Catching up. The race for aluminum. Metallurgy of light alloys in Russia II. For foreign technical assistance

Panorama of the Setun village. 1932

During the years of the first five-year plans, in addition to the reconstruction of old, pre-revolutionary enterprises, new enterprises were built on the territory of Kuntsevo. The largest new building in the pre-war years was the construction of a light alloys plant, later the Institute of Light Alloys - VILS (All Union Institute of Light Alloys, 1961) was formed under it, it was under this name that the enterprise became widely known in our country and far beyond outside.

There was no production of light alloys based on aluminum in the Russian Empire. The aluminum industry is one of the most energy-intensive industries. The first aluminum smelter in the USSR (Volkhovsky) was launched on the basis of the Volkhov hydroelectric power station (1932).

The light alloy plant was designed by Leningrad Gipromez in 1928, and construction began in the fall of 1929. The construction site was located at the fork of the Usovskaya and Mozhaiskaya railway lines, in the former village of Nekrasovka, which was located near the village of Setun.

The design and construction of the plant was preceded by a lot of work on mastering technological processes: melting and casting - engineer V. A. Butalov, rolling and heat treatment methods - engineer Yu. G. Muzalevsky, both carried out their work at the Kolchuginsky plant since 1921. The work was attended by graduate students of the Moscow Higher Technical School, who later became leading specialists of plant No. 95 N. M. Nadezhdin, S. S. Mironov, D. L. Averbakh, P. I. Sochikhin and others, under the general guidance of the chief metallurgist of the Kolchuginsky plant G. A. Osetsimsky and master foundry worker M. G. Zakharov.

At the same time, the experience of foreign companies was studied. The leading countries in the aluminum industry at that time were the USA, Canada, France, and Germany. Our experts visited BMW in Germany, Gnome and Ron in France. In 1929, an agreement was reached on the provision of technical assistance with the French Aluminum society. The Americans categorically did not enter into contacts with our country regarding aluminum technologies. One specialist, the American R. Anderson, agreed for a large reward to take part in the design of the plant. But as soon as he returned from Russia to the United States and began collecting the necessary materials, the head of the company where Anderson worked called him and immediately fired him. The head of the company was also a minister of the US government, so our well-wisher found himself in a very awkward position and never came to the USSR again.

Simultaneously with the construction of the main buildings of the plant, the design was adjusted. When starting work on the project, the designers relied on the existing domestic experience in casting and rolling aluminum alloys. At our factories we were able to roll ingots weighing 20–40 kg, while the yield of suitable sheet metal was 15–20%. Foreigners were already rolling ingots weighing 40–50 kg.

Our specialists convinced the designers to include in the project the rolling of ingots weighing from 80 kg with the possibility of further increasing the weight to

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300–500 kg. Electric heating was introduced to heat the ingots, multi-roll rolling mills were introduced instead of oil furnaces, and other innovative proposals were introduced into the project, which later fully justified themselves. After adjustments were made to the project, an examination of the project showed that in terms of production volumes, aluminum processing at the plant could exceed the production volumes of all European plants - such a giant.

The construction of the plant was carried out by contract. The preliminary and final designs were carried out first by Gipromez, and then by the Leningrad branch of Giprotsvetmet, working drawings by Gosproektstroy. Construction work was carried out by various trusts. This way of doing work has a significant drawback, namely, it separates a single goal into the interests of individual groups with their own narrow interests. To top it all off, an endless series of changes in construction management began (for example, within 6 months, construction management changed three times), and at the moment when it was necessary to develop a project for organizing construction work and begin its implementation.

The construction department of the management assigned engineers S.A. Yampolsky and V.P. Zapolsky to head the coordination of work, expanding the scope of the functions formally assigned to them. This measure made it possible to concentrate design and construction work under a single leadership.

The fundamental principles of construction design were as follows:

a) Possible simplification of work and, as a consequence, reduction in cost and the possibility of using unskilled workers. These installations were important given the difficulties in recruiting skilled labor given the enormous scale of construction that unfolded throughout the Soviet Union in accordance with the First Five-Year Plan.

This problem was solved by standardizing the types and main dimensions of buildings, which made it possible to achieve uniformity of structures, organize mass procurement of the main elements of these structures and increase the use of various auxiliary devices and fixtures, which have a large share in the total cost of work.

It is enough to point out that the repeated use of formwork during reinforced concrete work has given a great economic effect and savings in scarce materials.

b) Maximum use of less scarce building materials.

From this point of view, the replacement of iron as the main building material with wood should be considered a great achievement. Wood is almost the only material for floors, the use of reinforced concrete floors only in fire zones, the use for the first time in the Union of segmental forms made of wood of high humidity and normal commercial quality, laying brick walls with warm mortar, which reduced brick consumption, use as thermal insulation fiberboard material, made mainly from waste in the form of shavings, the absence of frame structures, causing increased consumption of cement and iron - these are the characteristic features of buildings and structures constructed in 1930.

The Shukhov-Brod system slabs used for the construction of the mechanical repair shop and the main store made it possible to use the most popular timber, and the slabs made of wooden nail beams for the garage, metal warehouse and door shop made it possible to use cuttings of forest materials obtained during the construction of large projects. These new designs, which solved the problem of easing the shortage of building materials, were a moment of healthy production risk, which should have taken place given the then enormous scale of construction.

c) Simplicity of structures and architectural forms of buildings in accordance with their intended purpose, compliance with the most advantageous dimensions of buildings in the plan were set as indispensable conditions for the plant builders.

d) Construction of a construction calendar plan in accordance with the sequence of commissioning of main and auxiliary workshops, which helped to avoid the construction of a number of temporary structures and ensure the normal progress of subsequent work on the development of production.

Guided by this principle, the construction management put into operation the first premises of a warehouse, a mechanical repair shop, a central laboratory, a plant management office, a federal plant, several residential buildings, a MOGES construction, a water supply and a boiler house. Of the production shops, the foundry was the first to go into operation.

e) Timely completion of those works that could affect the pace and cost of construction, such as: site planning, construction of permanent roads, construction of permanent railway tracks and water lines. All this was supposed to bring construction to a higher technical level and ensure a reduction in construction costs and its accelerated pace.

Unfortunately, this fundamental installation could not be completed completely, but a significant part of this type of work was completed in a timely manner.

With frequent changes in management at our contractor, the implementation of this extremely important principle is due solely to the energy of the then heads of the construction department, Comrade. Yampolsky and Zapolsky.

In the first season of main construction work (spring-summer-autumn 1930), the buildings of all main and auxiliary workshops were completed by November and prepared for the full deployment of foundation work. The seasons of 1931 and 1932 were spent on all kinds of special work, of which a significant percentage fell on the construction of foundations for main and auxiliary equipment. In 1932, the actual construction work was sharply reduced and the predominant role was played by assemblers in the installation of mechanical and power equipment.

Gipromez’s first project could not meet the requirements of new technology, without which the construction of an enterprise of such a large scale as Plant No. 95 was unthinkable.

French technical assistance could not contribute anything new to the creation of new technology.

The plant at that time was a huge enterprise, the likes of which Europe did not have, and the United States had only isolated examples that were of special importance and served as a source of special pride.

Our large-scale installations aroused surprise abroad, and sometimes even outright disbelief regarding the seriousness. Many doubted the reality of the planned production volume.

Criticism of the project here and abroad boiled down to the following main points:

1. 1. First of all, Soviet expertise considered it risky to base rolling shop calculations on ingots weighing 80 kg and strongly recommended stopping at ingots weighing 40–50 kg, which foreign and our factories were handling at that time (the latter used ingots weighing 20–40 kg).

2. Hence, the chosen power of the Shlomani trio mill was called into question, especially since when choosing a mill, we made it necessary for the company to calculate the design of the mill for a possible increase in the weight of the ingot in the future to 300–500 kg.

Based on the weight of the ingot of 40–50 kg, the examination recommended reducing the power of the mill by 2 times and replacing one with two mills of significantly smaller power.

2. 3. Untested advantages of electric melting in foundry production, which were doubted by French expertise.

3. 4. Both examinations (Soviet and French) questioned the technical and economic advantages of using direct current (variable speeds and powers) for hot and cold rolling and drawing.

It was recommended to limit ourselves to the use of alternating current, as it does not require large investments in equipment, and the possibility of changing speeds within the range of 1–3, which we designed, was considered completely unnecessary.

1. 5. The use of multi-roll mills, in particular 6-roll mills, which were new at that time not only here but also abroad, although they did not raise any special objections, they refused any definite point of view and recommendations from the examination, citing ignorance of this type of equipment. ore mining.

2. 6. The possibility of using high speeds in rolling and drawing was recognized by the examination as unclear.

3. 7. Certain doubts were expressed about the technical and economic payback of fully electrified and mechanized metal heat treatment operations.

4. 8. The general and very sharp reduction in the technological process path and the reduction in the number of production operations (rolling, drawing and annealing) also raised doubts.

From this list of main issues, which were the subject of either differences in views on the fundamental basis of the project between experts and projects, or examination doubts about the technical and economic feasibility of existing types of equipment or energy, it is clear that the final design of the plant differed sharply from the technology that existed at that time at Soviet and foreign factories.

We used the following fundamentally new points as the basis for the final project:

1. 1. Melting in large electric resistance furnaces with a capacity of 1.5–2 tons instead of smelting in crucibles with a capacity of 40–50 kg.

2. 2. Enlargement of ingots for rolling by at least 2 times for the first period of plant operation with the possibility of further increase.

3. 3. The use of direct current for hot rolling and drawing presses, with the ability to change speeds in the range of 1–3.

4. 4. The use of a powerful stanatrio, which makes it possible to sharply increase the productivity of hot rolling with the possibility of an even more dramatic increase in the future due to the enlargement of ingots.

5. 5. Application of 6-roll mills with roller bearings for cold rolling of strips in rolls 500 mm wide and sheets 1000 mm wide with the possibility of subsequent adaptation of sheet mills for rolling wide strips. The designed reduction schemes and the number of cold rolling were 3–5 times higher than the scheme accepted at that time on mills equipped with plain bearings.

1. 6. Order for horizontal presses for forward and reverse pressing methods.

2. 7. Complete electrification of all heat treatment processes (heating by pre-hot rolling and pressing, annealing and hardening).

3. 8. Refusal of nitrate and water when hardening sheet products and tapes in rolls.

4. 9. Creation of a first-class central laboratory in terms of equipment and variety of testing methods.

In addition, in the general note to the plant project as a whole, a forecast was given for the importance of forged products made of light alloys in national economic problems, especially for aviation and transport. This forecast was considered necessary, since the task for designing a forge shop was not received due to the lack of demand for the light alloy products it produced, and US practice pointed to the extremely wide use of the latter in all areas of industry and technology.

At the same time, considerations were given about the need to organize the production of extruded profiles, which at that time began to find wide use in Europe and especially in the USA.

These were the main points that served as a new characteristic and fundamental basis for the project.

The novelty and lack of knowledge of the designed technological processes distinguished it from the generally accepted practice of our and foreign factories for processing non-ferrous metals. In this sense, the designers had to bear responsibility, since critics of the examination limited themselves to warning, without insisting on revising the project, and it was accepted for implementation without any changes.

Already the initial period of the plant’s operation made it possible to take stock of the main issues that were the subject of dispute both in our technical circles and in the judgments of the French consultation.

The most important conclusions were:

1. 1. Electric smelting in the type of furnace we chose, which met with particularly vigorous condemnation from the French, practically justified itself both in terms of the quality of the metal produced and in terms of productivity.

2. 2. Rolling of large ingots, an issue that at one time caused particularly sharp disagreements, was successfully carried out, and the capacity of the head hundred sodium, as well as the 6 cold rolling mills, fully justified itself.

If we had listened to the examination at that time, recognized the impossibility of basing the design calculations on an 80 kg ingot and bought two stanatrios of significantly lower power and in total much more expensive, then this would have looked like a major and irreparable mistake.

Our standard ingot already in the first year of plant operation exceeded the designed one by 25% (100 kg instead of 80).

Our hot rolling mill, which immediately established itself as a harmonious installation in all parts, allows us today to increase the weight of the ingot by 2–3 times and thereby ensure a sharp increase in its productivity. Thus, this most valuable unit is not morally obsolete even now and, obviously, will not become obsolete for many years.

Therefore, quite correctly, the chief engineer of the project and construction management, B.P. Rolshchikov, expressed himself as follows: “Now this whole story of doubts, objections, surprises, well-desirable and simply uncommendable attempts to hinder the installation of such a mill looks strange.”

During the Great Patriotic War, plant No. 95 was evacuated to Verkhnyaya Salda. In the post-war period, the Institute of Light Alloys with technological and design departments, metallurgical laboratories was organized at the plant, which made it possible to comprehensively address issues of new technologies. The institute and the plant contributed

a great contribution to equipping the aviation industry, rocketry and other branches of the defense industry with the necessary materials and products. In the pre-perestroika years, VILS hosted a permanent industry exhibition where the latest achievements in science and technology were demonstrated. VILS became the center of scientific and technical information about the achievements of MAP in the USSR.

An invaluable contribution to the metallurgy of light and special alloys was made by scientists and employees of VILS under the leadership of its creator, Hero of Socialist Labor, State Prize laureate Alexander Fedorovich Belov. Under his leadership and with direct participation, sheathing foxes were created

for aviation, cold rolling was mastered and special equipment for processing aluminum alloys was created. VILS scientists made a great contribution to the development of the scientific foundations of the innovative technological system. VILS was the founder of the creation of aluminum alloys, alloyed with lithium, scandium, titanium and nickel alloys, scientific discoveries of the patterns of crystallization of metal materials and many other technological breakthroughs based on science.

The activities of VILS and its leader A.F. Belov in terms of the sum of scientific and engineering achievements in the field of light alloys are comparable to the progress in ferrous metallurgy achieved thanks to the brilliant discoveries of Dmitry Konstantinovich Chernov (1839–1921).

The cold rolling program was developed by Yu.G.Muzalevsky together with senior foreman K.A.Bolotnov. The results of the first mechanical tests greatly surprised and delighted us, because the tensile strength and elongation exceeded the specifications. The results of mechanical tests of samples hardened in workshop conditions turned out to be very good and quite satisfactory. Engineer V.A. Butalov was also familiarized with the results of mechanical tests. And this was in April 1922. To report to the board on the results of the work, Yu.G. went to Moscow together. Muzalevsky and V.A. Butalov.

We were looking forward to the return of Yuri Grigorievich. And so. Arriving in the morning at our workshop office, I met Yu.G. Muzalevsky entering. After greeting me, he told me that at a meeting of the board, the chairman of the meeting, N.A. Kalmykov, did not give the floor to him, Muzalevsky, leaving it to Butalov, who completely attributed the entire success of obtaining high mechanical qualities of duralumin to himself. Yuri Grigorievich was extremely indignant at such an unseemly act by Butalov.

They returned to Kolchugino in different carriages.

SOUTH. Muzalevsky left in May 1922, joining the former Dux bicycle plant in Moscow, where wooden airplanes were built and where the director was I.M. Nemtsov, who had previously been the director of the Kolchug plant.

As we later learned. V.A. Butalov was awarded by the board of Gospromtsvet a large cash prize “for mastering the production of duralumin.” At the same time, I also became aware that at a meeting of the board, N.A. Kalmykov deliberately did not give Yu.G. Muzalevsky the floor for his report, based solely on his personal great hostility to him, which had long-standing, deep roots.

After leaving the plant Yu.G. Muzalevsky for some time I had to perform the duties of the head of the rolling shops. Work on the production of duralumin sheets continued. It was attended by senior foreman of the copper rolling plant I.A. Balakin, senior foreman of the brass plant K.A. Bolotnikov and his assistant I.F. Sukhoreov, as well as metallographic laboratory technician I.I. Mikhailov and laboratory assistant K.V. Peredelsky.

V.A. Butalov went to the rolling shops and got acquainted with the test results. Sometimes we called him to the copper rolling shop to hot-roll duralumin if some ingots fell apart during rolling.

One day Butalov told me that he had introduced a small amount of nickel into the composition of duralumin. When I asked why we would introduce nickel, he said that this was done to circumvent the German patent for the production of duralumin, and that now this alloy will be called chain mail aluminum.

This is how Butalov created a “new” alloy. The introduction of nickel did not at all affect the rolling program previously developed by the rolling shops, nor the temperature regime of heat treatment, nor the final mechanical qualities of the finished products, since chain mail aluminum, in fact, was duralumin, contaminated with a small amount of nickel, which did not improve or worsen mechanical qualities of the alloy.

Since then, the production of aluminum chain mail products has continued. No changes were made to the technical production process...”

This is the “human factor”! All the laurels went to V.A. Butalov, and half a century later, when the 50th anniversary of metal aircraft construction was celebrated, in 1974, in the article “The Fate of Winged Metal” in the Literary Gazette, he was compared with Leskov’s Lefty. But this “Lefty” only has chain mail and aluminum on his account. In 1925, he left the Kolchuginsky plant and immediately stopped delving into the secrets of his invention and developing it further. But he wrote a lot about aluminum chain mail. He taught and published a textbook on the theory of color processing.

Yu.G. Muzalevsky, on the contrary, in 1924, plunged headlong into the secrets of aviation alloys, made a number of discoveries and, according to the laws of his time, he himself became a “secret”, a closed person with a “top secret” form. For several years he managed a light alloy plant in Setun. Merits of Yu.G. Muzalevek is difficult to overestimate. He created an entire scientific and technological school, which ensured the successful solution of problems in the field of development and outlined technologies for the production of light alloys.

Despite all the vicissitudes, intrigues and production difficulties and inconsistencies, the merits of the Kolchuginites in creating the “winged metal” are undoubted; they were pioneers in this matter, they were the first to open the way to the sky for domestic aviators.

The Verkhnesalda Metallurgical Production Association (VSMPO) begins its biography far from the Urals.
His place of birth is the village of Setun near Moscow, where in 1929 work began on the construction of a new generation plant (for that time, of course) for the production of duralumin. At the end of the 20s, it was the most advanced metal needed for aircraft, automobile, and shipbuilding. Moreover, the need for it increased literally every day. An example of this is that it was initially planned to produce only 1.5 thousand tons of duralumin per year. And in the final project, production volume increased to 7 thousand tons!

Installation of pipe pressing shop equipment. 1932

The plant, which had not yet been built, was named “No. 45” and was included among the most important facilities being built in those years. The work was carried out at an accelerated pace, although most operations were carried out manually. Specialists from Germany were involved in the construction (not only engineers, but also workers). Most of the equipment for the future giant of Soviet industry was purchased abroad in England, France, Germany, and the USA.

In January 1933, the first ingots were rolled at the plant. The enterprise has not yet been officially put into operation, but already in the first quarter it received a production plan for ingots, sheets and pipes. On July 1, 1933, a special Government Commission included the plant in operation.

Meeting dedicated to the launch of plant No. 45. 1933

Construction managers of plant No. 45. 4th from left - construction manager and first director Nikolai Petrovich Zaborov. 1929

1933 - 1941. Plant No. 95

Plant No. 45 became the main supplier of semi-finished products for the aircraft industry. In January 1934, the enterprise was transferred to the jurisdiction of Glavaviaprom and changed its name to “Plant No. 95”.

A large burden for the development of new alloys fell on the team of the central plant laboratory under the leadership of Savvaty Mikhailovich Voronov. For example, the M-95 alloy was developed, which became the main alloy in the manufacture of the new SB bomber. The industry still uses forging alloys AK5 and AK6, developed in 1935.

Technologies were developed and immediately introduced into production. Plant No. 95 was the only one producing semi-finished products from aluminum and magnesium alloys; metallurgical specialists from all over the country were trained on its basis. Having become one of the defense enterprises, the plant received strict directives (instructions) on how to implement the plan.

The end of the thirties is recorded in the history of the enterprise not only for its labor exploits. Mastering new technologies is impossible without releasing defects. New means still unknown. But at that time there was only one explanation for any difficulties: sabotage, treason, espionage. Arrests were carried out constantly; no compelling reasons were required for this, suspicion was sufficient. Both ordinary workers and leading specialists were imprisoned by the NKVD. Among those arrested were plant director S.M. Leshchenko, deputy chief metallurgist V.I. Dvoretsky, head of the technical control department P.I. Verakso, head of the research bureau I.A. Deitch, chief power engineer V.M. Yakovlev and many other metallurgists... Almost all of them were subsequently rehabilitated (acquitted, found innocent), many posthumously.

Panorama of plant No. 45 (95). Setun. 1930s

District newspaper telling about the launch of plant No. 45

The first pipes are under control. 1933

Digger foreman Mikhail Agafonovich Kryuchkov was awarded a personalized watch, kept in the VSMPO museum, for his hard work on the construction of the plant.

1941 - 1945. Rebirth. Work during the war years

The war changed everything.

Back in 1936, the Stalkonstruktsiya plant was built in Verkhnyaya Salda. It was used to manufacture bridges and various cranes, prefabricated welded metal structures for construction sites (for factory workshops and even the Moscow metro). It was here that Plant No. 95 was evacuated from the Moscow region in October-November 1941. Also, equipment from enterprises from Leningrad and Kolchugino - the basis of plant No. 519 - was transported to the "Stalkonstruktsiya" site.

The launch dates for Plant No. 95 were set according to wartime standards. Six months after the move, the company began producing products (in peacetime this would have taken at least 3 years). For the front, they produced aircraft propeller blades, blanks for tank radiator pipes, stamping of motor parts... Plant No. 519 mastered the production of brass and copper tape for cartridges.

“Everything for the front, everything for Victory!” - with this slogan, the factory workers fulfilled and exceeded production standards, the machines did not turn off for days. In 1943, Plant No. 95 exceeded its design capacity by 6 times! For their dedicated work, the plant's staff was awarded the country's highest award - the Order of Lenin. Twenty-one times during the war years it was awarded the Red Banner of the State Defense Committee; by decree of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry, the banner was left to the plant for eternal storage (in 1946).

Procurement department. 1944

Manufacturing of matrices. 1944

Casting ingots from a two-ton furnace at plant No. 95. 1944

Workers of the tool shop of plant No. 95. 1944

Director of Plant No. 95 Sergei Mikhailovich Leshchenko

Painting by artist I. Drize “Presentation of the Red Banner of the State Defense Committee to Plant No. 95.” 1943 Oil on canvas. Stored in the VSMPO Museum

1945 - 1954. On peaceful rails

The post-war period became another test for plant No. 95. The plant needed reconstruction (repair and rebuilding). For example, in April 1948, the rolling shop was completely stopped: replacing wooden floors with metal floors became not a luxury, but a necessity. The equipment also deteriorated greatly during the war years.

A big problem in the post-war years was the lack of qualified personnel. Evacuated workers sought to return to their homes. In 1945-1946, more than 1,000 people quit Plant No. 95, and the same number in 1947.

Despite all the difficulties, the plant lived and mastered new technologies. Requirements for products have changed. The future was in jet aviation and rocket science. Stamping for new aircraft required both high-quality alloys and the development of methods for producing complex-shaped parts with close tolerances (the blanks became extremely similar to finished parts). Already in 1945, plant No. 95 produced experimental batches of semi-finished products (blanks) from the high-strength aluminum alloy B95 for the heavy strategic bomber TU-4. The nuclear industry emerged, and secret orders were carried out for it. For the laboratory under the direction of I.V. Kurchatov in 1948, the first special-purpose finned tubes were produced.

But most of the products produced in the post-war period were sent to enterprises not related to the aviation industry. Such products were called “consumer goods” - products for general consumption.

There were no big changes in the work of plant No. 519 after the war. He still produced capsule and cartridge tape, copper tape for radiators. But post-war changes affected him too. By 1947 (the year of monetary reform), the production of a copper-nickel alloy for coins of a new type was mastered.

In 1952, by order of the Minister of Aviation Industry, Gavriil Dmitrievich Agarkov was appointed director of plant No. 95.

Gateway of plant No. 95. Late 1940s

Strategic bomber Tu-4

Construction of the stadium. 1947

1954 - 1957. Titanium era

On March 9, 1954, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution “On measures to implement titanium production.” It identified the need to develop and introduce into production a technology for manufacturing sheets of technical titanium and its alloys from ingots weighing 100-500 kg. The unique properties of titanium interested aviators and shipbuilders, mechanical engineers and rocket scientists, nuclear scientists and chemists... Titanium became a strategic metal.

At plant No. 519, they organized the production of titanium sheets using the equipment of a rolling shop (used for the production of sheets of non-ferrous metals). It’s funny to say now, but the secrecy of the work reached extremes. Even the plant engineers did not know what kind of metal was hidden under the designation VT-1D. In general, this is just a brand of titanium alloy, but it can be deciphered in another way: “VT is a military secret.” In October 1954, the first experimental work was carried out on hot rolling of small forged slabs of technical titanium (arrived from the Podolsk Chemical and Metallurgical Plant). In May 1955, titanium sheets were produced in series, but did not meet the declared properties (the quality was not as high as expected).

At the same time, a pilot workshop was organized at plant No. 95. He had to develop and implement technology for smelting titanium ingots. No one had experience working with titanium; the equipment was not adapted to the new metal. Everything had to be learned on the spot.

On June 21, 1956, a Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted. In it, plant No. 95 is given the task of reconstructing production for the production of products made of titanium and its alloys. The plant practically becomes one of the main centers not only for titanium production, but also for research and development work in this area. Plant No. 519 became part of a larger neighbor.

On February 17, 1957, the first titanium smelting was carried out, led by V.V. Tetyukhin. A.L. was near the control panel. Andreev, Yu.A. Kuntsev, Yu.M. Prilutskikh, A.N. Shchetnikov, P.G. Pavlov. Melting was carried out in a VD-5 furnace (vacuum-arc melting furnace), brought from VIAM. The resulting ingot did not fit in the crystallizer: its “crown” spilled onto the flange. I had to knock it into the oven chamber, after cooling, of course. The weight of the first titanium ingot is 4 kg, diameter is 100 mm.

In 1957, about 75 tons of titanium ingots were smelted. But it required many times more; the plant could not provide titanium to everyone.

We must not forget that the enterprise did not stop producing products from heavy non-ferrous metals (production was gradually phased out) and aluminum alloys. Important works include the production of profiles from aluminum alloys for the TU-95, stampings for the MiG-19, TU-16, TU-95, the B-300 “aircraft-projectile”, the Buran and Vyuga missile systems, engines for AN-10, AN-12, IL-18, TU-114.

Furnace VD-5, which produced the first titanium ingots

Youth of the plant at the May Day demonstration. 1950s

Participants in the smelting of the first titanium ingot at plant No. 95. From left to right: Yu.M. Prilutskikh, P.G. Pavlov, V.V. Tetyukhin. 1976

Roller T.P. Saikanov rolls the first titanium of plant No. 95. 1957

Installation of vertical hydraulic presses in the forge and press shop. 1958

1958 - 1989. Titanium giant

From the moment the enterprise switched to producing semi-finished products from titanium alloys, it was clear that their production technology was very different from the already known ones (aluminum alloys and copper-based alloys). New technological processes required the use of vacuum technology, much greater effort when deforming the metal, heating to higher temperatures, greater energy costs... Therefore, it was necessary not only to develop new modes, but also to design and manufacture new equipment for workshops being reconstructed and under construction.

In the 60s and 70s, the plant resembled a giant construction site. At this time, the buildings of new workshops were erected: smelting, rolling, mechanical repair, and tool shops. The area of ​​the enterprise has increased 6 times!

To create a new production, hundreds of machine-building enterprises, specialized design institutes, construction, installation and commissioning organizations were involved. A unique base was created for the serial smelting of titanium alloy ingots and their processing into sheets, forgings and stampings.

Many problems in increasing production were due to imperfect furnace designs. By 1960, the basic principles for the design of furnaces for the production of titanium ingots had been determined. Industrial designs have been created that make it possible to produce ingots weighing up to 1 ton. From 1961 to 1965, the plant put into operation seven new DVS-5 furnaces and five VD-650 furnaces.

At the same time, in 1960, work began on the production of large-sized ingots. For mastering the casting of ingots weighing up to 5 tons, smelter V. Shishin was awarded the Order of Lenin, V. Tetyukhin and I. Teitel were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. In 1976, the world's largest titanium ingot weighing 15 tons and with a diameter of 1200 mm was smelted at the Salda plant.

A new workshop was created (in 1959) for the production of stampings from aluminum alloys, large-sized ribbed panels, panels for the wings of anti-aircraft missiles and aircraft, torpedo and submarine engines. In 1961, the world's largest press with a force of 75 thousand tons began operating there. The use of large-sized parts in aircraft manufacturing (instead of assembling components from smaller ones) has made it possible to reduce the weight and increase the reliability of aircraft.

In June 1961, Plant No. 95 was renamed VSMOS (Verkhnesaldinsky Metalworking Plant).

Reconstruction continued. In 1963, the hammer forge, pipe and profile shops were rebuilt, and a new long-rolling shop was put into operation. In 1968, the buildings of a new foundry (120 thousand square meters) were built. On December 28 of the same year, the first experimental ingot was smelted there, and the next day the first six vacuum-arc melting furnaces were put into operation. In 1974, the new smelting shop reached its design capacity, providing titanium to the defense industries.

In January-February 1965, rolling technology was mastered and the first production batches of titanium rods with a diameter of 30-60 mm were produced. In 1968, a technology for the continuous production of blade blanks was developed and introduced. In 1974, the plant installed a unique cross-helical rolling unit (the first in the world). By 1979, the production of rods increased 6 times, and blades - 42 times!

In the early 70s, serial technologies for producing pipes from technical titanium (seamless and welded) were developed.

VSMOS participates in all aerospace projects of those years. One example of cooperation with aircraft designers is the development of technology for manufacturing long (up to 28 meters long!) panels and profiles from aluminum alloys used in the new generation of giant aircraft “Ruslan” and “Mriya”. Products are created on the basis of titanium and aluminum alloys for engines and landing gear of aircraft and helicopters. Salda semi-finished products were used in the docking station of the Soyuz-Apollo space complex, the Buran reusable spacecraft, and the Energia launch vehicle.

Since May 1982, the enterprise has had a new name - Verkhnesalda Metallurgical Production Association, VSMPO.

In 1983, for services to the development of domestic aviation metallurgy, the VSMPO team was awarded the Order of the October Revolution.

At the end of the 80s, the company produced about 100 thousand tons of titanium ingots - almost 1.5 times more than the rest of the world!

Gavriil Dmitrievich Agarkov, director of the plant in 1952-1958 and 1966-1981

Construction of a new smelting shop. 1965

Presentation of the Red Banner to the Winner of the Socialist Competition in honor of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. 1967

The first communist labor team at the plant was Serafima Afanasyevna Katushkina. 1959

A meeting dedicated to the awarding of VSMOS with the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. 1973

A team of blacksmiths at the forging and press shop. Brigadier - Hero of Socialist Labor Boris Semenovich Parfenov (second from left). 1985

Chief designer of "Anteev" and "Ruslanov" O.K. Antonov (center) in the new VSMPO smelting shop. 1983

First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU B.N. Yeltsin in the forging and rod shop of VSMPO. 1983

The world's largest titanium ingot weighing 15 tons was smelted at VSMOS in February 1976.

One of the largest stampings manufactured at VSMPO in the 1980s. Its surface area is 3.5 square meters. m

Participants in the smelting of a titanium ingot obtained by the scull smelting method

Presentation of the Order of the October Revolution to VSMPO. 1983

1989 - 2004. Post-perestroika period

Since January 1989, the enterprise began to operate under economic accounting conditions.

On the basis of existing workshops, factories were created: melting and foundry, sheet rolling, forging, iron foundry, consumer goods, construction, mechanical repair, energy repair. The work of the iron foundry in 1988-1989 became a model for others: deliveries under contracts were fully fulfilled, costs were significantly reduced, and wages increased. On December 1, 1989, a property lease agreement was concluded between ChLZ and VSMPO, ChLZ became a rental enterprise.

The time for change is coming; due to conversion (reduction of defense orders), by May 1989 VSMPO had lost orders worth 20 million rubles. But the desire to gain independence in matters of production and in the distribution of profits was stronger than caution. On January 1, 1990, the enterprise officially became a rental enterprise. On June 3-4, 1991, the association held elections for a general director, N.F. became the director. Kalmykov.

Today it is difficult to imagine all the difficulties of that period: deliveries under government orders were stopped; production volumes continue to decline; prices for raw materials increase; republics secede from the USSR, creating sovereign states with their own borders and national currencies; pre-payment for the execution of any orders is becoming the norm... Difficulties lead to a reduction in sales volumes, which means a shortage of funds and delays in wages.

On July 1, 1992, a new general director, Vladislav Valentinovich Tetyukhin, took up his duties.

Shops began to produce only what could be paid for by customers. The company saved raw materials and energy. VSMPO products (titanium, ferrotitanium, stainless steel) were more expensive on the foreign market. It was there that it was decided to maximize sales. In the early 90s, VSMPO experienced fierce competition from American and Japanese manufacturers. We had to improve production. In 1993-1994, the first certificates of the world's leading aircraft and engine manufacturing companies were received. Contracts were concluded with Boeing, Airbus, Embraer, Bombardier, Aerospatiale, Snecma, General Electric.

In 1995, more than 4,700 tons of titanium were exported. In 1996, the first large batch of stampings was sent abroad. In 2003, the largest stamping in the world was made: the landing gear beam of the Airbus A-380 weighing almost 3.5 tons!

Since 1998, VSMPO and AVISMA (the only titanium sponge manufacturer in Russia) have formed a production and technological group.

Time has shown that the company not only survived this extremely difficult period for the entire country, but also became one of the influential figures in the global titanium market.

The first meeting of representatives of VSMPO and Boeing. Seattle. March, 1993

The first bar for Pratt&Whitney

Signing of a strategic partnership agreement between VSMPO and Boeing. 1998

R. S. Dear owners and shareholders, representatives of company press services, marketing departments and other interested parties, if your company has something to show - “How it’s done and why it’s done this way!”, we are always happy to take part. Feel free to write to us yourself[email protected] and tell us about yourself by inviting us to visit YOU. Take an example from the leaders!

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Requisites

Resolution No. 158/ss STO USSR “On the aviation industry”

Top secret.

It must be stated that government decrees of March 5, 1930, September 5, 1930 and January 11, 1931 regarding the development of the aviation industry are clearly being implemented unsatisfactorily. In the special quarter of 1930 and the first half of 1931, plans for both construction and production were actually disrupted. The reconstruction of old plants and the planning and deployment of new plants are in a completely unsatisfactory state.

To state that the aviation industry, transferred for the purpose of its improvement in July 1930 to the jurisdiction of the NKVM, where it remained until March 1931, in fact did not achieve any improvement, but on the contrary, went down, which created the need for its reverse transfer under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Council.

In furtherance of these government resolutions, the Labor and Defense Council decides:

I. For pilot construction

1. To propose to the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR and the RVS to pay special attention to experimental aircraft construction and to provide all the necessary conditions for the deployment of experimental organizations to a size that fully ensures the accepted pace and scale of aviation development.

2. Organize the work of experienced organizations based on the concentration of scientific and design forces, attraction and use of foreign technical assistance, careful study of the best models of aircraft and engines so that the problem of “catch up and overtake” is resolved within the next 2-3 years and prototypes are created aircraft and engines, weapons and equipment (machine guns, cannons, sights, photos, radios), superior to the best examples of foreign technology.

3. Make it the responsibility of experienced organizations to carry out a detailed and thorough development of all technological issues related to the implementation and launch of prototypes into series, and the rationalization of mass production. Institutes must be the leading force in the technical reconstruction of the aviation industry.

In the field of organizing production, suggest that VAO set itself the main task of transitioning to mechanized production as soon as possible, using stamping, welding and other methods of mass production of parts and their assembly.

4. Oblige VAO, resolutely suppressing the attempts of individual comrades to turn pilot production into an end in itself, to take the main goal of the speedy introduction into mass production of built and tested aircraft and engine models as its primary task (within a period of no more than 6-8 months).

5. Oblige TsAGI and IAM¹* to focus on developing issues of technology of materials used in aircraft construction, for which purpose to create powerful technological departments within them.

6. To propose to VAO to design and produce heavy and super-heavy aircraft made of metal with the greatest possible use of steel and a decrease in aluminum, and light aircraft - predominantly of a mixed design (steel, wood, canvas).

7. Suggest to VAO to speed up work on the creation of heavy fuel diesel engines, with the widespread involvement of foreign technical assistance and the study of foreign samples.

Propose to VAO to build by November 1, according to the existing drawings, 5 heavy fuel diesel engines with a capacity of 230 HP. Along with this, pay special attention to solving the problem of stopping the motor at a distance.

8. Oblige the head of the Higher Administrative District to speed up the construction of prototypes of low-power aircraft and engines and, already in 1932, begin mass production at existing factories.

9. Oblige IAM to widely develop practical experimental work on electronic casting of crankcases and other engine components and to produce two experimental M-34 electronic crankcases no later than October 1, 1931, taking full advantage of the experience of the German company BMW and the experience of the Italian company Isota Fraschini."

10. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, represented by the trusts “Teplobeton”, “Gossantekhstroy”, Moskomgaz, VEO, etc., under the responsibility of the chairmen of these trusts and associations, to completely complete capital construction and equipment of experimental organizations within the stipulated time frame.

11. Oblige the NKVT to deliver to the Union the equipment ordered for IAM according to requests from 1929/30 and the special quarter no later than October 1, 1931.

12. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR to fully provide orders from research institutes for equipping laboratories and the IAM plant with transport devices, cranes, compressor units and other Soviet-made products no later than November 1, 1931.

13. Oblige the head of the VAO, Soyuzstankoinstrument, Orgmetal and the associations of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, under the responsibility of the chairmen of these associations, to satisfy requests for tools, materials and equipment for urgent experimental work on the pilot construction of the VAO, UVVS, VOGVF out of any queue, and the Izhevsky, Motovilikha and Elektrostal will supply forgings for experimental motors within a period not exceeding two months from the moment they receive the drawings.

14. Allocate an additional contingent of 250 thousand rubles for the Supreme Economic Council. for the purchase of special machines and laboratory equipment to create a powerful technological department at the IAM. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR and the NKVT to purchase and deliver equipment for this amount to the Union no later than December 1, 1931.

15. Open VSNKh for IAM with an additional free contingent of 50 thousand rubles. for urgent purchases abroad of individual materials, equipment, units for experimental laboratories and experimental engine building.

16. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR and the NKVT to immediately begin negotiations on the purchase abroad of three experimental, most advanced and powerful samples of gasoline and 4 samples of oil engines to study their designs at the IAM and, within a month and a half, report to the STO about the additional supply of foreign currency required. To invite, by October 1, 1931, 2 design groups, each of 5 people, and, in addition, 10 engineers, craftsmen and technicians for the IAM pilot plant.

17. Oblige the head of the VAO, no later than August 1, 1931, to send engineers from IAM to Italy to the Isota Fraschini plant (including one for electronic casting) for the entire period of acceptance of the ASSO motors we ordered for a detailed study of the experience of this company, especially in electronic casting, and in addition, in August and September, another 8 engineers and 4 craftsmen were sent to factories in Europe and America to carry out target tasks related to the plan for the pilot construction of aircraft engines.

18. Oblige the NKVM, VOGVF and VAO within a month to develop and submit for approval to the Council of Labor and Defense a plan for the pilot construction of aircraft and engines, bearing in mind the introduction of strict specialization of engines by plant, and the types of engines should be common to the Air Force and civil aviation.

II. For foreign technical assistance

To ensure the implementation of the planned plan for aviation construction and liberation from foreign dependence on technical supplies, starting from 1933 (excluding aluminum), it is considered necessary to attract foreign technical assistance, for which we oblige VAO to enter into agreements with foreign American and European companies for the following objects with submission for government approval .

A. For instrumental services

For technical assistance in setting up the production of all types of tools for the entire aviation industry with relevant foreign companies (Germany, Italy, England).

B. On split wings

Purchase from the English company “X. Page" licenses split wings.

B. Through chrome-molybdenum pipes

To provide technical assistance in setting up the production of chrome-molybdenum pipes with one of the foreign companies (England, Sweden).

D. By piston rings

To provide technical assistance for setting up the production of piston rings for aircraft engines with one of the foreign companies (Italy, Germany, America, etc.).

D. For aluminum foundry and finishing production

With the American company "American Aluminum Company" to provide technical assistance in casting, forging, stamping and heat treating of non-ferrous light and ultra-light alloys, as well as in impeller casting, forging and stamping of metal screws. When concluding an agreement, provide for the provision of technical assistance both in the design, construction and selection of foundry equipment, as well as in the development of technological processes, selection of molding soils, specifications of materials, etc.

If the agreement with the American Aluminum Company does not take place, an agreement should be concluded with the Curtis Wright company or with the Bon Aluminum Company or with one of the European companies (Italy, Germany).

E. For the manufacture of special products and parts

With the American company Veidix to start production of Stromberg type carburetors, Eclipse self-starters, electromechanical and electroinertial type and brake wheels.

G. For machining and manufacturing of screws

With the American company "Hamilton" for technical assistance for machining and manufacturing of screws from forgings (steel for bushings and aluminum for blades).

3.Valve production

With the American company Thomson for technical assistance and production of valves for aircraft engines.

I. For the production of bearings

With the American company “Adlison” for technical assistance and production of bearings²*.

K. On motor engineering

1. With the American company Curtis Wright to provide technical assistance in the design, construction and equipment of two engine plants, one for 10 thousand powerful water-cooled motors of the Curtis Converter type and the other for 10 thousand low-power air-cooled motors of the Wright type -6" 166 l. With. and its modifications and 5 thousand powerful air-cooled motors of the Wright-Cyclone type.

2. Purchase a license for the above-mentioned Curtis Conqueror and Wright engines in all types.

When concluding contracts, take into account the need to provide not only technical assistance for existing samples and manufacturing methods, but also for the development of samples and methods. At the same time, when concluding contracts, do not link the receipt of technical assistance and the acquisition of licenses with the purchase of equipment from these forms, focusing primarily on domestic mechanical engineering.

The acquisition of technical assistance must be associated with the maximum strengthening of the position of our own experimental construction. In particular, it is necessary to obtain from the companies with which contracts will be concluded the right to use experience and knowledge in the field of research laboratories, study methods, purchase special equipment and installations and attract workers from these laboratories to manage certain topics in our laboratories.

Considering it necessary to maximize savings in spending currency, instruct a commission consisting of Comrade Pavlunovsky, Rosengoltz (with the right to replace it at his direction), Baranov, Kaganovich, Alksnis, Goltsman, Guy and Goryanov to review all requirements for currency, equipment and technical assistance, with research all possibilities to be based on production and technology within the USSR. The convening of the commission is up to Comrade Pavlunovsky. If the commission unanimously decides to begin concluding contracts. The term of the commission is one month.

Urgent agreements should be reviewed and submitted within ten days. Authorize the immediate conclusion of agreements with American firms for technical assistance in aluminum casting, forging and stamping up to a currency amount of $1 million.

III. According to the implementation of the construction plan and program of 1931

1. Approve the aircraft industry production program in 1931 for aircraft: R-5 - 680, TB-1 - 146, R-6 - 50, fighters - 376, TB-3 - 3, U-2 (training) - 809, S-62 bis (“Savoy”) - 30, TS-7 (assault) - 10, ANT-9 - 114, K-5 - 205, U-1 - 105, R-1 - 302, AP-2 - 55 , P‑1 - 15, [total] - 2900, including Air Force - 2024; by engines: M‑17 - 900, M‑22 - 281, M‑11 - 971, M‑15 - 430, M‑27 - 150, M‑26 - 410, M‑19 - 10, M‑34 - 8 , YuUN - 10, [total] - 3170, including Air Force - 2090.

3. In order to timely provide the VAO plants with equipment for the implementation of the big program of 1932: a) Comrade Pavlunovsky’s commission to consider and report to the STO within ten days the issue of increasing the import contingent of the Supreme Economic Council in 1931 by 6.5 million rubles. for the purchase of equipment for Aviaprom factories; b) oblige the NKVT to place, in the shortest possible time, all orders for equipment for the aircraft industry according to all 1931 appropriations; c) oblige the Supreme Economic Council to completely place all the equipment required for the aviation industry in 1931 at the factories of the Union.

4. To ensure the 1931 program, take the following measures: a) oblige VAO to send abroad the required number of workers to learn the experience of foreign companies, and first of all: at plant No. 24 - 8 engineers, 8 foremen, 8 workers; for plant No. 26 - 6 engineers, 4 foremen to Germany to the BMW plant in accordance with the current agreement for technical assistance and license; for plant No. 29 - to France to the Gnome and Ron plant 10 engineers and 10 craftsmen in accordance with the existing contract for technical assistance and license; b) oblige VAO to recruit 45 engineers and 200 foremen and workers abroad; c) oblige the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR to ensure supply to plant No. 26 in July. 200 tons of fireclay and in the future, starting from August this year. g., 50 tons per month.

5. The reconstruction of old factories and new construction should be based on strict technical specialization, the introduction of the latest advanced processing methods, as well as the attraction and use of foreign technical assistance.

6. In terms of development of the aviation industry, provide for mass production of low-power aircraft and engines.

7. To propose to the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR to carry out constant and systematic management and control over the deployment of capital construction of the aviation industry and to provide the latter with everything necessary to fulfill the plan within the strictly specified time frame.

8. Create a powerful design department under the Capital Construction Department of the Eastern Administrative District.

9. Oblige the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council to allocate special construction offices locally for the construction of the Higher Administrative Okrug.

10. Attribute capital construction of the aviation industry to the group of shock constructions under the special supervision of the Supreme Economic Council.

11. Oblige Comrade Ivanov’s Soyuzstroy to ensure that projects and drawings for the construction work of the Eastern Administrative District are completed on time.

13. In view of the attraction of a large number of specialists, including foreign ones, to oblige the Moscow Council no later than January 1, 1932 to provide the VAO with 75 apartments and the VogVF with 25 apartments.

For plant No. 39. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council and the NKVM to produce 20 aircraft (interceptors) and 6 heavy bomb carriers TB-5 during 1931.

V. By personnel

1. Rapid growth of the aviation industry during the period 1931-1934. will require special attention to personnel training issues. The available quantities of qualified labor, engineering and technical personnel and the existing network of educational institutions of the Aviation Association do not ensure the implementation of the aviation industry development plan.

2. To propose to the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR to strengthen the apparatus of the Higher Administrative Okrug and the management of aircraft industry plants.

3. The HR department of the Supreme Economic Council and the head of the Higher Administrative Okrug should pay special attention to the selection of directors of aviation industry enterprises.

4. Oblige the Eastern Administrative District to provide funds for improving cultural, social and housing conditions in the target figures for 1932.

5. Oblige NKSnab, together with VAO, to outline specific measures within two decades to radically improve the supply of aviation industry workers and submit them for approval by the Council of People's Commissars.

6. To provide the 1931 production program with a qualified workforce, propose to VAO: a) from among the students 17 thousand people. workers to ensure the production of at least 6 thousand people this year. In addition, immediately expand the training of semi-skilled workers to graduate at least 4 thousand people this year, including 1 thousand people. without interruption from production; b) transfer from the Moscow aircraft factories the required number of qualified workers (copper workers, turners and milling operators) to plant No. 39 to ensure the completion of a special task within the established time limit.

7. Within a month, transfer qualified workers (4-7 categories) from other industries: a) for plant No. 26 - oblige Comrade Kolotilov to transfer at least 800 people. The Supreme Economic Council of the USSR will transfer the former plant to the jurisdiction of plant No. 26 in Rybinsk. "Metalist" named after. Berries with all equipment and personnel; b) for plant No. 29 - oblige Comrade Kosiora S. transfer at least 250 people, and also transfer the Zaporozhye Mechanical Plant (formerly Katsena), which is being mothballed, to the jurisdiction of plant No. 29 for personnel training; c) for plant No. 24 - oblige Comrade Ryndin to transfer 200 people.

8. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR to allocate, first of all, 630 machine tools for the Higher Administrative Okrug from the funds of machine tools intended for FZU schools.

9. Oblige the Eastern Administrative Okrug this year to develop additional workforce training for newly built factories in the amount of 16 thousand people, including 9.5 thousand people at the CIT bases at newly built factories.

Secretary of the Labor and Defense Council I. Miroshnikov

Notes:

1 * Institute of Aviation Engines (IAM) created by the decision of the Revolutionary Military Council on December 3, 1930. By order of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR on July 29, 1932, it was renamed the Central Institute of Aviation Engine Engineering (CIAM). He was engaged in the design and development of samples of aircraft engines and their units.

2 * Conclude an agreement with the Addison company in the event that an agreement is not concluded with the Bon Aluminum Company for the provision of technical assistance and production of aluminum castings and bearings ( Note doc.).

3 * In the certificate of NK RKI about implementation of the STO resolutionUSSR dated July 25, 1931, it was indicated that as of December 1, 1931, the following had been done: I. Regarding experimental construction: paragraphs 1, 11, 12 and 17 were not completed; paragraphs 14 and 18 were partially implemented; paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 are completed late. Point 2: achievements at the Institute of Aviation Engines were noted - work on the M‑34 engine was successfully completed, satisfactory results were noted in the field of research and application of new aircraft alloys. The clause on attracting foreign assistance is being implemented unsatisfactorily. Point 3: engine building - “a special serial production department has been created at IAM, regulations on its work and the procedure for introducing prototypes into series have been developed,” the study of the Giprospetsmet methodology for designing technological processes and equipment for serial production plants has begun. Aircraft manufacturing, a special department at TsAGI for the introduction of prototypes into mass production, is not working at the proper pace due to the lack of sufficiently qualified engineers. Point 4: IAM distributed its experimental motors to serial production plants, taking into account their production capabilities and experience. However, there is no complete linkage for aircraft: the ANT-14, produced in 1930, has not been fully tested up to this point and has not been included in serial production in 1932. Point 5: the process of creating a technological department has been intensified at IAM; TsAGI has carried out extensive work on chrome-molybdenum pipes. Point 6: TSh and TB-4 aircraft of steel construction were designed; In 1932, heavy aircraft TB-3, TB-1, ANT-9 were included in mass production. Point 7: IAM has created an oil department, where experiments are being carried out with single-cylinder units, and work has begun on the design of diesel engines. However, regarding the attraction of foreign technical assistance for the construction of 5 diesel engines and the issues of stopping the engine in the air, the resolution has not been implemented. Point 8: tests have been successfully carried out and serial production of the 65 HP motor has begun. TsAGI designed and will build 2 low-power aircraft in 1932, but mass production of low-power aircraft is not on the agenda. Point 9 has been completed completely. Point 10: capital construction of experienced organizations is proceeding unsatisfactorily; The Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council did not give special instructions and did not monitor the implementation of this decision by trusts and associations. II. Regarding foreign technical assistance: VAO has developed a plan for implementing the resolution to attract foreign technical assistance and provided an estimate. However, the foreign department of the Supreme Economic Council did not arrange business trips and did not transfer the necessary funds. All items in this section have not been completed. III. Regarding the implementation of the construction plan and program of 1931: only points 4 “c”, 5, 8, 11 and 12 have been completed. V. Regarding personnel: points 6 “b”, 7 “c”, 8, 11‑14 have not been completed. 17, 18. Sections VI-VIII have been completed in full. (GA RF. F. R-8418. Op. 5. D. 163. L. 123-136).

GA RF. F. R-8418. Op. 5. D. 62. L. 3-16. Certified copy.