Large-caliber artillery of the First World War. Super-heavy guns of the First World War. Situation during the war

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76.2 mm. cannon (Russia)

In 1900, based on the works of V.S. Baranovsky, a 3-inch gun was developed in Russia. Production began at Putilov's factories.
In 1902, engineers of the Putilov plant under the leadership of N.A. Zabudsky developed an improved version of the three-inch gun.
They shot with landmines and shrapnel. For firing shrapnel, the 3-inch gun received the nickname “Death Scythe” from soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies.
The gun was equipped with guidance devices, which made it possible to fire from cover.
In 1906, the gun was equipped with a shield and an optical sight.
It was produced virtually unchanged until 1930. The 3-inch barrel was used as the basis for the creation of new 76-mm divisional guns. This is how the F-22 cannon of the 1936 model, the USV of the 1939 model, and the ZIS-3 of the 1942 model were developed.
Weight: 1092 kg
Caliber: 76.2 mm.
Rate of fire - 10-12 rounds per minute.
Elevation angle: -6 + 17 degrees
Projectile weight: 6.5 kg
Initial projectile speed: 588 m/s
Firing range: 8530 m

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6-inch siege gun 1904 (Russia)

The Model 1904 6-inch siege gun is a heavy siege artillery gun with a caliber of 152.4 mm. The first official name was "6-inch long gun". Developed on the basis of a 6-inch 190-pound gun of the 1877 model. The design of the old 190-pound cannon barrel did not allow increasing the initial velocity of the projectile when switching to smokeless powder.
At the end of 1895, an order was placed with the Obukhov plant for a new 6-inch gun. In 1897, an order was issued to the St. Petersburg Arsenal to convert one carriage of the 1878 model into a 6-inch long cannon of 200 pounds. By the beginning of 1900, a 6-inch long gun was already firing at the Main Artillery Range. On December 19, 1904, by artillery order No. 190, a 6-inch 200-pound cannon with its carriage was introduced into the siege and fortress artillery, in accordance with the Highest Order of November 3, 1904.
Produced by the Perm Ordnance Plant. In 1904, the Obukhov plant received an order for the production of 1 copy. The Obukhov plant handed over its cannon to the Main Artillery Directorate in 1906. The Perm Ordnance Plant began deliveries after 1907. By 1913, 152 guns were manufactured and finally accepted. Another 48 copies were manufactured, but not tested by fire.
The gun was mounted on a carriage of the Durlyakher system and a rigid carriage designed by Markevich on the basis of a siege carriage of the 1878 model. From 1908 to 1911, the Kiev Arsenal and the Perm Plant supplied 200 carriages of the Markevich system.
After the Civil War, the gun was left in service with the Red Army (Red Army). At the end of the 20s, most of the 6-inch 200-pound guns were mounted on tractor-type metal wheels. In 1933, the GAROZ plant modernized the Markevich carriage.
In the early 1930s. The gun began to be replaced with 152-mm guns of the 1910/30 and 1910/34 models. As of January 1, 1933, there were 49 units in service. 6-inch guns, 200 pounds. After the 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 model (ML-20) was adopted into service, the guns of the 1904 model were removed from service with the Red Army. A number of 6-inch guns took part in the Soviet-Finnish War on the side of Finland.
Caliber: 152.4 mm.
Weight in combat position: 5437 kg.
The weight of the gun barrel is 200 pounds (3200 kg).
Rate of fire 1 shot per min.
Maximum firing range: 14.2 km.
Initial projectile speed: 623 m/s
Elevation angle: -3.5 + 40.5 degrees

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107 mm gun model 1910 (Russia)

In 1907, the Russian army ordered a long-range cannon from the French company Schneider. 107 mm was developed. gun, called M/1910. The gun was produced under license at the Putilov plant. The official name is "42-line heavy field gun model 1910."
With minor changes, it was produced in France under the name “Canon de 105 L, Modele 1913 TR”. Until the end of World War I, France produced 1,340 guns. About 1000 of them took part in.
The gun was also produced in Italy by Ansaldo under the name da 105/28.
The gun had an elevation angle of 37 degrees - the maximum angle for guns developed before the start of the First World War. During the war, it was used both to support infantry and for long-range shelling of enemy positions.
107 mm. used in the Civil War. In 1930 it was modernized and produced under the name "107-mm gun model 1910/30". The firing range increased to 16-18 km.
By June 22, 1941, the Red Army had 863 units in service. 107 mm gun mod. 1910/30
Caliber: 107 mm
Firing range: 12500 m.
Horizontal aiming angle: 6 degrees
Barrel angle: -5 +37 degrees
Weight: 2486 kg
Initial projectile speed: 579 m/s
Rate of fire: 5 shots per minute.
Projectile weight: 21.7 kg.

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37 mm. Obukhov (Russia)

37 mm. Obukhov gun. Produced in St. Petersburg at the Obukhov plant. Began production not long before the start of the First World War. A small number of guns were produced. The guns were delivered to the Black and Baltic seas. At least one cannon was installed on Grigorovich's M.9 flying boat.
In addition to the Obukhov air cannon, the Russian army used the 37 mm Hotchkiss M1885. At the beginning of 1914, a naval 37 mm. they tried to install the cannon on Ilya Muromets. The gun was installed under the fuselage of the aircraft. Intended for attacks on ground targets. After testing, the gun was found to be ineffective and was removed from the aircraft. Also during the war, 76 mm and 75 mm aircraft guns were tested.
The photo shows 37 mm. Obukhov on the Grigorovich M.9 flying boat, Orlitsa aircraft, Baltic Sea.
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A man is more terrible than a beast when he is a beast!
Omirimmen Zhanymdy - Otanimmen Suyiktilerim Ushin!

Alexey OLEINIKOV

The experience of the Russo-Japanese War was carefully studied in Germany, where they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create heavy field artillery armed with high-power guns. The Germans persistently and methodically implemented this concept, leaving their neighbors to conduct fruitless debates about the “overload of the German division with artillery.”

Heavy field artillery performed admirably during the maneuver phase of the First World War. And when the inability to achieve victory during maneuverable combat operations “buried” the warring parties in the ground, heavy field artillery became the most important tool for breaking through the enemy’s layered defense, the “fire hammer” of the infantry.

The First World War put forward the following range of tasks for heavy artillery:

1. firing at living targets and batteries from a distance inaccessible to field gun fire;

2. long-range shelling of bivouacs, convoys, parks, reserves, warehouses, supply points and other targets behind enemy lines;

3. shelling of living targets hidden in dugouts and field resistance units;

4. destruction of heavily fortified strongholds;

5. methodical shelling (so-called fire surveillance) of populated areas;

6. systematic shelling of important railway stations;

7. shelling of message nodes;

8. counter-battery combat, especially with artillery located in solid closures;

9. shelling of tethered balloons;

10. destruction of important targets, the shelling of which with other types of weapons is useless.

Heavy artillery is strong due to its caliber, the large weight of the projectile and its destructive effect, as well as its greater range of fire - i.e. its advantages were “power” and “range”. On the other hand, it is inactive - especially with very large calibers, and is also “capricious” in matters of ammunition supply. But the disadvantages were compensated by the results obtained from the combined power and range of fire. The rate of fire of heavy artillery during this period was 4-8 rounds per minute, which was considered satisfactory.

Speaking of mobility, it is worth noting that the ability of Russian heavy field artillery for active movement was tested in the Carpathians in February-March 1915, when, for example, a heavy battery

The 3rd Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade entered the valley of the Sivka River. She did it at night (!), crossing the Vyshkov Pass, walking along terrible mountain roads, only patched up in places with wooden flooring. Here, of course, the level of training of the personnel, the high moral qualities of the Russian artillerymen and their awareness of the enormous responsibility to the infantry played a role.

The key criteria for classifying a weapon as “heavy artillery” were its functional purpose and place in the structure of the Russian army. That is why the 122 mm field howitzer, along with the 76 mm field gun, was part of the light field artillery. And the smaller caliber 42-linear (107-mm) cannon was classified as “heavy artillery” - just like the 120-mm cannon of the Obukhov plant system and the 120-mm French cannon that appeared in the Russian army during the war.

The 107-mm rapid-fire cannon, 152-mm cannon and 152-mm howitzer of the 1910 model are the backbone of the Russian heavy artillery gun fleet. These guns were part of the corps artillery, heavy artillery divisions and brigades, as well as the special purpose heavy artillery corps (TAON).

6-inch howitzer model 1910 (Schneider system).

It is no coincidence that the main calibers for guns and howitzers of field heavy artillery were adopted: for guns - 42 lines (4.2 inches, 107 mm), and for howitzers - 6 inches (152 mm). Both guns were easily transported by eight horses. The only thing that was insufficiently mobile was the charging box, which was transported by only six horses. And in a combat situation, the box almost always lagged behind the gun. Sometimes, to increase the mobility of the charging boxes, it was necessary to harness “civilian” horses to them. Since both systems were equipped with recoil devices, as well as modern sighting devices, they had a fairly high rate of fire. Thus, the battery under the command of Captain Sokolov, which was part of the 1st heavy artillery brigade, during the battles near Angerburg (East Prussia) showed: for a cannon - up to nine shots, and for a howitzer - up to four shots per minute. Peacetime range shooting experience during the testing of these guns in 1914 demonstrated the following indicators: for a cannon - 10, and for a howitzer - six rounds per minute. But, of course, the training ground conditions were significantly different from the combat ones.

The classification of heavy artillery was also important. Russian artillery had to in 1910-1913. withstand repeated reorganizations until heavy artillery was brought to the structure that remained during the First World War: it was divided into “maneuver” and “positional”. Although this functional division was quite arbitrary.

All of the above guns belonged to maneuverable heavy artillery.

The so-called positional heavy artillery differed from it in that it did not have its own standard means of transportation and was transferred from one section of the front to another as needed. This type of artillery in the Russian army began to take shape towards the end of 1915, while among the allies - in the summer of 1915.

In contrast to maneuver artillery, which was more unified in its gun fleet and organizational structure, positional artillery was characterized by greater diversity. For its formation, fortress, coastal and even naval guns were used - that is, systems that were not originally intended for transportation in a combat zone. Such guns were transported, as a rule, along field narrow-gauge railways, along good highways, and only over short distances - along dry and wide dirt roads (if they were in good working order and had very strong bridges). The possibility of transporting such guns depended on their caliber and ground conditions, and, consequently, the time of year. The speed of movement on tractors on good highways is 5 km/h; at higher speeds, the material part suffered.

Positional guns were required to be placed in groups of at least two units - the complexity of the mechanism sometimes caused the gun to rupture, which could affect the completion of the task. Thus, the explosion of an 11-inch howitzer on the left flank of the 49th Corps deprived the Russian troops of serious fire support on the crucial day of June 18, 1917 - the first day of the June offensive of the Southwestern Front. This episode was very unpleasant - after all, the howitzer was supposed to destroy the enemy’s concrete observation post at a height near the villages. Years

The installation of position guns required from 20 minutes (8-inch Vickers gun) to seven days (10-inch coastal gun), as well as special cranes and other mechanisms.

Positional artillery was intended:

– to fire at the most important targets behind enemy lines (warehouses, headquarters, bridges, road intersections, etc.), to combat large-caliber and long-range artillery (the 6-inch Kane gun was most actively used);

– for shelling and destruction of important railway stations, communication centers and large military warehouses (a long-range 10-inch coastal gun with a range of almost 20 km and a 120-mm Vickers gun with a range of more than 13 km were used);

– for the destruction of very strong fortifications and especially important fortified units and sections of positions (9- and 11-inch howitzers of coastal artillery, 9-inch Vickers howitzer, 11-inch Schneider howitzer and other guns were used);

– to destroy strong structures of especially fortified trenches (6-inch guns were used).

What were the most important of the heavy field artillery guns?

The 107-mm cannon of the 1910 model had a flat fire trajectory and a powerful high-explosive projectile. The gun was very long-range, having proven itself effectively where the use of other types of guns was unpromising. The use of this weapon was allowed: with a high-explosive shell (grenade) - against important (and remote), mainly vertical, targets (railway stations, observation posts, reserves and headquarters), against enemy long-range artillery (counter-battery warfare); shrapnel - for firing at tethered balloons, hitting remote large open living targets (military columns, etc.).

The last task was most relevant during rearguard battles - when 107-mm cannons fired at the vanguard of the advancing enemy. Thus, the 2nd battery of the Life Guards heavy artillery division during the battles of July 22-23, 1915 in the Wlodawa direction repelled a series of powerful German attacks, giving combat stability to the infantry, which launched a successful counterattack.

Heavy howitzers were used to destroy defense units, machine gun nests, gun emplacements, shelters, etc. - that is, the main elements of defense, for the destruction of especially strong wire barriers (iron stakes on concrete bases, barriers in the forest, wire barriers of particular density - wire cylinders), for the destruction of wire barriers behind slopes of heights and in deep hollows, for the destruction of buildings fortified observation posts, to destroy fortified batteries and live targets behind serious closures.

Howitzers used both high-explosive shells and shrapnel.

9- and 10-inch guns; 9-, 11- and 12-inch howitzers of the Vickers and Obukhov plant systems were supposed to destroy particularly remote and significant objects: warehouses, railway junctions, heavy artillery positions, etc.

The 305-mm howitzer from the Obukhov plant, model 1915, became the top of the artillery pyramid of the Russian Army.

The howitzer was designed by the Obukhov and Petrograd metal plants and fired a 372 kg projectile at a 13.5 km distance. The projectile pierced a concrete slab 3.4 meters thick. The gun belonged to long-range and “great power” systems (a howitzer classmate of the Vickers system with the same caliber fired only 9 km).

The most striking episode of the combat use of “Russian Bertha” was the fire battle on December 3, 1916 near the village of Elovka on the Dvina front. The strike artillery group of the 19th Army Corps (two 305 mm and six 152 mm guns) delivered a powerful blow to eight German targets near Elovka. Objects located 11-13 km from the front line were hit.

Now it’s worth looking at the history of the development of Russian heavy artillery by the beginning of the 20th century, as well as the evolution of its structure.

The first experience of equipping Russian troops with heavy artillery in harnesses dates back to 1898-1899. - it took place at large maneuvers of the troops of the Kyiv Military District, which at that time was commanded by General M.I. Dragomirov.

Kyiv siege battalion under the command of Colonel A.V. Chocoly formed a platoon of 8-inch light mortars mounted on “hard” carriages. The carts with platforms and ammunition were drawn by civilian horses - the siege battalion did not have its own. This experience showed the possibility of moving a heavy artillery system along country roads and even (for a short distance) through plowing. The maneuvers ended with live firing with an attack on fortified positions. In accordance with the requirements of that time, the artillery, having carried out fire preparation for the infantry attack, changed its position, which was then exclusively open. But the heavy artillery of that time could not yet change positions.

The next episode, when heavy artillery was assigned to field troops, occurred in 1903 at the Rembertovsky training ground near Warsaw. Guard Colonel Ya.F. Karpov (later the commander of the Novogeorgievsk Fortress Artillery) commanded the guns, which were taken from the Warsaw Fortress Artillery (with special wooden platforms), while the 3rd Artillery Brigade provided the Life Guards with its own harnesses. At the same time, a device called “shoes” was tested - it was put on the wheels to reduce their “stickiness” in the ground.

During the Russo-Japanese War, in the area of ​​Dashichao Station, near Liaoyang and Mukden, the East Siberian Siege Artillery Division (formed in the Kiev Military District) operated, which was assigned batteries allocated from the Vladivostok fortress artillery, as well as those transferred from the Warsaw Fortress.

Then, for the first time, Russian heavy artillery practiced shooting at an invisible target.

In 1906, siege artillery battalions were formed consisting of three batteries: two 42-line guns and one 6-inch howitzer. The division also included a communications service and a searchlight department.

By the beginning of World War I, the Russian army had only five such divisions. But during the war, their number tripled (including, in addition to the numbered ones, two Siberian ones appeared), in addition, the divisions became the basis for siege artillery brigades.

The Russian and French armies entered the World War, clearly underestimating the role and importance of heavy artillery - the first had 240, and the second - 308 heavy guns. They made up for lost time already during the battles.

With the outbreak of the war, the commanders of the armies and fronts bombarded Headquarters with requests for heavy artillery. The Main Artillery Directorate was at first confused, and then remembered the existence of fortress artillery, which could provide guns until domestic factories could cope with the corresponding task and help arrived from the allies.

What fortresses could provide weapons? Coastal: Kronstadt, Sveaborg, Sevastopol, Libau, Vladivostok - armed themselves and had to support the fleet. Land: Novogeorgievsk, Brest-Litovsk, Osovets, Kovno, Grodno - were to become the basis of the defensive line of the Austro-German front. In the Caucasus there were Kars, Akhaltsykh (fortification), Akhalkalaki (fortification), and partially Batum. But these fortresses and fortresses, with the small number of troops on the Caucasian front, had to be in constant readiness and support the Caucasian army. The Vistula fortresses of Warsaw and Ivangorod provided guns, even though they were at the stage of reorganization. As a result, already in 1914, a 12-gun heavy division was formed, which received the name “Warsaw”. In mid-October 1914, the Vyborg fortress artillery sent 12 guns to Warsaw, from which they formed the Vyborg heavy division. Novogeorgievsk also allocated 12 guns to form the same division. The Novogeorgievsky heavy division took part in the siege of Przemysl.

A war participant recalled: “Already in 1915, heavy artillery divisions formed from fortress artillery appeared at the front. I had to see heavy artillery battalions formed from the Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk fortress artillery. I often visited one of these divisions, as it was commanded by one of my fellow soldiers. Frequently visiting this heavy division, I noted with great pleasure that the spirit and mood of the division’s officers differed very favorably from the spirit and mood of the officers of the fortress artillery in peacetime.”

Although the formation of fortress divisions continued (four Brest-Litovsk, two Ivangorod heavy artillery divisions were formed, etc.), this, of course, was not enough.

It was the needs of the front, if not for divisional, then at least for corps heavy artillery that led to the creation of three-battery heavy artillery divisions (in the peacetime army there were only five such divisions, and even those were framed). Two batteries were howitzers (six-inch howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model) and one battery was a cannon battery (42-line guns of the 1910 model). Each battery has four guns. During the war, the number of numbered heavy divisions steadily increased. In 1915, the Life Guards Heavy Artillery Division was formed.

Kane's naval 6-inch gun in a land firing position.

Heavy divisions became the basis for the formation of 17 heavy field artillery brigades of three divisions (15 numbered, Osovets and 1st Siberian). But in 1916-1917. the brigades were abolished, and the divisions received the name “separate field heavy artillery divisions.” A significant number of more mobile and better controlled divisions made it possible to saturate the troops of the active army with the necessary volume of heavy artillery units.

The first of the formed heavy divisions worked on the Bzura and Ravka rivers in the fall and winter of 1914. Their appearance at the front caused great joy among the troops. The artillerymen passed the first test with honor. An eyewitness recalled: “The young staff captain Boris Klyucharyov of the Warsaw division brought one 42-line gun to the infantry trenches at night, and when it was just dawn, he opened fire on the German machine-gun nests (on Bzura), which were hitting our positions. The nests were completely destroyed. Of course, the Germans also responded later. But this weapon was not damaged, and the next night he took it out unharmed.”

The experience of forming heavy divisions and their great importance for the front pointed out to the Main Artillery Directorate the need to give these formations a coherent system. And in 1915, a Reserve Heavy Artillery Brigade was established in Tsarskoe Selo - it was headed by academician artilleryman N.I. Fonstein.

And yet, until the beginning of 1917, the disproportionately small Russian heavy artillery had little influence on the course of the war. Organizationally, it was also not connected with field formations. And even divisions were assigned to army corps sporadically - to participate in major operations. The usual situation was battery-by-battery divisions of divisions - and the batteries “traveled” throughout the armies and corps. Thus, an active participant in the offensive of the Southwestern Front in 1916 - the 17th Army Corps - was reinforced by the Brest-Litovsk heavy artillery division only in the Brody-Radziwill area. The division supported the corps for only two weeks - until the capture of the city of Brody. That is, from May 22 until mid-July, the front’s strike formation fought without the support of heavy artillery.

The share of Russian heavy field artillery increased noticeably only by 1917. In addition to the above-mentioned types of guns, it was armed with 105-mm Japanese and 120-mm French cannons, 150-mm captured German and 152-mm English howitzers.

Since 1916, heavy artillery has been reinforced by “tractor” 203-mm and 228-mm howitzers (Vickers systems) - transported by mechanical traction. Naval 6-inch Kane guns (a system with a valuable firing range of up to 15-16 kilometers) were also adapted for transportation on tractors and on railway platforms. At the Reserve Heavy Artillery Brigade, a special school of tractor artillery was created - all officers and senior heavy artillery fireworks were required to complete it (according to an accelerated program).

Tractor batteries were well supplied for passenger cars and motorcycles. A special technical officer was appointed to command every eight vehicles, assisted by a technical master. To transport shells, the tractor battery had eight three-ton trucks, and for fuel – two tanks (5 and 3 tons). The commander of the tractor battery was entitled to a passenger car, and the other officers of the battery were entitled to two more cars. And, as an eyewitness noted, “we can and should say with confidence that no army had such rich equipment”! In addition, all officers and fireworks were given a saddle horse. The team of scouts and telephone operators also had 40 riding horses.

The organization of the second type of heavy artillery - positional - resulted in the creation of separate positional divisions and high-power batteries.

And finally, a special-purpose heavy artillery corps appeared - TAON (in documents from the First World War, this abbreviation was usually used in the masculine gender). It included guns of 120-305 mm caliber (including a 12-inch “butt” and the above-mentioned tractor artillery guns). As General V.I. recalled. Gurko: “At least three-quarters of all heavy artillery that has already entered service in the winter of 1916/17 or is still being created will be sent to the front chosen for the main offensive. Soon, from this artillery, the 48th Army Corps was formed, placed under the command of General Scheidemann. The peculiarity of this corps was that all its combat units were exclusively artillery.”

Thus, an organizationally separate heavy artillery formation for operational-strategic purposes appeared in the Russian Army. And the candidacy of his commander, Lieutenant General G.M. Scheidemann, an academician artilleryman, was chosen perfectly. In total, by the spring of 1917, TAON numbered 338 barrels. Tractor artillery and large-caliber howitzers from the TAON actively and effectively showed themselves during the summer offensive of the Southwestern Front in 1917 (but the Northern Front was most seriously saturated with heavy artillery - which was facilitated by communication lines, the echeloned nature of the enemy’s defense and the importance of the covered direction). Moreover, in the creation of breakthrough artillery, our country occupied a leading place among other states participating in the war.

TAON has become a powerful fire resource - the fire reserve of Headquarters. After all, if heavy field artillery was part of army formations, subordinate to the command of the latter and with its power replenishing the activity of field light artillery when breaking through fortified enemy defense lines, then TAON was a means of operational-strategic strengthening of shock formations - when the creation of a mighty fist of fire was required. During strategic offensive operations, TAON was attached to shock corps and armies - its guns were united into artillery groups, subordinate to their commanders, artillery chiefs and unit inspectors.

As of September 1917, the heavy artillery of the Russian Active Army had the following number of guns: 1203 guns (including 196 107 mm guns, 32 120 mm guns of the Obukhov plant system, 101 120 mm French guns and 558 152 mm guns other systems) and 743 howitzers (including 32 305-mm howitzers of the Obukhov plant system and 559 152-mm howitzers of various systems).

The Northern Front was most heavily equipped with cannons - 304 guns (132 - Western, 128 - South-Western, 136 - Romanian, 94 - Caucasian, another 240 - in the rear and 169 - in formation), and with howitzers - the Romanian Front, which had 138 guns (136 each - Western and Southwestern, 90 - Northern, 34 - Caucasian, another 130 - in the rear and 79 - in formation).

It is safe to say that if the Russian army had at the very beginning of the First World War at least an equal number of heavy artillery pieces with Germany, then the course of the war and the entire history of Russia would have been different. It was not for nothing that Erich von Ludendorff emphasized the importance of the presence of heavy artillery for the success of field troops - and in almost all German operations we note the presence of heavy and very heavy guns. Thus, even the Landsturm, which was part of the 8th Army during the operation at Tannenberg, had fortress artillery guns. Moreover, the German army used both Austrian 305-mm howitzers and long-range naval guns with a flat firing trajectory, which, taking into account the experience of combat operations, from the end of 1916, at the insistence of Emperor Wilhelm II, began to be removed from inactive ships.

Speaking about the advantages of German heavy artillery, the German historian H. Ritter noted: “In the First World War, the material of heavy artillery was exemplary. Its large numbers at the beginning of the war gave it an advantage in decisive battles and was the work of Count Schlieffen personally.”

Other warring armies had to overcome shortcomings in the issue of underestimating heavy artillery (especially field artillery) during combat operations - suffering unreasonably high losses in the most important operations of the world war.

As a prominent military leader during the First World War, General A.S., recalled. Lukomsky: “In addition to the lack of shells for our artillery, which greatly influenced the morale of the soldiers, we encountered large-caliber artillery from the enemy in field battles, which, by its effect, further worsened the situation. A new need has arisen - to urgently provide the field army with large-caliber artillery, which could equalize our chances with the enemy’s chances and would give us the opportunity to ensure the success of the struggle for fortified positions in the future.”

Another eyewitness recalled: “I remember very well the joy, almost delight, with which the approaching heavy division was greeted in the first battles in East Prussia. In one of the army corps, in response to complaints from the commanders of the field light batteries that the enemy was literally bombarding them with heavy shells, while they were powerless to fight the enemy heavy batteries, which were beyond the range of our 3-inch guns, the inspector of artillery of the corps gave advice to move our light batteries so that the shells of these batteries could hit the enemy’s heavy batteries. Of course, none of the light battery commanders followed this advice, and some of them noted with irritation that to do this they would have to choose positions ahead of their infantry. There is no doubt that the presence of heavy batteries in our country always increased the morale of the troops, while their absence had the opposite effect on the troops.”

A miscalculation was also the lack of integration of the existing heavy artillery units into the structure of the field forces.

These omissions, as noted, were not unique to the Russian army. And they were overcome. During the war, the number of heavy artillery increased many times, and in its structure there were two heavy artillery regiments, over 100 heavy artillery divisions (72 separate, 5 Siberian, etc.), siege artillery brigades and regiments, tractor heavy divisions, as well as a mass separate heavy and heavy position batteries. The formation and saturation of the new material unit was in full swing, and by the beginning of the 1917 campaign, the active army finally received powerful heavy artillery. However, the main role in the events of 1917 in Russia was played not by guns, but by politicians.

Alexey Vladimirovich OLEINIKOV – Doctor of Historical Sciences, member of the Association of Historians of the First World War, Professor of the Department of Russian History at Astrakhan State University

I decided to study the equipment of German heavy artillery. I have a suspicion that there are many people who confuse the standard number, the actual number and the number of guns in combat-ready units. There are also problems with taking into account departmental affiliation.
It is very often mentioned that the Germans either have 168 guns or 216. One comes across references to 264 guns and 144 guns.

Where did these guns come from?
The experience of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, where the Turks offered resistance, showed the need to allocate heavy artillery to the corps. Before the advent of shoe belts, the maximum caliber was de facto limited to 150-155 mm mortars. Therefore, the corps of the imperial and royal army received 150 mm M80 mortars. A very mediocre artillery system, but it can fire from the ground. With the advent of shoe hulls, they were re-equipped with 15 cm sFH M94 heavy howitzers. The Russians had 152 mm field mortars and suffered with a 152 mm gun at 70 pounds. It was proposed to give each corps a three-battery division of these guns when it was put into service. Total 18 guns, eight horses, firing range 33 kg shell (ammunition unified with mortars) 6 versts. But the system was completed only in 1910. Shirokorad's "History of Russian Artillery" mentions a 152 mm cannon with a weight of 80 pounds. Spanish American experience showed the complete ineffectiveness of field artillery against entrenched infantry. American shrapnel didn't even hit blockhouses.
It was decided to give each corps an artillery regiment of 16 guns, so as not to call in siege artillery for help. In 1903, the 15 cm sFH 02 was adopted, which was gradually equipped with units.
The experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the use of 120 and 150 mm howitzers by the Japanese under the supervision of German specialists showed the effectiveness of heavy artillery. The Japanese came to the conclusion that each division should be given a howitzer battery. This came down to the actual availability of materiel, but the conclusions were drawn correctly. Moreover, theoretical calculations and Austrian experience were confirmed. The Russians used much more heavy guns, there were only 128 6 dm cannons in 120 poods, but this did not help. Japanese howitzer artillery was superior to Russian in mobility. The Russians fought normally only with 6 dm field mortars and 107 mm battery guns. Everything turned out to be expected. The Russian concept of using siege artillery to combat field fortifications seemed incorrect to the Germans. If the Japanese had not lost their only battery of 105 mm guns at the very beginning, the history of German artillery might have gone differently. Based on combat experience, emphasis was placed on howitzers, and only before the war the opinion changed, but the 10 cm K 14 began to arrive only in May 1915.
A separate point was the use of 203 mm light siege guns weighing 190 pounds, of which there were 16 in the Siberian Siege Regiment. Essentially this is a heavy howitzer. The use of guns of this caliber in field battles was considered impossible. General Schlieffen made a rational proposal: the corps would be reinforced with 150 mm howitzers, the army with 210 mm. So that the army command does not call in siege artillery to fight the numerous old Belgian fortresses. They were mainly designed to fire 150 mm guns of the 1860s-80s. The staffing number was determined to be 21 divisions of two batteries, four-gun batteries. Total 168 guns.
In addition to the artillery attached to the army, there was siege artillery armed with 21 cm mörser 99. The new mortar was a howitzer, but for a number of reasons it was called a mortar. To storm the Belgian fortresses, according to the calculations of the command, it was necessary to have 30 batteries.

On August 1, 1914, 14 divisions were formed for the needs of field armies and 4 more were under formation. Some of the guns were produced and accepted, but were at the manufacturing plant. All 4 divisions became combat-ready from October 1914 to February 1915. That is, in fact, 14 divisions with 112 guns.

The siege artillery had 30 batteries with 120 210 mm guns, of which 72 21 cm Mörser 10 and 48 21 cm Mörser 99.
By the end of 1915, all 288 21 cm Mörser 10s were to be produced.

In other European countries the situation was worse.
The French assigned a regiment of 3-5 battalions of guns with a caliber of 120-155 mm to each army. A total of 308 guns, of which 84 were very mediocre 120 mm C mle 1890 howitzers for the First World War. They fired 18-20 kg shells at a distance of up to 5.8 km. But they had to bring up territorial troops for field battles, which also had 120-155 mm guns. We must understand that the main problem of the French is confusion and vacillation. By 1913, they finally adopted the 105 mm cannon, which was an almost exact copy of the 107 mm cannon adopted by the Russian army. The French, after problems with the 155 mm CTR mle 1904 howitzer, were against guns other than 75 mm guns. There were 155 mm howitzers to show that the money was not wasted. The 155 gun 1877/14 and the 105 mm gun were intended for siege artillery. Although according to the staff they have a battalion of 12,155 mm howitzers in their corps artillery regiment. Usually there was one battery, the other two were armed with 75 mm cannons.
In 1913, they conducted maneuvers, as a result of which they decided to accept 105 and 155 howitzers, but everything was drowned in chatter. Luckily for the French, they had a lot of systems suitable for military operations. There were about 2,200 155 mm guns alone, to which were added 2,500 long 120 mm guns and 330 220 mm mortars. Before the First World War, they thought about new guns of 193, 220 and 274 mm, but almost nothing was done. A sample of a 340 mm mortar was tested; 370 mm siege guns were ordered, but these guns cannot be used as field guns. Fortunately for the French, they designed a 280 mm mortar for the Russians and received an order, and in 1913 they began work on a 229 mm mortar. This made it possible to launch production of 220 mm mortars in 1915.

Austria-Hungary turned out to be a model of disintegration. Due to chronic problems and the peculiar cost structure, there was not enough money to purchase guns. Added to this were the problems of lobbying.
Theoretically, each corps should have 8,150 mm howitzers; if necessary, fortress artillery was used. It was represented by 120 and 150 mm cannons, 150, 240 and 305 mm mortar howitzers and 150 and 180 mm howitzers.
If necessary, 50 batteries (200) of 15 cm SFH M94 guns were allocated, that is, the same ones with which the army corps were armed, but only 240 guns were produced, of which 112 were used as corps artillery, 128 were transferred to the fortress. The shortcoming was covered by the 12 cm Kanone M80, an analogue of the Russian 107 mm siege gun, higher projectile weight, but shorter firing range. These 200 guns formed the basis of the army's artillery in the first year of the war, the 120 mm gun becoming the heaviest system used by Austria-Hungary in field battles at this time.
It must be said that Skoda presented prototypes of new heavy guns several times, but they were not accepted. The Austrians had 7 batteries (14 guns) of 240 mm 98/07 mechanized mortars and 12 batteries (48 guns) of 240 mm 98 mortars, but they did not dare to throw them into field battles.
It should be noted that money was allocated for the purchase of new 195 and 150 mm howitzers and 104 mm guns, but the lobbyists did not reach an agreement. But with these funds we bought 25,305 mm mortars. But the imperial and royal armies were left without modern heavy field guns.

The British had army artillery consisting of 6 dm cannons weighing 30 cwt and 240 mm mortars purchased in the Czech Republic. Very similar to the Austrian 240 mm mortars 98. There are only four of them, two of them in China. A prototype 234 mm howitzer was manufactured.

Natural disasters befell the Russian artillery: either the epic conflict of Genispart with the Minister of War, the infantry and the General Staff, or the State Duma, which cut expenses to show that they had power, or the 300th anniversary of the House of Romanov.
Most of the systems considered necessary were adopted. The Russo-Japanese War showed the unsuitability of the systems in service. There were two opinions: most of the members of the party committee and the Genispart V.Kn. Sergei Mikhailovich. With corps artillery there were two different options: most authorities believed that it was necessary that the corps division consisted of three 6-or batteries of 122 mm howitzers, military book. believed that a division consisting of 8,152 howitzers and 4,107 mm guns was needed. However, the allocated money was enough to form 20 heavy divisions for 37 corps; the mortar divisions had two batteries. However, in 1912-14, the necessary funds were knocked out that would allow each corps by April 1 (13), 1915 to have 8,152 mm howitzers model 1910, 4,107 mm cannons and 24,122 mm howitzers model. 1909. According to our generals, Russian corps artillery would be superior to German with its 16,150 mm howitzers. When mobilized in 1914, some corps were able to receive 24,122 howitzers.
Army artillery in European Russia was to be represented by six brigades, each with three divisions of three batteries (36,152 mm howitzers model 1909). The Caucasian and Siberian brigades of the same composition were also formed. It was assumed that the Siberian Brigade would be in Harbin a month after the start of mobilization.
Finally, they allowed us to order 280 mm mortars from France. There were two consecutive orders for a total of 32 guns, all to be delivered by March 1915 inclusive. This made it possible to form 7 divisions of 2 two-gun batteries each and have 4 guns in reserve. To this, if necessary, siege brigades could be added. Thus, the Northwestern Front was supposed to receive 120 152 mm guns of 120 and 200 pounds, but the General Staff, citing the Russian-Japanese experience, refused to deploy them at the front, but they were mobilized. When v.k. Claims were made against Sergei Mikhailovich, and he blamed the General Staff. The first siege brigade was sent to the front and arrived at the beginning of 1915. The difference from the original version was the replacement of 24,152 mm guns of 120 pounds with 8,152 mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 16 107 mm guns. There was a similar situation on the Southwestern Front.
In general, the main problem of the Russian army is not in materiel, but in the fact that the ruling elites have forgotten a simple truth: they must serve the Motherland “with pen and sword”©, and the majority had on their minds “balls, lackeys, cadets and the crunch of French bread”© . The exterminatus of the nobility and other elites was inevitable.

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Greece before entering World War I

After the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which were victorious for Greek weapons, there followed a short period of peace, which was used to reorganize the country, doubling its territory. In 1913, a temporary army organization was established, which did not have time to become permanent, since mobilization was announced in November 1915, in response to the mobilization announced by Bulgaria, which entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Greece entered the First World War late, due to the confrontation between King Constantine and Prime Minister E. Venizelos. An attempt by German and Austrian diplomacy to involve Greece in the war on the side of the Central Powers was unsuccessful - Venizelos responded that he was honoring the alliance agreements signed with Serbia from the period Balkan wars. Venizelos’s response to the German-Austrian remark that allied agreements could and could be violated remained in the collective memory of the Serbian people: “Greece is too small a country to commit such a great dishonor”:308. King Constantine, whose wife was Kaiser Wilhelm's sister, was confident of the Central Powers' victory and insisted that Greece should remain neutral. His decision was not shaken by the Entente’s promises for territorial acquisitions in Northern Epirus, nor by Britain’s promise to transfer the island of Cyprus to Greece. But neutrality did not prevent Venizelos from facilitating the evacuation of the defeated Serbian army to the Greek island of Corfu and allowing the landing of Entente troops in Thessaloniki to organize the Macedonian front, where the Serbian divisions were then transferred. The surrender of the Rupel forts on the Greek-Bulgarian border to the German-Bulgarians by the supporters of Constantine, which opened the way for the latter to Eastern Macedonia, was regarded by the supporters of Venizelos as a national betrayal and led to the National Schism and the formation of the Government of National Defense in Thessaloniki. Greece was split into two states. The Government of National Defense began forming volunteer divisions to participate in the war on the side of the Entente on the Macedonian front, and then mobilized in the territories under its control.

Note that, along with E. Venizelos and Admiral P. Koundouriotis, a member of the National Defense triumvirate was the co-author of the 75 mm Schneider-Danglis mountain gun, General of Artillery Panagiotis Danglis, who became the commander of the volunteer National Defense Army.

Greece's entry into the war

From September 1916, the Government of National Defense in Thessaloniki reinforced the Entente forces on the Macedonian Front with the initially Greek Serres Division, which entered the fighting in the Axios River sector and took part in the Battle of Ravina on 14 May 1917. In May, two more Greek divisions (Archipelago and Crete) entered battle on the Macedonian front. In the summer of 1917, following the deposition of King Constantine, the move of the Government of National Defense to Athens and Greece's official declaration of war against the Central Powers, the three (volunteer) divisions were reinforced by 7 more divisions through mobilization. The participation of 10 Greek divisions in the battles had a decisive influence on the course of the war on the Macedonian front, changing the balance of power in favor of the Allies, and made a decisive contribution to the outcome of the war on this front. On May 27, 1918, the Archipelago Division, which was included in the 1st group of divisions, developed an offensive on the German-Bulgarian front south of the spurs of Jena, supported on the flanks by the Crete and Serre divisions. This attack, which became known as the attack on Skra di Legen, named after the height of the same name, was a complete success, proved the combat effectiveness of the Greek divisions and established the confidence of the Allied command in the Greek army.

Participation of Greek artillery in the First World War

With regard to artillery, until the outbreak of the First World War, the provisional organization of November 1913 remained in force. In February 1914, the personal weapons of artillerymen were determined: for sergeants and corporals of field and horse artillery - a saber and a revolver, for corporals of mountain and garrison artillery - a carbine and bayonet. After 1917, the artillery of each division increased by 2 mountain artillery divisions and a heavy artillery formation was formed. A transport corps was formed, to which officers were transferred from the abolished material and technical artillery corps. Greek artillery in the period 1917 - 1918 consisted of: 3 field artillery regiments for each army corps with 75 mm Schneider - Kane (Kane, Gustav) and Skoda guns. 1 regiment of heavy artillery in the Army, with 120 mm De Bange guns with a firing radius of 11,000 m 1 regiment of 155 mm howitzers in the Army 20 mountain artillery battalions which were provided with two (2) to each division with 65 mm Schneider or 75 mm Schneider guns – Danglisa or Krupa (from the trophies of the Balkan Wars).

Artillery of the Army of the Government of National Defense

The initial composition of the Greek Army (corps) of the Government of National Defense, organized in stages from September 1916 to April 1917 and which became the first Greek formation to fight on the side of the Allies, included 3 infantry divisions. These 3 divisions were called the Divisions of Serres, Archipelago and Crete. Each of these divisions had 2 mountain artillery divisions with Schneider-Danglis 75 mm guns (the Serre Division with divisions Σ1 and Σ2, the Archipelago Division with divisions Αρ1 and Αρ2, and the Crete Division with divisions Κ1 and Κ2, which corresponded to the initial letters of the names of the divisions). In addition to the divisions under the direct control of the divisions, the National Defense Army Corps had at its disposal 1 field artillery regiment, consisting of a total of 9 batteries of Schneider-Kahne 75 mm guns and organized into 3 field artillery divisions. Gradually, from December 1917, the mobilization of the army corps Α΄ and Β΄ began, which consisted of Ι, ΙΙ, ΧΙΙI and ΙΙΙ, IV, XΙV infantry divisions, respectively. The artillery, directly subordinate to the Α΄ army corps, consisted of the Α΄ field artillery regiment, which consisted of 9 batteries of Schneider-Kahne 75 mm guns, organized into 3 divisions (Ι, ΙΙ and ΙΙΙ). In addition, each division of the Α΄ army corps (Ι, ΙΙ and ΧΙΙΙ infantry divisions) had 2 divisions with 75 mm Schneider-Danglis guns (a total of 6 divisions - Ια-Ιβ-ΙΙα-ΙΙβ-ΧΙΙΙα and ΧΙΙΙβ). Accordingly, the Β΄ field artillery regiment with 9 batteries of Schneider-Kahne 75 mm guns was directly subordinate to the Β΄ army corps. Each division of this corps also had 2 mountain artillery divisions with 75 mm Schneider-Danglis guns. In total, the corps had 6 mountain artillery divisions (ΙΙΙα-ΙΙΙβ-ΙVα-ΙVβ-ΧΙVα and ΧIVβ). In addition to the above-mentioned army corps, there was a separate (independent) Ioannina Division (ΙΧ infantry division), which had mountain artillery divisions ΙΧα and ΙXβ. Regarding the number of artillery barrels each division had, in September 1918 the Serre Division had 16 barrels, the Crete Division 16, the Archipelago Division 28, Ι Division 23, ΙΙ Division 17, ΙΙΙ Division 16, ΙV Division 22, Separate (ΙΧ) Ioannina Division 28, ΧΙΙΙ Division 17, ΧΙV Division 16. In addition, the Army formations had 72 guns, while outside the divisions the National Defense Army Corps (ΣΣΕΑ) and the Α΄ Army Corps had 33 guns each. In total in 1918, and with the completion of mobilization, the Greek army had 337 Schneider-Danglis 75 mm guns for mountain artillery battalions and Schneider-Kahne 75 mm guns for field artillery battalions. The heavy artillery regiment had heavy 120 mm De Bange type guns.

The National Defense Field Artillery Regiment was assigned to the Archipelago Division, while the Α΄ Artillery Regiment was assigned to the Α΄ Army Corps on the Strymonas River front. A separate field artillery battalion followed the ΙΧ division. From the heavy artillery regiments, the Ι and ΙΙ divisions and the Ι mortar (mortar) division formed a heavy artillery group, under the command of Colonel Marcos Dracos, which was transferred to the 1st group of divisions. The ΙΙ division of heavy guns and the ΙΙ mortar division were transferred to the front of the Strymonas River at the disposal of the Α΄ army corps. The ΙΙΙ howitzer division was placed at the disposal of the ΧΙΙ British Army Corps in the Doirana sector.

Significant battles involving Greek artillery

The main battles on the Macedonian front with the participation of Greek artillery were the battles at Ravina (14/27-5-1917), at Skra (27-5/9-6-1918), at the Strymonas River (from 18 to 28-9 and from 1 to 11/10/1918), under Dojran (5 and 19/9 1918) under Kerkini (25–9 and 9/10/1918), under Djena (21/9 and 4/10/1918), under Golo Bilu (16-9-1918), at Zborsk (17-9-1918), at Preslap (17-9-1918) and Erigona (from 16 to 22-9 - 1918) The most significant of them was the Battle of Skradi- Legen May 30, 1918.

Battle of Skra di Legen

In the spring of 1918, as part of the Allied master plan and in order to block (distract) as many enemy forces as possible on the Macedonian front, it was decided to launch a series of large-scale offensives. The area of ​​operations of the 1st Group of Divisions, specifically the western sector, was occupied by the Army National Defense Corps (ΣΣΕΑ), with the Crete and Archipelago divisions in the front line. The objective goal of Commander-in-Chief A. Guillaume was to occupy the Scra di Legen mountain range, which was a protrusion of the Bulgarian front. It was a fortified position, equipped with a large number of machine guns and mortars, which dominated the line of Greek units located a short distance from this difficult position. The commander-in-chief wanted to improve the front line in the sector where the Greek units were located and use the possible Greek success for subsequent broader offensive operations.

The Crete Division was deployed on the eastern (right) flank of the sector, the Archipelago Division on the western (left) flank. The Serre Division was initially on the second front line, but on April 18 it was deployed to the left of the Archipelago Division, which took over the sector from Croup di Bergerie to Bistrita, where the left flank of the National Defense Army Corps began. According to the orders of the 1st Group of Divisions, the offensive of the National Defense Army Corps in general terms included a main attack in the center by the Archipelago Division (5th and 6th Archipelago Regiments and 1st Serres Regiment) and a secondary attack by the Crete Division (7th Regiment and 1st Battalion 8th Regiment). In addition, minor attacks were launched by the Serre Division (2nd and 3rd Serre Regiments) following the attack of the 2nd Regiment's ΙΙ Battalion against Block Rocheux. These Greek forces were supported by 1 field artillery regiment with 3 battalions of 3 batteries of 75 mm Schneider–Kahne field guns. In addition, each division had 2 mountain artillery battalions with 75 mm Schneider-Danglis guns.

Commander-in-Chief Guillaume reinforced the 1st group of divisions with 3 light artillery divisions, 5 heavy batteries and 1 trench artillery battery. In total, the offensive of the Archipelago Division was to be supported by the following artillery forces: 44 mountain guns (24 French, 20 Greek), 48 field guns (French), 36 heavy guns of various calibers (34 French and 2 English), 10 trench guns (2 French 240 mm, 6 French and 2 Greek 58 mm). A total of 138 guns. In addition, 9 Greek 120 mm long-barreled guns, 20 French 200 mm long-barreled guns, 4 French 105 mm long-barreled guns, 32 French 155 mm long-barreled guns were provided for the offensive. A total of 65 long-barreled guns. The total number of barrels of all types and diameters is 203. Artillery preparation of the allied forces began in the sector of the 22nd French division two days before the offensive and in the sector of the Crete and Archipelago divisions the day before. On April 15, by order of the commander-in-chief, the artillery provided to the 1st group of divisions was increased to 4 light artillery divisions, 12 heavy artillery batteries and 2 trench artillery batteries. It was decided to begin the operation in the second half of May.

In the offensive sector, the German-Bulgarian forces were represented mainly by the 5th Bulgarian Division, which was the right flank of the 1st Bulgarian Army.

On May 25, Allied aircraft discovered new positions of enemy batteries in the Khumas region. So in this region the total number of German-Bulgarian field and mountain batteries reached 20 (88 guns). If we take into account the 13 batteries discovered in the Gurinchet and Gevgeliya sector, that is, 40 field and mountain guns, 8 heavy and 4 anti-aircraft guns, the total number of guns available to the 5th Bulgarian division reached 140.

On the eve of the offensive, on May 29, 1918, artillery preparation was programmed in the sector of the corps of the National Defense Army, especially in the sector of the Archipelago Division, which began at 05:10 with all available artillery. At 10:00 the shelling of the Bulgarian positions was interrupted for 30 minutes to allow airplanes to take photographs to assess the effectiveness of the artillery fire. At 10:30, the shelling of the Bulgarian positions began again and continued until 16:00, when it was again interrupted for aerial photography and assessment of the effectiveness of the shooting. Insufficiently hit targets were fired upon again. Their destruction was considered complete at 19:30. The Bulgarian artillery responded with occasional salvos against the forward and Allied batteries deployed at Point O and Kupa, but the Allied artillery silenced it at 08:30. At 16:05, when the allied artillery interrupted its shelling for half an hour, the German-Bulgarian artillery opened barrage fire for 6-8 minutes and fell silent again. Allied artillery observers confirmed breaches in the barbed wire barriers had been reached as early as noon. At 04:30 on May 30, all Allied artillery opened fire. Heavy artillery fired against the line Tumulush - Piton - Volan. At 04:45 the field and mountain batteries covered the barrage with 8 salvos per minute. The artillery continued to support the advance of the Greek infantry throughout its attack, both in the sector of the Archipelago Division and in the sectors of the Serres and Crete Divisions. The glory of the victory at Scra di Legen remained with the Greek infantry, but military analysts note that without the participation of Greek and allied artillery it would not have been achieved. In only one case were losses from friendly artillery fire noted in the sector of the 1st Serre Regiment. The success of the Greek infantry was facilitated by both rain and light fog during its attack, and the destruction of enemy observation posts during artillery preparation by the Allied artillery. Moreover, few enemy batteries survived the devastating Allied artillery fire.

In addition to a large number of prisoners (1835 people, including 35 officers), the Greek units captured 32 guns and 12 Bulgarian trench mortars. The success of the Greek army was also impressive for the Allies, who considered the Bulgarian positions on Skra impregnable, given that a year earlier, in March 1917, the French 112th Division had failed to occupy them. The Battle of Skra di Legen received great resonance in Greece. The Greeks for a while forgot about their political passions of the National Schism and remembered the glory days of the recent victorious Balkan Wars. The morale of the Greek army again became high, its combat effectiveness and courage were noted by world public opinion and, in particular, by the allied command. The Greek military was flattered by the statement of Commander Guillaume, who described the Greek infantry as “ infantry of unsurpassed courage and exceptional (brilliant) impulse" But most importantly, the Greek victory showed that the morale of the Bulgarian army was broken, which accelerated the Allied offensive on the Macedonian front in September 1918.

Ukrainian campaign

The dispatch of the Greek corps was carried out in a hurry. Thus, the dispatch of troops from Thessaloniki was carried out in stages, mainly on French transports and without the heavy weapons delivered later.

The expeditionary force did not have a centralized Greek command. Upon the arrival of the Greek units, they came under the command of local French commanders and were dispersed into smaller formations, battalions and companies without communication with each other.

However, the French did not have any specific plan of operations.

On January 20, 1919, the first units of the ΙΙ Greek Division - the 34th and 7th Infantry Regiments - landed in Odessa. The 2nd regiment of the ΧΙΙΙ division landed on March 24 in Sevastopol. A few days later the remaining units landed. However, of the three divisions planned to participate in the expedition, ultimately only two took part in the campaign, the ΙΙ and ΧΙΙΙ divisions.

Ι division “did not reach” Russia. A few months later, Greece was involved by the Entente in a larger Asia Minor campaign, which escalated into a full-scale war. Ι division became the first formation to land on May 15, 1919 in Smyrna: A-178.

Greek artillery in the Ukrainian campaign

The participation of Greek artillery in the Ukrainian campaign was limited. The artillery was represented by two battalions of mountain guns, whose personnel consisted of 19 officers and 599 privates. Division ΙΙα (commander Major Constantine Mamouris) was represented by the 1st (commander Lieutenant Plutarch Haloftis) and 2nd (commander Lieutenant Constantine Vasilakis) batteries. Division ΙΙβ (commander Major Konstantin Matalas) was represented by the 1st (commander Lieutenant Dimitris Kapetanopoulos) and 2nd (commander Captain Dimitris Anastasakos) batteries.

The main battles of the Greek units in support of the White Army and French troops were: defense of Kherson 7/20-3-1919, near Berezovka 18/31-3, near Serbka from March 22 to 31, near Odessa from March 21 to 24, near Sevastopol 16 April/29-4-1919.

On March 19, Greek units formed a covering front for Odessa in the Serbka region. This front began to strengthen with the arrival of French and Russian units. On March 26, the front advanced on the right flank to Kapitanskaya, reinforced by a White Army brigade, a Russian 120-mm heavy artillery battery and two attached Evzone battalions. Additionally, these forces were assigned a French 75mm artillery squadron and 2 cavalry squadrons (one French and one Romanian). General command of the front was taken by General Nerel, commander of the 30th French division.

Continuous shelling of the armored trains forced the left flank of the defenders to retreat to Bolshoy Buyalyk. These positions were occupied by Red Army soldiers. The commander of the 3rd Greek Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Kondylis, launched a counterattack and reoccupied all positions abandoned at Serbka station. The Red Army, building up its forces, attempted to encircle the defenders.

2 Greek battalions of the 5/42 Evzone Guards Regiment (Colonel Plastiras) north of the Buyalyk railway station. - 1st Greek battalion of the 3rd regiment on the heights east of the village of Buyalyk. - 2nd Greek battalion of the 3rd regiment, in reserve, at Buyalyk station. - 3rd Greek battalion of the 3rd regiment, in reserve at Riendza station. - A unit of Greek mountain artillery, with a French battery attached to it, behind the location of two battalions of Evzones. - 1 Greek battalion of the 34th regiment, in Kremidovka, at the disposal of General Nerel, providing his headquarters. - 3rd Greek battalion of the 5/42 Evzone regiment, in the Pavlinka area, as cover and reserve. - The Russian brigade with the rest of the French forces on the Kapitanka-Aleksandrovskaya line, east of Buyalyk.

During the First World War, a huge leap was made in military production in the Russian Empire, and the pace of industrial development was so high that it was not repeated after that in Russian history, and was not repeated in any of the periods of the Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The basis for this leap was the rapid expansion of military production capacity in 1914-1917. due to four factors:
1) Expanding the capacity of existing state military enterprises.
2) Massive involvement of private industry in military production.
3) Large-scale program for the emergency construction of new state-owned factories.
4) Widespread construction of new private military factories, secured by government orders.
The Russian Empire entered the war with unfinished military reform, which was supposed to be completed by 1917. It must be taken into account that the planning authorities of absolutely all countries made mistakes in forecasting the course of the war. Nobody thought it would last more than a year.

Accordingly, military supplies were designed for relatively short-term military operations. Industry, including Russia's, could not quickly compensate for the decline that a long war would imply.
Therefore, purchases of weapons and ammunition abroad were natural and justified. The tsarist government ordered 1.5 million rifles of the 1891-1910 model. from the American companies Remington and Westinghouse, plus 300 thousand rifles chambered for the Russian three-line cartridge from Winchester. But this order for the most part did not reach Russia - after the Bolshevik revolution, the US government confiscated the rifles and adopted them as US Rifle, Cal. .30, Model of 1916.
How great were the needs of the Russian army for weapons at the beginning of the First World War and how they were subsequently satisfied by domestic industry can be judged by the figures that are now quite accessible. They were analyzed in his study by Mikhail Barabanov, former scientific editor of the Arms Export magazine, since 2008 - researcher at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, editor-in-chief of the Moscow Defense Brief magazine. The following are necessary excerpts from his work.

Rifles.

The rifles were produced at three state-owned arms factories - Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk. The military capacity of all of them in the summer of 1914 was estimated at a total of 525 thousand rifles per year. In reality, in the first five months of the war from August to December 1914, these three factories produced 134 thousand rifles.
Since 1915, accelerated work was undertaken to expand all three factories, as a result of which the monthly production of rifles at them from December 1914 to December 1916 was increased fourfold - from 33.3 thousand to 127.2 thousand pieces . In 1916 alone, the productivity of each of the three factories was doubled, and the actual delivery amounted to: Tula plant 648.8 thousand rifles, Izhevsk - 504.9 thousand and Sestroretsk - 147.8 thousand, a total of 1301.4 thousand. rifles in 1916

In 1915, appropriations were authorized for the construction of a second arms factory in Tula with an annual capacity of 500 thousand rifles per year, and in the future it was supposed to be merged with the Tula Armory with a total total capacity of 3500 rifles per day. Additionally, money was allocated to purchase equipment from Remington (1691 machines) for the production of another 2 thousand rifles per day! In total, the entire Tula arms complex was supposed to produce 2 million rifles per year. Construction of the 2nd plant began in the summer of 1916 and was to be completed by the beginning of 1918.
In 1916, construction began on a new state-owned Yekaterinoslav arms factory near Samara with a capacity of 800 thousand rifles per year.

Thus, in 1918, the annual production capacity of the Russian industry for the production of rifles (without machine guns) should have amounted to 3.8 million units, which meant an increase of 7.5 times in relation to the mobilization capacity of 1914 and tripling in relation to issued in 1916. This overlapped the requests of the Headquarters (2.5 million rifles per year) by one and a half times.

Ammo.

In 1914, three state-owned cartridge factories were engaged in the production of rifle cartridges in Russia - Petrograd, Tula and Lugansk. The maximum capacity of each of these plants was 150 million rounds of ammunition per year during single-shift operation (450 million in total). In fact, all three factories should have already produced a third more in total in the peaceful year of 1914 - the state order amounted to 600 million rounds of ammunition.
From the beginning of 1915, enormous efforts were made to expand the capacity of all three factories, as a result of which the production of Russian three-line cartridges was tripled from December 1914 to November 1916 - from 53.8 million to 150 million pieces. In 1916 alone, the total production volume of Russian cartridges was increased by one and a half times (to 1.482 billion pieces). In 1917, while maintaining productivity, the supply of 1.8 billion cartridges was expected, plus the arrival of approximately the same number of Russian imported cartridges. In 1915-1917 the number of pieces of equipment from all three cartridge factories doubled. Think about it, 3 billion rounds of ammunition per year!
The headquarters in 1916 made clearly inflated demands for cartridges - for example, at the inter-union conference in January 1917, the need was calculated at 500 million cartridges per month (including 325 million Russians), which gave a cost of 6 billion . per year, or twice the consumption of 1916, and this with a sufficient supply of cartridges to the units by the beginning of 1917.
In July 1916, construction began on the Simbirsk Cartridge Plant (capacity 840 million rounds per year). In general, the total estimated capacity of the Russian cartridge industry in 1918 can be calculated at up to 3 billion cartridges per year.

Machine guns.

In fact, until the coup of 1917, the production of heavy machine guns was carried out only by the Tula Arms Plant, which increased production to 1200 units per month by January 1917. Thus, in relation to December 1915, the increase was 2.4 times, and in relation to December 1914 - seven times. During 1916, the production of machine guns almost tripled (from 4251 to 11072 units), and in 1917 the Tula plant was expected to supply 15 thousand machine guns.

Together with large import orders (in 1917, the delivery of up to 25 thousand imported heavy machine guns and up to 20 thousand light machine guns was expected), this should have satisfied the requests of Headquarters. With exaggerated hopes for imports, proposals from private industry to produce heavy machine guns were rejected by the GAU (Main Artillery Directorate).
The production of Madsen light machine guns was organized at the Kovrov machine gun plant, which was being built under an agreement with Madsen. An agreement on this with the issuance of an order to the syndicate for 15 thousand light machine guns was concluded in April 1916, the contract was signed in September, and construction of the plant began in August 1916 and was carried out at a very fast pace. The first batch of machine guns was assembled in August 1917. By the beginning of 1918, despite the “revolutionary” chaos, the plant was ready. The production of machine guns was planned at 4,000 units in the first half of the year, followed by 1,000 units per month and increasing to 2.5-3 thousand light machine guns per month.
However, contrary to popular belief, the armies of the countries participating in the First World War were driven into fortifications not by machine guns, but by light field artillery and shrapnel.

A good example is the armament of the Russian infantry division in 1914, where the regiment's machine gun teams had only 32 Maxims, but 48 Death Scythes in the division's artillery brigade. One Russian shrapnel shell contained 260 bullets, and a Maxim machine gun belt contained 250 rounds. Artillery was definitely more effective than machine guns!

Light weapons.

The production of light and mountain three-inch artillery was carried out at the Petrograd State and Perm gun factories. In 1915, the private Putilov plant (eventually nationalized at the end of 1916), as well as the private “Tsaritsyn group of factories” (Sormovsky plant, Lessner plant, Petrograd metal and Kolomensky plant) were connected to production. The monthly production of guns of the 1902 model eventually increased over 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) by more than 13 times (!!!) - from 35 to 472 systems.
To further expand artillery production, at the end of 1916, the construction of a powerful Saratov state-owned gun factory began. Due to the revolution of February 1917, construction was stopped at the initial stage.
Thus, with the monthly requirement for 1917, declared by Headquarters in January 1917, for 490 field and 70 mountain 3-dm guns, Russian industry had actually already reached its supply by that time, and in 1917-1918, apparently , would significantly exceed this need. With the commissioning of the Saratov plant, one could expect the production of more than 700 field guns and 100 mountain guns per month (assessing the disposal of 300 guns per month by execution without taking into account combat losses)...
It should be added that in 1916 the Obukhov plant began development of the 37-mm Rosenberg trench gun. Of the first order of 400 new systems dated March 1916, 170 guns were delivered already in 1916, the rest were scheduled for delivery in 1917. There is no doubt that this would be followed by new massive orders for these guns.

Heavy weapons.

By the beginning of the war, the production of 48-line howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model was carried out at the Putilov plant, the Obukhov plant and the Petrograd gun factory, and the 6-dm howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model were carried out at the Putilov and Perm factories.
The production of heavy artillery increased very quickly. In the first half of 1915, only 128 heavy artillery pieces were manufactured, but in a year and a half the volume increased 7 times! In total, in 1917, if the revolution had not happened, the GAU (without Morved) industry should have supplied up to 2,000 Russian-made heavy guns (versus 900 in 1916).
The second new center for the production of heavy artillery was to be the Saratov State Gun Factory with an annual program for heavy guns: 42-lin guns - 300, 48-lin howitzers - 300, 6-dm howitzers - 300, 6-dm fortress guns - 190, 8 -dm howitzers - 48. Due to the revolution of February 1917, construction was stopped at the initial stage. Among other measures considered by 1917 to increase the production of heavy artillery were the issuance of an order for 48-lin howitzers to the private Tsaritsyn group of factories, as well as the development in 1917 of the production of 12-dm howitzers and new “light” 16-dm howitzers at built since 1913 with the participation of Vickers at the Tsaritsyn plant for the production of naval heavy artillery (RAOAZ), whose construction was carried out sluggishly during WWII, but the first stage of which was expected in July 1916, and commissioning in the spring of 1917.

With the commissioning of the howitzer plant at the Putilov plant and the first stage of the Tsaritsyn plant, Russian industry would have reached an annual output of at least 2,600 heavy artillery systems in 1918, and more likely, even more. In fact, this meant that the 1916 Headquarters requests for heavy artillery could be covered by Russian industry by the end of 1917.
According to imports in 1917 - early 1918. about 1000 more heavy artillery systems were to be imported. In total, the total number of Russian heavy artillery, even minus losses, could reach 5,000 guns by the end of 1918, i.e. be comparable in number to the French.

Shells.

The main role in shell production under the GAU was played by the Perm plant, as well as the Putilov plant, which eventually united around a number of other private enterprises (Russian Society, Russian-Baltic and Kolomna). Thus, the Perm plant, with an annual design capacity of 3-dm shells of 500 thousand units, already in 1915 produced 1.5 million shells, and in 1916 – 2.31 million shells. The Putilov plant with its cooperation produced a total of 75 thousand 3-dm shells in 1914, and in 1916 - 5.1 million shells.
If in 1914 the entire Russian industry produced 516 thousand 3-dm shells, then in 1915 - already 8.825 million according to Barsukov, and 10 million according to Manikovsky, and in 1916 - already 26.9 million. shots according to Barsukov. Reports from the War Ministry provide even more significant figures for the supply of Russian-made 3-mm shells to the army - in 1915, 12.3 million shells, and in 1916, 29.4 million rounds. Thus, the annual production of 3-dm shells in 1916 practically tripled, and the monthly production of 3-dm shells from January 1915 to December 1916 increased 12 times!
Barabanov writes that according to all calculations, the army’s requirements for shells would have been more than satisfied in 1917 only by domestic production. “Most likely, by 1918, Russian light artillery would have been overstocked with ammunition,” in particular, he believes, “and if the pace of production and deliveries had been maintained and at least limitedly increased, by the end of 1918 the warehouses would have been bursting with huge reserves.” 3-dm shells."
The Russian Empire achieved a colossal and still underestimated leap in military production in the years 1914-1917. The growth of military production and the development of the defense industry in 1914-1917 were probably the largest in Russian history, surpassing in relative figures any jumps in military production during the Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The Russian Empire demonstrated its high ability to invest in the military industry and the real possibilities of a gigantic increase in the power and capabilities of the PKK in the shortest possible time.
The well-known organization of the authorized GAU Vankov attracted 442 (!) private factories to cooperation in military production. The conversion was not invented under Yeltsin, but under him it was carried out in one direction. In the Russian Empire, it was considered normal that if your private plant did not receive a military order today, then you produce, for example, blanks for handicraftsmen, and “if there is a war tomorrow,” then instead of samovars, cartridges and shells begin to roll off your production lines. And it was very honorable (and profitable!) to be among the companies trusted by the state.

In general, S.V. gives the same assessment of the pre-revolutionary defense industry. Volkov: “During 1915-16, a giant leap was made in arming and supplying the army. And it had great inertia - the production that was established led to the fact that by the spring of 1917 the Russian army was overwhelmed with weapons and ammunition.” .
But for the Bolshevik nonhumans who seized the central warehouses, these reserves were enough for the entire war of 1917-1922.

Russia is the only country of all involved in the First World War that did not have problems with food. None. Not only in 1917, but also in 1918.

At the time of its exit from the First World War, the Russian Empire had enormous mobilization resources. In our country, only 39% of men of the corresponding age were drafted, while, for example, in Germany and France - over 80%.

Russia has actually demonstrated the mobilization abilities of the economy. By 1917-1918, the country was almost completely self-sufficient in domestically produced weapons and ammunition (for a number of items, with a strong reserve).
Russia, as they say, kept pace with the times: a significant increase in armor was planned in the army and new capacities were being prepared in the field of aircraft construction.