who listen to philosophy and, perhaps, even quote Heidegger. And if we do not miss, we attend the course, will the ambiguity disappear? Will anything change for the eye? Isn't everyone sitting looking equally attentive or equally bored? Are we better than our neighbors because we are quicker to grasp, or are we simply more dexterous and eloquent - say, we have become more proficient in philosophical terminology at philosophical seminars than others? But perhaps - and despite all this - we lack the most essential thing that another - be it just some student - has.

We - you as listeners - are constantly besieged and stalked by an ambiguous entity: philosophy. And especially the teacher. What he is not able to prove, in what forests of concepts and terminology he does not wander, in what kind of scientific apparatus he does not introduce into action - so that the poor listener is overcome with melancholy. The teacher can make it clear that with him philosophy enters the world for the first time as an absolute science. What does he not proclaim with the latest slogans about the world situation, about the spirit and future of Europe, about the coming era and about the new Middle Ages! With what inimitable seriousness he can speak about the position of the university and the university machine, asking what a person is, a transitional link in evolution or an insult to the gods. Maybe he's a comedian - who knows? Even if not, how contradictory is his undertaking: philosophizing is the final reprimand, the ultimate, in which a person retires to his pure presence, while the teacher meanwhile rants to the masses? Why, if he is a philosophist, does he part with loneliness and rub shoulders like a public professor in the market? And most importantly, what a dangerous beginning this ambiguous position is!

Are we simply ranting in front of the crowd or - if we look more closely - are we convincing them, convincing them of relying on an authority that we do not have at all, but which for various reasons, for the most part, still somehow takes its toll in various forms, even if we We don’t want it at all? In this case, what is the basis of the authority with which we tacitly persuade? Not on the fact that we are acting on instructions from some higher authority, and not on the fact that we are wiser and smarter than others, but solely on the fact that we are not understood. Only as long as we are not understood does this dubious authority work for us. When we begin to be understood, it becomes clear whether we are philosophizing or not. If we do not philosophize, all authority falls apart on its own. If we philosophize, then it never existed at all. Then it simply becomes clear that philosophizing is inherent in principle to every person, that some people can or should have a strange destiny - to be an incentive for others to awaken philosophizing in them. So the teacher is not excluded from ambiguity, but simply by the fact that he acts as a teacher, he spreads a certain appearance around himself. And any reading of philosophical lectures - whether they are philosophizing or not - is an ambiguous undertaking, which does not happen in the sciences.

To everything that has been said about the ambiguity of philosophizing in general and ours in particular, one may object: even though in fact there is always, among other things, a certain appearance, inauthenticity, and unjustified authoritarian influence, but ultimately and first of all, the matter is decided on the purely objective basis of evidence. A loner has only as much weight as he brings forward evidentiary arguments, by means of proven evidence forcing others to agree. What has not been proven and presented as proven in philosophy - so what? What is the general situation with the proof? What exactly is provable? Perhaps only what is essentially unimportant is always provable. Perhaps what can be proven and therefore subject to proof is, in principle, worth little. If, however, philosophizing concerns something essential, can it then turn out to be, and is it accordingly doomed to remain, something unprovable? Does philosophy have the right to follow the path of arbitrary statements? Or – do we have no right at all to attach philosophy to the “either-or” of provability and unprovability? What then is the general situation with truth in philosophy? Are the features of philosophical truth similar to the evidence of a scientific thesis or is it something fundamentally different? We come here to the question of the deepest internal ambiguity of philosophy.

The truth of philosophy and its ambiguity

In the previous part of the preliminary examination, we received the initial characteristic of metaphysics - it is thinking in ultimate absorbing concepts, questioning, which in every question, and not only ultimately asks about the whole. Any question about the whole of the exciting and questioning person puts it into question based on the whole. We tried to characterize this whole from one side, perceived as something psychological - from the side of what we called the ambiguity of philosophizing. We have so far considered this ambiguity of philosophy in two aspects: firstly, its ambiguity in general, and secondly, the ambiguity of our philosophizing here and now. The ambiguity of philosophy in general means that it presents itself as a science and a worldview without being either one or the other. It leads us to the impossibility of verifying whether philosophy is a science and a worldview or not.

This general ambiguity becomes acute precisely when we dare to present something as specifically philosophical. Appearance is not eliminated in this way, but rather intensified. This is appearance in a double sense, affecting you, the listeners, and me; an appearance that can never be eliminated for reasons we have yet to delve into. This appearance for a teacher is much more stubborn and dangerous, because a certain unwanted authority always speaks for him, which is expressed in a kind of elusive conviction of others - a conviction whose danger very rarely makes itself recognized. The conviction inherent in any teaching of philosophy will not disappear even when the demand for a complete justification of everything and proof as the decisive criterion is put forward. The thesis that, ultimately, by limiting oneself to the plane of what is being proven, one can in principle eliminate any ambiguity, goes back to an even deeper presumption: that in philosophy, as elsewhere, what is being proven is generally essential. But this may be misleading; perhaps only that which is essentially unimportant is provable; and perhaps everything that needs to be proven first has no internal weight in itself.

So this last attempt to eliminate ambiguity by limiting it to the provable leads to the question of what is the nature of philosophical truth and philosophical knowledge, whether it is possible to talk about provability here at all.

Let us leave aside for now the peculiar circumstance that the question of philosophical truth was rarely raised, and even then only in passing. This situation is not accidental; it is rooted precisely in the ambiguity of philosophy. Why? The ambiguity of philosophy tempts a person to give philosophy as its allies and guides common sense, which equally ambiguously prescribes what one must think about it and its truth.

We said: philosophizing is reprimanding and delimitation concerning the last and ultimate things. Even everyday consciousness knows that philosophy is something of this kind, although it interprets this knowledge in the sense of a worldview and absolute science. In the closest way, philosophy seems to be something that, firstly, concerns and reaches everyone, and, secondly, is the ultimate and highest.

A) Presenting itself as philosophy as something that concerns everyone and is accessible to everyone

Philosophy is something that concerns everyone. It is not the privilege of any one person. There is probably no doubt about this. But everyday consciousness draws a silent conclusion from this: what concerns everyone must reach everyone. It should naturally be accessible to everyone. This “by itself” means: everything should be immediately clear. Directly - that means to any person on the street, without any further costs for a clear and sound mind. And what comes to everyone naturally is, everyone knows, statements like twice two is four, amenable to calculation, not beyond everyone’s control, not beyond what everyone is able to take into account without much ado. Calculation is an intelligible thing, like two and two are four. To learn this kind of thing requires a minimal expenditure of human substance, if any at all. We understand such universally valid truths without risking our fundamental humanity. I understand this, every person understands this, be he a scientist or a peasant, a gentleman or a swindler, whether he is close to himself and captured or lost in the accidental and entangled in it. Philosophy concerns everyone. Therefore, it is for everyone, as everyone naturally believes. Philosophical truth, precisely because it concerns everyone, must reach everyone, in accordance with the everyday criterion of intelligibility. This directly presupposes that what reaches everyone contains within itself the order and manner in which it reaches everyone. Clarity prescribes what can be true in general, what truth in general and philosophical truth in particular should look like.

B) Philosophy posing as the ultimate and highest

C) Philosophical truth under the guise of absolutely reliable truth

Philosophy is the last, the ultimate. This is exactly what one must have and be able to possess in a lasting manner. As the highest, it must also be the most reliable - this is obvious to everyone. It must be most reliable. What reaches everyone on its own, without human effort, must have the highest reliability. And look - what is already available to everyone without any problems, like two and two is four, is known to us in its ultimate manifestation as mathematical knowledge. In any case, as everyone knows, it is the highest, most rigorous and most reliable knowledge. So it seems that we have here the idea and scope of philosophical truth, arising from what philosophizing is and should be. To top it all off, we remember that Plato, whom we would hardly want to deny his philosophical charisma, ordered us to write at the entrance to his academy: “let no one enter who is not knowledgeable in geometry, in mathematical knowledge.” Descartes, who determined the fundamental attitude of modern European philosophy, what else did he want but to give philosophical truth a mathematical character and lead humanity out of doubt and ambiguity? From Leibniz came the saying: Sans les mathematiques on ne penetre point au fond de la Metaphysique, “without mathematics one cannot penetrate the foundation of metaphysics.” Here, it seems, is the deepest and most capacious confirmation of what people naturally present as the absolute truth in philosophy for everyone.

But if it is so obviously clear that philosophical truth is an absolutely reliable truth, then why is it not given to any efforts of philosophy? Do we not see, on the contrary, in the entire history of philosophy, as regards its efforts to achieve absolute truth and certainty, constantly one catastrophe after another? Thinkers like Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel have to put up with being refuted by some doctoral student. These disasters are so catastrophic that those affected by them do not even notice them.

Shouldn't we, from the experience of the entire previous fate of philosophy as an absolute science, conclude that we must say goodbye to such a goal? One might object to such a conclusion: firstly, although two and a half millennia of the history of Western philosophy represent a considerable period of time, they are still not enough to draw the same conclusion regarding the entire future; secondly, since it is impossible to judge and judge the future from the past in this way, the possibility that the efforts of philosophy will one day be crowned with success must be left fundamentally open.

Both reproaches must be answered: we deny philosophy the character of an absolute science, not because it has not yet achieved anything here, but because such an idea of the essence of philosophy is attributed to the latter on the basis of its ambiguity, and because this idea undermines philosophy in its deepest essence. That is why we briefly indicated the origin of this goal. What does it mean to prescribe mathematical knowledge to philosophy as the measure of knowledge and the ideal of truth? This means nothing less than making knowledge that is completely non-binding and in its content the most empty, the criterion for the most binding and complete - i.e. aimed at the whole - knowledge. So there is no need for us to even leave open the possibility that philosophy will ultimately succeed in its imaginary task of becoming an absolute science, for this possibility is not a possibility of philosophy at all.

If from the very beginning we reject in principle the connection between mathematical and philosophical knowledge, then the motive for this is precisely the one we named: mathematical knowledge in itself in its content, although it contains great wealth in the objective sense, is the most empty knowledge that is possible to think, and as such is at the same time the least binding for a person. Hence the remarkable fact that some mathematicians at the age of 17 could make great discoveries. Mathematical knowledge does not necessarily have to be based on the inner substance of a person. For philosophy, this is basically impossible. The emptiest and at the same time the least connected knowledge with the essence of man, mathematical, cannot become a measure for the most complete and binding knowledge that can be conceived: philosophical. This is the real reason—let us outline it only briefly for now—why mathematical knowledge cannot be presented as an ideal before philosophical knowledge.

D) The emptiness and non-bindingness of the argument about a formal contradiction. The rooting of philosophical truth in the fate of human presence.

If we deal with objections in this way, defending the thesis that philosophical knowledge, in short, is not mathematical in the broad sense and does not have the character of absolute certainty, then aren’t we in danger of another, much more caustic objection, which seems to nullify all our previous ones? calculations? Can't everyone easily stand in our way and say: Stop! You repeat here and there in a decisive tone that philosophy is not a science at all, not at all an absolutely reliable knowledge. But this, just this - that it is not absolutely reliable knowledge - one must think, is absolutely certain, and you proclaim this absolutely reliable thesis in a philosophical lecture. No, we’ve had enough of sophistry, filled to the brim with such unscientific demarches. To assert with a claim to absolute certainty that there is no absolute certainty is the most cunning trick you can come up with, but such things are very short-lived. Indeed, how could they resist the objection just presented?

Since the argument that has now appeared before us was not just born today, but surfaces again and again, we must look at it in its entirety and grasp it in its formal transparency. Isn't this argument convincing? Here it is: it is absurd, self-contradictory to assert with absolute certainty the absence of absolute certainty, because then at least this certainty remains - that there is none, and this means: there is some kind of certainty. Of course, he is as convincing as he is vulgar; and it was as vulgar as it remained ineffective at all times. It cannot be an accident that this apparently unshakable argument is nevertheless not an obstacle to anything. But we do not want to appeal again to the invalidity of this argument in previous history, but to invite us to think about two things.

First: precisely because this argument is always so easy to present, it is precisely because of this that it essentially says nothing. It is completely empty and non-binding. This is an argument that, in its internal content, generally relates not to philosophy, but to formal casuistry, designed to throw everyone speaking back into self-contradiction. In order for this argument to have the convincing force and significance attributed to it in such circumstances, it would still be necessary - at least in the spirit of those who want to see everything built on such certainty and on reliable evidence - to first have proof that this empty the trick of formal self-contradiction is suitable to carry and define philosophy in its essence, in its uttermostness and focus on the whole. Such proof has not only not been presented yet, but even its necessity has not been realized, much less understood by the people manipulating the said argument.

Second: this argument, which hopes to subvert our thesis, “philosophy is not a science and has no inherent certainty,” simply misses the mark. We do not claim and will never claim that it is absolutely certain that philosophy is not a science. Why do we leave it uncertified? Is it because we still leave open the possibility for it to be something like science? In no way, but because we do not know and will never be able to know with absolute certainty whether we are philosophizing at all in all our proceedings. If we cannot in this sense be certain of our own action, how are we going to assign any absolute certainty to it?

We are not confident in our philosophizing. In this case, perhaps it, philosophy, directly in itself has absolute certainty? No, because this - the fact that we are not certified in our philosophizing - is not at all an accidental property of philosophy as applied to us, but belongs to it itself, since it is a human matter. Philosophy has meaning only as a human act. Its truth is essentially the truth of human presence. The truth of philosophizing is rooted in the destiny of human presence. And this presence comes true in freedom. Opportunity, change and situation are dark. Presence is located before possibilities that it does not foresee. It is subject to change which it does not know. It moves constantly in a situation that it does not control. All presences belonging to existence belong with equal essentiality to the truth of philosophy. In saying this, we do not know this with absolute certainty, nor do we know with a degree of probability, which is only an antonym to the postulated absolute certainty. We know all this with a special kind of knowledge, marked by a balance between certainty and unreliability - knowledge in which we grow only through philosophizing. For when we say this so simply, only the same appearance of apodictic judgments arises again, in which a person does not participate. Visibility will disappear when we change the content.

But if we ourselves don’t know whether we are philosophizing here or not, then doesn’t everything begin to waver? Starts. Everything must inevitably come into vibration. We have no right to expect anything else as far as we are concerned. We could count on something different only if it were ensured that we, that each of us, is some kind of deity or God himself. Then philosophy would also become completely superfluous, especially our investigation regarding it. Because God does not philosophize, since philosophy, as its name already says, this love for..., this nostalgia for... is destined to reside in our insignificance, our finitude. Philosophy is the opposite of any tranquility and security. She is a funnel into the middle of which she pulls a person so that only in this way can he understand his own presence without fantasizing. Precisely since the truth of such an understanding is something final and ultimate, it has as a constant and dangerous neighbor the highest unreliability. No one who knows stands at every moment as close to the edge of error as a philosophizer. Anyone who has not yet understood this has never imagined what is truly called philosophizing. The last and ultimate is the most dangerous and unsecured, and everything is aggravated by the fact that this last and ultimate, in fact, should be self-evident, most reliable for everyone, and this is what philosophy appears under. In the frenzy of the idea of philosophy as absolute knowledge, people usually forget about this dangerous neighbor of philosophizing. Unless they remember it belatedly sometime with a hangover, without this memory becoming decisive for their actions. That is why a genuine fundamental disposition is rarely awakened, which would be at the level of this deepest ambiguity of philosophical truth. We are still completely unaware of this - this elementary readiness for the danger of philosophy. Since it is unknown to us and certainly does not affect us, since among those who engage in philosophy, but do not philosophize, it rarely, if ever, comes to philosophical dialogue. As long as there is no such elementary readiness for the internal danger of philosophy, no philosophizing discussion will take place, no matter how many articles with mutual attacks appear in journals. They all want to prove all kinds of truths to each other and at the same time forget the only real and most difficult task - to raise their own presence and the presence of others to fruitful interrogation.

E) The ambiguity of the critical attitude in Descartes and in modern European philosophy.

It is not at all accidental that with the emergence of a clearly expressed tendency to elevate philosophy to the rank of an absolute science, in Descartes, the peculiar ambiguity of philosophy immediately makes itself felt in a special way. Descartes' main tendency was to transform philosophy into absolute knowledge. It is with him that we discover something remarkable. Philosophizing here begins with doubt, and it is as if everything is being called into question. But it only looks like it. Presence, I (ego) is not questioned at all. This appearance and this ambiguity of the critical attitude stretches through all of modern European philosophy right up to the last modernity. We are dealing here, at best, with a scientific-critical, but not with a philosophical-critical attitude. It is always only knowledge, consciousness of things, objects or, further, subjects that is called into question - or, even less, remains outside the brackets and is not comprehended - and then only in order to make the anticipated certainty even more convincing; but the presence itself is never questioned. The Cartesian attitude in philosophy fundamentally cannot call the presence of man into question; she would then have destroyed herself in advance in her specific plan. She and with her all the philosophizing of the New Age, starting with Descartes, are not going to risk anything at all. On the contrary, the fundamental Cartesian attitude already knows in advance, or thinks that it knows, that everything is amenable to absolutely strict and pure proof and justification. To prove this, she is critical in a non-binding and non-threatening way - critical in such a way that she ensures in advance that nothing will presumably happen to her. We will begin to understand why this happens later. As long as we stand in such a relationship to ourselves and to things, we stand outside philosophy.

The struggle of philosophizing against the insurmountable ambiguity of its being. Self-philosophizing as the main event within our presence.

Looking into the multifaceted ambiguity of philosophizing has a frightening effect and ultimately makes you think about the futility of such an undertaking. It would be a misunderstanding if we wanted to even in the slightest degree weaken this impression of the hopelessness of philosophizing or retroactively smooth it out by pointing out that in the end everything is not so bad, that philosophy has done a lot in the history of mankind, and the like. All this is again just chatter, leading away from philosophy. On the contrary, we must preserve and withstand this fear. In it, an important side of any philosophical understanding makes itself known - that the philosophical encompassing concept is the capture of man, and precisely man as a whole - expelled from everyday life and driven into the basis of things. The invader here, however, is not a person, a dubious subject of everyday pastime and cognitive bliss, but presence itself, the being of a person, leads in philosophizing its capture of a person. Thus, at the core of his being, a person is subject to capture and is captured, overwhelmed by the desire to “become what he is,” embraced by his own understanding and grasping questioning. But this capture is not blissful awe, but a struggle with the insurmountable ambiguity of all questioning and being.

It would be the same perversion to see in philosophizing a desperate pressure that leads to exhaustion, something gloomy, dull, “pessimistic”, gravitating towards everything dark and negative. It would be a perversion to perceive philosophy in this way - not because, say, along with this supposedly shadow side, it also has bright sides, but because this assessment of philosophizing in general is not drawn from itself. Today, publicists of the most diverse worldviews and trends and their adherents agree on such criticism of philosophizing - and precisely our own attempts.

This assessment of philosophizing, which is in no way new, arises, in turn, from the easily observable intoxicated atmosphere of a normal person and from the convictions by which he is guided and according to which the normal is the essential, and the mediocre and therefore generally accepted is the true ( eternal mean). This normal person takes his little pleasures as the measure of what should be considered joy. This normal person takes his skinny fears as a measure of what should be regarded as fear and horror. This normal person takes his hidden comfort as a measure of what can be considered security and, accordingly, insecurity. We now dare to at least ask ourselves whether philosophy, as the final and ultimate reprimand and demarcation, has the right to submit itself to such a judge, whether we want, whether we are going to allow this judge to dictate our attitude towards philosophy - or are we deciding otherwise, i.e. That is, we want everything to rest on ourselves, on our human being. Is it really so certain that the interpretation of human presence in which we are moving today - according to which, for example, philosophy is a so-called cultural value along with others and, perhaps, science, something in need of stimulation - that such an interpretation of presence is the highest ? Where is the guarantee that man, in this current self-understanding, has not elevated his own mediocre average to god?

We have tried so far, in contrast to our initial whirlings, to comprehend - albeit only preliminary - philosophizing itself. We went two ways. First, we conceptualized philosophical questioning by interpreting Novalis’s dictum: philosophizing is nostalgia, the desire to be at home everywhere. Secondly, we noted the characteristic ambiguity of philosophizing. From all this we will extract one thing: philosophy is something independent. We cannot take it as one of the sciences, nor, on the other hand, as something that we simply discover when, say, we examine the sciences, clarifying their foundations. Not because there are sciences, there is philosophy among them, but on the contrary, sciences can take place only because and only when there is philosophy. But the substantiation of sciences, that is, the task of providing them with a foundation, is neither the only nor the most noble task of philosophy. Philosophy permeates the whole of human life (presence) even when there are no sciences, and not only in such a way that it simply looks back at life (presence), considering it as a kind of presence, ordering and defining it in the light of higher concepts. Rather, philosophizing is one of the main types of presence. Philosophy is that which, for the most part, gradually only allows presence to become what it can be. But what a human presence can be in a particular era, a given presence never knows; on the contrary, its possibilities are precisely for the first time formed within presence. And these possibilities are the possibilities of actual presence, i.e., the upcoming demarcation from existence as a whole.

Philosophizing is also not a belated reflection on existing nature and culture, nor is it an invention of possibilities and laws that are subsequently applied to the existing given.

All these are concepts that make production and mechanism out of philosophy, albeit in any sublimated form. Philosophizing, on the contrary, is something that takes place before any gesheft and constitutes the main event of presence; which is independent and completely foreign to the way of behavior in which we usually move.

The ancient philosophers already knew this - and should have known it - in the first decisive beginning. This is how the saying came down to us from Heraclitus (……………………………., ………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………). “The speeches of no matter how many people I have heard, not one has reached the point of knowing that wisdom, (…………..) [philosophy] is something separated from everything.” In Latin, separated is absolutum, something located in its own place, or rather, by itself for the first time and forming its own place. – Plato once says in one of his great dialogues that the difference between a philosophizing person and a non-philosophizing person is like the difference between being awake (………….) and sleeping (…………). A non-philosophizing person, including a man of science, of course exists, but he is asleep, and only philosophizing is a waking presence, something completely different in relation to everything else, incomparably independent. – Hegel – let’s call the philosopher of modern times – characterizes philosophy as a world topsy-turvy. He wants to say that in relation to what is normal for a normal person, it is perceived as a perversion, but in essence it is a straightening of human existence. Let this not be enough for you - not as an authoritative proof, but simply as an indication that I am not here inventing the concept of philosophy or presenting to you a whimsical private opinion.

Philosophy is something inherently independent, but precisely for this reason it is not isolated; on the contrary, as this ultimate and first, it initially already embraced everything, so that any application of it is always late and turns out to be a misunderstanding.

The point is nothing less than the restoration of this original dimension of the event in philosophizing being, in order to again “see” all things more simply, sharply and more persistently.

Third chapter. Justification for characterizing the ultimate questions about the world, finitude, solitude as metaphysics. The emergence and historical fate of the word “metaphysics”

Philosophical concepts, the basic concepts of metaphysics turned out to be limiting concepts (Inbegriffe), always containing the question of the whole and at the same time exciting the question of the one who understands. Therefore we define metaphysical questioning as the ultimate. At the same time, it might seem strange that we constantly equated philosophy and metaphysics, philosophical and metaphysical thinking. Indeed, in philosophy, along with “metaphysics,” there is also “logic,” and “ethics,” and “aesthetics,” and “philosophy of nature,” and “philosophy of history.” Why on earth do we define philosophizing specifically as metaphysical thinking? Why do we give metaphysics such an advantage over other disciplines?

These familiar philosophical disciplines, whose actual composition is by no means as harmless for the fate of philosophy as it might seem, arose when philosophy became a matter of school. We, however, are not at all in danger of arbitrarily preferring one philosophical discipline - metaphysics - to all others, because we are not talking about disciplines at all now. This preliminary consideration is intended precisely to destroy the idea of metaphysics as a rigid discipline.

Metaphysics is the ultimate questioning. These kinds of ultimate questions are: What is the world, finitude, solitude?

But on what basis then do we use the name “metaphysics” to name this kind of limiting questions? This question is indeed legitimate; it can be answered only after a brief analysis of the history of the word and its meaning. In addition, we have now already reached a certain preliminary point.

THE EMERGENCE OF ROMANTICISM.

ITS MAIN FEATURES.

Romanticism is an artistic movement that emerges at the beginning 19th century Europe and continues until the 40s of the 19th century.

The main one is the conflict between man and the world. The psychology of a rebellious personality emerges, which was most deeply reflected by Lord Byron in his work “Childe Harold’s Travels.”

The immediate cause of the emergence of romanticism was the Great French bourgeois revolution.

As for romantic art, Schlegel pointed out the primacy of “content” over form in it, emphasizing the expressiveness of a formless sketch, a fragment, something unfinished, where form is secondary.

"THE MOVEMENT OF STORM AND DRUG"

BASIC IDEAS OF BRIGHT REPRESENTATIVES

GERMAN ROMANTICISM

Indicated by the appearance of the steam engine, steam locomotive, steamship, photography and factory outskirts. If the Enlightenment is characterized by the cult of reason and civilization based on its principles, then romanticism affirms the cult of nature, feelings and the natural in man. It was in the era of romanticism that the phenomena of tourism, mountaineering and picnics, designed to restore the unity of man and nature, took shape. The image of a “noble savage”, armed with “folk wisdom” and not spoiled by civilization, is in demand.

Philosophy of Romanticism

Founders of philosophical romanticism: the Schlegel brothers (August Wilhelm and Friedrich), Novalis, Hölderlin, Schleiermacher.

Romanticism in painting

The development of romanticism in painting proceeded in sharp polemics with adherents of classicism. The Romantics reproached their predecessors for “cold rationality” and the lack of “movement of life.” In the 1820-1830s, the works of many artists were characterized by pathos and nervous excitement; they showed a tendency towards exotic motifs and play of imagination, capable of leading away from the “dull everyday life”. The struggle against frozen classicist norms lasted a long time, almost half a century. The first who managed to consolidate the new direction and “justify” romanticism was Theodore Gericault.

One of the branches of romanticism in painting is the Biedermeier style.

A number of works of art from the Romantic era are presented in the Neue Pinakothek in Munich (Germany).

Romanticism in literature

Romanticism first arose in Germany, among the writers and philosophers of the Jena School (W. G. Wackenroder, Ludwig Tieck, Novalis, brothers Friedrich and August Schlegel). The philosophy of romanticism was systematized in the works of F. Schlegel and F. Schelling. In its further development, German romanticism was distinguished by an interest in fairy-tale and mythological motifs, which was especially clearly expressed in the works of the brothers Wilhelm and Jacob Grimm, and Hoffmann. Heine, starting his work within the framework of romanticism, later subjected it to critical revision.

Romanticism became widespread in other European countries, for example, in France (Chateaubriand, J.Stal, Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Alfred de Vigny, Prosper Merimee, George Sand, Alexandre Dumas), Italy (N. U. Foscolo, A. Manzoni , Leopardi), Poland (Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Zygmunt Krasinski, Cyprian Norwid) and in the USA (Washington Irving, Fenimore Cooper, W. C. Bryant, Edgar Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry Longfellow, Herman Melville).

Stendhal also considered himself a French romantic, but he meant something different by romanticism than most of his contemporaries. In the epigraph of the novel “Red and Black” he took the words “The truth, the bitter truth,” emphasizing his vocation for a realistic study of human characters and actions. The writer was partial to romantic, extraordinary natures, for whom he recognized the right to “go on the hunt for happiness.” He sincerely believed that it depends only on the structure of society whether a person will be able to realize his eternal, given by nature itself, craving for well-being.

Romantic poets began to use angels, especially fallen ones, in their works.

Romanticism in Russian literature

The most prominent representatives of romanticism in music are: Franz Schubert, Ludwig van Beethoven (only the first notes of romanticism were traced in the works), Johannes Brahms, Frederic Chopin, Franz Liszt, Charles Valentin Alkan, Felix Mendelssohn, Robert Schumann, Louis Spohr, A. A. Alyabyev , M. I. Glinka, Dargomyzhsky, Balakirev, N. A. Rimsky-Korsakov, Mussorgsky, Borodin, Cui, P. I. Tchaikovsky.

The romantic worldview is characterized by a sharp conflict between reality and dreams. Reality is low and unspiritual, it is permeated with the spirit of philistinism, philistinism, and is worthy only of denial. A dream is something beautiful, perfect, but unattainable and incomprehensible to reason.

Romanticism contrasted the prose of life with the beautiful kingdom of the spirit, the “life of the heart.” The Romantics believed that feelings constitute a deeper layer of the soul than reason. According to Wagner, “the artist appeals to feeling, not to reason.” And Schumann said: “the mind goes astray, the feelings never.” It is no coincidence that the ideal form of art was declared to be music, which, due to its specificity, most fully expresses the movements of the soul. It was music in the era of romanticism that took a leading place in the art system.

If in literature and painting the romantic movement basically completes its development by the middle of the 19th century, then the life of musical romanticism in Europe is much longer. Musical romanticism as a movement emerged at the beginning of the 19th century and developed in close connection with various movements in literature, painting and theater. The initial stage of musical romanticism is represented by the works of F. Schubert, E. T. A. Hoffmann, K. M. Weber, N. Paganini, G. Rossini; the subsequent stage (1830-50s) - the work of F. Chopin, R. Schumann, F. Mendelssohn, G. Berlioz, F. Liszt, C. Alkan, R. Wagner, G. Verdi. The late stage of romanticism extends to the end of the 19th century.

The main problem of romantic music is the problem of personality, and in a new light - in its conflict with the outside world. The romantic hero is always lonely. The theme of loneliness is perhaps the most popular in all romantic art. Very often the thought of a creative personality is associated with it: a person is lonely when he is an extraordinary, gifted person. The artist, poet, musician are favorite heroes in the works of the romantics (“The Love of a Poet” by Schumann, “Symphony Fantastique” by Berlioz with its subtitle “An Episode from the Life of an Artist”, Liszt’s symphonic poem “Tasso”).

The deep interest in the human personality inherent in romantic music was expressed in the predominance of a personal tone in it. The revelation of personal drama often acquired a touch of autobiography among the romantics, which brought special sincerity to the music. For example, many of Schumann's piano works are connected with the story of his love for Clara Wieck. Wagner emphasized the autobiographical nature of his operas in every possible way.

Attention to feelings leads to a change in genres - lyrics, in which images of love predominate, acquire a dominant position.

The theme of nature is often intertwined with the theme of “lyrical confession”. Resonating with a person’s state of mind, it is usually colored by a feeling of disharmony. The development of genre and lyric-epic symphony is closely connected with images of nature (one of the first works is the “big” symphony

(based on materials: Schelling F. Philosophy of art )

Philosophy of art

The traditional idea of romanticism, which preaches extreme subjectivism, individualism and contemplation, needs to be adjusted. The accusation of the (German) romantics of primitivism - of constructing a dualistic model of culture: culture - civilization, and accordingly “the will to culture” - “the will to live”, of exalting aristocratic culture (contemplation, decadence) over burgher, middle-class (mass) culture is clearly not fair, although it has some basis (by the way, one can just as easily accuse the Russian romantic of destructivism, N. Berdyaev, of primitivism, who argued that culture is the great loser of life). Romantic individualism in Germany certainly developed under the influence of Fichte's subjective philosophy, however, both Schelling and Novalis (who were directly influenced by his idealism and called Fichte their teacher), and many other romantics over time moved away from subjective idealism: Schelling created a system of objective idealism, which became the philosophical basis of Jena romanticism, and the Jena romantics themselves proclaimed the idea of a synthesis of art and life, a new understanding of art that poeticizes life. Russian romantic poet - V.A. Zhukovsky expressed this apotheosis of romanticism in the poem “I am a young muse, it happened...”: “Life and poetry are one.” The greatest idea of a comprehensive synthesis: man and nature, art and science, philosophy and literature (poetry), philosophy and religion, music and architecture, all types (genres) of art was embodied most fully and talentedly in the philosophy of culture (Schelling’s philosophy of art) and the aesthetics of the romantics .

In art, and the art of romance was recognized as the highest form of spiritual activity, they looked for a universal form that would more fully correspond to the entire richness of human life and the diversity of natural existence. It is not knowledge of nature, but creative intuition, admiration and love for nature that helps a person to penetrate deeper into its secrets, to merge with nature in the One (God). And although philosophy is a “theory of knowledge” and “helps us to know the value of poetry,” it is poetry that is the heroine of philosophy and “the poet comprehends nature better than the mind of a scientist” (Novalis). Philosophy is capable of captivating a person to the very heights of the spirit, but it captivates only a particle of it. “Art allows an integral person to reach these heights” (Schelling). The essence of art lies in the fact that it harmonizes man’s relationship with the world (nature), bridges the gap between them, freedom and necessity. A person in his creativity (poet, artist) creates a spiritual world (culture, art, religion) and this intermediate sphere is the unity of the real and the ideal. Art and, above all, poetry, as a higher spiritual potency, flows directly from nature: “Poetry,” wrote Novalis in “Flower Pollen,” “in fact, is absolutely real, ... the more poetry, the closer to reality.” F. Schlegel defined the essence of romantic poetry: “Romantic is that which presents sentimental content in a fantastic form. Sentimental is what excites us, what awakens emotions in us, but not sensual, but spiritual. The source and soul of these impulses is love, and the spirit of love must hover invisibly everywhere in romantic poetry... And this inexplicable is the source of the fantastic, embodied in the poetic image.” So, only the “feeling of poetry,” which is akin to the “feeling of the mystical,” only genuine experience, “heartfelt imagination” (as P. Vyazemsky called the lyrical poetry of V. Zhukovsky, close to the German herzliche Phantasie by Novalis) is “a feeling of the special, personal, unknown , the hidden,” only it is capable of revealing the “necessary-accidental,” only it “represents the unimaginable, sees the invisible, feels the intangible” (Novalis). V. Zhukovsky created his own poetry of mood (suggestive), filled with a special meaning of the merging of man with the world. His poetic experience was comprehensively used by symbolist poets and existentialist philosophers in the twentieth century.

Being the ideological leader of early German romanticism, Schelling himself was in turn influenced by his other representatives, primarily the Schlegel brothers; It is known that Schelling directly borrowed a considerable portion of the concrete historical material appearing in the Philosophy of Art from the writings of his comrades in the Jena circle. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to say a few words about the latter.

The Romantic movement in Germany, as well as in other countries, began in the field of literature. Then it captured other forms of art: music (Weber, Schubert, Schumann) and painting (Rupge, Friedrich, Cornelius). Romanticism was developed in philosophy (Schelling), political economy (L. Müller), philology (the Brothers Grimm), theology (Schleiermacher), etc.

It is not easy to give an unambiguous formula of romanticism. Various ideological trends were united under his banner, which made this ideological movement controversial. However, over time, romanticism has undergone significant evolution. The term “romanticism” itself has been used in various senses. Thus, in the Age of Enlightenment, “romantic” meant everything that belongs to the type of chivalric romance. F. Schlegel meant new poetry by this term, as opposed to classical, ancient poetry. Novalis identifies the “romantic” with the poetic in general.

German romanticism as an ideological phenomenon took shape in the mid-90s of the 18th century, that is, after the collapse of the Jacobin dictatorship, and is a kind of echo of the French Revolution.

But it is characteristic that from the very beginning the romantics had a negative attitude towards the German bourgeoisie, its way of life and worldview. This was expressed in their opposition to the ideology of the Enlightenment (especially the late one). The Romantics criticized the groundless optimism of the late German enlighteners, their flat rationalism in ethics, aesthetics and art. They believed that Enlightenment ideology was unable to explain the modern era.

The Romantics sought to reject all moral and legal norms regulating the life of society. The spearhead of romantic subjectivism was directed against the morality of duty of Kant - Fichte, and ultimately against the morality of duty in general. The moral subjectivism and anarchism of the romantics, expressed in the desire to reject all norms of social life, were devoid of constructive content from the very beginning.

Along with criticism of the burgher morality of duty, the romantics subjected a thorough critical analysis to the educational approach to benefit. In him they saw tendencies hostile to man, destroying the integrity of the individual. A person engaged in any practical activity, from the point of view of the romantics, is not free, subordinate to goals external to the individual. Any participation in practical activity, according to their views, disfigures a person, since this activity takes place under conditions of division of labor. Hence the apology for idleness and quietism. It is not difficult to see anti-capitalist tendencies in such critical attacks of the romantics. Schiller and Goethe also criticized the capitalist division of labor. However, they did not lose historical perspective and did not deny historical progress, although they saw its contradictions. The romantics criticized capitalism from the perspective of past eras and took the path of reactionary utopianism. Disappointment in capitalist progress and the results of the revolution led the romantics to idealize obsolete eras - the initial stage of capitalism or the Middle Ages in general. Romantics see remnants of the golden age in the modern aristocracy and the Catholic Church.

Romanticism as an independent ideological movement has been taking shape since 1799 (the fall of the Directory and the beginning of Napoleon's Consulate). The circle of Jena romantics includes Wackenroder, Tieck, F. Schlegel, Novalis, who publish the journal Athenaeum, and the theologian Schleiermacher joins them.

Based on the philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, the romantics created their own aesthetic concept. They strongly opposed the aesthetic principles of classicism and the Enlightenment. They rejected the Enlightenment thesis about art as a reproduction of life and the idea of the classicists about the existence of insurmountable boundaries between genres of art. The purpose of romantic poetry, according to F. Schlegel, “is not only to reunite all separate types of poetry and to bring poetry into contact with philosophy and rhetoric. She strives and must either mix or dissolve poetry and prose, genius and criticism, artificial poetry and the poetry of nature. It must give poetry vitality and a spirit of sociability, and give life and society a poetic character. It must transform wit into poetry, saturate art with serious cognitive content and introduce humorous animation into it." According to F. Schlegel, poetry "recognizes the poet's arbitrariness as its fundamental law."2 Not limiting itself to mixing all genres of art, it strives to destroy the line between art and life. Aesthetic categories no longer act as a reflection of the latter, but are thought of as its constructive C.1. The magical power of creative subjectivity, according to the romantics, should abolish the prose of the world. As we see, the romantics borrowed from classical philosophy the position of the activity of the subject in the knowledge and design of the material of reality, turning this activity into an end in itself. Having put forward the principle of elevation above the material of life, the romantics “removed" all objectivity. Almighty subjectivity, in their opinion, is the main principle of philosophy, art and life. This attitude to reality the romantics called " romantic irony."

Capitulation to reality among the romantics took the form of a conscious opposition of art to life. Thus, Novalis calls for going into the “world of art.” “Whoever is unhappy in today’s world, who does not find what he is looking for, let him go into the world of books and art, into the world of nature - this is the eternal unity of antiquity and modernity, let him live in this persecuted church of a better world. He will find his beloved and friend, fatherland and God in them." 4. Elsewhere he declares: "Poetry in fact is absolutely real. This is the core of my philosophy. The more poetry, the closer to reality"

The Enlightenmentists and German classics spoke under the banner of reason. Romantics, on the contrary, preach the cult of the unconscious, the unconscious, the irrational. Novalis contrasts poetry with science. “A poet,” he says, “comprehends nature better than the mind of a scientist.” 6. Novalis also contrasts “laws of imagination” with “laws of logic.” Poetic creativity itself is conceived by the romantics as an illogical process. “The poet,” declares Novalis, “truly creates in unconsciousness... The artist has turned into an unconscious instrument, into an unconscious accessory to a higher power.” 7. The aesthetic sense is brought closer by the romantics to the sense of the mystical. “I,” says Wackenroder, “compare the enjoyment of the noblest works of art with prayer.”8 Closely related to the irrationalistic interpretation of the creative process is the romantic cult of “divine genius.” The ironically aristocratic genius looks down on all other people, declaring them flat and limited, since they are not imbued with the stamp of genius. “This is the general meaning of this brilliant, divine irony as that concentration of the “I” in itself,” says Hegel, “for which all bonds have disintegrated and which can live only in a blissful state of self-enjoyment. This irony was invented by Mr. Friedrich von Schlegel, and many others

Schelling considers art from the point of view of how the I can realize the original harmony between the objective and the subjective, that is, from the point of view of how “self-contemplation of the spirit” is accomplished. The latter, according to Schelling, is possible only in the contemplation of works of art. A work of art is the product of genius. Creative activity is free and at the same time subject to coercion, conscious and unconscious, deliberate and impulsive. “Just as fate is the name given to that force that realizes goals that we did not set in our free behavior, causing actions without our knowledge and even (contrary to our desire), so we call genius that incomprehensible thing that gives objectivity to the conscious without any assistance from freedom and even in spite of the latter." Artists, according to Schelling, create "unconsciously", "satisfying here only the persistent need of their nature"

A work of art created by the inspiration of nature always contains more than what the artist intended to express, due to which the product of artistic creativity itself acquires the character of a “miracle”, which, “even once accomplished, should assure us of the absolute reality of a higher being” 14 From this feature of the creative genius, Schelling then deduces the distinctive feature of works of art: “the infinity of unconsciousness.” The artist puts into his work, in addition to what was included in his plan, “a certain infinity”, which is not accessible to any “finite reason”. As an illustration, the philosopher takes Greek mythology, which arose as a result of unconscious folk art and which nevertheless contains “inexhaustible meaning.” The same applies to genuine works of art. “Any of them,” says Schelling, “as if the author had an infinite number of ideas, allows for an infinite number of interpretations, and one can never say whether this infinity is invested by the artist himself or is revealed in the work as such.” 15. A similar idea was formulated by Kant Schelling, like Kant, tries to emphasize the polysemy of the artistic image, but in his interpretation polysemy turns into unknowability.

“Philosophy of Art” arose when Schelling’s philosophical development clearly showed a turn to religious and mystical ideas, reflected in the dialogue “Bruno” (1802) and the works “On the Method of Academic Study” (1803) and “Philosophy and Religion” (1804) . Here Schelling makes an attempt to reconcile his philosophy with the Christian religion. The Incarnation of Christ appears to him as an eternal emanation of the finite and the infinite. The goal of Christianity, according to Schelling, is the gradual merging of religion, philosophy and art.

The turn to religious mysticism was reflected in the “Philosophy of Art”. However, this work still preserves many ideas that were formulated by Schelling in the early period of his activity, in particular during the period of his studies on philosophical problems of natural science.

The starting point for the “Philosophy of Art” is objective idealism. At the basis of everything that exists is the absolute as pure indifference, the indistinguishable identity of the real and the ideal, the subjective and the objective. All differences are completely eliminated. According to Hegel's witty remark, the absolute appears to Schelling in the form of night, where, as they say, all cats are gray.

3.1. "Construction" method

Schelling is guided in his aesthetic research by the “construction” method. With the help of several categories (ideal and real, subjective and objective, infinite and finite, freedom and necessity, etc.), he constructs an ideal model of the world of art. Hegel noted that by operating with two concepts (“ideal” and “real”), Schelling was like an artist who tried to depict the world by mixing just two colors on his palette.

Schelling is trying to determine the place of art in the universe and thereby understand its internal necessity and metaphysical meaning. Art is, as it were, the completion of the world spirit; in it the subjective and objective, spirit and nature, internal and external, conscious and unconscious, necessity and freedom are united in the form of the finite. As such, art is the contemplation of the absolute.

Art, like nature, is something holistic. All types, kinds and genres of art, according to Schelling, are internally connected and constitute a single whole, for they reproduce the absolute from different sides and by their own means. But Schelling not only considers various types and genres of art from the point of view of their organic connection with each other. He establishes the same connection between art, philosophy and morality. At the same time, he proceeds from the Kantian triad of ideas: beauty, truth and goodness. If truth is associated with necessity, and goodness with freedom, then beauty appears as a synthesis of freedom and necessity. Schelling believes that between truth, goodness and beauty there cannot be the same relationship that exists between goal and means.

3.2. The principle of historicism

The idea of a holistic consideration of all phenomena of art is in close connection with the principle of historicism. Already Herder, Schiller, Goethe expressed the idea of the need for a historical approach to art. Schelling tried to make the principle of historicism the starting point in his analysis. The philosopher's plan, however, could not be realized. The fact is that in Schelling's absolute there is no movement and development, and therefore no time. And since the system of arts reflects nothing more than the absolute, where time ceases to exist, then, naturally, the arts are ultimately withdrawn from time.

3.3. Beauty and art

The definition of beauty deduced from the absolute coincides for Schelling with the definition of art. “Beauty,” he writes, “is neither only the general or ideal (it = truth), nor only the real (it manifests itself in action)... It is only a perfect interpenetration or reunification of both. Beauty is present where the particular (the real) corresponds to its concept to such an extent that the latter, like the infinite, enters into the finite and is considered in concreto. By this, the real, in which it (the concept) manifests itself, becomes truly similar and equal to the prototype, the idea, where exactly this general and particular are in absolute identity.”

This coincidence is not accidental. For Schelling, the field of art is mainly limited to the reproduction of beauty, since the universe appears for him in the form of an absolute work of art, created in eternal beauty. It is important to note that the philosopher brings together the concepts of the beautiful and the sublime. He directly states that there is only a purely quantitative difference between these categories, and gives many examples to prove their complete indissolubility.

Summarizing his thoughts regarding the essence of art, Schelling writes: “The true construction of art is the representation of its forms as the forms of things as they are in themselves or as they are in the absolute... the universe is built in God as eternal beauty and as an absolute work of art; also all things, taken in themselves or in God, are unconditionally beautiful, and equally unconditionally true. Therefore, the forms of art, since they are the forms of beautiful things, represent the forms of things as they are in God or as they are in themselves, and since any construction is a representation of things in the absolute, then the construction of art is primarily a representation of its forms, what they are in the absolute, and thereby the universe, as an absolute work of art, such as it is built in eternal beauty in God.”

Schelling is characterized by the idea of the internal isomorphy of art and organic life (this is most noticeable in his analysis of painting, sculpture and architecture). Reason, according to Schelling, is directly objectified in the body. The same thing happens in the process of artistic creativity. After all, genius creates like nature. In essence, the creative process appears to Schelling as an unconscious, irrational, uncontrollable process, although the philosopher expresses various reservations on this matter.

3.4. Art and mythology

The problem of mythology occupies a large place in the “Philosophy of Art”. The philosopher believes that “mythology is a necessary condition and primary material for all art.”

Schelling associates the problem of mythology with the goal of removing art from the absolute. If beauty is the “clothing” of the absolute into the concrete-sensual, but at the same time direct contact between the absolute and things is impossible, some intermediate authority is required. The latter are ideas, breaking up into which the absolute becomes accessible to sensory contemplation. Ideas thus connect the pure unity of the absolute with the finite diversity of individual things. They are the essence of the material and, as it were, the universal matter of all arts. But ideas as an object of sensory contemplation, according to Schelling, are the same as the gods of mythology. In this regard, Schelling devotes great attention to the construction of mythology as the universal and fundamental “matter” of art.

Schelling outlined the concept of mythology in a systematic form in the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, as well as in the works World Ages and the Samothrace Mysteries. This concept is quite controversial. On the one hand, Schelling approaches myth from a historical point of view. Thus, a comparison of ancient and Christian mythology leads the philosopher not only to the idea of the historical variability of myth, but also to the identification of the distinctive abilities of ancient and modern art. Along with this, myth is often understood by Schelling as a specific form of thinking, independent of any historical boundaries. Schelling brings myth closer to symbol, i.e. with a sensual and indecomposable expression of an idea, with artistic thinking in general. Hence the conclusion is drawn that neither in the past, nor in the present, nor in the future, art is unthinkable without mythology. If the latter is absent, then, according to Schelling, the artist himself creates it for his own use. The philosopher hopes that in the future a new mythology will emerge, enriched and fertilized by the spirit of the new time. The philosophy of nature, in his opinion, should create the first symbols for this mythology of the future.

Having formulated general aesthetic principles, Schelling begins to consider individual types and genres of art.

3.5. Ideal and real series in art

Schelling's philosophical system rests on the postulation of two series in which the absolute is concretized: the ideal and the real. The system of arts is divided accordingly. The real series is represented by music, architecture, painting and plastic arts, the ideal - by literature. As if feeling the tension of his principle of classification of arts, Schelling introduces additional categories (reflection, submission and reason), which were intended to concretize the initial positions. However, even in this case the classification remains quite artificial.

3.6. Music and painting

He begins his characterization of individual types of art with music. This is the weakest part, since Schelling knew this type of art poorly, which forced him to limit himself to the most general remarks (music as a reflection of the rhythm and harmony of the visible world, a reproduction of becoming itself, devoid of imagery, as such, etc.). Painting, according to Schelling, is the first form of art that reproduces images. She depicts the particular, the particular in the universal. The category that characterizes painting is subordination. Schelling dwells in detail on the characteristics of drawing, light and shade, and color. In the dispute between supporters of drawing and color, he advocates a synthesis of both, although in practice it is clearly seen that drawing is of greater importance to him. Along with drawing, light is also of great importance for Schelling, so Schelling’s ideal in painting is dual: it is either Raphael (drawing!), or Correggio (chiaroscuro!).

3.7. Architecture and sculpture

Schelling sees art that synthesizes music and painting in plastic art, which includes architecture and sculpture. Schelling views architecture largely in terms of its reflection of organic forms, while at the same time emphasizing its kinship with music. For him it is “frozen music.”

In the plastic arts, sculpture occupies the most important place, because its subject is the human body, in which Schelling, in the spirit of the most ancient mystical tradition, sees a meaningful symbol of the universe.

The sculpture completes the real series of arts.

3.8. Poetry: lyrics, epic and drama

If the visual arts reproduced the absolute in the concrete, material, physical, then poetry does this in the general, i.e. in language. The art of words is the art of the ideal, the highest order. Therefore, Schelling considers poetry to express, as it were, the essence of art in general.

As in all other cases, the relationship between the ideal and the real serves as the basis for Schelling’s specification of certain types of poetry: lyric poetry, epic and drama. Lyrics embodies the infinite in the finite, drama is the synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the real and the ideal. In the following, Schelling analyzes separately lyric, epic and drama. The analysis of the novel and tragedy deserves the closest attention.

3.8.1 Roman

The novel, as we know, arose in modern times, and its theory practically did not exist until the beginning of the 19th century, with the exception of some statements by Fielding. The Romantics were the first to create the theory of the novel, which was further developed by Hegel. The novel is considered by Schelling as an epic of modern times. He bases his reasoning on “Don Quixote” by Cervantes and “Wilhelm Meister” by Goethe. He reacted coldly to the English novel. It is important that Schelling views the novel as “a synthesis of epic and drama.” In fact, a realistic novel of the 19th century. cannot be imagined without a dramatic element. It arose under the influence of the development of realistic drama.

3.8.2. Tragedy

Regarding tragedy, Schelling connects the tragic conflict with the dialectic of necessity and freedom: freedom is given in the subject, necessity in the object. The collision of historical necessity with the subjective aspirations of the hero forms the basis of a tragic collision. In his concept of the tragic, Schelling partly proceeds from the ideas of Schiller, who gave not only theory, but also brilliant examples of the tragic genre. For Schiller, the meaning of tragedy is the victory of spiritual freedom over the unreasonable, blind, natural necessity of fate. For Schelling, this meaning is that in the clash of freedom and necessity, neither side wins, or rather, both sides win: the tragic conflict ends with the synthesis of freedom and necessity, their reconciliation. Only from the inner reconciliation of freedom and necessity does the desired harmony arise, says Schelling. Schiller's unreasonable fate turns into something reasonable, divine, and natural in Schelling. As a result of this interpretation of necessity, Schelling’s latter acquires a mystical-religious connotation of inevitability. Therefore, it is quite logical that Schelling places Calderon above Shakespeare, for in the latter “freedom fights with freedom.” It is also clear why, in Schelling’s interpretation, Sophocles’ Oedipus acquired the features of the biblical sufferer Job.

3.8.3. Comedy

Schelling developed the problem of the comic to a lesser extent. He sees the essence of comedy in the “inversion” of freedom and necessity: necessity passes into the subject, freedom into the object. Necessity, which has become a whim of the subject, is, of course, no longer a necessity. Schelling here moves to the position of subjectivism and thereby removes the comic conflict from the sphere of historical law, due to which the possibility of arbitrary interpretation of historical conflicts arises.

4. Conclusion

The very attempt to classify types and genres of art is of interest. All of them, according to Schelling, are internally connected, there is no solid partition between them. In Schelling, the destruction of firm boundaries between types and genres of art often turns into a disregard for the definiteness of the objective material of art, i.e. to romantic subjectivism.

Schelling's aesthetics exhibits features of many modern theories of art. In his work “Philosophy of Art,” issues such as the theory of the tragic, the concept of the novel, and the synthesis of the arts were deeply developed.

15th century was the heyday of Italian humanism. Humanists of the first half of the century, occupied with practical issues of life, had not yet revised the foundations of traditional views. The most common philosophical basis for their ideas was nature, the requirements of which were recommended to be followed. Nature was called divine (“or god”, “that is, god”), but humanists did not have developed ideas of pantheism. Understanding nature as “good” led to the justification of human nature, the recognition of good nature and man himself. This displaced the idea of the “sinfulness” of nature and led to a rethinking of ideas about original sin. Man began to be perceived in the unity of soul and body; the contradictory understanding of this unity, characteristic of early humanism, was replaced by the idea of harmony. To the high appreciation of the body that appeared in humanism (Lorenzo Valla, Gianozzo Manetti, etc.), a positive perception of the emotional and sensory sphere departing from asceticism was added (Salutati, Valla, etc.). Feelings were recognized as necessary for life, knowledge and moral activity. They should not be killed, but transformed by reason into virtuous actions; directing them to good deeds with the help of will and reason is a titanic effort, akin to the exploits of Hercules (Salyutati).

During the Renaissance, the individual acquires much greater independence; he increasingly represents not this or that union, but himself. From here grows a new self-awareness of a person and his new social position: pride and self-affirmation, awareness of one’s own strength and talent become the distinctive qualities of a person. The Renaissance individual tends to attribute all his achievements to himself. Versatility is the ideal of the Renaissance man. Man becomes the creator of himself. As a result, man no longer needs divine grace for his salvation. As a person realizes himself as the creator of his own life and destiny, he also turns out to be an unlimited master over nature.

By including man in society, humanists even more actively included him in nature, which was facilitated by natural philosophy and Florentine Neoplatonism. The French humanist Charles de Beauvel called man the consciousness of the world; the world looks into his mind in order to find in it the meaning of his existence; knowledge of man is inseparable from knowledge of the world, and in order to know man, one must begin with the world. And Paracelsus argued that man (microcosm) consists in all its parts of the same elements as the natural world (macrocosm), being part of the macrocosm, it is known through it. At the same time, Paracelsus spoke about the power of man, his ability to influence the macrocosm, but human power was asserted not along the path of the development of science, but on magical-mystical paths. And although humanists did not develop a method of understanding man through nature, the inclusion of man in nature led to radical conclusions. Michel Montaigne, in his Experiments, deeply questioned the idea of man's privileged place in nature; he did not recognize the subjective, purely human standard, according to which a person ascribed to animals such qualities as he wanted. Man is not the king of the Universe; he has no advantages over animals, which have the same skills and properties as humans. According to Montaigne, in nature, where there is no hierarchy, everyone is equal, a person is neither higher nor lower than others. Thus, Montaigne, by denying man the high title of King of the Universe, crushed anthropocentrism. He continued the line of criticism of anthropocentrism outlined by Machiavelli, Palingenia, Gelli, but did it more consistently and reasonedly. His position was comparable to the ideas of Nicolaus Copernicus and Bruno, who deprived the Earth of its central place in the Universe.

Disagreeing with both Christian anthropocentrism and the humanistic elevation of man to God, Montaigne included man in nature, life in accordance with which does not humiliate man, being, according to the humanist, a truly human life. The ability to live humanly, simply and naturally, without fanaticism, dogmatism, intolerance and hatred constitutes the true dignity of a person. Montaigne’s position, preserving the primary interest in man inherent in humanism and at the same time breaking with his exorbitant and unlawful exaltation, including man in nature, turned out to be at the level of problems of both his time and subsequent eras.

During the Renaissance, art acquires great importance, and as a result, the cult of the human creator arises. Creative activity acquires a kind of sacred (sacred) character.

The cult of beauty characteristic of the Renaissance is associated with anthropocentrism. During the Renaissance, the value of the individual person increased as never before. The originality and uniqueness of each individual is placed above all else in this era. During the Renaissance, philosophy again turned to the study of nature. Interest in natural philosophy intensified towards the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries, as the medieval attitude towards nature as a dependent sphere was revised. In the understanding of nature, as well as in the interpretation of man, the philosophy of the Renaissance has its own specifics - nature is interpreted pantheistically. The Christian God here seems to merge with nature, and the latter is thereby deified.

Cultural studies in England and North America were divided into two streams: cultural-philosophical and culturological.

The philosophy of culture set the task of penetrating the meaning of culture, comprehending it as a whole, determining its relationship with man, God, and the purpose of history. Culturology, or the science of culture, has not set itself such high goals. First of all, she rejected any teleology, the derivation of culture from metaphysical principles, limiting herself to establishing cause-and-effect relationships between individual cultural phenomena and considering them in development, in the transition from one evolutionary phase to another.

The romantic concepts of the philosophy of culture in England and America in the first half of the 19th century are similar to European philosophy, originating in the ideas of Kant, Schelling and Hegel. In the systems of Schelling and Hegel, the world was viewed as a process and product of the self-development of the spirit. Cognition was understood as the discovery of identity in opposites (spirit in its objective forms). Consequently, the method of knowledge of morality, art, law and other cultural phenomena could only be philosophical, for no other science, except speculative, is able to show in part the whole,

Those who set themselves the task of creating a science of culture that meets modern scientific requirements, were guided not by philosophy (metaphysics) or theology, but by natural science.

The term “culture” was used in the most general sense, equivalent to the concept of “civilization,” to designate the diversity of phenomena that is studied by various humanities. At the same time, cultural studies, drawing closer in this regard to ethnography and cultural anthropology, turned to the early stages of human civilization, emphasizing that knowledge of primitive forms of culture studied by other humanities in their mature stage is necessary to discover their genesis and hidden magical or mythological meaning .

The largest representative of the romantic philosophy of culture in England in the first half of the 19th century. was Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881). At the same time, Ralph Emerson (1803-1882) developed the ideas of transcendentalism in America. The differences in their research are based only on the difference in the ideologies of the people of the Old and New Worlds.

Both thinkers professed a romantic philosophy of man, which deserves special mention. Romantic ideas about man stem from the teachings of the German classics about the “moral” and “aesthetic” man. Kant and Schiller understood this as a “man of culture,” i.e., an educated person who united in his activity in harmonious proportions the natural and spiritual principles, necessity and freedom, will (reason) and reasoning (cognition), who discerns the embodiment in nature itself the divine principle in the form of beauty and the sublime, the unity of the aesthetic and moral principles.

Such unity is shown in the appearance of the symbol. The symbol combines the finite and the infinite (nature and spirit), the obvious and the secret; nature is a symbolically encrypted text, and art concentrates and focuses in itself the same symbolism that is diffused throughout the universe.

The romantic consciousness, in contrast to medieval symbolism, was interested not only in the supersensible world, but also in the sensual. Although the romantics called for not limiting the horizon of one’s horizons to earthly problems, they by no means shunned them. They were characterized by an interest in natural science (this was especially characteristic of Emerson), they also took social problems to heart, and intervened in the life around them. It is known what role Emerson played in the struggle against slavery in America, and Carlyle in the struggle to improve the situation of the working class in England. But in everything they looked for transcendental foundations, in everything they saw symbols of the supersensible.

John Ruskin (1819-1900) acted as a true romantic in his philosophical substantiation of the importance of nature for man as a morally cleansing force, the only refuge among the noise, noise, soot of modern machine civilization and its ugly products. Nature serves as the starting point for Ruskin for the construction of sociology (or social philosophy of art). The attitude towards nature determines the moral state of society. And the nature of labor, art and political institutions depends on it. It is the depth of the artist’s penetration into nature (the idea of truth) that shows the degree of his ability to approach God, and, consequently, his moral qualities.

In a major study of the “autumn of the Middle Ages” - the culture of Venice in the 13th-15th centuries.6 - Ruskin showed the dependence of grand style architecture on nature, as well as on the nature of the social, political, religious life of the people who created this architecture.

Ruskin is convinced that, in contrast to the modern state of society, where the incorrect organization of labor leads to contrasts of poverty and wealth, urban communities of the Middle Ages, inspired by religious and aesthetic values, embodied peace and harmony. In accordance with this social “myth of the Middle Ages,” life can be organized on the basis of cooperation, rather than the pursuit of profit, if it is based on religious ideas about the morally purifying nature of work.

Ruskin's denial of the contemporary economic organization of society continued with an attempt to create his own economic doctrine. In the spirit of Carlyle, the doctrine of the wealth of society is taken as a basis not as accumulated property, but as the moral dignity of the creators of material wealth. The essence of labor, according to Ruskin, in contrast to A. Smith and the classics of political economy of the Manchester School, is not in the creation of value, but in the expression of creative human abilities. Ruskin believed that if respect for work spread throughout society, and workers and employers recognized mutual authority, then the ills of poverty and social contrasts would be ended. In order to remake the consciousness of the working and managerial class, Ruskin preached in the form of lectures and books (in the 70-80s), almost abandoning his studies in art. But as a social theorist and public preacher he was much less original and interesting than as an artistic ideologist. His political economy turns out to be a departure from Proudhon’s “philosophy of poverty,” which has spread throughout all European countries, but cannot offer anything other than moneyless exchange, the replacement of commodity production with natural exchange, and the reduction of large private property to small property.

The decline of romanticism and the emergence of scientific theories of society and culture were associated with a change in the view of man.

Popular

Parthenogenesis - technique of the immaculate conception

« The concept of parthenogenesis During fertilization, the sperm releases the egg from its dormant state and it begins to develop. But in nature there are cases... »

The Tale of the Three Brothers Who gave the three brothers Harry Potter accessories

« Once upon a time there lived Three Brothers of a Wizard, and one day they needed to cross a river; they couldn’t swim across it, it was too wide and deep. And brothers... »

De Broglie hypothesized that particles of matter

« O.S.Ageeva, T.N.Stroganova, K.S.Chemezova ELEMENTS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS AND SOLID STATE PHYSICS Tyumen. 2009 UDC 537(075):621.38 Ageeva O.S.,... »