The victory gave rise to people's hopes for a better life, a weakening of the pressure of the totalitarian state on the individual, and the elimination of its most odious costs. The potential for changes in the political regime, economy, and culture opened up.
The “democratic impulse” of the war, however, was opposed by the entire power of the System created by Stalin. Its positions not only were not weakened during the war, but seemed to have become even stronger in the post-war period. Even the victory in the war itself was identified in the mass consciousness with the victory of the totalitarian regime.
Under these conditions, the struggle between democratic and totalitarian tendencies became the leitmotif of social development.
The state of the USSR economy after the end of the war. The war resulted in huge human and material losses for the USSR. It claimed almost 27 million human lives. 1,710 cities and towns were destroyed, 70 thousand villages were destroyed, 31,850 plants and factories, 1,135 mines, 65 thousand km of railways were blown up and put out of action. Cultivated areas decreased by 36.8 million hectares. The country has lost approximately one third of its national wealth.
The country began to restore the economy during the war years, when in 1943 a special party and government decree “On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation” was adopted. With the colossal efforts of the Soviet people, by the end of the war in these areas it was possible to restore industrial production to a third of the 1940 level. The liberated areas in 1944 provided over half of the national grain procurements, a quarter of livestock and poultry, and about a third of dairy products.
However, the country faced the central task of reconstruction only after the end of the war.
Industrial development. The restoration of industry took place under very difficult conditions. In the first post-war years, the work of Soviet people was not much different from the military emergency. The constant shortage of food (the rationing system was abolished only in 1947), the most difficult working and living conditions, and the high level of morbidity and mortality were explained to the population by the fact that the long-awaited peace had just arrived and life was about to get better. However, this did not happen.
However, some wartime restrictions were lifted: the 8-hour working day and annual leave were reintroduced, and forced overtime was abolished. The restoration took place in the context of a sharp increase in migration processes caused by the demobilization of the army (its number decreased from 11.4 million people in 1945 to 2.9 million in 1948), the repatriation of Soviet citizens from Europe, the return of refugees and evacuees from eastern regions of the country. Another difficulty in the development of industry was its conversion, which was largely completed by 1947. Considerable funds were also spent on supporting the allied Eastern European countries.
Huge losses in the war resulted in a shortage of labor, which, in turn, led to an increase in turnover of personnel seeking more favorable working conditions.
These costs, as before, had to be compensated by increasing the transfer of funds from villages to cities and by developing the labor activity of workers.
For the first time in many years after the war, there was a tendency towards a wider use of scientific and technical developments in production. However, it manifested itself mainly only at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC), where, under the conditions of the outbreak of the Cold War, the process of developing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, new missile systems, and new models of tank and aircraft equipment was underway.
Along with the priority development of the military-industrial complex, preference was also given to mechanical engineering, metallurgy, fuel, and energy industries, the development of which accounted for 88% of capital investments in industry. The light and food industries, as before, were financed on a residual basis (12%) and, naturally, did not satisfy even the minimum needs of the population.
In total, during the years of the 4th Five-Year Plan (1946-1950), 6,200 large enterprises were restored and rebuilt. In 1950, according to official data, industrial production exceeded pre-war figures by 73% (and in the new union republics of Estonia and Moldova - 2-3 times). True, reparations and products of joint Soviet-East German enterprises were also included here.
Agriculture. The country's agriculture emerged from the war even more weakened, whose gross output in 1945 did not exceed 60% of the pre-war level. The situation there worsened further due to the drought of 1946, which caused severe famine.
However, the unequal exchange of goods between the city and the countryside continued after this. Through government procurement, collective farms compensated for only a fifth of the costs of milk production, a tenth for grain, and a twentieth for meat. Peasants working on the collective farm received practically nothing. The only thing that saved me was the farming. However, the state dealt a significant blow to him too. For the period 1946-1949. 10.6 million hectares were cut off in favor of collective farms. land from peasant plots. Taxes on income from market sales were significantly increased. Market trade itself was allowed only to those peasants whose collective farms fulfilled state supplies. Each peasant farm was obliged to hand over meat, milk, eggs, and wool to the state as a tax for a plot of land. In 1948, collective farmers were “recommended” to sell small livestock to the state (which was allowed to be kept by the collective farm charter), which caused a massive slaughter of pigs, sheep, and goats throughout the country (up to 2 million heads).
Pre-war norms that limited the freedom of movement of collective farmers were preserved: they were actually deprived of the opportunity to have passports, they were not covered by temporary disability payments, and they were deprived of pension benefits. The monetary reform of 1947 also hit the peasantry, who kept their savings at home, hardest.
states, the transformation of occupied territories into a colonial raw material appendage of the Reich, the physical extermination of tens of millions of people. The entire territory up to the Urals was subject to Germanization.
Initially, the war was scheduled to begin on May 15, 1941, but the overthrow of the pro-German government in Yugoslavia and the failure of Italian troops in the war with Greece forced Germany to withdraw some troops from the Soviet border and transfer them to the Balkans. And only after the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece at the end of April, the date of the attack on the USSR was finally set - June 22. The moment for the attack on the USSR was not chosen by chance: the rearmament of the Red Army that had begun had not yet been completed; industry has not completely rebuilt itself on a war footing; the new military command cadres were still too inexperienced.
Selected German troops were drawn to the borders of the Soviet Union, who had gained rich combat experience in waging lightning war and were armed with first-class equipment for those times. To implement the “Barbarossa Plan”, 153 divisions were allocated, including 19 tank and 14 motorized. Germany's European allies (Finland, Romania, Hungary, Italy) sent 37 divisions against the USSR. In total, thus, 190 fully mobilized divisions of ground forces with a total number of 5.5 million people, 4,300 tanks, 5,000 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars were concentrated near the Soviet border.
Having subordinated the economies of the captured and allied countries, Germany significantly increased its military-economic potential, which allowed it to obtain 348 million tons of coal and 43.6 million tons of steel in 1940. In the USSR this year, 166 million tons of coal were mined and 18.3 million tons of steel were smelted. Accordingly, the output of other products, including military products, was much smaller.
The German command received a huge amount of weapons, military equipment, and military equipment from the occupied countries. All this created a significant superiority in forces and means and strengthened the confidence of the Nazi leadership in the successful implementation of the “Barbarossa Plan”.
The victory over fascism came at a high cost to the USSR. A military hurricane raged for several years over the main regions of the most developed part of the Soviet Union. Most industrial centers in the European part of the country were hit. All the main breadbaskets - Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and a significant part of the Volga region - were caught in the flames of war. So much was destroyed that restoration could take many years, even decades.
The war resulted in huge human and material losses for the USSR. It claimed almost 27 million human lives. 1,710 cities and towns were destroyed, 70 thousand villages were destroyed, 31,850 factories and factories, 1,135 mines, 65 thousand km of railways were blown up and disabled. Cultivated areas decreased by 36.8 million hectares. The country has lost approximately one third of its national wealth.
In the context of the transition from war to peace, questions arose about the ways of further development of the country's economy, about its structure and management system. It was not only about the conversion of military production, but also about the advisability of maintaining the existing economic model. In many ways, it was formed under the emergency conditions of the thirties. The war further strengthened this “extraordinary” nature of the economy and left its mark on its structure and system of organization. The years of war revealed the strong features of the existing economic model, and in particular, very high mobilization capabilities, the ability to quickly establish mass production of high-quality weapons and provide the army and military-industrial complex with the necessary resources by overstraining other sectors of the economy. But the war also strongly emphasized the weaknesses of the Soviet economy: the high proportion of manual labor, low productivity and the quality of non-military products. What was tolerable in peacetime, pre-war times, now required a radical solution.
The discussion was about whether it was necessary to return to the pre-war model of the economy with its hypertrophied military industries, strict centralization, unlimited planning in determining the activities of each enterprise, the complete absence of any elements of market exchange, and strict control over the work of the administration.
The post-war period required a restructuring of the type of work of government bodies to solve two contradictory problems: the conversion of the huge military-industrial complex that emerged during the war, with the goal of quickly modernizing the economy; the creation of two fundamentally new weapons systems that guarantee the security of the country - nuclear weapons and invulnerable means of their delivery (ballistic missiles). The work of a large number of departments began to be combined into intersectoral targeted programs. This was a qualitatively new type of public administration, although it was not so much the structure of the bodies that changed, but rather the functions. These changes are less noticeable than structural ones, but the state is a system, and the process in it is no less important than the structure.
The conversion of the military industry was carried out quickly, increasing the technical level of civilian industries (and thereby allowing the transition to the creation of new military industries). The People's Commissariat of Ammunition was rebuilt into the People's Commissariat of Agricultural Engineering. People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons to People's Commissariat of Mechanical Engineering and Instrument Making, People's Commissariat of Tank Industry to People's Commissariat of Transport Engineering, etc. (in 1946 the people's commissariats began to be called ministries).
As a result of the mass evacuation of industry to the east and the destruction of 32 thousand industrial enterprises in the European part during the occupation and hostilities, the economic geography of the country changed greatly. Immediately after the war, a corresponding reorganization of the management system began - along with the sectoral principle, they began to introduce the territorial principle into it. The point was to bring management bodies closer to enterprises, for the sake of which the ministries were disaggregated: during the war there were 25, and in 1947 there were 34. For example, coal mining was now managed by the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry of the western regions and the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry of the eastern regions. The People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry was similarly divided.
On this wave, among economic managers and economists, aspirations began to appear to reorganize the economic management system, to soften those aspects of it that restrained the initiative and independence of enterprises, and in particular, to weaken the shackles of over-centralization.
Analyzing the existing economic system, some scientists and industrialists proposed to carry out reforms in the spirit of the NEP: with the predominant dominance of the public sector, officially admit the private sector, covering primarily the service sector and small-scale production. The mixed economy naturally used market relations.
An explanation for such sentiments can be sought in the situation that developed during the war. The country's economy during the war, the life of the population, and the organization of work of local authorities acquired unique features. With the transfer of the work of the main industries to meet the needs of the front, the output of peaceful products sharply decreased; ensuring the life of the population and supplying them with the most necessary goods and services began to be carried out primarily by local authorities, organizing small-scale production, attracting handicraftsmen and artisans to the production of necessary goods. As a result, handicraft industry developed, private trade revived, not only in food, but in industrial goods. Centralized supplies covered only a small part of the population.
The war taught many leaders at all levels to have a certain independence and initiative. After the war, local authorities made attempts to expand the production of goods for the population not only in small handicraft workshops, but also in large factories subordinated directly to central ministries. The Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, together with the leadership of the Leningrad region, organized a fair in the city in 1947, at which enterprises not only in Russia, but also in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other republics sold materials they did not need. The fair opened up the possibility of establishing independent economic ties between industrial enterprises bypassing the center. To a certain extent, it contributed to the expansion of the scope of market relations (several years later, the organizers of this fair paid with their lives for their initiative).
Hopes for changes in economic management turned out to be unrealistic. From the late 40s, a course was taken to strengthen the previous administrative-command methods of leadership and to further develop the existing economic model.
To understand the reasons for this decision, one must keep in mind the dual purpose of Russian industry. Its high mobilization capabilities during the war years were largely explained by the fact that the economy from the very beginning was oriented towards work in war conditions. All factories that were created in the pre-war years had both a civilian and military profile. Thus, the question of the economic model had to necessarily touch on this key aspect. It was necessary to decide whether the economy would be truly civil or, as before, remain a two-faced Janus: peaceful in words and military in essence.
Stalin's position became decisive - all attempts at change in this area ran into his imperial ambitions. As a result, the Soviet economy returned to the militaristic model with all its inherent shortcomings.
Also during this period, the question arose: what was the Soviet economic system (it was called socialism, but this is a purely conventional concept that does not answer the question). Before the end of the war, life posed such clear and urgent tasks that there was no great need for theory. Now it was necessary to understand the meaning of the plan, goods, money and market in the economy of the USSR.
Feeling that the question was complicated and there was no ready answer in Marxism, Stalin delayed the publication of a textbook on the political economy of socialism as long as he could. In 1952, he published an important work, “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” where he carefully, without entering into polemics with Marxism, gave an understanding of the Soviet economy as a non-market economy, a civilization different from the West (“capitalism”). No other interpretation was possible.
The country began to restore the economy in the year of the war, when in 1943. a special party and government resolution was adopted “On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation.” With the colossal efforts of the Soviet people, by the end of the war in these areas it was possible to restore industrial production to a third of the 1940 level. The liberated areas in 1944 provided over half of the national grain procurements, a quarter of livestock and poultry, and about a third of dairy products.
However, the country faced the central task of reconstruction only after the end of the war.
At the end of May 1945, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer part of the defense enterprises to the production of goods for the population. Somewhat later, a law was passed on the demobilization of thirteen ages of army personnel. These decisions marked the beginning of the Soviet Union's transition to peaceful construction. In September 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished. All functions of governing the country were concentrated in the hands of the Council of People's Commissars (in March 1946, transformed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR).
Measures were taken aimed at resuming normal work in enterprises and institutions. Mandatory overtime work was abolished, the 8-hour working day and annual paid leave were restored. The budget for the third and fourth quarters of 1945 and for 1946 was reviewed. Appropriations for military needs were reduced and expenditures for the development of civilian sectors of the economy increased. The restructuring of the national economy and social life in relation to peacetime conditions was completed mainly in 1946. In March 1946, the Supreme Council of the USSR approved a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1946-1950. The main objective of the Five Year Plan was to restore the areas of the country that were subject to occupation, achieve pre-war levels of industrial and agricultural development, and then surpass them. The plan provided for the priority development of heavy and defense industries. Significant financial resources, material and labor resources were allocated here. It was planned to develop new coal regions and expand the metallurgical base in the east of the country. One of the conditions for fulfilling planned targets was the maximum use of scientific and technological progress.
1946 was the most difficult year in the post-war development of industry. To switch enterprises to the production of civilian products, production technology was changed, new equipment was created, and personnel retraining was carried out. In accordance with the five-year plan, restoration work began in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The coal industry of Donbass was revived. Zaporizhstal was restored, and the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant came into operation. At the same time, construction of new and reconstruction of existing plants and factories was carried out. Over the five-year period, over 6.2 thousand industrial enterprises were restored and rebuilt. 1 Particular attention was paid to the development of metallurgy, mechanical engineering, fuel and energy and military-industrial complexes. The foundations of nuclear energy and the radio-electronic industry were laid. New industry giants emerged in the Urals, Siberia, the republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia (Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead-Zinc Plant, Kutaisi Automobile Plant). The country's first long-distance gas pipeline, Saratov - Moscow, went into operation. The Rybinsk and Sukhumi hydroelectric power stations began to operate.
Enterprises were equipped with new technology. The mechanization of labor-intensive processes in the iron and steel and coal industries has increased. Electrification of production continued. By the end of the Five-Year Plan, the electrical output of labor in industry was one and a half times higher than the level of 1940.
A large volume of industrial work was carried out in the republics and regions included in the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. In the western regions of Ukraine and in the Baltic republics, new industrial sectors were created, in particular, gas and automobile, metalworking and electrical engineering. The peat industry and electric power industry have developed in Western Belarus.
Work to restore the industry was largely completed in 1948. But at some metallurgy enterprises it continued in the early 50s. The massive industrial heroism of the Soviet people, expressed in numerous labor initiatives (the introduction of high-speed work methods, the movement for saving metal and high quality products, the movement of multi-machine operators, etc.), contributed to the successful implementation of planned targets. By the end of the Five-Year Plan, the level of industrial production was 73% higher than the pre-war level. However, the priority development of heavy industry and the redistribution in its favor of funds from the light and food industries led to further deformation of the industrial structure towards an increase in the production of group “A” products.
The restoration of industry and transport, new industrial construction led to an increase in the number of the working class.
After the war, the country was in ruins, and the question of choosing the path of economic development became acute. An alternative could be market reforms, but the existing political system was not ready for this step. The directive economy still retained the mobilization character that was inherent in it during the first five-year plans and during the war. Millions of people were organized in an organized manner to restore the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant, metallurgical plants of Krivoy Rog, Donbass mines, as well as to build new factories, hydroelectric power stations, etc.
The development of the USSR economy rested on its excessive centralization. All economic issues, large and small, were resolved only in the center, and local economic authorities were strictly limited in resolving any matters. The main material and monetary resources necessary to fulfill planned targets were distributed through a large number of bureaucratic authorities. Departmental disunity, mismanagement and confusion led to constant downtime in production, storming, huge material costs, and absurd transportation from one end to another of the vast country.
The Soviet Union received reparations from Germany in the amount of $4.3 billion. As reparations, industrial equipment, including even entire factory complexes, was exported from Germany and other defeated countries to the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet economy was never able to properly manage this wealth due to general mismanagement, and valuable equipment, machines, etc. were gradually turned into scrap metal. 1.5 million German and 0.5 million Japanese prisoners of war worked in the USSR. In addition, the GULAI system during this period contained approximately 8-9 million prisoners, whose work was practically unpaid.
The division of the world into two hostile camps had negative consequences for the country's economy. From 1945 to 1950, foreign trade turnover with Western countries decreased by 35%, which had a noticeable impact on the Soviet economy, which was deprived of new equipment and advanced technologies. That's why in the mid-1950s. The Soviet Union faced the need for profound socio-economic and political changes. Since the path of progressive changes of a political nature was blocked, narrowed to possible (and even then not very serious) amendments to liberalization, the most constructive ideas that appeared in the first post-war years concerned not politics, but the economic sphere. The Central Committee of the CPSU(b) considered various proposals from economists in this regard. Among them is the manuscript “Post-war Domestic Economy”, owned by S.D. Alexander. The essence of his proposals boiled down to the following:
transformation of state-owned enterprises into joint-stock or share partnerships, in which the workers and employees themselves are the shareholders, and are governed by an authorized elected board of shareholders;
decentralization of the supply of raw materials to enterprises by creating district and regional industrial supplies instead of supplies under the people's commissariats and central administrations;
abolition of the system of state procurement of agricultural products, granting collective and state farms the right to free sale on the market;
reform of the monetary system taking into account gold parity;
liquidation of state trade and transfer of its functions to trading cooperatives and share partnerships.
These ideas can be considered as the foundations of a new economic model, built on the principles of the market and partial denationalization of the economy, very bold and progressive for that time. True, the ideas of S.D. Alexander had to share the fate of other radical projects; they were classified as “harmful” and written off in the “archive”.
The Center, despite certain hesitations, remained staunchly committed to its previous course on fundamental issues concerning the fundamentals of constructing economic and political models of development. Therefore, the center was receptive only to those ideas that did not affect the fundamentals of the supporting structure, i.e. did not encroach on the exclusive role of the state in matters of management, financial support, control and did not contradict the main tenets of ideology.
The first attempt to reform the command-administrative system is closely connected with the end in March 1953 of the Stalinist period in the history of the USSR, when the government of the country was concentrated in the hands of three politicians: Chairman of the Council of Ministers G.M. Malenkov, Minister of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev. A struggle broke out between them for sole power, during which each of them counted on the support of the party and state nomenklatura. This new layer of Soviet society (secretaries of the Central Committee of republican communist parties, regional committees, regional committees, etc.) was ready to support one of these leaders of the country, provided that he was given greater independence in resolving local issues and, most importantly, guarantees of personal safety, the end of political “purges” and repression.
Subject to these conditions, the nomenklatura was ready to agree to reforms within certain limits, beyond which it could not and did not want to go. During the reforms, it was necessary to reorganize or abolish the Gulag system, stimulate the development of the agricultural sector of the economy, carry out reforms in the social sphere, and reduce the tension of constant “mobilization” in solving economic problems and in the search for internal and external enemies.
As a result of a complex struggle on the political “Olympus,” N.S., supported by the nomenklatura, came to power. Khrushchev, who quickly pushed aside his rivals. In 1953, L. Beria was arrested and executed on the absurd charges of “collaboration with imperialist intelligence services” and “conspiracy to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie.” In January 1955, G. Malenkov resigned. In 1957, the “anti-party group” consisting of G. Malenkov, L. Kaganovich, V. Molotov and others was expelled from the top leadership. Khrushchev, being the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1958 also became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Political changes in the USSR needed to be consolidated by changes in the economy. Speaking in August 1953 at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, G.M. Malenkov clearly formulated the main directions of economic policy: a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods, large investments in light industry. Such a radical turn, it would seem, should have forever changed the fundamental guidelines for the development of the Soviet economy, established in previous decades.
But this, as the history of the country’s development has shown, did not happen. After the war, various administrative reforms were carried out several times, but they did not make fundamental changes to the essence of the planning administrative system. In the mid-1950s, attempts were made to abandon the use of mobilization measures in solving economic problems. After a few years, it became clear that this task was insurmountable for the Soviet economy, since economic incentives for development were incompatible with the command system. It was still necessary to organize masses of people to carry out various projects. Examples include calls for young people to participate in the development of virgin lands, in the construction of grandiose “communist construction projects” in Siberia and the Far East.
An example of a not very well-thought-out reform is the attempt to restructure management along territorial lines (1957). During this reform, many sectoral union ministries were abolished, and territorial councils of the national economy (economic councils) appeared in their place. The only ministries in charge of military production, the Ministry of Defense, Foreign and Internal Affairs and some others were not affected by this restructuring. Thus, an attempt was made to decentralize control.
In total, 105 economic administrative regions were created in the country, including 70 in the RSFSR, 11 in Ukraine, 9 in Kazakhstan, 4 in Uzbekistan, and in the remaining republics - one economic council. The functions of the USSR State Planning Committee remained only general planning and coordination of territorial and sectoral plans, distribution of the most important funds among the union republics.
The first results of the management reform were quite successful. So, already in 1958, i.e. a year after it began, the increase in national income was 12.4% (compared to 7% in 1957). The scale of production specialization and intersectoral cooperation has increased, and the process of creating and introducing new technology into production has accelerated. But, according to experts, the resulting effect is not only a consequence of perestroika itself. The point is also that for some period the enterprises turned out to be “ownerless” (when the ministries actually no longer functioned and economic councils had not yet been formed), and it was during this period that they began to work noticeably more productively, without feeling any leadership “from above.” But as soon as the new management system took shape, the previous negative phenomena in the economy began to intensify. Moreover, new aspects have appeared: localism, stricter administration, an ever-growing “in-house” local bureaucracy.
And although outwardly the new, “sovnarkhoz” system of management was significantly different from the previous, “ministerial” one, its essence remained the same. The previous principle of distribution of raw materials and products, the same dictate of the supplier in relation to the consumer, was preserved. Economic levers simply could not become decisive under the conditions of the absolute dominance of the command-administrative system.
All reorganizations ultimately did not lead to noticeable success. Moreover, if in 1951-1955. industrial production increased by 85%, agricultural production - by 20.5%, and in 1956-1960 by 64.3 and 30%, respectively (and the growth of agricultural production was mainly due to the development of new lands), then in 1961-1965 these figures began to decline and amounted to 51 and 11% Our Fatherland. Experience of political history. T.2 - M., 1991, p.427.
So, centrifugal forces noticeably weakened the country’s economic potential; many economic councils turned out to be incapable of solving major production problems. Already in 1959, the consolidation of economic councils began: weaker ones began to join more powerful ones (by analogy with the consolidation of collective farms). The centripetal tendency turned out to be stronger. Soon enough, the previous hierarchical structure in the country's economy was restored.
Scientists, economists and practitioners tried to develop new approaches to the country's economic development, especially in the field of long-term planning and forecasting, and the determination of strategic macroeconomic goals. But these developments were not designed for quick results, so they were not given enough attention. The country's leadership needed real results at the present time, and therefore all efforts were directed towards endless adjustments to current plans. For example, a detailed plan for the fifth five-year plan (1951-1955) was never drawn up, and the Directives of the 19th Party Congress became the starting document that guided the work of the entire economy for five years. These were just the outlines of a five-year plan, but there was no specific plan. The same situation arose with the sixth five-year plan (1956-1960).
Traditionally, so-called grassroots planning has been weak, i.e. drawing up plans at the enterprise level. Basic plan targets were often adjusted, so the plan turned into a purely nominal document, directly related only to the process of calculating wages and bonus payments, which depended on the percentage of fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan.
Since, as noted above, the plans were constantly being adjusted, the plans that were carried out (or rather not carried out) were completely different from those that were adopted at the beginning of the planning period (year, five-year plan). The State Planning Committee “bargained” with the ministries, and the ministries with enterprises about what plan they could implement with the available resources. But the supply of resources for such a plan was still disrupted, and “bidding” began again on the figures of the plan, on the amount of supplies, etc.
All this confirms the conclusion that the Soviet economy depended to a greater extent not on competent economic developments, but on political decisions, constantly changing in directly opposite directions and most often leading to a dead end. Fruitless attempts were made in the country to improve the structure of the state apparatus, to vest ministers, heads of central administrations, and directors of enterprises with new rights or, conversely, to limit their powers, to divide existing planning bodies and create new ones, etc. There were many such “reforms” in the 1950s and 1960s, but none of them brought real improvements to the functioning of the command system.
Basically, when determining the priorities of post-war economic development, when developing the fourth five-year plan - the recovery plan - the country's leadership actually returned to the pre-war model of economic development and pre-war methods of conducting economic policy. This means that the development of industry, primarily heavy industry, had to be carried out not only to the detriment of the interests of the agricultural economy and the sphere of consumption (i.e., as a result of the appropriate distribution of budget funds), but also largely at their expense, because the pre-war policy of “pumping” funds from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector continued (hence, for example, the unprecedented increase in taxes on the peasantry in the post-war period)
LECTURE 79. USSR in 1945-1953.
Results and significance of the Great Patriotic War
Reasons, sources of victory in the Great Patriotic War
The Second World War is over.
The war caused enormous damage. 1,700 villages, 70 thousand villages and hamlets were destroyed. USSR
lost about 30% of national wealth. The standard of living has fallen catastrophically. The economy was experiencing an acute labor shortage. In 1946, the difficult economic situation was aggravated by crop failure and famine.
The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950) set the goal of restoring and exceeding pre-war production levels. At the same time, the primary goal was clearly formulated - the restoration and development of heavy industry. Heavy industry reached pre-war levels in 1948. The Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, the Zaporozhye Metallurgical Plant, the Stalingrad and Kharkov Tractor Plants were restored. New industrial enterprises were built. It was a success achieved through colossal effort and labor heroism of the people.
Reparations (reparation is partial compensation for material damage caused by military actions) equipment from Germany were of a certain importance. Just like in the 30s. the labor of Gulag prisoners was used. At the same time, enormous amounts of money were spent on creating new types of weapons ( 1949 - atomic bomb test - Kurchatov; 1953 - hydrogen bomb test; Korolev missile test).
The course towards the priority development of heavy industry, especially industries related to the military-industrial complex, excluded the possibility of a significant increase in living standards.
Agriculture of pre-war indicators by the early 1950s. The transfer of funds to industry has assumed enormous proportions. Mandatory government supplies increased, taxes rose, and household plots were reduced.
1947 - abolition of cards.
1947 currency reform. At constant prices, money was exchanged for new ones at a rate of 10:1. Amounts stored in savings banks were exchanged at a preferential rate: up to 3 thousand - 1:1; 3-10 thousand-3:2; over 10 thousand -2:1. It was assumed that speculators who had profited during the war would suffer from the reform. In practice, peasants and workers who traditionally kept their money not in savings banks, but in a “stocking”, suffered. During the reform, about a third of cash was not presented for exchange.
The war led to colossal material and human losses for our country: 27 million killed and 2 million disabled. A reduction in cultivated area by 37 million hectares and the loss of a third of national wealth. 1. Economic consequences of the war. Losses of Soviet people 27 million. Destroyed: cities, towns and villages 70 thousand factories and factories mines 1135 railways, 65 thousand km reduction of crop area 25% total material damage 2.5 trillion rubles. Stalingrad
Stalin's speech (). - Summary of history. -Strategy. -V challenges Stalin demanded not only to restore, but also to surpass the pre-war level of development of ___ and ___. CHECK YOURSELF. Read 1. Working on a plan. Page From the law on the five-year plan for 1946 - 1950. P a g e Industrial development. N.A. Voznesensky Kursk Minsk
Difficulties. -Resources -Restore industry. -New industrial sectors. Res –t “+” ek –ki 1946 –peaceful. products up to W level 1950 – 73% up to W heavy. easy. 2. Industry development. Restoration of the Dnieper hydroelectric station. Stalingrad Tractor Plant
Plan 4 “5 l” 27% drought, famine (Black Earth Region of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Moldova) Grain procurement Volga region, Siberia, Kazakhstan. famine 3. Post-war village. In a post-war village.
% to W (overestimated) Plan Reasons. - slave. hands -Financing principle (residual). -Not interested (ek). -Hunger, drought. PROM. S/X? food 3. Post-war village. The first harvest after the occupation.
Results “-” “+” - resources - enthusiasm (internal) - discipline. reparations 1947 WORKERS. -Prisoners -Orgnabor (village) -Komsomol? Compare the plans of the two “5l” Page Results 4 “5l” (). 5 "5l" ()
Similarities in plans. 1. ave. heavy easy. 2 Investments in agriculture, etc. 3. life. level Differences Agricultural financing - part of the funds in agricultural residuals. principle - Development through agriculture - re-equipment of agriculture - Restoration - development - N. A. Voznesensky - M. Z. Saburov 4. Results 4 “5l” (). 5 "5l" ()
Potsdam Intelligence I.V. Kurchatov August 6 and 9 Semipalatinsk I. E. Tamm. Hydrogen bomb 6. Creation of atomic weapons. Test of the Soviet atomic bomb.
15
The end of the war brought to the fore the task of restoring normal functioning of the national economy. The human and material losses caused by the war were very heavy. The total loss of life is estimated at 27 million people, of which only slightly more than 10 million were military personnel. 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 1710 cities and towns, 70 thousand villages were destroyed. The amount of direct losses caused by the war was estimated at 679 billion rubles, which was 5.5 times higher than the national income of the USSR in 1940. In addition to the enormous destruction, the war led to a complete restructuring of the national economy on a war footing, and its end meant the need for new efforts to his return to peacetime conditions.
Restoring the economy was the main task of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Already in August 1945, the State Planning Committee began developing a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1946 - 1950. When considering the draft plan, the country's leadership revealed different approaches to the methods and goals of restoring the country's economy: 1) more balanced, balanced development of the national economy, some mitigation of coercive measures in economic life, 2) a return to the pre-war model of economic development, based on the predominant growth of heavy industry.
The difference in points of view in the choice of ways to restore the economy was based on a different assessment of the post-war international situation. Supporters of the first option (A.A. Zhdanov - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee, N.A. Voznesensky - Chairman of the State Planning Committee, M.I. Rodionov - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, etc.) believed that with With the return to peace in capitalist countries, an economic and political crisis must occur; a conflict between the imperialist powers is possible due to the redistribution of colonial empires, in which, first of all, the USA and Great Britain will collide. As a result, in their opinion, a relatively favorable international climate is developing for the USSR, which means there is no urgent need to continue the policy of accelerated development of heavy industry. Supporters of a return to the pre-war model of economic development, among whom the main role was played by G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria, as well as the leaders of heavy industry, on the contrary, viewed the international situation as very alarming. In their opinion, at this stage capitalism was able to cope with its internal contradictions, and the nuclear monopoly gave the imperialist states a clear military superiority over the USSR. Consequently, the absolute priority of economic policy should once again be the accelerated development of the country's military-industrial base.
The five-year plan, approved by Stalin and adopted by the Supreme Soviet in the spring of 1946, meant a return to the pre-war slogan: the completion of the construction of socialism and the beginning of the transition to communism. Stalin believed that the war only interrupted the completion of this task. The process of building communism was viewed by Stalin in a very simplified manner, primarily as the achievement of certain quantitative indicators in several industries. To do this, it is enough to allegedly, within 15 years, bring the production of cast iron to 50 million tons per year, steel - up to 60 million tons, oil - up to 60 million tons, coal - up to 500 million tons, i.e. produce in 3 times more than what was achieved before the war.
Thus, Stalin decided to remain faithful to his pre-war industrialization scheme, which relied on the priority development of several basic branches of heavy industry. Later, a return to the development model of the 30s. was theoretically substantiated by Stalin in his work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” (1952), in which he argued that in the conditions of the growing aggressiveness of capitalism, the priorities of the Soviet economy should be the primary development of heavy industry and the acceleration of the process of transforming agriculture towards greater socialization . The main direction of development in the post-war years again became the accelerated development of heavy industry at the expense and to the detriment of the development of the production of consumer goods and agriculture. Therefore, 88% of capital investments in industry were directed to mechanical engineering and only 12% to light industry.
In order to increase efficiency, an attempt was made to modernize the controls. In March 1946, a law was passed transforming the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR into the Council of Ministers of the USSR. However, the number of ministers grew, the administrative apparatus expanded, and forms of wartime leadership were practiced, which became familiar. In fact, the country was governed by decrees and resolutions published on behalf of the party and government, but they were developed at meetings of a very narrow circle of leaders. The Congress of the Communist Party has not been convened for 13 years. Only in 1952 did the next 19th Congress convene, at which the party adopted a new name - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The party's Central Committee, as an elected body of collective governance of the multimillion-strong ruling party, also did not work. All the main elements that made up the mechanism of the Soviet state - the party, the government, the army, the MGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, diplomacy - were subordinated directly to Stalin.
Relying on the spiritual uplift of the victorious people, the USSR already in 1948 managed to increase national income by 64% and reach the pre-war level of industrial production. In 1950, the pre-war level of gross industrial production was exceeded by 73%, with a 45% increase in labor productivity. Agriculture also returned to pre-war production levels. Although the accuracy of these statistics has been criticized, the steep positive dynamics of the process of economic recovery in 1946-1950. noted by all specialists.
Science and technology developed at a high pace in the post-war years, and the USSR reached the most advanced levels in a number of areas of science and technology. Major achievements have been achieved in domestic rocket science, aircraft manufacturing, and radio engineering. Significant progress has been made in the development of mathematics, physics, astronomy, biology, and chemistry. On August 29, 1949, the USSR tested an atomic bomb, developed by a large group of scientists and engineers under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatova.
The solution to social problems improved much more slowly. The post-war years were difficult for the vast majority of the population. However, the first successes in restoring the national economy made it possible to abolish the card system already in December 1947 (earlier than in most European countries). At the same time, a monetary reform was carried out, which, although at first it infringed on the interests of a limited section of the population, led to a real stabilization of the monetary system and ensured a subsequent increase in the well-being of the people as a whole. Of course, neither the monetary reform nor the periodic price reductions led to a significant increase in the purchasing power of the population, but they contributed to an increase in interest in work and created a favorable social climate. At the same time, enterprises voluntarily and compulsorily carried out annual loans and subscriptions to bonds in the amount of at least a month’s salary. However, the population saw positive changes around them and believed that this money was going towards the restoration and development of the country.
To a large extent, the high rates of restoration and development of industry were ensured by the withdrawal of funds from agriculture. During these years, life in the village was especially difficult; in 1950, in every fifth collective farm, cash payments for workdays were not made at all. Gross poverty stimulated a massive exodus of peasants to the cities: about 8 million rural residents left their villages in 1946-1953. At the end of 1949, the economic and financial situation of collective farms deteriorated so much that the government had to adjust its agricultural policy. Responsible for agricultural policy A.A. Andreev was replaced by N.S. Khrushchev. The subsequent measures to consolidate collective farms were carried out very quickly - the number of collective farms decreased from 252 thousand to 94 thousand by the end of 1952. The consolidation was accompanied by a new and significant reduction in individual plots of peasants, a reduction in payment in kind, which made up a significant part of collective farm earnings and was considered of great value , since it gave peasants the opportunity to sell surplus products in markets at high prices for cash.
The initiator of these reforms, Khrushchev, intended to complete the work he had begun with a radical and utopian change in the entire way of peasant life. In March 1951 Pravda published his project for creating “agricultural cities.” Khrushchev envisioned the agricultural city as a real city, in which peasants, resettled from their huts, had to lead city life in apartment buildings far from their individual plots.
The post-war atmosphere in society carried a potential danger for the Stalinist regime, which was due to the fact that extreme wartime conditions awakened in a person the ability to think relatively independently, critically assess the situation, compare and choose solutions. As in the war with Napoleon, the mass of our compatriots visited abroad, saw a qualitatively different standard of living for the population of European countries and asked the question: “Why do we live worse?” At the same time, in peacetime conditions, such stereotypes of wartime behavior as the habit of command and subordination, strict discipline and unconditional execution of orders remained tenacious.
The long-awaited common victory inspired people to rally around the authorities, and open confrontation between the people and the authorities was impossible. Firstly, the liberating, fair nature of the war presupposed the unity of society in confrontation with a common enemy. Secondly, people, tired of destroying, strove for peace, which became the highest value for them, excluding violence in any form. Thirdly, the experience of the war and the impressions of foreign campaigns forced us to reflect on the justice of the Stalinist regime, but very few thought about how, in what way to change it. The existing regime of power was perceived as an unchangeable given. Thus, the first post-war years were characterized by a contradiction in people’s minds between the feeling of injustice of what was happening in their lives and the hopelessness of trying to change it. At the same time, complete trust in the ruling party and the leadership of the country was prevalent in society. Therefore, post-war difficulties were perceived as inevitable and surmountable in the near future. In general, the people were characterized by social optimism.
However, Stalin did not really count on these sentiments and gradually revived the practice of the repressive whip in relation to his associates and the people. From the point of view of the leadership, it was necessary to “tighten up the reins” that had been loosened somewhat during the war, and in 1949 the repressive line became noticeably tougher. Among the political processes of the post-war period, the most famous was the “Leningrad case”, which includes a whole series of cases fabricated against a number of prominent party, Soviet and economic workers in Leningrad, accused of departing from the party line.
The “Doctors' Plot” gained odious historical notoriety. On January 13, 1953, TASS reported the arrest of a terrorist group of doctors, which allegedly aimed to shorten the lives of leading figures of the Soviet state through sabotage treatment. Only after Stalin’s death was a resolution adopted by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the complete rehabilitation and release of doctors and members of their families.
6. Causes and origins of the Cold War
The post-war decade is full of important political events. Many rightly believed that the broad anti-Hitler coalition of states and social forces that emerged during the years of the struggle against fascism would guarantee the peaceful progress of mankind in the long term. However, the second half of the 40s. did not become a period of development of the cooperation potential of the allied states, but, on the contrary, was a time of first cooling of relations between the victorious powers, and then drawing them into the so-called “Cold War”. The main change in the international situation after the end of the Second World War was the further deepening of the split of the world into two socio-political blocs, which began in 1917.
The fact that the anti-Hitler coalition was doomed to collapse soon after the elimination of the common enemy - Hitlerism - was well understood by such a cold and far-sighted politician as W. Churchill long before the end of the war. The deep reason for this was the fundamental ideological contradictions in the social structure of the ruling circles of the opposing states, primarily the USSR and the USA, which had already knowingly denied each other the historical right to exist as social systems. Of course, there were real Soviet-American economic, geopolitical and other mutual interests and contradictions, but the main reason for the global confrontation was that interstate relations were so ideological that everything else receded into the background. In the history of international relations, a long period of global confrontation between two world powers began - the USSR and the USA.
A loud manifesto of the Cold War between former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition was the speech of former British Prime Minister W. Churchill in Fulton (USA), delivered on March 5, 1946 in the presence of the new American President G. Truman. The political meaning of this speech and the subsequent propaganda campaign was, first of all, to psychologically prepare the Western public for the subsequent severance of relations between the victorious countries, to erase from the minds of people those feelings of respect and gratitude for the Soviet people that developed during the years of joint struggle with fascism.
In the fall of 1946, liberal-minded figures towards the USSR from the previous administration of F.D. Roosevelt was forced out of key positions in the American government. In March 1947, in the wake of the ever-increasing political confrontation between the USSR and the USA, Truman announced in Congress his decision to stop the spread of “Soviet rule” in Europe at any cost (the “Truman Doctrine”). For the first time, the term “cold war” was released into propaganda circulation.
To be fair, it should be noted that the strategic turn of the US foreign policy towards open confrontation with the USSR was largely provoked by the ideology and policies of the Stalinist leadership. Having launched massive ideological and political repressions in its own country and in the Eastern European countries that fell into its sphere of influence, Stalinism turned in the eyes of millions of people into a kind of political bogeyman. This greatly facilitated the work of right-wing conservative forces in the West, who advocated refusal of cooperation with the USSR.
The sad diplomatic experience of the thirties for the USSR and, above all, the experience of Soviet-German relations had a certain influence on the nature of Stalin’s foreign policy in the post-war period. Therefore, Stalin was very suspicious of Western diplomacy, believing that it was impossible to maintain stable long-term relations with it. This resulted in inflexibility, ultimatum notes in relations with the United States and other countries, and often an inadequate reaction to the actions of the West.
The specific subject of contradictions in the relations between the former allies were, first of all, differences in approaches to the post-war structure of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. After the war, there was a growth in the influence of leftist communist forces, which was seen in the West as a potential threat to the existing system. The United States tried to counter this in every possible way. In turn, the leadership of the USSR considered the West’s desire to influence the nature of political processes in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe as an attempt to bring regimes unfriendly to the USSR to power here, to restore a “cordon sanitaire” at the western borders of the country, to deprive it of the fruits of victory, to oust The USSR from the sphere of interests of its security. Not without reason, Stalin perceived with increasing distrust any actions of the former allies in this region, suspecting that they were preparing strategic springboards for themselves for a future war with the USSR. Based simultaneously on the previous idea of a world communist revolution and the global geopolitical tasks of the USSR, Stalin actively contributed to the establishment of socio-political regimes similar to the USSR in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania. In 1949, largely thanks to the assistance of the USSR, the communists finally won power in China.
In fact, one of the specific applied programs of the “Truman Doctrine” was the plan for the economic revival of Europe (the “Marshall Plan”) proposed by the United States. By offering quite significant economic assistance to war-stricken countries, the United States pursued both political (to achieve regime stability and avert the threat of social explosions on the continent) and economic (to rid its country of oversaturation of capital and goods markets) goals. The leadership of the USSR saw in this plan a US claim to world hegemony and gross interference in the internal affairs of European states. A negative attitude towards the “Marshall Plan” was imposed by Stalin on the governments of Central and South-Eastern Europe and by communists in other regions of the world.
In accordance with the “Truman Doctrine,” the United States and its allies involved the USSR in a ruinous arms race, soon surrounded the USSR with military bases, and in 1949 they created the NATO bloc. The USSR, which was significantly inferior in economic power, responded by tightly closing the country and its allies with the “Iron Curtain”, creating nuclear weapons, and, in opposition to NATO, in 1949 formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance from its allies, and later in the mid-50s. - Organization of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, repeatedly in the post-war period the world was put at risk by the irresponsible actions of politicians and the military of the Cold War escalating into a nuclear one. An open test of the military forces of the opposing blocs was the Korean War (1950-1953), which brought humanity to the brink of the third world war.
Under these conditions, the United Nations, created in 1945, could become an instrument for maintaining peace. However, the outbreak of confrontation between the USSR and the USA in the Cold War did not allow hopes for the UN to be realized as a mechanism for resolving conflicts; its activities were virtually paralyzed. Instead of becoming an instrument of peace, the UN was turned into a field of diplomatic confrontation and propaganda battles for many years. During these years, the broad public Peace Movement began to play a well-known positive, but still mostly propaganda, role.
Thus, during a difficult period in world history, the USSR and the bourgeois-liberal countries were able to overcome, at least temporarily, their mutual fundamental ideological alienation in order to protect the planet from the real threat of establishing an inhumane fascist “new order.” After the war, the USSR quickly restored its economy and significantly expanded its sphere of international influence. In the history of international relations, a long period of global confrontation began between two world powers - the USSR and the USA, which was based on deep ideological contradictions on issues of social order.
topic 16 Soviet society in the context of the beginning of the scientific and technological revolution (50-80s of the XX century)
1/ The first attempts to liberalize Soviet society: the Khrushchev decade. (1955-1964)
2/ Search for ways to intensify the economy of the USSR and ease international tension in the 60-80s. "The Age of Stagnation"
1. The first attempts to liberalize Soviet society: the Khrushchev decade (1955-1964)
In the middle of the 20th century, humanity entered a long historical period of the scientific and technological revolution (STR). This meant a radical, qualitative transformation of the productive forces based on the transformation of science into the leading factor in the development of social production, a direct productive force. Since then, everything in the world has become dependent on how science is developed and how its achievements are used. This concerns safety and welfare, product competitiveness, health and education, etc.
Scientific and technological revolution arose under the influence of major scientific and technical discoveries and the increased interaction of science with technology and production. Its main directions were complex automation of production, control and management based on the widespread use of computers, the discovery and use of new types of energy, the creation and use of new types of structural materials.
Initially, the Soviet Union demonstrated particular receptivity to the achievements of scientific and technological progress. Centralized leadership had a temporary positive effect. The labor enthusiasm of the masses and their self-sacrifice were of considerable importance. Back in the mid-30s, on the eve of the scientific and technological revolution, the problems of automation were already discussed in the USSR. In 1939, the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a decision on the development of automated production. In 1939-1940 The first automatic line was created at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. This was followed by the launch of a number of other automatic lines at various factories, and in 1949-1950. The automatic plant came into operation in Ulyanovsk.
In the USA, the development of automatic lines began only in the late 40s, and they themselves appeared and began to produce products only in 1954. Naturally, this is not a basis for the assertion that the scientific and technological revolution was imported from the USSR to the USA. Moreover, a number of technical means characterizing the main directions of scientific and technological revolution appeared in the USA earlier than in the USSR. Nevertheless, scientific and technological progress quickly gained momentum in the USSR. However, this did not at all indicate that the productive forces of socialism were potentially receptive to the widest introduction of the achievements of science and technology, as was believed for many years. The system of strict centralized economic management simply had a certain effect. Production relations did not create conditions for scientific and technical progress and did not stimulate its acceleration. On the contrary, they were a hindrance to the successful development of scientific and technical achievements. All this began to be acutely felt already in the early 50s, when the command-administrative methods of managing scientific and technical progress had exhausted themselves and the discrepancy between production relations and the level of development of the productive forces began to clearly appear. The measures taken over many years to improve the former did not lead to positive results, which caused a serious lag in the scientific and technical sphere. The created model of socialism, oriented towards forceful pressure, eliminated the effect of objective economic laws and rejected economic incentives. And in fact, the opportunity to make a breakthrough in the leading areas of scientific and technological revolution was lost.
Against the background of our failed experience, the scientific and technological policy of advanced industrial countries, which has absorbed all the best created in the world, looks indicative. It partly used management methods characteristic of socialism. Such as elements of planning, government intervention in monopoly affairs, etc.
However, other factors have had a decisive influence on the progress of science and technology in modern capitalist society. Among them, a special place is occupied by the sharply intensified competitive struggle between monopolies within the country, between states in international external markets for the possession of monopoly excess profits, for control over territories rich in raw materials.
As a result, it was not the world of socialism, but the world of capitalism that managed to make maximum use of the results of scientific and technological revolution and ensure economic growth. The subsequent surge in the growth of labor productivity ensured high monopoly profits, allowed the monopoly giants to emerge victorious in the fierce competition, and at the same time led to the creation of an abundance of material goods and services, and contributed to an overall increase in the living standards of the population of the leading capitalist countries.
Negative results of scientific and technological policy in the USSR in the 60-80s. do not mean that the country's political leadership during this period was not looking for answers to the question of ways of national economic development in the conditions of the unfolding scientific and technological revolution. Of particular importance for strengthening the union of science, technology and production were the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On improving the study and introduction into the national economy of the experience and achievements of advanced domestic and foreign science and technology” (1955), the July decision (1955 d.) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, XX and XXI Party Congresses. In them, for the first time, qualitatively new tasks for the development of Soviet science were identified, specific measures were outlined to increase the scientific and technical level of production in the main industries, the special importance of mechanization and automation was emphasized, and the enormous role of improving the skills of workers, collective farmers, and specialists in all spheres of production was noted as a decisive factor. ensuring the most effective use of new technology. Continuous scientific and technological progress, it was emphasized at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, is “a decisive condition for the further growth of all industrial production.”
The CPSU program, adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPSU, confirmed the conclusion of previous party documents about the entry of mankind into the era of the scientific and technological revolution and highlighted a number of areas of scientific and technical progress, placing them at the center of attention of a unified national scientific and technological policy. They were: complete electrification of the country, comprehensive mechanization of basic and auxiliary work with a further transition to automation of production processes, widespread use of chemistry in the national economy, introduction of computing technology, etc. In a special section of the Program dedicated to the tasks of the party in the field of science, It was emphasized that scientific institutions must build and control their research on the most important issues in accordance with plans for the development of the national economy.
The correct and timely determination of priority areas of scientific and technical progress is important in scientific and technical policy. The ability to see and properly take into account at first some of the leading trends in the development of science and technology was one of the main factors that allowed our country to reach the forefront of world scientific and technological progress in many respects. The start of operation of the world's first Soviet turbojet passenger aircraft "TU-104" and the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite, the launching of the nuclear icebreaker "Lenin" and the flight of Soviet citizen Yu.A. Gagarin into space, the commissioning of the world's first unit for continuous casting of steel and the emergence of laser installations - these and many other facts convincingly testified to the profound influence of science on the creation of new equipment and technology in a number of sectors of the national economy. At the same time, the accumulated experience shows how disastrous consequences can be from underestimating certain progressive trends, as was the case with genetics and cybernetics in their time. Particularly great damage was caused by the subjectivity and voluntarism of the country's leaders in choosing the priorities of scientific and technological policy. And finally, the scale of the country and the varying degrees of development of productive forces throughout its entire space were not taken into account. Issues related to production culture, the level of education and qualifications of personnel were considered secondary.
The growing importance of scientific and technological progress dictated the need to democratize society, which would contribute to the awakening of proactive, creative forces. New needs have also arisen in the field of foreign policy. The scientific and technological revolution knows no boundaries; it is a planetary phenomenon. And the effectiveness of using its results largely depended on the inclusion of a particular country in global processes of exchange of information, technologies, and scientific discoveries. The peculiarity of our country has become a serious obstacle to accelerating the pace of scientific and technological progress. The slogan “self-reliance” was losing its relevance. It was necessary to look for ways to establish broad contacts with the West. This was the call of the times. Responding to it, the country's political leadership, headed since 1955 by N.S. Khrushchev, first of all, took measures to improve party and state life. Party bodies were freed from the most odious figures who were unable to work in the new conditions. Plenums of party committees at all levels began to be convened regularly. Great importance was attached to improving the work of the state apparatus; the number of staff in administrative and managerial structures was reduced.
Great importance was attached to the restoration of law and order. The cases of those who were repressed as a result of political processes in the post-war period were reviewed. Tens of thousands of people began to return from prisons and camps. In February 1956, at the 20th Party Congress N.S. Khrushchev delivered a report on exposing Stalinism. Following this, new steps are being taken to democratize the political system. The rights of Soviets at all levels in solving economic and social problems were expanded. The union republics received greater rights than before. The rights of public organizations, in particular trade unions, increased.
Having dealt a blow to Stalinism at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev returned to this problem at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Criticism of Stalin was heard openly throughout the country.
Through the efforts of Khrushchev, the USSR was saved from the extremes of Stalinism, but did not take the path of deep democratic transformations. The political life of the state bore the mark of the influence of the traditions of Stalinism. The country's top political leadership and its activities remained outside the scope of public criticism. Institutions through which such criticism could be carried out were not created. Important political decisions were made in a narrow circle of party and government leaders, and often individually by Khrushchev himself. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the reforms of the 50s and early 60s. bore the stamp of this bright, contradictory personality in their own way. Acting as the initiator of numerous undertakings in the field of economics and government, Khrushchev brought into this activity his characteristic impulsiveness, thoughtlessness, and haste, which later gave rise to accusations of voluntarism and subjectivism.
The restructuring of the management of the national economy, in which sectoral ministries were eliminated, and the councils of the national economy of economic regions (economic councils) became the organizational form of management, did not justify itself. Reasonable decisions in agricultural policy were often carried out in such a form that all the positive content of measures aimed at improving the country's agriculture was emasculated. This includes the development of virgin lands, the widespread distribution of corn, designed to become the main feed crop, and the popularization of the experience of leaders, including the notorious T.D. Lysenko, and the campaign to transform collective farms into state farms and much more.
Khrushchev's relationship with the intelligentsia was difficult. Understanding its enormous role in the society in which the processes generated by the scientific and technological revolution developed, he nevertheless could not overcome the traditions of Stalinism, which were characterized by a distrustful attitude towards the intelligentsia. And therefore, on the one hand, a revival of cultural life began, called by contemporaries the “thaw.” Highly artistic literary works appeared that posed pressing issues of social life. Among them is the novel by V.D. Dudintsev “Not by Bread Alone”, poem by A.T. Tvardovsky “Terkin in the Other World”, story by A.I. Solzhenitsyn’s “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” and others. On the other hand, pressure on the creative intelligentsia continued, which was especially evident during the 1958 campaign against B.L. Pasternak, Khrushchev’s criticism of abstractionists and formalists during an inspection of an exhibition of Moscow artists in 1962.
As a result, the processes unfolding in the spiritual sphere of society bore the stamp of half-heartedness, indecision, and fear that excessive democratization would lead to unpredictable consequences for the socio-political system that had developed in the country.
Foreign policy in the Khrushchev decade was no less controversial. It was largely determined by the changes that took place in the world after the Second World War, in the balance of power between East and West. If before the war there was a polycentric balance, then after the defeat of fascism it was destroyed and a kind of bipolar system emerged, in which the main role was played by the USSR and the USA. All problems of humanity were considered by the Soviet leadership exclusively through the prism of the historical confrontation between two world systems. And although changes were made to the content of this paradigm, they did not change its essence. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, conclusions were drawn about the possibility of preventing world war, about the peaceful coexistence of two opposing systems, about the paths of transition to socialism, which allowed for a departure from the absolutization of our experience. But the belief in the speedy triumph of socialism over the world of capital remained unshakable.
This type of thinking was given stability by the events that unfolded in the world in the late 50s and early 60s. The collapse of the world colonial system gave rise to the conclusion that the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism had begun. Numerous states that arose on the site of former colonies found themselves in the situation of choosing development paths. The country's political leadership believed that by providing support to these states, it was possible to expand the bridgehead of socialism. The victory of the Cuban revolution caused a lot of enthusiasm.
At the same time, it was as if it was not noticed that after the exposure of Stalin’s personality cult, the prestige of the Soviet Union was undermined. He ceased to be considered as the bearer of absolute truth in matters of creating a new society. This was evidenced by conflicts with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, China and the CCP.
The development of events more than once put the USSR in a situation of acute confrontation with the United States. This happened in 1956 during the Hungarian events and the Suez crisis. The pinnacle of this confrontation was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The world was on the brink of a nuclear conflict. The great powers came to the edge of the abyss, but managed to stop in time. In 1963, the USSR and the USA signed a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space. The first step was taken on the long road to banning atomic weapons.
And yet, the atmosphere of an unresolved Cold War and distrust in the policies of the United States and its allies prompted the leadership to take measures to increase the country's defense potential. Achieving military parity with the United States remained one of the global goals of government policy, which required enormous economic and political efforts.
In the decade of Khrushchev it was not possible to destroy the Iron Curtain. The tradition of confrontation with the opposing system has been preserved. It resulted in a heavy burden of the arms race, isolationism, which doomed the country to lag behind the West, to too slow changes in the sphere of social policy, which did not allow effectively solving the problems of increasing the level and quality of life of Soviet people.
And yet, despite many difficulties, the country's productive forces were reaching a new level of development, which gave rise to the need for widespread use of the achievements of scientific and technological revolution, decentralization of economic relations, expansion of the rights of enterprises, and the use primarily of economic methods in managing the national economy.
It seemed that the economic policy of the 50s and the first half of the 60s. took these needs into account. Scientific advances in some industries have been impressive. Nuclear energy, rocket science, and space exploration brought well-deserved recognition to Soviet science and technology.
However, attempts, relying on command-administrative methods, to widely introduce the achievements of scientific and technological revolution into the sphere of production turned out to be ineffective. The low effectiveness of these methods became apparent already in the late 50s. Thus, in 1958, of the planned 5,353 measures for the introduction of new technology, only 53% were implemented, of 503 new models of industrial products, only 57% were mastered. The downward trend in labor productivity growth has not been stopped. If in 1952-1956. it was 7.7% per year, then in 1957-1964. - only 5.5%. The share of the national economic effect from the introduction of scientific and technological achievements in national income fell from 12.1% in 1950-1960. up to 7.4% in 1961-1965; the rate of growth of national income has decreased from 11.3% average annual growth in 1951-1955. to 6.5% in 1961-1965.
All subsequent experience of the country's development in the 60-70s. showed that it was impossible to overcome the trend towards delayed development in the field of scientific and technological progress, which emerged in the late 50s, on the basis of team methods. The existing system of economic relations in the national economy turned out to be immune to the achievements of scientific and technological progress, and attempts to solve this problem within the framework of an overly centralized system demonstrated their futility.
In 1962-1964. The living conditions of the country's population deteriorated, which was reflected in rising food prices, rising taxes, and limiting the size of collective farmers' private plots. However, any manifestations of social discontent were severely persecuted. In 1962, troops shot a demonstration of workers in Novocherkassk. In the spiritual sphere, strict control was again restored by the country's political leadership.
Tired of Khrushchev's inventive, but not always successful attempts to create a prosperous power, the country was sympathetic to the desire of the new leadership that replaced him in October 1964 to ensure stability and order, not realizing that in another decade a period would come calm and tranquility, and Soviet society will slowly be drawn into a state of stagnation.
For many years after the October (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, assessments of Khrushchev’s activities were dominated by accusations of subjectivism and voluntarism. In the 80s After the unspoken ban on the topic related to the disgraced politician was lifted, publications appeared that viewed Khrushchev’s activities as an attempt at a failed turn, which, if successful, could accelerate the progress of Soviet society. However, such a point of view is not indisputable, since the search for ways to renew society in those years did not go beyond the boundaries of established stereotypes of thinking and did not affect the foundations of the historically established socio-economic and political system.
2. Search for ways to intensify the economy of the USSR and ease international tension in the 60s-80s. "The Age of Stagnation"
If Khrushchev’s decade passed under the sign of reforms, noisy political, ideological and economic campaigns, then the twentieth year, from the mid-60s to the mid-80s, when the country’s political leadership was headed mainly by L.I. Brezhnev is called a time of stagnation - a time of missed opportunities. Having begun with fairly bold reforms in the field of economics, it ended with an increase in negative trends in all spheres of public life, stagnation in the economy, and a crisis in the socio-political system.
To be fair, it should be noted that the economic policy pursued during this period of time proclaimed goals that were in keeping with the spirit of the times. It was supposed to ensure a significant increase in the material well-being of the Soviet people based on the intensification of social production, the main means of which was scientific and technological progress.
By the beginning of the 70s. the main directions of the scientific and technological revolution were determined. These included:
creation of new types of automated technological production processes (synthesis of mechanics and electronics) and automated control systems based on the integration of advances in electronics, instrument engineering, electronic computer engineering, new sub-sectors of machine tool construction related to the creation of robotics and flexible automated systems, laser technology and communications;
development of new transportation systems, information, management, and scientific research methods based on the achievements of aerospace technology;
the development of materials that are increasingly diverse in their combination of properties, specialized for their intended purpose, new structural materials, multi-composition, ceramic, ultra-pure, etc.;
expansion and improvement of the energy base of production based on the development of nuclear energy, bioenergy, geo- and solar energy;
the creation of biotechnological production based on the achievements of genetic engineering, the emergence of bionics.
In each of these areas, new industries contributed in the 70s and 80s. significant contribution to the development and improvement of production, mainly in advanced industrial countries. Progressive progress has begun in such important areas as integrated automation of production and management, electronicization and biotechnology of economic activity, the use of nuclear energy, research and development of outer space and the World Ocean. New industries have created guidelines for the economy of the future, the transition of the world economy into the electronic, nuclear and space age.
All these aspects of the participation of new industries in the scientific and technological development of capitalist society were most clearly manifested in the USA, Japan and Germany. In our country, when developing scientific and technological policy, not all trends in scientific and technological revolution were taken into account. Without grasping the peculiarities of its new stage, the leadership of the USSR for a long time considered it necessary to focus attention on the development of only the main direction of scientific and technological progress. Automation of production processes has been highlighted as such from the very beginning. It was recognized that it was precisely this that contained the possibility of transforming material production, management and achieving a manifold increase in labor productivity. It was also argued that the most important achievements of the natural and technical sciences of the 20th century find their material embodiment in complex automation in a concentrated form.
The selection of one area of scientific and technical progress instead of the whole complex, as required by the scientific and technological revolution, was another miscalculation. To be fair, it should be noted that in the field of automation, despite the declared priority, no tangible results have been achieved. This was largely due to the lack of specific measures to structurally restructure the economy.
The need to accelerate the pace of scientific and technological progress became especially acute in the 70-80s. At party congresses, decisions were made on the need to shift the emphasis in economic policy by shifting the center of gravity from quantitative to qualitative indicators. It was recognized that the extensive factors of economic growth had exhausted themselves and were leading to stagnation, and that it was necessary to more actively develop the sectors that determine scientific and technological progress. At the same time, ambitious tasks were put forward: during the 70s, in just one decade, to transfer the economy to a qualitatively new stage of expanded reproduction, and in the 80s. - complete the transition of the economy to the path of intensification; bring all sectors of the national economy to the forefront of science and technology; achieve a significant increase in labor productivity, allowing for 85-90% of the increase in national income.
At the same time, against the backdrop of large-scale goals, the means to achieve them looked quite traditional. Hopes were pinned on the implementation of the task formulated at the XXIV Party Congress and confirmed in the decisions of subsequent congresses - “organically combining the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of socialism.” Moreover, it was intended to focus on factors of an ideological nature, as well as centralized methods of leadership. The advantages of socialism meant nothing more than planned economic development, centralization of resources, socialist competition, etc. The use of such a thesis revealed the desire of the country's leadership to unreasonably exaggerate the potential capabilities of the socialist system, to avoid the need to introduce economic incentives that would destroy the existing overly centralized management system .
It cannot be denied that some work has been carried out in the country to carry out technical reconstruction. If in 1971 there were 89,481 mechanized production lines in industry, then in 1985 - 161,601; automatic lines are 10917 and 34278, respectively. The number of comprehensively mechanized, automated and comprehensively automated sections, workshops, and production facilities increased during this period from 44248 to 102140, and such enterprises - from 4984 to 7198.
Nevertheless, there was no sharp turnaround in increasing production efficiency. The decisions of the XXIV-XXVI Party Congresses remained, in essence, only directives. The course they proclaimed for intensification throughout the 70s. did not give any noticeable results. Worse, industry failed to meet its plans in either the ninth or tenth five-year plans (as well as construction and agriculture). The tenth five-year plan, contrary to declarations, did not become a five-year plan of efficiency and quality.
It was not possible to correct the situation in the first half of the 80s. The economy, by inertia, continued to develop largely on an extensive basis, focusing on the involvement of additional labor and material resources in production. The pace of introduction of mechanization and automation did not meet the requirements of the time. By manual labor by the mid-80s. About 50 million people were employed: about a third of the workers in industry, more than half in construction, three quarters in agriculture.
In industry, the age characteristics of production equipment continued to deteriorate. The implementation of measures on new technology did not lead to an increase in efficiency - actual costs increased and profits decreased.
As a result, the growth rate of labor productivity and some other efficiency indicators have seriously decreased. If we compare the average annual growth of the most important national economic indicators, we can see that it decreased from five-year period to five-year period. Thus, in national income used for consumption and accumulation there was a decrease from 5.1% in the Ninth Five-Year Plan to 3.1% in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, in industrial output from 7.4 to 3.7%, respectively, in social labor productivity - from 4.6 to 3.1%, in real per capita income - from 4.4 to 2.1%.
However, the severity of the impending crisis in the 70s. was smoothed out by the unexpected wealth that fell upon the country in the form of petrodollars. The conflict between Arab states and Israel, which broke out in 1973, led to a sharp rise in oil prices. The export of Soviet oil began to generate huge income in foreign currency. It was used to purchase consumer goods, which created the illusion of relative prosperity. Huge amounts of money were spent on purchasing entire enterprises, complex equipment, and technologies. However, the low efficiency of economic activity did not allow us to wisely manage unexpected opportunities.
The economic situation in the country continued to deteriorate. An inefficient economy was unable to solve the problems of improving the living standards of workers. In fact, the task set in 1971 at the 24th Congress of the CPSU was failed - to significantly strengthen the social orientation of the economy by increasing the pace of development of sectors of the national economy producing consumer goods. The residual principle of resource distribution - production first, and only then people - dominated socio-economic policy.
The social development of society was also negatively affected by the unresolved food problem, which directly depended on the state of agriculture. For 1965-1985 670.4 billion rubles were invested in it. The result was disappointing. In the eighth five-year plan, the increase in gross output was 21%, in the ninth - 13, in the tenth - 9, in the eleventh - 6%. Finally, in 1981-1982. the rate of development was 2-3% and was the lowest in all the years of Soviet power (excluding the periods of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War). Many imbalances in the national economy arose and worsened. The country, which has enormous resources, is faced with a shortage of them. A gap has formed between social needs and the achieved level of production, between effective demand and its material coverage.
Underestimation of the severity and urgency of transferring the economy to intensive methods of development, active use in the national economy of the achievements of scientific and technological progress led to the accumulation of negative phenomena in the country's economy. There were many calls and conversations on this subject, but things practically stood still. From congress to congress, from five-year plan to five-year plan, more and more new tasks were put forward in the field of scientific and technical progress. Most of them remained unachieved.
Among them is the solution to structural restructuring of the economy. For decades, the Soviet economy maintained its macrostructure, the main characteristics of which remained virtually unchanged. This is, firstly, a constant extensive increase in the production of primary resources and, in general, the production of means of production to the detriment of the development of consumer industries and intangible industries. Secondly, an overly centralized mechanism for the distribution and redistribution of all types of resources (material, labor, financial) with a maximum narrowing of the scope of commodity-money relations. Thirdly, the super-priority resource provision of the military-industrial complex and its dominance over all other sectors of the national economy.
As a result, the Soviet economy looked rather contradictory. On the one hand, it included a number of high-tech, knowledge-intensive areas of production activity, which were mainly part of the military-industrial complex; on the other hand, it had a very significant traditional sphere, characteristic of third world countries, with a low level of efficiency, weak competitiveness, and price imbalances , which generally do not meet the requirements of the world market.
Of course, the fact that many decisions at party congresses were half-hearted and not always consistent had negative consequences. At the XXIV, XXV, XXVI Congresses of the CPSU, much was said about the urgent need for technical re-equipment of enterprises. However, mechanical engineering did not receive priority; it developed approximately at the level of the entire industry. Therefore, the material base of technical progress did not meet the increased needs. The old practice continued: capital investments went mainly to new construction, while the equipment of existing enterprises was aging, existing equipment and technologies were increasingly lagging behind the best world standards.
The decisions made at the party congresses in the field of scientific and technological progress were not connected with real steps to expand and develop democratic institutions, i.e., the mechanism through which alone it was possible to set the human factor in motion and thereby contribute to the implementation of decisions.
On the contrary, the Brezhnev leadership took the path of curtailing criticism of Stalin’s personality cult and its consequences; decisive suppression of the democratic movement that arose in society during the years of Khrushchev’s reforms. In fact, these guidelines in the sphere of domestic policy focused on strengthening administrative methods in the management of society and strengthened authoritarian-bureaucratic tendencies in relations between managers and subordinates. There was no sober, scientific analysis of the trends that had developed in the economy. As a rule, the reasons for the lag in increasing the efficiency of social production were hushed up or revealed without the necessary sharpness and depth.
However, the most important reason is related to the preservation of the economic management mechanism and management system that developed during the pre- and post-war five-year plans, i.e., during the period of extensive development of the national economy. Subsequently, the existing mechanism of economic management and management, remaining practically unchanged, was at best subject to only partial, and insignificant, changes. Thus, the measures taken during the economic reform of the second half of the 60s, outlined by the September (1965) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, did not adequately affect the fundamental foundations of the process of increasing production efficiency. One direction of economic reform excluded the other. Along with the proposed introduction of economic controls, the process of strengthening centralized leadership continued. The mechanism of economic management and management has turned into a mechanism for slowing down our economic and social development.
Capitalist countries experienced something similar in the 70s. At this time, there was a deterioration in the conditions of reproduction, caused by a deep crisis in the structure of the capitalist economy. The economic mechanism has ceased to stimulate economic development in the new situation. At the same time, there was a relative lack of risk capital, which went towards the development of new industries in production. Capital was directed to quieter and more profitable areas, which undermined long-term prospects for economic growth and improved economic efficiency. The turning point period of the 70s and early 80s. was characterized by a general decrease in the rate of economic growth, weak utilization of production capacity, and a decrease in the growth rate of economic efficiency indicators (primarily labor productivity and capital productivity). So, if the growth rate of labor productivity in the US manufacturing industry in 1955-1978. amounted to 2.7%, then in 1978-1979. - 1.45%. In Japan, respectively - 9.26 and 7.05%, in Germany - 6.05 and 4.08%, France - 5.87 and 5%, in Great Britain - 3.63 and 1.56%.
The capitalist world instantly responded to the new phenomena of reproduction occurring. And the 70-80s. became a time of change in the economic mechanism. The main emphasis was placed on structural restructuring of the economy, curbing inflation and stimulating investment. At the same time, allocations for scientific research and their centralized planning were increased, an extensive system of new state science management bodies was created, and legislative acts were adopted to accelerate the pace of scientific and technical progress. Thus, in the USA, the Stevenson-Vidler New Technologies Act, the Economic Recovery Tax Law, the Joint Research and Development Act, etc. were adopted. In Japan, the State Administration for Science and Technology was created with the rights of a ministry. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research, as well as the Interministerial Committee for Science and Research, began to operate in Germany.
Changes in demand and new possibilities of scientific and technical progress, almost equally effective for enterprises of different sizes, have led to the need to transform the organizational structure of production in the direction of abandoning gigantomania, lowering the boundaries of the optimal size of enterprises and making it more flexible.
More advanced forms of labor and production organization began to be used. The increasing costs of labor force reproduction were compensated by job rotation, expanding work assignments, creating circles of innovation and product quality, and the use of flexible work schedules. Under the influence of scientific and technical progress, the share of highly skilled workers has increased. Combined with the improvement of labor tools, this contributed to the development of a sustainable trend towards increasing labor productivity.
The needs of scientific and technological revolution led to a strengthening of the role of the state in the economy. As a result, the main sectors and industries of the production sphere have adapted to the new economic conditions of reproduction. The leading capitalist countries began to quickly pick up the pace of accelerated economic development. In our country, instead of a balanced analysis of the current internal situation, praising what has been achieved and hushing up shortcomings prevailed.
Assessments of the foreign policy of the USSR, as well as the economic one, in the 60s-80s. were also of an apologetic nature, creating the impression of complete well-being achieved in this area.
The country's political leadership, headed by Brezhnev, when determining foreign policy priorities, as before, proceeded from the idea that humanity was going through a long historical period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Capitalist countries were seen as carriers of aggressive tendencies, allies of the forces of reaction, hindering the development of progressive changes taking place in the world.
And yet, despite attempts by conservative forces to impart greater orthodoxy to foreign policy, the course towards total confrontation with capitalist countries, primarily the United States, was rejected. Preserving peace became the highest priority.
However, the path to detente turned out to be difficult. The world in the mid-60s. was more than once disrupted by regional and internal conflicts, in which the USSR and the USA were involved to one degree or another. The Cold War, somewhat softened by Khrushchev's initiatives, was by no means a thing of the past; the thinking it generated encouraged suspicion, mistrust, and the desire to respond blow to blow. The policy of the United States and its allies was not particularly balanced. In 1965, the United States, which provided military assistance to the government of South Vietnam, extended military operations to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, bombing it. In 1967, conflict broke out between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The USSR supported the Arab countries in this conflict, the USA supported Israel. In 1968, the USSR sent troops into Czechoslovakia during the emerging political crisis, which caused a negative reaction in the world.
Nevertheless, there was a sphere of common interests between the USSR and the USA related to the prevention of nuclear war. In this regard, the Soviet-American Moscow summit meeting in 1972 played a huge role. It opened the way for a relaxation of international tension. In the summer of 1975, in Helsinki, the leaders of European states, as well as the United States and Canada, signed the Final Act - a kind of set of principles of interstate relations that meets the requirements of the policy of peaceful coexistence.
In addition, a number of important Soviet-American agreements were signed to prevent nuclear war and limit nuclear weapons.
All this created favorable opportunities for improving the international situation and for finally overcoming the legacy of the Cold War. However, this did not happen. In the second half of the 70s. the process of détente slowed down, and in the early 80s the world began to be drawn into a new Cold War, and the confrontation between East and West sharply intensified.
Responsibility for the failure of the policy of détente lies with both sides: the USA and the USSR. The logic of the Cold War turned out to be stronger than the objective need for a new type of international relations, established by détente. Tension was rapidly growing in the world. In 1979, the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan, which sharply increased anti-Soviet sentiment in the world.
At the end of the 70s. a new round of the arms race began. In response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR took measures to prevent a violation of the existing military parity. However, our country could no longer withstand a new round of the arms race, since the military-economic and scientific-technical potential of the West far exceeded the potential of the ATS countries. By the mid-80s. The CMEA countries produced 21.3% of the world's industrial output, and the developed capitalist countries - 56.4%. An arms race could only ruin the country. It was necessary to look for new ways to ease international tension.
The period of stagnation was complex and contradictory in its own way. Society did not stand still. Changes were taking place in it, new needs were accumulating. But the historically established socio-political system began to slow down its movement and created a state of stagnation.
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